Academic literature on the topic 'Governor's Council on Criminal Justice'
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Journal articles on the topic "Governor's Council on Criminal Justice"
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Hrp, Maulana Muslim, Madiasa Ablisar, Marlina, and Edy Ikhsan. "PENERAPAN DIVERSI TERHADAP ANAK YANG BERKONFLIK DENGAN HUKUM MENURUT QANUN ACEH NOMOR 9 TAHUN 2008 TENTANG PEMBINAAN KEHIDUPAN ADAT DAN ADAT ISTIADAT DAN UNDANG-UNDANG NOMOR 11 TAHUN 2012 TENTANG SISTEM PERADILAN PIDANA ANAK." Jurnal Hukum Samudra Keadilan 16, no. 1 (June 21, 2021): 123–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.33059/jhsk.v16i1.3388.
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The background is by two law applications that apply in Aceh, the first law that generally applies in Indonesia and the second one that applies specifically in Aceh, the Law Number 11 of 2012 concerning the System Juvenile Criminal Court is a way out for better handling of children conflict with the law. The law regulates diversion where there are two important things that have a special place in the SPPA Law, namely restorative justice and diversion.
The results showed that the resolution of the problem of children conflict with the law in Aceh consists of two legal applications, starting with the mediation process according to Aceh Qanun Number 9 of 2008 concerning fostering customary life and customs Development with the aim that these problems can be resolved amicably according to the Decree Joint between the Governor of Aceh and the Aceh Regional Police and the Aceh Traditional Council No 189/677/2011 dated 20 December 2011 concerning the Implementation of the Gampong and Mukim Adat Courts, but if during the mediation process no agreement is found then proceed to the legal process according to the Law Number 11 of 2012 concerning the Criminal Justice System for Children.
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Cullen, Miriam. "Questioning the Criminal Justice Imperative." Global Governance 25, no. 2 (June 10, 2019): 327–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02502003.
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Abstract The Security Council’s structure as a small but powerful executive, combined with its primary responsibility for international peace and security, leads to a presumption against the application of ordinary standards of procedural fairness. At the same time, explicit provisions of the UN Charter and its own rules of procedure indicate that some balance was to be struck. This article questions whether the attainment of international criminal jurisdiction through Security Council decision-making really outweighs the need to ensure procedural integrity in every step of the process. It posits that a lack of procedural fairness in the Council’s methods of work at least undermines the justice imperative that the Council so espouses and at most violates an ancillary legal obligation.
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CRYER, ROBERT. "Sudan, Resolution 1593, and International Criminal Justice." Leiden Journal of International Law 19, no. 1 (March 2006): 195–222. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156505003237.
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The UN Security Council has recently referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the International Criminal Court. This has been hailed as a breakthrough in international criminal justice. However, aspects of the referral resolution can be criticized from the point of view of their consistency with both the Rome Statute and the UN Charter. The limitations of the referral with respect to whom the Court may investigate also raise issues with respect to the rule of law. In addition, Sudan has accused the Security Council of acting in a neo-colonial fashion by referring the situation in Darfur to the Court. This article investigates these criticisms against the background of the international system in which international criminal law operates, and concludes that although the referral cannot be considered neo-colonial in nature, the referral can be criticized as selective and as an incomplete reaction to the crisis in Darfur. The referral remains, however, a positive step.
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Solomon, Solon. "Broadening International Criminal Jurisdiction?" International Human Rights Law Review 4, no. 1 (June 11, 2015): 53–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22131035-00401006.
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The interests of justice are embedded in Article 53 (1) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute). They give the Prosecutor the right to decline to initiate an investigation or suspend a prosecution. In these cases, the interests of justice act as a basis for the Prosecutor to refrain from any action. This article argues that due to their non-positivist character, the interests of justice could serve as the platform also of prosecutorial action, acting as the legal vehicle for a broad interpretation of the Rome Statute in the name of justice. Nevertheless, such broad, interests of justice-instigated interpretation, cannot but have positivism as its outmost limit. The Rome Statute is an international criminal law instrument and international criminal law is governed by the legality principle, which narrows any hermeneutical endeavors. Along these lines, this article examines the nexus between the expansive interpretational interests of justice function and its limits by referring to cases where the International Criminal Court (icc) was called to endorse or not a broad interpretation of notions included in the Rome Statute. The article examines cases arising from situations referred to the icc by States and by the un Security Council.
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Olugbuo, Benson Chinedu. "The African Union, the United Nations Security Council and the Politicisation of International Justice in Africa." African Journal of Legal Studies 7, no. 3 (September 12, 2014): 351–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17087384-12342051.
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There are two questions with multiple answers regarding the relationship between Africa and the International Criminal Court. The first is whether the International Criminal Court is targeting Africa and the second is if politics plays any role in the decision to investigate and prosecute crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. For the African Union, the International Criminal Court has become a western court targeting weak African countries and ignoring the atrocities committed by big powers including permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The accusation by the African Union against the International Criminal Court leads to the argument that the International Criminal Court is currently politised. This is a charge consistently denied by the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. The aim of this paper is to discuss the relationship between the United Nations Security Council, the International Criminal Court and the African Union. It articulates the role of the three institutions in the fight against impunity and the maintenance of international peace and security with reference to the African continent. The paper argues that complementarity should be applied to regional organisations and that the relationship between the African Union and the International Criminal Court should be guided by the application of positive complementarity and a nuanced approach to the interests of justice. This offers the International Criminal Court and the African Union an opportunity to develop mutual trust and result-oriented strategies to confront the impunity on the continent. The paper further argues that the power of the United Nations Security Council to refer situations to the International Criminal Court and defer cases before the Court is a primary source of the disagreement between the prosecutor and the African Union and recommends a division of labour between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations Security Council.
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Gelb, Adam. "Research Illustrates Role of New Council on Criminal Justice as Center of Gravity for the Field." Federal Sentencing Reporter 32, no. 3 (February 1, 2020): 145–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/fsr.2020.32.3.145.
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Launched in 2019, the nonpartisan Council on Criminal Justice (CCJ) is an invitational membership organization and think tank that serves as a center of gravity and incubator of policy and leadership for the criminal justice field. Its mission is to advance understanding of the criminal justice policy choices facing the nation and build consensus for solutions that enhance safety and justice for all. CCJ’s emergence reflects broad agreement across the ideological spectrum that the nation’s justice system is deeply flawed and requires equally deep reform. A quarter-century ago, crime was one of the most divisive issues in politics; today, people in Washington and in capitals of red and blue states alike are uniting behind solutions based on facts and evidence. That consensus and commitment to data-driven policymaking is the lifeblood of the Council, and it is embodied by the accomplished and diverse group of leaders and innovators who comprise its members, Directors and Trustees. Through research, task forces, convenings, and special projects, CCJ accelerates momentum for criminal justice reform and drives smart policymaking by generating achievable solutions that are factual, not just fashionable. The Council’s first projects include an ongoing series of papers analyzing the legacy and lessons of the 1994 Crime Bill, which was and remains the most far-reaching and controversial criminal justice legislation in the nation’s history. Also in its first year, CCJ produced a report documenting recent, surprising trends in racial disparities across correctional populations, marking a significant advance in the data and analysis surrounding this critical issue.
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Abdo, Muradu. "Comment: Ethiopia’s Ongoing Criminal Justice Reform: Modus Operandi, Methodology and Observations." Mizan Law Review 14, no. 2 (December 31, 2020): 341–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/mlr.v14i2.6.
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This Comment relates to activities undertaken by the Criminal Justice Working Group (WG) under the auspices of the Legal and Justice Affairs Advisory Council (AC). It covers the period between 17 August 2018 and December 2020. The Comment highlights factors calling for reform of Ethiopia`s criminal justice, institutional arrangement for the ongoing legal and justice reform in Ethiopia and three principal tasks carried out by the WG. It also briefly forwards issues of concern and expression of gratitude.
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Orentlicher, Diane. "Building Victim-Led Coalitions to Press for Justice Following Mass Atrocity." Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting 112 (2018): 23–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/amp.2018.7.
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Assurances of victim participation in proceedings before the International Criminal Court and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia have been seen as a welcome corrective to the flawed model of earlier tribunals. The first such tribunal created since the postwar period, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), was established by the UN Security Council in May 1993 without even consulting those who survived the atrocities that gave rise to its creation, the majority of which took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nor were victims formally incorporated into the ICTY's work except for those who provided testimony and other evidence. (The same holds true for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established by the UN Security Council in 1994; in the interests of brevity, my remarks will focus on the ICTY.)
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Fiselier, Jan, and Paul C. Vegter. "The Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles." European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 12, no. 2 (November 21, 2006): 93–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10610-006-9017-0.
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Stevanovic, Ivana. "Steps towards improving the system of records, collection and monitoring of data relevant to statistics within the system of juvenile justice in the Republic of Serbia." Temida 15, no. 3 (2012): 49–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/tem1203049s.
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The paper emphasises the importance of ?good statistics of juvenile justice? as one of the basis for a clearer overview of the juvenile crime situation, in order to create unique policies at local and national levels for the suppression and prevention of this phenomenon, and to create appropriate areas for action in terms of improving the system reform. The author particularly gives a review of the ?Global Indicators in Juvenile Justice? which present the basic set of data and comparative tool that provides a basis for the assessment and evaluation of services and policies in the field of juvenile justice, and highlights the importance of compatibility of ?national indicators? with them. Particular attention in the paper has been devoted to the overview and analysis of the necessary measures to improve this field, that were prepared and delivered to the relevant ministries and institutions by the Council for Monitoring and Promoting the work of Bodies Engaged in Criminal Proceeding and Enforcement of Juvenile Criminal Sanctions Involving Juveniles - Juvenile Justice Council (hereinafter: the Council). It was pointed, first of all, at the suggestions made by the Council to the Ministry of Justice with the aim to improve the Program for automated record keeping, at the necessary changes of the Court rules, and certain amendments to Forms SK- 3 and SK- 4 of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia were presented.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Governor's Council on Criminal Justice"
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Lugulu, Jullie Ingrid. "A critical examination of the relationship between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations Security Council, in the light of referrals and deferrals." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/12858.
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Includes bibliographical references.The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) provides for a close relationship between the International Criminal Court (Court) and the United Nations Security Council (Security Council). This relationship is demonstrated through Security Council exercise of referrals and deferrals. This dissertation discusses first, the Security Council referrals of the situations in Darfur, Sudan and Libya. Second, the Security Council passing of resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003), which deferred the Court from commencing any investigations or prosecuting of any crimes that could have arisen as a result of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. This dissertation argues that the Security Council has exercised referrals and deferrals contrary to the Rome Statute, the Charter of the United Nations (the Charter), and the Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the Court and the Security Council (Relationship Agreement) as envisaged by the drafters of the Rome Statute. It concludes by stating that, the relationship between the Court and the Security Council is at a crossroad because the latter has failed to exercise referrals and deferrals in the manner provided for in the Rome Statute and as envisioned during the drafting of the Rome Statute, thereby equating the Court to the proverbial bark of a toothless dog.
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Boge, Y. A. "A constructive relationship in peace, security and justice. The United Nations Security Council and the International Criminal Court." Thesis, Queen's University Belfast, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.517105.
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Allafi, Mousa. "La cour pénale internationale et le conseil de sécurité : justice versus maintien de l'ordre." Thesis, Tours, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013TOUR1002/document.
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Le système de la Cour pénale internationale (CPI), dont la mission est d’assurer la justice internationale, repose sur un lien étroit avec le Conseil de sécurité. Il convient donc de s’interroger sur le rôle du Conseil dans le fonctionnement de la justice pénale internationale. Cette question est fondamentale, car l'intervention d'un organe politique dans l’activité d’un organe judiciaire remet en cause les missions de chacune de ces institutions. L’intrusion du Conseil dans l’activité de la CPI, basée sur sa mission de maintien de la paix, est en fait établie au nom d’un ordre international voulu par le Conseil lui-même. Ce rôle affecte le fonctionnement, l’indépendance et même l’impartialité de la Cour. Les pouvoirs que le Statut de Rome confère au Conseil, lui permettent en effet de saisir la CPI, d’imposer aux Etats de coopérer avec la Cour, de suspendre son activité ou encore de qualifier un acte, de crime d’agression. Cependant, les rapports entre le Conseil et la CPI ne devraient pas être subordonnés, mais entretenus dans le respect mutuel, ainsi une véritable crainte existe concernant le respect du Conseil envers le Statut de Rome. L’étude met en évidence le conflit entre justice et politique et révèle les enjeux actuels en termes de justice pénale internationaleThe international criminal Court system (ICC) whose mission is to ensure international justice, is based on a close relationship with the security Council. So it is proper to wonder about the Council’s role in the functioning of international criminal justice. Such a questionning is fundamental, for the intervention of a political body into the functioning of a judicial body calls into question the missions of both institutions. The Council’s interference in the activity of the ICC, based on its mission of maintaining international peace, is actually carried out on behalf of an international order intended by the Council itself. This role affects the functioning, the independence and even the impartiality of the ICC. The powers the Rome Statute gives to the Council allow it to refer to the ICC, to impose for the States to cooperate with the Court, to suspend its activity or also to qualify an act as a crime of aggression. However the relations between the Council and the ICC should not be subordinated, but maintained in mutual respect. Thus there is a real concern regarding the observance of the Rome Statute by the Council. The study highlights the conflict between justice and politics and reveals the current issues in terms of international criminal justice
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Hassan, Kamal. "Le statut des tribunaux ad hoc en droit international pénal." Thesis, Tours, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015TOUR1005/document.
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Cette thèse a pour objet d’examiner les tribunaux ad hoc en analysant leur définition en droit international public, leurs principes juridiques fondateurs, leur compétence face aux crimes internationaux et leurs objectifs pour déterminer s’il existe un statut international commun pour ces tribunaux. La mise en œuvre des premiers tribunaux ad hoc sur la scène internationale après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les TMI de Nuremberg et de Tokyo, était due à l’incapacité ou à l’absence de volonté du système judiciaire interne des pays intéressés pour traduire en justice les auteurs des crimes de guerre. Par la suite, neuf tribunaux ad hoc ont été créés (soit unilatéralement par le Conseil de sécurité, soit par un accord international) en vue de juger les crimes internationaux les plus monstrueux, tels que les crimes de génocide, les crimes contre l’humanité et les crimes de guerre. Nous pouvons dire à cet égard que les tribunaux ad hoc bénéficient de tous les mécanismes nécessaires pour être efficaces, comme la responsabilité pénale individuelle, la primauté sur les juridictions nationales et l'obligation des Etats de coopérer, et ils ont réussi à satisfaire l'objectif de justice. Toutefois, ces tribunaux s'étaient vu attribuer, outre leur fonction naturelle d'assurer la justice, un objectif supplémentaire, à savoir la réalisation de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, objectif qu'ils n'ont pu réaliser, car un organe juridique ne peut pas atteindre un objectif dont les motifs sont politiques. Après avoir étudié le statut des tribunaux ad hoc, et nécessairement avoir analysé tous les textes qui organisent la fonction de ces Tribunaux, nous sommes à même de confirmer que les tribunaux ad hoc ne seront pas remplacés par d'autres types d'organes de justice, tels que la justice transitionnelle et la compétence universelle. En outre, malgré l'entrée en fonction de la CPI en 2002, en tant que Cour permanente, nous assisterons à de nouvelles créations de tribunaux ad hoc, dont les statuts pourront s'inspirer du statut commun et de nos propositions personnellesThe purpose of this thesis is to examine the ad hoc tribunals by analysing their definition in international public law, their founding legal principles, their jurisdiction over international crimes and their goals to determine wether there is a common international status for these tribunals.The implementation of the first ad hoc tribunals on the international stage after World War II, the IMT of Nuremberg and Tokyo, was due to the inability or unwillingness of the internal judicial system in the countries concerned to bring the perpetrators of war crimes to justice.Subsequently, nine ad hoc tribunals were established (either unilaterally by the Security Council or through an international agreement) with a view to prosecute the most monstrous crimes, such as crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. In this respect, we can say that the ad hoc tribunals benefit from all the mechanisms required to be efficient, such as individual criminal responsibility, primacy over nation courts and the obligation of States to cooperate,and they have succeeded to achieve the purpose of justice.However, in addition to their natural function to ensure justice, these tribunals had been given a further aim : to achieve international peace and security. They were not able to achieve this aim, because a legal body cannot reach a goal whose motives are political.After studying the status of the ad hoc tribunals and thus necessarily analysing all the texts which organise the function of these tribunals, we are in a position to confirm that the ad hoc tribunals will not be replaced by other judicial bodies, such as transitional justice or universal jurisdiction.Moreover, despite the entry into force of the ICC as a permanent court in 2002, new ad hoc tribunals will be established. Their status could be based on the common status and on our proposals
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El, Baroudy Jinane. "La sanction du crime international d’agression : perspectives de droit international et de droit comparé." Thesis, Strasbourg, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013STRAA015.
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L'absence de définition du crime international d’agression, qualifié pourtant comme la mère de tous les crimes internationaux, par la Cour pénale internationale ainsi que l'incapacité du Conseil de sécurité de qualifier et de sanctionner de telles violations afin d’établir la justice et la paix internationales, participent au fait que l’agression, au travers du recours à la force armée, reste malheureusement de nos jours une vieille tradition aussi fréquente que dangereuse. Au-delà de la difficulté conceptuelle, il existe une autre difficulté difficilement surmontable sur les scènes nationale et internationale, à savoir la question de la répression de ces guerres. L’absence d’identification des auteurs et la non reconnaissance des victimes conduisent à une totale impunité, source de répétition de cette violation, par les grandes puissances. Afin de savoir s’il est réaliste et opportun de poursuivre les auteurs de ce crime en tant qu’acte de l’État sans cependant oublier principalement la dimension individuelle de l'acte, l'objet de cette recherche a été de déterminer tous les recours possibles tant par la voie judiciaire que par la voie politique (l’ONU, les organisations régionales, les parlements nationaux, l’opinion publique). Concernant la voie judiciaire, il s'est agi d'analyser tant la répression par le juge interne (dans les systèmes français, allemand, américain et anglais) que par le juge international devant la Cour pénale International et les autres tribunaux internationaux.Cette thèse s’efforce de faire une présentation de toutes les possibilités réelles d’engager la responsabilité pour crime international d'agression, aussi bien en ce qui concerne l’agression en tant que faute politique majeure que comme crime, l’étude de ces deux aspects étant dressée par une analyse des obstacles rencontrés par l’application du droit international et national dans le contexte du crime d’agressionThe lack of definition of the international crime of aggression, described as the mother of all international crimes, by the International Criminal Court, and the inability of the Security Council to qualify and punish such violations to establish justice and peace, participate that the aggression, through the use of armed force, remains unfortunately nowadays a tradition as often as dangerous. Beyond the conceptual difficulty, there is another problem that is as difficult to overcome in the national and international scenes, namely identifying the way to repress these wars. The lack of identification of the authors of these wars and the non-recognition of the victims lead to lack of punishment which is the main source of repetition of the violations by the great powers.In order to know whether it is realistic and appropriate to prosecute this crime as an act of the State, without forgetting the individual dimension of the act, the purpose of this research was to identify all remedies whether through the courts or by political means (the UN, regional organizations, national parliaments, public opinion). Concerning judicial matters, this research analyzes internal repression by the judge (in the French, German, American and English systems) and by the international judge to the International Criminal Court and other international tribunals. This thesis aims to present all real possibilities of engagement and liabilities for international crimes of aggression, whether these are treated as major political mistakes or crimes, through an analysis of the obstacles encountered by the application of international and domestic laws in the context of crimes of aggression
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Bouchet, Marthe. "La validité substantielle de la norme pénale." Thesis, Paris 2, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016PA020049.
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La norme pénale valide est celle qui possède la capacité de déployer ses effets. Elle est celle qui autorise le déclenchement des poursuites, le prononcé des condamnations et l'exécution de peines. En premier lieu, il a fallu montrer ce qui paraît s’imposer d’instinct : loin de se résumer au respect d'exigences formelles, la validité de la norme pénale dépend directement de la conformité à des exigences substantielles, portées par la Constitution et les conventions européennes. La preuve de la part substantielle de validité est apportée en deux temps. D’abord, l’entrée en vigueur de la règle pénale est subordonnée à sa bonne insertion dans la hiérarchie des normes. Ensuite, les normes répressives irrégulières sont systématiquement invalidées.En second lieu, la composante substantielle de la validité de la norme pénale a de multiples conséquences, qui sont tantôt bénéfiques, tantôt problématiques. En effet, les principes qui conditionnent substantiellement la validité de la norme pénale assoient la légitimité de la répression. En revanche, l’avènement du pouvoir prétorien, dans une discipline en quête de stabilité, soulève de nombreuses difficultés. Pour les surmonter, proposer des clefs de résolution s’est révélé nécessaireThe valid criminal norm is the one that is able to have a legal impact. It allows for the commencement of a prosecution, the imposition of a sanction, and the enforcement of sentences. Firstly, we had to demonstrate what seems manifest: far from being only a matter of respecting the formal requirements, the validity of a criminal norm depends directly on its compliance to substantial requirements that are contained in the French Constitution and the European conventions. The substantial proportion of the validity is demonstrated in two steps. The entry into force of the criminal rule is at first subordinated to its correct integration in the hierarchy of norms. Then, the improper repressive norms are systematically invalidated. Secondly, the substantial part of the validity of the criminal norm has several consequences that are in some cases beneficial but not in others. Indeed, the principles that substantially determine the validity of the criminal norm make the punishment legitimate. However, the emergence of the judge-made law raises many difficulties in a discipline that yearns for stability. In order to overcome them, it appeared necessary to suggest some key elements of resolution
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Fall, Astou. "Le traitement juridictionnel du crime de génocide et des crimes contre l'humanité commis au Rwanda." Thesis, Clermont-Ferrand 1, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014CLF10451.
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Le génocide des Tutsi du Rwanda est singulier au regard des génocides du XXème siècle. Il l’est par le nombre de ses victimes, par sa rapidité, ses modes d’exécution et surtout par le nombre de ses auteurs. Ce sont plus d’un million de Rwandais (Hutu) qui ont pris part directement aux massacres. La sanction de ces crimes de masse dans une société en quête de reconstruction soulevait d’innombrables difficultés notamment dans l’appréhension d’une criminalité collective en termes de responsabilité individuelle. L’ampleur et le paroxysme atteint dans ce drame a nécessité un traitement spécifique. Trois instances de justice ont été activées de manière concomitante : les juridictions classiques rwandaises (relayées par des juridictions coutumières dites Gacaca), le Tribunal international créé par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies et enfin les juridictions nationales étrangères en application du principe de la compétence universelle. L’intérêt scientifique de notre démarche réside justement dans l’étude de ce traitement juridictionnel multiniveaux. Deux questions se posent : quelle est la pertinence de ce modèle de justice 20 ans après le drame rwandais ?Quel bilan provisoire peut-on tirer de tous les jugements rendus par ces différentes juridictions ?The Tutsi genocide in Rwanda is singular in consider genocides of the XXth century. It is true by the number of victims, the speed and methods of implementation and, above all the number of the authors. These are more than one million Rwandan (Hutu) who participated directly in the massacres. Punishment of the massive crimes in a society in search of reconstruction, run into problems of group crime and individual responsibility. The scale and the speak of human tragedy needed specific treatment. Rwandan ordinary courts (replace by customary Courts called Gacaca), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (created by United Nations Security Council) and lastly, national foreign jurisdictions are also begin simultaneously in application of the principle of universal jurisdiction. The interest of our scientific approach lies in the study of multilevel constitutionalism. This raises two obvious questions: What is the relevance of this justice model twenty years after the Rwandan tragedy? What has been the interim review of all the judgments handed down by the different jurisdictions?
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Abou, Kasm Antonios. "Le Tribunal spécial pour le Liban : défis juridiques et enjeux stratégiques." Thesis, Grenoble, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012GREND006.
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Le Tribunal spécial pour le Liban (TSL) est établi en vertu d’un accord bilatéral conclu entre l’ONU et le Gouvernement libanais; mais ses instruments constitutifs ne sont entrés en vigueur qu’en vertu de la résolution 1757 (2007) du Conseil de sécurité adoptée sur la base du Chapitre VII de la Charte. Le TSL, siégeant aux Pays-Bas, composé de juges étrangers et libanais, s’avère un tribunal pénal internationalisé sui generis. Son mandat principal consiste à poursuivre les responsables de l’attentat du 14 février 2005 ôtant la vie à l’ancien Premier Ministre libanais Rafic HARIRI et de 22 autres personnes ; toutefois la compétence du TSL peut être élargie pour couvrir des attentats connexes. Plusieurs caractéristiques distinguent le TSL du fait qu’il est le premier tribunal pénal créé sous les auspices des Nations Unies, sans appartenir à la discipline du droit international humanitaire, et qui ne juge que des crimes de terrorisme en temps de paix à la lumière du droit national libanais ; comme il est le premier tribunal pénal international qui mène des procès in absentia; et le premier qui est doté d’un Bureau pour la Défense - comme organe autonome du TSL – sur un même pied d’égalité avec le Bureau du Procureur en conférant des pouvoirs larges aux conseils de la Défense. Le TSL fonctionne selon son propre Règlement de procédure et de preuve - adopté par ses juges - associant à la fois le système romano-germanique et le système anglo-saxon. Le fonctionnement du TSL confronte des défis juridiques, de par son financement mixte assuré à travers la contribution conventionnelle du Gouvernement libanais et les contributions volontaires des États membres, ou de par sa primauté restreinte qui est juste limitée aux juridictions libanaises, générant une coopération problématique avec les États tiers et hésitante avec le Liban. Également, le Statut du Tribunal est réticent sur la question des immunités. La mise en place du TSL a créé une grande polémique politique au Liban, son fonctionnement au cœur d’un cadre géopolitique instable provoque des enjeux stratégiques pertinents ayant des impacts sur la scène politique au Liban et au Moyen-Orient. Le TSL encourt des enjeux stratégiques du fait que son premier acte d’accusation incrimine des membres appartenant au Hezbollah - une résistance armée contre Israël - allié de l’Iran et de la Syrie. Le Printemps arabe et ses implications sur la révolte syrienne générèrent une instabilité politique et sécuritaire au Liban, alertant une nouvelle série d’attentats terroristes. La mission principale du TSL consiste à mettre fin à l’impunité au Liban, principalement celle relative aux assassinats politiques. Du fait que le TSL est établi juste pour juger un seul attentat et un nombre restreint de crimes connexes dans un cadre temporel et spatial restreints, alors qu’un grand nombre de crimes graves de droit international humanitaire et de crimes politiques et terroristes restent impunis au Liban, le TSL est conçu comme un instrument de justice sélective. Pour ses détracteurs, le TSL concrétise le dilemme entre « paix civile » et « justice internationale », bien que sa finalité consiste à consolider la réconciliation nationale à travers la découverte de la véritéThe Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) is created through a bilateral agreement concluded between the UN and the Lebanese Government; but its essential instruments didn’t come into force until the adoption of the binding resolution 1757 (2007) of the Security Council adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The STL, sitting in the Netherlands, composed of foreign and Lebanese judges, is an internationalized criminal tribunal sui generis. Its primary mandate consists on prosecuting those responsible for the 14th February 2005 attempt which caused the death of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic HARIRI and 22 other people; nevertheless the STL’s jurisdiction can be extended to cover connected attacks. Many features distinguish the STL, since it is the first criminal tribunal that was created under the UN’s framework outside of the International humanitarian law’s discipline; it judges terrorism crimes in peace time under the Lebanese domestic law; moreover, it is the first international criminal tribunal which holds trials in absentia, establishes an Office for the Defense as an autonomous organ equally with the Office of the Prosecutor giving the defense counsel large powers. The STL works according to its proper Rules of Procedure and Evidence – adopted by its judges – associating the civil law system and the common law system. The STL’s functioning confronts legal challenges due to its combined funding mechanism, assured by the conventional contribution of the Lebanese Government as by the voluntary contributions of member States; or due to its restricted primacy limited only to Lebanese courts, arising a problematical horizontal cooperation. In addition, the STL’s Statute expresses reluctance on the immunities’ question. The implementation of the STL has created a large political controversy in Lebanon; its work in an unstable geopolitical framework triggers relevant strategic issues having impacts on the political scene in Lebanon and Middle-East. The STL incurs strategic challenges since its first indictment incriminates Hezbollah members – an armed resistance against Israel – ally of Iran and Syria. The Arab spring and its implications on the Syrian revolution generate instability to the political and security conditions of Lebanon, alerting a new series of terrorist attempts. The main mission of the STL consists to end impunity in Lebanon related first and foremost to political assassinations. The STL is considered as an instrument of selective justice since it is established only to judge a single attempt and a small number of connected crimes in a restricted spatiotemporal framework, whereas a large number of serious crimes of International humanitarian law and political crimes perpetrated in Lebanon are still unpunished. For its detractors, the STL embodies the dilemma between "civil peace" and "international justice", although its finality seeks to consolidate the national reconciliation through the discovery of the truth
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Montoir, Carmen. "Les principes supérieurs du droit pénal des mineurs délinquants." Thesis, Paris 2, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA020028/document.
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Après une décennie de réformes incessantes et à l’heure où l’on envisage une refonte globale de la matière, il paraît important de s’interroger sur les principes supérieurs gouvernant le droit pénal des mineurs délinquants. En dépit d'une cristallisation remontant à 2002, via le mécanisme original du principe fondamental reconnu par les lois de la République, et sa protection par quelques instruments internationaux, l’autonomie de la justice des mineurs pose, à ce jour encore, de nombreuses questions. Sur le plan substantiel, elle repose sur des principes, reconnus supérieurs, d’adaptation de la réponse au relèvement éducatif et moral des mineurs et d’atténuation de la pénalité, qui s’avèrent quasiment absolus. Le discernement, en revanche, n’a pas bénéficié, pour sa part, d’une consécration expresse sur le plan suprême. Il se voit même concurrencé par le critère rigide de l’âge, et ce, bien qu’il soit un préalable essentiel à la détermination de la responsabilité pénale. Sur le plan processuel, malgré leur protection supra-législative, tant la règle de juridictions spécialisées que l’exigence de procédures appropriées, régulièrement infléchies, semblent vouées à la relativité. Le Conseil Constitutionnel, à la fois constituant et garant de la matière, a souvent été invité à en marquer les limites infranchissables et à en protéger le noyau dur inaltérable. Fort de l’identification et de l’appréciation de ce dernier, le présent travail tend à montrer que la malléabilité des principes de forme du droit pénal des mineurs délinquants permet de contourner l’immutabilité des principes de fond dirigeant celui-ciFollowing one decade of continuous reforms of the juvenile offenders penal law and while a global recast of the matter is considered, it appears important to question the superior principles governing it. Despite its original crystallization, starting in 2002, through the original mechanism of fundamental principle recognized by Republic Law, and its protection by some international tools, the autonomy of the juvenile justice is still currently questionable. On the substantial side, juvenile justice is based on principles, recognized as superior, of answer’s adaptation to the educational and moral restoring of the juvenile and sentence mit igation, which appear nearly absolute. On the other hand discernment has not benefited from an explicit consecration of its paramount status. It is even challenged by the age arbitrary criteria despite the fact that this condition is a cardinal preliminary for penal responsibility determination. On the procedural side, notwithstanding their supra-legislative guarantee, specialized jurisdictions so as requirement for appropriate procedures, regularly inflected, seems dedicated to relativity. Constitutional Council, both matter constituent and guarantor, has been very often invited to determine unreachable limits and to protect the unalterable core. Based on this core’ identification and assessment, this work intend to demonstrate that malleability of the form principles of juvenile offender penal law allows by-pass of background principles immutability, governing this one
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Ashnan, Almoktar. "Le principe de complémentarité entre la cour pénale internationale et la juridiction pénale nationale." Thesis, Tours, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015TOUR1004/document.
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L’objet de cette recherche est d’analyser le principe de complémentarité, de montrer la spécificité de la notion et d’en étudier la mise en œuvre à la lumière de la pratique de la Cour Pénale Internationale (CPI) afin de mettre en évidence les obstacles juridiques et politiques. Selon l’article 1er du Statut de Rome, la Cour est complémentaire des juridictions pénales nationales pour le crime de génocide, les crimes contre l’humanité, les crimes de guerre et le crime d’agression. Dans le cadre de ce principe, les juridictions nationales ont la priorité mais la compétence de la Cour prend le relais lorsqu’un État ne dispose pas des moyens techniques ou juridiques nécessaires pour juger et punir les auteurs desdits crimes ou bien s’il mène un procès truqué. Dès lors, le régime de complémentarité vise à mettre fin à l’impunité à l’égard des personnes impliquées dans les crimes les plus graves qui touchent l’ensemble de la Communauté internationale. Le Statut de Rome, notamment par les dispositions de son article 17, indique comment mettre en œuvre la complémentarité selon les critères de recevabilité qui sont l’incapacité, le manque de volonté et la gravité. Les articles 18 et 19, pour leur part, fournissent le mécanisme de décision préjudicielle sur la recevabilité et la contestation. Par ailleurs, le rôle du Conseil de sécurité face à la complémentarité est aussi considéré comme un élément essentiel pour bien comprendre l’effectivité et l'impact juridique de cette Cour. En effet, les pouvoirs que le Statut de Rome et le chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies confèrent au Conseil lui permettent de saisir la CPI, de suspendre son activité, d’imposer aux États de coopérer avec la Cour, ou encore de qualifier un acte de crime d’agression, et ceci bien que l'indépendance de l’enquête et du procès soit l’épine dorsale de toute la justice pénale, si celle-ci veut être efficaceThe purpose of this research is to analyse the principle of complementarity, to show the specific character of the notion and to study its implementation in the light of the practice of the International criminal court (ICC) in order to highlight the political and legal obstacles. In accordance with Article 1, the Court is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions for crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crime of aggression. Under this principle, national jurisdictions have priority over ICC but the Court’s jurisdiction takes over when a State lacks the technical or legal means, which are necessary to try and punish the perpetrators of such crimes, or if a rigged trial took place. Therefore, complementarity aims to bring an end to impunity for those responsible for the most serious crimes of international concern. The Rome Statute, namely with the provisions of Article 17, indicates how to implement complementarity according to the criteria for admissibility which are inability, unwillingness and seriousness. Articles 18 and 19, for their part, provide the mechanism of preliminary ruling regarding admissibility and challenge. Furthermore, the role of the Security Council regarding complementarity is also considered as essential to understand the effectiveness and the legal impact of this Court. Powers which are conferred under the Rome Statute and chapter VII of the United Nations Charter allow the Security Council to refer a situation to the ICC, to suspend an ICC investigation, to require States to cooperate with the ICC, or to qualify a crime as aggression, and this despite the fact that the independence of the investigation and of the trial is the backbone of criminal justice ensuring it is efficient
Books on the topic "Governor's Council on Criminal Justice"
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Virginia Council on Human Rights. Report of the Virginia Council on Human Rights on racial and cultural insensitivity and its impact on the criminal justice system to the Governor and the General Assembly of Virginia. Richmond: Commonwealth of Virginia, 1994.
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Great Britain. Colonial Office. Lower Canada: Copies of all ordinances, except those already presented to the House, passed by the Special Council and governor of Lower Canada, since the 24th day of November 1838. [London: HMSO, 2001.
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Council, Alaska Criminal Justice. Recommendations of the Alaska Criminal Justice Council. Anchorage, AK: Alaska Judicial Council, 2003.
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North Carolina. Governor's Crime Commission. Agenda in pursuit of justice: 1989 legislative program of the Governor's Crime Commission. [Raleigh, N.C.] (P.O. Box 27687, Raleigh 27611-7687): N.C. Dept. of Crime Control & Public Safety, 1989.
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System, Colorado General Assembly Legislative Council Committee on Adult Criminal Justice. Colorado Legislative Council recommendations for 1988: Legislative Council report to the Colorado General Assembly. [Denver, Colo.]: The Council, 1987.
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Council, Alaska Criminal Justice. Interim status report of the Alaska Criminal Justice Council. Anchorage, AK: Alaska Criminal Justice Council, Alaska Judicial Council, 2002.
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Jacobsen, Susan. Report on the Governor's Seventh Annual Law Enforcement Forum, September 26-27, 1990. [Albany, N.Y.?: Division of Criminal Justice Services, Office of Justice Systems Analysis, Bureau of Program and Policy Analysis, 1990.
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Maryland. Governor's Task Force on Alternative Sanctions to Incarceration. Governor's Task Force on Alternative Sanctions to Incarceration final report. [Baltimore, Md.]: The Task Force, 1992.
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Great Britain. Colonial Office. Lower Canada: Return to an address of the Honourable the House of Commons, dated 24 February 1836, for copies of all correspondence that has taken place between the secretary of state for the colonies and the governors of Canada and Mr. W.B. Felton, relative to lands granted to the said W.B. Felton. [London: HMSO, 2000.
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Governor's Law Enforcement Forum (9th 1992 Albany, N.Y.). Report on the Governor's Ninth Annual Law Enforcement Forum: November 17-18, 1992. Albany: New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, Office of Justice System Analysis, 1993.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Governor's Council on Criminal Justice"
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Schuerch, Res. "The Security Council Deferral Power Under Article 16 Rome Statute." In International Criminal Justice Series, 219–63. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-192-0_11.
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Schuerch, Res. "The Security Council Referral Power Under Article 13(b) Rome Statute." In International Criminal Justice Series, 169–217. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-192-0_10.
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Watson, Andrew. "The Judicial Reform CouncilThe Judicial Reform Council and Its Recommendations." In Popular Participation in Japanese Criminal Justice, 69–85. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-35077-6_5.
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Meron, Theodor. "Statement to the UN Security Council." In The Making of International Criminal Justice, 128–37. Oxford University Press, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608935.003.0012.
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Broomhall, Bruce. "ICC Enforcement: Cooperation of States, Including the Security Council." In International Justice and the International Criminal Court, 151–62. Oxford University Press, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199274246.003.0009.
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Scheffer, David. "The United Nations Security Council and international criminal justice." In The Cambridge Companion to International Criminal Law, 178–96. Cambridge University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107280540.010.
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Van Schaack, Beth. "Prospects for Justice before the International Criminal Court." In Imagining Justice for Syria, edited by Michael N. Schmitt, Shane R. Reeves, Winston S. Williams, and Sasha Radin, 179–210. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190055967.003.0005.
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Chapter 5 begins the book’s journey through the accountability matrix with the International Criminal Court (ICC). Although Russia and China vetoed the ICC referral resolution, thus preventing the Court from exercising its plenary jurisdiction over events in Syria, the transnational elements of the conflict mean that there are still some options for invoking the Court’s nationality and territorial jurisdiction. Given the proliferation of foreign fighters hailing from around the globe, including from ICC member states, the Syrian conflict offers the potential to activate the Court’s nationality jurisdiction. In addition, the spillover effects of the war implicate the territories of ICC states parties, in the region and beyond, as well as states where the ICC is already active, such as Libya. Finally, there are theoretical arguments that the Security Council could refer “the situation involving ISIL” to the Court, which could encompass either the organization itself, untethered from any territorial space, or the transboundary statelet that once encompassed ISIL’s self-proclaimed caliphate. Although many advocates and diplomats assumed that the ICC should be in the lead adjudicating the many international crimes committed in Syria, this chapter closes with some notes of caution as to why the ICC may not be the ideal forum, even assuming a Council referral were forthcoming.
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"Rosa Aloisi: A Tale of Two Institutions: The United Nations Security Council and the International Criminal Court." In The Realities of International Criminal Justice, 147–68. Brill | Nijhoff, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789004251113_008.
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Van Schaack, Beth. "The Security Council and International Crimes in Syria." In Imagining Justice for Syria, edited by Michael N. Schmitt, Shane R. Reeves, Winston S. Williams, and Sasha Radin, 53–120. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190055967.003.0003.
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Chapter 3 revisits some of the conflict history through the lens of (in)action at the U.N. Security Council, whose discursive practices, pronouncements, operational initiatives, and vetoed resolutions offer a distinctive window into the trajectory of the conflict and the international community’s meager and ineffectual reaction to the atrocities underway. This chapter traces these malfunctions on a number of fronts alongside the few areas of progress. The areas of concern include condemnations of human rights violations and abuses; attempts to impose ceasefires and expand humanitarian access; the use of force and the Responsibility to Protect; inspiring the parties to pursue a political transition; the international community’s preoccupation with counterterrorism and countering violent extremism measures; neutralizing Syria’s chemical weapons; futile efforts to impose U.N. sanctions; and—most relevant to this volume—attempts to promote accountability, including a French-led effort to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court. Along the way, the chapter assembles the vetoes deployed by the P-5 during the Syrian conflict and captures the deteriorating dynamics within the Council chamber. The paralysis in the Council sets the scene for the chapters that follow, which recount efforts to promote accountability elsewhere. The chapter concludes with a short discussion of the way in which the Syrian conflict has further stimulated the Security Council reform effort.
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Kaiafa-Gbandi, M. "C-176/03 – Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union." In The Court of Justice and European Criminal Law. Hart Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781509911196.ch-005.
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