Journal articles on the topic 'Grand Council Treaty no. 9'

October and November 1960 were two of the coldest months of the Cold War. Continuing tensions over Berlin and the nuclear balance were exacerbated by crises in Laos, Congo, and—for the first time—France's rebellious départements in Algeria. During Nikita Khrushchev's table-pounding visit to the United Nations, he embraced Belkacem Krim, the foreign minister of the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA). After mugging for the cameras at the Soviet estate in Glen Cove, New York, Khrushchev confirmed that this constituted de facto recognition of the provisional government and pledged all possible aid. Meanwhile, in Beijing, President Ferhat Abbas delivered the GPRA's first formal request for Chinese “volunteers.” U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower asked his National Security Council “whether such intervention would not mean war.” The council agreed that if communist regulars infiltrated Algeria, the United States would be bound by the North Atlantic Treaty to come to the aid of French President Charles de Gaulle and his beleaguered government. After six years of insurgency, Algeria appeared to be on the brink of becoming a Cold War battleground.1

The Conclusions Reached at the meeting of the European Council in Maastricht, on 9 — 10 December 1991, on economic and monetary union and also on political union, form an impressive and complex whole, in which undertakings of major importance coexist with other more timid ones. A detailed analysis would overstep the limits of an article. Moreover, there are still some problems to be cleared up before the final drafts are agreed, even if the principal political decisions have already been taken. The remarks which I would like to submit here will therefore deal more with general questions, and I will limit myself to the more significant provisions of the Maastricht agreements.

On 1 January 1995 Austria became a member of the European Union. Austria’s accession to the EU constituted the most important transfer of jurisdiction in the history of the Federal Constitution. On this occasion the Austrian legislature passed an amendment to the Federal Constitution which provides for the participation of Austrian organs in the decision-making process of the European Union. The legal basis of Austria’s membership in the EU is the treaty on accession to the European Union and the special constitutional bill authorizing the competent authorities to ratify the treaty on accession. First of all, provisions on the election of Austrian members to the European Parliament were introduced by the amendment into the Constitution. Secondly, the amendment contains a procedure for participation of the Austrian lands and local governments in the decisions of the European Union. Thirdly, the legislative bodies on the central government level (National Council and Federal Council) are also accorded the right to participate in decision-making of the EU. Finally, a special provision confirming Austria’s participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union was introduced.

Gregory IX is rarely associated with the affairs of the Holy Land. In fact, he is most widely known for initiating the conflict between imperial and papal authority which was to occupy European society for most of the thirteenth century. After all, the conflict with Emperor Frederick II had been among the defining features of Gregory’s pontificate. In September 1227, barely six months into office, he excommunicated Frederick, and in 1241 he died after a failed attempt to try Frederick before a general council. Consequently, the period of concord between 1230, when peace was made with Frederick in the Treaty of San Germano, and March 1239, when the Emperor was excommunicated for a second time, has been described as an interlude, a breathing space, allowing both Frederick and Gregory to muster the means and arguments for their final show-down.

Objective:To describe with prospective methodology the therapeutic response to clonazepam or paroxetine in a 3-year treatment of panic disorder (PD).Methods:A total of 120 PD outpatients (DSM-IV) were openly treated with clonazepam or paroxetine for 8 weeks. Those who responded entered a 3-year follow-up. Demographic and clinical features were compared in the two groups.Results:Efficacy was evaluated by Intent to treat, last value carried forward. The Hamilton Scale for Anxiety (HAMA) did not differ between the groups at baseline and during the first two months. In the acute treatment phase and at the end of the long-term follow-up both groups had a significant and similar response - 86.8% of the clonazepam group and 73.0% of the paroxetine group had a complete remission of panic attacks. The mean dose for clonazepam was 1.9 ± 0.2 mg/day and for paroxetine 33.8 ± 9.8 mg/day. There was no difference in the scale scores, and the reduction in panic attacks from baseline to end-point did not differ significantly between the groups. The most common adverse events during treatment were tremor/shaking, nausea/vomiting, sexual dysfunction and appetite/weight change in the paroxetine group and drowsiness, sexual dysfunction and memory/concentration complains in the clonazepam group.Conclusion:PD patients using clonazepam or paroxetine had an equivalent response during acute and long term treatment. The patients using clonazepam had significantly less side effects than the paroxetine group.Acknowledgements: Brazilian Council for scientific and technological development (CNPq).Grant: 554411/2005-9.

AbstractIn the new post-Cold War security era, there is a perception that the nature of cross-border security threats has changed. The need to respond to these new threats has led to a proliferation of multilateral international and regional treaties in this area, as well as unilateral demands made by the United States post-9/11. We have, then, seen a process of globalisation of criminal law, a field traditionally linked to State sovereignty. This chapter examines, first, EU action with regard to UN multilateral conventions and the impact of those conventions on internal EU law, as well as the impact of EU action within the framework of the regional treaties of the Council of Europe; secondly, the interrelationship between Union law and the global production of norms in criminal matters by the UN Security Council and by the Financial Action Task Force; thirdly, bilateral cooperation between the EU and the US, in particular in connection with the transfer of Passenger Name Records data; fourthly, the question of compliance by the EU in this area, in both the internal and the external context; and, fifthly, the Court of Justice’s approach to the protection of fundamental rights when global criminal law is engaged. The EU has managed to take centre stage in international developments in the field of global criminal law through a clear commitment to multilateral negotiations as well as a clear political will to implement at the Union level norms agreed internationally without a high degree of transparency. The Court of Justice has also been reluctant to overturn Union security decisions in the name of fundamental rights. The coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty will eliminate some complexity in this area, but not all, and it still remains to be seen whether in the process of globalisation of criminal law the European values proclaimed in Article 2 of the new EU Treaty will be promoted or compromised.

Abstract In the new post-Cold War security era, there is a perception that the nature of cross-border security threats has changed. The need to respond to these new threats has led to a proliferation of multilateral international and regional treaties in this area, as well as unilateral demands made by the United States post-9/11. We have, then, seen a process of globalisation of criminal law, a field traditionally linked to State sovereignty. This chapter examines, first, EU action with regard to UN multilateral conventions and the impact of those conventions on internal EU law, as well as the impact of EU action within the framework of the regional treaties of the Council of Europe; secondly, the interrelationship between Union law and the global production of norms in criminal matters by the UN Security Council and by the Financial Action Task Force; thirdly, bilateral cooperation between the EU and the US, in particular in connection with the transfer of Passenger Name Records data; fourthly, the question of compliance by the EU in this area, in both the internal and the external context; and, fifthly, the Court of Justice’s approach to the protection of fundamental rights when global criminal law is engaged. The EU has managed to take centre stage in international developments in the field of global criminal law through a clear commitment to multilateral negotiations as well as a clear political will to implement at the Union level norms agreed internationally without a high degree of transparency. The Court of Justice has also been reluctant to overturn Union security decisions in the name of fundamental rights. The coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty will eliminate some complexity in this area, but not all, and it still remains to be seen whether in the process of globalisation of criminal law the European values proclaimed in Article 2 of the new EU Treaty will be promoted or compromised.

On 26 February 1921, the Soviet Union signed a «Treaty of Friendship» with Iran which was to pave the way for future relations between the two states. Although the Russians renounced various commercial and territorial concessions which the Tsarist government had exacted from Iran, they secured the insertion of two articles which prohibited the formation or residence in either country of individuals, groups, military forces which were hostile to the other party, and gave the Soviet Union the right to send forces into Iran in the event that a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation there, use Iran as a base for operations against Russia, or otherwise threaten Soviet frontiers. Furthermore, in 1927, the Soviet Union signed a «Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality» with Iran which required the contracting parties to refrain from aggression against each other and not to join blocs or alliances directed against each other’s sovereignty. However, the treaty was violated by the Soviet Union’s wartime occupation of Iran, together with Britain and the United States. The violation was subsequently condoned by the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 29 January 1942, which permitted the Soviet Union to maintain troops in Iran for a limited period. Requiring restraint from propaganda, subversion and hostile political groups, the treaty would also appear to have been persistently violated by the Soviet Union: for example, the various radio campaigns of «Radio Moscow» and the «National Voice of Iran»; the financing and control of the Tudeh party; and espionage and rumour-mongering by Soviet officials in Iran. Whatever the Soviet’s original conception of this treaty may have been, they had since used it one-sidedly as a treaty in which both countries would be neutral, with one being «more neutral than the other». In effect, both the 1921 and 1927 treaties had been used as «a stick to beat the Iranians» whenever it suited the Soviets to do so, in propaganda and in inter-governmental dealings. During the Second World War, the treaty between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Iran, dated 29 January 1942 - and concluded some 5 months after the occupation of parts of Iran by allied forces, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were entitled to maintain troops in Iran, but the presence of such troops was not to constitute a military occupation. Nonetheless, Soviet forces in the Northern provinces used their authority to prevent both the entry of officials of the Iranian Government and the export of agricultural products to other provinces. The treaty also required military forces to be withdrawn not later than six months after «all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or on the conclusion of peace, whichever is the earlier». This entailed that the Soviet Union should have withdrawn its forces by March 1946, six months after the defeat of Japan. Meanwhile, however, there emerged in Iranian Azerbaijan, under Soviet tutelage, a movement for advanced provincial autonomy which developed into a separatist movement under a Communist-led «National Government of Azerbaijan». In 1945, Soviet forces prevented the Iranian army from moving troops into Azerbaijan, and also confined the Iranian garrison to barracks while the dissidents took forcible possession of key points. At the same time, Soviet troops prevented the entry of Iranian troops into the Kurdistan area, where, under Soviet protection, a Kurdish Republic had been set up by Qazi Mohammad. In 1946, after Iran had appealed to the Security Council, the Russians secured from the Iranian Prime Minister, Qavam es Saltaneh, a promise to introduce a bill providing for the formation of a Soviet-Iranian Oil Company to exploit the Northern oil reserves. In return, the Soviet Union agreed to negotiate over Azerbaijan: the Iranians thereupon withdrew their complaint to the Security Council, and Soviet forces left Azerbaijan by 9 May 1946. In 1955, when Iran was considering joining a regional defensive pact, which was later to manifest itself as the Baghdad Pact, the Soviet Government threatened that such a move would oblige the Soviet Union to act in accordance with Article 6 of the 1921 treaty. This was the «big stick» aspect of Soviet attempts to waylay Iranian membership of such a pact; the «carrot» being the conclusion in 1955 of a Soviet-Iranian «Financial and Frontier Agreement» by which the Soviets agreed to a mutually beneficial re-alignment of the frontier and to pay debts arising from their wartime occupation of Northern Iran. The Soviets continued their war of nerves against Iranian accession to the Pact by breaking off trade negotiations in October 1955 and by a series of minor affronts, such as the cancellation of cultural visits and minimal attendance at the Iranian National Day celebrations in Moscow. In a memorandum dated November 26, the Iranian Government openly rejected Soviet criticisms. Soviet displeasure was expressed officially, in the press and to private individuals. In the ensuing period, Soviet and Soviet-controlled radio stations continued to bombard their listeners with criticism of the Baghdad Pact, or CENTO as it later became. In early 1959, with the breakdown of the negotiations for a non-aggression pact, Iran-Soviet relations entered into a phase of propaganda warfare which intensified with the signature of the bilateral military agreement between Iran and the United States. The Soviet Union insisted that Iran should not permit the establishment of foreign military bases on its soil, and continued to threaten Iran despite the Shah’s assurance on this issue. Consequently, the Iranians denounced Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 treaty, on the basis of which the Soviet Union was making its demands. Attempts by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to improve relations met with little success until September 1959, when Russia offered massive economic support on condition that Iran renounced its military agreements with the United States. This offer was rejected, and, as relations continued to become strained, the Soviets changed their demand to one neither for a written agreement that Iran would not allow its terrain to be used as a base of aggression nor for the establishment of foreign missile bases. The publication by the Soviet Union of the so-called «CENTO documents» did nothing to relieve the strain: the Soviet Union continued to stand out for a bilateral agreement with Iran, and the Shah, in consultation with Britain and the United States, continued to offer no more than a unilateral assurance. In July 1962, with a policy of endeavouring once more to improve relations, the Shah maintained his insistence on a unilateral statement, and the Soviet Government finally agreed to this. The Iranian undertaking was accordingly given and acknowledged on 15 September. The Instruments of ratification of the 1957 Agreements on Transit and Frontier Demarcation were exchanged in Moscow on 26 October 1962 and in Tehran on 20 December, respectively.

On September 11, 2019, twelve states parties invoked the Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), because they considered the crisis in Venezuela to have a destabilizing impact on the peace and security of the hemisphere. Venezuela was one of the twelve, voting in favor; this was because, on April 9, 2019, the Organization of American States (OAS) formally recognized Juan Guaido's representative, Gustavo Tarre, in lieu of Nicolas Maduro's Ambassador. At the OAS General Assembly in June, Tarre's appointment was approved in a much contested and heated session. The OAS has thirty-five member states and approximately one-third of its membership supported the invocation of the TIAR. The TIAR is the OAS's mutual defense pact; it was last invoked following the events of September 11, 2001. Article 5 of the NATO Charter, calling for collective action in the case of an armed attack on one member, is derived from Article 3 of the TIAR. Following invocation of the TIAR, the Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (the OAS equivalent to the UN Security Council, but without veto power) held its 30th meeting in New York City during the UN General Assembly. The result of that meeting was the adoption of the Resolution under consideration here.

This article reveals the existence of a hitherto unknown Black Chamber in the Dutch Republic and the identity of its principal codebreaker, Abel Tasien d'Alonne (1646–1723), acting also as private secretary to Grand Pensionary Heinsius. On the basis of an analysis of a number of previously unidentified worksheets, three cases are put together that merited d'Alonne's attention, one related to a French diplomat at the court of the Bavarian Elector during the years 1707–9, one related to an undercover agent of the Bavarian Elector in the Dutch Republic during the years 1711–12 and one related to a French emissary to the state council in Brussels during the period 1714–15. The emergence of a Black Chamber in The Hague is remarkable because the Dutch could always call upon the Black Chamber of Hanover for the solution of any intercepted, coded documents. This indicates that the development of inter-allied relations during the war played a more important role in the rise of the Dutch Black Chamber than one would expect.

The European Convention on Human Rights is one of the manifestations of the Council of Europe, an organisation of European states founded in 1949 with the aim of strengthening the common democratic heritage. It is an international treaty which binds the contracting States to respect the list of human rights and freedoms it proclaims. An enforcement mechanism exists in the form of the European Court of Human Rights (in this paper called ‘the Strasbourg court’).In brief, these rights and freedoms are the right to life (art. 2); freedom from torture or inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment (art. 3); freedom from slavery or forced labour (art. 4); the right to liberty (art. 5); the right to a fair trial (art. 6); freedom from retrospective criminal laws (art. 7); the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence (art. 8); freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art. 9); freedom of expression (art. 10); freedom of peaceful assembly (art. 11); and the right to marry and found a family (art. 12). Over the years, this initial list of rights has been expanded by a series of additional Protocols — not all of which have been ratified by all the Member States. The First Protocol, which Britain has ratified, guarantees the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions, education, and free elections.

On September 20, 1996 an overwhelming 96.5% of the members present at the Joint Session of the Nepalese Parliament hurriedly ratified the Mahakali Treaty to fulfill the requirements of Article 126 of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal.The then Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba and Water Resources Minister Pashupati SJB Rana provided CPN-UML General Secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal and CPN-UML Mahakali Study Team Coordinator KP Sharma (Oli) written replies on the “equal sharing” of the Mahakali waters. However, despite the lapse of 15 years, the two critical clauses: i) “...equal entitlement in the use of Mahakali waters without prejudice to their respective consumptive uses...,” and ii) “...precludes the claim, in any form, by either Party on the unutilized portion of the shares of the waters...” still remain obfuscated and clouded in mist. Is “equal entitlement” (50 percent each) considered after deducting the respective consumptive uses as interpreted but later withdrawn by Minister Rana? Or is this “equal entitlement” (50 percent each) considered prior to deducting the consumptive uses as interpreted by Secretary General MK Nepal and then applying the clause “without prejudice” to their respective consumptive uses? No attempts appear to have been made by Nepal to elicit the Government of India’s interpretations on this vital issue.The Ganges basin supports a massive over 523 million people; i.e., 450 million in India, 45 million in Bangladesh, and 28 million in Nepal. With India’s economy growing consistently at a high 8 to 9% annually, the quality of life of her people is definitely on the rise. This will invariably mean drastic increases in her per capita consumption of water. With Nepal contributing over 72% of the dry season flows of the Ganges, India’s eyes and ears are on Nepal either in the form of “...without prejudice to their respective consumptive uses...” or “...precludes the claim, in any form, ...the unutilized portion of the waters...” However, Nepalese governments from the Panchayat era perceived water, whether by design or otherwise, as a mere secondary component of hydropower. Despite the full knowledge that water has become a scarce diminishing resource, the Nepalese Governments continue to be mesmerized by hydropower. This is manifested by the government unveiling in a span of two years her grand dreams of 10,000 MW in ten years and 25,000 MW in twenty years. This article attempts to delve into the intricacies of the Mahakali waters as expounded by Prime Minister SB Deuba’s government during the extremely hurried ratification the Mahakali Treaty in 1996.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/hn.v8i0.4925 Hydro Nepal: Journal of Water, Energy and Environment Issue No. 8, 2011 JanuaryPage: 48-56Uploaded date: 23 June, 2011

The subject of this article is to analyze the meaning of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality in the light of the provisions of primary and secondary European Union law and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is inherent to the functioning of the internal market and EU citizenship. The prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality is undoubtedly one of the main goals of the European Union[1] in the social and economic context, which was reflected in the localization of the matter in question in the primary law of the European Union[2], in secondary law and in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The Treaty on European Union (TEU)[3] and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)[4] indicate equality as one of the EU values (Article 2 TEU), require it to be promoted and combat all discrimination (Articles 8 and 10 TFEU) and prohibit discrimination due to the criteria indicated therein (Articles 18 and 19 TFEU). In secondary law, this principle was expressed primarily in the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council No. 492/2011 on the free movement of workers within the Union and in art. 24 of Directive 2004/38/EC 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their relatives to move freely[5]. A special role in this area is played by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which stated that all authorities of the Member States are obliged to refuse to apply a provision of national law that is contrary to the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of citizenship (Article 18 TFEU)[6]. Moreover, national measures may be examined in the light of art. 18 TFEU, but only to the extent that they apply to situations not covered by specific non-discrimination provisions included in the Treaty[7]. The author puts forward the thesis that the analysis of CJEU jurisprudence reveals a visible dissonance between the application of national regulations of the Member States and the provisions of EU law in this matter, which significantly hinders the implementation of the principle of non-discrimination in practice. Discrepancies mainly occur in domestic legal acts due to the improper drafting of national legal provisions and / or their misinterpretation by national judicial or administrative authorities. It should be emphasized that the Member States are obliged to comply with EU law, which is not tantamount only to the obligation of state authorities to respect directly applicable acts, or to implement required regulations into internal law, but also the obligation to interpret and apply internal law in a manner that does not violate the requirement resulting from EU law[8]. Judicial and administrative authorities of the Member States should therefore interpret national law as far as possible, in line with EU law, because the limits of the pro-EU interpretation will be determined by the powers conferred by domestic law[9]. The study uses the legal-comparative method, consisting in a comparative analysis of the legal systems of the Member States and the European Union in the field of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, rights and restrictions on the freedom of movement of authorized entities. Comparative verification of EU acts with the internal standards of individual EU Member States allows to reveal the degree of advancement of the implementation process of EU law provisions under the free movement of EU citizens and their family members in the discussed area in the legal systems of European Union Member States. The purpose of this analysis is to, inter alia, diagnose areas in which these countries have not implemented or improperly implemented EU regulations, or have misinterpreted them. The second method used is the method of analyzing the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union - the rulings of the CJEU constitute a significant part of the study. The case law in question covers the period from the establishment of the Treaties of Rome to the present day. The use of the latter obligated the author to apply the comparative method of judgments based on same or similar legal bases in similar circumstances from different stages of the evolution of the free movement of citizens of the European Union and their family members under the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality. [1] Cf. Olivier De Schutter, Links between migration and discrimination. A legal analysis of the situation in EU Member States (Brussels: European Commission, 2016), 102 and next; See also Brita Sundberg-Weitman, Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality. Free Movement of Workers and Freedom of Establishment under the EEC Treaty (Amsterdam, New York, Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1977). [2] Erica Szyszczak, “Antidiscrimination Law in the European Union,” Fordham International Law Journal, no. 32 (2008): 635. [3] The Treaty on European Union (consolidated version) OJ of the EU 2012, No. C 326/01. [4] The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated version) OJ of the EU 2012, No. C 326/01. [5] Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council No. 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (O.J.E.C. L 158, 30 April 2004). [6] CJEU Judgement of 7 May 1998, Clean Car Autoservice GmbH p. Landeshauptmann von Wien, Case C-350/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:205. [7] CJEU Judgement of 18 June 2019, Republic of Austria v Federal Republic of Germany, Case C-591/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:504, pt 41. [8] Marek Górski, “Wpływ orzecznictwa Europejskiego Trybunału Sprawiedliwości na interpretację i stosowanie przepisów o ochronie środowiska,” in Wspólnotowe prawo ochrony środowiska i jego implementacja w Polsce trzy lata po akcesji, ed. Jerzy Jendrośka and Magdalena Bar (Wrocław: Centrum Prawa Ekologicznego Press, 2008), 31. [9] Monika Niedźwiedź, “Stosowanie prawa wspólnotowego przez organy administracyjne,” Casus, no. 32 (October 2004): 6.

Upon becoming president of the United States, Barack Obama formulated the policy of reset in the U.S.-Russia relations – as part of his grand project of improving international relations on a more equitable basis, with a bigger role for diplomacy and international alliances and less reliance on unilateral actions and the use of force. As part of resetting their relationship in the military-political field, the United States and Russia were able, in the first and part of the second tenure of Obama’s presidency, to claim some major achievements in the military-political field, such as signing the New START Treaty, working on further nuclear disarmament measures, and developing bilateral anti-terrorist activities. U.S.-Russia cooperation also resulted in Russia’s agreement to open up its air space and railways for NATO transports which helped the International Coalition to conduct operation in Afghanistan in its “surge” phase and then to successfully withdraw combat units from that country. U.S.-Russia relations were also instrumental in bridging the positions of the two countries with regard to Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear problem, with Russia and China voting alongside with the United States on UN Security Council resolutions for sanctions against North Korea and Iran to make them comply with the nuclear safeguards. Yet in various regions of the world, Obama’s policy – initially announced as an innovative breakthrough strategy proved instead to be reactive, aimed not at future perspective, but at dealing with the emerging crises on a case by case basis: in Lybia, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and then finally in Ukraine. The “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific, also announced by Obama’s administration, was formulated without consideration of Russia’s interests in the region, while at the same time causing turbulence in relations with China, and was finally overshadowed by the Ukrainian crisis and then the ISIS offensive in the Middle East. The reset fell prey to the contradictions in U.S.-Russia relations which particularly exacerbated after the events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine and led to freezing of arms control negotiations and bilateral U.S.-Russia cooperation in the military-political field. The Ukrainian crisis is likely to have long-term negative consequences, and in particular will increase hawkish tendencies in U.S. politics. Yet this does not preclude and to the contrary increases the importance of seeking ways to strengthen stability, searching for possible measures for nuclear weapons limitations which would become applicable after bilateral relations improve. U.S.-Russia cooperation remains essential for resolving key international challenges as well as major regional problems.

This study, titled A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty, deals with 16 documents addressed from Kazakh sultans to the Qing Dynasty (and the Russian Empire/Governor-General of Siberia). These were written in the Oyirad (Mongol) language with Tod script or in the Turkic language with Arabic script from the eighteenth to nineteenth century, and come complete with text, transcription, and translation. In addition, this study includes two essays written by the authors who made use of these documents. The majority of Qing documents are preserved in a collection of the First Historical Archives (第一歴史襠案館) in Beijing. Many of these documents related to the Kazakhs have started to be published as The Collection of the Archival Documents Concerning Sino-Kazakh Relations at the Time of the Qing Dynasty (清代中哈関係襠案彙編) and so on, and to be used for historical research. Of the documents dealt with in this study, 14 are from the Manchu Language Reference Copy of Grand Council Palace Memorial (軍機処満文副奏摺) of the First Historical Archives, one is from Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Respubliki Kazakhstan, and one is from Vneshnyaya politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka (Moskva: Izd-vo Nauka, t. 11–12, 1979–1980). However, most of these documents are not included in the published collection mentioned above. Therefore, this study, together with the above-mentioned collection, represents another major step in the study of these documentss. In addition, by utilizing these documents, Takahiro Onuma clarifies that the international world order between the Qing dynasty and Kazakh nomads in Central Asia was not based on the “suzerain-dependency (Ch. zong-fan 宗藩) relationship”, which was heavily influenced by Confucianism, but rather, on the “master-slave (Mon. ejen-albatu) relationship”, which originated in Mongol nomadic society. Jin Noda, who also utilized these documents, states that the title of Kazakh sultans, which has been regarded as a product of the Qing benefit policy, was in fact a result of both the Kazakh sultans and Qing requiring the ‘title-bestowal system’ in the process of the establishment of relations. This system was gradually becoming a mere formality, partly because of the influence of Russia. These findings suggest that the Kazakh khanates were independently developing a “bilateral diplomatic policy” while mediating between the Qing and Russian empires, and they highlight the policy differences of both empires toward the Kazakh khanates. We hope that the fin­dings from this study will further advance the study of the history of the mutual relations between the Kazakh khanates and the Qing and Russian empires.

The 2014 Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, which replaces the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, may be considered the most important result of a cooperation developed since the beginning of 90’s, first in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, then of the Eastern Partnership. This paper analyses in an essential way the evolving relations between the EU and Ukraine, and the progress made by Ukraine in pursuing the objectives set forth in the Association Agreement. The Author considers the main features of the Agreement, and identifies and assesses the principal legal issues arising from its implementation. The Agreement is aimed at deepening political and economic relations between the EU and Ukraine, and to gradually integrate Ukraine into the EU internal market. It is the first of a new generation of EU agreements characterized by comprehensiveness, and democratic conditionality. It requires a broad and detailed work of approximation of the Ukrainian laws to the EU regulations. Reforms are foreseen in a number of key areas. Ukraine has been developing a complex strategy to reorient its legal system towards the EU. According to the 2018 Report on Implementation of the Association Agreement – prepared by the Government Office for Coordination of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, and the Vice Prime Minister’s Office for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, based on the outcome of performance of the objectives scheduled for 2018, the Agreement was implemented by 52%. According to the Author, in evaluating the “results achieved” by Ukraine in the approximation of the national legislation to the EU legislation, it must be taken into account the challenging situation of the country. The Government and the Verkhovna Rada have been acting with the aim to pursue the overall objectives of the Association Agreement notwithstanding the difficult political and administrative situation following the events in Crimea, the Donbass conflict, the worsening of the relations with Russia until the termination of the Treaty of Friendship and the temporary adoption of the Martial Law. He highlights the efforts of the EU in financially supporting the process of reform in Ukraine, and of Ukraine towards constitutional and legislative reforms reinforcing the European choice. Ukraine has finally developed an ad hoc institutional framework, and new legislation, including amendments to the Constitution, for the implementation of the Association Agreement. Relevant progress has been made in various sectors of the cooperation, while in various others the actions taken are not yet effective. For example, in the sector of the rule of law, various actions were taken, but modest results were achieved in the fight against corruption; while in the environment sector, which is not considered among the priorities, the Law on EIA might be considered an important achievement. In the whole, the implementation of the Association Agreement was evaluated positively at the highest level of political dialogue, by the 20th EU-Ukraine Summit (9 July 2018), and the 5th EU-Ukraine Association Council (Brussels, 17 December 2018). In the Аuthor’s opinion, notwithstanding various critical points, the numerous constitutional and legislative acts, the regulations and the plans adopted in the period 2014–2018, represent important steps of a broad process of change. He underlines the importance to proceed focusing not just on the formal harmonization of the Ukrainian legal system to the EU law, but on the effectiveness and efficacy of the new rules, and their real implications on the social, economic, political and cultural heritage and life of people.

Background:contrast-enhanced ultrasonography (CEUS) has been proposed as a tool to assess myositis, but data in the literature are still scarce (Radiologe 2018;58:579).Objectives:to evaluate CEUS as a tool to assess myositis patients and its accuracy in differentiating myositis from common mimickers.Methods:16 patients with myositis (4 polymyositis, 6 dermatomyositis, 2 immune-mediated necrotizing myopathy, 1 inclusion body myositis, 2 overlaps Sjøgren’s syndrome - myositis and 1 Enterovirus-reactive myositis) and 4 controls (2 peripheral neuropathy, 1 limb girdle muscle dystrophy, and 1 metabolic myopathy) underwent after rest CEUS (Esaote MyLab, linear probe 13-5 MHz, Sonovue®) at a room temperature of 20° of the vastus lateralis and medialis muscles. CEUS was performed by 2 ultrasonographists with an expertise in muscle US blinded to the clinical data of the patients. CEUS muscle signal was expressed on a 0-4 scale as described in J Rheumatol 2001; 28:1271 per each muscle group and the global score was divided by four. Creatine kinase (CK), manual muscle test (MTT) and MRI of the thigh muscles were performed within maximum one month from the CEUS. MMT was expressed using the 0-5 Medical Research Council scale; intermediate points were converted into decimals as detailed in Kendall FP et al, Muscle Testing & Function: Testing and Function with Posture and Pain. 5th ed., Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2005. MRI of the thigh muscles was considered positive if it showed muscle edema. Myositis was defined active if CK was raised above the reference range and/or MMT showed progressive worsening. Results were expressed as median (range). Between-group comparison was performed with Mann-Whitney test. Statistical analysis was performed with SPSS version 20. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee and all patients provided their written consent.Results:Median (range) age was 38 (69) years in the myositis and 41 (45) years in the control group (p=0.89). Disease duration in the myositis group was 60 (334) months. CEUS muscle score was 0.5 (3) in the myositis group and 2 (3) in the control group (p=0.99). In the myositis group, CEUS score did not differ between treated and untreated patients (p=0.84). CK values were 361 (6442) in the myositis group and 363 (799) in the control group (p=0.68). MMT was significantly lower in the myositis group [4.33 (2)] than in the control group [4.94 (0)] (p=0.038). CEUS was 77% (47-05 95% confidence interval) sensitive and 67% (9-99% 95% confidence interval) specific for a diagnosis of myositis. CEUS was positive in 10/13 patients and negative in 3/13 with active myositis, while was negative in 2/3 patients and positive in 1/3 with inactive myositis. Statistically, CEUS did not discriminate between active and inactive myositis (Fisher’s exact test p= 0.21). All controls had a positive CEUS. No association was found between MRI edema and a positive CEUS (intraclass correlation coefficient p=0.5). No correlation was found between CEUS score, on the one hand, and CK levels or MMT, on the other (Spearman’s rho p>0.05).Conclusion:CEUS has moderate sensitivity for a diagnosis of myositis, but does not discriminate between myositis and some of its common mimickers. Larger studies are required to better evaluate the role of CEUS in patients with myositis.Disclosure of Interests:Nicolo Pipitone Consultant of: Received royalties from Uptodate.comInvestigator for the gevokizumab in myositis Servier study (2014), the sirukumab in GCA GSK study (2016), PI for the ToReMy AIFA funded (2017) study and for the FOREUM funded (2018) GCA study, Speakers bureau: Guest speaker at UCB-sponsored meetings: (Immunology Summits, Prague, 2012, 2013 & 2014, MACRO Meet the expert at the ACademy of RheumatOlogy, Bologna 13 - 14 April 2012, GRAPPA Workshop, Milan 29 January 2016 and Rome 30 November 2017), Fininvest (Catania 2016), Aim Group (Reggio Emilia 2018), I&C (Cologna, 2018), Alfa-Wassermann sponsored meeting (Rhewind, Bologna, February 2016 and 2019), Pierluigi Macchioni: None declared, Gianluigi Bajocchi: None declared, Carlo Salvarani Grant/research support from: consulting and investigator fees from Abbvie, Pfizer, MSD, Roche, Celgene, Novartis, Consultant of: consulting and investigator fees from Abbvie, Pfizer, MSD, Roche, Celgene, Novartis

Background: Single-agent gilteritinib and quizartinib (quiz) met their primary endpoints of improved overall survival (OS) in relapsed/refractory (R/R) FLT3-mut AML in phase III studies, but CRc durations were short (4-11 months). Quiz demonstrated potent synergy with venetoclax (VEN) (a BCL-2 inhibitor) in AML cell lines and PDX models (Mali et al. Haematologica 2020). Methods: Newly diagnosed or R/R AML with ECOG ≤2, and adequate organ function were eligible. The protocol initially evaluated safety of the doublet of decitabine (DAC) plus quiz regardless of FLT3 status [Fig 1A]. After the first 10 pts were treated on the doublet, the protocol was amended to add VEN (triplet) in a safety dose escalation lead in [Fig 1B]. CRc criteria were as published in the phase III ADMIRAL and QUANTUM-R studies. Results: 21 pts including DAC10 + quiz (phase 1: N=10) and DAC10 + VEN + quiz (phase IB/II: n=11) were evaluable at the time of this report (Table 1). DAC10 + Quiz Of 10 pts treated with DAC10 + quiz (Table 1), CRc rate was 40% (1 CRp and 3 CRi). No FLT3 R/R WT (n=3) pts responded. Four of 7 FLT3-ITD mut pts (1 frontline and 5/6 R/R, who had all received ≥1 FLT3 TKI) achieved CRc (57%), with 3/6 FLT3-PCR negative at response. 1 pt experienced QTcF prolongation > 500 msec on quiz 40mg/day (resolved after holding quiz with no clinical cardiac events). Grade 3/4 toxicities in >/= 2 pts, irrespective of attribution, included infection (12), neutropenic fever (3), mucositis (3), diarrhea (2), and prolonged QTcF >450 (2). With a median (med) follow-up (f/u) of 12 months (mos), the med OS was 5.7 months in the 6 R/R FLT3-mut pts (Fig 2A). Three of 4 CRc pts proceeded to allogeneic stem cell transplantation (ASCT) and 2 were alive in remission at last f/u. DAC10 + VEN + Quiz Of 11 enrolled pts (Table 2), 10 treated prior to July 1 2020 were evaluable. CRc achieved in 9/10 (90%) (1 CR, 3 CRp, 5 CRi) with 5/9 responders FLT3-PCR negative. Excluding the 1 frontline evaluable pt, 8 of 9 R/R FLT3-ITD (88% with ≥1 prior FLT3 TKIs) pts achieved CRc. No pts developed a DLT with 30 mg/day quiz, however with the 40mg/day quiz 2 pts developed hematologic DLT (grade ≥3 neutropenia with a <5% cellular bone marrow lasting ≥42 days. Hence, quiz 30 mg/day dose was determined as RP2D for triplet. Grade 3/4 toxicities in >/=2 pts, irrespective of attribution, included infection (7) and neutropenic fever (4). No QTcF prolongations >500msec noted. 60-day mortality was 0. With a med f/u of 6 mos, med OS was not reached and 6-month OS was 86% (one death) (Fig 2B). Of 9 CRc pts, 5 remain on protocol in CRc, 2 underwent ASCT and are alive post-ASCT, and 2 have relapsed. CyTOF (single-cell mass cytometry) analysis was performed in longitudinal samples collected on the triplet therapy. In a pt (baseline FLT3-ITD, NRAS, IDH1/2, SRSF2, DNMT3A, RUNX1, CSF3R) with a 3 week CRc duration, we identified two distinct blast populations at C1D1; monocytic (CD33+/CD34-/CD68+) and myeloid (CD33+/CD34+) (Fig 3A). The monocytic blasts had low BCL-2 and high MCL-1 at baseline, with modest reduction at EOC1 (from 25.8% to 10.8%) (Fig 3B-C). However, the myeloid blasts with high BCL-2 and lower MCL-1 showed significant reduction at EOC1 (from 52% to 5.5%) (Fig 3B-C). Heat-map demonstrated major downregulation in signaling pathways (MCL-1, STAT, BCL-XL, and MAPK) in the myeloid blasts at EOC1 of triplet therapy (Fig 3D). However, these signaling pathways remained active in the monocytic blasts at EOC 1 (Fig 3D). Pt relapsed prior to starting C2, driven by monocytic blasts (Fig 3C).On the other hand, in a pt (baseline FLT3-ITD only) who remains in CR (DOR 11 mos), both myeloid and monocytic populations had high BCL-2 at baseline (Fig 4A-B). Despite almost complete elimination of myeloid blasts (Fig 4C), monocytic blasts were detectable at a low level at C1D28 (Fig 4C). Importantly, converse to the prior pt, the active signaling pathways at diagnosis (MCL-1, STAT, MAPK, c-MYC) were significantly downregulated in both populations at EOC1 (Fig 4D). This patient underwent ASCT on D35 of therapy, and remains in CR. Conclusion: DAC10 + venetoclax + quiz is highly active in R/R FLT3-ITD mut AML pts, with CRc rates of 90% and projected 6-month OS of 86%. CYTOF profiling may predict for response based on pre- and on-therapy apoptotic and signaling pathway profiles enabling potential optimal selection of future combinatorial or sequential approaches. Accrual to the triplet continues and updated clinical and correlative data will be presented. Disclosures Yilmaz: Pfizer: Research Funding; Pint Pharma: Honoraria; Daicho Sankyo: Research Funding. Kantarjian:Agios: Honoraria, Research Funding; AbbVie: Honoraria, Research Funding; Novartis: Research Funding; Takeda: Honoraria; BMS: Research Funding; Amgen: Honoraria, Research Funding; Jazz Pharma: Research Funding; Actinium: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Daiichi-Sankyo: Research Funding; Pfizer: Honoraria, Research Funding; Cyclacel: Research Funding; Astex: Research Funding; Immunogen: Research Funding; Ariad: Research Funding. Kadia:Cellenkos: Research Funding; Cyclacel: Research Funding; Amgen: Research Funding; JAZZ: Honoraria, Research Funding; BMS: Honoraria, Research Funding; Pfizer: Honoraria, Research Funding; Novartis: Honoraria; Pulmotec: Research Funding; Abbvie: Honoraria, Research Funding; Genentech: Honoraria, Research Funding; Ascentage: Research Funding; Incyte: Research Funding; Astellas: Research Funding; Astra Zeneca: Research Funding; Celgene: Research Funding. Konopleva:Eli Lilly: Research Funding; Amgen: Consultancy; Cellectis: Research Funding; Agios: Research Funding; AbbVie: Consultancy, Research Funding; Reata Pharmaceutical Inc.;: Patents & Royalties: patents and royalties with patent US 7,795,305 B2 on CDDO-compounds and combination therapies, licensed to Reata Pharmaceutical; Forty-Seven: Consultancy, Research Funding; Sanofi: Research Funding; Rafael Pharmaceutical: Research Funding; F. Hoffmann La-Roche: Consultancy, Research Funding; Genentech: Consultancy, Research Funding; AstraZeneca: Research Funding; Ascentage: Research Funding; Stemline Therapeutics: Consultancy, Research Funding; Calithera: Research Funding; Ablynx: Research Funding; Kisoji: Consultancy. Borthakur:PTC Therapeutics: Research Funding; Incyte: Research Funding; Novartis: Research Funding; Abbvie: Research Funding; Jannsen: Research Funding; GSK: Research Funding; Cyclacel: Research Funding; BioLine Rx: Research Funding; BMS: Research Funding; AstraZeneca: Research Funding; Polaris: Research Funding; Xbiotech USA: Research Funding; Oncoceutics: Research Funding; Curio Science LLC: Consultancy; FTC Therapeutics: Consultancy; Argenx: Consultancy; PTC Therapeutics: Consultancy; BioLine Rx: Consultancy; BioTherix: Consultancy; Nkarta Therapeutics: Consultancy; Treadwell Therapeutics: Consultancy. DiNardo:Takeda: Honoraria; Celgene: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Novartis: Consultancy; ImmuneOnc: Honoraria; AbbVie: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Agios: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Notable Labs: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Jazz: Honoraria; Calithera: Research Funding; Syros: Honoraria; Daiichi Sankyo: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; MedImmune: Honoraria. Pemmaraju:Roche Diagnostics: Honoraria; Samus Therapeutics: Research Funding; SagerStrong Foundation: Other: Grant Support; MustangBio: Honoraria; Celgene: Honoraria; Pacylex Pharmaceuticals: Consultancy; Novartis: Honoraria, Research Funding; Incyte Corporation: Honoraria; AbbVie: Honoraria, Research Funding; Daiichi Sankyo: Research Funding; Blueprint Medicines: Honoraria; DAVA Oncology: Honoraria; Affymetrix: Other: Grant Support, Research Funding; Plexxikon: Research Funding; Cellectis: Research Funding; LFB Biotechnologies: Honoraria; Stemline Therapeutics: Honoraria, Research Funding. Short:Amgen: Honoraria; Takeda Oncology: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Astellas: Research Funding; AstraZeneca: Consultancy. Alvarado:Daiichi-Sankyo: Research Funding; Tolero Pharmaceuticals: Research Funding; Sun Pharma: Research Funding; Jazz Pharmaceuticals: Research Funding; FibroGen: Research Funding; Astex Pharmaceuticals: Research Funding; BerGenBio ASA: Research Funding; MEI Pharma: Research Funding. Jabbour:Takeda: Other: Advisory role, Research Funding; Amgen: Other: Advisory role, Research Funding; Adaptive Biotechnologies: Other: Advisory role, Research Funding; Pfizer: Other: Advisory role, Research Funding; Genentech: Other: Advisory role, Research Funding; BMS: Other: Advisory role, Research Funding; AbbVie: Other: Advisory role, Research Funding. Garcia-Manero:Merck: Research Funding; Genentech: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Bristol-Myers Squibb: Consultancy, Research Funding; Novartis: Research Funding; Celgene: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; AbbVie: Honoraria, Research Funding; Jazz Pharmaceuticals: Consultancy; Amphivena Therapeutics: Research Funding; Acceleron Pharmaceuticals: Consultancy, Honoraria; H3 Biomedicine: Research Funding; Onconova: Research Funding; Astex Pharmaceuticals: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Helsinn Therapeutics: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding. Ravandi:AstraZeneca: Consultancy, Honoraria; Orsenix: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Amgen: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Abbvie: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Celgene: Consultancy, Honoraria; Xencor: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; BMS: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Jazz Pharmaceuticals: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Macrogenics: Research Funding; Astellas: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding. Andreeff:Centre for Drug Research & Development; Cancer UK; NCI-CTEP; German Research Council; Leukemia Lymphoma Foundation (LLS); NCI-RDCRN (Rare Disease Clin Network); CLL Founcdation; BioLineRx; SentiBio; Aptose Biosciences, Inc: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Amgen: Research Funding; Daiichi-Sankyo; Jazz Pharmaceuticals; Celgene; Amgen; AstraZeneca; 6 Dimensions Capital: Consultancy; Daiichi-Sankyo; Breast Cancer Research Foundation; CPRIT; NIH/NCI; Amgen; AstraZeneca: Research Funding. Daver:Daiichi Sankyo: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Astellas: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Novimmune: Research Funding; Gilead: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Amgen: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Trovagene: Research Funding; Fate Therapeutics: Research Funding; ImmunoGen: Research Funding; Novartis: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Celgene: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Jazz: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Trillium: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Syndax: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Amgen: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; KITE: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Agios: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Bristol-Myers Squibb: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Pfizer: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Karyopharm: Research Funding; Servier: Research Funding; Genentech: Research Funding; AbbVie: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding.

Society, the state, and the law – these are the three interrelated interacting institutions. From the society comes the initiative for the foundation of the state. The society may be strongly motivated in this process or it may follow the dream of independence intuitively. The state then creates the legal system for organization of the society and the existence of the state. Active representatives of the society who participate in the foundation, formation and strengthening of the state make an integral part of this process. These are representatives of different occupations – clergymen, writers, cultural figures, lawyers, etc. The aim of this research is to study the contribution of the lawyers of Latgale to the foundation of the Republic of Latvia and its development until 1940. Literature that covers three fields has been used in the research. First of all, this is the literature on the most important historical facts of Latvia and Latgale about the period of the First Free Republic of Latvia, finding the most active people who participated in these events. Secondly, literature about the 1917 Latgale Congress is analysed in the study, considering its significance in the foundation of the State and summarising its participants. Thirdly, literature about lives of these participants was studied, analysing their origin, relation to legal education and assessing the contribution of the representatives of Latgale justice system to the foundation and development of the State until 1940. The following research methods are used in the study: analytical, historical and systemic methods. The National Awakening of Latgale is traditionally associated with the period from 1904 until 1917, that is, from the lifting of the printing ban until Latgale Congress in Rēzekne on May 9 and 10, 1917. However, the supported opinion that the Awakening of Latgale has been already initiated between the 60s and the 80s of the 19th century is expressed more and more convincingly. In this period considerable activities of the Latgalian spirit are felt that led to freedom from the status of the Inflanty of the Vitebsk Governorate and to acquiring the name of Latgale. Thus, two representatives of the Latgale system of justice are to be mentioned in this period – Gustavs Manteifelis and Pīters Miglinīks. The lawyers of Latgale made a significant contribution to the foundation and formation of the Republic of Latvia. At the 1917 Latgale Congress, the Provisional Land Council of Latgale was formed that together with the Provisional Land Councils of Vidzeme and Courland worked in the Latvian Provisional National Council, promoting the foundation of the Republic of Latvia. The lawyers of Latgale also participated in this congress and were elected to the Provisional Land Council of Latgale (for example, Jānis Grišāns, Antons Laizāns, Pāvils Laizāns, Juris Pabērzs), as well as worked in the government of the Republic of Latvia – holding high official positions (for example, J. Pabērzs (Minister of Justice, Minister of Social Welfare), Pauls Mincs (Minister of Labour), Antons Rancāns (Minister of Transportation)), and achieving notable success in their professional activities (for example, A. Laizāns, J. Grišāns, Broņislavs Trubiņš, etc.), thus strengthening the Republic of Latvia. Despite the limited financial, social and other opportunities of the people of Latgale at the time, a relatively large number (12 people) of legal representatives made a significant contribution to the foundation of the State. The lawyers of Latgale generally came from farmers’ families; this fact only testifies to their fighting spirit. Access to legal education was relatively difficult because the nearest educational institutions that offered it were the University of Saint Petersburg, the University of Moscow and the University of Tartu. And only at the end of the period under study, such education was offered at the University of Latvia. Still, the representatives of Latgale obtained academic legal education, even at the Master’s degree level. In one exceptional case, legal skills were self-taught (P. Miglinīks), besides, to an excellent level. This is confirmed by the achievements of this lawyer of Latgale in practical activity and the contribution to the formation of the State. The origins of Latgale lawyers of the period under study covered practically the whole of Latgale, because their places of birth were in the districts of Rēzekne, Daugavpils, and Ludza. Even though some of them left for work in Rīga, some of them stayed in Latgale; still, regardless of the place of residence, the connection with Latgale was not lost, but contribution to the formation of the state was made. The activity of the lawyers of Latgale in the period under study was diverse in its content, wide in its range, and directed at a common aim. Firstly, through their professional activity they provided legal services, being, for example, lawyers, notaries, legal advisors; as well as provided legal aid to society, for instance, translating the Russian law into the Latgalian language, representing in court pro bono. Secondly, the lawyers of Latgale held high official positions, for example, there were three ministers among them, as well as members of parliament, state controllers, and judges. Thirdly, they also actively performed public activity, for example, joining societies (including professional societies), participating in publication of newspapers and other printed matter, being writers, poets, and songwriters. The activity of the lawyers of Latgale covered not only the national scale of Latvia, but high achievements were made at the international level both in social (G. Manteifelis) and professional (P. Mincs) activity. Furthermore, they worked as jurists, for example, P. Mincs, whose work was published again in the modern times. The work of all lawyers of Latgale was directed at a common aim – state under the rule of law – by promoting its foundation and strengthening the newly formed State. The significant contribution of the lawyers of Latgale to the interest of the State is also confirmed by the high awards received. Firstly, for the contribution to the benefit of the Republic of Latvia, national awards were received, such as the Order of the Three Stars, The Cross of Recognition, Lāčplēsis Military Order, and the Cross of Merit of Aizsargi. Secondly, for achievements on the international level, high awards of other states were received such as the Hungarian Order of Merit, the Russian Cross of Saint George, the Order of the Lithuanian Grand Duke Gediminas, an honorary diploma of the Leipzig museum, thus with honour representing the name of Latvia abroad. The contribution of the lawyers of Latgale is significant – in the implementation of the National Awakening of Latgale, in the foundation of the Republic of Latvia, in the development and strengthening of the Republic of Latvia. These historical events significant to the Republic of Latvia occurred with active involvement of the lawyers of Latgale and their important contribution.

Background Recent advances have led to higher response rates and improved survival in patients with newly diagnosed AML. However, early death, lack of response, and long term leukemia-free survival remain important challenges. Early mortality in AML has been reported to be as high as 20-30%. Similar to relapse risk, disease related factors (along with patient and treatment factors) may also contribute significantly to early mortality. Here we investigated predictors of early (4- and 8-week) mortality, response, relapse-free survival, and overall survival in a contemporary cohort from a single large academic medical center. Methods We analyzed all newly diagnosed patients with AML presenting to and treated at our institution from January 2012 to January 2020. For 4- and 8-week mortality and overall response rate (CR/CRi), logistic regression models were generated to identify factors associated with these outcomes. Kaplan-Meier methods were used to determine the median of the time to event outcomes. Cox proportional hazards modelswere used to identify any association with each of the variables and survival outcomes. Multivariate models were performed for all the outcomes, the models included variables with p<0.25 in the univariate analysis. Backward elimination methods were used to determine a final multivariate models for each outcome. Results Our cohort included 1576 consecutive patients (pts) with newly diagnosed AML with a median follow-up of 11 months (range 0 - 96). The median age is 66 (range: 17 - 94), with 66% of pts being ≥ 60 years (yrs) old. By 2017 ELN risk classification, 44% were classified as adverse, 31% intermediate, and 25% were favorable risk. To simplify induction regimens, we classified patients as receiving intensive (high dose Ara-C based), low intensity, and low intensity with venetoclax. 44% received intensive, 42% received low intensity, and 14% received low intensity with venetoclax therapy. The 4- and 8-week mortality rates were 5% and 11%, respectively. Among pts < 60 yrs the 4- and 8 week mortality rates were 3% and 5%, respectively; while those rates in pts ≥ 60 yrs were 6% and 14%, respectively. In the final reduced models the following factors are associated with both increased 4- and 8-week mortality: elevated baseline total bilirubin, age ≥ 60, and ELN intermediate and adverse risk classifications, when compared to ELN favorable. Elevated baseline WBC and bone marrow blasts were associated with 8-week but not 4-week mortality. Baseline platelet count ≥ 8k/µL was associated with reduced 4 and 8-week mortality. Among 97 pts who died between 4 and 8 weeks 87 patients (90%) had active disease or no response to their initial therapy, suggesting disease refractoriness as an important contributor to early death. The factors associated with decreased CR/CRi were increased baseline peripheral blasts, total bilirubin, serum creatinine, age ≥ 60, and ELN risk classifications when compared to favorable risk disease. Treatment with low intensity plus venetoclax and intensive therapy were associated with increased CR/CRi rates as was baseline platelet count ≥ 8k/µL. Median relapse-free survival for the cohort is 8 months (95% CI: 7- 9). Median overall survival for the cohort is 13 months (95% CI: 12- 14), with median OS for those ≥ 60 yrs: 10months (95%CI: 9- 11) and those < 60 yrs: 37months (95%CI: 24- 67). Factors associated with increased hazard of both relapse and death were increased baseline total bilirubin, creatinine, age ≥ 60, and ELN risk classifications when compared favorable disease. Factors associated with decreased hazard of both relapse and death were treatment with low intensity plus venetoclax and intensive therapy when compared to low intensity, and baseline hemoglobin ≥ 9 g/dl and platelet count ≥ 8k/µL. Conclusion In this study, using a contemporary cohort of consecutive, unselected AML patients, we identified parameters associated with early mortality, response, relapse-free, and overall survival. Compared to published historical data, patients at a high-volume academic center experienced lower early mortality and favorable long term outcomes. We identify both patient (i.e. baseline organ dysfunction) and disease (i.e. ELN risk) intrinsic characteristics that have a significant impact clinical outcomes in patients with AML. Further analysis including the impact mutational groups outside of ELN and treatment on or off investigational trials will be presented. Disclosures Ravandi: Xencor: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; AstraZeneca: Consultancy, Honoraria; Jazz Pharmaceuticals: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Abbvie: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Macrogenics: Research Funding; BMS: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Orsenix: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Celgene: Consultancy, Honoraria; Astellas: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Amgen: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding. Sasaki:Novartis: Consultancy, Research Funding; Pfizer Japan: Consultancy; Otsuka: Honoraria; Daiichi Sankyo: Consultancy. Borthakur:FTC Therapeutics: Consultancy; BioLine Rx: Consultancy; BioTherix: Consultancy; Nkarta Therapeutics: Consultancy; Treadwell Therapeutics: Consultancy; Curio Science LLC: Consultancy; Oncoceutics: Research Funding; Xbiotech USA: Research Funding; Polaris: Research Funding; AstraZeneca: Research Funding; BMS: Research Funding; BioLine Rx: Research Funding; Cyclacel: Research Funding; GSK: Research Funding; Jannsen: Research Funding; Abbvie: Research Funding; Novartis: Research Funding; Incyte: Research Funding; PTC Therapeutics: Research Funding; PTC Therapeutics: Consultancy; Argenx: Consultancy. Garcia-Manero:Bristol-Myers Squibb: Consultancy, Research Funding; Astex Pharmaceuticals: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Onconova: Research Funding; Acceleron Pharmaceuticals: Consultancy, Honoraria; H3 Biomedicine: Research Funding; AbbVie: Honoraria, Research Funding; Helsinn Therapeutics: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Novartis: Research Funding; Genentech: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Amphivena Therapeutics: Research Funding; Celgene: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Jazz Pharmaceuticals: Consultancy; Merck: Research Funding. Daver:Bristol-Myers Squibb: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Pfizer: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Karyopharm: Research Funding; Servier: Research Funding; Genentech: Research Funding; AbbVie: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Astellas: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Novimmune: Research Funding; Gilead: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Amgen: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Trovagene: Research Funding; Fate Therapeutics: Research Funding; ImmunoGen: Research Funding; Novartis: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Celgene: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Jazz: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Trillium: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Syndax: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Amgen: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; KITE: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Agios: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Daiichi Sankyo: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding. DiNardo:Novartis: Consultancy; Daiichi Sankyo: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Agios: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Celgene: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Jazz: Honoraria; ImmuneOnc: Honoraria; AbbVie: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Syros: Honoraria; MedImmune: Honoraria; Takeda: Honoraria; Calithera: Research Funding; Notable Labs: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees. Jabbour:Pfizer: Other: Advisory role, Research Funding; Genentech: Other: Advisory role, Research Funding; BMS: Other: Advisory role, Research Funding; Adaptive Biotechnologies: Other: Advisory role, Research Funding; AbbVie: Other: Advisory role, Research Funding; Amgen: Other: Advisory role, Research Funding; Takeda: Other: Advisory role, Research Funding. Pemmaraju:AbbVie: Honoraria, Research Funding; Incyte Corporation: Honoraria; Novartis: Honoraria, Research Funding; MustangBio: Honoraria; Daiichi Sankyo: Research Funding; SagerStrong Foundation: Other: Grant Support; DAVA Oncology: Honoraria; Cellectis: Research Funding; Plexxikon: Research Funding; Samus Therapeutics: Research Funding; Stemline Therapeutics: Honoraria, Research Funding; Pacylex Pharmaceuticals: Consultancy; LFB Biotechnologies: Honoraria; Affymetrix: Other: Grant Support, Research Funding; Blueprint Medicines: Honoraria; Roche Diagnostics: Honoraria; Celgene: Honoraria. Andreeff:Centre for Drug Research & Development; Cancer UK; NCI-CTEP; German Research Council; Leukemia Lymphoma Foundation (LLS); NCI-RDCRN (Rare Disease Clin Network); CLL Founcdation; BioLineRx; SentiBio; Aptose Biosciences, Inc: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Daiichi-Sankyo; Breast Cancer Research Foundation; CPRIT; NIH/NCI; Amgen; AstraZeneca: Research Funding; Amgen: Research Funding; Daiichi-Sankyo; Jazz Pharmaceuticals; Celgene; Amgen; AstraZeneca; 6 Dimensions Capital: Consultancy. Verstovsek:Incyte Corporation: Consultancy, Research Funding; Roche: Research Funding; AstraZeneca: Research Funding; PharmaEssentia: Research Funding; Sierra Oncology: Consultancy, Research Funding; Novartis: Consultancy, Research Funding; Blueprint Medicines Corp: Research Funding; Gilead: Research Funding; Promedior: Research Funding; Genentech: Research Funding; CTI Biopharma Corp: Research Funding; ItalPharma: Research Funding; Protagonist Therapeutics: Research Funding; Celgene: Consultancy, Research Funding; NS Pharma: Research Funding. Jain:Janssen: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Cellectis: Research Funding; Servier: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Pfizer: Research Funding; Verastem: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Incyte: Research Funding; Pharmacyclics: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; AbbVie: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Genentech: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; AstraZeneca: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; BMS: Research Funding; BeiGene: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; ADC Therapeutics: Research Funding; Adaptive Biotechnologies: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Precision Bioscienes: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Fate Therapeutics: Research Funding; Aprea Therapeutics: Research Funding; TG Therapeutics: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees. Konopleva:AbbVie: Consultancy, Research Funding; Genentech: Consultancy, Research Funding; Stemline Therapeutics: Consultancy, Research Funding; Sanofi: Research Funding; Rafael Pharmaceutical: Research Funding; Reata Pharmaceutical Inc.;: Patents & Royalties: patents and royalties with patent US 7,795,305 B2 on CDDO-compounds and combination therapies, licensed to Reata Pharmaceutical; Eli Lilly: Research Funding; Agios: Research Funding; Ablynx: Research Funding; Forty-Seven: Consultancy, Research Funding; Amgen: Consultancy; Calithera: Research Funding; Kisoji: Consultancy; Cellectis: Research Funding; AstraZeneca: Research Funding; F. Hoffmann La-Roche: Consultancy, Research Funding; Ascentage: Research Funding. Kantarjian:Abbvie: Honoraria, Research Funding; Amgen: Honoraria, Research Funding; Ascentage: Research Funding; BMS: Research Funding; Daiichi-Sankyo: Honoraria, Research Funding; Immunogen: Research Funding; Jazz: Research Funding; Novartis: Honoraria, Research Funding; Pfizer: Honoraria, Research Funding; Sanofi: Research Funding; Actinium: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Adaptive biotechnologies: Honoraria; Aptitute Health: Honoraria; BioAscend: Honoraria; Delta Fly: Honoraria; Janssen: Honoraria; Oxford Biomedical: Honoraria. Kadia:Cyclacel: Research Funding; Novartis: Honoraria; Incyte: Research Funding; Genentech: Honoraria, Research Funding; Cellenkos: Research Funding; Ascentage: Research Funding; Pulmotec: Research Funding; Astra Zeneca: Research Funding; Celgene: Research Funding; Abbvie: Honoraria, Research Funding; JAZZ: Honoraria, Research Funding; BMS: Honoraria, Research Funding; Astellas: Research Funding; Amgen: Research Funding; Pfizer: Honoraria, Research Funding.

It has become an overused, indeed dated, cliché to claim that the European Union (EU) is at a crossroads. Today it is more common, and perhaps also more accurate, to argue that the EU faces an existential crisis. This is not just an academic opinion, but the language that is increasingly present in the EU’s political, policy and strategic documents. The changing, indeed deteriorating, domestic, regional and global security environment, which has openly put the very existence of the EU at risk, has consequently increased demands for a genuine and robust EU common security and defence policy (CSDP). The latter is not a recent invention. It has a long history, with many ups and downs, not unlike the process of European integration, in which concerns about national sovereignty and related national comprehensive, if too often parochial, priorities have been struggling to match normative ambitions, and solemn declarations that have been developed in response to the actual growing security concerns. How have the EU and its Member States coped with the Scylla of national sovereigntist defence priorities and the Charybdis of the objective needs of supranational cooperation in the dire straits of the CSDP? What are the current most acute security challenges? What can or should be done to improve the CSDP and are there grounds for pessimism or optimism with a view to its future development? These are the questions that this special issue of Contemporary Military Challenges, dedicated to the CSDP, explores across five articles written by legal, international, social and security science academics, as well as security and defence experts. The picture these articles have painted is a mixed one. Modest optimism in terms of the progress of the CSDP mechanisms is combined with chagrin related to missed opportunities, too often due to the culture of non-compliance, and concerns related to the changes taking place in the overall global model of governance. The latter are particularly addressed in the article penned by Senčar. He persuasively demonstrates how, in the course of the last 20 years, the European post-Cold War consensus and mindset, embedded in the Kantian ideals of liberal democracy, rule of law, protection of human rights and solidarity in and between the states has gradually, but almost without notice, given way to a Hobbesian, strategic and competitive world order, primed by national sovereigntist interests. However, due to technological progress, the collapse of the post-Cold War consensus and the resulting change in paradigm possesses new, as yet still unexplored security threats, which will affect nothing as much as our minds. As Senčar powerfully demonstrates, contemporary and, in particular, future warfare will be directed against our heads, featuring a paramount cognitive dimension. It is for this reason that the EU and its Member States must invest in the cognitive aspects of the CSDP, in particular with an eye on the leading revisionist power, Russia. However, to do so the EU must be in possession of the necessary and appropriate competencies, backed by a sufficient national political will. The remaining four articles are thus dedicated to the examination of this issue. The article by Katarina Vatovec comes across as the most optimistic. She traces the process of the ‘communitarization’ of the EU’s defence policies and identifies the required socio-political grounds for strengthening this process in the future. In her view, communitarization, which has traditionally stood for bringing a particular policy field from an intergovernmental to a supranational pillar, subject to an ordinary legislative procedure based on qualified majority voting, can be gradually introduced through the presence of a sufficient political will resulting from actual experience, successfully implemented policy initiatives, and growing awareness of the increasing security threats. While according to this author the future of the European Defence Union remains in the hands of the Member States and intergovernmental cooperation, following the important breakthrough with the Treaty of Lisbon, a number of institutional, legal, policy, soft-law and financial measures have intensified the functioning of EU defence policy and, simultaneously, driven it in the direction of further communitarization. The article by Dick Zandee partakes of a similar normative premise. He believes that the CSDP is faced with the dilemma of making a breakthrough or simply continuing to muddle through. For him the answer is unequivocal. What is needed is a breakthrough, which would contribute to closing the gap between rhetorical commitments and action. A concrete opportunity for that is presented by the Strategic Compass. This is envisaged as a concrete, ambitious and actionable tool that should provide tangible direction for the EU’s role in security and defence over the next five or ten years. To meet this goal, according to Zandee, nothing is required more than realism. The article thus concludes by laying down eight concrete and realistic actions by which the EU could break out of its current status quo in the CSDP and turn itself into a truly global power before it is too late. Aleksandra Koziol’s contribution, quite fittingly, complements Zandee’s contribution by putting some empirical flesh on the normative agenda. She describes the EU’s current security and defence engagement in Europe and abroad, the major challenges that it poses, and the actual capacity of the EU to address them. This remains relatively weak and sometimes questionable for a variety of political, organizational, financial and sometimes also ad hoc reasons. The latter are currently the most explicit in form of the Covid-9 pandemic, which has importantly hampered, as the author demonstrates, the European Commission’s ambition of assuming the role of a geopolitical commission. In the author’s opinion it is decisive for the future development of the CSDP that the EU simultaneously builds on the civilian and the military side of the CSDP and develops its capacities for early warnings, early actions and a rapid response. Finally, the article by Jelena Juvan, after describing the historical evolution of the CSDP in the context of European integration, looks into the future of CDSP, paying special attention to the role of small Member States, such as Slovenia, in it. The author notes that size matters, and that the development of supranational security and defence structures could especially work to the advantage of the small Member States. Their capacity to shape the development of the CSDP is, however, limited, unless they invest in specialization and cooperation, and also prudently seize the opportunity when presiding over the Council of the EU in their mediating and to an extent also agenda-setting role. While time will tell how Slovenia is going to use its opportunity as the head of the Council of the EU, the article insists that, especially for small Member States with limited human and financial resources, setting the CSDP priorities matter most. When these are set and the agreements entered into, they must also be delivered upon. In the opposite case a culture of non-compliance prevails, which effectively leaves the CSDP as only a half-built house. In conclusion, the five reviewed articles contained in this volume yet again confirm Kintis’ impression that the field of the CSDP, more than any other EU policy field, is torn between ambition and paralysis. This results, in particular, from the discrepancy between the ever-changing security and defence challenges brought about by an increasingly dynamic global environment, and the actual EU capacity to address them that is, in turn, dependent on the national political will. The articles contained in this volume express their concerns with the slow progress of the CSDP, but they also try to overcome it by putting forward some new proposals or, at least, by raising the right questions. Eventually, however, the CSDP can only make a real, qualitative and required step forward when a consensus on the legal and political nature of the EU is formed. As long as the latter stays in its current, sui-generis, hybrid form, the CSDP will remain stuck between ‘ambition and paralyzis’. The operationalization of the CSDP and its actual functional character thus first requires the addressing of the constitutional question of the nature, object and purpose of the European Union itself.

Abstract Background: A histologic finding of large cell transformation (LCT) in Mycosis fungoides (MF) is often associated with an aggressive clinical course and inferior prognosis (Arulogun et al. Blood 2008). In patients (pts) with advanced MF (stage IIB-IV), LCT has been established as an independent prognostic factor (Scarisbrick et al. JCO 2015). Although CD30 expression is observed more frequently in MF with LCT vs without LCT, a wide range of CD30 expression levels is observed in LCT lesions and the level of expression lacks prognostic value for MF (Vergier et al. Blood. 2000). The ALCANZA study (NCT01578499) demonstrated significantly better rates of objective response lasting ≥4 months (ORR4) (∆43.8%; p<0.0001) and progression-free survival (PFS) (16.7 months vs 3.5 months; p<0.0001) with brentuximab vedotin vs physician's choice (PC) of oral methotrexate or bexarotene in adults with previously treated CD30+ MF or primary cutaneous anaplastic large-cell lymphoma (Prince et al. Lancet 2017). Despite variability in CD30 expression, significant improvements in ORR4 and PFS were consistently seen with brentuximab vedotin over PC, across all CD30 expression levels in pts with MF. This post-hoc analysis characterized the proportion of pts with LCT, efficacy of brentuximab vedotin in pts with LCT and relationship to CD30 expression. Methods: Analyses were performed on skin biopsies taken from 98 pts with previously treated CD30+ MF who were randomized 1:1 to receive brentuximab vedotin or PC. CD30 expression levels were measured by immunohistochemistry on samples obtained during screening of pts for the ALCANZA study. LCT status at baseline was assessed using ≥2 biopsies obtained at screening; pts were deemed to have LCT if any biopsy showed presence of LCT (large cells - with nuclei ≥4 times larger than those of normal lymphocytes - present in >25% of total dermal infiltrate or forming microscopic nodules). Objective response rates lasting ≥4 months (ORR4), PFS, and safety endpoints were assessed according to LCT and CD30 expression. Results: Baseline demographics and LCT status by disease stage are described in Table 1. In both arms, 17/49 pts (35%) pts had LCT, and LCT was found more frequently in stage IIB pts (59% [brentuximab vedotin] and 41% [PC]). Brentuximab vedotin improved ORR4 vs PC in pts with LCT (11/17 [64.7%] vs 3/17 [17.6%]; p=0.006) and without LCT (12/31 [38.7%] vs 2/31 [6.5%]; p=0.003) (Table 2). Median PFS improved with brentuximab vedotin vs PC in pts with LCT (15.5 vs 2.8 months; HR=0.304; 95% CI 0.139, 0.668; p=0.002) and without LCT (16.1 vs 3.5 months; HR=0.364; 95% CI 0.200, 0.662; p<0.001). Median PFS follow-up times were 26.0 months (both arms, pts without LCT), 36.0 months (brentuximab vedotin arm, pts with LCT), and not estimable (PC arm, pts with LCT). Grade ≥3 adverse event (AE), drug-related grade ≥3 AE and serious AE rates were similar across LCT status groups (Table 2), and CD30 expression levels and were not associated with treatment-emergent AEs in the brentuximab vedotin arm. In pts with LCT, median average CD30 expression was 50% of total dermal infiltrate (range 3-95%) in the brentuximab vedotin arm and 35% (6.3-97.5%) in the PC arm (Figure 1), although pts with high baseline average CD30 expression (upper tercile of all enrolled MF pts) were more likely to have LCT; in the high CD30 expression sub-group, 56% and 64% of pts had LCT in the brentuximab vedotin and PC arms, respectively. Globally, pts with LCT treated with brentuximab vedotin who achieved an ORR4 had higher median average baseline CD30 levels (65%) vs pts who did not attain ORR4 (20%). Of the pts with LCT who achieved an ORR4, 9/11 pts in the brentuximab vedotin arm had baseline average CD30 expression levels ≥40%, but responses were also noted in the 2 pts with low average CD30 levels (10% and 17.5%). Conclusions: Previously, there were limited data on the relationship between LCT status and clinical outcome or CD30 expression in MF pts treated with brentuximab vedotin. Our analyses demonstrated that pts with MF benefitted from brentuximab vedotin regardless of LCT status. A wide range of CD30 expression levels was observed in pts with MF and LCT. In these pts, high baseline CD30 expression levels were generally predictive of a good response to treatment with brentuximab vedotin although meaningful responses were observed in those with lower CD30 levels. Disclosures Kim: Merck: Research Funding; Eisai: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Tetralogic: Research Funding; Seattle Genetics: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Innate Pharma: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; miRagen: Research Funding; Medivir: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Kyowa-Kirin-Pharma: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Horizon Pharma: Consultancy, Research Funding; Portola: Research Funding; Soligenix: Research Funding; Takeda: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Galderma: Research Funding; Forty Seven Inc: Research Funding; Neumedicine: Consultancy, Research Funding. Prince:Celgene: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Janssen Cilag: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Novartis: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Takeda: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Amgen: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees. Whittaker:Galderma: Research Funding. Horwitz:Trillium: Consultancy; ADC Therapeutics: Consultancy, Research Funding; Millennium/Takeda: Consultancy, Research Funding; Celgene: Consultancy, Research Funding; Spectrum: Research Funding; Infinity/Verastem: Consultancy, Research Funding; Kyowa-Hakka-Kirin: Consultancy, Research Funding; Aileron Therapeutics: Consultancy, Research Funding; Forty Seven: Consultancy, Research Funding; Portola: Consultancy; Mundipharma: Consultancy; Innate Pharma: Consultancy; Seattle Genetics: Consultancy, Research Funding; Corvus: Consultancy. Duvic:UT MD Anderson Cancer Center: Employment; Shape: Research Funding; Concert Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Consultancy; Forty Seven, Inc.: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Precision Oncology, LLC: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Aclaris Therapeutics Int'l Ltd.: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; MEDACorp: Consultancy; Cell Medica Inc.: Consultancy, Honoraria; Medscape: Other: Speaker/Preceptor; Array Biopharma: Consultancy, Honoraria; American Council on Extracorporeal Photopheresis (ACE): Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Medivir AB: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Spatz Foundation: Research Funding; Rhizen Pharma: Research Funding; Dr. Reddy's Laboratories (A.K.A. Promius Pharma): Consultancy; Mallinckrddt Pharmaceuticals (formerly Therakos): Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Kiniksa Pharmaceuticals: Consultancy; The Lynx Group: Consultancy; MiRagen Therapeutics: Consultancy; Guidepoint Global: Consultancy; Soligenix, Inc.: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Huya Bioscience Int'l: Consultancy; Seattle Genetics: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Evidera, Inc.: Consultancy; Huron Consulting Group: Consultancy; Defined Health: Consultancy; Taiwan Liposome Company LTD: Consultancy; Jonathan Wood & Associates: Other: Speaker; Celgene Corp: Consultancy, Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Eisai: Research Funding; Allos: Research Funding; Oncoceuticals: Research Funding; Tetralogics: Research Funding; Kyowa Hakko Kirin, Co: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Clinical Care Options: Consultancy. Bechter:MSD: Consultancy; Pierre Fabre: Consultancy; Sanofi: Consultancy; Bristol Myers Squibb: Consultancy; Novartis: Consultancy. Stadler:ICN: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Novartis: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Roche: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Takeda: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Seattle Genetics: Consultancy; Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Incmited: Consultancy; Johnson and Johnson: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees. Scarisbrick:Takeda harmaceuticals: Consultancy. Zinzani:Roche: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Verastem: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Speakers Bureau; Bayer: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Janssen: Honoraria, Speakers Bureau; Takeda: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; MSD: Honoraria, Speakers Bureau; PFIZER: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Bayer: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; BMS: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Speakers Bureau; Merck: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Astra Zeneca: Speakers Bureau; TG Pharmaceuticals: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; SERVIER: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Speakers Bureau; PFIZER: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Celltrion: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Speakers Bureau; TG Pharmaceuticals: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Merck: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Celgene: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Speakers Bureau; Gilead: Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Speakers Bureau. Eradat:Novartis: Research Funding; Celgene: Research Funding; Gilead: Honoraria, Research Funding; Roche: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Genentech: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Abbvie: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Pharmacyclics: Research Funding. Ortiz-Romero:Actelion: Consultancy; Innate Pharma: Consultancy; 4SC: Consultancy; Takeda: Consultancy; MEDA: Research Funding; Patent of PLG1 mutation for diagnostic or treatment of cutaneous lymphomas: Patents & Royalties: Patent of PLG1 mutation for diagnostic or treatment of cutaneous lymphomas; Janssen: Other: Travel Expenses; Roche: Other: Travel Expenses; Abbvie: Other: Travel Expenses. Akilov:Kyowa Kirin: Consultancy; Seattle Genetics: Consultancy; Pfizer: Research Funding; Trillium Therapeutics: Research Funding; Actelion Pharmaceuticals: Consultancy. Trotman:PCYC: Research Funding; Jassen: Research Funding; Celgene: Research Funding; Roche: Research Funding; Janssen: Research Funding; Beigene: Research Funding. Weichenthal:Takeda: Consultancy; Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Cambridge, MA, USA, a wholly owned subsidiary of Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited: Research Funding; TEVA: Other: Grant. Fisher:Genetech: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Pharmacyclics: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Seattle Genetics Inc.: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees. McNeeley:Quest Diagnostics: Employment, Equity Ownership. Gru:Seattle Genetics: Consultancy, Honoraria, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; BMS: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees. Wang:Seattle Genetics, Inc.: Employment, Equity Ownership. Palanca-Wessels:Seattle Genetics, Inc.: Employment, Equity Ownership. Lisano:Seattle Genetics: Employment, Equity Ownership. Li:Seattle Genetics, Inc.: Employment. Lin:Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited: Employment, Equity Ownership. Little:Takeda: Employment, Equity Ownership. Trepicchio:Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited: Employment. Dummer:Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS): Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Sun Pharma: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Novartis: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Pierre Fabre: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Takeda: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Merck Sharp & Dhome (MSD): Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Amgen: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Roche: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees.

Background Treatment of older patients with newly diagnosed AML has been limited by modest response rates with low-intensity therapy and higher levels of toxicity with intensive therapy. We previously reported on a low-intensity backbone of cladribine + LDAC (CLAD/LDAC) alternating with hypomethylating agent (HMA) for older patients with AML, yielding higher rates of CR and improved outcomes compared to HMAs alone. Recently, addition of the BCL-2 inhibitor venetoclax to HMAs was shown, in a randomized study, to improve survival over HMAs alone. We hypothesized that the addition of venetoclax to the low intensity CLAD/LDAC backbone may further improve response rates and outcomes for this group of patients. Methods This is a phase II clinical trial studying the combination of venetoclax with CLAD/LDAC alternating with 5-azacytidine (AZA) in older (age ≥ 60y) or unfit patients with newly diagnosed AML (excluding APL, CBF). Induction was cladribine 5 mg/m2 IV over 30 minutes on D1-5 followed by araC 20mg SQ BID on D1-10. Consolidation/maintenance consisted of 2 cycles of cladribine 5 mg/m2 IV on D1-3 + araC 20 mg SQ BID on D1-10 alternating with 2 cycles of AZA 75 mg/m2 on D1-7, for up to 18 cycles. Venetoclax 400 mg was added on days 1-21 of each cycle with dose adjustments for concomitant CYP3A inhibitors. One cycle was 4 weeks and up to 2 cycles of induction were allowed. Results A total of 48 patients were treated on study, with a median age of 68 yrs (57-84); 18 (38%) pts were ≥ 70 yrs and 1 pt &lt; 60 yrs who was unfit for intensive chemotherapy was enrolled. 12 (25%) patients had secondary AML (sAML) and 12 (25%) had adverse karyotype. The baseline patient characteristics are summarized in Table 1. Among 48 evaluable pts, 37 (77%) achieved a complete remission (CR), 8 (17%) had a CR with incomplete count recovery (CRi) for a CR/CRi rate of 94%. The median number of cycles to response was 1 (1-3) and 36 (80%) pts were negative for MRD by multi-parameter flow cytometry at the time of CR/CRi. Among the subset of patients who had CR with complete count recovery, the MRD negative rate was 92% (34/37). Among pts with sAML or with adverse karyotype, the CR/CRi rate was 83% (58%/25%) and 83% (50%/33%), respectively. The regimen was well tolerated, with 4- and 8-week mortality rates of 0% and 6%, respectively. The most frequent grade 3/4 non-heme adverse events were neutropenic fever (n=20), lung infection (9), decreased urine output (2), nausea (1), acute kidney injury (1), dizziness (1), and mucositis (1). Eleven (24%) of the 45 responding pts proceeded with allogeneic stem cell transplant (SCT). With a median follow-up of 11+ months, the median overall survival (OS) has not been reached (NR), with 6- and 12-month OS rates of 86% and 70%, respectively (Figure 1). The median OS of pts with or without MRD at CR were 10.7m and NR, respectively (P=0.056). For pts with sAML vs. de novo AML, the median OS was 10.6m vs. NR, respectively (P=0.09). OS by cytogenetic risk is shown in Figures 2. OS among different subgroups are summarized in Table. The median RFS was not reached, with 6- and 12-month RFS rates of 79% and 64%, respectively. Conclusion CLAD/LDAC plus venetoclax alternating with AZA plus venetoclax is an effective, lower-intensity regimen that is well tolerated among older patients with newly diagnosed AML, producing high rates of durable MRD negative remission and meaningful blood count recovery. With approximately 1-year follow-up, the rates of overall and relapse-free survival are encouraging in this cohort of older AML patients. Further study of this backbone in combination approaches is warranted. Disclosures Kadia: Incyte: Research Funding; Novartis: Honoraria; Cellenkos: Research Funding; Amgen: Research Funding; Pfizer: Honoraria, Research Funding; BMS: Honoraria, Research Funding; Cyclacel: Research Funding; Astra Zeneca: Research Funding; Ascentage: Research Funding; Genentech: Honoraria, Research Funding; Pulmotec: Research Funding; Astellas: Research Funding; Celgene: Research Funding; JAZZ: Honoraria, Research Funding; Abbvie: Honoraria, Research Funding. 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Pemmaraju:Samus Therapeutics: Research Funding; Cellectis: Research Funding; Roche Diagnostics: Honoraria; Celgene: Honoraria; Stemline Therapeutics: Honoraria, Research Funding; Pacylex Pharmaceuticals: Consultancy; DAVA Oncology: Honoraria; SagerStrong Foundation: Other: Grant Support; AbbVie: Honoraria, Research Funding; Plexxikon: Research Funding; LFB Biotechnologies: Honoraria; Incyte Corporation: Honoraria; Blueprint Medicines: Honoraria; Novartis: Honoraria, Research Funding; Affymetrix: Other: Grant Support, Research Funding; Daiichi Sankyo: Research Funding; MustangBio: Honoraria. 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DiNardo:Novartis: Consultancy; ImmuneOnc: Honoraria; Celgene: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Jazz: Honoraria; Takeda: Honoraria; Notable Labs: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; AbbVie: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Daiichi Sankyo: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Agios: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Syros: Honoraria; Calithera: Research Funding; MedImmune: Honoraria. Sasaki:Otsuka: Honoraria; Daiichi Sankyo: Consultancy; Pfizer Japan: Consultancy; Novartis: Consultancy, Research Funding. Issa:Novartis: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Syndax: Research Funding; Celegene: Research Funding. Short:Astellas: Research Funding; Amgen: Honoraria; Takeda Oncology: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; AstraZeneca: Consultancy. 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OffLabel Disclosure: This combination is investigational.

AbstractThe nucleus of the collection of paintings in the Mauritshuis around 130 pictures - came from the hereditary stadholder Prince William v. It is widely believed to have become, the property of the State at the beginning of the 19th century, but how this happened is still. unclear. A hand-written notebook on this subject, compiled in 1876 by - the director Jonkheer J. K. L. de Jonge is in the archives of the Mauritshuis Note 4). On this basis a clnsor systematic and chronological investigation has been carried out into the stadholder's. property rights in respect of his collectcons and the changes these underwent between 1795 and 1816. Royal decrees and other documents of the period 1814- 16 in particular giae a clearer picture of whal look place. 0n 18 January 1795 William V (Fig. 2) left the Netherlands and fled to England. On 22 January the Dutch Republic was occupied by French armies. Since France had declared war on the stadholder, the ownership of all his propergy in the Netherlands, passed to France, in accordance with the laws of war of the time. His famous art collections on the Builerth of in. The Hague were taken to Paris, but the remaining art objects, distributed over his various houses, remained in the Netherlands. On 16 May 1795 the French concluded a treaty with the Batavian Republic, recognizing it as an independent power. All the properties of William v in the Netehrlands but not those taken to France, were made over to the Republic (Note 14), which proceeded to sell objects from the collections, at least seven sales taking place until 1798 (Note 15). A plan was then evolved to bring the remaining treasures together in a museum in emulation of the French. On the initiative of J. A. Gogel, the Nationale Konst-Galerij', the first national museum in the .Netherlands, was estahlished in The Hague and opened to the public on ,31 May 1800. Nothing was ever sold from lhe former stadholder's library and in 1798 a Nationale Bibliotheek was founded as well. In 1796, quite soon after the French had carried off the Stadholder, possessions to Paris or made them over to the Batavian Republic, indemnification was already mentioned (Note 19). However, only in the Trealy of Amiens of 180 and a subaequent agreement, between France ararl Prussia of 1 802, in which the Prince of Orarage renounced his and his heirs' rights in the Netherlands, did Prussia provide a certain compensation in the form of l.artds in Weslphalia and Swabia (Note 24) - William v left the management of these areas to the hereditary prince , who had already been involved in the problems oncerning his father's former possessions. In 1804 the Balavian Republic offered a sum of five million guilders 10 plenipotentiaries of the prince as compensation for the sequestrated titles and goods, including furniture, paintings, books and rarities'. This was accepted (Notes 27, 28), but the agreement was never carried out as the Batavian Republic failed to ratify the payment. In the meantime the Nationale Bibliolkeek and the Nationale Konst-Galerij had begun to develop, albeit at first on a small scale. The advent of Louis Napoleon as King of Hollarad in 1806 brought great changes. He made a start on a structured art policy. In 1806 the library, now called `Royal', was moved to the Mauritshuis and in 1808 the collectiorts in The Hague were transferred to Amsterdam, where a Koninklijk Museum was founded, which was housed in the former town hall. This collection was subsequertly to remain in Amsterdam, forming the nucleus of the later Rijksmuseum. The library too was intended to be transferred to Amsterdam, but this never happened and it remained in the Mauritshuis until 1819. Both institutions underwent a great expansion in the period 1806-10, the library's holdings increasing from around 10,000 to over 45,000 books and objects, while the museum acquired a number of paintings, the most important being Rembrandt's Night Watch and Syndics, which were placed in the new museum by the City of Amsterdam in 1808 (Note 44). In 1810 the Netherlands was incorporated into France. In the art field there was now a complete standstill and in 1812 books and in particular prints (around 11,000 of them) were again taken from The Hague to Paris. In November 1813 the French dominion was ended and on 2 December the hereditary prince, William Frederick, was declared sovereign ruler. He was inaugurated as constitutional monarch on 30 March 1814. On January 3rd the provisional council of The Hague had already declared that the city was in (unlawful' possession of a library, a collection of paintings, prints and other objects of art and science and requested the king tot take them back. The war was over and what had been confiscated from William under the laws of war could now be given back, but this never happened. By Royal Decree of 14 January 1814 Mr. ( later Baron) A. J. C. Lampsins (Fig. I ) was commissioned to come to an understanding with the burgomaster of The Hague over this transfer, to bring out a report on the condition of the objects and to formulate a proposal on the measures to be taken (Note 48). On 17 January Lampsins submitted a memorandum on the taking over of the Library as the private property of His Royal Highness the Sovereign of the United Netherlartds'. Although Lampsins was granted the right to bear the title 'Interim Director of the Royal Library' by a Royal Decree of 9 February 1814, William I did not propose to pay The costs himself ; they were to be carried by the Home Office (Note 52). Thus he left the question of ownership undecided. On 18 April Lampsins brought out a detailed report on all the measures to be taken (Appendix IIa ) . His suggestion was that the objects, formerly belonging to the stadholder should be removed from the former royal museum, now the Rijksmuseum, in Amsterdam and to return the 'Library', as the collectiort of books, paintings and prints in The Hague was called, to the place where they had been in 1795. Once again the king's reaction was not very clear. Among other things, he said that he wanted to wait until it was known how extensive the restitution of objects from Paris would be and to consider in zvhich scholarly context the collections would best, fit (Note 54) . While the ownership of the former collections of Prince William I was thus left undecided, a ruling had already been enacted in respect of the immovable property. By the Constitution of 1814, which came into effect on 30 March, the king was granted a high income, partly to make up for the losses he had sulfered. A Royal Decree of 22 January 1815 does, however, imply that William had renounced the right to his, father's collections, for he let it be known that he had not only accepted the situation that had developed in the Netherlands since 1795, but also wished it to be continued (Note 62). The restitution of the collections carried off to France could only be considered in its entirety after the defeat of Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo on 18 June 1815- This was no simple matter, but in the end most, though not all, of the former possessions of William V were returned to the Netherlands. What was not or could not be recovered then (inc.uding 66 paintings, for example) is still in France today (Note 71)- On 20 November 1815 127 paintings, including Paulus Potter's Young Bull (Fig. 15), made a ceremonial entry into The Hague. But on 6 October, before anything had actually been returned, it had already been stipulated by Royal Decree that the control of the objects would hence forlh be in the hands of the State (Note 72). Thus William I no longer regarded his father's collections as the private property of the House of Orange, but he did retain the right to decide on the fulure destiny of the... painting.s and objects of art and science'. For the time being the paintings were replaced in the Gallery on the Buitenhof, from which they had been removed in 1795 (Note 73). In November 1815 the natural history collection was made the property of Leiden University (Note 74), becoming the basis for the Rijksmuseum voor Natuurlijke Historie, The print collection, part of the Royal Library in The Hague, was exchanged in May 1816 for the national collectiort of coins and medals, part of the Rijksmuseum. As of 1 Jufy 1816 directors were appointed for four different institutions in The Hague, the Koninklijke Bibliotheek (with the Koninklijk Penningkabinet ) , the Koninklijk Kabinet van Schilderijen and the Yoninklijk Kabinet van Zeldzaamheden (Note 80) . From that time these institutions led independenl lives. The king continued to lake a keen interest in them and not merely in respect of collecting Their accommodation in The Hague was already too cramped in 1816. By a Royal Decree of 18 May 1819 the Hotel Huguetan, the former palace of the. crown prince on Lange Voorhout, was earmarked for the Koninklijke Bibliotheek and the Koninklijk Penningkabinet (Note 87) . while at the king's behest the Mauritshuis, which had been rented up to then, was bought by the State on 27 March 1820 and on IO July allotted to the Koninklijk Kabinet van Schilderijen and the Koninklijk Kabinet van Zeldzaamheden (Note 88). Only the Koninklijk Kabinet van Schilderijen is still in the place assigned to it by William and the collection has meanwhile become so identified with its home that it is generally known as the Mauritshui.s'. William i's most important gift was made in July 1816,just after the foundation of the four royal institutions, when he had deposited most of the objects that his father had taken first to England and later to Oranienstein in the Koninklijk Kabinet van Zeldzaamheden. The rarities (Fig. 17), curios (Fig. 18) and paintings (Fig. 19), remained there (Note 84), while the other art objects were sorted and divided between the Koninklijke Bibliotheek (the manuscripts and books) and the koninklijk Penningkabinet (the cameos and gems) (Note 85). In 1819 and 182 the king also gave the Koninklijke Bibliotheek an important part of the Nassau Library from the castle at Dillenburg. Clearly he is one of the European monarchs who in the second half of the 18th and the 19th century made their collectiorts accessible to the public, and thus laid the foundatinns of many of today's museums. But William 1 also made purchases on behalf of the institutions he had created. For the Koninklijke Bibliotheek, for example, he had the 'Tweede Historiebijbel', made in Utrecht around 1430, bought in Louvain in 1829 for 1, 134 guilders (Pigs.30,3 I, Note 92). For the Koninkijk Penningkabinet he bought a collection of 62 gems and four cameos , for ,50,000 guilders in 1819. This had belonged to the philosopher Frans Hemsterhuis, the keeper of his father's cabinet of antiquities (Note 95) . The most spectacular acquisition. for the Penninukabinet., however, was a cameo carved in onyx, a late Roman work with the Triumph of Claudius, which the king bought in 1823 for 50,000 guilders, an enormous sum in those days. The Koninklijk Kabinet van Zeldzaamhedert also received princely gifts. In 1821- the so-called doll's house of Tzar Peter was bought out of the king's special funds for 2.800 guilders (Figs.33, 34, ,Note 97) , while even in 1838, when no more money was available for art, unnecessary expenditure on luxury' the Von Siebold ethnographical collection was bought at the king's behest for over 55,000 guilders (Note 98). The Koninklijk Kabinel van Schilderyen must have been close to the hearl of the king, who regarded it as an extension of the palace (Notes 99, 100) . The old master paintings he acquzred for it are among the most important in the collection (the modern pictures, not dealt with here, were transferred to the Paviljoen Welgelegen in Haarlem in 1838, Note 104). For instance, in 1820 he bought a portrait of Johan Maurice of Nassau (Fig.35)., while in 1822, against the advice of the then director, he bought Vermeer' s View of Delft for 2,900 guilders (Fig.36, Note 105) and in 1827 it was made known, from Brussels that His Majesty had recommended the purchase of Rogier van der Weyden's Lamentation (Fig.37) . The most spectacular example of the king's love for 'his' museum, however, is the purchase in 1828 of Rembrandt's Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Nicolaes Tulp for 32,000 guilders. The director of the Rijksmuseum, C. Apostool, cortsidered this Rembrandt'sfinest painting and had already drawn attention to it in 1817, At the king'.s behest the picture, the purchase of which had been financed in part by the sale of a number of painlings from. the Rijksmuseum, was placed in the Koninklijk Kabinet van Schilderijen in The Hague. On his accession King William I had left the art objects which had become state propery after being ceded by the French to the Batavian Republic in 1795 as they were. He reclaimed the collections carried off to France as his own property, but it can be deduced from the Royal Decrees of 1815 and 1816 that it Was his wish that they should be made over to the State, including those paintings that form the nucleus of the collection in the Mauritshuis. In addition, in 1816 he handed over many art objects which his father had taken with him into exile. His son, William II, later accepted this, after having the matter investigated (Note 107 and Appendix IV). Thus William I'S munificence proves to have been much more extensive than has ever been realized.

In her recent book published after the election of Donald Trump as the US President in 2016, Cynthia Enloe argues that the patriarchy, similar to our smart phones, has updated itself as a reaction against the achievements of the second and third wave feminisms. The updated patriarchy has this time renewed itself through the beliefs and values about the ways the world works (2017). The competing foreign policies representing the hypermasculine hegemonic masculinity of the current world politics and its authoritarian leaders are the outputs of this new updated version of patriarchy. Enloe doubts that having gained sustainability with its updates, the patriarchy could be fought against simply with street demonstrations, as it was before. The patriarchy could be forced to retreat only by incessantly asking “curious” feminist questions that would expose all masculine patterns of life (2017). Continuously asking questions without giving up or giving in would make the patriarchy transparent and vulnerable. In the face of curious, non-stop questions from a gender perspective and the conscious use of the terms supporting gender equality, the patriarchy, albeit updated and sustained, does not stand a chance. Enloe explains the reason why incorporating gender in International Relations has been considered irrelevant by the power- and security dominated character of the discipline. Also, because the heavy majority of the academics associated with International Relations are male, it is them who choose what is important and worthy of ‘serious’ investigation (Enloe, 2004, 96). This masculine attitude, however, has been clearly excluding multiple human experiences and hindering their capacity to create new possibilities for peaceful co-existence in international relations (Youngs, 2004). As a matter of fact, when we look at the emergence of International Relations as a separate discipline, and the political theories that it takes as its first point of reference, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen) – the human rights document at the time of the French Revolution – Machiavelli’s The Prince; and Man, the State and War, written in 1959 by Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neo-realism, were the mainstream writings that brought liberal (libertarian) and realist perspectives to the discipline of International Relations, respectively. The fundamental aim of these texts was, in fact, to make an analysis based on history and ‘his’ problems. Although these texts put forward a desire for rights and freedoms, as well as the achievement of peace, these values are mostly targeted towards men. Thus, over time, the prominent concepts of International Relations, such as security and hegemony, were defined from a masculine and patriarchal perspective. For instance, from the theoretical view of realists, hegemony is attributed to the order established and led by the most powerful state of the international system– both militarily and economically– while sovereignty evokes the Hobbesian Leviathan (the Devil), with its masculine nature and might. Raewyn Connell responds to these masculine conceptualizations by pointing out that hegemony includes organized social domination in all spheres of life, from religious doctrines to mundane practice, from mass media to taxation (1998: 246). As Connell reminds us, “hegemonic masculinity” expresses the domination of men over women intellectually, culturally, socially, or even politically, thus establishing an unequivocal linkage between gender and power (Connell, 1998). Just as the Western approach to reading and identifying the East and its fiction found an answer in Edward Said’s critique of Orientalism, the theory of political realism put forth by Hans Morgenthau was criticized by Ann Tickner for conceptualizing international politics through the lens of an assumed masculine subject (Tür & Koyuncu, 2010: 9). Critical theory and postmodernism, as alternative approaches in International Relations, drew attention to the otherization of different geographies, civilizations and identities. Yet, on the issue of gender equality, the otherization of women has not been sufficiently recognized; the superiority of man and patriarchy is made possible through the othering of women. From this point of view, it would be beneficial to make a holistic reading of the International Relations literature, and to dismantle these masculine concepts by asking “curious” questions of the discipline. In Terrell Carver’s words, “Gendering IR” is...a project; “gendered” IR is an outcome” (Carver, 2003: 289). In order to achieve such outcome, it bears utmost importance for the gender-equality advocates to insist on, institutionally and practically, gender-based approaches and to not agree with the priority list of the masculine agenda. Security, order, control and retaliation increasingly dominate the discourse shaping the world politics. The gender perspective in International Relations develops to create alternative paradigms that would break this vicious circle of (in)security. Feminist theory in International Relations has demonstrated significant progress since the 1990s and opened pathways in an uncharted territory. Cynthia Enloe, Ann Tickner, Spike V. Peterson and Christine Sylvester, among others, are the most prominent forerunners of this field. Through their works, feminist theory has adopted a perspective critical of the masculinity and the masculine values of international politics by taking not only ‘women’ but a wider category of gender into its centre. These feminist scholars have deconstructed International Relations theories by posing gender-related questions and displayed the masculine prejudice embedded in the definitions of security, power and sovereignty. The feminist theories of International Relations have thus distinguished themselves from the other theories of the discipline by paying a ‘curious’ attention to the power hierarchies and relation structures through inclusiveness and self-reflexivity (True, 2017: 3). As Cynthia Enloe puts it, the gender perspective in International Relations must first be guided by a feminist consciousness (2004: 97). The feminist International Relations, however, although more than a quarter of century has passed since its emergence, are still struggling with the masculine theories to be considered as an equally legitimate way of understanding how the world works. Various epistemological, ontological and ethical debates may have enriched the field (True, 2017: 1), but at the same time, too many as they are, such debates may paradoxically be accusing the spreading-thin of the gender coalition. The capacity of the feminist International Relations’ ethical principles to participate in the global politics has been limited to the United Nations Security Council’s decision number 1325 and the Swedish feminist foreign policy. The feminist attempt to facilitate substantial change and interaction by creating a normative agenda has been called ‘normative feminism’ by Jacqui True (2013: 242). Normative feminism is a project of institutionalising gender in foreign policy by focusing on socio-economic and political changes. The special issue here is our attempt to partake in this project of change in international relations. We have aimed to enhance the visibility of the gender norms of behavior and decision-making with the presupposition that they would pose an alternative to the masculine norms in International Relations by better supporting the human priorities of peace and co-existence. Adopting Judith Butler’s notion of performativity, the feminist existence in international politics has an undeniable connection to engaging in continuous activities. As Rihannan Bury suggests, “what gives a community its substance is the consistent repetition of these ‘various acts’ by a majority of members.” “Being a member of community,” therefore, “is not something one is but something one does” (2005: 14). In Turkey, too, in order to challenge the recognition of the ‘hyper’ version of the hegemonic masculinity as the only viable world view, gender-charged normative discourses, interactions and agendas must be continuously created and multiplied. We hope that the Turkish literature-review and the articles published here will serve this purpose. As is the situation in all disciplines, the feminist International Relations has nurtured many onto-epistemologies, some in competition with one another. Such multitude, though definitely a richness, has been challenging the feminist stance’s capacity to stand united against the hypermasculine hegemonic masculinity. In her latest book, Enloe calls for a continuous struggle of a new and wider feminist coalition against the updated authoritarianism of the patriarchy –inspiring our title “Don’t Give Up! Don’t Give In!.” Such expanded coalition could rise on the common purpose of fighting male dominance and ignore the differences of discourse created by the debate on identity. The gender-guided change and transformation desired in international politics could be achieved more easily in this way (Hemmings, 2012: 148, 155). On this account, in parallel with Enloe’s proposal of establishing a wider consensus simply on peace and co-existence (2017), a new era, in which questions of identity will, for some time, not be asked, may be dawning. A grand coalition of consensus has better chance of resisting the authoritarian leaders of hyper hegemonic masculinity. Our special issue of Gender and International Relations opens with a Turkish literature review with the aim of introducing the topic to Turkish readers. Çiçek Coşkun, against a historical background, presents some of the prominent feminist scholars who have left their footprints in this very masculine area with their fresh gender perspectives. In doing that she offers us a comparative framework in which works by the Turkish and international scholars could be assessed simultaneously. Nezahat Doğan’s article seeks to establish the relation between global peace and gender by using the data obtained from the Global Peace Index, Gender Inequality Index and Social Institutions and Gender Index. In this way, adopting a currently trendy approach, Doğan investigates the interaction between gender and International Relations through a quantitative method. Zehra Yılmaz’s article discusses the temporary position of Syrian women asylum seekers in Turkey from the perspective of the post-colonial feminist concept of subaltern. The article aims to combine feminist migration studies and post-colonial feminist literature within the context of International Relations. Sinem Bal’s article questions whether the EU has designed its gender policies as an aspect of the human-right norms of the European integration or as a way to regulate market economy. Bal pursues such questioning through the reading of the official documents of the EU that prescribes what Europeanization is for Turkey. Thus, all articles constitute a well-rounded understanding of what gendered approaches can achieve in the current practice of international studies. The co-authored article written by Bezen Balamir-Coşkun and Selin Akyüz examined how the images of women leaders in international politics were presented in the international media. The selected images the three most powerful women political leaders list of Forbes in 2017 –Angela Merkel, Theresa May and Federica Mogherini were analysed in the light of the political masculinities literature from a social visual semiotics perspective. It is believed that such an analysis will contribute to the debates about gendered aspect of international relations as well as the current debates on political masculinities. Gizem Bilgin-Aytaç points out that the global policy that emerged after the Cold War and the emergence of the new way of approaching the IR from a feminist perspective have improved the scope of conceptual analysis in peace theories as well. Bilgin-Aytaç discusses global peace conditions with a gender perspective - in particular, referring to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, with a focus on exemplary contemporary issues. Fulden İbrahimhakkıoğlu, in her article, discusses the debate between Ukraine-based feminist group FEMEN staged several protests in support of Amina Tyler, a Tunisian FEMEN activist receiving death threats for posting nude photographs of herself online with social messages written on her body and the Muslim Women Against FEMEN who released an open letter criticizing the discourse FEMEN used in these protests, which they found to be white colonialist and Islamophobic. Thus, İbrahimhakkıoğlu aimes to examines the discursive strategies put forth by the two sides of the very debate, and unveiling the shortcomings of liberalism as drawn on by both positions, the author attempts to rethink what “freedom” might mean for international feminist alliances across differences.

Introduction In 2017, 250 Indigenous delegates from across the country convened at the National Constitution Convention at Uluru to discuss a strategy towards the implementation of constitutional reform and recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples (Referendum Council). Informed by community consultations arising out of 12 regional dialogues conducted by the government appointed Referendum Council, the resulting Uluru Statement from the Heart was unlike any constitutional reform previously proposed (Appleby & Synot). Within the Statement, the delegation outlined that to build a more equitable and reconciled nation, an enshrined Voice to Parliament was needed. Such a voice would embed Indigenous participation in parliamentary dialogues and debates while facilitating further discussion pertaining to truth telling and negotiating a Treaty between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. The reforms proposed are based on the collective input of Indigenous communities that were expressed in good faith during the consultation process. Arising out of a government appointed and funded initiative that directly sought Indigenous perspectives on constitutional reform, the trust and good faith invested by Indigenous people was quickly shut down when the Prime Minster, Malcolm Turnbull, rejected the reforms without parliamentary debate or taking them to the people via a referendum (Wahlquist Indigenous Voice Proposal; Appleby and McKinnon). In this article, we argue that through its dismissal the government treated the Uluru Statement from the Heart as a passing phase or mere “thought bubble” that was envisioned to disappear as quickly as it emerged. The Uluru Statement is a gift to the nation. One that genuinely offers new ways of envisioning and enacting reconciliation through equitable relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations. Indigenous voices lie at the heart of reconciliation but require constitutional enshrinement to ensure that Indigenous peoples and cultures are represented across all levels of government. Filter Bubbles of Distortion Constitutional change is often spoken of by politicians, its critics, and within the media as something unachievable. For example, in 2017, before even reading the accompanying report, MP Barnaby Joyce (in Fergus) publicly denounced the Uluru Statement as “unwinnable” and not “saleable”. He stated that “if you overreach in politics and ask for something that will not be supported by the Australian people such as another chamber in politics or something that sort of sits above or beside the Senate, that idea just won't fly”. Criticisms such as these are laced with paternalistic rhetoric that suggests its potential defeat at a referendum would be counterproductive and “self-defeating”, meaning that the proposed changes should be rejected for a more digestible version, ultimately saving the movement from itself. While efforts to communicate the necessity of the proposed reforms continues, presumptions that it does not have public support is simply unfounded. The Centre for Governance and Public Policy shows that 71 per cent of the public support constitutional recognition of Indigenous Australians. Furthermore, an online survey conducted by Cox Inall Ridgeway found that the majority of those surveyed supported constitutional reform to curb racism; remove section 25 and references to race; establish an Indigenous Voice to Parliament; and formally recognise Indigenous peoples through a statement of acknowledgment (Referendum Council). In fact, public support for constitutional reform is growing, with Reconciliation Australia’s reconciliation barometer survey showing an increase from 77 per cent in 2018 to 88 per cent in 2020 (Reconciliation Australia). Media – whether news, social, databases, or search engines – undoubtedly shape the lens through which people come to encounter and understand the world. The information a person receives can be the result of what Eli Pariser has described as “filter bubbles”, in which digital algorithms determine what perspectives, outlooks, and sources of information are considered important, and those that are readily accessible. Misinformation towards constitutional reform, such as that commonly circulated within mainstream and social media and propelled by high profile voices, further creates what neuroscientist Don Vaughn calls “reinforcement bubbles” (Rose Gould). This propagates particular views and stunts informed debate. Despite public support, the reforms proposed in the Uluru Statement continue to be distorted within public and political discourses, with the media used as a means to spread misinformation that equates an Indigenous Voice to Parliament to the establishment of a new “third chamber” (Wahlquist ‘Barnaby’; Karp). In a 2018 interview, PM Scott Morrison suggested that advocates and commentators in favour of constitutional reform were engaging in spin by claiming that a Voice did not function as a third chamber (Prime Minister of Australia). Morrison claimed, “people can dress it up any way they like but I think two chambers is enough”. After a decade of consultative work, eight government reports and inquiries, and countless publications and commentaries, the Uluru Statement continues to be played down as if it were a mere thought bubble, a convoluted work in progress that is in need of refinement. In the same interview, Morrison went on to say that the proposal as it stands now is “unworkable”. Throughout the ongoing movement towards constitutional reform, extensive effort has been invested into ensuring that the reforms proposed are achievable and practical. The Uluru Statement from the Heart represents the culmination of decades of work and proposes clear, concise, and relatively minimal constitutional changes that would translate to potentially significant outcomes for Indigenous Australians (Fredericks & Bradfield). International examples demonstrate how such reforms can translate into parliamentary and governing structures. The Treaty of Waitangi (Palmer) for example seeks to inform Māori and Pākehā (non-Maori) relationships in New Zealand/Aotearoa, whilst designated “Māori Seats” ensure Indigenous representation in parliament (Webster & Cheyne). More recently, 17 of 155 seats were reserved for Indigenous delegates as Chile re-writes its own constitution (Bartlett; Reuters). Indigenous communities and its leaders are more than aware of the necessity of working within the realms of possibility and the need to exhibit caution when presenting such reforms to the public. An expert panel on constitutional reform (Dodson 73), before the conception of the Uluru Statement, acknowledged this, stating “any proposal relating to constitutional recognition of the sovereign status of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples would be highly contested by many Australians, and likely to jeopardise broad public support for the Panel’s recommendations”. As outlined in the Joint Select Committee’s final report on Constitutional Recognition relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples (Referendum Council), the Voice to parliament would have no veto powers over parliamentary votes or decisions. It operates as a non-binding advisory body that remains external to parliamentary processes. Peak organisations such as the Law Council of Australia (Dolar) reiterate the fact that the proposed reforms are for a voice to Parliament rather than a voice in Parliament. Although not binding, the Voice should not be dismissed as symbolic or something that may be easily circumvented. Its effectiveness lies in its ability to place parliament in a position where they are forced to confront and address Indigenous questions, concerns, opinions, and suggestions within debates before decisions are made. Bursting the ‘Self-Referential Bubble’ Indigenous affairs continue to be one of the few areas where a rhetoric of bipartisan agreement is continuously referenced by both major parties. Disagreement, debate, and conflict is often avoided as governments seek to portray an image of unity, and in doing so, circumvent accusations of turning Indigenous peoples into the subjects of political point scoring. Within parliamentary debates, there is an understandable reservation and discomfort associated with discussions about what is often seen as an Indigenous “other” (Moreton-Robinson) and the policies that a predominantly white government enact over their lives. Yet, it is through rigorous, open, and informed debate that policies may be developed, challenged, and reformed. Although bipartisanship can portray an image of a united front in addressing a so-called “Indigenous problem”, it also stunts the conception of effective and culturally responsive policy. In other words, it often overlooks Indigenous voices. Whilst education and cultural competency plays a significant role within the reconciliation process, the most pressing obstacle is not necessarily non-Indigenous people’s inability to fully comprehend Indigenous lives and socio-cultural understandings. Even within an ideal world where non-Indigenous peoples attain a thorough understanding of Indigenous cultures, they will never truly comprehend what it means to be Indigenous (Fanon; de Sousa Santos). For non-Indigenous peoples, accepting one’s own limitations in fully comprehending Indigenous ontologies – and avoiding filling such gaps with one’s own interpretations and preconceptions – is a necessary component of decolonisation and the movement towards reconciliation (Grosfoguel; Mignolo). As parliament continues to be dominated by non-Indigenous representatives, structural changes are necessary to ensure that Indigenous voices are adequality represented. The structural reforms not only empower Indigenous voices through their inclusion within the parliamentary process but alleviates some of the pressures that arise out of non-Indigenous people having to make decisions in attempts to solve so-called Indigenous “problems”. Government response to constitutional reform, however, is ridden with symbolic piecemeal offerings that equate recognition to a form of acknowledgment without the structural changes necessary to protect and enshrine Indigenous Voices and parliamentary participation. Davis and her colleagues (Davis et al. “The Uluru Statement”) note how the Referendum Council’s recommendations were rejected by the then minister of Indigenous affairs Nigel Scullion on account that it privileged Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander voices. They note that, until the Referendum Council's report, the nation had no real assessment of what communities wanted. Yet by all accounts, the government had spent too much time talking to elites who have regular access to them and purport to speak on the mob's behalf. If he [Scullion] got the sense constitutional symbolism and minimalism was going to fly, then it says a lot about the self-referential bubble in which the Canberra elites live. The Uluru Statement from the Heart stands as testament to Indigenous people’s refusal to be the passive recipients of the decisions of the non-Indigenous political elite. As suggested, “symbolism and minimalism was not going to fly”. Ken Wyatt, Scullion’s replacement, reiterated the importance of co-design, the limitations of government bureaucracy, and the necessity of moving beyond the “Canberra bubble”. Wyatt stated that the Voice is saying clearly that government and the bureaucracy does not know best. It can not be a Canberra-designed approach in the bubble of Canberra. We have to co-design with Aboriginal communities in the same way that we do with state and territory governments and the corporate sector. The Voice would be the mechanism through which Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander interests and perspectives may be strategically placed within parliamentary dialogues. Despite accusations of it operating as a “third chamber”, Indigenous representatives have no interest in functioning in a similar manner to a political party. The language associated with our current parliamentary system demonstrates the constrictive nature of political debate. Ministers are expected to “toe the party line”, “crossing the floor” is presented as an act of defiance, and members must be granted permission to enter a “conscience vote”. An Indigenous Voice to Parliament would be an advisory body that works alongside, but remains external to political ideologies. Their priority is to seek and implement the best outcome for their communities. Negotiations would be fluid, with no floor to cross, whilst a conscience vote would be reflected in every perspective gifted to the parliament. In the 2020 Australia and the World Annual Lecture, Pat Turner described the Voice’s co-design process as convoluted and a continuing example of the government’s neglect to hear and respond to Indigenous peoples’ interests. In the address, Turner points to the Coalition of the Peaks as an exemplar of how co-design negotiations may be facilitated by and through organisations entirely formed and run by Indigenous peoples. The Coalition of the Peaks comprises of fifty Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community-controlled peak organisations and was established to address concerns relating to closing the gap targets. As Indigenous peak organisations are accountable to their membership and reliant on government funding, some have questioned whether they are appropriate representative bodies; cautioning that they could potentially compromise the Voice as a community-centric body free from political interference. While there is some debate over which Indigenous representatives should facilitate the co-design of a treaty and Makarrata (truth-telling), there remains a unanimous call for a constitutionally enshrined Voice to Parliament that may lead negotiations and secure its place within decision-making processes. Makarrata, Garma, and the Bubbling of New Possibilities An Indigenous Voice to Parliament can be seen as the bubbling spring that provides the source for greater growth and further reform. The Uluru Statement from the Heart calls for a three-staged approach comprising of establishing an Indigenous Voice, followed by Treaty, and then Truth-Telling. This sequence has been criticised by some who prioritise Truth and Treaty as the foundation for reform and reconciliation. Their argument is based on the notion that Indigenous Sovereignty must first be acknowledged in Parliament through an agreement-making process and signing of a Treaty. While the Uluru Statement has never lost sight of treaty, the agreement-making process must begin with the acknowledgment of Indigenous people’s inherent right to participate in the conversation. This very basic and foundational right is yet to be acknowledged within Australia’s constitution. The Uluru Statement sets the Voice as its first priority as the Voice establishes the structural foundation on which the conversation pertaining to treaty may take place. It is through the Voice that a Makarrata Commission can be formed and Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples may “come together after a struggle” – the translation of the word’s Yolngu origins (Gaykamangu; Pearson). Only then may we engage in truth telling and forge new paths towards agreement-making and treaty. This however raises the question as to how a Voice to Parliament may look and what outcomes it aims to achieve. As discussed in the previous section, it is a question that is often distorted by disinformation and conjecture within public, political, and news-media discourses. In order to unpack what a Voice to Parliament may entail, we turn to another Yolngu word, Garma. Garma refers to an epistemic and ontological positioning in which knowledge is attained from a point where differences converge and new insights arise. For Yolngu people, Garma is the place where salt and fresh water intersect within the sea. Fresh and Salt water are the embodiments of two Yolngu clans, the Dhuwa and Yirritja, with Garma referring to the point where the knowledge and laws of each clan come into contact, seeking harmonious balance. When the ebb and flow of the tides are in balance, it causes the water to foam and bubble taking on new form and representing innovative ideas and possibilities. Yolngu embrace this phenomenon as an epistemology that teaches responsibility and obligations towards the care of Country. It acknowledges the autonomy of others and finds a space where all may mutually benefit. When the properties of either water type, or the knowledge belonging a single clan dominates, ecological, social, political, and cosmological balance is overthrown. Raymattja Marika-Munungguritj (5) describes Garma as a dynamic interaction of knowledge traditions. Fresh water from the land, bubbling up in fresh water springs to make waterholes, and salt water from the sea are interacting with each other with the energy of the tide and the energy of the bubbling spring. When the tide is high the water rises to its full. When the tide goes out the water reduces its capacity. In the same way Milngurr ebbs and flows. In this way the Dhuwa and Yirritja sides of Yolngu life work together. And in this way Balanda and Yolngu traditions can work together. There must be balance, if not either one will be stronger and will harm the other. The Ganma Theory is Yirritja, the Milngurr Theory is Dhuwa. Like the current push for constitutional change and its rejection of symbolic reforms, Indigenous peoples have demanded real-action and “not just talk” (Synott “The Uluru statement”). In doing so, they implored that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples be involved in all decision-making processes, for they are most knowledgeable of their community’s needs and the most effective methods of service delivery and policy. Indigenous peoples have repeatedly expressed this mandate, which is also legislated under international law through the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Coming together after a struggle does not mean that conflict and disagreement between and amongst Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities will cease. In fact, in alignment with political theories such as agonism and pluralism, coming together within a democratic system necessitates a constructive and responsive embrace of different, competing, and in some cases incommensurable views. A Voice to Parliament will operate in a manner where Indigenous perspectives and truths, as well as disagreements, may be included within negotiations and debates (Larkin & Galloway). Governments and non-Indigenous representatives will no longer speak for or on behalf of Indigenous peoples, for an Indigenous body will enact its own autonomous voice. Indigenous input therefore will not be reduced to reactionary responses and calls for reforms after the damage of mismanagement and policy failure has been caused. Indigenous voices will be permanently documented within parliamentary records and governments forced to respond to the agendas that Indigenous peoples set. Collectively, this amounts to greater participation within the democratic process and facilitates a space where “salt water” and the “bubbling springs” of fresh water may meet, mitigating the risk of harm, and bringing forth new possibilities. Conclusion When salt and fresh water combine during Garma, it begins to take on new form, eventually materialising as foam. Appearing as a singular solid object from afar, foam is but a cluster of interlocking bubbles that gain increased stability and equilibrium through sticking together. When a bubble stands alone, or a person remains within a figurative bubble that is isolated from its surroundings and other ways of knowing, doing, and being, its vulnerabilities and insecurities are exposed. Similarly, when one bubble bursts the collective cluster becomes weaker and unstable. The Uluru Statement from the Heart is a vision conceived and presented by Indigenous peoples in good faith. It offers a path forward for not only Indigenous peoples and their future generations but the entire nation (Synott “Constitutional Reform”). It is a gift and an invitation “to walk with us in a movement of the Australian people for a better future”. Through calling for the establishment of an Indigenous Voice to Parliament, a Makarrata Commission, and seeking Truth, Indigenous advocates for constitutional reform are looking to secure their own foothold and self-determination. The Uluru Statement from the Heart is more than a “thought bubble”, for it is the culmination of Indigenous people’s diverse lived experiences, outlooks, perspectives, and priorities. When the delegates met at Uluru in 2017, the thoughts, experiences, memories, and hopes of Indigenous peoples converged in a manner that created a unified front and collectively called for Voice, Treaty, and Truth. 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Karp, Paul. “Scott Morrison Claims Indigenous Voice to Parliament Would Be a Third Chamber.” The Guardian, 26 Sep. 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/sep/26/scott-morrison-claims-indigenous-voice-to-parliament-would-be-a-third-chamber>. Koziol, Michael. “Joyce Admits He Was Wrong to Call Indigenous Voice a 'Third Chamber’.” Sydney Morning Herald 18 July 2019. <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/barnaby-joyce-admits-he-was-wrong-to-call-indigenous-voice-a-third-chamber-20190718-p528ki.html>. Larkin, Dani, and Kate Galloway. “Uluru Statement from the Heart: Australian Public Law Pluralism.” Bond Law Review 30.2 (2018): 335–345. Law Council of Australia. “Nothing ‘Un-Australian’ about Human Rights, the Constitution and the Rule of Law.” 14 Aug. 2017. <https://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/media/media-releases/nothing-unaustralian-about-human-rights-the-constitution-and-the-rule-of-law>. 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Pearson, Luke. “What Is a Makarrata? The Yolngu Word Is More than a Synonym for Treaty.” ABC Radio National 10 Aug. 2017. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-08-10/makarrata-explainer-yolngu-word-more-than-synonym-for-treaty/8790452>. Praiser, Eli. The Filter Bubble: How the New Personalized Web Is Changing What We Read and How We Think. Penguin, 2012. Prime Minister, Attorney General, and Minister for Indigenous Affairs. Response to Referendum Council's Report on Constitutional Recognition. 26 Oct. 2017. <https://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/media/response-to-referendum-councils-report-on-constitutional-recognition>. Prime Minister of Australia. Radio interview with Fran Kelly. ABC Radio National 26 Sep 2018. <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/radio-interview-fran-kelly-abc-rn>. Reconciliation Australia. 2020 Australian Reconciliation Barometer, 2020. <https://www.reconciliation.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/australian_reconciliation_barometer_2020_-full-report_web.pdf>. Referendum Council. Referendum Council Final Report, 2017. <https://www.referendumcouncil.org.au/sites/default/files/report_attachments/Referendum_Council_Final_Report.pdf>. Reuters. "Chile Reserves Seats for Indigenous as It Prepares to Rewrite Constitution." Reuters, 16 Dec. 2020. 19 Nov. 2020 <https://www.reuters.com/article/chile-constitution-indigenous-idUSKBN28Q05J>. Rose Gould, Wendy. “Are You in a Social Media Bubble? Here's How to Tell.” NBC News 22 Oct. 2019. <https://www.nbcnews.com/better/lifestyle/problem-social-media-reinforcement-bubbles-what-you-can-do-about-ncna1063896>. Rubenstein, Kim. “Power, Control and Citizenship: The Uluru Statement from the Heart as Active Citizenship.” Bond Law Review 30.1 (2018): 19-29. Synott, Eddie. “The Uluru Statement Showed How to Give First Nations People a Real Voice – Now It’s the Time for Action.” The Conversation 5 Mar. 2019. <https://theconversation.com/the-uluru statement-showed-how-to-give-first-nations-people-a-real-voice-now-its-time-for-action-110707>. ———. “Constitutional Reform Made Easy: How to Achieve the Uluru Statement and a Voice.” The Conversation 7 May 2019. <https://theconversation.com/constitutional-reform-made-easy-how-to-achieve-the-uluru-statement-and-a-first-nations-voice-116141>. Turner, Pat. “The Long Cry of Indigenous Peoples to Be Heard – a Defining Moment in Australia.” The 'Australia and the World' 2020 Annual Lecture. National Press Club of Australia, 30 Sep. 2020. <https://ausi.anu.edu.au/events/australia-and-world-2020-annual-lecture-pat-turner-am>. Wahlquist, Calla. “A Year On, the Key Goal of Uluru Statement Remains Elusive.” The Guardian 26 May 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/may/26/a-year-on-the-key-goal-of-uluru-statement-remains-elusive>. ———. “Barnaby Joyce Criticised for Misinterpreting Proposed Indigenous Voice to Parliament.” The Guardian 29 May 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/may/29/barnaby-joyce-criticised-for-misinterpreting-proposed-indigenous-voice-to-parliament>. ———. “Indigenous Voice Proposal ‘Not Desirable’, Says Turnbull.” The Guardian 26 Oct. 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/oct/26/indigenous-voice-proposal-not-desirable-says-turnbull>. ———. “Turnbull’s Uluru Statement Rejection Is ‘Mean-Spirited Bastardry’ – Legal Expert.” The Guardian 26 Oct. 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/oct/26/turnbulls-uluru-statement-rejection-mean-spirited-bastardry-legal-expert>. 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Abstract The UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council should amend their rules of procedure to create gender parity on the bench of the International Court of Justice. Only 3.7 per cent of all judges on the ICJ have been women. The UN Charter, ICJ Statute, and long-standing practice of the Court underscore the importance of representation, but the focus has been on geographical representation. Using the law of international organizations, combined with the law of treaty interpretation and international human rights law, this article argues that Article 9 of the ICJ Statute should be interpreted to include a requirement of gender parity. Established practice, subsequent practice, and the UN’s multi-decade gender parity in staffing policy establish an evolutive interpretation of what is required to fulfil equality at the UN and the ICJ. The nomination and election procedures for ICJ judges are sufficiently flexible to facilitate this interpretation.

What conclusions of the Pope’s doctrine are significant for our way of teachingthe treaty on Redemption?/) e lecture should include an analysis of the concrete existential situationof today’s individual, our nation and all modern humanity. Awarenessof the contemporary existential situation and contemporary conditions shouldbe both a starting point in the considerations on the Redemption, their relevanceand indispensability, as does political theology or liberation theology in theirown way, and the basis which makes it possible that lectures on Redemptionwould demonstrate its significance for today’s man and teach people effectiveconcern for specific matters of existence of Others. When talking about theeffects of Redemption, one should ask what is its significance today for human existence, for example in the burning matter of human dignity and rights, orin the field of the Church’s tasks in the world. us, both the starting point andeffects of the Redemption should be presented in a concrete way, in relationto the current socio-historical situation, based on current experience.() All teaching on the Redemption should be based on biblical sources,obviously interpreted in light of the last Council and entire Christian Tradition.Referring – to a greater extent – to the content and statements presentedin the Bible, may help to overcome the abstractness and the one-sidednessof traditional soteriological treaties, which consider Redemption only in termsof substitute compensation, the most perfect sacrifice and individualistic andethical participation in the atonement and merits of Christ.X) It is necessary to harmoniously combine – as the Pope does in his Encyclical– various aspects of the doctrine of the Redemption, o6en interpreted separatelyin earlier theological treaties. In the spirit of such a harmonious synthesis,it is necessary to demonstrate the relationship between the work of Redemptionand the work of creation, between the Incarnation and the Passover of Christ,between man’s Redemption and the Redemption of the whole world, betweenmoral liberation from sin and social liberation from all forms of oppression,the concern for eternal salvation and for authentic humanism in earthy life.Z) Among many biblical categories that provide a closer view on the mysteryof Redemption, it is especially important to present the category of love, notonly in order to overcome the narrow, legal and social approach to Redemptionin terms of satisfaction and merit, but above all because love is a preeminentcategory in the theory of Christian revelation, the attitude and action mostappropriate for God and for every human being, and the source or bond of trueand full communion between people and God.9) One should teach about the Redemption using a concrete language,and not the abstract one. When analyzing the biblical texts it is necessary to explainthat the revelation of the mystery of the Redemption took place gradually,within the framework of history, in the context of certain cultural categories,that people were redeemed from the situation of sin through concrete events,carried out by God throughout history, especially through life, death and resurrectionof Christ.e Christ who lived in a certain place and in a certain time carried outthe Redemption by restoring the broken covenant of mankind with God, andtoday He allows us to enjoy the effects of the Redemption. rough meetingand uniting with Him in faith and love, confirmed and strengthened in thesacraments, each person regains the highest dignity and the possibility of fulldevelopment. us, the teaching on Redemption using a concrete language will be thus also tantamount to emphasizing the historical, Christocentric andpersonalist character of Redemption.Y) Finally, following the biblical approach, one should refrain from confiningoneself to recognize the mystery of the Redemption in a purely objectiveand essentializing manner – which was common in earlier textbooks – fromcarrying out considerations about its essence in isolation from man and hissituation, but instead one should try to recognize this mystery in terms of itsrole in human life and humanity, its significance for specific human history, itsinfluence on human activity and human culture.

ObjectiveUsing a syndromic surveillance system to understand the magnitude and risk factors related to heat-related illness (HRI) in Pinal County, AZ.IntroductionExtreme heat is a major cause of weather-related morbidity and mortality in the United States (US).1 HRI is the most frequent cause of environmental exposure-related injury treated in US emergency departments.2 More than 65,000 emergency room visits occur for acute HRI each summer nationwide.3 In Arizona, HRI accounts for an estimated 2,000 emergency room patients and 118 deaths each year.4 As heat-related illness becomes increasingly recognized as a public health issue, local health departments are tasked with building capacity to conduct enhanced surveillance of HRI in order to inform public health preparedness and response efforts. In Pinal County, understanding the magnitude and risk factors of HRI is important for informing prevention efforts as well as developing strategies to respond to extreme heat.MethodsTo gain a better understanding of the magnitude of HRI in Pinal County, historical cases were reviewed from hospital discharge data (HDD) from 2010-2016. Cases were included if the discharge record included any ICD codes consistent with HRI (ICD-9 codes 992 or ICD-10 codes T67 or X30) and if the patient’s county of residence was Pinal County. Recent HRI cases during the summer of 2017 were identified using the National Syndromic Surveillance Program BioSense Platform. The ESSENCE syndromic surveillance tool within the BioSense Platform includes data reported by local hospitals. This data can be used to detect abnormal activity for public health investigation. HRI cases were identified in ESSENCE based on ICD-10 codes and chief complaint terms according to a standardized algorithm developed by the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists.1 Both emergency department and admitted patients with a HRI were abstracted from HDD and ESSENCE. To assess HRI risk factors for the summer of 2017, a survey instrument was developed. Survey questions included the nature and location of the HRI incident, potential risk factors, and knowledge and awareness of HRI. Cases were identified in ESSENSE on a weekly basis from May 1, 2017-September 12, 2017, and follow up phone interviews were conducted with eligible cases. For HRI cases eligible for interview, three attempts were made to contact the patient by phone. Cases were excluded if the patient was incarcerated, deceased, or did not have a HRI upon medical record review. An exploratory analysis was performed for the data from HDD, ESSENCE, and interviews.ResultsPinal County Public Health Services District identified 1,321 HRI cases from 2010-2016, an average of 189 per year. Hospital discharge data suggest HRI cases are more likely to occur in males between the ages of 20-44 years old (27%). It is also notable that a sharp increase in HRI cases is observed each year in mid-to-late June, with an estimated 14% of annual cases occurring during the third week of June. Further analysis of HDD showed 31% of cases received medical treatment in Casa Grande in central Pinal County. Between May 1st and September 12th of 2017, 161 HRI cases were detected using ESSENCE. Of which 149 cases were determined to be HRI; 22 cases did not have contact information, and 4 cases were ineligible due to incarceration or death. A total of 31 HRI cases were interviewed out of the eligible 123 ESSENSE cases (25% response rate). Interview data indicated occupational exposure to extreme heat as a major risk factor for HRI. Additional risk factors reported during interviews included exposure to extreme heat while at home or traveling, although interview results are not representative due to a small sample size (n=31).ConclusionsSyndromic surveillance combined with interviews and a review of HDD provides an informative approach for monitoring and responding to HRI. Data suggest Pinal County should expect an increase in HRI cases by mid-June each year, typically coinciding with the first National Weather Service Extreme Heat Warning of the season. Preliminary results suggest that cases occur more frequently in working males ages 20-44 years old in occupations that expose workers to extreme heat conditions. Additional information is needed to assess risk factors for HRI among vulnerable populations in Pinal County who were not represented in this study, including individuals who are homeless, undocumented, elderly, or in correctional facilities. Future areas for improvement include improving the phone interview script to include English and Spanish language versions and performing medical record abstractions on all HRI cases. Enhanced syndromic surveillance is recommended to provide information on risk factors for HRI to inform prevention efforts in Pinal County.References1. Heat-Related Illness Syndrome Query: A Guidance Document For Implementing Heat-Related Illness Syndromic Surveillance in Public Health Practice. In: Epidemiologists CoSaT, ed. Vol 1.02016:1-12.2. Pillai SK, Noe RS, Murphy MW, et al. Heat illness: predictors of hospital admissions among emergency department visits-Georgia, 2002-2008. J Community Health. 2014;39(1):90-98.3. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention . Climate Change and Extreme Heat: What You Can Do to Prepare. 2016; Available from https://www.cdc.gov/climateandhealth/pubs/extreme-heat-guidebook.pdf4. Trends in Morbidity and Mortality from Exposure to Excessive Natural Heat in Arizona, 2012 report. In: Services ADoH, ed2012.

IntroductionCulinary education in Ireland has long been influenced by culinary education being delivered in catering colleges in the United Kingdom (UK). Institutionalised culinary education started in Britain through the sponsorship of guild conglomerates (Lawson and Silver). The City & Guilds of London Institute for the Advancement of Technical Education opened its central institution in 1884. Culinary education in Ireland began in Kevin Street Technical School in the late 1880s. This consisted of evening courses in plain cookery. Dublin’s leading chefs and waiters of the time participated in developing courses in French culinary classics and these courses ran in Parnell Square Vocational School from 1926 (Mac Con Iomaire “The Changing”). St Mary’s College of Domestic Science was purpose built and opened in 1941 in Cathal Brugha Street. This was renamed the Dublin College of Catering in the 1950s. The Council for Education, Recruitment and Training for the Hotel Industry (CERT) was set up in 1963 and ran cookery courses using the City & Guilds of London examinations as its benchmark. In 1982, when the National Craft Curriculum Certification Board (NCCCB) was established, CERT began carrying out their own examinations. This allowed Irish catering education to set its own standards, establish its own criteria and award its own certificates, roles which were previously carried out by City & Guilds of London (Corr). CERT awarded its first certificates in professional cookery in 1989. The training role of CERT was taken over by Fáilte Ireland, the State tourism board, in 2003. Changing Trends in Cookery and Culinary Textbooks at DIT The Dublin College of Catering which became part of the Dublin Institute of Technology (DIT) is the flagship of catering education in Ireland (Mac Con Iomaire “The Changing”). The first DIT culinary award, was introduced in 1984 Certificate in Diet Cookery, later renamed Higher Certificate in Health and Nutrition for the Culinary Arts. On the 19th of July 1992 the Dublin Institute of Technology Act was enacted into law. This Act enabled DIT to provide vocational and technical education and training for the economic, technological, scientific, commercial, industrial, social and cultural development of the State (Ireland 1992). In 1998, DIT was granted degree awarding powers by the Irish state, enabling it to make major awards at Higher Certificate, Ordinary Bachelor Degree, Honors Bachelor Degree, Masters and PhD levels (Levels six to ten in the National Framework of Qualifications), as well as a range of minor, special purpose and supplemental awards (National NQAI). It was not until 1999, when a primary degree in Culinary Arts was sanctioned by the Department of Education in Ireland (Duff, The Story), that a more diverse range of textbooks was recommended based on a new liberal/vocational educational philosophy. DITs School of Culinary Arts currently offers: Higher Certificates Health and Nutrition for the Culinary Arts; Higher Certificate in Culinary Arts (Professional Culinary Practice); BSc (Ord) in Baking and Pastry Arts Management; BA (Hons) in Culinary Arts; BSc (Hons) Bar Management and Entrepreneurship; BSc (Hons) in Culinary Entrepreneurship; and, MSc in Culinary Innovation and Food Product Development. From 1942 to 1970, haute cuisine, or classical French cuisine was the most influential cooking trend in Irish cuisine and this is reflected in the culinary textbooks of that era. Haute cuisine has been influenced by many influential writers/chefs such as Francois La Varenne, Antoine Carême, Auguste Escoffier, Ferand Point, Paul Bocuse, Anton Mosiman, Albert and Michel Roux to name but a few. The period from 1947 to 1974 can be viewed as a “golden age” of haute cuisine in Ireland, as more award-winning world-class restaurants traded in Dublin during this period than at any other time in history (Mac Con Iomaire “The Changing”). Hotels and restaurants were run in the Escoffier partie system style which is a system of hierarchy among kitchen staff and areas of the kitchens specialising in cooking particular parts of the menu i.e sauces (saucier), fish (poissonnier), larder (garde manger), vegetable (legumier) and pastry (patissier). In the late 1960s, Escoffier-styled restaurants were considered overstaffed and were no longer financially viable. Restaurants began to be run by chef-proprietors, using plate rather than silver service. Nouvelle cuisine began in the 1970s and this became a modern form of haute cuisine (Gillespie). The rise in chef-proprietor run restaurants in Ireland reflected the same characteristics of the nouvelle cuisine movement. Culinary textbooks such as Practical Professional Cookery, La Technique, The Complete Guide to Modern Cooking, The Art of the Garde Mange and Patisserie interpreted nouvelle cuisine techniques and plated dishes. In 1977, the DIT began delivering courses in City & Guilds Advanced Kitchen & Larder 706/3 and Pastry 706/3, the only college in Ireland to do so at the time. Many graduates from these courses became the future Irish culinary lecturers, chef-proprietors, and culinary leaders. The next two decades saw a rise in fusion cooking, nouvelle cuisine, and a return to French classical cooking. Numerous Irish chefs were returning to Ireland having worked with Michelin starred chefs and opening new restaurants in the vein of classical French cooking, such as Kevin Thornton (Wine Epergne & Thorntons). These chefs were, in turn, influencing culinary training in DIT with a return to classical French cooking. New Classical French culinary textbooks such as New Classical Cuisine, The Modern Patisserie, The French Professional Pastry Series and Advanced Practical Cookery were being used in DIT In the last 15 years, science in cooking has become the current trend in culinary education in DIT. This is acknowledged by the increased number of culinary science textbooks and modules in molecular gastronomy offered in DIT. This also coincided with the launch of the BA (Hons) in Culinary Arts in DIT moving culinary education from a technical to a liberal education. Books such as The Science of Cooking, On Food and Cooking, The Fat Duck Cookbook and Modern Gastronomy now appear on recommended textbooks for culinary students.For the purpose of this article, practical classes held at DIT will be broken down as follows: hot kitchen class, larder classes, and pastry classes. These classes had recommended textbooks for each area. These can be broken down into three sections: hot kitche, larder, and pastry. This table identifies that the textbooks used in culinary education at DIT reflected the trends in cookery at the time they were being used. Hot Kitchen Larder Pastry Le Guide Culinaire. 1921. Le Guide Culinaire. 1921. The International Confectioner. 1968. Le Repertoire De La Cuisine. 1914. The Larder Chef, Classical Food Preparation and Presentation. 1969. Patisserie. 1971. All in the Cooking, Books 1&2. 1943 The Art of the Garde Manger. 1973. The Modern Patissier. 1986 Larousse Gastronomique. 1961. New Classic Cuisine. 1989. Professional French Pastry Series. 1987. Practical Cookery. 1962. The Curious Cook. 1990. Complete Pastrywork Techniques. 1991. Practical Professional Cookery. 1972. On Food and Cooking. The Science and Lore of the Kitchen. 1991. On Food and Cooking: The Science and Lore of the Kitchen. 1991 La Technique. 1976. Advanced Practical Cookery. 1995. Desserts: A Lifelong Passion. 1994. Escoffier: The Complete Guide to the Art of Modern Cookery. 1979. The Science of Cooking. 2000. Culinary Artistry. Dornenburg, 1996. Professional Cookery: The Process Approach. 1985. Garde Manger, The Art and Craft of the Cold Kitchen. 2004. Grande Finales: The Art of the Plated Dessert. 1997. On Food and Cooking: The Science and Lore of the Kitchen. 1991. The Science of Cooking. 2000. Fat Duck Cookbook. 2009. Modern Gastronomy. 2010. Tab.1. DIT Culinary Textbooks.1942–1960 During the first half of the 20th century, senior staff working in Dublin hotels, restaurants and clubs were predominately foreign born and trained. The two decades following World War II could be viewed as the “golden age” of haute cuisine in Dublin as many award-wining restaurants traded in the city at this time (Mac Con Iomaire “The Emergence”). Culinary education in DIT in 1942 saw the use of Escoffier’s Le Guide Culinaire as the defining textbook (Bowe). This was first published in 1903 and translated into English in 1907. In 1979 Cracknell and Kaufmann published a more comprehensive and update edited version under the title The Complete Guide to the Art of Modern Cookery by Escoffier for use in culinary colleges. This demonstrated that Escoffier’s work had withstood the test of the decades and was still relevant. Le Repertoire de La Cuisine by Louis Saulnier, a student of Escoffier, presented the fundamentals of French classical cookery. Le Repertoire was inspired by the work of Escoffier and contains thousands of classical recipes presented in a brief format that can be clearly understood by chefs and cooks. Le Repertoire remains an important part of any DIT culinary student’s textbook list. All in the Cooking by Josephine Marnell, Nora Breathnach, Ann Mairtin and Mor Murnaghan (1946) was one of the first cookbooks to be published in Ireland (Cashmann). This book was a domestic science cooking book written by lecturers in the Cathal Brugha Street College. There is a combination of classical French recipes and Irish recipes throughout the book. 1960s It was not until the 1960s that reference book Larousse Gastronomique and new textbooks such as Practical Cookery, The Larder Chef and International Confectionary made their way into DIT culinary education. These books still focused on classical French cooking but used lighter sauces and reflected more modern cooking equipment and techniques. Also, this period was the first time that specific books for larder and pastry work were introduced into the DIT culinary education system (Bowe). Larousse Gastronomique, which used Le Guide Culinaire as a basis (James), was first published in 1938 and translated into English in 1961. Practical Cookery, which is still used in DIT culinary education, is now in its 12th edition. Each edition has built on the previous, however, there is now criticism that some of the content is dated (Richards). Practical Cookery has established itself as a key textbook in culinary education both in Ireland and England. Practical Cookery recipes were laid out in easy to follow steps and food commodities were discussed briefly. The Larder Chef was first published in 1969 and is currently in its 4th edition. This book focuses on classical French larder techniques, butchery and fishmongery but recognises current trends and fashions in food presentation. The International Confectioner is no longer in print but is still used as a reference for basic recipes in pastry classes (Campbell). The Modern Patissier demonstrated more updated techniques and methods than were used in The International Confectioner. The Modern Patissier is still used as a reference book in DIT. 1970s The 1970s saw the decline in haute cuisine in Ireland, as it was in the process of being replaced by nouvelle cuisine. Irish chefs were being influenced by the works of chefs such as Paul Boucuse, Roger Verge, Michel Guerard, Raymond Olivier, Jean & Pierre Troisgros, Alain Senderens, Jacques Maniere, Jean Delaveine and Michel Guerard who advanced the uncomplicated natural presentation in food. Henri Gault claims that it was his manifesto published in October 1973 in Gault-Millau magazine which unleashed the movement called La Nouvelle Cuisine Française (Gault). In nouvelle cuisine, dishes in Carème and Escoffier’s style were rejected as over-rich and complicated. The principles underpinning this new movement focused on the freshness of ingredients, and lightness and harmony in all components and accompaniments, as well as basic and simple cooking methods and types of presentation. This was not, however, a complete overthrowing of the past, but a moving forward in the long-term process of cuisine development, utilising the very best from each evolution (Cousins). Books such as Practical Professional Cookery, The Art of the Garde Manger and Patisserie reflected this new lighter approach to cookery. Patisserie was first published in 1971, is now in its second edition, and continues to be used in DIT culinary education. This book became an essential textbook in pastrywork, and covers the entire syllabus of City & Guilds and CERT (now Fáilte Ireland). Patisserie covered all basic pastry recipes and techniques, while the second edition (in 1993) included new modern recipes, modern pastry equipment, commodities, and food hygiene regulations reflecting the changing catering environment. The Art of the Garde Manger is an American book highlighting the artistry, creativity, and cooking sensitivity need to be a successful Garde Manger (the larder chef who prepares cold preparation in a partie system kitchen). It reflected the dynamic changes occurring in the culinary world but recognised the importance of understanding basic French culinary principles. It is no longer used in DIT culinary education. La Technique is a guide to classical French preparation (Escoffier’s methods and techniques) using detailed pictures and notes. This book remains a very useful guide and reference for culinary students. Practical Professional Cookery also became an important textbook as it was written with the student and chef/lecturer in mind, as it provides a wider range of recipes and detailed information to assist in understanding the tasks at hand. It is based on classical French cooking and compliments Practical Cookery as a textbook, however, its recipes are for ten portions as opposed to four portions in Practical Cookery. Again this book was written with the City & Guilds examinations in mind. 1980s During the mid-1980s, many young Irish chefs and waiters emigrated. They returned in the late-1980s and early-1990s having gained vast experience of nouvelle and fusion cuisine in London, Paris, New York, California and elsewhere (Mac Con Iomaire, “The Changing”). These energetic, well-trained professionals began opening chef-proprietor restaurants around Dublin, providing invaluable training and positions for up-and-coming young chefs, waiters and culinary college graduates. The 1980s saw a return to French classical cookery textbook such as Professional Cookery: The Process Approach, New Classic Cuisine and the Professional French Pastry series, because educators saw the need for students to learn the basics of French cookery. Professional Cookery: The Process Approach was written by Daniel Stevenson who was, at the time, a senior lecturer in Food and Beverage Operations at Oxford Polytechnic in England. Again, this book was written for students with an emphasis on the cookery techniques and the practices of professional cookery. The Complete Guide to Modern Cooking by Escoffier continued to be used. This book is used by cooks and chefs as a reference for ingredients in dishes rather than a recipe book, as it does not go into detail in the methods as it is assumed the cook/chef would have the required experience to know the method of production. Le Guide Culinaire was only used on advanced City & Guilds courses in DIT during this decade (Bowe). New Classic Cuisine by the classically French trained chefs, Albert and Michel Roux (Gayot), is a classical French cuisine cookbook used as a reference by DIT culinary educators at the time because of the influence the Roux brothers were having over the English fine dining scene. The Professional French Pastry Series is a range of four volumes of pastry books: Vol. 1 Doughs, Batters and Meringues; Vol. 2 Creams, Confections and Finished Desserts; Vol. 3 Petit Four, Chocolate, Frozen Desserts and Sugar Work; and Vol. 4 Decorations, Borders and Letters, Marzipan, Modern Desserts. These books about classical French pastry making were used on the advanced pastry courses at DIT as learners needed a basic knowledge of pastry making to use them. 1990s Ireland in the late 1990s became a very prosperous and thriving European nation; the phenomena that became known as the “celtic tiger” was in full swing (Mac Con Iomaire “The Changing”). The Irish dining public were being treated to a resurgence of traditional Irish cuisine using fresh wholesome food (Hughes). The Irish population was considered more well-educated and well travelled than previous generations and culinary students were now becoming interested in the science of cooking. In 1996, the BA (Hons) in Culinary Arts program at DIT was first mooted (Hegarty). Finally, in 1999, a primary degree in Culinary Arts was sanctioned by the Department of Education underpinned by a new liberal/vocational philosophy in education (Duff). Teaching culinary arts in the past had been through a vocational education focus whereby students were taught skills for industry which were narrow, restrictive, and constraining, without the necessary knowledge to articulate the acquired skill. The reading list for culinary students reflected this new liberal education in culinary arts as Harold McGee’s books The Curious Cook and On Food and Cooking: The Science and Lore of the Kitchen explored and explained the science of cooking. On Food and Cooking: The Science and Lore of the Kitchen proposed that “science can make cooking more interesting by connecting it with the basic workings of the natural world” (Vega 373). Advanced Practical Cookery was written for City & Guilds students. In DIT this book was used by advanced culinary students sitting Fáilte Ireland examinations, and the second year of the new BA (Hons) in Culinary Arts. Culinary Artistry encouraged chefs to explore the creative process of culinary composition as it explored the intersection of food, imagination, and taste (Dornenburg). This book encouraged chefs to develop their own style of cuisine using fresh seasonal ingredients, and was used for advanced students but is no longer a set text. Chefs were being encouraged to show their artistic traits, and none more so than pastry chefs. Grande Finale: The Art of Plated Desserts encouraged advanced students to identify different “schools” of pastry in relation to the world of art and design. The concept of the recipes used in this book were built on the original spectacular pieces montées created by Antoine Carême. 2000–2013 After nouvelle cuisine, recent developments have included interest in various fusion cuisines, such as Asia-Pacific, and in molecular gastronomy. Molecular gastronomists strive to find perfect recipes using scientific methods of investigation (Blanck). Hervè This experimentation with recipes and his introduction to Nicholos Kurti led them to create a food discipline they called “molecular gastronomy”. In 1998, a number of creative chefs began experimenting with the incorporation of ingredients and techniques normally used in mass food production in order to arrive at previously unattainable culinary creations. This “new cooking” (Vega 373) required a knowledge of chemical reactions and physico-chemical phenomena in relation to food, as well as specialist tools, which were created by these early explorers. It has been suggested that molecular gastronomy is “science-based cooking” (Vega 375) and that this concept refers to conscious application of the principles and tools from food science and other disciplines for the development of new dishes particularly in the context of classical cuisine (Vega). The Science of Cooking assists students in understanding the chemistry and physics of cooking. This book takes traditional French techniques and recipes and refutes some of the claims and methods used in traditional recipes. Garde Manger: The Art and Craft of the Cold Kitchen is used for the advanced larder modules at DIT. This book builds on basic skills in the Larder Chef book. Molecular gastronomy as a subject area was developed in 2009 in DIT, the first of its kind in Ireland. The Fat Duck Cookbook and Modern Gastronomy underpin the theoretical aspects of the module. This module is taught to 4th year BA (Hons) in Culinary Arts students who already have three years experience in culinary education and the culinary industry, and also to MSc Culinary Innovation and Food Product Development students. Conclusion Escoffier, the master of French classical cuisine, still influences culinary textbooks to this day. His basic approach to cooking is considered essential to teaching culinary students, allowing them to embrace the core skills and competencies required to work in the professional environment. Teaching of culinary arts at DIT has moved vocational education to a more liberal basis, and it is imperative that the chosen textbooks reflect this development. This liberal education gives the students a broader understanding of cooking, hospitality management, food science, gastronomy, health and safety, oenology, and food product development. To date there is no practical culinary textbook written specifically for Irish culinary education, particularly within this new liberal/vocational paradigm. There is clearly a need for a new textbook which combines the best of Escoffier’s classical French techniques with the more modern molecular gastronomy techniques popularised by Ferran Adria. References Adria, Ferran. Modern Gastronomy A to Z: A Scientific and Gastronomic Lexicon. London: CRC P, 2010. Barker, William. The Modern Patissier. London: Hutchinson, 1974. Barham, Peter. The Science of Cooking. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2000. Bilheux, Roland, Alain Escoffier, Daniel Herve, and Jean-Maire Pouradier. Special and Decorative Breads. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1987. Blanck, J. "Molecular Gastronomy: Overview of a Controversial Food Science Discipline." Journal of Agricultural and Food Information 8.3 (2007): 77-85. Blumenthal, Heston. The Fat Duck Cookbook. London: Bloomsbury, 2001. Bode, Willi, and M.J. Leto. The Larder Chef. Oxford: Butter-Heinemann, 1969. Bowe, James. Personal Communication with Author. Dublin. 7 Apr. 2013. Boyle, Tish, and Timothy Moriarty. Grand Finales, The Art of the Plated Dessert. New York: John Wiley, 1997. Campbell, Anthony. Personal Communication with Author. Dublin, 10 Apr. 2013. Cashman, Dorothy. "An Exploratory Study of Irish Cookbooks." Unpublished M.Sc Thesis. Dublin: Dublin Institute of Technology, 2009. Ceserani, Victor, Ronald Kinton, and David Foskett. Practical Cookery. London: Hodder & Stoughton Educational, 1962. Ceserani, Victor, and David Foskett. Advanced Practical Cookery. London: Hodder & Stoughton Educational, 1995. Corr, Frank. Hotels in Ireland. Dublin: Jemma, 1987. Cousins, John, Kevin Gorman, and Marc Stierand. "Molecular Gastronomy: Cuisine Innovation or Modern Day Alchemy?" International Journal of Hospitality Management 22.3 (2009): 399–415. Cracknell, Harry Louis, and Ronald Kaufmann. Practical Professional Cookery. London: MacMillan, 1972. Cracknell, Harry Louis, and Ronald Kaufmann. Escoffier: The Complete Guide to the Art of Modern Cookery. New York: John Wiley, 1979. Dornenburg, Andrew, and Karen Page. Culinary Artistry. New York: John Wiley, 1996. Duff, Tom, Joseph Hegarty, and Matt Hussey. The Story of the Dublin Institute of Technology. Dublin: Blackhall, 2000. Escoffier, Auguste. Le Guide Culinaire. France: Flammarion, 1921. Escoffier, Auguste. The Complete Guide to the Art of Modern Cookery. Ed. Crachnell, Harry, and Ronald Kaufmann. New York: John Wiley, 1986. Gault, Henri. Nouvelle Cuisine, Cooks and Other People: Proceedings of the Oxford Symposium on Food and Cookery 1995. Devon: Prospect, 1996. 123-7. Gayot, Andre, and Mary, Evans. "The Best of London." Gault Millau (1996): 379. Gillespie, Cailein. "Gastrosophy and Nouvelle Cuisine: Entrepreneurial Fashion and Fiction." British Food Journal 96.10 (1994): 19-23. Gisslen, Wayne. Professional Cooking. Hoboken: John Wiley, 2011. Hanneman, Leonard. Patisserie. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1971. Hegarty, Joseph. Standing the Heat. New York: Haworth P, 2004. Hsu, Kathy. "Global Tourism Higher Education Past, Present and Future." Journal of Teaching in Travel and Tourism 5.1/2/3 (2006): 251-267 Hughes, Mairtin. Ireland. Victoria: Lonely Planet, 2000. Ireland. Irish Statute Book: Dublin Institute of Technology Act 1992. Dublin: Stationery Office, 1992. James, Ken. Escoffier: The King of Chefs. Hambledon: Cambridge UP, 2002. Lawson, John, and Harold, Silver. Social History of Education in England. London: Methuen, 1973. Lehmann, Gilly. "English Cookery Books in the 18th Century." The Oxford Companion to Food. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999. 227-9. Marnell, Josephine, Nora Breathnach, Ann Martin, and Mor Murnaghan. All in the Cooking Book 1 & 2. Dublin: Educational Company of Ireland, 1946. Mac Con Iomaire, Máirtín. "The Changing Geography and Fortunes of Dublin's Haute Cuisine Restaurants, 1958-2008." Food, Culture and Society: An International Journal of Multidisiplinary Research 14.4 (2011): 525-45. ---. "Chef Liam Kavanagh (1926-2011)." Gastronomica: The Journal of Food and Culture 12.2 (2012): 4-6. ---. "The Emergence, Development and Influence of French Haute Cuisine on Public Dining in Dublin Restaurants 1900-2000: An Oral History". PhD. Thesis. Dublin: Dublin Institute of Technology, 2009. McGee, Harold. The Curious Cook: More Kitchen Science and Lore. New York: Hungry Minds, 1990. ---. On Food and Cooking the Science and Lore of the Kitchen. London: Harper Collins, 1991. Montague, Prosper. Larousse Gastronomique. New York: Crown, 1961. National Qualification Authority of Ireland. "Review by the National Qualifications Authority of Ireland (NQAI) of the Effectiveness of the Quality Assurance Procedures of the Dublin Institute of Technology." 2010. 18 Feb. 2012 ‹http://www.dit.ie/media/documents/services/qualityassurance/terms_of_ref.doc› Nicolello, Ildo. Complete Pastrywork Techniques. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991. Pepin, Jacques. La Technique. New York: Black Dog & Leventhal, 1976. Richards, Peter. "Practical Cookery." 9th Ed. Caterer and Hotelkeeper (2001). 18 Feb. 2012 ‹http://www.catererandhotelkeeper.co.uk/Articles/30/7/2001/31923/practical-cookery-ninth-edition-victor-ceserani-ronald-kinton-and-david-foskett.htm›. Roux, Albert, and Michel Roux. New Classic Cuisine. New York: Little, Brown, 1989. Roux, Michel. Desserts: A Lifelong Passion. London: Conran Octopus, 1994. Saulnier, Louis. Le Repertoire De La Cuisine. London: Leon Jaeggi, 1914. Sonnenschmidt, Fredric, and John Nicholas. The Art of the Garde Manger. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1973. Spang, Rebecca. The Invention of the Restaurant: Paris and Modern Gastronomic Culture. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2000. Stevenson, Daniel. Professional Cookery the Process Approach. London: Hutchinson, 1985. The Culinary Institute of America. Garde Manger: The Art and Craft of the Cold Kitchen. Hoboken: New Jersey, 2004. Vega, Cesar, and Job, Ubbink. "Molecular Gastronomy: A Food Fad or Science Supporting Innovation Cuisine?". Trends in Food Science & Technology 19 (2008): 372-82. Wilfred, Fance, and Michael Small. The New International Confectioner: Confectionary, Cakes, Pastries, Desserts, Ices and Savouries. 1968.

IntroductionTasmania hangs from the map of Australia like a drop in freefall from the substance of the mainland. Often the whole state is mislaid from Australian maps and logos (Reddit). Tasmania has, at least since federation, been considered peripheral—a region seen as isolated, a ‘problem’ economically, politically, and culturally. However, Tasmania not only cleaves to the ‘north island’ of Australia but is also subject to the gravitational pull of an even greater land mass—Antarctica. In this article, we upturn the political conventions of map-making that place both Antarctica and Tasmania in obscure positions at the base of the globe. We show how a changing global climate re-frames Antarctica and the Southern Ocean as key drivers of worldwide environmental shifts. The liquid and solid water between Tasmania and Antarctica is revealed not as a homogenous barrier, but as a dynamic and relational medium linking the Tasmanian archipelago with Antarctica. When Antarctica becomes the focus, the script is flipped: Tasmania is no longer on the edge, but core to a network of gateways into the southern land. The state’s capital of Hobart can from this perspective be understood as an “Antarctic city”, central to the geopolitics, economy, and culture of the frozen continent (Salazar et al.). Viewed from the south, we argue, Tasmania is not a problem, but an opportunity for a form of ecological, cultural, economic, and political sustainability that opens up the southern continent to science, discovery, and imagination.A Centre at the End of the Earth? Tasmania as ParadoxThe islands of Tasmania owe their existence to climate change: a period of warming at the end of the last ice age melted the vast sheets of ice covering the polar regions, causing sea levels to rise by more than one hundred metres (Tasmanian Climate Change Office 8). Eleven thousand years ago, Aboriginal people would have witnessed the rise of what is now called Bass Strait, turning what had been a peninsula into an archipelago, with the large island of Tasmania at its heart. The heterogeneous practices and narratives of Tasmanian regional identity have been shaped by the geography of these islands, and their connection to the Southern Ocean and Antarctica. Regions, understood as “centres of collective consciousness and sociospatial identities” (Paasi 241) are constantly reproduced and reimagined through place-based social practices and communications over time. As we will show, diverse and contradictory narratives of Tasmanian regionality often co-exist, interacting in complex and sometimes complementary ways. Ecocritical literary scholar C.A. Cranston considers duality to be embedded in the textual construction of Tasmania, writing “it was hell, it was heaven, it was penal, it was paradise” (29). Tasmania is multiply polarised: it is both isolated and connected; close and far away; rich in resources and poor in capital; the socially conservative birthplace of radical green politics (Hay 60). The weather, as if sensing the fine balance of these paradoxes, blows hot and cold at a moment’s notice.Tasmania has wielded extraordinary political influence at times in its history—notably during the settlement of Melbourne in 1835 (Boyce), and during protests against damming the Franklin River in the early 1980s (Mercer). However, twentieth-century historical and political narratives of Tasmania portray the Bass Strait as a barrier, isolating Tasmanians from the mainland (Harwood 61). Sir Bede Callaghan, who headed one of a long line of federal government inquiries into “the Tasmanian problem” (Harwood 106), was clear that Tasmania was a victim of its own geography:the major disability facing the people of Tasmania (although some residents may consider it an advantage) is that Tasmania is an island. Separation from the mainland adversely affects the economy of the State and the general welfare of the people in many ways. (Callaghan 3)This perspective may stem from the fact that Tasmania has maintained the lowest Gross Domestic Product per capita of all states since federation (Bureau of Infrastructure Transport and Regional Economics 9). Socially, economically, and culturally, Tasmania consistently ranks among the worst regions of Australia. Statistical comparisons with other parts of Australia reveal the population’s high unemployment, low wages, poor educational outcomes, and bad health (West 31). The state’s remoteness and isolation from the mainland states and its reliance on federal income have contributed to the whole of Tasmania, including Hobart, being classified as ‘regional’ by the Australian government, in an attempt to promote immigration and economic growth (Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development 1). Tasmania is indeed both regional and remote. However, in this article we argue that, while regionality may be cast as a disadvantage, the island’s remote location is also an asset, particularly when viewed from a far southern perspective (Image 1).Image 1: Antarctica (Orthographic Projection). Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons, Modified Shading of Tasmania and Addition of Captions by H. Nielsen.Connecting Oceans/Collapsing DistanceTasmania and Antarctica have been closely linked in the past—the future archipelago formed a land bridge between Antarctica and northern land masses until the opening of the Tasman Seaway some 32 million years ago (Barker et al.). The far south was tangible to the Indigenous people of the island in the weather blowing in from the Southern Ocean, while the southern lights, or “nuyina”, formed a visible connection (Australia’s new icebreaker vessel is named RSV Nuyina in recognition of these links). In the contemporary Australian imagination, Tasmania tends to be defined by its marine boundaries, the sea around the islands represented as flat, empty space against which to highlight the topography of its landscape and the isolation of its position (Davies et al.). A more relational geographic perspective illuminates the “power of cross-currents and connections” (Stratford et al. 273) across these seascapes. The sea country of Tasmania is multiple and heterogeneous: the rough, shallow waters of the island-scattered Bass Strait flow into the Tasman Sea, where the continental shelf descends toward an abyssal plain studded with volcanic seamounts. To the south, the Southern Ocean provides nutrient-rich upwellings that attract fish and cetacean populations. Tasmania’s coast is a dynamic, liminal space, moving and changing in response to the global currents that are driven by the shifting, calving and melting ice shelves and sheets in Antarctica.Oceans have long been a medium of connection between Tasmania and Antarctica. In the early colonial period, when the seas were the major thoroughfares of the world and inland travel was treacherous and slow, Tasmania’s connection with the Southern Ocean made it a valuable hub for exploration and exploitation of the south. Between 1642 and 1900, early European explorers were followed by British penal colonists, convicts, sealers, and whalers (Kriwoken and Williamson 93). Tasmania was well known to polar explorers, with expeditions led by Jules Dumont d’Urville, James Clark Ross, Roald Amundsen, and Douglas Mawson all transiting through the port of Hobart. Now that the city is no longer a whaling hub, growing populations of cetaceans continue to migrate past the islands on their annual journeys from the tropics, across the Sub-Antarctic Front and Antarctic circumpolar current, and into the south polar region, while southern species such as leopard seals are occasionally seen around Tasmania (Tasmania Parks and Wildlife). Although the water surrounding Tasmania and Antarctica is at times homogenised as a ‘barrier’, rendering these places isolated, the bodies of water that surround both are in fact permeable, and regularly crossed by both humans and marine species. The waters are diverse in their physical characteristics, underlying topography, sea life, and relationships, and serve to connect many different ocean regions, ecosystems, and weather patterns.Views from the Far SouthWhen considered in terms of its relative proximity to Antarctic, rather than its distance from Australia’s political and economic centres, Tasmania’s identity undergoes a significant shift. A sign at Cockle Creek, in the state’s far south, reminds visitors that they are closer to Antarctica than to Cairns, invoking a discourse of connectedness that collapses the standard ten-day ship voyage to Australia’s closest Antarctic station into a unit comparable with the routinely scheduled 5.5 hour flight to North Queensland. Hobart is the logistical hub for the Australian Antarctic Division and the French Institut Polaire Francais (IPEV), and has hosted Antarctic vessels belonging to the USA, South Korea, and Japan in recent years. From a far southern perspective, Hobart is not a regional Australian capital but a global polar hub. This alters the city’s geographic imaginary not only in a latitudinal sense—from “top down” to “bottom up”—but also a longitudinal one. Via its southward connection to Antarctica, Hobart is also connected east and west to four other recognized gateways: Cape Town in South Africa, Christchurch in New Zealand; Punta Arenas in Chile; and Ushuaia in Argentina (Image 2). The latter cities are considered small by international standards, but play an outsized role in relation to Antarctica.Image 2: H. Nielsen with a Sign Announcing Distances between Antarctic ‘Gateway’ Cities and Antarctica, Ushuaia, Argentina, 2018. Image Credit: Nicki D'Souza.These five cities form what might be called—to adapt geographer Klaus Dodds’ term—a ‘Southern Rim’ around the South Polar region (Dodds Geopolitics). They exist in ambiguous relationship to each other. Although the five cities signed a Statement of Intent in 2009 committing them to collaboration, they continue to compete vigorously for northern hemisphere traffic and the brand identity of the most prominent global gateway. A state government brochure spruiks Hobart, for example, as the “perfect Antarctic Gateway” emphasising its uniqueness and “natural advantages” in this regard (Tasmanian Government, 2016). In practice, the cities are automatically differentiated by their geographic position with respect to Antarctica. Although the ‘ice continent’ is often conceived as one entity, it too has regions, in both scientific and geographical senses (Terauds and Lee; Antonello). Hobart provides access to parts of East Antarctica, where the Australian, French, Japanese, and Chinese programs (among others) have bases; Cape Town is a useful access point for Europeans going to Dronning Maud Land; Christchurch is closest to the Ross Sea region, site of the largest US base; and Punta Arenas and Ushuaia neighbour the Antarctic Peninsula, home to numerous bases as well as a thriving tourist industry.The Antarctic sector is important to the Tasmanian economy, contributing $186 million (AUD) in 2017/18 (Wells; Gutwein; Tasmanian Polar Network). Unsurprisingly, Tasmania’s gateway brand has been actively promoted, with the 2016 Australian Antarctic Strategy and 20 Year Action Plan foregrounding the need to “Build Tasmania’s status as the premier East Antarctic Gateway for science and operations” and the state government releasing a “Tasmanian Antarctic Gateway Strategy” in 2017. The Chinese Antarctic program has been a particular focus: a Memorandum of Understanding focussed on Australia and China’s Antarctic relations includes a “commitment to utilise Australia, including Tasmania, as an Antarctic ‘gateway’.” (Australian Antarctic Division). These efforts towards a closer relationship with China have more recently come under attack as part of a questioning of China’s interests in the region (without, it should be noted, a concomitant questioning of Australia’s own considerable interests) (Baker 9). In these exchanges, a global power and a state of Australia generally classed as regional and peripheral are brought into direct contact via the even more remote Antarctic region. This connection was particularly visible when Chinese President Xi Jinping travelled to Hobart in 2014, in a visit described as both “strategic” and “incongruous” (Burden). There can be differences in how this relationship is narrated to domestic and international audiences, with issues of sovereignty and international cooperation variously foregrounded, laying the ground for what Dodds terms “awkward Antarctic nationalism” (1).Territory and ConnectionsThe awkwardness comes to a head in Tasmania, where domestic and international views of connections with the far south collide. Australia claims sovereignty over almost 6 million km2 of the Antarctic continent—a claim that in area is “roughly the size of mainland Australia minus Queensland” (Bergin). This geopolitical context elevates the importance of a regional part of Australia: the claims to Antarctic territory (which are recognised only by four other claimant nations) are performed not only in Antarctic localities, where they are made visible “with paraphernalia such as maps, flags, and plaques” (Salazar 55), but also in Tasmania, particularly in Hobart and surrounds. A replica of Mawson’s Huts in central Hobart makes Australia’s historic territorial interests in Antarctica visible an urban setting, foregrounding the figure of Douglas Mawson, the well-known Australian scientist and explorer who led the expeditions that proclaimed Australia’s sovereignty in the region of the continent roughly to its south (Leane et al.). Tasmania is caught in a balancing act, as it fosters international Antarctic connections (such hosting vessels from other national programs), while also playing a key role in administering what is domestically referred to as the Australian Antarctic Territory. The rhetoric of protection can offer common ground: island studies scholar Godfrey Baldacchino notes that as island narratives have moved “away from the perspective of the ‘explorer-discoverer-colonist’” they have been replaced by “the perspective of the ‘custodian-steward-environmentalist’” (49), but reminds readers that a colonising disposition still lurks beneath the surface. It must be remembered that terms such as “stewardship” and “leadership” can undertake sovereignty labour (Dodds “Awkward”), and that Tasmania’s Antarctic connections can be mobilised for a range of purposes. When Environment Minister Greg Hunt proclaimed at a press conference that: “Hobart is the gateway to the Antarctic for the future” (26 Apr. 2016), the remark had meaning within discourses of both sovereignty and economics. Tasmania’s capital was leveraged as a way to position Australia as a leader in the Antarctic arena.From ‘Gateway’ to ‘Antarctic City’While discussion of Antarctic ‘Gateway’ Cities often focuses on the economic and logistical benefit of their Antarctic connections, Hobart’s “gateway” identity, like those of its counterparts, stretches well beyond this, encompassing geological, climatic, historical, political, cultural and scientific links. Even the southerly wind, according to cartoonist Jon Kudelka, “has penguins in it” (Image 3). Hobart residents feel a high level of connection to Antarctica. In 2018, a survey of 300 randomly selected residents of Greater Hobart was conducted under the umbrella of the “Antarctic Cities” Australian Research Council Linkage Project led by Assoc. Prof. Juan Francisco Salazar (and involving all three present authors). Fourteen percent of respondents reported having been involved in an economic activity related to Antarctica, and 36% had attended a cultural event about Antarctica. Connections between the southern continent and Hobart were recognised as important: 71.9% agreed that “people in my city can influence the cultural meanings that shape our relationship to Antarctica”, while 90% agreed or strongly agreed that Hobart should play a significant role as a custodian of Antarctica’s future, and 88.4% agreed or strongly agreed that: “How we treat Antarctica is a test of our approach to ecological sustainability.” Image 3: “The Southerly” Demonstrates How Weather Connects Hobart and Antarctica. Image Credit: Jon Kudelka, Reproduced with Permission.Hobart, like the other gateways, activates these connections in its conscious place-branding. The city is particularly strong as a centre of Antarctic research: signs at the cruise-ship terminal on the waterfront claim that “There are more Antarctic scientists based in Hobart […] than at any other one place on earth, making Hobart a globally significant contributor to our understanding of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean.” Researchers are based at the Institute for Marine and Antarctic Studies (IMAS), the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), and the Australian Antarctic Division (AAD), with several working between institutions. Many Antarctic researchers located elsewhere in the world also have a connection with the place through affiliations and collaborations, leading journalist Jo Chandler to assert that “the breadth and depth of Hobart’s knowledge of ice, water, and the life forms they nurture […] is arguably unrivalled anywhere in the world” (86).Hobart also plays a significant role in Antarctica’s governance, as the site of the secretariats for the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) and the Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP), and as host of the Antarctic Consultative Treaty Meetings on more than one occasion (1986, 2012). The cultural domain is active, with Tasmanian Museum and Art Gallery (TMAG) featuring a permanent exhibit, “Islands to Ice”, emphasising the ocean as connecting the two places; the Mawson’s Huts Replica Museum aiming (among other things) to “highlight Hobart as the gateway to the Antarctic continent for the Asia Pacific region”; and a biennial Australian Antarctic Festival drawing over twenty thousand visitors, about a sixth of them from interstate or overseas (Hingley). Antarctic links are evident in the city’s natural and built environment: the dolerite columns of Mt Wellington, the statue of the Tasmanian Antarctic explorer Louis Bernacchi on the waterfront, and the wharfs that regularly accommodate icebreakers such as the Aurora Australis and the Astrolabe. Antarctica is figured as a southern neighbour; as historian Tom Griffiths puts it, Tasmanians “grow up with Antarctica breathing down their necks” (5). As an Antarctic City, Hobart mediates access to Antarctica both physically and in the cultural imaginary.Perhaps in recognition of the diverse ways in which a region or a city might be connected to Antarctica, researchers have recently been suggesting critical approaches to the ‘gateway’ label. C. Michael Hall points to a fuzziness in the way the term is applied, noting that it has drifted from its initial definition (drawn from economic geography) as denoting an access and supply point to a hinterland that produces a certain level of economic benefits. While Hall looks to keep the term robustly defined to avoid empty “local boosterism” (272–73), Gabriela Roldan aims to move the concept “beyond its function as an entry and exit door”, arguing that, among other things, the local community should be actively engaged in the Antarctic region (57). Leane, examining the representation of Hobart as a gateway in historical travel texts, concurs that “ingress and egress” are insufficient descriptors of Tasmania’s relationship with Antarctica, suggesting that at least discursively the island is positioned as “part of an Antarctic rim, itself sharing qualities of the polar region” (45). The ARC Linkage Project described above, supported by the Hobart City Council, the State Government and the University of Tasmania, as well as other national and international partners, aims to foster the idea of the Hobart and its counterparts as ‘Antarctic cities’ whose citizens act as custodians for the South Polar region, with a genuine concern for and investment in its future.Near and Far: Local Perspectives A changing climate may once again herald a shift in the identity of the Tasmanian islands. Recognition of the central role of Antarctica in regulating the global climate has generated scientific and political re-evaluation of the region. Antarctica is not only the planet’s largest heat sink but is the engine of global water currents and wind patterns that drive weather patterns and biodiversity across the world (Convey et al. 543). For example, Tas van Ommen’s research into Antarctic glaciology shows the tangible connection between increased snowfall in coastal East Antarctica and patterns of drought southwest Western Australia (van Ommen and Morgan). Hobart has become a global centre of marine and Antarctic science, bringing investment and development to the city. As the global climate heats up, Tasmania—thanks to its low latitude and southerly weather patterns—is one of the few regions in Australia likely to remain temperate. This is already leading to migration from the mainland that is impacting house prices and rental availability (Johnston; Landers 1). The region’s future is therefore closely entangled with its proximity to the far south. Salazar writes that “we cannot continue to think of Antarctica as the end of the Earth” (67). Shifting Antarctica into focus also brings Tasmania in from the margins. As an Antarctic city, Hobart assumes a privileged positioned on the global stage. This allows the city to present itself as central to international research efforts—in contrast to domestic views of the place as a small regional capital. The city inhabits dual identities; it is both on the periphery of Australian concerns and at the centre of Antarctic activity. Tasmania, then, is not in freefall, but rather at the forefront of a push to recognise Antarctica as entangled with its neighbours to the north.AcknowledgementsThis work was supported by the Australian Research Council under LP160100210.ReferencesAntonello, Alessandro. “Finding Place in Antarctica.” Antarctica and the Humanities. Eds. Peder Roberts, Lize-Marie van der Watt, and Adrian Howkins. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 181–204.Australian Government. 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Complex systems are an invention of the universe. It is not at all clear that science has an a priori primacy claim to the study of complex systems. (Galanter 5) Introduction In popular dialogues, describing a system as “complex” is often the point of resignation, inferring that the system cannot be sufficiently described, predicted nor managed. Transport networks, management infrastructure and supply chain logistics are all often described in this way. In socio-cultural terms “complex” is used to describe those humanistic systems that are “intricate, involved, complicated, dynamic, multi-dimensional, interconnected systems [such as] transnational citizenship, communities, identities, multiple belongings, overlapping geographies and competing histories” (Cahir & James). Academic dialogues have begun to explore the collective behaviors of complex systems to define a complex system specifically as an adaptive one; i.e. a system that demonstrates ‘self organising’ principles and ‘emergent’ properties. Based upon the key principles of interaction and emergence in relation to adaptive and self organising systems in cultural artifacts and processes, this paper will argue that complex systems are cultural systems. By introducing generic principles of complex systems, and looking at the exploration of such principles in art, design and media research, this paper argues that a science of cultural systems as part of complex systems theory is the post modern science for the digital age. Furthermore, that such a science was predicated by post structuralism and has been manifest in art, design and media practice since the late 1960s. Complex Systems Theory Complexity theory grew out of systems theory, an holistic approach to analysis that views whole systems based upon the links and interactions between the component parts and their relationship to each other and the environment within they exists. This stands in stark contrast to conventional science which is based upon Descartes’s reductionism, where the aim is to analyse systems by reducing something to its component parts (Wilson 3). As systems thinking is concerned with relationships more than elements, it proposes that in complex systems, small catalysts can cause large changes and that a change in one area of a system can adversely affect another area of the system. As is apparent, systems theory is a way of thinking rather than a specific set of rules, and similarly there is no single unified Theory of Complexity, but several different theories have arisen from the natural sciences, mathematics and computing. As such, the study of complex systems is very interdisciplinary and encompasses more than one theoretical framework. Whilst key ideas of complexity theory developed through artificial intelligence and robotics research, other important contributions came from thermodynamics, biology, sociology, physics, economics and law. In her volume for the Elsevier Advanced Management Series, “Complex Systems and Evolutionary Perspectives on Organisations”, Eve Mitleton-Kelly describes a comprehensive overview of this evolution as five main areas of research: complex adaptive systems dissipative structures autopoiesis (non-equilibrium) social systems chaos theory path dependence Here, Mitleton-Kelly points out that relatively little work has been done on developing a specific theory of complex social systems, despite much interest in complexity and its application to management (Mitleton-Kelly 4). To this end, she goes on to define the term “complex evolving system” as more appropriate to the field than ‘complex adaptive system’ and suggests that the term “complex behaviour” is thus more useful in social contexts (Mitleton-Kelly). For our purpose here, “complex systems” will be the general term used to describe those systems that are diverse and made up of multiple interdependent elements, that are often ‘adaptive’, in that they have the capacity to change and learn from events. This is in itself both ‘evolutionary’ and ‘behavioural’ and can be understood as emerging from the interaction of autonomous agents – especially people. Some generic principles of complex systems defined by Mitleton Kelly that are of concern here are: self-organisation emergence interdependence feedback space of possibilities co-evolving creation of new order Whilst the behaviours of complex systems clearly do not fall into our conventional top down perception of management and production, anticipating such behaviours is becoming more and more essential for products, processes and policies. For example, compare the traditional top down model of news generation, distribution and consumption to the “emerging media eco-system” (Bowman and Willis 14). Figure 1 (Bowman & Willis 10) Figure 2 (Bowman & Willis 12) To the traditional news organisations, such a “democratization of production” (McLuhan 230) has been a huge cause for concern. The agencies once solely responsible for the representation of reality are now lost in a global miasma of competing perspectives. Can we anticipate and account for complex behaviours? Eve Mitleton Kelly states that “if organisations are understood as complex evolving systems co-evolving as part of a social ‘ecosystem’, then that changed perspective changes ways of acting and relating which lead to a different way of working. Thus, management strategy changes, and our organizational design paradigms evolve as new types of relationships and ways of working provide the conditions for the emergence of new organisational forms” (Mitleton-Kelly 6). Complexity in Design It is thus through design practice and processes that discovering methods for anticipating complex systems behaviours seem most possible. The Embracing Complexity in Design (ECiD) research programme, is a contemporary interdisciplinary research cluster consisting of academics and designers from architectural engineering, robotics, geography, digital media, sustainable design, and computing aiming to explore the possibility of trans disciplinary principles of complexity in design. Over arching this work is the conviction that design can be seen as model for complex systems researchers motivated by applying complexity science in particular domains. Key areas in which design and complexity interact have been established by this research cluster. Most immediately, many designed products and systems are inherently complex to design in the ordinary sense. For example, when designing vehicles, architecture, microchips designers need to understand complex dynamic processes used to fabricate and manufacture products and systems. The social and economic context of design is also complex, from market economics and legal regulation to social trends and mass culture. The process of designing can also involve complex social dynamics, with many people processing and exchanging complex heterogeneous information over complex human and communication networks, in the context of many changing constraints. Current key research questions are: how can the methods of complex systems science inform designers? how can design inform research into complex systems? Whilst ECiD acknowledges that to answer such questions effectively the theoretical and methodological relations between complexity science and design need further exploration and enquiry, there are no reliable precedents for such an activity across the sciences and the arts in general. Indeed, even in areas where a convergence of humanities methodology with scientific practice might seem to be most pertinent, most examples are few and far between. In his paper “Post Structuralism, Hypertext & the World Wide Web”, Luke Tredennick states that “despite the concentration of post-structuralism on text and texts, the study of information has largely failed to exploit post-structuralist theory” (Tredennick 5). Yet it is surely in the convergence of art and design with computation and the media that a search for practical trans-metadisciplinary methodologies might be most fruitful. It is in design for interactive media, where algorithms meet graphics, where the user can interact, adapt and amend, that self-organisation, emergence, interdependence, feedback, the space of possibilities, co-evolution and the creation of new order are embraced on a day to day basis by designers. A digitally interactive environment such as the World Wide Web, clearly demonstrates all the key aspects of a complex system. Indeed, it has already been described as a ‘complexity machine’ (Qvortup 9). It is important to remember that this ‘complexity machine’ has been designed. It is an intentional facility. It may display all the characteristics of complexity but, whilst some of its attributes are most demonstrative of self organisation and emergence, the Internet itself has not emerged spontaneously. For example, Tredinnick details the evolution of the World Wide Web through the Memex machine of Vannevar Bush, through Ted Nelsons hypertext system Xanadu to Tim Berners-Lee’s Enquire (Tredennick 3). The Internet was engineered. So, whilst we may not be able to entirely predict complex behavior, we can, and do, quite clearly design for it. When designing digitally interactive artifacts we design parameters or co ordinates to define the space within which a conceptual process will take place. We can never begin to predict precisely what those processes might become through interaction, emergence and self organisation, but we can establish conceptual parameters that guide and delineate the space of possibilities. Indeed this fact is so transparently obvious that many commentators in the humanities have been pushed to remark that interaction is merely interpretation, and so called new media is not new at all; that one interacts with a book in much the same way as a digital artifact. After all, post-structuralist theory had established the “death of the author” in the 1970s – the a priori that all cultural artifacts are open to interpretation, where all meanings must be completed by the reader. The concept of the “open work” (Eco 6) has been an established post modern concept for over 30 years and is commonly recognised as a feature of surrealist montage, poetry, the writings of James Joyce, even advertising design, where a purposive space for engagement and interpretation of a message is designated, without which the communication does not “work”. However, this concept is also most successfully employed in relation to installation art and, more recently, interactive art as a reflection of the artist’s conscious decision to leave part of a work open to interpretation and/or interaction. Art & Complex Systems One of the key projects of Embracing Complexity in Design has been to look at the relationship between art and complex systems. There is a relatively well established history of exploring art objects as complex systems in themselves that finds its origins in the systems art movement of the 1970s. In his paper “Observing ‘Systems Art’ from a Systems-Theroretical Perspective”, Francis Halsall defines systems art as “emerging in the 1960s and 1970s as a new paradigm in artistic practice … displaying an interest in the aesthetics of networks, the exploitation of new technology and New Media, unstable or de-materialised physicality, the prioritising of non-visual aspects, and an engagement (often politicised) with the institutional systems of support (such as the gallery, discourse, or the market) within which it occurs” (Halsall 7). More contemporarily, “Open Systems: Rethinking Art c.1970”, at Tate Modern, London, focuses upon systems artists “rejection of art’s traditional focus on the object, to wide-ranging experiments al focus on the object, to wide-ranging experiments with media that included dance, performance and…film & video” (De Salvo 3). Artists include Andy Warhol, Richard Long, Gilbert & George, Sol Lewitt, Eva Hesse and Bruce Nauman. In 2002, the Samuel Dorsky Museum of Art, New York, held an international exhibition entitled “Complexity; Art & Complex Systems”, that was concerned with “art as a distinct discipline offer[ing] its own unique approache[s] and epistemic standards in the consideration of complexity” (Galanter and Levy 5), and the organisers go on to describe four ways in which artists engage the realm of complexity: presentations of natural complex phenomena that transcend conventional scientific visualisation descriptive systems which describe complex systems in an innovative and often idiosyncratic way commentary on complexity science itself technical applications of genetic algorithms, neural networks and a-life ECiD artist Julian Burton makes work that visualises how companies operate in specific relation to their approach to change and innovation. He is a strategic artist and facilitator who makes “pictures of problems to help people talk about them” (Burton). Clients include public and private sector organisations such as Barclays, Shell, Prudential, KPMG and the NHS. He is quoted as saying “Pictures are a powerful way to engage and focus a group’s attention on crucial issues and challenges, and enable them to grasp complex situations quickly. I try and create visual catalysts that capture the major themes of a workshop, meeting or strategy and re-present them in an engaging way to provoke lively conversations” (Burton). This is a simple and direct method of using art as a knowledge elicitation tool that falls into the first and second categories above. The third category is demonstrated by the ground breaking TechnoSphere, that was specifically inspired by complexity theory, landscape and artificial life. Launched in 1995 as an Arts Council funded online digital environment it was created by Jane Prophet and Gordon Selley. TechnoSphere is a virtual world, populated by artificial life forms created by users of the World Wide Web. The digital ecology of the 3D world, housed on a server, depends on the participation of an on-line public who accesses the world via the Internet. At the time of writing it has attracted over a 100,000 users who have created over a million creatures. The artistic exploration of technical applications is by default a key field for researching the convergence of trans-metadisciplinary methodologies. Troy Innocent’s lifeSigns evolves multiple digital media languages “expressed as a virtual world – through form, structure, colour, sound, motion, surface and behaviour” (Innocent). The work explores the idea of “emergent language through play – the idea that new meanings may be generated through interaction between human and digital agents”. Thus this artwork combines three areas of converging research – artificial life; computational semiotics and digital games. In his paper “What Is Generative Art? Complexity Theory as a Context for Art Theory”, Philip Galanter describes all art as generative on the basis that it is created from the application of rules. Yet, as demonstrated above, what is significantly different and important about digital interactivity, as opposed to its predecessor, interpretation, is its provision of a graphical user interface (GUI) to component parts of a text such as symbol, metaphor, narrative, etc for the multiple “authors” and the multiple “readers” in a digitally interactive space of possibility. This offers us tangible, instantaneous reproduction and dissemination of interpretations of an artwork. Conclusion: Digital Interactivity – A Complex Medium Digital interaction of any sort is thus a graphic model of the complex process of communication. Here, complexity does not need deconstructing, representing nor modelling, as the aesthetics (as in apprehended by the senses) of the graphical user interface conveniently come first. Design for digital interactive media is thus design for complex adaptive systems. The theoretical and methodological relations between complexity science and design can clearly be expounded especially well through post-structuralism. The work of Barthes, Derrida & Foucault offers us the notion of all cultural artefacts as texts or systems of signs, whose meanings are not fixed but rather sustained by networks of relationships. Implemented in a digital environment post-structuralist theory is tangible complexity. Strangely, whilst Philip Galanter states that science has no necessary over reaching claim to the study of complexity, he then argues conversely that “contemporary art theory rooted in skeptical continental philosophy [reduces] art to social construction [as] postmodernism, deconstruction and critical theory [are] notoriously elusive, slippery, and overlapping terms and ideas…that in fact [are] in the business of destabilising apparently clear and universal propositions” (4). This seems to imply that for Galanter, post modern rejections of grand narratives necessarily will exclude the “new scientific paradigm” of complexity, a paradigm that he himself is looking to be universal. Whilst he cites Lyotard (6) describing both political and linguistic reasons why postmodern art celebrates plurality, denying any progress towards singular totalising views, he fails to appreciate what happens if that singular totalising view incorporates interactivity? Surely complexity is pluralistic by its very nature? In the same vein, if language for Derrida is “an unfixed system of traces and differences … regardless of the intent of the authored texts … with multiple equally legitimate meanings” (Galanter 7) then I have heard no better description of the signifiers, signifieds, connotations and denotations of digital culture. Complexity in its entirety can also be conversely understood as the impact of digital interactivity upon culture per se which has a complex causal relation in itself; Qvortups notion of a “communications event” (9) such as the Danish publication of the Mohammed cartoons falls into this category. Yet a complex causality could be traced further into cultural processes enlightening media theory; from the relationship between advertising campaigns and brand development; to the exposure and trajectory of the celebrity; describing the evolution of visual language in media cultures and informing the relationship between exposure to representation and behaviour. In digital interaction the terms art, design and media converge into a process driven, performative event that demonstrates emergence through autopoietic processes within a designated space of possibility. By insisting that all artwork is generative Galanter, like many other writers, negates the medium entirely which allows him to insist that generative art is “ideologically neutral” (Galanter 10). Generative art, like all digitally interactive artifacts are not neutral but rather ideologically plural. Thus, if one integrates Qvortups (8) delineation of medium theory and complexity theory we may have what we need; a first theory of a complex medium. Through interactive media complexity theory is the first post modern science; the first science of culture. References Bowman, Shane, and Chris Willis. We Media. 21 Sep. 2003. 9 March 2007 http://www.hypergene.net/wemedia/weblog.php>. Burton, Julian. “Hedron People.” 9 March 2007 http://www.hedron.com/network/assoc.php4?associate_id=14>. Cahir, Jayde, and Sarah James. “Complex: Call for Papers.” M/C Journal 9 Sep. 2006. 7 March 2007 http://journal.media-culture.org.au/journal/upcoming.php>. De Salvo, Donna, ed. Open Systems: Rethinking Art c. 1970. London: Tate Gallery Press, 2005. Eco, Umberto. The Open Work. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1989. Galanter, Phillip, and Ellen K. Levy. Complexity: Art & Complex Systems. SDMA Gallery Guide, 2002. Galanter, Phillip. “Against Reductionism: Science, Complexity, Art & Complexity Studies.” 2003. 9 March 2007 http://isce.edu/ISCE_Group_Site/web-content/ISCE_Events/ Norwood_2002/Norwood_2002_Papers/Galanter.pdf>. Halsall, Francis. “Observing ‘Systems-Art’ from a Systems-Theoretical Perspective”. CHArt 2005. 9 March 2007 http://www.chart.ac.uk/chart2005/abstracts/halsall.htm>. Innocent, Troy. “Life Signs.” 9 March 2007 http://www.iconica.org/main.htm>. Johnson, Jeffrey. “Embracing Complexity in Design (ECiD).” 2007. 9 March 2007 http://www.complexityanddesign.net/>. Lyotard, Jean-Francois. The Postmodern Condition. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1984. McLuhan, Marshall. The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1962. Mitleton-Kelly, Eve, ed. Complex Systems and Evolutionary Perspectives on Organisations. Elsevier Advanced Management Series, 2003. Prophet, Jane. “Jane Prophet.” 9 March 2007 http://www.janeprophet.co.uk/>. Qvortup, Lars. “Understanding New Digital Media.” European Journal of Communication 21.3 (2006): 345-356. Tedinnick, Luke. “Post Structuralism, Hypertext & the World Wide Web.” Aslib 59.2 (2007): 169-186. Wilson, Edward Osborne. Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New York: A.A. Knoff, 1998. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Cham, Karen, and Jeffrey Johnson. "Complexity Theory: A Science of Cultural Systems?." M/C Journal 10.3 (2007). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0706/08-cham-johnson.php>. APA Style Cham, K., and J. Johnson. (Jun. 2007) "Complexity Theory: A Science of Cultural Systems?," M/C Journal, 10(3). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0706/08-cham-johnson.php>.

Photograph by Gonzalo Echeverria (2010)Declaring War Soon after Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the Bush Administration described its new grand strategy: the “Global War on Terror”. This underpinned the subsequent counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and the United States invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Media pundits quickly applied the Global War on Terror label to the Madrid, Bali and London bombings, to convey how Al Qaeda’s terrorism had gone transnational. Meanwhile, international relations scholars debated the extent to which September 11 had changed the international system (Brenner; Mann 303). American intellectuals adopted several variations of the Global War on Terror in what initially felt like a transitional period of US foreign policy (Burns). Walter Laqueur suggested Al Qaeda was engaged in a “cosmological” and perpetual war. Paul Berman likened Al Qaeda and militant Islam to the past ideological battles against communism and fascism (Heilbrunn 248). In a widely cited article, neoconservative thinker Norman Podhoretz suggested the United States faced “World War IV”, which had three interlocking drivers: Al Qaeda and trans-national terrorism; political Islam as the West’s existential enemy; and nuclear proliferation to ‘rogue’ countries and non-state actors (Friedman 3). Podhoretz’s tone reflected a revival of his earlier Cold War politics and critique of the New Left (Friedman 148-149; Halper and Clarke 56; Heilbrunn 210). These stances attracted widespread support. For instance, the United States Marine Corp recalibrated its mission to fight a long war against “World War IV-like” enemies. Yet these stances left the United States unprepared as the combat situations in Afghanistan and Iraq worsened (Ricks; Ferguson; Filkins). Neoconservative ideals for Iraq “regime change” to transform the Middle East failed to deal with other security problems such as Pakistan’s Musharraf regime (Dorrien 110; Halper and Clarke 210-211; Friedman 121, 223; Heilbrunn 252). The Manichean and open-ended framing became a self-fulfilling prophecy for insurgents, jihadists, and militias. The Bush Administration quietly abandoned the Global War on Terror in July 2005. Widespread support had given way to policymaker doubt. Why did so many intellectuals and strategists embrace the Global War on Terror as the best possible “grand strategy” perspective of a post-September 11 world? Why was there so little doubt of this worldview? This is a debate with roots as old as the Sceptics versus the Sophists. Explanations usually focus on the Bush Administration’s “Vulcans” war cabinet: Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, who later became Secretary of State (Mann xv-xvi). The “Vulcans” were named after the Roman god Vulcan because Rice’s hometown Birmingham, Alabama, had “a mammoth fifty-six foot statue . . . [in] homage to the city’s steel industry” (Mann x) and the name stuck. Alternatively, explanations focus on how neoconservative thinkers shaped the intellectual climate after September 11, in a receptive media climate. Biographers suggest that “neoconservatism had become an echo chamber” (Heilbrunn 242) with its own media outlets, pundits, and think-tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute and Project for a New America. Neoconservatism briefly flourished in Washington DC until Iraq’s sectarian violence discredited the “Vulcans” and neoconservative strategists like Paul Wolfowitz (Friedman; Ferguson). The neoconservatives' combination of September 11’s aftermath with strongly argued historical analogies was initially convincing. They conferred with scholars such as Bernard Lewis, Samuel P. Huntington and Victor Davis Hanson to construct classicist historical narratives and to explain cultural differences. However, the history of the decade after September 11 also contains mis-steps and mistakes which make it a series of contingent decisions (Ferguson; Bergen). One way to analyse these contingent decisions is to pose “what if?” counterfactuals, or feasible alternatives to historical events (Lebow). For instance, what if September 11 had been a chemical and biological weapons attack? (Mann 317). Appendix 1 includes a range of alternative possibilities and “minimal rewrites” or slight variations on the historical events which occurred. Collectively, these counterfactuals suggest the role of agency, chance, luck, and the juxtaposition of better and worse outcomes. They pose challenges to the classicist interpretation adopted soon after September 11 to justify “World War IV” (Podhoretz). A ‘Two-Track’ Process for ‘World War IV’ After the September 11 attacks, I think an overlapping two-track process occurred with the “Vulcans” cabinet, neoconservative advisers, and two “echo chambers”: neoconservative think-tanks and the post-September 11 media. Crucially, Bush’s “Vulcans” war cabinet succeeded in gaining civilian control of the United States war decision process. Although successful in initiating the 2003 Iraq War this civilian control created a deeper crisis in US civil-military relations (Stevenson; Morgan). The “Vulcans” relied on “politicised” intelligence such as a United Kingdom intelligence report on Iraq’s weapons development program. The report enabled “a climate of undifferentiated fear to arise” because its public version did not distinguish between chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons (Halper and Clarke, 210). The cautious 2003 National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) report on Iraq was only released in a strongly edited form. For instance, the US Department of Energy had expressed doubts about claims that Iraq had approached Niger for uranium, and was using aluminium tubes for biological and chemical weapons development. Meanwhile, the post-September 11 media had become a second “echo chamber” (Halper and Clarke 194-196) which amplified neoconservative arguments. Berman, Laqueur, Podhoretz and others who framed the intellectual climate were “risk entrepreneurs” (Mueller 41-43) that supported the “World War IV” vision. The media also engaged in aggressive “flak” campaigns (Herman and Chomsky 26-28; Mueller 39-42) designed to limit debate and to stress foreign policy stances and themes which supported the Bush Administration. When former Central Intelligence Agency director James Woolsey’s claimed that Al Qaeda had close connections to Iraqi intelligence, this was promoted in several books, including Michael Ledeen’s War Against The Terror Masters, Stephen Hayes’ The Connection, and Laurie Mylroie’s Bush v. The Beltway; and in partisan media such as Fox News, NewsMax, and The Weekly Standard who each attacked the US State Department and the CIA (Dorrien 183; Hayes; Ledeen; Mylroie; Heilbrunn 237, 243-244; Mann 310). This was the media “echo chamber” at work. The group Accuracy in Media also campaigned successfully to ensure that US cable providers did not give Al Jazeera English access to US audiences (Barker). Cosmopolitan ideals seemed incompatible with what the “flak” groups desired. The two-track process converged on two now infamous speeches. US President Bush’s State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002, and US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s presentation to the United Nations on 5 February 2003. Bush’s speech included a line from neoconservative David Frumm about North Korea, Iraq and Iran as an “Axis of Evil” (Dorrien 158; Halper and Clarke 139-140; Mann 242, 317-321). Powell’s presentation to the United Nations included now-debunked threat assessments. In fact, Powell had altered the speech’s original draft by I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, who was Cheney’s chief of staff (Dorrien 183-184). Powell claimed that Iraq had mobile biological weapons facilities, linked to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Mohamed El-Baradei, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and the Institute for Science and International Security all strongly doubted this claim, as did international observers (Dorrien 184; Halper and Clarke 212-213; Mann 353-354). Yet this information was suppressed: attacked by “flak” or given little visible media coverage. Powell’s agenda included trying to rebuild an international coalition and to head off weather changes that would affect military operations in the Middle East (Mann 351). Both speeches used politicised variants of “weapons of mass destruction”, taken from the counterterrorism literature (Stern; Laqueur). Bush’s speech created an inflated geopolitical threat whilst Powell relied on flawed intelligence and scientific visuals to communicate a non-existent threat (Vogel). However, they had the intended effect on decision makers. US Under-Secretary of Defense, the neoconservative Paul Wolfowitz, later revealed to Vanity Fair that “weapons of mass destruction” was selected as an issue that all potential stakeholders could agree on (Wilkie 69). Perhaps the only remaining outlet was satire: Armando Iannucci’s 2009 film In The Loop parodied the diplomatic politics surrounding Powell’s speech and the civil-military tensions on the Iraq War’s eve. In the short term the two track process worked in heading off doubt. The “Vulcans” blocked important information on pre-war Iraq intelligence from reaching the media and the general public (Prados). Alternatively, they ignored area specialists and other experts, such as when Coalition Provisional Authority’s L. Paul Bremer ignored the US State Department’s fifteen volume ‘Future of Iraq’ project (Ferguson). Public “flak” and “risk entrepreneurs” mobilised a range of motivations from grief and revenge to historical memory and identity politics. This combination of private and public processes meant that although doubts were expressed, they could be contained through the dual echo chambers of neoconservative policymaking and the post-September 11 media. These factors enabled the “Vulcans” to proceed with their “regime change” plans despite strong public opposition from anti-war protestors. Expressing DoubtsMany experts and institutions expressed doubt about specific claims the Bush Administration made to support the 2003 Iraq War. This doubt came from three different and sometimes overlapping groups. Subject matter experts such as the IAEA’s Mohamed El-Baradei and weapons development scientists countered the UK intelligence report and Powell’s UN speech. However, they did not get the media coverage warranted due to “flak” and “echo chamber” dynamics. Others could challenge misleading historical analogies between insurgent Iraq and Nazi Germany, and yet not change the broader outcomes (Benjamin). Independent journalists one group who gained new information during the 1990-91 Gulf War: some entered Iraq from Kuwait and documented a more humanitarian side of the war to journalists embedded with US military units (Uyarra). Finally, there were dissenters from bureaucratic and institutional processes. In some cases, all three overlapped. In their separate analyses of the post-September 11 debate on intelligence “failure”, Zegart and Jervis point to a range of analytic misperceptions and institutional problems. However, the intelligence community is separated from policymakers such as the “Vulcans”. Compartmentalisation due to the “need to know” principle also means that doubting analysts can be blocked from releasing information. Andrew Wilkie discovered this when he resigned from Australia’s Office for National Assessments (ONA) as a transnational issues analyst. Wilkie questioned the pre-war assessments in Powell’s United Nations speech that were used to justify the 2003 Iraq War. Wilkie was then attacked publicly by Australian Prime Minister John Howard. This overshadowed a more important fact: both Howard and Wilkie knew that due to Australian legislation, Wilkie could not publicly comment on ONA intelligence, despite the invitation to do so. This barrier also prevented other intelligence analysts from responding to the “Vulcans”, and to “flak” and “echo chamber” dynamics in the media and neoconservative think-tanks. Many analysts knew that the excerpts released from the 2003 NIE on Iraq was highly edited (Prados). For example, Australian agencies such as the ONA, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Department of Defence knew this (Wilkie 98). However, analysts are trained not to interfere with policymakers, even when there are significant civil-military irregularities. Military officials who spoke out about pre-war planning against the “Vulcans” and their neoconservative supporters were silenced (Ricks; Ferguson). Greenlight Capital’s hedge fund manager David Einhorn illustrates in a different context what might happen if analysts did comment. Einhorn gave a speech to the Ira Sohn Conference on 15 May 2002 debunking the management of Allied Capital. Einhorn’s “short-selling” led to retaliation from Allied Capital, a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation, and growing evidence of potential fraud. If analysts adopted Einhorn’s tactics—combining rigorous analysis with targeted, public denunciation that is widely reported—then this may have short-circuited the “flak” and “echo chamber” effects prior to the 2003 Iraq War. The intelligence community usually tries to pre-empt such outcomes via contestation exercises and similar processes. This was the goal of the 2003 NIE on Iraq, despite the fact that the US Department of Energy which had the expertise was overruled by other agencies who expressed opinions not necessarily based on rigorous scientific and technical analysis (Prados; Vogel). In counterterrorism circles, similar disinformation arose about Aum Shinrikyo’s biological weapons research after its sarin gas attack on Tokyo’s subway system on 20 March 1995 (Leitenberg). Disinformation also arose regarding nuclear weapons proliferation to non-state actors in the 1990s (Stern). Interestingly, several of the “Vulcans” and neoconservatives had been involved in an earlier controversial contestation exercise: Team B in 1976. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assembled three Team B groups in order to evaluate and forecast Soviet military capabilities. One group headed by historian Richard Pipes gave highly “alarmist” forecasts and then attacked a CIA NIE about the Soviets (Dorrien 50-56; Mueller 81). The neoconservatives adopted these same tactics to reframe the 2003 NIE from its position of caution, expressed by several intelligence agencies and experts, to belief that Iraq possessed a current, covert program to develop weapons of mass destruction (Prados). Alternatively, information may be leaked to the media to express doubt. “Non-attributable” background interviews to establishment journalists like Seymour Hersh and Bob Woodward achieved this. Wikileaks publisher Julian Assange has recently achieved notoriety due to US diplomatic cables from the SIPRNet network released from 28 November 2010 onwards. Supporters have favourably compared Assange to Daniel Ellsberg, the RAND researcher who leaked the Pentagon Papers (Ellsberg; Ehrlich and Goldsmith). Whilst Elsberg succeeded because a network of US national papers continued to print excerpts from the Pentagon Papers despite lawsuit threats, Assange relied in part on favourable coverage from the UK’s Guardian newspaper. However, suspected sources such as US Army soldier Bradley Manning are not protected whilst media outlets are relatively free to publish their scoops (Walt, ‘Woodward’). Assange’s publication of SIPRNet’s diplomatic cables will also likely mean greater restrictions on diplomatic and military intelligence (Walt, ‘Don’t Write’). Beyond ‘Doubt’ Iraq’s worsening security discredited many of the factors that had given the neoconservatives credibility. The post-September 11 media became increasingly more critical of the US military in Iraq (Ferguson) and cautious about the “echo chamber” of think-tanks and media outlets. Internet sites for Al Jazeera English, Al-Arabiya and other networks have enabled people to bypass “flak” and directly access these different viewpoints. Most damagingly, the non-discovery of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction discredited both the 2003 NIE on Iraq and Colin Powell’s United Nations presentation (Wilkie 104). Likewise, “risk entrepreneurs” who foresaw “World War IV” in 2002 and 2003 have now distanced themselves from these apocalyptic forecasts due to a series of mis-steps and mistakes by the Bush Administration and Al Qaeda’s over-calculation (Bergen). The emergence of sites such as Wikileaks, and networks like Al Jazeera English and Al-Arabiya, are a response to the politics of the past decade. They attempt to short-circuit past “echo chambers” through providing access to different sources and leaked data. The Global War on Terror framed the Bush Administration’s response to September 11 as a war (Kirk; Mueller 59). Whilst this prematurely closed off other possibilities, it has also unleashed a series of dynamics which have undermined the neoconservative agenda. The “classicist” history and historical analogies constructed to justify the “World War IV” scenario are just one of several potential frameworks. “Flak” organisations and media “echo chambers” are now challenged by well-financed and strategic alternatives such as Al Jazeera English and Al-Arabiya. Doubt is one defence against “risk entrepreneurs” who seek to promote a particular idea: doubt guards against uncritical adoption. Perhaps the enduring lesson of the post-September 11 debates, though, is that doubt alone is not enough. What is needed are individuals and institutions that understand the strategies which the neoconservatives and others have used, and who also have the soft power skills during crises to influence critical decision-makers to choose alternatives. Appendix 1: Counterfactuals Richard Ned Lebow uses “what if?” counterfactuals to examine alternative possibilities and “minimal rewrites” or slight variations on the historical events that occurred. The following counterfactuals suggest that the Bush Administration’s Global War on Terror could have evolved very differently . . . or not occurred at all. Fact: The 2003 Iraq War and 2001 Afghanistan counterinsurgency shaped the Bush Administration’s post-September 11 grand strategy. Counterfactual #1: Al Gore decisively wins the 2000 U.S. election. Bush v. Gore never occurs. After the September 11 attacks, Gore focuses on international alliance-building and gains widespread diplomatic support rather than a neoconservative agenda. He authorises Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan and works closely with the Musharraf regime in Pakistan to target Al Qaeda’s muhajideen. He ‘contains’ Saddam Hussein’s Iraq through measurement and signature, technical intelligence, and more stringent monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Minimal Rewrite: United 93 crashes in Washington DC, killing senior members of the Gore Administration. Fact: U.S. Special Operations Forces failed to kill Osama bin Laden in late November and early December 2001 at Tora Bora. Counterfactual #2: U.S. Special Operations Forces kill Osama bin Laden in early December 2001 during skirmishes at Tora Bora. Ayman al-Zawahiri is critically wounded, captured, and imprisoned. The rest of Al Qaeda is scattered. Minimal Rewrite: Osama bin Laden’s death turns him into a self-mythologised hero for decades. Fact: The UK Blair Government supplied a 50-page intelligence dossier on Iraq’s weapons development program which the Bush Administration used to support its pre-war planning. Counterfactual #3: Rogue intelligence analysts debunk the UK Blair Government’s claims through a series of ‘targeted’ leaks to establishment news sources. Minimal Rewrite: The 50-page intelligence dossier is later discovered to be correct about Iraq’s weapons development program. Fact: The Bush Administration used the 2003 National Intelligence Estimate to “build its case” for “regime change” in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Counterfactual #4: A joint investigation by The New York Times and The Washington Post rebuts U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the United National Security Council, delivered on 5 February 2003. Minimal Rewrite: The Central Intelligence Agency’s whitepaper “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs” (October 2002) more accurately reflects the 2003 NIE’s cautious assessments. Fact: The Bush Administration relied on Ahmed Chalabi for its postwar estimates about Iraq’s reconstruction. Counterfactual #5: The Bush Administration ignores Chalabi’s advice and relies instead on the U.S. State Department’s 15 volume report “The Future of Iraq”. Minimal Rewrite: The Coalition Provisional Authority appoints Ahmed Chalabi to head an interim Iraqi government. Fact: L. Paul Bremer signed orders to disband Iraq’s Army and to De-Ba’athify Iraq’s new government. Counterfactual #6: Bremer keeps Iraq’s Army intact and uses it to impose security in Baghdad to prevent looting and to thwart insurgents. Rather than a De-Ba’athification policy, Bremer uses former Baath Party members to gather situational intelligence. Minimal Rewrite: Iraq’s Army refuses to disband and the De-Ba’athification policy uncovers several conspiracies to undermine the Coalition Provisional Authority. AcknowledgmentsThanks to Stephen McGrail for advice on science and technology analysis.References Barker, Greg. “War of Ideas”. PBS Frontline. Boston, MA: 2007. ‹http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/newswar/video1.html› Benjamin, Daniel. “Condi’s Phony History.” Slate 29 Aug. 2003. ‹http://www.slate.com/id/2087768/pagenum/all/›. Bergen, Peter L. The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and Al Qaeda. New York: The Free Press, 2011. Berman, Paul. Terror and Liberalism. W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 2003. Brenner, William J. “In Search of Monsters: Realism and Progress in International Relations Theory after September 11.” Security Studies 15.3 (2006): 496-528. Burns, Alex. “The Worldflash of a Coming Future.” M/C Journal 6.2 (April 2003). ‹http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0304/08-worldflash.php›. Dorrien, Gary. Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana. New York: Routledge, 2004. Ehrlich, Judith, and Goldsmith, Rick. The Most Dangerous Man in America: Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers. Berkley CA: Kovno Communications, 2009. Einhorn, David. Fooling Some of the People All of the Time: A Long Short (and Now Complete) Story. Hoboken NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2010. Ellison, Sarah. “The Man Who Spilled The Secrets.” Vanity Fair (Feb. 2011). ‹http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2011/02/the-guardian-201102›. Ellsberg, Daniel. Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers. New York: Viking, 2002. Ferguson, Charles. No End in Sight, New York: Representational Pictures, 2007. Filkins, Dexter. The Forever War. New York: Vintage Books, 2008. Friedman, Murray. The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy. New York: Cambridge UP, 2005. Halper, Stefan, and Jonathan Clarke. America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order. New York: Cambridge UP, 2004. Hayes, Stephen F. The Connection: How Al Qaeda’s Collaboration with Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America. New York: HarperCollins, 2004. Heilbrunn, Jacob. They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons. New York: Doubleday, 2008. Herman, Edward S., and Noam Chomsky. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. Rev. ed. New York: Pantheon Books, 2002. Iannucci, Armando. In The Loop. London: BBC Films, 2009. Jervis, Robert. Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. Ithaca NY: Cornell UP, 2010. Kirk, Michael. “The War behind Closed Doors.” PBS Frontline. Boston, MA: 2003. ‹http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/›. Laqueur, Walter. No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Continuum, 2003. Lebow, Richard Ned. Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations. Princeton NJ: Princeton UP, 2010. Ledeen, Michael. The War against The Terror Masters. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2003. Leitenberg, Milton. “Aum Shinrikyo's Efforts to Produce Biological Weapons: A Case Study in the Serial Propagation of Misinformation.” Terrorism and Political Violence 11.4 (1999): 149-158. Mann, James. Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet. New York: Viking Penguin, 2004. Morgan, Matthew J. The American Military after 9/11: Society, State, and Empire. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Mueller, John. Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them. New York: The Free Press, 2009. Mylroie, Laurie. Bush v The Beltway: The Inside Battle over War in Iraq. New York: Regan Books, 2003. Nutt, Paul C. Why Decisions Fail. San Francisco: Berrett-Koelher, 2002. Podhoretz, Norman. “How to Win World War IV”. Commentary 113.2 (2002): 19-29. Prados, John. Hoodwinked: The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War. New York: The New Press, 2004. Ricks, Thomas. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. New York: The Penguin Press, 2006. Stern, Jessica. The Ultimate Terrorists. Boston, MA: Harvard UP, 2001. Stevenson, Charles A. Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations under Stress. New York: Routledge, 2006. Walt, Stephen M. “Should Bob Woodward Be Arrested?” Foreign Policy 10 Dec. 2010. ‹http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/12/10/more_wikileaks_double_standards›. Walt, Stephen M. “‘Don’t Write If You Can Talk...’: The Latest from WikiLeaks.” Foreign Policy 29 Nov. 2010. ‹http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/29/dont_write_if_you_can_talk_the_latest_from_wikileaks›. Wilkie, Andrew. Axis of Deceit. Melbourne: Black Ink Books, 2003. Uyarra, Esteban Manzanares. “War Feels like War”. London: BBC, 2003. Vogel, Kathleen M. “Iraqi Winnebagos™ of Death: Imagined and Realized Futures of US Bioweapons Threat Assessments.” Science and Public Policy 35.8 (2008): 561–573. Zegart, Amy. Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI and the Origins of 9/11. Princeton NJ: Princeton UP, 2007.

IllegitimacyBack in 1987, Gregory Bateson argued that:Kurt Vonnegut gives us wary advice – that we should be careful what we pretend because we become what we pretend. And something like that, some sort of self-fulfilment, occurs in all organisations and human cultures. What people presume to be ‘human’ is what they will build in as premises of their social arrangements, and what they build in is sure to be learned, is sure to become a part of the character of those who participate. (178)The human capacity to marginalise and discriminate against others on the basis of innate and constructed characteristics is evident from the long history of discrimination against people whose existence is ‘illegitimate’, defined as being outside the law. What is inside or outside the law depends upon the context under consideration. For example, in societies such as ancient Greece and the antebellum United States, where slavery was legal, people who were constructed as ‘slaves’ could legitimately be treated very differently from ‘citizens’: free people who benefit from a range of human rights (Northup). The discernment of what is legitimate from that which is illegitimate is thus implicated within the law but extends into the wider experience of community life and is evident within the civil structures through which society is organised and regulated.The division between the legitimate and illegitimate is an arbitrary one, susceptible to changing circumstances. Within recent memory a romantic/sexual relationship between two people of the same sex was constructed as illegitimate and actively persecuted. This was particularly the case for same-sex attracted men, since the societies regulating these relationships generally permitted women a wider repertoire of emotional response than men were allowed. Even when lesbian and gay relationships were legalised, they were constructed as less legitimate in the sense that they often had different rules around the age of consent for homosexual and heterosexual couples. In Australia, the refusal to allow same sex couples to marry perpetuates ways in which these relationships are constructed as illegitimate – beyond the remit of the legislation concerning marriage.The archetypal incidence of illegitimacy has historically referred to people born out of wedlock. The circumstances of birth, for example whether a person was born as a result of a legally-sanctioned marital relationship or not, could have ramifications throughout an individual’s life. Stories abound (for example, Cookson) of the implications of being illegitimate. In some social stings, such as Catherine Cookson’s north-eastern England at the turn of the twentieth century, illegitimate children were often shunned. Parents frequently refused permission for their (legitimate) children to play with illegitimate classmates, as if these children born out of wedlock embodied a contaminating variety of evil. Illegitimate children were treated differently in the law in matters of inheritance, for example, and may still be. They frequently lived in fear of needing to show a birth certificate to gain a passport, for example, or to marry. Sometimes, it was at this point in adult life, that a person first discovered their illegitimacy, changing their entire understanding of their family and their place in the world. It might be possible to argue that the emphasis upon the legitimacy of a birth has lessened in proportion to an acceptance of genetic markers as an indicator of biological paternity, but that is not the endeavour here.Given the arbitrariness and mutability of the division between legitimacy and illegitimacy as a constructed boundary, it is policed by social and legal sanctions. Boundaries, such as the differentiation between the raw and the cooked (Lévi-Strauss), or S/Z (Barthes), or purity and danger (Douglas), serve important cultural functions and also convey critical information about the societies that enforce them. Categories of person, place or thing which are closest to boundaries between the legitimate and the illegitimate can prompt existential anxiety since the capacity to discern between these categories is most challenged at the margins. The legal shenanigans which can result speak volumes for which aspects of life have the potential to unsettle a culture. One example of this which is writ large in the recent history of Australia is our treatment of refugees and asylum seekers and the impact of this upon Australia’s multicultural project.Foreshadowing the sexual connotations of the illegitimate, one of us has written elsewhere (Green, ‘Bordering on the Inconceivable’) about the inconceivability of the Howard administration’s ‘Pacific solution’. This used legal devices to rewrite Australia’s borders to limit access to the rights accruing to refugees upon landing in a safe haven entitling them to seek asylum. Internationally condemned as an illegitimate construction of an artificial ‘migration zone’, this policy has been revisited and made more brutal under the Abbot regime with at least two people – Reza Barati and Hamid Khazaei – dying in the past year in what is supposed to be a place of safety provided by Australian authorities under their legal obligations to those fleeing from persecution. Crock points out, echoing the discourse of illegitimacy, that it is and always has been inappropriate to label “undocumented asylum seekers” as “‘illegal’” because: “until such people cross the border onto Australian territory, the language of illegality is nonsense. People who have no visas to enter Australia can hardly be ‘illegals’ until they enter Australia” (77). For Australians who identify in some ways – religion, culture, fellow feeling – with the detainees incarcerated on Nauru and Manus Island, it is hard to ignore the disparity between the government’s treatment of visa overstayers and “illegals” who arrive by boat (Wilson). It is a comparatively short step to construct this disparity as reflecting upon the legitimacy within Australia of communities who share salient characteristics with detained asylum seekers: “The overwhelmingly negative discourse which links asylum seekers, Islam and terrorism” (McKay, Thomas & Kneebone, 129). Some communities feel themselves constructed in the public and political spheres as less legitimately Australian than others. This is particularly true of communities where members can be identified via markers of visible difference, including indicators of ethnic, cultural and religious identities: “a group who [some 585 respondent Australians …] perceived would maintain their own languages, customs and traditions […] this cultural diversity posed an extreme threat to Australian national identity” (McKay, Thomas & Kneebone, 129). Where a community shares salient characteristics such as ethnicity or religion with many detained asylum seekers they can become fearful of the discourses around keeping borders strong and protecting Australia from illegitimate entrants. MethodologyThe qualitative fieldwork upon which this paper is based took place some 6-8 years ago (2006-2008), but the project remains one of the most recent and extensive studies of its kind. There are no grounds for believing that any of the findings are less valid than previously. On the contrary, if political actions are constructed as a proxy for mainstream public consent, opinions have become more polarised and have hardened. Ten focus groups were held involving 86 participants with a variety of backgrounds including differences in age, gender, religious observance, religious identification and ethnicity. Four focus groups involved solely Muslim participants; six drew from the wider Australian community. The aim was to examine the response of different communities to mainstream Australian media representations of Islam, Muslims, and terrorism. Research questions included: “Are there differences in the ways in which Australian Muslims respond to messages about ‘fear’ and ‘terror’ compared with broader community Australians’ responses to the same messages?” and “How do Australian Muslims construct the perceptions and attitudes of the broader Australian community based on the messages that circulate in the media?” Recent examples of kinds of messages investigated include media coverage of Islamic State’s (ISIS’s) activities (Karam & Salama), and the fear-provoking coverage around the possible recruitment of Australians to join the fighting in Syria and Iraq (Cox). The ten focus groups were augmented by 60 interviews, 30 with respondents who identified as Muslim (15 males, 15 female) and 30 respondents from the broader community (same gender divisions). Finally, a market research company was commissioned to conduct a ‘fear survey’, based on an established ‘fear of rape’ inventory (Aly and Balnaves), delivered by telephone to a random sample of 750 over-18 y.o. Australians in which Muslims formed a deliberative sub-group, to ensure they were over-sampled and constituted at least 150 respondents. The face-to-face surveys and focus groups were conducted by co-author, Dr Anne Aly. General FindingsMuslim respondents indicate a heightened intensity of reaction to media messages around fear and terror. In addition to a generalised fear of the potential impact of terrorism upon Australian society and culture, Muslim respondents experienced a specific fear that any terrorist-related media coverage might trigger hostility towards Muslim Australian communities and their own family members. According to the ‘fear survey’ scale, Muslim Australians at the time of the research experienced approximately twice the fear level of mainstream Australian respondents. Broader Australian community Australian Muslim communityFear of a terrorist attackFear of a terrorist attack combines with the fear of a community backlashSpecific victims: dead, injured, bereavedCommunity is full of general victims in addition to any specific victimsShort-term; intense impactsProtracted, diffuse impactsSociety-wide sympathy and support for specific victims and all those involved in dealing with the trauma and aftermathSociety-wide suspicion and a marginalisation of those affected by the backlashVictims of a terrorist attack are embraced by broader communityVictims of backlash experience hostility from the broader communityFour main fears were identified by Australian Muslims as a component of the fear of terrorism:Fear of physical harm. In addition to the fear of actual terrorist acts, Australian Muslims fear backlash reprisals such as those experienced after such events as 9/11, the Bali bombings, and attacks upon public transport passengers in Spain and the UK. These and similar events were constructed as precipitating increased aggression against identifiable Australian Muslims, along with shunning of Muslims and avoidance of their company.The construction of politically-motivated fear. Although fear is an understandable response to concerns around terrorism, many respondents perceived fears as being deliberately exacerbated for political motives. Such strategies as “Be alert, not alarmed” (Bassio), labelling asylum seekers as potential terrorists, and talk about home-grown terrorists, are among the kinds of fears which were identified as politically motivated. The political motivation behind such actions might include presenting a particular party as strong, resolute and effective. Some Muslim Australians construct such approaches as indicating that their government is more interested in political advantage than social harmony.Fear of losing civil liberties. As well as sharing the alarm of the broader Australian community at the dozens of legislative changes banning people, organisations and materials, and increasing surveillance and security checks, Muslim Australians fear for the human rights implications across their community, up to and including the lives of their young people. This fear is heightened when community members may look visibly different from the mainstream. Examples of the events fuelling such fears include the London police killing of Jean Charles de Menezes, a Brazilian Catholic working as an electrician in the UK and shot in the month following the 7/7 attacks on the London Underground system (Pugliese). In Australia, the case of Mohamed Hannef indicated that innocent people could easily be unjustly accused and wrongly targeted, and even when this was evident the political agenda made it almost impossible for authorities to admit their error (Rix).Feeling insecure. Australian Muslims argue that personal insecurity has become “the new normal” (Massumi), disproportionately affecting Muslim communities in both physical and psychological ways. Physical insecurity is triggered by the routine avoidance, shunning and animosity experienced by many community members in public places. Psychological insecurity includes fear for the safety of younger members of the community compounded by concern that young people may become ‘radicalised’ as a result of the discrimination they experience. Australian Muslims fear the backlash following any possible terrorist attack on Australian soil and describe the possible impact as ‘unimaginable’ (Aly and Green, ‘Moderate Islam’).In addition to this range of fears expressed by Australian Muslims and constructed in response to wider societal reactions to increased concerns over radical Islam and the threat of terrorist activity, an analysis of respondents’ statements indicate that Muslim Australians construct the broader community as exhibiting:Fear of religious conviction (without recognising the role of their own secular/religious convictions underpinning this fear);Fear of extremism (expressed in various extreme ways);Fear of powerlessness (responded to by disempowering others); andFear of political action overseas having political effects at home (without acknowledging that it is the broader community’s response to such overseas events, such as 9/11 [Green ‘Did the world really change?’], which has also had impacts at home).These constructions, extrapolations and understandings by Australian Muslims of the fears of the broader community underpinning the responses to the threat of terror have been addressed elsewhere (Green and Aly). Legitimate Australian MuslimsOne frustration identified by many Muslim respondents centres upon a perceived ‘acceptable’ way to be an Australian Muslim. Arguing that the broader community construct Muslims as a homogenous group defined by their religious affiliation, these interviewees felt that the many differences within and between the twenty-plus national, linguistic, ethnic, cultural and faith-based groupings that constitute WA’s Muslim population were being ignored. Being treated as a homogenised group on a basis of faith appears to have the effect of putting that religious identity under pressure, paradoxically strengthening and reinforcing it (Aly, ‘Australian Muslim Responses to the Discourse on Terrorism’). The appeal to Australian Muslims to embrace membership in a secular society and treat religion as a private matter also led some respondents to suggest they were expected to deny their own view of their faith, in which they express their religious identity across their social spheres and in public and private contexts. Such expression is common in observant Judaism, Hinduism and some forms of Christianity, as well as in some expressions of Islam (Aly and Green, ‘Less than equal’). Massumi argues that even the ways in which some Muslims dress, indicating faith-based behaviour, can lead to what he terms as ‘affective modulation’ (Massumi), repeating and amplifying the fear affect as a result of experiencing the wider community’s fear response to such triggers as water bottles (from airport travel) and backpacks, on the basis of perceived physical difference and a supposed identification with Muslim communities, regardless of the situation. Such respondents constructed this (implied) injunction to suppress their religious and cultural affiliation as akin to constructing the expression of their identity as illegitimate and somehow shameful. Parallels can be drawn with previous social responses to a person born out of wedlock, and to people in same-sex relationships: a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ kind of denial.Australian Muslims who see their faith as denied or marginalised may respond by identifying more strongly with other Muslims in their community, since the community-based context is one in which they feel welcomed and understood. The faith-based community also allows and encourages a wider repertoire of acceptable beliefs and actions entailed in the performance of ‘being Muslim’. Hand in hand with a perception of being required to express their religious identity in ways that were acceptable to the majority community, these respondents provided a range of examples of self-protective behaviours to defend themselves and others from the impacts of perceived marginalisation. Such behaviours included: changing their surnames to deflect discrimination based solely on a name (Aly and Green, ‘Fear, Anxiety and the State of Terror’); keeping their opinions private, even when they were in line with those being expressed by the majority community (Aly and Green, ‘Moderate Islam’); the identification of ‘less safe’ and ‘safe’ activities and areas; concerns about visibly different young men in the Muslim community and discussions with them about their public behaviour and demeanour; and women who chose not to leave their homes for fear of being targeted in public places (all discussed in Aly, ‘Australian Muslim Responses to the Discourse on Terrorism’). Many of these behaviours, including changing surnames, restricting socialisation to people who know a person well, and the identification of safe and less safe activities in relation to the risk of self-revelation, were common strategies used by people who were stigmatised in previous times as a result of their illegitimacy.ConclusionConstructions of the legitimate and illegitimate provide one means through which we can investigate complex negotiations around Australianness and citizenship, thrown into sharp relief by the Australian government’s treatment of asylum seekers, also deemed “illegals”. Because they arrive in Australia (or, as the government would prefer, on Australia’s doorstep) by illegitimate channels these would-be citizens are treated very differently from people who arrive at an airport and overstay their visa. The impetus to exclude aspects of geographical Australia from the migration zone, and to house asylum seekers offshore, reveals an anxiety about borders which physically reflects the anxiety of western nations in the post-9/11 world. Asylum seekers who arrive by boat have rarely had safe opportunity to secure passports or visas, or to purchase tickets from commercial airlines or shipping companies. They represent those ethnicities and cultures which are currently in turmoil: a turmoil frequently exacerbated by western intervention, variously constructed as an il/legitimate expression of western power and interests.What this paper has demonstrated is that the boundary between Australia and the rest, the legitimate and the illegitimate, is failing in its aim of creating a stronger Australia. The means through which this project is pursued is making visible a range of motivations and concerns which are variously interpreted depending upon the position of the interpreter. The United Nations, for example, has expressed strong concern over Australia’s reneging upon its treaty obligations to refugees (Gordon). Less vocal, and more fearful, are those communities within Australia which identify as community members with the excluded illegals. The Australian government’s treatment of detainees on Manus Island and Nauru, who generally exhibit markers of visible difference as a result of ethnicity or culture, is one aspect of a raft of government policies which serve to make some people feel that their Australianness is somehow less legitimate than that of the broader community. AcknowledgementsThis paper is based on the findings of an Australian Research Council Discovery Project (DP0559707), 2005-7, “Australian responses to the images and discourses of terrorism and the other: establishing a metric of fear”, awarded to Professors Lelia Green and Mark Balnaves. 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