Academic literature on the topic 'Great Britain World War, 1939-1945'

In the years 1989–1944 two different wars against the Soviet Union were imposed upon Finland. During the Winter War of 1989–1940 Germany remained strictly neutral on the basis of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact&&Great Britain and France planned intervention in favour of Finland. When the second, so-called Continuation War broke out in the summer of 1041, Finland was co-belligerent of Germany, and Great Britain declared war on Finland in December 1941. De jure, however, Finland was never an ally of Germany, and at the end of the war, in the winter 1944–1945, the Finnish armed forces expelled the German troops from Lapland, which was devastated by the Germans during their retreat to Norway. Military service was compulsory for each male citizen of Finland. In 1939 the Jewish population of Finland numbered 1 700. Of these, 260 men were called up and approximately 200 were sent to serve at the front during the Winter War.

In the course of World War II, the seven great powers of 1939 – Germany, the Soviet Union. Britain. France, Italy, Japan and the United States – were temporarily reduced to two. each commanding awesome strength, and each posing a realistic threat of world domination. The huge forces of the Soviet Union at the edge of western Europe were positioned to move all the way to the Atlantic, thus achieving the control of the Eurasian heartland that, according to geopolitical doctrine, would confer world domination. There were fifth columns prepared to assist them within most European and Asiatic nations.

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest zaprezentowanie mało znanej historii służby wojskowej Adama Bunscha w armii austro-węgierskiej i polskiej w latach 1915–1920 i 1939–1945. Bunsch, który wywodził się ze znanej krakowskiej rodziny (jego ojciec był rzeźbiarzem, a brat po II wojnie światowej został popularnym polskim pisarzem), był do tej pory szerzej znany przede wszystkim ze swojej pracy artystycznej, jako plastyk i dramaturg. Jednakże wydaje się, że miał istotne dokonania także jako żołnierz służący w jednostkach artylerii podczas wojny polsko-ukraińskiej i polsko-bolszewickiej, a także w latach 1939–1940. Bunsch odegrał również istotną rolę jako oficer oświatowy służąc w 1. Dywizji Pancernej generała Stanisława Maczka w Wielkiej Brytanii.The aim of this article is to present a very little known history of Adam Bunsch’s military service in Austro-Hungarian and Polish armies between 1915–1920 and 1939–1945. Bunsch, who descended from well-known Cracowian family (his father was a sculptor, his brother became a popular Polish writer after the II World War), has been so far widely known mainly for his art work as a visual artist and playwright. It seems however that he had significant achievements as a soldier serving in various artillery units during Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Bolshevik wars and between 1939–1940. Bunsch also played vital role as educational officer serving in general Stanislaw Maczek’s 1. Armored Division in Great Britain.

Arthur Turner, The Cost of War: British Policy on French War Debts, 1918–1932 (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998), 272pp., £45.00 (hb), ISBN 1-898723-37-0.Patricia Clavin, The Great Depression in Europe, 1929–1939 (Basingstoke: Macmillan/Palgrave 2000) 244pp., £13.99 (pb), ISBN 0-333-60681-7.Karl Mayer, Zwischen Krise und Krieg. Frankreich in der Außenpolitik der United States zwischen Wirtschaftskrise und Zweitem Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1999), 275pp., DM 84.00, ISBN 3-515-07373-6.Christoph Buchheim and Redvers Garside, eds., After the Slump. Industry and Politics in 1930s Britain and Germany (New York and Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2000), 235pp., DM 69.00. ISBN 3-631-34912-2.Philipp Heyde, Das Ende der Reparationen. Deutschland, Frankreich und der Youngplan 1929–1932. Paderborn: Schöningh, 1998), 506 pp., DM 134.00 ISBN 3-506-77507-3.Monika Rosengarten, Die Internationale Handelskammer. Wirtschaftspolitische Empfehlungen in der Zeit der Weltwirtschaftskrise 1929–1939 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 360 pp., DM 148.00, ISBN 3-428-10411-0.

This review examines some of the recent British, American, and Russian scholarship on a series of important international transitions that occurred in the years around 1945. One is the shift of global leadership from Great Britain to the United States, in which, it is argued, the decisive moment was the fall of France in 1940. Another transition is the emergence of a wartime alliance between Britain and America, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other, followed by its disintegration into the Cold War. Here the opening of Soviet sources during the 1990s has provided new evidence, though not clear answers. To understand both of these transitions, however, it is necessary to move beyond diplomacy and strategy to look at the social, cultural, and economic dimensions of the Second World War. In particular, recent studies of American and Soviet soldiers during and after the conflict re-open the debate about Cold War ideology from the bottom up.

Comparative studies on the experiences of female representatives of different countries in WWII remain relevant today. They not only deepen our understanding of the life of women at war, but also allow us to explore the power regimes of different states at one stage or another. After all, the government organized the activities of various groups of the population aimed at winning the war. Women were no exception in this respect, regardless of whether they worked in the rear or defended their homeland with weapons in hand. For centuries, the navy for the most part represented a purely masculine environment, and the presence of a woman on a ship was considered a bad omen. However, the scale of hostilities during the world wars and, as a consequence, the need for a constant supply of personnel to the armed forces made their adjustments – states began to gradually recruit women to serve in the navy. The article compares the experiences of Great Britain and the USSR in attracting women to serve in the navy during WWII. The countries were chosen not by chance, as they represent democracy and totalitarianism, respectively, and studying their practice of involving women in the navy can deepen our knowledge of these regimes. After analysing the experience of women’s service in the navy in 1939-1945, the author concludes that their recruitment to the navy in Great Britain took place through a special organization – the Women’s Royal Naval Service (WRNS). Its personnel were trained mostly separately from men and then sent to military units of the navy. The USSR did not create separate women's organizations for this purpose; women served in the same bodies as men. The main purpose of mobilizing women to the navy in both the USSR and Great Britain was initially to replace men in positions on land to release the latter for service at sea. However, in both countries there were cases when women also served at sea. The range of positions available to them in the navy expanded during the war, and in the USSR reached its apogee in the form of admission of women to combat positions. In Great Britain, women in the navy did not officially perform combat roles, and there was a ban on them from using lethal weapons.

The paper examines how military and political leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain assessed in the first post-war years and in the face of emerging bipolar world order the lessons of World War II, how the latter influenced their strategic planning and forecasts with the emergence of nuclear weapons. The author outlines the key features of this period (1945–1949), including still fresh memories of the unprecedented destruction and losses of the past war, the US ‘nuclear monopoly’, and the absence of a system for nuclear deterrence. The paper provides a systematic comparison of lessons from the past war, learnt by the Soviet, the US and British establishment, identifies similarities and differences between them. The author concludes that WWII was perceived by the political and military leaders of that time as a model of the eventual ‘great war’ in the future, which almost certainly would be ‘total’ and ‘global’ in scope and would demand both thorough preparations during the peacetime and the militarization of civil life. Indeed, the experience of WWII had greatly influenced the strategic and operational planning in the USSR, the USA and Great Britain in 1945–1949. Moscow prepared to face the potential aggression on its Western borders or in the Far East in order to avoid the mistakes of 1941. In Washington the decisionmakers acknowledged the Soviet superiority in conventional weapons and didn’t exclude the possibility that the Soviet Army could quickly establish control over the Western Europe and that the US military would have to retake it in a ‘new Operation Overlord’. The pessimistic outlook of the ‘defense of the Rhine’ was also shared in London, and the British military planned to evacuate the troops to the British Isles (‘shadow of Dunkirk’) and to focus on strategic bombing of the USSR and its allies. Even the appearance of nuclear weapons, that would dramatically alter the strategic context in the following years, played a relatively minor role in 1945–1949. The author concludes that the shadow of World War II and its lessons had a long-lasting effect on the post-war international relations.

ABSTRACT During the Second World War, the central Mediterranean island of Malta was famously besieged by the Italian navy and intensively bombed by Italian and later German air forces, from June 1940 until Allied victory in North Africa in May 1943 brought an end to the siege. It was then scheduled as a staging post to support the Allied invasion of Sicily from North Africa in July 1943 and of mainland Italy from Sicily in September. From 1941 until 1945, two Tunnelling Companies Royal Engineers, overlapping in succession, excavated underground facilities safe from aerial or naval bombardment. In 1943 and then 1944–1945, two Boring Sections Royal Engineers in succession drilled wells to enhance water supplies, initially for increased troop concentrations. Borehole site selection was guided in 1943 by the Director of the Geological Survey of Great Britain (Edward Battersby Bailey: 1881–1965) and by geologists Captain Frederick William Shotton (1906–1990) and Major Gordon Lyall Paver (1913–1988). In 1944, it was guided by geologist Captain Howard Digby Roberts (1913–1971), leading a detachment from 42nd Geological Section of the South African Engineer Corps that pioneered earth resistivity surveys on the island. Overall, these military studies generated a new but unpublished geological map of the island at 1:31,680-scale and refined knowledge of its geological structure: a much faulted but otherwise near-horizontal Oligo-Miocene sedimentary sequence. Further refinement was achieved as a consequence of the 1944–1945 drilling programme, led principally by geologist Captain Thomas Owen Morris (1904–1989) of the Royal Engineers. By 1945, this had helped to develop an improved water supply system for the island, and plans to develop groundwater abstracted from a perched upper aquifer (in the Upper Coralline Limestone and underlying Greensand formations, above a ‘Blue Clay’) as well as from the main lower aquifer, near sea level (in the Globigerina Limestone and/or underlying Lower Coralline Limestone formations).

This article describes the course of World War II in the Intermarium region in relation both to the national policies of several countries and to the resistance movement organized by the communities opposing the Soviets as well as German domination. The first phase of events takes place in the period from September 1939 to the German invasion of the USSR; the second phase lasts until the end of the war and launches the partisan actions inspired by communist organizations on behalf of the Communist International (Comintern). The aim of the partisans’ actions was the resistance to the domination of the Third Reich and Italy achieved through diversions at the rear of the armies of the Axis powers. At the same time the Soviets’ joining the alliance results in treaties of the Big Three (The USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union) establishing the political order for Europe after the end of WWII, particularly the subjugation of Intermarium countries by the Soviet domination.

There are few events in the history of humankind which have been more compelling than the Second World War (1939-1945). Unfortunately, most of what transpired during this period of history stands obscured by events such as D-Day, Kursk, and Midway, all happenings which popular history has been more than happy to dwell upon. This study' s intent is to, with the use of primary materials, analyze one of the more "obscured" happenings of the Second World War, the Rashid Ali al-Kilani Revolt of April and May 1941. Central to this work is an assessment of the policy responses of both Great Britain and Germany to the Baghdadbased revolt. It also seeks to answer the following question: why did Great Britain approach the coup with great urgency, while Germany, for the most part, paid it very little attention? In the case of Great Britain, its traditional power position in the Middle East, and possession of both the Suez Canal and extensive oil stocks, was challenged by Axis activity in north Africa, the Balkans and Crete. The Iraqi coup simply exacerbated the British problem. London's fears were valid and its successful response reflected as much. For Germany and its leader Adolf Hitler, ideological concerns took precedence over a Middle Eastern campaign. A Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, an event which, by design, would destroy Slavism, Bolshevism, and much of world Jewry, plus gain greater Germany "living space," was primary to Hitler's thinking in the spring of 1941. Furthermore, the Fuehrer's desire for an Anglo-German "understanding" seems to have influenced his attitude in regards to the coup. Conclusions are also drawn that the policy paths chosen by each European player during the coup were met with dissension. In Great Britain's case, Middle Eastern Commander-in-Chief Archibald Wavell felt that aggressive British action in Iraq might antagonize Arab nationalism. For Germany, Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was a major advocate of an antiBritish strategy and corresponding Nazi activity in Iraq. The Rashid Ali coup represented the last opportunity for Ribbentrop, prior to "Barbarossa," to expose the great vulnerability of the British Empire. From this, proffered is the theory that Ribbentrop, through an exploitation of the Iraq coup, was perhaps attempting to dissuade Hitler from an invasion of the Soviet Union.

From 1940 through 1943, British grand strategy was shaped by a broad consensus, generally accepted and understood in the central direction of the war. This consensus was based on the assumption of relative weakness, and was expressed by what may be termed the "wear down" approach: "to knock out the props" from under Axis military power by a combination of blockade, bombing, raids, subversion and sabotage, and peripheral campaigns. An ultimate direct assault would only be launched after enemy power had visibly declined. The balance, emphasis, and specific thrust of this outline changed; its essence did not. Even as a powerful Grand Alliance emerged, the British remained convinced that the assumption of relative weakness must continue to guide its grand strategy. This assumption was finally rejected by the coalition as a whole, but it proved well founded for the British themselves. Ultimately, however, this formulation of grand strategy by consensus was, in general, a sober and responsible interpretation of the overall British situation.

This thesis examines the use of prisoners of war (POWs), agents and other groups of persons as source of information in the British conduct of war against Germany during the Second World War and demonstrates its significance. While the successes of Bletchley Park in decrypting German wireless traffic are well-known, human intelligence (HUMINT) has received considerably less scholarly attention. During the years 1939 to 1945, the British used an extensive espionage network, maintained informal contacts in neutral cities, and questioned refugees, convicted enemy spies and soldiers who had escaped from German captivity. Most notably, the military services established a far-reaching system of interrogation facilities to obtain intelligence from German prisoners of war in all theatres of war. These activities provided a valuable amount of intelligence on German weaponry, tactics, plans and mentality, which not only constituted useful background information in rapidly changing war conditions but also improved decision-making processes and resulting actions. During the past decades, the main focus of academic research lay on signals intelligence and its influence on British strategy and operations which resulted in a neglect of other forms of intelligence. Recent academic research has not only emphasised a more holistic view of intelligence and its impact on warfare but also points to several successful HUMINT operations such as the international cooperation in espionage and the so-called Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre, United Kingdom (CSDIC(UK)). At the same time, studies in intelligence provide an extensive framework dealing with various theoretical, practical and ethical aspects which facilitates the analysis of intelligence in historical context. In light of these developments and the unprecedented access to archival material, a re-evaluation of the role of human intelligence in Great Britain during the Second World War is necessary. This thesis combines the theoretical approaches of intelligence with an examination of the organisation of human intelligence during wartime. It utilises three case studies covering the tactical, operational and strategic level of war. First, it offers a model of “main areas”, collection, analysis, dissemination and use, to examine the intelligence process in historical context. These elements constitute a set of interacting steps which describe the way from a specific piece of raw material to its use as human intelligence in decision-making. The human origin influences the characteristics of the intelligence process such as the interaction of individuals during collection, the inherent problem of reliability and accuracy, and the question of acceptance by potential users. The model also serves as a basis for an evaluation scheme: the internal value addresses the intelligence process itself, whereas the external value measures the effect within decision-making and its impact on resulting actions. Regarding the organisational aspect, the intelligence agencies responsible for human intelligence used their previous experience from the last war and grew significantly in size during the Second World War. The interrogation of prisoners of war consisted of a multi-step process with the CSDIC(UK) at the top, which over 10 000 POWs passed through. The combination of interrogation techniques – such as the omniscient trick and friendly approach, concealed microphones, and former refugees or prisoners acting as stool pigeons – resulted in a high output of accurate and appreciated HUMINT. The Secret Service (SIS) recovered after some setbacks at the beginning of the war and – supported by contacts in occupied territory – it was able to deliver reports covering a wide range of topics. In addition, the Security Service (MI5) and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) supplemented the work of the SIS – besides their primary objectives. In addition to the use of enemy prisoners and agents in the field, there were three other sources for HUMINT: the questioning of refugees in the specifically designed London Reception Centre, regular contacts with interned British soldiers and individual arrangements in neutral countries, most notably in Sweden and Switzerland, which provided the Foreign Office with news of varying quality. The outcome of these extensive efforts is discussed in the three case studies. The tactical example deals with the defence against German attacks during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz in 1940/1941. POW Intelligence supplemented the other sources of intelligence with the perspective of the enemy: it provided actual data on armament, armour and equipment of German bomber and fighter aircraft; it added details on the order of battle and combat readiness of the German Luftwaffe; and it gave insight into enemy tactics, targeting and the effectiveness of British countermeasures. Therefore, HUMINT made a valuable contribution to the overall intelligence picture which supported and optimised the efforts of Fighter Command. It helped to prepare fighter pilots for their engagements with the enemy and to counter new tactics and technologies such as navigational aids for night bombing. The operational case study covers the detection of the German plans to use a liquid rocket and cruise missile (the so called V-weapons V1 and V2) against British cities, where human intelligence played a key role. In early 1943, SIS reports and secret records of conversations between German POWs convinced the authorities in London of the danger of a long range weapon of a new type. HUMINT later gave indications of the existence of two distinct weapons and the V1 firing system in Northern France. In 1944, it provided details on the characteristics and launching procedures of the V2. These contributions enabled the British not only to direct other intelligence resources such as aerial reconnaissance towards the new threat but also to develop effective offensive and defensive countermeasures. These delayed the deployment of the two weapons and significantly reduced the inflicted damage. The strategic example deals with the British efforts to assess the state of morale of the German military and civilian population. This aspect was primarily covered by human intelligence. Although the amount of raw material gradually expanded and the analytical methods became more sophisticated – especially after the drastic increase of prisoner of war interrogations after D-Day –, the impact of HUMINT remained ambivalent. Until 1943, preconceived opinions about an inferior German morale and an especially vulnerable civilian population were not altered by intelligence products provided by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee and a separate “morale committee”. The conviction in the second half of 1943 that Germany would collapse from within as it had happened in 1918 was the most visible result. In the following months, intelligence analysis improved considerably and finally falsified previous hopes; however, that development did not restrain British authorities from over-enthusiastic expectations of a rapid end of war in the summer of 1944. Ultimately, human intelligence provided a considerable insight into the inner state of the enemy, but the intelligence task to detect a predefined collapse and the attempt to conceive an elaborated concept of morale overburdened the intelligence services. This thesis combines theoretical approaches with a historical analysis and shows that human intelligence was a powerful force multiplier which the British early recognized and successfully utilized. Therefore, this thesis offers a new perspective on British intelligence and military history during the Second World War. Furthermore, it seeks to contribute to general discussions about the relevance of intelligence in decision-making up to the present day.

This work is a critical assessment of the role of neuropsychiatry in the management of aerial warfare. Focussing almost exclusively on the Second World War (1939-45), the thesis demonstrates how the Royal Air Force (RAF) mobilised specialist medical knowledge to improve wastage and combat efficiency in flying personnel. Neurological and psychiatric expertise was enlisted to improve service performance and reduce the burden of neuropsychiatric disorders. To meet these key objectives, the RAF neuropsychiatric division undertook important administrative and therapeutic duties in the areas of personnel selection, service discipline, neuropsychiatric research, and the treatment of mental disorders. The work therefore assesses how the division responded to these challenges and contributed to the management of aerial warfare. The thesis assesses the factors that shaped the practice of neuropsychiatry in the service. Historically, the training and personal interests of specialists and the context of therapeutic practice guided the development of mental health specialties. To gain a fuller appreciation of the administrative and therapeutic duties of the division, this work explores the medical, social, military, and professional factors that shaped neuropsychiatric thought and practice. Secondly, the work engages with the 'human element' of aerial combat. The physical and mental health of aircrew was fundamental to the conduct of the air war and underpinned the administrative decisions of the air force. It was the primary objective of the neuropsychiatric division to preserve and develop these vital human resources. Neuropsychiatric disorders represented a challenge to efficiency, for they could affect the performance and motivation of a flyer. The thesis will examine how the neuropsychiatric division attempted to sustain aircrew by preventing and treating the disorders that compromised their efficiency.

This thesis is a history of the Polish Country Section of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), a British organisation whose purpose was to infiltrate agents behind enemy lines during World War II. The thesis covers the period 1940 – 1946, the entire period that SOE existed, and its close connection with the Polish special department, formally known as the Sixth Bureau of the Polish Government in Exile. Chapters contained herein each cover a full year of operations from 1941 -1943, followed by two chapters for 1944, and one chapter for 1945-1946. Covered are details of agent training, information on the first flight to Poland to drop agents and couriers and the problems encountered. The German invasion of the Soviet Union and SOE’s thoughts on the predicted outcome is covered, as are also Polish operations in France and indications of support for Polish operations in other parts of the world. Throughout, is evidence of the difficulties in obtaining sufficient air support for flights to Poland which, although inadequate for Polish requirements, were more abundant than many realised at the time. This is especially true with reference to supplies dropped to Warsaw during the rising of 1944. Brief accounts of the meetings between the ‘Big Three’, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, at Teheran and Yalta in as much as they affected SOE/Polish relations. The thesis finishes with appendices detailing agent/courier parachute drops, lists of personnel involved, a bibliography and glossary.

While most naval action within the Mediterranean during the First World War took place in the east and in the Adriatic, in waters that lapped the shores of the disintegrating empires of the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, the entire Mediterranean became the setting for rivalry between 1918 and 1939. At the centre of the struggle for mastery of the Mediterranean lay the ambitions of Benito Mussolini, after he won control of Italy in 1922. His attitude to the Mediterranean wavered. At some moments he dreamed of an Italian empire that would stretch to ‘the Oceans’ and offer Italy ‘a place in the sun’; he attempted to make this dream real with the invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, which, apart from its sheer difficulty as a military campaign, was a political disaster because it lost him whatever consideration Britain and France had shown for him until then. At other times his focus was on the Mediterranean itself: Italy, he said, is ‘an island which juts into the Mediterranean’, and yet, the Fascist Grand Council ominously agreed, it was an imprisoned island: ‘the bars of this prison are Corsica, Tunisia, Malta and Cyprus. The guards of this prison are Gibraltar and Suez.’ Italian ambitions had been fed by the peace treaties at the end of the First World War. Not merely did Italy retain the Dodecanese, but the Austrians were pushed back in north-eastern Italy, and Italy acquired much of Italia irredenta, ‘unredeemed Italy’, in the form of Trieste, Istria and, along the Dalmatian coast, Zara (Zadar), which became famous for the excellent cherry brandy produced by the Luxardo family. Fiume (Rijeka) in Istria was seized by the rag-tag private army of the nationalist poet d’Annunzio in 1919, who declared it the seat of the ‘Italian Regency of Carnaro’; despite international opposition, by 1924 Fascist Italy had incorporated it into the fatherland. One strange manifestation, which reveals how important the past was to the Fascist dream, was the creation of institutes to promote the serious study (and italianità, ‘Italianness’) of Corsican, Maltese and Dalmatian history.

The Allied victory over Germany in the Second World War, like that in the First, left the Mediterranean unsettled. After Greece emerged from its civil war with a pro-western government, there were ever louder rumbles in Cyprus, where the movement calling for enôsis, union with Greece, was gathering pace again. Precisely because the Greeks sided with the West, and because Turkey had kept out of the war, during the late 1940s the United States began to see the Mediterranean as an advance position in the new struggle against the expanding power of the Soviet Union. The explicit theme was the defence of democracy against Communist tyranny. Stalin’s realism had prevented him from supporting Communist insurgency in Greece, but he was keen to find ways of gaining free access to the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles. In London and Washington, the fear that Soviet allies would establish themselves on the shores of the Mediterranean remained real, since the partisan leader in Yugoslavia, Tito, had played the right cards during the last stages of the war, even winning support from the British. Moreover, the Italians had lost Zadar along with the naval base at Kotor and chunks of Dalmatia they had greedily acquired during the war, while Albania, after an agonizing period of first Italian and then German occupation, had recovered its independence under the Paris-educated Communist leader Enver Hoxha, whose uncompromising stance was to bring his country into ever-greater isolation. When he took power, Hoxha imagined that his country would form part of a brotherly band of socialist nations, alongside Tito’s renascent Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Close ties with the Yugoslavs were sealed by economic pacts which reveal Tito’s hope of drawing Albania into the Yugoslav federation. Hoxha had other aspirations, and in his view Albania’s right to defend every square inch of the national territory extended into the waters off the Albanian coast: the Corfu Channel, long used as a waterway linking Greece to the Adriatic, was mined to prevent foreign incursions. Britain decided to send warships through the channel, asserting its right to police the Mediterranean on behalf of the nations of the world.

Post-war Britain has long been seen as a nation in decline: the loss of imperial territory and international clout from 1945 onwards undeniable and inexorable facts that exposed the fantasy that Britain remained a Great Power. That fantasy was still viable during conferences at Yalta and Potsdam in 1945 that set the boundaries for a new, Cold War, geography. The Suez Crisis of 1956 is an oft-recited marker of decline, exposing the myth of British imperial reach, and prompting US Secretary of State’s Dean Acheson’s crushing evaluation that Great Britain had lost an Empire but had not yet found a role. The 1980s might be read as slowing the pace of decline, the Thatcher government under its forthright, pro-American leader attempting to re-establish Britain’s credentials on the world stage.