Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Group-lending'

With the backing of major donor agencies and non-governmental organizations, microenterprise development programs (MDPs) continue to proliferate throughout the world. These have the intention of harnessing the entrepreneurial skills which have been identified in the informal sector in order to improve standards of living. Making financial credit accessible is the primary method used by MDPs in order to reach their goals. From an anthropological perspective, this bid for social change raises issues concerning the suitability of a credit-centered mechanism that neglects the implications of social innovations which have endemically addressed the same issue of inaccessibility to capital resources. Most importantly, associational relationships which go beyond credit will determine the viability and appropriateness of such a program--especially when a group lending approach is used. Anthropologists can greatly enhance the effectiveness of MDPs by identifying the group dynamics of prospective program participants and by emphasizing a "people-centered" approach in general.

Microfinance Performance and Social Capital: A Cross-country AnalysisThis paper investigates the relationship between the extent to which social capital formation is facilitated within different societies, and the financial and social performance of MFIs. We carry out a cross-country analysis on a dataset containing 100 countries. We identify different social dimensions that we use as proxies for how easy social capital can be developed in different countries, and we hypothesize that microfinance is more successful, both in terms of their financial and social aims, in societies that are more conducive to the development of social capital. Our empirical results support our hypothesis.
Defining Social Collateral in Microfinance Group Lending: Microfinance group lending with joint liability allows asset-poor individuals to replace physical collateral by social collateral. This paper provides a theoretical framework to evaluate the impact of social collateral pledged by group borrowers on group lending repayment. We take into account the external ties of group borrowers, i.e. the social ties linking borrowers to non-borrowers from their community, whereas previous work in this field has looked solely at internal ties (i.e. ties between group members). Our model stresses the impact of network configuration on the amount of social capital pledged as collateral. It shows why the group lending methodology works better in rural areas than in urban areas, namely because rural social networks are typically denser than urban ones, which results in higher social collateral.
The Economic Value of Social Capital:Empirical studies on the importance of social capital for poor households show divergent outcomes. This divergence may stem from the lack of a conceptual framework for capturing the social capital dimensions that deliver economic value to individuals. This paper defines individual social capital from an economic perspective and proposes a measurement based on the two dimensions of individual social capital that bring economic value to individuals: (1) informal risk insurance arrangements and (2) information advantages that arise from personal social networks. Using this measurement, I present a numerical application to argue that differing network configurations drive asymmetry of social interactions among individuals.
Social Capital and the Repayment of Microfinance Group Lending: A Case Study of Pro Mujer Mexico:In this paper, we investigate how social networks of group borrowers come into play in joint liability group lending. We use a large, original dataset with 802 mapped social networks of borrowers from Pro Mujer Mexico. We are the first to examine external ties, that is, social ties with individuals outside the borrowing group. We have two main findings. First, borrowers with stronger informal risk insurance arrangements are in better economic shape and have a higher capacity to pay than borrowers with weaker informal risk insurance arrangements. Second, borrowers who pledge valuable ties as social collateral have fewer repayment problems. We postulate that borrowers receive effective help from their ties in cases of need.
Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Political Science
Ph.D.
This study examines variations in the lending strategies of the four main agencies of the World Bank. Countries with similar basic development and demographic attributes often receive very different amounts of financial support from the different agencies of the World Bank. Utilizing regression analysis of panel-data covering the years between 1990 through 2011, the study finds that variation in the allocation of development aid both within and between the different World Bank agencies (IBRD, IDA, IFC, and MIGA) do not generally reflect patterns in objective indicators of economic need or institutional quality among recipients. Rather, statistical analysis shows that World Bank aid is positively correlated with several measures of donor influence. Utilizing a multi-donor model of political influence, the study finds evidence that the Bank’s top donors, countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan disproportionately influence the Bank to lend in ways that support their foreign policy interests. Countries with close economic, political, and geostrategic ties to powerful donors tend to receive more aid on average than their less well-connected peers. The data show that the Bank often lends in ways that contradict its own lending criteria. Despite the Bank’s explicit emphasis on economic need and institutional quality, the agencies of the World Bank often provide greater amounts of assistance to those with less need and poor quality governance. The study has implications for the study of international organizations, institutional design, and how donor influence at the World Bank is mediated by variations in internal agency structures.
Temple University--Theses

Poor people often lack collateral, which is one of the reasons that they have no access to

formal financial institutions. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) provide financial services to

poor people. Traditional MFIs have received some criticism, for instance that they do not

target the poorest of the poor. This paper, with a field study from Dhaka, takes a closer look at

SafeSave, a new MFI working in a quite different way than the traditional MFIs in

Bangladesh. The conclusion of this paper is that SafeSave’s more flexible services are able to

reach the poor better than the services of traditional MFIs, but might not be the best solution

seen from a long-term development perspective.

Thesis (MDF)--Stellenbosch University, 2012.
The provision of finance to the poor through group lending has evolved enormously over the years following the successful implementation by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the BancoSol in Bolivia. Various microfinance institutions in Swaziland also adopted this model and achieved varying results. Imbita Swaziland Women’s Finance Trust Fund is the only microfinance institution that has continuously embraced this model whilst others closed down or migrated to individual lending. This paper uses Imbita as the focal organisation for the study in order to understand the adoption of group lending in Swaziland. The core objectives of the paper were to evaluate Imbita’s experience in applying this model, understanding the characteristics of the groups they lend to and how the groups manage loan repayment. Data collected from the groups suggests that Imbita has relatively succeeded in applying group lending as evidenced by the high performance of group loans compared to individual loans. This success is attributed to close monitoring of the groups and peer selection at the group formation stage. The success is coupled with a few challenges which include inaccessibility of groups, capital limitations within the organisation and non repayment of loans. A majority of the groups comprised family members, aged between 26-45 years and are involved in informal business activities. The high presence of family members in the groups negatively affects the repayment performance of a group. Groups that had known each other for a longer period (11 years and above) prior to group formation perform better in loan repayment compared to those who have known each other for a shorter period (6-10 years). Groups still struggle with ensuring repayment of loans on time by members hence they always apply pressure on members to repay. However they still maintain the joint liability obligation by paying loans on behalf of members who need help in paying their loans. However, some groups have faced dissolution and were reformed as a result of non-payment. The application of group lending still requires design and implementation improvements. Some of the design improvements include ensuring homogeneity within the groups, reducing the sizes of groups, aligning repayment periods with the nature of each particular business and collecting sufficient information on borrowers. The high presence of family members within groups needs to be discouraged to improve loan repayment performance.

My diploma work is about problematics of insurance and lending of local action groups. First part is focused on basic characteristics of local action groups, historical development of its financing and characteristics of MAS Šumavsko, z.s. Then I describe problematice of credit products of chosen banks on czech bank market. Next part is about detailed analysis of credits and insurance products od MAS Šumavsko, process of using and comparison in time. The last part of my diploma works is focused on proposals and recommendations for MAS Šumavsko in the field of financing, lending and insurance.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2003.
Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains xv, 164 p.: ill. (some col.). Includes abstract and vita. Advisor: Douglas H. Graham, Dept. of Agricultural, Environmental, and Development Economics. Includes bibliographical references (p. 158-164).

Offering financial services to the unprivileged is a complex task and past attempts have been rather unsuccessful. One commendable effort that has sprung from the failures of commercial banks is microfinance and thanks to innovative ideas microfinance institutions have managed to cope with many of the challenges previously experienced by the formal bank sector in the 1970’s through the 90’s.

The “new” approach has successfully managed to overcome obstacles such as lack of collateral and information asymmetry. By using joint-liability schemes and by requiring frequent installments microfinance institutions have managed to reduce their risk exposure and by outsourcing the screening process to the borrowers they have dealt with the lack of information on their clients.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate what microfinance institutions do that make them more suitable for delivering financial services to the poor. We will look at the supply driven efforts carried out in the past and see how they differ from the demand driven approach taken today.

We will evaluate some of the most common mechanisms of microfinance and assess their potential contribution to achieving the high repayment rates that many of these institutions obtain today.

The main finding is that group lending subject to social sanctions should improve the repayment rate. Other mechanisms that may enhance the performance are the use of dynamic incentives and regular repayment schedules. The effect of targeting women and social programs on repayment rates are ambiguous although their empowerment effect is notable.

By joining forces with NGOs, local authorities and the commercial financial sector microfinance has emerged as a viable poverty reduction tool alongside traditional aid.

Nel primo articolo si dimostra che, con contratti standard di debito, ammontare del prestito e profitti del debitore non variano sia quando si tratta di un prestito individuale o di un prestito di gruppo con penalità congiunta, poiché l'effetto positivo del secondo schema sul rischio della banca (e il tasso debitore) è compensato dalla penale congiunta sui debitori. E’ stato anche dimostrato che il prestito partecipato (debito più utili) che riduce i tassi di interesse (rispetto ai contratti di debito standard) genera maggiore richiesta di debito e output, ma inferiori profitti per il debitore. Tali contratti, tuttavia, non può essere usati in presenza informazioni nascoste ex-post, a meno che la verifica ex post da parte del creditore è possibile ed economicamente conveniente. Tuttavia, si dimostra che (un prestito standard o partecipato) il prestito di gruppo ha un vantaggio comparato nel risolvere il problema dell’eterogeneità dei debitori, in quanto, con questi è possibile un menu di contratti che consente di discriminare tra gruppi eterogenei. Infine si dimostra che, sotto certe alcune condizione parametriche, questi contratti garantiscono profitti più elevati per i debitori meno rischiosi rispetto ad un contratto standard di debito individuale. Nel secondo articolo si analizza l'effort di equilibrio dei debitori e il costo dei prestiti di microcredito in presenza di moral hazard, correlazione dei progetti e di sovvenzioni nel caso di prestiti di gruppo. I risultati dimostrano che nel caso di effort endogeno, la correlazione dei progetti ha effetti significativi sull’effort dei debitori solo quando ci sono shock asimmetrici (positivi o negativi). Questi risultati indicano che il ben noto effetto negativo sull’effort nel caso di prestiti di gruppo con penalità congiunta (simmetrico) nel caso di correlazione dei progetti scompare una volta che l’effort è considerato endogeno. Si analizzano inoltre gli effetti delle sovvenzioni ai prestiti (e correlazione asimmetrica) sulla relativa convenienza (in termini di effort del debitore) nel caso di i) prestito di gruppo e prestito individuali con nozionale di garanzia, ii) tra tre diverse strutture di mercato della microfinanza l'industria. Nella terzo articolo si introducono le opzioni reali per individuare la struttura ottima del capitale in presenza di incertezza e distribuzione asimmetrica dei benefici e dei costi tra il debitore e il creditore. Il lavoro analizza sia il contesto uniperiodale sia quello multiperiodale. Il livello ottimale del debito consente di ottenere un equilibrio Pareto efficiente.

An insufficient financial market means that poor individuals cannot access financial capital, making it difficult for them to generate a stable income. Formal banks see these individuals as unreliable customers because of their financial background and see a risk that these potential customers will not repay their loans, which would put the bank at risk. Banks usually use the borrower’s assets as collateral for their loans. Unfortunately, not many of these poor people have any assets. Microloans can solve these problems by opening up the opportunity for financial capital that enables poor people to make the investments needed to create or develop some form of production and thus increase employment. This research was carried out to analyze if the collected variables can determine the repayment ability of those who got a microloan from the Amhara Credit and Savings institution. Since the borrowers received their loans through two different processes, this study divided the data into two groups. Group 1 received their microloan based on a personality test and the individuals in group 2 received their microloan based on group lending. This division is done in order to be able to eliminate that the lending process itself may have affected the repayment ability. This study is based on random sample data from the Amhara Credit and Savings institution. Regression analyses were performed using the STATA-15 software. The results are not entirely consistent with previous studies because some variables did not get the expected outcome linked similar to previous studies. Some of the variables in this study appear to have an effect on the repayment ability, but not all. Thus, the conclusion is that the results are insufficient and further research needs to be made to reject or confirm the influence of the socio-economic factors and structure of the microloan on the repayment ability for Ethiopian borrowers.
En otillräcklig finansmarknad innebär att fattiga individer inte kan få tillgång till finansiellt kapital vilket gör det svårt för dem att generera en stabil inkomst. Formella banker ser dessa individer som opålitliga kunder på grund av deras ekonomiska bakgrund och ser en risk med att dessa potentiella kunder inte kommer att återbetala sina lån, vilket skulle sätta banken i risk. Banker använder vanligtvis låntagarens tillgångar som säkerhet för sina lån. Tyvärr så har inte många av dessa fattiga människor några tillgångar. Mikrolån kan lösa dessa problem genom att öppna upp möjligheten för finansiellt kapital som gör det möjligt för fattiga människor att göra de investeringar som behövs för att skapa eller utveckla någon form av produktion och därmed öka sysselsättningen. Denna forskning genomfördes för att analysera om våra insamlade variabler kan förklara återbetalningsförmågan hos de som fick ett mikrolån från Amhara Credit and Savings Institution. Eftersom låntagarna fick lån genom två olika processer delade vi upp dem i grupp ett, som fick sitt mikrolån genom ett personlighetstest och grupp två, som fick sitt mikrolån via en grupp med andra individer. Detta för att kunna eliminera att själva processen till hur de har fått lånet kan ha påverkat återbetalningsförmågan. Studien är baserad på slumpmässiga provdata från Amhara Credit and Savings Institution. Regressionsanalyser utfördes med användning av Stata 15-programvaran. Resultaten är inte helt i överensstämmelse med tidigare studier, i och med att vissa variabler inte har det förväntade utfallet kopplat till tidigare studier. Några av variablerna i denna studie visar sig ha en påverkan på återbetalningsförmågan, men inte alla. Således är vår slutsats att resultaten är otillräckliga och behöver ytterligare undersökning för att kunna avvisa eller bekräfta denna uppsats variablers påverkan på återbetalningsförmågan.

The use of group lending for poverty alleviation is a widespread feature of modern microfinance. The structure of joint-liability credit - if one member defaults the others are held financially responsible - produces a natural tension between a borrower's social and economic interests. This study integrates theory from economics, sociology, and behavioural experiments to address the question, "How do social and economic mechanisms interact to shape a microcredit group's financial behaviour?" The empirical analysis involves an original dataset from a microfinance institution in Sierra Leone. The total dataset includes 7,025 joint-liability borrowers involved in 47,931 repayment transactions from 2005 to 2011. The empirical methods used are diverse: ethnographic fieldwork, GPS spatial analysis, social affiliation survey design, and multilevel statistical analysis of loan performance data. The original work is structured as three distinct papers. In the first paper, I examine social collateral, the formal use of a borrower's relationships as security against loan default. How does a group's spatial structure affect the efficacy of social collateral? Spatial concentration improves a group's economic performance up to a certain level after which the effect reverses and performance declines. The relationship is driven by a social trade-off between ability and willingness to enforce the loan. Further, groups that consist of multiple spatial fragments produce worse performance. Spatially fragmented groups are prone to splitting into social factions. In the second paper, I question what drives the self-selection process of microcredit group formation. The results show that group leaders prefer members with pre-existing social ties, who are spatially proximate, and have matching business types. The preference for socio-spatial factors is likely motivated by reducing the risk of strategic default by group members. In the third paper, I explore how economic cooperation in small groups evolves over years of repeated interaction. Despite the selective retention of better performing groups, average cooperation rates consistently decline, in terms of contribution and effort. Further, variance across groups continues to increase over 30 months of repeated interaction, suggesting that convergence to a stable cooperation rate has not occurred. Given that group lending exhibits many of the factors found to promote cooperation in laboratory experiments, it is surprising to find such a marked decline in this field setting. Overall, this thesis contributes to economic sociology by dissecting the difficult trade-offs between social and economic motives in group lending and offers policy implications for microfinance institutions regarding group formation heuristics, contract design, and loan management.

Poor loan repayment causes the decline and failure of some microfinance institutions. The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore strategies that microfinance (MFI) leaders use to reduce loan default in the base of the pyramid market. The study population included 6 MFI leaders, 12 borrower community-based groups, and 4 staff members of the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA Rwanda) who reduced MFI loan default in Rwanda. Data were collected through semistructured interviews with 3 MFI leaders, 3 ADRA Rwanda staff members, and 3 members of borrower groups. Data were also collected through focus groups with 3 borrower community-based groups comprising 6 to 8 members. Additional data were collected through the analysis of MFI and ADRA Rwanda organizational documents. The Varian group lending model was the conceptual framework for the study. Data analysis involved methodological triangulation and the Gadamerian hermeneutics framework of interpretation. Four major themes emerged: intrapreneurship and environmental business opportunities, favorable loan repayment conditions, strategies for choosing borrower groups, and loan use monitoring. A sustainable microfinance institution can produce social change by providing microfinance loans that clients can use to start and grow microenterprises that can become the source of income for improving the lives of clients and their family members. Findings may also be used to create economic growth through the participation of more people in economic activities in the base of the pyramid market.

Cette thèse explore le risque de crédit au niveau de l'entreprise, en ce qui concerne les structures de propriété de l'entreprise, le sexe de son propriétaire et la manière dont les dirigeants de banque ont été incités à allouer du crédit dans la perspective de la grande crise financière. Il compare le risque de crédit associé au financement de groupes d’entreprises par rapport à des entreprises indépendantes. Il vérifie si l’effet de levier, la rentabilité des entreprises et la probabilité de défaillance au niveau de l’entreprise peuvent être attribués au sexe du dirigeant de l’entreprise. Enfin, il décrit en détail comment les dirigeants des banques islandaises ont été incités à allouer des crédits au cours d’un épisode de croissance rapide du crédit menant à la faillite des banques
This dissertation explores credit risk at the corporate level, with respect to corporate ownership structures, gender of the corporate owner and how bank executives were incentivized to allocate credit in the run up to the Great Financial Crisis. It compares credit risk associated with funding of business groups versus stand alone firms. It tests whether leverage, firm profitability and probability of default at the firm level can be attributed to the gender of the firm leadership. Lastly, it provides a detailed account of how bank executives in the Icelandic banks were incentivized to allocate credit during a rapid credit growth episode leading up to the failure of the banks

La thèse a pour objectif d’examiner la nature des informations fournies sur les transactions liées dans le cadre des normes comptables internationales IAS 24. Dans le chapitre 1, nous étudions si les actionnaires des banques d’Etat anticipent qu’il existe un risque d’expropriation, risque qu’ils sont prêts à accepter si un soutien de l’Etat est apporté en cas de difficultés financières. Nous travaillons pour cela sur des données de banques et de firmes emprunteuses indonésiennes dans la mesure où il y a une forte présence des banques d’Etat en Indonésie et que le risque d’expropriation est institutionnellement élevé. Nos résultats mettent en évidence que les actionnaires des banques d’Etat anticipent effectivement qu’il y a un risque qu’ils soient expropriés, mais qu’ils acceptent ce risque en échange du soutien que l’Etat apportera à la banque en cas de risque de défaut. Ce résultat est encore plus renforcé si la firme qui a emprunté est elle aussi une firme dont l’actionnaire le plus important est l’Etat. Dans le chapitre 2, nous étudions comment les créanciers tarifient le risque lié aux transactions liées effectuées par un emprunteur. Nous utilisons pour cela des données de crédit sur les opérations de syndicationen Asie et des données collectées dans les rapports annuels sur les transactions liées(RPTs)des firmes emprunteuses qui nous permettent de différencier les transactions relevant d’un comportement d’expropriation(detrimentalRPTs)de celles relevant d’un soutien financier(beneficialRPTs). Nous nous concentrons sur les firmes asiatiques qui présentent pour la plupart une structure de l’actionnariat pyramidal avec un fort risque d’expropriation, mais également la possibilité de bénéficier d’un soutien financier du groupe en cas de difficultés financières. Notre étude empirique met en évidence que les créanciers exigent un taux de crédit plus élevé pour les emprunteurs ayant un niveau plus élevé de detrimentalRPTs, ainsi que pour les firmes ayant un niveau plus élevé de beneficialRPTs. Ce dernier résultat, qui peut paraître contre intuitif, suggère que les créanciers anticipent qu’un soutien apporté aujourd’hui par les actionnaires ultimes peut être fait pour ménager la possibilité de mieux exproprier demain. Le troisième chapitre vient compléter ce travail en étudiant si les créanciers structurent différemment le syndicat en fonction de l’importance des transactions liées (detrimental ou beneficialRPTs).Nos résultats montrent qu’il y a un plus grand nombre de prêteurs dans le syndicat si l’emprunteur a un niveau plus élevé de detrimentalRPTs, alors qu’on observe au contraire la présence d’un moins grand nombre de prêteurs si les beneficialRPTssont plus élevées. Ces résultats suggèrent que les créanciers ajustent la structure du syndicat en fonction du risque d’expropriation
This thesis aims to provide an answer to the question what information conveyed by the disclosure of related party transaction under IAS 24. In the first chapter we investigate whether shareholders rationally anticipate expropriation but are willing to accept it in exchange for higher expectations ofgreater stability andgovernmentsupport during financial distress. We focus our empirical research on this chapter on Indonesia where the legal institution is widely considered as a weak. We findthat shareholders of government bank indeed rationally expect being expropriated but are willing to accept this in exchange for specific government support in the case of financial distress. This reaction is consistent if the borrowing firms is also government owned. In the second chapter we take a different perspective by investigating how the creditor perceived the information conveyed in the related party transactions in the syndicated loan market and set the price base on the information. We extent ouranalysis by taking into account both detrimental and beneficial RPT and focus our analysis on East Asian firms where the pyramidal ownership exists. Our finding shows that creditor set a higher price for borrower with high detrimental and beneficial RPT indicating that even though receiving propping can be beneficial, it may preserve a future option for the ultimate owner to expropriate the firms. Third chapter compliments the analysis by looking into how creditor set the syndicated loan structure based on the information of detrimental and beneficial RPT from the borrowing firms. The finding shows that there is a less concentration of syndicated structure if the borrower has high level of detrimental RPT while high concentration of syndicated structure ifthe borrower has high level of beneficial RPT. This indicates that creditor adjust the structure to be able to perform extensive monitoring and due diligence when the borrower is prone to expropriation. Our findings therefore provide an evidence that RPT disclosure under IAS 24 is valuable to determine the risk of expropriation that the firms face and to understand the nature of expropriation. Therefore, our evidences support the decision from regulators to limit related party transactions and to improve the transparency on RPT disclosure in order to improve the protection for investors and creditors

Over the years, the lending procedures of microcredit has evolved. The original joint liability group lending with simultaneous financing (loans released at once) has been replaced by sequential financing (loans released one by one). Moreover, recent studies suggest individual liability lending in groups to be the optimal choice. While numerous theoretical studies provide thorough models of each of these approaches, none presents a comparative analysis. In this study, we model these three schemes using the framework by Van Tassel (1999) and compare them. Further, we add exogenous peer monitoring costs and within-group heterogeneity of loan sizes to our models. Our findings prove that, in the presence of information asymmetry, group lending with joint liability dominates individual liability lending in groups. Furthermore, the interest rate of the sequential model is more sensitive to changes of monitoring costs or opportunity costs of capital than in the sequential model. On the contrary, sequential approach allows for higher degree of within-group heterogeneity of loan sizes. It is ambiguous which model achieves higher profit and lower interest rate. Our results confirm that the choice of optimal financing approach is determined by the characteristics of borrowers. JEL Classificiation G2 Keywords...

碩士
國立東華大學
國際企業學系
95
This study is based on the viewpoint of the Syndicated (two banks) and borrowers to investigate the international group lending behavior in evaluating and determining the optimal exchange rate in the Syndicated and monitoring cost between two borrowers. The focus of this study is the Real Options Approach (ROA) to investigate whether Syndicated and borrowers should join the project of an international lending group or not? Furthermore, in this study, the optimal critical threshold will be determined during the evaluating process. In the first case study, the constructed mathematical model can be used to deal with each member of borrowers to decide whether to monitor each other or not? And also whether the Syndicate should decide to lend to borrowers or not? If we assume that two borrowers, one of whom is a domestic enterprise and the other is a foreign enterprise are to conduct a project as a lending group depends on either choosing a monitor or non-monitor. With the purpose of working as a bi-lending group, there are four existing possible situations of monitoring-cost-expansion. These situations of payoffs will be defined and calculated. In the second case study, an international bank group dealing with a transnational group lending under the project values produced by borrowers and expected revenues of international banks which are affected by uncertainty exchange rate changing, international banks are whether willing to accessing the transnational group lending through a decision-making process or not. Finally, both previous discussed two different conceptual models which will presented by the Real Optional Approach in this study.

碩士
逢甲大學
財務金融學所
90
This study focuses on the differences of lending relationship between the group-affiliated firms and their member bank, vs. the group-affiliated firms without a member bank and their dealing banks. We collects individual loan transaction data, and financial and their dealing banks variables of the two groups. We use stylized fact and regression analyses, and obtain three main empirical results as follows. 1.Excepting interest rate, the group-affiliated firms with a member bank get no much premium in lending terms. Entering in bank industry will help group-affiliated firms to lower their capital cost. Moreover the group-affiliated firms with a member bank have better performance than the ones without a member bank. 2.According to the investment regression of Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein(1991) suggested, we use their model to test whether the group-affiliated firms with their member bank will face less financial constraints because of their member bank’s help. The results prove this hypothesis. Thus, they don’t maintain much cash on hand for future investment. 3.According to interest rate regression of Ferri, Kang and Kim(2001) suggested, we examine the differences of the interest rate offering by their dealing banks between two groups, between pre- and post- Asian Financial Crisis. We find that the group-affiliate firms’ member bank don’t offer lower interest rate than other banks. They still can play the role of monitor well.

碩士
東吳大學
會計學系
104
Based on the case of Rebar Group, the purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between internal control weakness and the lending system within conglomerate like this. Through analyzing, quantifying and sorting out the contents of the indictment from The Taipei District Prosecutors Office with regard to illegal transactions, including setting up numerous subsidiary companies, issuing inferior bonds, granting fraudulent credit to overlend and so on, this study identifies the important internal control weaknesses broken the lending system within conglomerate. Main conclusions are as follows: 1. The factors that most frequently cause the weaknesses of internal control are these who participant in business groups and those who handle business duties; 2. In flows of loan review process, the most frequent mistakes result from the credit appraisal processes are the first steps , especially when the credit officer do not straightforwardly provide the objective verifying report.

abstract: In this paper, I study many-to-one matching markets in a dynamic framework with the following features: Matching is irreversible, participants exogenously join the market over time, each agent is restricted by a quota, and agents are perfectly patient. A form of strategic behavior in such markets emerges: The side with many slots can manipulate the subsequent matching market in their favor via earlier matchings. In such a setting, a natural question arises: Is it possible to analyze a dynamic many-to-one matching market as if it were either a static many-to-one or a dynamic one-to-one market? First, I provide sufficient conditions under which the answer is yes. Second, I show that if these conditions are not met, then the early matchings are "inferior" to the subsequent matchings. Lastly, I extend the model to allow agents on one side to endogenously decide when to join the market. Using this extension, I provide a rationale for the small amount of unraveling observed in the United States (US) medical residency matching market compared to the US college-admissions system. Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) are designed to improve the welfare of the poor. Group lending with joint liability is the standard contract used by these institutions. Such a contract performs two roles: it affects the composition of the groups that form, and determines the properties of risk-sharing among their members. Even though the literature suggests that groups consist of members with similar characteristics, there is evidence also of groups with heterogeneous agents. The underlying reason is that the literature lacked the risk-sharing behavior of the agents within a group. This paper develops a model of group lending where agents form groups, obtain capital from the MFI, and share risks among themselves. First, I show that joint liability introduces inefficiency for risk-averse agents. Moreover, the composition of the groups is not always homogeneous once risk-sharing is on the table.
Dissertation/Thesis
Doctoral Dissertation Economics 2020

Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements of the degree Doctor of Technology: Public Management, Durban University of Technology, Durban, South Africa, 2015.
In 2006, the government-supported microfinance programmes implemented by the Kenyan government started lending credit to Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs) using a group-lending mode, a change which represented a paradigm shift from individual lending mode. The overall aim of this research is to provide an investigation of whether the transformation of this lending policy was backed by any theoretical and empirical support. Specifically, the entirety of this study is intended to give an insight of what might have influenced the change, what informed it and what might have been overlooked. To achieve clarity and the study aim, the research is compartmentalised into three discrete studies. In the first study, a historical investigation into the factors which hindered MSEs from acquiring credit was undertaken. The second study investigated the reasons MSEs were credit rationed. The third study investigated whether the problems experienced by MSEs, associated with lack of credit access (lack of credit demand and rationing), could have been mitigated by group lending. The research utilised quantitative research design, the first two studies utilised data derived from National MSEs Baseline survey conducted in 1999. The third study utilised primary data collected from micro credit groups of the Kenya Rural Enterprise Programme (K-REP) in 2006 in Nairobi, Kenya. Various economic models and regression analysis were utilised in analysing different outcomes. In particular, the research utilised Univariate Probit, Bivariate Probit and Heckman Two-Stage Models to model various credit access outcomes. The study found that group lending largely mitigated information asymmetry- the main cause of MSEs failure to access credit. However, the study concludes that asymmetric information was not the only source of credit failure in Kenya. For group lending to work, or to have worked, it required support by other pro-MSE programme dynamics. This suggested that the government decision to change policy was partially informed by theory and practice.
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