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Journal articles on the topic 'Group-lending'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 21 February 2023

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1

Spallone, Marco, and Pina Murè. "Strategic group lending for banks." Banks and Bank Systems 13, no. 1 (March 29, 2018): 115–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/bbs.13(1).2018.11.

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Credit institutions often refuse to lend money to small firms. Usually, this happens because small firms are not able to provide collateral to lenders. Moreover, given the small amount of required loans, the relative cost of full monitoring is too high for lenders. Group lending contracts have been viewed as an effective solution to credit rationing of small firms in both developing and industrialized countries. The aim of this paper is to highlight the potential of group lending contracts in terms of credit risk management. In particular, this paper provides a theoretical explanation of the potential of group lending programs in screening good borrowers from bad ones to reduce the incidence of non-performing-loans (NPL). This paper shows that the success of firms involved in selected group lending programs is due to the fact that co-signature is an effective screening device: more precisely, if lenders make a proper use of co-signature to screen good firms from bad ones, then only firms that are good ex-ante enter group lending contracts. So, the main argument of this paper is that well designed group lending programs induce good firms to become jointly liable, at least partially, with other good firms and discourage other – bad-firms to do the same. Specifically, co-signature is proven to be a screening device only in the case of a perfectly competitive bank sector.

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2

Bhole, Bharat, and Sean Ogden. "Group lending and individual lending with strategic default." Journal of Development Economics 91, no. 2 (March 2010): 348–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.06.004.

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3

Bourjade, Sylvain, and Ibolya Schindele. "Group lending with endogenous group size." Economics Letters 117, no. 3 (December 2012): 556–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.07.034.

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4

Armendariz de Aghion, Beatriz, and Jonathan Morduch. "Microfinance Beyond Group Lending." Economics of Transition 8, no. 2 (July 2000): 401–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0351.00049.

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5

Ahlin, Christian, and Godwin Debrah. "Group lending with covariate risk." Journal of Development Economics 157 (June 2022): 102855. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2022.102855.

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6

Van Tassel, Eric. "Group lending under asymmetric information." Journal of Development Economics 60, no. 1 (October 1999): 3–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3878(99)00034-6.

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7

Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Tchétché N'Guessan. "Group lending with adverse selection." European Economic Review 44, no. 4-6 (May 2000): 773–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(99)00041-0.

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8

Gan, Li, Manuel A. Hernandez, and Yanyan Liu. "GROUP LENDING WITH HETEROGENEOUS TYPES." Economic Inquiry 56, no. 2 (December 19, 2017): 895–913. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12541.

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9

de Quidt, Jonathan, Thiemo Fetzer, and Maitreesh Ghatak. "Group lending without joint liability." Journal of Development Economics 121 (July 2016): 217–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.11.006.

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10

Chaturvedi, Ashish, and Hari Prapan Sharma. "Individual Lending versus Group Lending in Microfinance: An analytical Study." Siddhant- A Journal of Decision Making 19, no. 2 (2019): 80. http://dx.doi.org/10.5958/2231-0657.2019.00011.9.

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11

Impavido, Gregorio. "Credit Rationing, Group Lending and Optimal Group Size." Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 69, no. 2 (June 1998): 243–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8292.00081.

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12

Ahlin, Christian. "The role of group size in group lending." Journal of Development Economics 115 (July 2015): 140–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.03.001.

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13

Kodongo, Odongo, and Lilian G. Kendi. "Individual lending versus group lending: An evaluation with Kenya's microfinance data." Review of Development Finance 3, no. 2 (April 2013): 99–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2013.05.001.

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14

Rusydiana, Aam Slamet, and Abrista Devi. "Islamic Group Lending and Financial Inclusion." Signifikan: Jurnal Ilmu Ekonomi 5, no. 1 (April 8, 2016): 51–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.15408/sjie.v5i1.3128.

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Based on measurements of several indicators including the level of community participation, community empowerment, repayment rate was good, cross reporting good, and the application of penalties in accordance with the applicable rules, the results show that with the program GLM people feel the difference in economic condition and social than before and after the program. This is a major discovery is valuable. The development strategy for the program GLM is divided into seven levels with the elements most important include: The need for equality of access to funds for all types of financial institutions, both banking and lending model-based group, the need to improve the quality of human resources as a pioneer of service models based lending group this, as well as the importance of financial inclusion in the entire financial systemDOI: 10.15408/sjie.v5i1.3128

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15

Kumar K, Naveen. "Dynamic Incentives in Microfinance Group Lending." SAGE Open 2, no. 2 (April 17, 2012): 215824401244428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2158244012444280.

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16

Katzur, Tomek, and Robert Lensink. "Group lending with correlated project outcomes." Economics Letters 117, no. 2 (November 2012): 445–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.032.

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17

Mukherjee, Shirsendu, and Sukanta Bhattacharya. "Optimal group size with joint liability group lending strategy." Indian Growth and Development Review 8, no. 1 (April 13, 2015): 2–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/igdr-02-2014-0002.

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Purpose – This paper aims to offer a theory on optimal group size. To overcome the problems of institutional credit facilities to the poor and marginal people, Joint Liability Group Lending (JLGL) is often considered as a better option. However, the literature in the field is surprisingly silent about the issue of group-size. This paper tries to fill the vacuum in a theoretical framework. Design/methodology/approach – Using a standard theoretical model, this paper shows that even with costless peer monitoring, there exists an upper bound on the size of group, and this upper bound is exactly pinned down by the strength of the social sanction. Findings – This paper shows that under reasonable specification of effort cost, as group size increases, both optimal cooperative effort level and the deviation incentive from that effort level rise monotonically for any individual borrower. Thus, given the strength of social sanction, the rising incentive for deviation uniquely determines the optimal group size even in absence of free riding in peer monitoring. Research limitations/implications – The theoretical results derived in the paper require empirical verification which is, however, tricky because of the problems associated with quantifying social sanctions. Practical implications – This paper argues that the group size should be larger in more integrated communities which have better social cohesion among its members. Originality/value – This paper shows that, for a given extent of joint liability the borrowers need to bear, the group size in joint liability group lending should be designed according to the strength of social sanction prevailing in the society to achieve social efficiency.

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18

van Eijkel, Remco, Niels Hermes, and Robert Lensink. "Group lending and the role of the group leader." Small Business Economics 36, no. 3 (July 16, 2009): 299–321. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11187-009-9223-5.

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19

MUKHERJEE, SASWATEE. "SEQUENTIAL GROUP LENDING WITH AND WITHOUT GROUP LIABILITY; GRAMEEN I VERSUS GRAMEEN II." Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship 25, no. 03 (September 2020): 2050017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s108494672050017x.

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The paper shows that in absence of any physical collateral, sequential group lending with joint-liability fails to guarantee loan repayment by borrowers because of the coordination problem among the borrowers. The model finds that under certain conditions, profits can be higher under joint-liability group lending if one can ensure peer pressure is adequate to guarantee there is no strategic default, i.e., repayment when the borrower has earned enough to be able to repay. From the lender’s point of view, the individual lending contract may turn out to be a better option than joint-liability group lending under certain circumstances.

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20

Alexeev, Michael, Mira Nurmakhanova, and Leonid I. Polishchuk. "Institutions and social capital in group lending." Russian Journal of Economics 7, no. 4 (December 30, 2021): 269–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.7.76647.

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Formal institutions and social capital interact with each other in multiple ways. We argue and show empirically at the cross-country level that in the case of group lending, contract enforcement complements bonding social capital and substitutes for bridging one. It means that payoff to social capital in group lending depends on social capital type and is contingent on the quality of contract enforcement which serves as a sorting factor, working in the opposite directions for different stripes of social capital. These results are robust to various estimations, sets of controls, and social capital measures.

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21

Laffont, Jean-Jacques. "Collusion and group lending with adverse selection." Journal of Development Economics 70, no. 2 (April 2003): 329–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3878(02)00100-1.

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22

Ghatak, Maitreesh. "Group lending, local information and peer selection." Journal of Development Economics 60, no. 1 (October 1999): 27–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3878(99)00035-8.

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23

Haldar, Antara, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. "Group Lending, Joint Liability, and Social Capital." Politics & Society 44, no. 4 (November 9, 2016): 459–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032329216674001.

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This article grapples with the causes of India’s microfinance crisis. By contrasting Bangladesh’s highly successful Grameen model with the allegedly “universalizable” version of India’s SKS Microfinance (which precipitated the crisis), trust or social capital is isolated—not just narrowly interpreted within standard economic theory, but more broadly construed—as the essential element accounting for the early success of microfinance. It is argued that the microfinance experience has been widely misinterpreted, in both analytical and policy terms. This article suggests inherent limits in extending the model to for-profit institutions and, in particular, to the pace of scaling up.

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24

Guttman, Joel M. "Assortative matching, adverse selection, and group lending." Journal of Development Economics 87, no. 1 (August 2008): 51–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2007.06.002.

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25

Allen, Treb. "Optimal (partial) group liability in microfinance lending." Journal of Development Economics 121 (July 2016): 201–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.08.002.

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26

Besley, Timothy, and Stephen Coate. "Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral." Journal of Development Economics 46, no. 1 (February 1995): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-3878(94)00045-e.

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27

Pang, Sulin, Jinwang Xiao, and Shuqing Li. "Pricing method and applications for the farmer's joint liability based on intensity model and Monte Carlo simulation." Journal of Financial Engineering 02, no. 01 (March 2015): 1550008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2345768615500087.

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This paper studies the pricing problem of group lending using the strength model and the Monte Carlo simulation method. Simulating the default process of farmers with a Poisson process, this paper describes the default distribution for farmers, and based on which the paper establishes the pricing model of the group lending and obtains the critical number of the defaulted farmers and the default probability for the group. Next, this paper introduces the t-Copula function to describe the default correlation between farmers, and obtains the partially analytical solution of the loan rate for the group lending, and it also provides the Monte Carlo simulation algorithm for the pricing of group lending based on t-Copula function. Finally, this paper carries out the Monte Carlo simulation algorithm on the pricing problem of group lending with three and five peasant households through an example, and discusses the relationship between the loan rate and each of the influencing factors in the pricing model of the group lending.

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28

Xu, Yuyun, Wenli Cheng, and Longyao Zhang. "Switching from Group Lending to Individual Lending: The Experience at China’s Largest Microfinance Institution." Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 56, no. 9 (July 18, 2019): 1989–2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1540496x.2019.1636228.

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29

Okumu, Armstone Kiplangat, and Simon Nyakwara. "Influence of joint liability on enterprise development of rural women in Nyamache Sub-County." East African Journal of Business and Economics 5, no. 2 (November 19, 2022): 15–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.37284/eajbe.5.2.972.

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Group lending has received a great attention from economists and policymakers for its successful delivery of credit to poor borrowers and its role in alleviating poverty in the developing countries. The success of group lending in providing credit to poor borrowers has been attributed to its ability to mitigate the asymmetry of information and enforcement problems in credit markets. The ability of group lending institutions to overcome the asymmetry of information and enforcement problems has been theorized to be the driving force behind their outreach to the poor, their sustainability, and their repayment performance. While there is a host of theoretical models explaining the success of group lending, empirical research has lagged behind. The focus of this study was to explore the determinants of group lending mechanism on enterprise development of rural women in Nyamache sub-county, Kenya. The questionnaires were edited first for accuracy, and completeness. The study used frequency distribution and percentages, and computer software-Statistical Package for Social Scientists version 22 (SPSS v 22) as a tool of analyzing data, and to establish relationships between variables. The study established that, joint liability, training, group representation and loan size positively and significantly influenced enterprise development. The study recommends that; women groups should be strengthened so that they can be in position to jointly access loan for the development of their enterprises, the women groups lending group should organize effectively trainings so as to equip the members with capacity to efficiently manage their business enterprises, the women lending group should share the lending policies with members to understand them foe easy of operation and to minimize misunderstanding and any arising conflict and that the women lending groups should effectively vet group members to enable them access maximum qualified amounts so as they could invest in their businesses for survival and growth.

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30

Sharma, Sudhir, Priti Singh, Kratika Singh, and Bhawana Chauhan. "Group Lending Model - A Panacea to Reduce Transaction Cost?" Zagreb International Review of Economics and Business 20, no. 2 (November 27, 2017): 49–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/zireb-2017-0017.

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Abstract Microfinance institutions (MFIs) have stepped up towards commercialization and sustainability yet they face challenges in terms of transaction cost that limit their growth prospects. Transaction cost is incurred in forming the group of members, searching for the potential clients, monitoring, and administration, in providing training to the clients etc. Group lending has emerged as an effective tool in reducing this cost by transferring its burden on the group. Though the concept of group lending is not new in micro finance but in India it was introduced by NABARD in 2004-05 owing to its key advantage of income generation. This paper aims to analyze whether group lending programme has some role to play in reducing transaction cost of MFIs. It also discusses the concept of transaction cost, characteristics of group lending as well as process of forming a group. The results reveal that internal management of small and medium MFIs is not working efficiently which results in increased costs. Large MFIs do not face such problems.

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31

Guoping Nong, and Sulin Pang. "Modeling on Group Lending Based onMultivariable Gaussian Copula." INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON Advances in Information Sciences and Service Sciences 5, no. 8 (April 30, 2013): 890–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.4156/aiss.vol5.issue8.105.

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32

Devi, Abrista, and Aam Rusydiana. "ISLAMIC GROUP LENDING MODEL (GLM) AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION." International Journal of Islamic Business Ethics 1, no. 1 (March 29, 2016): 80. http://dx.doi.org/10.30659/ijibe.1.1.80-94.

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The lack of capital access from poor society to Indonesia banking is greater. These all are caused by poor society don�t have enough collateral which is requested by bank officer to get loan. Non-bank financial institution is one of micro-financial institution which has covered all of poor society and also maximizing the existency of UMKM, include social model credit capital (GLM). The aim of this study to see the form of Group Lending Model (GLM) and its� impact to their members social structure. This research also tries to give the� solutions such as the first GLM development strategy in other to be more effective and efficient. The methods used are Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) and Interpretaive Structural Modeling (ISM). Based on the measurement of some indicators there are the participation indext of society, society development, good repayment rate, good cross reporting, and penalty implications appropriate with the regulations. The results show that GLM programme, the society feel the� differenciation from the economic and social condition between before and after following this programme. This is valuable invention for economic studies. GLM development strategy are devided into 7 levels with its important elements are : the needy of similiarity fund access for all of financial institution. The needy of human resource quality development as the pioneer of group lending model, and the importance of inclusive financial to all financial system.

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33

Gan, Li, Manuel A. Hernandez, and Yanyan Liu. "Group Lending with Peer Selection and Moral Hazard." Theoretical Economics Letters 12, no. 05 (2022): 1351–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/tel.2022.125074.

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34

HIRTH, ROBERT M., and DAANISH PESTONJEE. "HOW GROUP LENDING AFFECTS INNOVATION: EVIDENCE FROM ETHIOPIA." Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship 21, no. 04 (December 2016): 1650023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1084946716500230.

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Microlending has become one of the primary interventions intended to alleviate poverty in the developing world. However, empirical results of the benefits of microlending have been disappointing. This article proposes the common microlending practice of group lending reduces the likelihood borrowers will engage in innovative activities, which has been demonstrated to be a key factor in improving borrower outcomes. The hypotheses proposed are tested with data collected from interviews with 340 microloan borrowers in Ethiopia. The findings are consistent with a weak sorting effect where innovative individuals are less likely to participate in group loans than individual loans, and a social pressure effect where innovative individuals taking group loans are pressured to behave less innovatively than their peers taking individual loans.

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35

Coleman, Brett E. "The impact of group lending in Northeast Thailand." Journal of Development Economics 60, no. 1 (October 1999): 105–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3878(99)00038-3.

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36

Abbink, Klaus, Bernd Irlenbusch, and Elke Renner. "INTEREST RATES IN GROUP LENDING: A BEHAVIOURAL INVESTIGATION." Pacific Economic Review 11, no. 2 (June 2006): 185–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0106.2006.00309.x.

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37

Paal, Beatrix, and Thomas Wiseman. "Group insurance and lending with endogenous social collateral." Journal of Development Economics 94, no. 1 (January 2011): 30–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.11.009.

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38

Al-Azzam, Moh'd, R. Carter Hill, and Sudipta Sarangi. "Repayment performance in group lending: Evidence from Jordan." Journal of Development Economics 97, no. 2 (March 2012): 404–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.06.006.

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39

Nkwocha, Obinna Udodiri, Javed Hussain, Hatem El-Gohary, David J. Edwards, and Ernest Ovia. "Dynamics of Group Lending Mechanism and the Role of Group Leaders in Developing Countries." International Journal of Customer Relationship Marketing and Management 10, no. 3 (July 2019): 54–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijcrmm.2019070104.

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Group lending mechanisms have increasingly become popular among microfinance providers in recent years. This is largely due to its ability to leverage joint liability to increase loan repayments whilst promoting an entrepreneurial spirit among borrowers. Meanwhile, a group-lending mechanism is also very important in promoting women's empowerment through cooperative engagements of all group members. However, the effectiveness of the group lending methodology in the delivery of microfinance within a developing country context is largely under-researched. Using data from extensive focus groups interviews of women borrowers held in Nigeria among participants from 150 different groups, this article analyses the dynamics of group lending mechanism (group formation, peer monitoring, pressure and support). The article widens the current narrow literature on group leaders by providing a detailed empirical account of the activities of group leaders in a microfinance intervention. The findings showed that because group leaders are primarily held liable for loan delinquency of group members, they are more highly motivated than other members to monitor and pressure members. The results also suggest that while group leaders were found to perform vital roles, some of these group leaders abused their positions in ways that undermine group cohesion and microfinance sustainability. Lastly, the article introduces the “multiple card phenomenon” in group-based microfinance intervention.

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40

Syamlan, Yaser Taufik. "The Circular Economy of the Islamic Group Lending Model:‎ Lending Money for Garbage in Return." International Journal of Islamic Economics 2, no. 02 (January 8, 2021): 110. http://dx.doi.org/10.32332/ijie.v2i02.2580.

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The Model of Group Lending has been flourishing in the Microfinance Industry. This model has been used ‎widely to serve the needy and un-bankable group of people by lending money plus interest addition. Islamic ‎finance also embraces this model by omitting the interest and applying the Qardul Hassan to finance the ‎members' daily needs. This divine scheme's problem is the microfinance's sustainability since they have a burden ‎to bear the operational cost due to the non – interest feature of the financing. This paper tries to solve this ‎problem by utilizing the household garbage as the media to repay the Qardul Hassan financing to the Islamic ‎Microfinance Institution (IMFI). This would enable to create more added value product, selling it to get more ‎income and achieving the organization sustainability.

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41

Amboningtyas, Dheasey. "The Circular Economy of the Islamic Group Lending Model:‎ Lending Money for Garbage in Return." International Journal of Islamic Economics 2, no. 02 (January 8, 2021): 136. http://dx.doi.org/10.32332/ijie.v2i02.2607.

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This paper is a study on the financing model for batik MSMEs in Central Java, which is oriented towards the value of CSR's cost and benefit (Corporate Social Responsibility). It aims to see how to implement the cost and benefit value of CSR on batik MSMEs in Central Java, especially on three research objects. Among others: Laweyan batik, Lasem batik, and Pekalongan batik. It is based on, maybe if we look at an industry or large-scale companies, of course, the cost and benefits they usually appear in every financial report at the end of each year. Meanwhile, for MSMEs to determine the cost and benefit value's implementation, it has a tremendous impact on MSMEs' survival. This research was conducted to determine that this research was conducted on a financial financing model for batik MSMEs, which is oriented to the value of CSR's cost and benefit. Data were collected using purposive sampling according to the criteria for determining the sample in 3 research objects: the batik area of Laweyan, Lasem, and Pekalongan MSMEs. The analysis technique used is Partial Least Square (PLS) analysis to test the hypothesis with a quantitative approach. The study results show more efforts to increase the construction of financial funding at the UMKM Kampung Batik Laweyan Solo, Kampoeng Batik LasemRembang, and Kampoeng Batik KaumanPekalongan.The finding suggests implementing cost and benefits CSR through social activities such as processing waste products, reducing harmful chemicals in the process, and participating in environmental protection activities.

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42

Syamlan, Yaser Taufik. "The Circular Economy of the Islamic Group Lending Model:‎ Lending Money for Garbage in Return." International Journal of Islamic Economics 2, no. 02 (January 8, 2021): 110. http://dx.doi.org/10.32332/ijie.v2i02.2580.

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The Model of Group Lending has been flourishing in the Microfinance Industry. This model has been used ‎widely to serve the needy and un-bankable group of people by lending money plus interest addition. Islamic ‎finance also embraces this model by omitting the interest and applying the Qardul Hassan to finance the ‎members' daily needs. This divine scheme's problem is the microfinance's sustainability since they have a burden ‎to bear the operational cost due to the non – interest feature of the financing. This paper tries to solve this ‎problem by utilizing the household garbage as the media to repay the Qardul Hassan financing to the Islamic ‎Microfinance Institution (IMFI). This would enable to create more added value product, selling it to get more ‎income and achieving the organization sustainability.

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43

Amboningtyas, Dheasey. "The Circular Economy of the Islamic Group Lending Model:‎ Lending Money for Garbage in Return." International Journal of Islamic Economics 2, no. 02 (January 8, 2021): 136. http://dx.doi.org/10.32332/ijie.v2i02.2607.

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This paper is a study on the financing model for batik MSMEs in Central Java, which is oriented towards the value of CSR's cost and benefit (Corporate Social Responsibility). It aims to see how to implement the cost and benefit value of CSR on batik MSMEs in Central Java, especially on three research objects. Among others: Laweyan batik, Lasem batik, and Pekalongan batik. It is based on, maybe if we look at an industry or large-scale companies, of course, the cost and benefits they usually appear in every financial report at the end of each year. Meanwhile, for MSMEs to determine the cost and benefit value's implementation, it has a tremendous impact on MSMEs' survival. This research was conducted to determine that this research was conducted on a financial financing model for batik MSMEs, which is oriented to the value of CSR's cost and benefit. Data were collected using purposive sampling according to the criteria for determining the sample in 3 research objects: the batik area of Laweyan, Lasem, and Pekalongan MSMEs. The analysis technique used is Partial Least Square (PLS) analysis to test the hypothesis with a quantitative approach. The study results show more efforts to increase the construction of financial funding at the UMKM Kampung Batik Laweyan Solo, Kampoeng Batik LasemRembang, and Kampoeng Batik KaumanPekalongan.The finding suggests implementing cost and benefits CSR through social activities such as processing waste products, reducing harmful chemicals in the process, and participating in environmental protection activities.

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44

Syamlan, Yaser Taufik. "The Circular Economy of the Islamic Group Lending Model: Lending Money for Garbage in Return." International Journal of Islamic Economics 2, no. 2 (January 20, 2021): 110. http://dx.doi.org/10.32332/ijie.v2i2.2580.

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The Model of Group Lending has been flourishing in the Microfinance Industry. This model has been used widely in the world to serve the needy and un-bankable group of people by lending money plus interest addition. In Islamic finance also embrace this model by omitting the interest and applying the Qardul Hassan to finance the members so that they can fulfill their daily need. The problem of this divine scheme is the sustainability of the microfinance since they have a burden to bare the operational cost due to the non – interest feature of the financing. This paper tries to solve this problem by utilizing the household garbage as the media to repay the Qardul Hassan financing to the Islamic Microfinance Institution (IMFI) so that it can be processed by the IMFI to create more added value product, selling it to get more income and achieving the organization sustainability.

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Markheim, Marina. "The Role of Group Size and Correlated Project Outcomes in Group Lending." Theoretical Economics Letters 07, no. 05 (2017): 1189–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/tel.2017.75080.

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Stepanenko, Serhiy, and Kateryna Ampilohova. "Modern methods of risk management in banks’ lending to individuals." Socio-Economic Problems of the Modern Period of Ukraine, no. 4(144) (2020): 33–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.36818/2071-4653-2020-4-5.

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The article is devoted to the substantiation of risk management methods of banks’ lending to individuals. Existing approaches to understanding the nature of consumer loan are considered. The classification of loans to individuals is provided. The paper proves that consumer lending should be considered in the context of the entities, object, currency, and principles. Consumer lending by its nature as a financial phenomenon refers to the provision of funds by the lender to individuals to obtain goods, works, or services, the acquisition of which meets the specific needs of consumers by redistributing cash flows in the present and future on the principles of maturity and payment. Consumer lending is a subtype of lending to individuals along with mortgage lending. The process of formation of consumer lending in Ukraine is considered: the main periods are identified and the key events and patterns that determine the current state of affairs in the consumer lending by banks are identified. The dynamics of lending to individuals is presented along with the total amount of loans granted. The nature of lending risk and its components are given. The loans are classified into 5 groups depending on the level of credit risk. The volumes of loan debt and loan risk are calculated for all groups: the largest volumes of loans issued to individuals account for the 1st and 5th groups. The amounts of loan debts and loan risk are calculated for all groups: the bulk of the debt is concentrated in the first group - that is, these are the most reliable loans, and the amount of loan risk is the largest in the fifth group. The analysis of the structure of foreign currency loans suggests that the 1st group is formed by new loans in the domestic currency issued to entities with a strong financial condition, and the 5th - old loans, most of which are issued in foreign currency, where debtors are characterized as unreliable with critical financial condition. The lending, operational, and country risks are the main risks of lending to individuals. The classification of risk management in lending to individuals is proposed. Methods of minimizing operational risk in the course of lending to individuals are considered.

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ZAKAYO, ALICE, and IBRAHIM TIRIMBA ONDABU. "Effect of Lending on the Financial Performance of Commercial Banks Listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange." International Journal of Finance 7, no. 6 (November 3, 2022): 1–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.47941/ijf.1110.

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ABSTRACT Purpose: This study aimed at determining how check-off lending, group lending, collateral lending and mobile lending affects the financial performance of commercial banks in Kenya. A descriptive survey research design was employed in the study with the target population comprising of 12 commercial banks listed in Nairobi Securities Exchange. Methodology: A total of 48 employees in the credit and lending department in the selected commercial bank formed the target respondents and with the study utilizing both primary and secondary data. Primary data was gathered through five point Likert scale questionnaires while secondary data was collected from audited reports and CBK financial reports for the period between 2017 and 2021. Both descriptive and inferential statistics were utilized in analyzing the data collected. SPSS and multi-linear regression model were used to analyze the data and which was presented by use of tables and figures. Findings: The study established that check-off lending, group lending, collateral lending and mobile lending positively and significantly affects financial performance of commercial. The results bear the implications that increasing the any of the independent variable with one unit results to an increase in the levels of financial performance with the respective beta value. Unique contribution to theory, practice and policy: The study provides that commercial banks’ performance can be enhanced through various lending practices that formed the independent variables of this study and hence resonates with commercial banks to take lending seriously as it is a cash cow to their products’ offering.

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Batra, Vikas. "Microfinance and Mechanism of Group Lending: Theory and Experiences." Economic Affairs 58, no. 4s (2013): 467. http://dx.doi.org/10.5958/j.0976-4666.58.4s.033.

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Van Tassel, Eric. "A study of group lending and incentives in Bolivia." International Journal of Social Economics 27, no. 7/8/9/10 (July 2000): 927–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03068290010336865.

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Qinlan, Zhang, and Yoichi Izumida. "Determinants of repayment performance of group lending in China." China Agricultural Economic Review 5, no. 3 (August 30, 2013): 328–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/caer-08-2012-0083.

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