Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Groupe paramilitaire'

La place de la violence dans l'histoire du XX° siècle est l'objet de nombreuses études depuis la publication des ouvrages de l'historien américain George L. Mosse. Si cet intérêt s'est longtemps concentré sur l'étude des mouvements d'extrême-droite, depuis une décennie la recherche historique se penche sur l'étude des relations qu'entretient le communisme, avec la violence. C'est dans cet environnement historiographique que notre étude vise à éclairer la place tenue par la violence dans la vie du PCF de sa naissance, en 1920, à son interdiction en septembre 1939. Dans un premier temps, après avoir analysé la place de la violence dans le mouvement socialiste et ouvrier avant 1914, il s'agit de percevoir la nouveauté introduite par l'idéologie bolchevique dans cette relation au moment où la société française est confrontée à la Grande Guerre et ses séquelles et de déterminer le rôle de la violence dans la naissance du PCF et dans son développement jusqu'à la fin des années 1920. Nous analysons ensuite la période « classe contre classe » où le PC développe pleinement les potentialités contenues dans la culture de guerre civile qu'il cultive depuis sa naissance. Il essaye alors d'inscrire cette guerre civile dans la réalité française. Le discours qui s'appuie sur la simplification de la perception des réalités politiques, économiques et sociales, décryptée au prisme de la culture de la guerre civile se durcit pour marquer l'imminence de la parousie révolutionnaire. Le PCF prône alors la confrontation directe avec les forces de l'ordre dans le but de conquérir la rue tout en essayant de mettre sur pied une force paramilitaire. L'abandon de l'activisme violent à la fin de 1931 entraîne une période d'hésitation sur la place de la violence dans la stratégie communiste, hésitation qui prend fin à partir de 1934 avec le tournant vers le Front populaire qui fait l'objet de notre troisième et dernière partie. La culture de guerre civile, que porte en lui le communisme, s'intègre alors à la culture républicaine sous le signe de l'antifascisme. Ce processus, qui participe aux succès que connaissent alors les communistes, entraîne une atténuation de la place de la violence dans la politique du PCF, mais non sa disparition. Sa trace se retrouve dans la politique interne de vigilance révolutionnaire, l'usage de la force contre les fascistes et les renégats et le rôle des communistes français sur le front espagnol durant la guerre civile<br>The place of violence in history of XX ° century is the object of many studies since the studies of the American historian George L. Mosse. If this interest has concentrated for a long time on the study of the far-right movements, for decade historical research leans over the study of relations communism, with violence. It's in this historiographic environment that our study aims at lighting the place held by violence in the life of PCF since its birth, in 1920 to its ban in September, 1939. At first, having analysed the place of violence in socialist and working movement before 1914 and the novelty introduced by the bolchevik ideology in this relation at the time when the French society is confronted with First World War and its consequences to determine the role of violence in the birth of PCF and in its development during 1920s. We analyse the period «class against class» where the PC develops entirely potentialities contained in the culture of civil war which it cultivates since its birth. He tries to register this civil war in French reality. The speech which leans on the simplification of the perception of political, economic and social realities, having read in prism of the culture of civil war to mark the imminence of the revolutionary parousie. PCF search direct confrontation with police force in the intention of winning the street, while trying to set up a paramilitary force. The end of violent activism at the end of 1931 draws away a period of hesitancy on the place of violence in communist strategy, hesitancy which comes to end from 1934 with turn towards the Popular Front which makes the object of our third and last part. The culture of civil war, that hits in him communism, integrates then with republican culture under the sign of antifascism. This process, which participates in the successes which know then the communists, draws away an alleviation of the place of violence in the policy of PCF, but not its disappearance. Its trace is in the internal policy of revolutionary alertness, the usage of force against the fascists and the renegades and the role of the French communists on the Spanish front during civil war

Dans les conflits armés du Guatemala, du Pérou et de Colombie, des groupes paramilitaires ont été créés afin de lutter contre les guérillas et aussi d’empêcher la mobilisation des secteurs sociaux intéressés à transformer l’ordre social établi. Dans ces pays, différentes circonstances ont mené à la désactivation officielle des structures paramilitaires.Les groupes paramilitaires du Guatemala (PAC) ont été créés par l’État au début des années 80 et ont été officiellement démobilisés en 1996, après la signature des accords de paix entre le gouvernement et la guérilla URNG. Au Pérou, les rondes paysannes ont été créées dans la cordillère sud-centrale au cours des années 1980. En 2003, après la chute du Fujimori, l’État péruvien cesse de motiver l’organisation de ces groupes. En Colombie, les groupes paramilitaires ont été promus pendant les années 80 par différents acteurs, parmi lesquels figuraient les élites régionales, l’armée et les narcotrafiquants. En 2003, ces groupes armés ont signé un accord de paix avec le gouvernement du président Uribe, dans lequel ils s’engagent à remettre les armes et à commencer un processus progressif de démobilisation.Même si au Guatemala, au Pérou et en Colombie, des processus pour désactiver les groupes paramilitaires ont été mis en place, ceux-ci continuent d’exister. Ainsi, il est pertinent de se demander si ces structures sont encore une forme de paramilitarisme et d’identifier les raisons pour lesquelles elles sont toujours présentes. En vue de répondre à cette question, l’objectif principal de recherche est d’analyser depuis une perspective comparative les processus de transformation des PAC, des rondes paysannes et des paramilitaires colombiens à partir du moment où les États respectifs prennent la décision officielle de désactiver ces groupes. Ce travail est développé en trois chapitres.Le premier chapitre compare l’émergence des groupes paramilitaires étudiés. A partir de cette perspective comparative et en utilisant certains éléments des approches systémique et structurelle fonctionnaliste, nous élaborons une conceptualisation théorique du phénomène paramilitaire. Selon cette conceptualisation, la fonction principale du paramilitarisme dans les trois cas d’étude est la protection de l’ordre social menacé.Le deuxième chapitre étudie les processus qui ont conduit à la désactivation officielle du paramilitarisme dans les trois pays analysés. À cette fin, nous comparons les conditions dans lesquelles se sont terminés les conflits armés respectifs, le contexte où chaque État a pris la décision de désactiver le paramilitarisme et les processus de Désarmement, de Démobilisation et de Réintégration (DDR).Le troisième chapitre compare la transformation des PAC, des rondes paysannes et des paramilitaires colombiens après leur désactivation officielle.La recherche se base sur la méthode comparative. Pour chaque chapitre, des variables de comparaison sont construites. Les sources d’information principales sont, premièrement, une révision bibliographique sur la conceptualisation théorique du paramilitarisme, les conflits armés et l’origine et l’évolution des PAC, des rondes paysannes et des paramilitaires colombiens. Deuxièmement, l’analyse des caractéristiques actuelles des groupes étudiés se base principalement sur une étude de presse on line.L’analyse comparative de l’émergence du paramilitarisme au Guatemala, au Pérou et en Colombie permet de conclure que l’existence d’un ordre social perçu comme menacé est à l’origine de la création de structures armées dont la fonction principale n’est pas de lutter contre la guérilla, mais la protection de cet ordre social. En conséquence, la persistance d’un contexte dans lequel l’ordre social ou le statu quo sont toujours considérés en danger est l’élément qui explique la poursuite du paramilitarisme. Ainsi, les structures qui existent actuellement au Guatemala et en Colombie sont, en effet, une forme de paramilitarisme, à la différence du Pérou<br>In the armed conflicts of Guatemala, Peru and Colombia, paramilitary groups were created to fight the guerrillas and also to prevent the mobilization of the social sectors interested in transforming the established social order. In these countries, different circumstances led to the official deactivation of paramilitary structures.Guatemala's paramilitary groups (PAC) were established by the state in the early 1980s and were formally demobilized in 1996 after the signing of peace agreements between the government and the guerrilla group URNG. In Peru, the peasant rounds were created in the south-central cordillera during the 1980s. In 2003, after the fall of President Fujimori, the Peruvian state ceases to motivate the organization of these armed groups. In Colombia, paramilitary groups were promoted during the 1980s by various actors, including regional elites, militaries and drug traffickers. In 2003, these armed groups signed a peace agreement with the government of President Uribe, in which they pledge to surrender arms and begin a gradual process of demobilization.Despite the aforementioned processes to disable paramilitaries, those groups continue to exist. Thus, it is relevant to ask whether these structures are still a form of paramilitarism and to identify the reasons why they are still present. In order to answer these questions, the main research objective is to analyze, from a comparative perspective, the transformation processes of PAC, peasant rounds and Colombian paramilitaries from the moment when the respective States took the official decision to disable these groups. This work is developed in three chapters.The first chapter compares the emergence of the paramilitary groups studied. From this comparative perspective and using certain elements of the systemic and the structuralist functionalist approaches, I propose a theoretical conceptualization of the paramilitary phenomenon. According to this conceptualization, the main function of paramilitarism in the three study cases is the protection of the threatened social order.The second chapter examines the processes that led to the official deactivation of paramilitarism in the three countries. To this end, we compare the conditions under which the respective armed conflicts ended, the context in which each State took the decision to disable the paramilitary and the different Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) processes.The third chapter compares the transformation of PACs, peasant rounds and Colombian paramilitaries after their official deactivation.The research is based on the comparative method. For each chapter, comparison variables are constructed. The main sources of information are, first, a bibliographic review on the theoretical conceptualization of paramilitarism, the armed conflicts of the respective countries and the origin and evolution of the studied groups. Secondly, a study of the online press about the recent activities of the PACs, peasant rounds and Colombian paramilitary groups to analyze the current characteristics these groups.Finally, the comparative analysis of the emergence of paramilitarism in Guatemala, Peru and Colombia leads to the conclusion that the existence of a social order perceived as threatened is the core element to explain the creation of those armed structures. The main objective is not to fight guerrilla, but to protect the social order. As a result, the persistence of a situation in which the social order or the status quo is still considered “in danger” explains the persistence of paramilitarism. Thus, the structures that currently exist in Guatemala and Colombia are, indeed, a form of paramilitarism, unlike Peru

La relation des groupes armés non étatiques à l’Etat ne relève pas nécessairement d’une alternative exclusive entre l’affaiblissement étatique ou la délégation de la violence. Cette thèse prend comme objet la relation entre l’Etat et les groupes paramilitaires en Colombie afin d’étudier le lien entre la violence privée et la formation de l’Etat. L’histoire de ces groupes se caractérise à la fois par des alliances collusives avec des secteurs des élites politiques et administratives et par des processus de dénonciation qui rendent ces relations inavouables. Il s’agit donc d’une situation dans laquelle le pouvoir des armes échoue à se transformer en pouvoir légal. Une double perspective est mobilisée. Une première approche analyse le traitement des groupes paramilitaires par les institutions étatiques centrales, dans les termes d la politique de sécurité, de l’action judiciaire ou encore des politiques de sortie de conflit. Elle montre que ces groupes font l’objet d’une multiplicité de formes d’intervention étatique. Celles- ci ne peuvent se comprendre comme une forme univoque d’action publique, mais plutôt comme le signe de conflits intra-étatiques portant sur le contrôle et la régulation de la violence. Une seconde approche analyse l’action locale des groupes paramilitaires, à la fois dans leur intervention dans le jeu électoral, leur rôle d’entrepreneurs de violence, leur positionnement face aux guérillas et leur relation au marché. Elle montre que les groupes paramilitaires constituent des formes d’autorité locale. Loin de s’opposer à l’Etat, ils cherchent à tirer des bénéfices de leur position dans le maintien de l’ordre et l’exploitation des ressources<br>The relation between non-state armed groups and the state should not be necessarily interpreted as a mutually exclusive alternative between state weakness and violence sub- contracting. This thesis mobilizes a research on the relations between the state and paramilitary groups in Colombia in order to analyse the link between private violence and state formation. The history of these groups is characterized by the existence of collusive alliances with sectors of the political and administrative elites, but also by forms of denunciation and disclosure that delegitimize these relations. This thesis examines a situation in which the power of weapons fails to turn into legal power. From a double perspective, it mobilizes the conceptual tools of the historical sociology of the state. A first approach analyses the treatment of paramilitary groups by central state institutions, in terms of security policies, judicial action or peace-building policies. It shows that these groups are subject to multiple modalities of state intervention. These cannot be understood as a univocal form of public action, but rather as a sign of intra- state disputes over the control and regulation of private violence. A second approach analyses the local action of paramilitary groups: their intervention in the electoral process, their role as violent entrepreneurs, their positioning relative to the guerrillas and their relation to the market It shows that paramilitary groups are forms of local authority; far from being opposed to the state, they seek instead to benefit from their position as key actors for resource extraction, as well as in the construction and maintenance of local orders

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited<br>In the early 1990s, Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) created their own military arms that later evolved into sophisticated paramilitary groups, now engaged in an all-out war against the state and/or anyone who represents an obstacle for their criminal activities. Furthermore, they are not hesitating to use tactics of extreme violence as terrorism to psychologically impact their enemies and those civilians not supporting them. Historically, terrorism related to drugs is new in Mexico but not in Latin America. The illegal drug trade has funded terrorist groups in Peru and Colombia, empowered criminal organizations and caused them to challenge the state's authority. An objective comparison of these cases can teach important lessons and show new paths to follow in the solution of Mexico's costly conflict. This thesis will define: How, where and why are DTO's paramilitary groups opting for terrorism in Mexico. It will outline the proper mechanisms to counter that terrorism. There is a long way to go to win the war on drugs in Mexico, but in order to apply new long term, less direct, and more social-based strategies, it is urgent for the state to set the proper security conditions in the short term.

CHDS State/Local<br>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited<br>The Fire the City of New York (FDNY) has responded to the consequences of terrorist incidents for decades, but global trends in active-shooter terrorism may force firefighters to operate in an active, hostile environment, and not just in the aftermath of attacks. In assault-style terrorism, a swift-moving, networked enemy combines small-arms with explosives or accelerants, causing extensive fires and smoke conditions, further endangering victims or hostages. To continue its position as a lead innovator in the national fire service, the FDNY must create new strategies and collaborations to frame its participation in swarm-like terrorist attacks, requiring a plurality of expertise from the across the emergency-responder spectrum. In light of this emerging threat, the all-hazards approach is no longer adequate. The answer to Mumbaistyle attacks may require combined fire/police units. The units can only succeed with an understanding of group bias, which must be attenuated or managed for the integrated unit to function effectively.

In recent years urban violence has become understood as a 'reproduced', multi-causal and socially generated phenomenon. Less is understood about why young men reproduce the majority of this violence. This thesis uses original empirical data based on thirty-two life-histories of youths living in two poor and violent neighbourhoods in Medellín, Colombia. It argues that urban violence is reproduced by male youths because it is linked to 'masculinity'; that is, the process of 'becoming men' where youths strive to fulfil productive or 'successful' models of masculinity. These processes are related to contexts of poverty, inequality and exclusion, so this thesis does not reduce the generation of urban violence to masculinity alone. Rather, understanding masculinity provides us with further insight into the reproduction of violence. This thesis further argues that male youths are disposed by their habitus - after Pierre Bourdieu - to negotiate a pathway to manhood that largely reflects traditional masculine values in their context. Striving to achieve prevailing versions of manhood contributed to some of these youths joining armed groups, such as gangs. The gang acted as a mechanism to fulfil their dispositions to become men, by providing them with a way to perform a version of 'successful' masculinity. This is prevalent in urban contexts of exclusion and high levels of social violence, because there are limited opportunities to achieve legal and dignified versions of manhood, whilst there are significant opportunities to join the local gang. The youths interviewed that did not join gangs tended to come from families that taught them to reject violence at a young age, whilst supporting them in pursuing alternative pathways to manhood. Youths that joined gangs tended to have more problems at home and often had family members already in gangs.<br>ESRC, and University of Bradford

Although drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) exist and have an effect on health, crime, economies, and politics, little research has explored these entities as political organizations. Legal interest groups and movements have been found to influence domestic and international politics because they operate within legal parameters. Illicit groups, such as DTOs, have rarely been accounted for—especially in the literature on interest groups—though they play a measurable role in affecting domestic and international politics in similar ways. Using an interest group model, this dissertation analyzed DTOs as illicit interest groups (IIGs) to explain their political influence. The analysis included a study of group formation, development, and demise that examined IIG motivation, organization, and policy impact. The data for the study drew from primary and secondary sources, which include interviews with former DTO members and government officials, government documents, journalistic accounts, memoirs, and academic research. To illustrate the interest group model, the study examined Medellin-based DTO leaders, popularly known as the “Medellin Cartel.” In particular, the study focused on the external factors that gave rise to DTOs in Colombia and how Medellin DTOs reacted to the implementation of counternarcotics efforts. The discussion was framed by the implementation of the 1979 Extradition Treaty negotiated between Colombia and the United States. The treaty was significant because as drug trafficking became the principal bilateral issue in the 1980s; extradition became a major method of combating the illicit drug business. The study’s findings suggested that Medellin DTO leaders had a one-issue agenda and used a variety of political strategies to influence public opinion and all three branches of government—the judicial, the legislative, and the executive—in an effort to invalidate the 1979 Extradition Treaty. The changes in the life cycle of the 1979 Extradition Treaty correlated with changes in the political power of Medellin-based DTOs vis-à-vis the Colombian government, and international forces such as the U.S. government’s push for tougher counternarcotics efforts.

In recent years urban violence has become understood as a 'reproduced', multi-causal and socially generated phenomenon. Less is understood about why young men reproduce the majority of this violence. This thesis uses original empirical data based on thirty-two life-histories of youths living in two poor and violent neighbourhoods in Medellín, Colombia. It argues that urban violence is reproduced by male youths because it is linked to 'masculinity'; that is, the process of 'becoming men' where youths strive to fulfil productive or 'successful' models of masculinity. These processes are related to contexts of poverty, inequality and exclusion, so this thesis does not reduce the generation of urban violence to masculinity alone. Rather, understanding masculinity provides us with further insight into the reproduction of violence. This thesis further argues that male youths are disposed by their habitus - after Pierre Bourdieu - to negotiate a pathway to manhood that largely reflects traditional masculine values in their context. Striving to achieve prevailing versions of manhood contributed to some of these youths joining armed groups, such as gangs. The gang acted as a mechanism to fulfil their dispositions to become men, by providing them with a way to perform a version of 'successful' masculinity. This is prevalent in urban contexts of exclusion and high levels of social violence, because there are limited opportunities to achieve legal and dignified versions of manhood, whilst there are significant opportunities to join the local gang. The youths interviewed that did not join gangs tended to come from families that taught them to reject violence at a young age, whilst supporting them in pursuing alternative pathways to manhood. Youths that joined gangs tended to have more problems at home and often had family members already in gangs.

Over the course of Northern Ireland's recent political conflict, categorised as 'The Troubles', a number of research studies into the involvement of former paramilitaries have been conducted. For example, various studies have focused on the reintegration of former paramilitaries back into their communities, while others focused on the involvement of former paramilitaries in conflict resolution and DOW former paramilitaries are dealing with the past. However, to this date, none have explored in any detail the situational forces and systemic influences that contributed to the transformation of ordinary young men into paramilitary killers. This six year, Ph. D. study seeks to fill this void by investigating what led ordinary young men to join paramilitary groups and perpetrate violence. Throughout this thesis, I will persistently repeat that seeking to understand such situational and systemic influences, on the participants in this investigation, is not an attempt to excuse them from, or absolve them of, their actions. This sociological study examines the biographical narratives of former Loyalist paramilitaries from inner city Belfast. The individuals under investigation are former political prisoners who were members of the paramilitary group known as the Ulster Volunteer Force, (UVF) or its associated groups namely the Young Citizen Volunteers, (YCV) and Red Hand Commando (RHC). Fourteen narratives have been captured using the method known as the Biographical Narrative Interpretive Method (BNIM) containing the personal accounts of the respondents. Two of the fourteen narratives are presented as case studies and are the main focus of the thesis. These oral histories offer a perspective on the past now which the narrators did not have at the time but which has emerged in the reflection on and telling of their stories. The additional twelve narratives are considered satellite cases from which material is used in support or otherwise of the two case studies. The retrospective period being investigated is from their earliest memories until their time of arrest. The specific relevance of this study is that it focuses on the situational factors which are influential in seeking to understand why ordinary young men, some of whom were still at school, engaged in the conflict at its most violent period, (1972-1975), and became killers. In addition, it aims to contribute an additional perspective to the body of literature on paramilitarism in Northern Ireland. The study is borne out of the personal experience of being a former political prisoner myself and has emerged out of consistent contact with former political prisoners over the past twenty years, during the course of my community development practice.

Although the government of the United States of America was established to protect the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness among all American citizens, this thesis argues intractable gang violence in inner-city Chicago has persistently denied these rights, in turn undermining fundamental (and foundational) American political values. Thus, gang violence can be argued to represent a threat to both civil order and state legitimacy. Yet, where comparable (and generally lower) levels of community-level violence in Northern Ireland garnered the sustained attention and direct involvement of the United Kingdom's central government, the challenge posed by gang violence has been unappreciated, if not ignored, by the American federal government. In order to mobilise the political commitment and resources needed to find a durable resolution to Chicago's long and often anarchic 'uncivil war', it is first necessary to politicise the problem and its origins. Contributing to this politicisation, this thesis explains why gang violence in Chicago has been unable to capture the political imagination of the American government in a way akin to paramilitary (specifically republican) violence in Northern Ireland. Secondly, it explains how the depoliticisation of gang violence has negatively affected response, encouraging the continued application of inadequate and largely ineffective response strategies. Finally, it makes the case that, while radical, a conditional agreement-centric peace process loosely modelled on that employed in Northern Ireland might offer the most effective strategy for restoring the sense of peace and security to inner-city Chicago lost over half a century ago.

While research increasingly recognizes the importance of civilian agency and strategies in influencing conflict dynamics and reducing civilian victimization in the context of armed conflict, research has until now not investigated whether civilians also have the capacity to limit organized criminal violence. This study thus aims to answer under which conditions civilians can protect themselves from and influence levels of organized criminal violence and draws on the literatures on civilian self-protection and autonomy strategies in the context of armed conflict, as well as on organized criminal governance and violence. I argue that civilian communities with high levels of social organization will experience lower levels of violence, as they are more likely to mount successful collective strategies that influence costs and benefits for organized crime groups to use violence. Using the method of structured focused comparison, this hypothesis is tested on the Colombian municipalities San Juan de Arama, Vistahermosa and Granada. The results show some support for the theorized relationship. In general, municipalities with higher levels of social organization experienced lower levels of organized criminal violence, but this relationship appears to be moderated by levels of civil war violence. Due to the explorative character of this study, more research is warranted.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

This thesis focuses on the changes to law enforcement precipitated by the establishment of counter terrorist squads within State police forces during the late 1970's. It looks at the impact of Victoria's specialist counter terrorist squad, the Special Operations Group (SOG), on policing in Victoria and asks whether the group has led to the development of a more 'military based' approach to policing. The research demonstrates that the SOG has been the harbinger of more military styles of policing involving high levels of confrontation, more lethal weapons and a greater range of weapons and more frequent recourse to deadly force. The establishment of groups like the SOG has also undermined Australia's democratic traditions by blurring the boundaries between the police and military and weakening the safeguards which have in then past prevented military force being used against citizens.<br>The SOG has acted as a vanguard group within Victoria police, anticipating and leading progress towards a range of new military-style tactics and weapons. The SOG, although relatively small in number,, has had a marked influence on the tactics and operations of police throughout the force. The group was never contained to dealing with only terrorist incidents but instead used for a range of more traditional police duties. While terrorism has remained rare in Australia the SOG has nevertheless expanded in size and role. Because the SOG is considered elite and because the SOG are frequently temporarily seconded to other areas of policing, SOG members provide a role for other police and have the opportunity to introduce parliamentary tactics into an extended range of police duties. The parliamentary skills developed by the SOG have been passes on to ordinary police through training programs headed by former SOG officers. In addition, the group has effectively been used as a testing ground for new weapons. The structure of the Victoria Police Protective Security Group and the way public demonstrations and industrial disputes are viewed in police and security circles ensure that parliamentary counter terrorist tactics will be used to stifle dissent and protest. The move towards paramilitary policing is necessarily a move away from the police mandate to protect life, keep the peace and use only minimum force.<br>The interrogation of SOG and SOG tactics into everyday policing has occurred without any public debate or recognition of the important democratic traditions that have ensured that military force is not used against citizens except in the most extreme circumstances. Although the SOG is not formally part of the military it is nevertheless a significant parliamentary force virtually indistinguishable in terms of the weapons and levels of force at its disposal from the military proper.

Ce mémoire s’intéresse aux récits des ex-combattants des groupes paramilitaires Autodéfenses unies de Colombie sur leur participation au conflit armé. Ces narrations, construites dans un contexte de réintégration à la société, permettent de réfléchir à la construction de la vérité par les ex-combattants dans les contextes post-conflit. Nous avons analysé les histoires de vie de 18 ex-combattants qui participaient au Programme de réintégration à la vie civile à Bogota. Nos interviewés ont adopté une position de victimes, en élaborant des discours justificateurs visant à se déresponsabiliser. Ces discours montrent une normalisation de la violence qui revient à la notion de « banalité du mal » d’Hannah Arendt. Nos interviewés ont employé plusieurs rhétoriques des groupes paramilitaires afin de justifier la violence. Ces rhétoriques font partie de la construction psychologique de l’ennemi par les groupes et elles invitent à analyser le rôle du langage dans la construction d’une culture paramilitaire. Néanmoins, certains interviewés ont condamné la violence exercée par leur groupe. Nous avons observé qu’il existe plusieurs interprétations de la manière dont nos interviewés disaient avoir réagi aux contextes de violence de masse, ce qui nous a amenés à réfléchir aux notions de culpabilité morale et juridique.<br>This paper studies the interpretations of the ex-combatants of the paramilitary groups United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia about their participation in the internal conflict. These discourses, created in a context of social reintegration, are used to discuss the recreation of the truth brought by the ex-combatants in post-conflict contexts. We analyzed the life stories of 18 ex-combatants who were part of the reintegration to civil life Program held in Bogota. Our interviewees have adopted a position of victims, creating discourses of legitimation of the violence in order to avoid the according responsability. In there, it suggests a normalization of violence, remembering the concept of the “banality of evil” brought by Hannah Arendt. Our interviewees have used the paramilitary rhetoric to justify violence. This rhetoric belongs to the psychological construction of the enemy by the groups and it reveals the role of language in the construction of a paramilitary culture. Although, we found that there are other interpretations that don’t concede and justify violence. There are different interpretations of their reactions in the contexts of mass violence. From there we discussed the notions of moral and legal guilty.<br>Esta investigación se interesa por las interpretaciones de los excombatientes de los grupos paramilitares Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia sobre su participación en el conflicto armado interno. Estas narraciones, creadas en un contexto de reintegración social, permiten reflexionar sobre la construcción de la verdad por los excombatientes en los contextos post-conflicto. Analizamos las historias de vida de 18 excombatientes que participaban en el Programa de Reintegración a la Vida Civil en Bogotá. Nuestros entrevistados adoptaron una posición de víctimas, construyendo discursos justificatorios buscando des-responsabilizarse. Estos discursos muestran una normalización de la violencia que recuerdan la noción de “banalidad del mal” de Hannah Arendt. Nuestros entrevistados emplearon varias retóricas de los grupos paramilitares para justificar la violencia. Estas retóricas hacen parte de la construcción psicológica del enemigo por los grupos e invitan a analizar el rol del lenguaje en la construcción de una cultura paramilitar. Sin embargo, no todos utilizaron discursos justificatorios. Encontramos que existen varias interpretaciones de la manera en que nuestros entrevistados decían haber reaccionado a los contextos de violencia de masa, lo cual nos condujo a reflexionar sobre las nociones de culpabilidad moral y jurídica.

The Kenyan state is currently under pressure from two sides: First, numerous non-state armed groups have taken over the provision of security in areas where the state is practically absent. Second, drug-trafficking organizations are gaining ground as the country is increasingly being used as a major transit hub for narcotics. This article investigates the relationship between drug trafficking and informal security provision in Kenya and draws analogies from comparable experiences in Latin America and West Africa. Field research in Kenya has demonstrated that profit-oriented, informal security actors in Mombasa work for drug lords, while their counterparts in Nairobi are more likely to be hired by politicians. Moreover, faith-based vigilante groups in both cities appear to be less susceptible to external manipulation by drug traffickers. The article concludes by considering the potential consequences of an expansion of the drug trade in Kenya.<br>© 2014 GIGA. Reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. Africa Spectrum is an Open Access publication. It may be read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.