Academic literature on the topic 'Handset Subsidy'
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Journal articles on the topic "Handset Subsidy"
Ahn Kyeong-Bong and 신홍균. "Tax Base Issue Regarding Mobile Handset Subsidy." KOOKMIN LAW REVIEW 24, no. 2 (October 2011): 283–325. http://dx.doi.org/10.17251/legal.2011.24.2.283.
Full textAhn Kyeong-Bong. "VAT Tax Base Calculation regarding Handset Subsidy." KOOKMIN LAW REVIEW 29, no. 3 (February 2017): 195–228. http://dx.doi.org/10.17251/legal.2017.29.3.195.
Full textKim, Han-joo, Sang-kyu Byun, and Myeong-cheol Park. "Mobile handset subsidy policy in Korea: historical analysis and evaluation." Telecommunications Policy 28, no. 1 (February 2004): 23–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2003.11.001.
Full textKim, Soo-Hyun. "Moderating Effects of Handset Subsidy on the Mobile Communication Service Switching Intention." Journal of the Korea Contents Association 14, no. 11 (November 28, 2014): 389–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.5392/jkca.2014.14.11.389.
Full textKIMWEONSEEK. "An Economic Analysis of Dynamic effects of Ceiling on Mobile Handset Subsidy." Journal of Social Science 41, no. 1 (April 2015): 111–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.15820/khjss.2015.41.1.005.
Full textHan, Sungsoo, Sungho Choi, Byeong-Kwan Kim, and Hyun Chung. "A Quantitative Analysis of the Effects of a Handset Subsidy on Consumer Welfare." ETRI Journal 28, no. 5 (October 10, 2006): 621–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.4218/etrij.06.0105.0204.
Full textPark, Seolah. "Handset Contract Subsidy and the Value Added Tax Base- Focusing on the sales discount -." Korean Lawyers Association Journal 65, no. 5 (May 2016): 273–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.17007/klaj.2016.65.5.007.
Full textMo, Jeonghoon, Hansol Kim, and Weonseek Kim. "Impacts of subsidy regulation on the mobile market in Korea : Major provider’s diversification of handset quality." Telematics and Informatics 34, no. 4 (July 2017): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tele.2016.12.005.
Full text이준봉 and Jisun Chung. "A Study on the Inclusion of Mobile Phone Handset Contract Subsidy In the Value Added Tax Base." SungKyunKwan Law Review 25, no. 3 (September 2013): 229–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.17008/skklr.2013.25.3.010.
Full textYue, Yunpeng, and Tiaojun Xiao. "Pricing and Bundling Strategies for Competing Mobile Phone Supply Chains With Network Externality." International Journal of Information Systems and Supply Chain Management 13, no. 3 (July 2020): 54–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijisscm.2020070104.
Full textDissertations / Theses on the topic "Handset Subsidy"
Mattar, Abdullah. "Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy on Saudi's petrochemical products." Thesis, Brunel University, 2015. http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/10538.
Full textChen, Li-chun, and 陳俐君. "The Optimal Subsidy Policy Under Asymmetric Information: On Taiwan Film Industry''s Subsidy." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/9h7m7q.
Full text國立中山大學
經濟學研究所
95
Our purpose is to examine: what should be the best subsidy mechanism which can reduce the lost from the asymmetric information problem whereas the administration performs a subsidy policy. We use the incentive contract theory to establish our models, and analyze different kinds of subsidy policy results. We prove that: compare with the partial equally subsidy, zero-subsidy and full-purchase subsidy, the partial discriminably subsidy is the best subsidy policy.
LIU, WEN-JING, and 劉文菁. "Do Matching Subsidy And Rebate Subsidy Crowd Out Private Donations? An Experimental Study." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/vdbe3a.
Full text國立臺北大學
財政學系
107
This study investigates whether implementing matching subsidy and rebate subsidy can generate more private donations after excluding the cost of subsidy. According to the experimental results, we find that regardless of the subsidy scheme (matching or rebate), the implement of subsidy policy can significantly improve the total donations. We further discuss where the increased donations came from and find that both of the subsidy schemes will not crowd out private donations, but only with the matching scheme people will significantly donate more. This study find that matching subsidy has a significant positive effect on both total donations and private donations, and the subsidy rates will also affect the amount of donations. Besides the laboratory results, through the questionnaire we find that “economic status and giving habit” and “altruism” may also have an influence on people’s donation decisions. Furthermore, we find that “whether people believe the charity need help or not” will also influence people’s donations.
LIN, YUN-CHEN, and 林昀臻. "Fallow Subsidy and Endogenous Growth." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/57b8xm.
Full text東海大學
經濟系
105
This dissertation establishes an endogenous growth model with an agriculture-specific factor (land). Individuals make fallow decisions based on the fallow subsidy policy, the productivity of the land factor, and the income tax rate. The government allocates its income tax revenues between subsidizing fallow land and directly maintaining land fertility. We investigate the effects of the fallow subsidy and income tax on economic growth and welfare. Our main findings are as follows. First, both raising the fallow subsidy and income tax rate have ambiguous effects on growth and welfare. Second, the welfare-maximizing proportion of fallow subsidy is higher than the growth-maximizing proportion of fallow subsidy. Third, the welfare-maximizing income tax rate is higher than the growth-maximizing income tax rate. Lastly, by calibrating the parameters using Taiwan data, our numerical analysis shows that decreasing fallow subsidy or increasing the income tax rate can enhance growth and welfare.
Lin, Chia-Yi, and 林佳宜. "Allocation Mechanism of Transit Subsidy." Thesis, 1996. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/97517489906181268323.
Full textShu-kuan, Wu, and 吳淑綸. "Subsidy、Regional Intergration and Direct Investment." Thesis, 1998. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/98653452958175660870.
Full text東吳大學
經濟學研究所
86
Abstract The rise of multinational enterprises has changed the patterns of trade and investment. Under the trend of internationalization, foreign direct investment plays an important role in the global economy. Although the World Trade Organization has already put some strict restrictions, investment subsidies are still common for many countries indirectly. After considering the benefits of foreign direct investments on the economy of the host country, many countries engage in policies offering factory sites or other infrastructures in order to attract more FDI from multinational firms. Therefore ,the gist of this thesis is to investigate how investment subsidies affect the decisions of multinational firms on FDI and also how they affect the level of welfare in the host country. Due to the fact that available documents relating to subsidizing policies lack exploration in market size, this thesis will also shed light on this topic. The analysis of this study is based in Nash Equilibrium concept in game theory. The strategies of a multinational firm are exporting and FDI. The potential entrant of the host country has two types of strategy : entering or not entering the industry. Considering two major variables including investment subsidies and market size ,I analyze the critical point of exporting / FDI subsidy, and the effect of subsidies on the level of welfare in the host country Furthermore, using three-nation model, this thesis also discusses how regional intergration affects FDI behaviors of the multinational firm. The following conclusions can be derived using from the study. 1.Complying with variance in market size, decisions of the multinational firm are affected by the amount of investment subsidies and strategies adopted by the potential entrant in the host country. Also, the critical point of exporting / FDI subsidy is inversely related to market size. 2.As change of investment subsidies causes the multinational firm to shift from exporting to FDI ,the welfare change of the host country is discrete. If the potential entrant in the host country has not entered the industry and the market size is relatively large, the welfare of the host country increases. If the potential entrant of the host country has entered the industry, under the situation of higher wages and larger market size, the welfare of the host country increases. 3.If other country lower trade barriers on the host country, it would lower the critical point of multinational firm*s exporting / FDI market size, and also lower trade barriers of firms from member nations. As a result of regional intergration, FDI from non-member nations would increase and the amount of trade within the intergrating region would also increase. 4.Trade barriers imposed upon the host country by other nations will move in opposite direction with the following items ： (1)multinational firm*s critical point of exporting / FDI subsidy. (2)The optimal subsidy given by the host country when FDI strategy of multinational firms stays unchanged. 5.If other nations remove trade barriers on the host country, the potential entrant is easier to enter into the industry. Finally, the level of welfare in the host country would increase. 6.If other nations remove trade barriers in the host country, it would make it easier for the multinational firm to shift from exporting to FDI. As a result, the potential entrant has not entered the industry, the level of welfare in the host country would increase. If the potential entrant has entered the industry and the wage in host country is relatively higher, the level of welfare in the host country would increase.
Hou, Yu-Chun, and 侯雨君. "Corporate Social Responsibility, Privatization and Subsidy." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/5n37g5.
Full text國立政治大學
財政學系
106
In the past, the literature on privatization and government subsidy policies are mostly focused on the interaction between government and manufacturers, and rarely considered other production derived from the changes in consumer’s consumption patterns. On that account, this paper follows the analysis framework of White (1996), and constructed a mixed oligopoly model introducing the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) that have been valued by consumers in recent years. This paper shows: (1) The Privatization Neutrality Theorem is established when the production of both public and private firms is not external and are engaged in CSR activities. (2) The Privatization Neutrality Theorem cannot be established when both public and private firms have a negative production externality and are engaged in ECSR activities. When the consumer’s preference for ECSR activities is not significant, and even the marginal damage of pollution is tremendous, the government’s optimal policy will be converted from subsidies to taxation. (3) When the production leads to environmental pollution, even if both public and private firms are engaged in ECSR activities, privatization will still have a negative impact on social welfare; which is consistent with the general literature of privatization and environmental issues.
Lin, Yu-Kai, and 林鈺凱. "Endogenous Market Structure and Subsidy Policy." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/eb7n29.
Full text國立政治大學
經濟學系
106
This thesis builds up a second-generation R&D-based growth model featuring endogenous market structure, and uses it to explore the growth effect of four distinct styles of subsidies. The four subsidies this thesis consider include final goods production subsidies, intermediate goods productions subsidies, in-house R&D subsides and entry subsidies. Several main findings emerge from the analysis. First, when the number of firms is fixed in the short run, final goods production subsidies, intermediate goods productions subsidies and in-house R&D subsides will stimulate the economic growth rate. However, entry subsidies are powerless to affect economic growth. Second, when market structure adjusts endogenously in the long run, final goods production subsidies and intermediate goods productions subsidies will increase the number of firms, and this tends to lower economic growth. The induced negative growth effect arisen from a rise in the number of firms just exactly offsets the positive growth effect in the short run, leaving the economic growth rate intact. Third, when market structure adjusts endogenously in the long run, in-house R&D subsidies increase economic growth but decrease the number of firms, whereas entry subsidies expand the number of firms but reduce economic growth. As the result, in-house R&D subsidies is a better policy instrument compared to other subsidies since it can stimulate economic growth in the long run.
WU, PENG-TA, and 鄔朋達. "Smart Contract of Organic Agriculture Subsidy." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/e7ucp8.
Full text東吳大學
資訊管理學系
107
Recently, the blockchain technology has been valued. With the support of resources across many industries, an increased number of innovations are made available, the emerging commercial modes in the financial technology in particular. The government, by employing the smart contracts, can change the way they deliver services and business processes to reduce the administrative cost. The government, in order to protect the interests of farmers, implements plural subsidy policies. The subsidy amount exceeds over half of the annual agricultural budget and the subsidy given to organic agriculture hikes year by year. Without being certified by organic agriculture certification companies, it is not allowed to make any organic claim. When farmers consider converting to organic, the costs may hinder their willingness, so the government grants subsidies to farmers in need of organic certification. The study employed the ethereum smart contract based on the blockchain technology to develop a prototype of the organic farming subsidy payment system. Compare the system with the current subsidy process, it shows that the system has the following advantages: 1. All applications must be submitted through the online application system, and farmers can apply for subsidies online at any time. 2. Integrate farmers' information flow into government's. E-procedures can reduce the working hours of review. 3. Using smart contracts to store data on the blockchain. With subsidies granted by cryptocurrency to ensure timely releases of funds.
Chen, Shih-Hsien, and 陳世憲. "Tariffs、Export Subsidy and Economic Growth." Thesis, 2003. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/03853427539284434343.
Full textBook chapters on the topic "Handset Subsidy"
Friedman, Lawrence M. "Law and the Economy: 1776–1850." In A History of American Law, 147–72. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190070885.003.0004.
Full textDewani, Deepti, Shreyansh Jain, and Sumeet Gupta. "Supply Chains of Commodity Products in India." In Cases on Supply Chain and Distribution Management, 97–115. IGI Global, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-4666-0065-2.ch005.
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