To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Hans Hegel.
Journal articles on the topic 'Hans Hegel'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Hans Hegel.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Brooks, Thom. "Hegel's theory of international politics: a reply to Jaeger." Review of International Studies 30, no. 1 (December 2, 2003): 149–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026021050400587x.
Full textAbstract:
Hans-Martin Jaeger argues in this Journal that Hegel endorses a ‘reluctant realism’, whereby Hegel's theory of international politics institutionalises a transnationalising civil society of states. In Jaeger's view, Hegel's conception of individuals in civil society is analogous to states in international politics. On the contrary, I argue Hegel's conception of abstract right is far more commensurable with his theory of international politics. The mutual recognition existing in civil society – which helps to produce legal relationships – does not exist beyond the state where there are no legal relationships. Thus, Hegel is a realist of a more familiar sort, without any ‘reluctance’.
2
LYSSY, Ansgar. "REZENSION ZU HANS HEINZ HOLZ: LEIBNIZ IN DER REZEPTION DER KLASSISCHEN DEUTSCHEN PHILOSOPHIE, HRSG. VON JÖRG ZIMMER, DARMSTADT: WISSENSCHAFTLICHE BUCHGESELLSCHAFT, 2015." Estudos Kantianos [EK] 4, no. 02 (January 25, 2017): 215–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.36311/2318-0501.2016.v4n2.15.p215.
Full textAbstract:
Hans Heinz Holz hat maßgeblich zur Leibniz-Forschung beigetragen. Nach seinem Tod im Jahre 2012 hat Jörg Zimmer einige seiner kürzeren, verstreut publizierten Arbeiten zu Leibniz in zwei Bänden zusammengetragen und neu herausgegeben. Der vorliegende Band versammelt einzelne Aufsätze zu Leibniz und seinem historischen Kontext, etwa in Bezug zu Pascal, oder in der Rezeption durch Lessing, Gottsched, Hegel, Marx, Schelling und Feuerbach. Den Worten des Herausgebers zufolge soll es sich hierbei um Arbeiten zur Rezeptionsgeschichte handeln, wobei das historische Material anhand einer Problemgeschichte strukturiert ist (Vorwort, S. 9). Die Rezeption soll durch die strukturellen Übereinstimmungen der Problematik gedacht werden: Leibniz wird in diesen Texten auf einen anderen Denker bezogen, weil und insofern dieser dieselben Probleme behandelt oder weil Leibnizsche Ansätze neu aufgegriffen und überarbeitet werden; dabei wird Leibniz’ eigentliche Philosophie oftmals schlichtweg nicht verstanden (so Holz über Gottsched, siehe S. 50 ff.) oder unzureichend rezipiert, weil die relevanten Texte gar nicht vorlagen (so bei Hegel, siehe S. 83). Die beiden Texte zur Natur bei Leibniz und zu Leibniz und Pascal fallen nicht in dieses Schema.
3
Cescon, Everaldo, and Fábio André Frizzo. "O liberalismo como base para um sistema político, social e econômico na pós-história de Hegel e Fukuyama: um contraponto à luz de Hans Jonas." Griot : Revista de Filosofia 21, no. 1 (February 1, 2021): 221–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.31977/grirfi.v21i1.2139.
Full textAbstract:
O objetivo deste artigo é reforçar o alerta que o filósofo alemão Hans Jonas faz em sua obra Princípio responsabilidade sobre a iminente possibilidade de um final de história trágico para a humanidade se forem considerados os efeitos imprevisíveis decorrentes da forma de atuação do sistema político-econômico liberal e do inconsequente avanço da tecnologia que dele decorre. Nesse intento, optou-se como estratégia, enfraquecer e rebater a ideia hegeliana, oposta à visão de Jonas, de que não haveria motivos para alarmes porque a história, no seu desenvolvimento, é orientada por uma razão imanente e bem intencionada que conduz inevitavelmente a humanidade ao reino da liberdade e ao espírito absoluto. Mais recentemente, o filósofo, economista e cientista político americano Francis Fukuyama, apoiando-se em Hegel, decretou que a história havia chegado ao seu fim com o ápice da evolução sociocultural da humanidade. Nesse contexto, busca-se, inicialmente, apresentar uma análise interpretativa das ideias de Hegel e Fukuyama para, a seguir, realizar-se uma crítica a essa forma de pensar, à luz dos argumentos de Hans Jonas. Por fim, conclui-se, pelas lentes jonasianas, que a história, além de não ter chegado ao seu fim, como Fukuyama afirmou, pode também ter um final bem distinto daquele imaginado por Hegel. Portanto, não se deve desconsiderar a ocorrência da hipótese de uma morte essencial seguida de uma morte física do gênero humano, bem antes que o projeto hegeliano da liberdade tenha chance de se realizar. Na dúvida, é melhor que o homem desconfie da existência e(ou) da intenção e(ou) da capacidade de uma razão imanente e reassuma a tempo as rédeas de seu próprio destino, por meio da adoção de um novo princípio ético: o da responsabilidade.
4
Kant, Cleres. "Claves dialécticas de la hermenéutica gadameriana." Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe, no. 4 (June 6, 2018): 127–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.14409/topicos.v0i4.7311.
Full textAbstract:
El propósito de este ensayo consiste en una lectura de la hermenéutica filosófica (según Hans-Georg Gadamer) destacando los referentes históricos del pensamiento dialéctico (v.g. Platón, Hegel); distinguimos la aceptación de algunos elementos tradicionales respecto a la crítica ejercida sobre otros y la progresiva configuración de su hermenéutica como una dialéctica dialógica marcadamente original. Se observa el discurrir dialéctico en los diversos comportamientos lingüísticos (desde el enunciativo hasta el del universo poético).
5
Döhn, Raphael. "Die Wahrheit des fiktionalen Mythos." Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 63, no. 3 (September 1, 2021): 316–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2021-0018.
Full textAbstract:
Zusammenfassung Dieser Beitrag fokussiert den von Hans Jonas in Der Gottesbegriff nach Auschwitz. Eine jüdische Stimme als Antwort auf die Theodizeefrage skizzierten Mythos und setzt ihn in Beziehung zu Fiktionalitätsdiskursen. An die Darstellung und Erläuterung des Mythos schließen sich Ausführungen zu den ihm zugrundeliegenden Quellen (u. a. Gnosis, Kabbala, Hegel) sowie zu Jonas’ eigenen Reflexionen zur Textgattung und zu den Kernaussagen des Mythos an. Nach einer christlich-theologischen Würdigung der jonasschen Religionsphilosophie wird der Mythos unter Bezugnahme auf Fiktionalitätsdiskurse betrachtet und auf Berührungspunkte mit jüdischen, christlichen und gnostischen Weltentstehungs- und Welterklärungserzählungen aufmerksam gemacht.
6
Kubota, Ken. "THE DIALECTICAL PRESENTATION OF THE GENERAL NOTION OF CAPITAL IN THE LIGHT OF HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY: ON THE LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF ADORNO AND THE RESEARCH RESULTS OF RUBIN, BACKHAUS, REICHELT, UNO, AND SEKINE." Revista Dialectus - Revista de Filosofia, no. 18 (October 25, 2020): 39–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.30611/2020n18id61181.
Full textAbstract:
Hegel and Marx share the concept of a strict deduction of the genesis of forms—forms of thought and being in the case of Hegel, and economic forms in the case of Marx: "the form of commodity, the form of money, the form of capital, the form of profit, of interest, etc." (Reichelt) In the article it is shown that Kozo Uno and Thomas T. Sekine in Japan as well as Hans-Georg Backhaus and Helmut Reichelt in Germany independently discovered "the premature and unnecessary reference to the labour theory of value in the early part of Capital" (Uno), stating that Marx contradicts to his own method by establishing that socially necessary labour constitutes the substance of value already at the very beginning of Capital, in the sphere of circulation, although necessary prerequisites such as competition are only available later, in the sphere of production. Finally, Uno's and Sekine's theory of capital is integrated into a system in accordance to Hegel's encyclopae-dia, involving Hegel's Logic (as logic), Uno's/Sekine's theory of capital (based on Marx) as base/substructure (nature), and superstructure (spirit).
7
Quinteiro Fiuza, Luis. "El espacio sagrado como horizonte ideal de arquitectura." Actas de Arquitectura Religiosa Contemporánea 1 (December 1, 2007): 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.17979/aarc.2007.1.0.5014.
Full textAbstract:
La forma es siempre, de un modo insuperable, el lugar de la teofanía de los dioses. En este punto, Schelling tiene razón frente a Hegel, como autorizadamente afirma Hans Urs von Balthasar en su Estética Teológica. Por ello, añade, es preciso diferenciar y fijar la significación teológica de los sentidos y se pregunta: ¿Qué es ver, oír, gustar, etc. en asuntos de fe? Este interrogante nos sitúa ante uno de los campos más apasionantes en la percepción y en la búsqueda de lo divino por parte de la persona humana. Y en este camino nos queremos adentrar en las jornadas que iniciamos hoy.
8
Gibson, Michael D. "The Beauty of the Redemption of the World: The Theological Aesthetics of Maximus the Confessor and Jonathan Edwards." Harvard Theological Review 101, no. 1 (January 2008): 45–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0017816008001727.
Full textAbstract:
Catholic theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar, in hisHerrlichkeit, laments the eclipse of the aesthetic in modern theology, noting that thebeingof a Christian is itself a thing of beauty inscribed by the grace of God; that is, it is a form of existence “opened up to us by the God-Man's act of redemption. . . . God's incarnation perfects the whole ontology and aesthetics of created being.” Von Balthasar traces the loss of the aesthetic dimension from Protestant theology to the Reformation principle ofsola scriptura, which seeks to abstract “data” of scriptural revelation into objective formulae. This approach leads to the historicism of Hegel, Schelling, Schleiermacher, and Barth, effectively removing the meditative gaze from theological contemplation. Von Balthasar's ultimate argument is that it is necessary for Protestant theology to revive the Alexandrian tradition in order to recover the “transcendent principle of beauty as derived from and most proper to God,” which is to be “for us the very apex and archetype of beauty in the world.”
9
Moggach, Douglas. "Reciprocity, Elicitation, Recognition: The Thematics of Intersubjectivity in the Early Fichte." Dialogue 38, no. 2 (1999): 271–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300007216.
Full textAbstract:
RésuméCet article explore les liens entre la Wissenschaftslehre (WL) de Fichte, en 1794–1795, et ses Fondements du droit naturel (Grundlage des Naturrechts — GNR) de 1796–1797. Nous examinons la façon dont le concept de réciprocité dans WL aide à expliquer la pensée développée par Fichte dans GNR au sujet de l'action intersubjective et de la sphère du droit, et montrons que certaines difficultés conceptuelles dans le premier texte expliquent des tensions irrésolues dans le second. Hans-Jürgen Verweyen a identifié une conception large et une conception étroite de l'intersubjectivité dans GNR, la première impliquant la réciprocité comme causalité mutuelle, tandis que la seconde l'implique comme limitation mutuelle. Pour expliquer cette dualité, nous entreprenons une analyse détaillée de l'action réciproque dans WL, établissant d'abord sa place et sa fonction dans l'idéalisme critique de Fichte, et procédant ensuite à l'examen de son application à l'intersubjectivité juridique dans GNR. Cette approche clarifie également le rapport de Fichte à Kant et à Hegel.
10
Losurdo, Domenico. "Relativisme, universalisme, “empirisme vulgaire” et “absolu”." Revista Ideação 1, no. 30 (April 18, 2018): 21. http://dx.doi.org/10.13102/ideac.v1i30.1320.
Full textAbstract:
Uma mudança singular ocorreu no panorama filosófico e cultural. Nos anos que seguiram imediatamente à segunda guerra mundial foi grande a difusão e acolhida que recebeu a tese de Hans Kelsen que estabelecia um nexo estreito entre empirismo, relativismo e democracia de um lado e “absolutismo filosófico” e “absolutismo político” de outro. Aos olhos do grande jurista (e de numerosos outros ilustres intelectuais de primeiríssimo plano) não havia dúvida: o “totalitarismo epistemológico” abria caminho para o “totalitarismo” político propriamente dito. Em nossos dias, em vez disso, desfruta de enorme prestígio, nos Estados Unidos e no Ocidente, um Leo Strauss, campeão do universalismo e crítico radical do relativismo, segundo o qual, bem longe de ser o fundamento da democracia, o relativismo pode justificar até o “canibalismo”. Devemos tomar partido por Kelsen ou por Strauss, pelo “relativismo” ou pelo “universalismo”? Em realidade, nem um nem o outro mantêm suas promessas. Não obstante suas poses iconoclastas, o “relativismo” de Kelsen (ou de Richard Rorty) não põe em discussão as ingênuas certezas da ideologia dominante e desemboca na exaltação acrítica do Ocidente liberal. Vem à mente a advertência de Hegel: um certo relativismo pode muito bem “combinar-se com um cru dogmatismo”. A este mesmo resultado também chega o “universalismo” tal como o entende Strauss (ou Habermas), que não hesita em apontar no Ocidente liberal a encarnação dos valores universais e que não por acaso tornou-se o filósofo de referência das assim chamadas “guerras humanitárias”. Vem à mente outra advertência de Hegel: um certo “universalismo” bem pode transformar-se num “empirismo absoluto”, isto é num etnocentrismo exaltado. Não obstante as aparências, as duas tradições de pensamento aqui contrastadas têm em comum um dogmatismo de fundo: como explicar isso e de que modo superar esta situação?
11
Wachterhauser, Brice R. "Prejudice, Reason and Force." Philosophy 63, no. 244 (April 1988): 231–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100043382.
Full textAbstract:
Perhaps no other aspect of Hans-Georg Gadamer's Wahrheit und Methode has generated more controversy and caustic criticism than his attempt to defend the role of ‘prejudice’ (Vorurteil) in human understanding. Gadamer's goal in challenging what he calls ‘the Enlightenment's prejudice against prejudice’ is not to defend irresponsible, idiosyncratic, parochial or otherwise self-willed understanding in the human sciences, but to argue that all human cognition is ‘finite’ and ‘limited’ in the sense that it always involves, to borrow Polanyi's phrase, a ‘tacit dimension’ of implicit judgments, concerns, or commitments which shape definitively our grasp of the subject matter in ways we cannot anticipate or control. This implies a ‘finite’ or ‘limited’ view of human understanding in at least two ways. First, Gadamer seems to use the word ‘finite’ in conscious opposition to Hegel's notion of an ‘infinite’ intellect. For Hegel the ‘infinite’ was the ‘unconditioned’ and ‘self-determining’. An ‘infinite’ intellect would be its own master, an autonomous, spontaneous source of all its essential activities and contents.
12
Schuck, Rogério José. "Formación (Bildung) y apropiación de la tradición en tiempos tecnológicos." Cuestiones de Filosofía 6, no. 27 (November 20, 2020): 111–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.19053/01235095.v6.n27.2020.12027.
Full textAbstract:
El artículo busca discutir el concepto de formación (Bildung), siguiendo las sendas de Hans-Georg Gadamer y las conexiones con autores presentes en sus discusiones, como es el caso de Apel y Hegel. Señalando algunas aproximaciones con el proceso de apropiación de la tradición, Theunissen (2001) afirma que se trata fundamentalmente de percibir el comprender actual en cuanto acontecimiento de la tradición viva. En un segundo momento, el texto vincula las tecnologías de la información y la comunicación (TICs) con la formación (Bildung), conduciendo a la idea de que estamos viviendo un tiempo del acontecimiento del comprender de nuevas posturas, que lentamente están configurando también una tradición, al lado de aquellos que nacen en este contexto. De este modo, nos resta despejar esa prehistoria de la nueva era que vivimos, a partir de la inmersión en el lenguaje, para lograr traer a presencia el modo de ser virtual y tecnológico que desde el nacimiento ya se hace presente en las nuevas generaciones –los llamados nativos digitales. Es por ello que es posible afirmar que es improbable tener algún tipo de formación (Bildung) fuera de la tradición en la que ésta se encuentra inmersa.
13
Marques, Cristian. "Gadamer com Platão e o conhecimento na hermenêutica filosófica." Trilhas Filosóficas 11, no. 2 (March 1, 2019): 23–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.25244/tf.v11i2.3439.
Full textAbstract:
Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo é explicitar aspectos da interpretação de Gadamer à Carta Sétima de Platão que lancem luz sobre quais traços fundamentais são imprescindíveis a uma epistemologia que se ancore na hermenêutica filosófica. Merold Westphal propôs em um artigo que a hermenêutica filosófica poderia fornecer elementos para uma renovação da epistemologia analítica. O presente trabalho inscreve-se no interesse amplo de tratar sobre que implicações teriam para noção de conhecimento se a epistemologia seguisse o caminho apontado por Westphal. Para tanto, escolhemos um trabalho onde Hans Georg Gadamer, principal defensor da hermenêutica filosófica, explora uma interpretação fenomenológica de Platão em que identificamos elementos relevantes para pensar a noção de conhecimento dentro dessa chave de leitura. Hans-Georg Gadamer explora, sob a luz de sua concepção ontológico-hermenêutica, o texto da Carta Sétima, dando um entendimento renovado a alguns aspectos da obra platônica, bem como indicações a uma compreensão fenomenológica do conhecimento. Palavras-chave: Teoria do Conhecimento. Gadamer. Platão. Carta Sétima. Hermenêutica. Abstract: The aim of this article is to make explicit aspects of Gadamer 's interpretation of Plato's Seventh Letter that shed light on what fundamental traits are indispensable to an epistemology that is anchored in philosophical hermeneutics. Merold Westphal proposed in an article that philosophical hermeneutics could provide elements for a renewal of analytic epistemology. This paper is part of the broader interest of discussing what implications would have for the notion of knowledge if epistemology followed the path Westphal pointed out. For this, we chose a work where Hans Georg Gadamer, the main defender of philosophical hermeneutics, explores a phenomenological interpretation of Plato in which we identify relevant elements to think the notion of knowledge within this key of reading. Hans-Georg Gadamer explores, in the light of his ontological-hermeneutic conception, the text of the Seventh Letter, giving a renewed understanding to some aspects of the Platonic work, as well as indications to a phenomenological understanding of knowledge. Keywords: Theory of Knowledge. Gadamer. Plato. Seventh Letter. Hermeneutics. REFERÊNCIASBONJOUR, L. The structure of empirical knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985.GADAMER, H.-G. Dialektik ist nicht Sophistik. Theätet lernt das im Sophistes. In: Griechische Philosophie. t.3. Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 7. Tubingen: Mohr, 1985c [1990], pp.338-370._______. Dialektik und Sophistik im siebenten Platonischen Brief. In: Griechische Philosophie. t.2. Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 6. Tubingen: Mohr, 1985b [1964], pp.90-115._______. Die phänomenologische Bewegung. In: Neuere Philosophie, t. 1; Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger. Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 3. Tubingen: Mohr, 1987 [1963], pp.105-146._______. Hegel und Heidegger. In: Neuere Philosophie, t. 1; Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger. Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 3. Tubingen: Mohr, 1987 [1971], pp.87-101._______. Platos dialektische Ethik. In: Griechische Philosophie. t.1. Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 5. Tubingen: Mohr, 1985a [1931], pp.3-163._______. Platos dialektische Ethik - beim Wort genommen. In: Griechische Philosophie. t.3. Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 7. Tubingen: Mohr, 1985c [1989], pp.121-127._______. Praktisches Wissen. In: Griechische Philosophie. t.1. Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 5. Tubingen: Mohr, 1985a [1930], pp.230-248._______. Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik. In: Hermeneutik I. Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 1. Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990 [1960].GRONDIN, J. Einführung zu Gadamer. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000._______. Von Heidegger zu Gadamer: Unterwegs zur Hermeneutik. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft – WBG, 2001.HEIDEGGER, M. Sein und Zeit. 19. Faksimile-Ausgabe der 1. Ausgabe. Tübingen: Verlag, 2006 [1927].PLATÃO. Opera Platonis. Recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit Ioannes Burnet. Scriptorum Classicorum. Bibliotheca Oxoniensis, v.1-6. Oxford: Clarendoniano Typographeo, 1900.///RORTY, R. A filosofia e o espelho da natureza. Rio de Janeiro: Relume-Dumará, 1994.ROHDEN, L. Filosofa enquanto Fenomenologia e Hermenêutica à luz da Carta VII de Platão. In: BOMBASSARO, L. C.; DALBOSCO, C. A.; KUIAVA, E. A., (org.). Pensar Sensível. Festscrift ao prof. Jayme Paviani. Caxias do Sul, RS: Educs, 2011, pp. 87-104._______. Filosofando com Gadamer e Platão: movimentos, momentos e método[s] da dialética. Dissertatio, 36 (2012), pp. 105-130. Disponível em: <http://dx.doi.org/10.15210/dissertatio.v36i0.8660> (acessado em 09.08.2018)._______. Hermenêutica e[m] resposta ao elogio da verdadeira filosofia da Carta Sétima de Platão. In: Kriterion, Belo Horizonte, v. 54, 127 (2013), p. 25-42. Disponível em: <http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-512X2013000100002&lng=en&nrm=iso > (acessado em 17.09.2018)._______. Filosofar com Gadamer e Platão: hermenêutica filosófica a partir da Carta Sétima. 1. ed. São Paulo: Annablume, 2018.SMITH, P. C. H.-G. Gadamer’s Heideggerian Interpretation of Plato. In: Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Stockport, England, v. 12, 3 (1981), pp. 211–230. Disponível em: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.1981.11007544> (acessado em 06.07.2018).VALENTIM, I. A Carta VII, o manifesto e a autobiografia política de Platão. In: Revista Opinião Filosófica, Porto Alegre, v. 3, 1 (2012), pp-60-72. Disponível em: <http://periodico.abavaresco.com.br/index.php/opiniaofilosofica/article/view/435> (acessado em 17.09.2018).WESTPHAL, M. A hermenêutica enquanto epistemologia. In: GRECO, J.; SOSA, E. (orgs.). Compêndio de Epistemologia. São Paulo: Loyola, 2008. pp. 645-676.
14
De Souza, Draiton Gonzaga. "Apresentação." Veritas (Porto Alegre) 49, no. 1 (December 30, 2004): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2004.1.34480.
Full textAbstract:
O presente número da revista Veritas reúne textos relacionados, quase em sua maioria, à filosofia de língua alemã, que em 2004 merece, sem dúvida, destaque especial. Neste ano comemoramos o bicentenário da morte de Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). No mundo inteiro, realizar-se-ão importantes eventos dedicados à filosofia de um dos maiores gênios da história do pensamento ocidental. Também a Seção Rio Grande do Sul da Sociedade Kant Brasileira www.pucrs.br/pgfilosofia/kant, presidida pelo Prof. Dr. Nythamar de Oliveira (PUCRS), promoverá um Colóquio sobre o filósofo de Konigsberg em maio, em Porto Alegre, juntamente com o Instituto Goethe, reunindo renomados especialistas no pensamento kantiano no Brasil e da Alemanha. Este evento insere-se nas atividades que antecedem o X. Congresso Internacional Kant, previsto para a primeira semana de setembro de 2005, em São Paulo, sob a presidência do Prof. Dr. Valério Rohden.Ainda em 2004, dois professores do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da PUCRS também comemorarão datas especiais: Prof. Dr. Ernildo Stein festeja seus 70 anos, em julho, e Prof. Dr. Hans-Georg Flickinger completa 60 anos, em agosto. Estes dois eminentes professores dedicam grande parte de sua atividade intelectual à filosofia alemã, num diálogo crítico permanente com autores como Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Marx e Gadamer.
15
Schütz, Rosalvo. "A CONTRADIÇÃO FUNDAMENTAL ENTRE A LÓGICA-VALOR DO CAPITAL [ASSIM COMO DA RIQUEZA ADVINDA DO TRABALHO HUMANO] E A TERRA (WOLFDIETRICH SCHMIED-KOWARZIK)." Revista Dialectus - Revista de Filosofia, no. 21 (April 30, 2021): 390–403. http://dx.doi.org/10.30611/2021n21id70912.
Full textAbstract:
Platão e Aristóteles já haviam detectado uma contradição fundamental entre a oikonomia e a crematística: uma sendo geradora de bem-viver e outra preocupada exclusivamente com o acúmulo de dinheiro. Também Hegel, à sua maneira, demonstrou que, tendencialmente, a sociedade moderna se contrapõe à vida humana e à natureza. Mas foi Marx o primeiro a demonstrar como a lógica do valor, própria da dinâmica produtiva capitalista, instrumentaliza e tende a destruir tanto os seres humanos quanto a natureza. Interessada unicamente na produção de mais-valia, a dinâmica capitalista não se importa em deixar para trás escombros de destruição ambiental e crescente pobreza humana. A lógica da valorização do valor, estaria, portanto, na base de nossa relação alienada com a natureza. A superação dessa tendência implicaria uma transformação revolucionária da própria estrutura da sociedade capitalista, a partir de uma práxis sustentada pela aliança entre as vítimas humanas desse processo no contexto de uma reconciliação com a natureza. (Resumo elaborado pelo tradutor).
*Título original: Der Grundwidespruch zwischen der Wertlogik des Kapitals sowie dem Reichtum aus der menschlichen Arbeit und der Erde. Palestra proferida em 2006 num evento em Nürnberg e publicado pela primeira vez em (Müller, 2007) e republicado como capítulo final em (Immler, Hans; Schmied-Kowarzik, 2011).
16
James, Stuart. "Hegel Bibliography:997Kurt Steinhauer Compiled by, under the assistance of Hans‐Dieter Schlüter. Hegel Bibliography: Background Material on the International Reception of Hegel Within the Context of the History of Philosophy; Hegel Bibliographie: Materialen zur Geschichte der internationalen Hegel‐Rezeption und zur Philosophie‐Geschichte. MünchenMünchen: K.G.SaurK.G.Saur 1980. xvi + 894 pp, 2 vols: pp.xviii+1‐568; xiv+569‐1128, ISBN: 3 598 03184 X DM 298.00, ISBN: 3 598 10787 0 DM 396.00 Keyword index by Stichwortregister von Gitta Hausen Keyword index by Stichwortregister von Anton Sergl." Reference Reviews 13, no. 1 (January 1999): 8–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/rr.1999.13.1.8.7.
Full text
17
Lisi, Leonardo. "Martin Thibodeau. Hegel and Greek Tragedy. Translated by Hans-Jakob Wilhelm. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2013. ISBN: 978-0-7391-7729-7 (hbk). Pp. 197. £60." Hegel Bulletin 40, no. 3 (October 18, 2017): 508–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2017.23.
Full text
18
Sembou, Evangelia. "The Young Hegel on ‘Life’ and ‘Love’." Hegel Bulletin 27, no. 1-2 (2006): 81–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200007552.
Full textAbstract:
Wilhelm Dilthey, the first scholar to study Hegel's early writings, most of which have been published by Herman Nohl under the title Hegels Theologische Jugendschriften, examined the thought of the young Hegel in the light of German idealism; Dilthey was interested in establishing the Kant-Fichte-Schelling-Hegel Entwicklungsgeschichte. Another line of interpretation, no doubt encouraged by the tide of Nohl's compendium, has been to see these writings as dealing with a religious experience and religious issues. Unique in the literature stands Laurence Dickey's study of intellectual history, in which he shows that the young Hegel was influenced by the culture of Old Württemberg – more specifically, by Württemberg's ideal of Protestant civil piety. Finally, Georg Lukács and Raymond Plant concentrate on the social and political concerns of the young Hegel. On the one side, Lukács, writing from a Marxist perspective, explores the political and economic ideas of the young Hegel as well as the way these have contributed to the development of the dialectical method. For his part, Plant has put forward the view that the essays compiled by Nohl in his collection constitute a series of attempts on the part of the young Hegel to comprehend and account for the cultural and socio-political crisis of his time. For Plant, Hegel sought the causes thereof in religion.I propose to look at the young Hegel from yet another angle. I shall argue that what lies beneath Hegel's exegesis of the Scriptures is a Platonism. H. S. Harris has noted this aspect of Hegel's thought in his seminal study of Hegel's development, but the Platonism of the young Hegel has generally been under-researched. In this paper I shall try to bring this out. To do this, I shall explore the meaning and significance of ‘life’ and ‘love’ by focusing on ‘The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate’ essay, the fragment on ‘Love’, as well as some of the fragments in the appendix of Nohl's volume. Let us not forget that, despite his practical concerns, Hegel was also interested in theological doctrine, which, he thought, expressed substantial truths in metaphorical language; so in the ‘Spirit of Christianity’ essay, as well as providing an historical account of Judaism and a description of Christian ethics, Hegel also discusses theological tenets. Hegel always believed that theory and practice go hand in hand, and he was convinced that religion was as much about dogma as it was about practice. For this reason I deem it necessary to look at Hegel's interpretation of Christian theology in the course of this paper.
19
Laitinen, Arto, and Constantine Sandis. "Hegel on Purpose." Hegel Bulletin 40, no. 3 (August 29, 2019): 444–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2019.12.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractIn this paper we propose a new interpretation of Hegel's views on action and responsibility, defending it against its most plausible exegetical competitors.1 Any exposition of Hegel will face both terminological and substantive challenges, and so we place, from the outset, some interpretative constraints. The paper divides into two parts. In part one, we point out that Hegel makes a number of distinctions which any sensible account of responsibility should indeed make. Our aim here is to show that Hegel at least has the materials for a sensible and nuanced account, whatever the precise details of how they hang together. Part two then turns to a hard question concerning the relation of two different aspects of our deeds to responsibility. We consider five alternate ways of relieving the tension in Hegel's text, before putting forth our own preferred solution.
20
Bernasconi, Robert. "G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik. Erster Teil: Die objective Logik. Erster Band: Die Lehre vom Sein (1832). (Gesammelte Werke Band 21). Hrsg. von Friedrich Hogemann und Walter Jaeschke. Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1985, pp. ix, 448, DM 148.Hans-Peter Falk, Das Wissen in Hegels ‘Wissenschaft der Logik’, Freiburg/München, Karl Alber, 1983, pp. 198, DM 48." Hegel Bulletin 6, no. 02 (1985): 21–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200003931.
Full text
21
Ferrarin, Alfredo. "Hegel on Aristotle's Energeia." Hegel Bulletin 27, no. 1-2 (2006): 69–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200007540.
Full textAbstract:
What is coming to assert itself as the mainstream reading of Hegel's philosophy at the start of our century is the picture of a reaction to, elaboration of, and finally solution to, Kantian problems. What goes hand in hand with this reading is a rejection of metaphysics as supposedly uncritical pre-Kantian baggage unaware of its presuppositions and unable to examine its own sources and the legitimacy of its claims.However complex this perspective and intelligent its merits, even if the intention is the well-meaning one of liberating Hegel's philosophy from whatever smacks of traditionalist views fuelling the various Hegel myths and legends and of making Hegel palatable again to a naturally suspicious English-speaking world, I think that this picture does Hegel a disservice. It is also detrimental to our understanding of the pre-Kantian tradition, which is all too often misconstrued as indistinguishable from Wolffian metaphysics. While I do not intend to dispute in any way the crucial importance of critical philosophy for the genesis of absolute idealism, or suggest that this appropriation of Hegel is merely instrumental, I am saying that it is one-sided in that it ignores Hegel's extraordinary attempt at understanding his own philosophy as digesting what is best about our tradition, assimikting it, and making it speak for us again in a new voice.So I am not denying that trying to update or appropriate Hegel might shed considerable light on select deeper meanings of a thought whose opacity still makes us regard it as an inert and surd obstacle to straight and unambiguous philosophical practice. But all too often one gets the impression that for most proponents of such a view metaphysics is the naive description of a sort of formal ontology, which does not question its fixed meanings but adopts stable substrates represented as such from ordinary experience, and understands thought as a description, as the realistic mirroring of an objectivity that is given to it.
22
Houlgate, Stephen. "Time for Hegel." Hegel Bulletin 27, no. 1-2 (2006): 125–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200007576.
Full textAbstract:
In section 82 of Being and Time Heidegger calls Hegel's account of time ‘the most radical way in which the ordinary [or vulgar] understanding of time has been given form conceptually’ (BT 480). For Heidegger, in the vulgar conception ‘the basic phenomenon of time is seen in the “now”; by contrast, Dasein's own “ecstatico-horizonal temporality temporalizes itself primarily in terms of the future (BT 479). Hegel's problem, it seems, is that he has no time for the future.As Heidegger explains in his 1924 lecture on the concept of time, Dasein is futural because it is essentially possibility — ‘the possibility of its certain yet indeterminate past (CT 12). That future pastness is, of course, Dasein's death. Dasein is thus oriented towards the future because it is being-towards-death — the death that is certain to come, one knows not when.The vulgar interpretation of time represents a flight both from Dasein's death and from its futural temporality, since it places the present at the centre of concern. Time, for the vulgar understanding, is simply ‘a sequence of “nows” which are constantly “present-at-hand”, simultaneously passing away and coming along’ (BT 474). The past and future are thus understood to be no more than the now that is no longer or is not yet. The future in particular is hereby distorted: for it is not thought to be the certain though indeterminate possibility in relation to which our present existence is first constituted, but is conceived as present existence that is yet to come.
23
Stern, Robert. "Pippin on Hegel." Hegel Bulletin 10, no. 01 (1989): 1–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200004602.
Full textAbstract:
Ever since Plato coined the metaphor, it has been tempting to treat the history of philosophy as a series of battles between Gods and Giants, as a ‘clash of argument’ between idealists and materialists, rationalists and naturalists, and idealists and realists. Many commentators, provoked by Hegel's combative remarks, have been led to see the Kant-Hegel relation in this way; and yet it has not always been easy to determine either what the issue between these two antagonists really is, or indeed which of them is the Giant and which the God. Robert Pippin, in his new book, Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. xii + 327, hb £30.00, pb £10.95) casts new light on the nature of the struggle, and makes clear what was at stake: a non-rationalist, non-metaphysical answer to the sceptic, and with it absolute knowledge. Pippin's densely written but engrossing book provides the focus of discussion for this issue of the Bulletin. The contributions by H.S. Harris and Terry Pinkard offer critical comments on Pippin's approach to Hegel, and they are followed with a response by Pippin himself. These pieces were originally presented as a meeting of the Western APA, and assume an acquaintance with Pippin's argument, which I will try to outline in what follows. Like many recent commentators, Pippin begins by insisting that we take seriously Hegel's claim to have ‘completed’ Kant, and so rejects any metaphysical, rationalist readng of Hegel. On the other hand, Pippin wants to understand Hegel's claim to have found a form of idealism that answers Kant's transcendental scepticism regarding the ‘thing-in-itself’, without collapsing back into rationalism.
24
Pinkard, Terry. "Subjectivity and Substance." Hegel Bulletin 36, no. 1 (April 21, 2015): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.1.
Full textAbstract:
Among the many developments in philosophy in the last several years has been the relatively recent wave of books and articles, especially in ethics, linking Kantianism with Aristotelianism. Hegelians are not surprised at this turn. For Hegel, there was a kind of logic to the key concepts in Aristotle and Kant that inevitably pushed us from one to the other, and something like that thought is behind his notorious summary statement in thePhenomenologythat ‘everything hangs on apprehending and expressing the true not merely assubstancebut also equally assubject.’ Or as we might alternately put it with a narrower scope, everything about our interpretation of Hegel hangs on what in the world we take Hegel to mean by that assertion. Answering that requires us to take a stand on what constitutes Hegel’s idealism and what constitutes his version of naturalism (even on whether there is such a thing as Hegel’s naturalism at all).
25
Hammer, Espen. "Hegel as a Theorist of Secularization." Hegel Bulletin 34, no. 2 (August 23, 2013): 223–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2013.13.
Full textAbstract:
Hegel's philosophy of religion is characterized by what seems to be a deep tension. On the one hand, Hegel claims to be a Christian thinker, viewing religion, and in particular Christianity, as a manifestation of the absolute. On the other hand, however, he seems to view modernity as largely secular, devoid of authoritative claims to transcendence. Modernity is secular in the political sense of requiring the state to be neutral when it comes to matters of religion. However, it is also secular in the sense of there being no recourse to authoritative representations of a transcendent God. Drawing on Charles Taylor's view of secularization, the article focuses on the second strand of his religious thinking, exploring how Hegel can be thought of as a theorist of secularization. It is claimed that his dialectic of religious development describes a process of secularization. Ultimately, Hegel's system offers a view of the absolute as immanent, suggesting that an adequate account of religion will necessarily have to accept secularization as the end-point of spirit's development. This is how the tension between religion and secularization can be resolved.
26
Tobe, Renée. "Plato and Hegel stay home." Architectural Research Quarterly 11, no. 1 (March 2007): 53–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1359135507000498.
Full textAbstract:
As we watch a film, we let filmmakers take us by the hand and tell us a story until they lead us into a world visually constructed to captivate us for a specific amount of time. The worst thing a filmmaker can do is not to terrify us, or fool us with special effects, but to rob us of our illusion that what we are seeing is ‘true’ even if just for now. Through the mimetic power of film, we, the viewer, picture the film set as if it is real architecture, and assemble the walls and floors we see into an architectural whole. This paper focuses on what we see ‘behind’ the screen rather than the cinematic experience itself. The premise is that by examining the nature of filmic ‘reality’ we will be helped to understand architectural form and order.
27
Lauener, Michael. "Lauener, Michael, Schutz der Kirche und Stabilität des Staates durch Absenz von religiöser ,Seichtigkeit': die religionspolitischen Anschauungen von Jeremias Gotthelf und Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel aus dem Geist der Versöhnung." Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte: Kanonistische Abteilung 105, no. 1 (June 26, 2019): 280–349. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/zrgk-2019-0009.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract Protection of the church and state stability through the absence of religious 'shallowness': views on religion-policy of Jeremias Gotthelf and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel out of a spirit of reconciliation. The article re-examines a thesis of Paul Baumgartner published in 1945: "Jeremias Gotthelf's, 'Zeitgeist and Bernergeist', A Study on Introduction and Interpretation", that if the Swiss writer and keen Hegel-opponent Jeremias Gotthelf had read any book of the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, some of this would have received his recognition. Both Gotthelf and Hegel see the Reformation to be the cause of the emergence of a strong state. For Gotthelf, this marks the beginning of a process of strengthening the state at the expense of the church. Hegel, on the other hand, considers the modern state to be the reality of freedom, produced by the Christian 'religion of freedom' (Rph, §270 Z., p. 430). In contrast to Gotthelf, for whom only Christ can reconcile the state and religion, Hegel praises the French Revolution as "reconciliation of the divine with the world". For Gotthelf, the French Revolution was only a poor imitation of the process of spiritual and political liberation initiated by the Reformation, through which Christ reduced people to their original liberty. Nevertheless, both Gotthelf and Hegel want to protect the state and the church from falling apart, they reject organizational unity of state – religion – church in the sense of a theocracy, and demand the protection of church communities.
28
Rauch, Leo. "Hegel Writes the Propaedeutic." Hegel Bulletin 9, no. 01 (1988): 20–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200004535.
Full textAbstract:
What is remarkable about Hegel's creative activity (in the period 1808-12) is the diversity of its contrasts: his thinking and writing of The Science of Logic was going on while he was caught up in the daily tasks of newspaper editorship and then of school-teaching and administration. The contrast is enhanced if we include his Philosophical Propaedeutic here, and place it against The Science of Logic. (We can regard them as having been written almost simultaneously.) The latter book is intended for the learned specialist, and is concerned with elucidating the ultimate structure of reality in the most abstract terms. As a work of philosophy it is technical to an extreme; it is his most recondite work, making no concessions to the difficulties a reader might encounter. The Philosophical Propaedeutic, on the other hand, is intended for the student at secondary school and junior college, and is concerned in part with the concrete social values embedded in social morality and religion. As a work, it is entirely accessible and “open”, and it represents Hegel's attempt to lead his students from their view of the immediate social reality up to an all-encompassing world-vision. (There is a further contrast in the fact that it was not written as a book at all, but as a series of lecture-notes, and was put together as a book by Karl Rosenkranz, nine years after Hegel's death.) Obviously it was because there was no university post for him that he accepted the position of Rector and Professor of Philosophy at the Aegidien Gymnasium in Nuremberg, in 1808. Yet his acceptance was not accompanied by the attitude of faute de mieux -- as though “the speculative Pegasus were being harnessed to the wagon of schoolwork.”
29
Elorduy, Eduardo Charpenel. "Recepción y apropiación de la filosofía práctica aristotélica en la Filosofía del derecho de Hegel." Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía, no. 52 (December 27, 2016): 173. http://dx.doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i52.821.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract En el presente artículo se examina la relación de la Filosofía del derecho de Hegel con la filosofía práctica aristotélica. Con ello se pretende mostrar, por una parte, que algunas de las tesis y motivos centrales de la filosofía del derecho hegeliana se entienden de mejor forma trayendo a primer plano ciertos planteamientos aristotélicos y, por otro lado, que dichos planteamientos son objeto de una reinterpretación y reelaboración por parte de Hegel ante ciertas exigencias históricas y filosóficas del contexto moderno. En particular, se examina la relación entre estos dos autores atendiendo a dos puntos concretos: la metodología holística de una filosofía práctica –entendida de modo amplio– y la teoría de la motivación ética. In this article I examine the relation of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right with the Aristotelean practical philosophy. My aim with this is to show, on the one hand, that some of the theses and central motifs of the Hegelian philosophy of right are better understood if one brings certain Aristotelean ideas to the forefront of the discussion and, on the other hand, that these ideas are subjected to a reinterpretation by Hegel due to the historical and philosophical demands of the Modern Age. In particular, the relationship between these two authors is analyzed by examining two specific subjects: the holistic methodology of a practical philosophy –broadly construed– and the theory of ethical motivation. Palabras clave: Aristóteles, Hegel, Filosofía del derecho, Ética normativa, Metodología ética, Teoría de la motivación ética, Virtud y deber, Historia de la recepción del aristotelismo Key Words: Aristotle, Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Normative Ethics, Methods in Ethics, Theory of Ethical Motivation, Virtue and Duty, History of the Reception of Aristotelianism
30
Heidemann, Dietmar H. "Hegel on the Nature of Scepticism." Hegel Bulletin 32, no. 1-2 (2011): 80–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200000173.
Full textAbstract:
In the Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel states that ‘philosophy … contains the sceptical as a moment within itself — specifically as the dialectical moment’ (§81, Addition 2), and that ‘scepticism’ as ‘the dialectical moment itself is an essential one in the affirmative Science’ (§78). On the one hand, the connection between scepticism and dialectic is obvious. Hegel claims that scepticism is a problem that cannot be just removed from the philosophical agenda by knock-down anti-sceptical arguments. Scepticism intrinsically belongs to philosophical thinking; that is to say, it plays a constructive role in philosophical thinking. On the other hand, scepticism has to be construed as the view according to which we cannot know whether our beliefs are true, i.e., scepticism plays a destructive role in philosophy no matter what. It is particularly this role that clashes with Hegel's claim of having established a philosophical system of true cognition of the entirety of reality. In the following I argue that for Hegel the constructive and the destructive role of scepticism are reconcilable. I specifically argue that it is dialectic that makes both consistent since scepticism is a constitutive element of dialectic.In order to show in what sense scepticism is an intrinsic feature of dialectic I begin by sketching Hegel's early view of scepticism specifically with respect to logic and metaphysics. The young Hegel construes logic as a philosophical method of human cognition that inevitably results in ‘sceptical’ consequences in that it illustrates the finiteness of human understanding. By doing so, logic not only nullifies finite understanding but also introduces to metaphysics, i.e., the true philosophical science of the absolute.
31
Kreines, James. "Metaphysics without Pre-Critical Monism: Hegel on Lower-Level Natural Kinds and the Structure of Reality." Hegel Bulletin 29, no. 1-2 (2008): 48–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026352320000077x.
Full textAbstract:
Recent debates about Hegel's theoretical philosophy are marked by a surprising lack of agreement, extending all the way down to the most basic question: what is Hegel talking about? On the one hand, proponents of ‘metaphysical’ interpretations generally read Hegel as aiming to articulate the overall structure or organisation of reality itself, and the nature of a highest or most fundamental being. Particularly influential is the idea that Hegel is reviving and modifying a form of Spinoza's metaphysical monism, according to which the organised whole of everything is the highest being, providing a ground or reason for everything real. On the other hand, proponents of ‘non-metaphysical’ interpretations argue Hegel's topic is something else entirely. The idea is that Hegel agrees with Kant in finding pre-critical forms of metaphysics to be uncritical or dogmatic. And the topic of Hegel's positive project is supposed to be not the nature of reality itself, nor any most fundamental being, but rather ‘forms of thought’ akin to Kant's categories and the objectivity, legitimacy, or normative authority of those forms of thought.This is of course only a rough sketch of the most basic recent debate, about which there is more to say than can fit in this paper. My focus here is on what Hegel has to say about nature and natural kinds, in ‘Observing Reason’ from the Phenomenology, and also in similar material from the Logic and Encyclopedia. I intend to argue that this material suggests a surprising way of stepping beyond the fundamental debate sketched above. There can of course be no question of elaborating and defending here a complete interpretation of Hegel's entire theoretical philosophy. I will have to restrict myself to arguing for the unlikely conclusion that there is an approach that can combine and integrate the strongest points made by both sides in the most basic debate shaping recent Hegel interpretation.
32
Westphal, Merold. "Hegel and Onto-Theology." Hegel Bulletin 21, no. 1-2 (2000): 142–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026352320000745x.
Full textAbstract:
Postmodernism and religion. The discussion continues to become increasingly rich and complex. In the background of much of it is Heidegger's critique of onto-theology, in which Hegel is one of his two prime paradigms. He introduced this term in 1949 in relation to Aristotle's completion of his ontology with a theology of the Unmoved Mover. When he returned to it in 1957, it was in the context of a seminar on Hegel's Science of Logic. There he described onto-theology as allowing God to enter philosophical discourse only on philosophy's terms and in the service of its project and complained, in the spirit of Pascal and Kierkegaard, that this God was religiously otiose. What he says there specifically about Hegel will best be understood after we see in what sense Hegel is a pantheist.It is possible to date quite precisely the time when Hegel abandoned theism for good. Ironically, it was in 1795 in correspondence with his two friends from seminary days at Tübingen. Schelling and Hölderlin had become Fichte enthusiasts, as we see from letters they sent to Hegel early that year. On the basis of prepublication access to Fichte's 1794 Wissenschaftslehre, Schelling wrote on January 5,Philosophy is not yet at an end. Kant has provided the results. The premises are still missing. And who can understand the results without the premises? … Kant has swept everything away, but how is the crowd to notice? One must smash it to pieces before their very eyes, so they grasp it in their hands. The great Kantians now everywhere to be seen have got stuck on the letter … [;] the old superstition of so-called natural religion as well as of positive religion has in the minds of most already once more been combined with the Kantian letter. It is fun to see how quickly they get to the moral proof. Before you can turn around the deus ex machina springs forth, the personal individual Being who sits in Heaven above! Fichte will raise philosophy to a height at which even most of the hitherto Kantians will become giddy … . Now I am working on an ethic á la Spinoza (HL 29).
33
de Beistegui, Miguel. "The Erosion of Democracy." Research in Phenomenology 38, no. 2 (2008): 157–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156916408x286941.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThis paper analyzes the reasons behind what it calls the erosion of democracy under George W. Bush's presidency since September 11, 2001, and claims that they are twofold: first, the erosion in question can be attributed to a crisis of the state and the belief that security is its only genuine function. In other words, the erosion of democracy is an erosion of the very idea of the public sphere (which, following Hegel, I call "ethical life") beyond security and war. Secondly, the erosion of the ethical sphere goes hand in hand with an extraordinary resurgence of what, still following Hegel, I call "morality," and which privileges the subjective over the objective, or moral (and even religious) feeling over institutions and the law.
34
Ferro, Bernardo. "Against realism: Hegel and Adorno on philosophy’s critical role." Philosophy & Social Criticism 46, no. 2 (April 22, 2019): 183–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453719839451.
Full textAbstract:
Key representatives of the dialectical tradition, Hegel and Adorno conceived philosophy as a critical tool, directed both at the naive realism of ordinary reason and the more sophisticated realism of modern scientific discourse. For the two authors, philosophy’s main task is to question received ideas and practices and to expose their underlying contradictions, thereby enabling meaningful forms of cultural and political change. But while for Hegel this procedure takes the form of a systematic enquiry, leading from a spurious to a true account of reality, Adorno rejects the idea that reason and reality can be reconciled. On the one hand, he praises Hegel for having developed a truly dialectical form of criticism, set into motion by the immanent unfolding of reality’s intrinsic contradictions. On the other hand, he views Hegel’s emphasis on systematic integration as a form of dogmatism, which must itself be criticized. Instead of a ‘positive’ or ‘closed’ dialectic, fuelled by the expectation of a final overarching synthesis, Adorno calls for a ‘negative’ or ‘open’ dialectic, radically averse to all forms of unification. In doing so, however, he is led to question the very limits of conceptual reason, leaving criticism vulnerable to new forms of attack.
35
Ferro, Bernardo. "Hegel, Liberalism and the Pitfalls of Representative Democracy." Hegel Bulletin 40, no. 2 (October 17, 2016): 215–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2016.53.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractAlthough Hegel is very critical of representative democracy, his views on political participation are in many ways richer and more sophisticated than the ones favoured today by most Western societies. The present paper aims to shed light on this apparent paradox by dispelling some of the misunderstandings still associated with Hegel’s ethical and political thought. I argue, on the one hand, that Hegel’s emphasis on the notion of freedom does not amount to an endorsement of political liberalism, but to a critique of its underlying principles. On the other hand, I show that the Hegelian theory of the modern state, albeit falling short of a fully democratic constitutional solution, is by no means opposed to social justice or political pluralism. Hegel views political freedom as the result of a global web of mutual recognition, embodied by social institutions destined to bridge the gap between private and communal interests. Despite the ambiguous and outdated elements of Hegel’s description, I believe his overall solution remains uniquely relevant, and an important source for the ongoing debate about the merits and limitations of contemporary democracies.
36
Souyris Oportot, Lorena. "Poder e impoder de la muerte: al encuentro del escepticismo y el goce (concurrencias entre Jacques Lacan y G.W.F. Hegel)." Hermenéutica Intercultural, no. 22 (July 4, 2014): 119. http://dx.doi.org/10.29344/07196504.22.548.
Full textAbstract:
Poder e impoder de la muerte: al encuentro del escepticismo y el goce (concurrencias entre Jacques Lacan y G.W.F. Hegel).Power and impower of death: to the encounter of skepticism and enjoyment. (concurrences between Jacques Lacan y G.W.F. Hegel).Recibido: 31/07/2013 ∙ Aceptado: 28/08/2013ResumenEl artículo es una tentativa para repensar, a partir de una frontera entre el psicoanálisis y la filosofía, el estatuto de la pulsión de muerte inscribiéndose, a partir de una confrontación entre intuiciones de Jacques Lacan y G.W.F. Hegel. En este diseño, el artículo se consagra como una exploración del «sentido» y las «posibilidades» de especulación alrededor de una ex-pulsión de muerte bajo una base escéptica en el significado lógico del término. Para ello, se propone, por una parte, explicar el lugar de la negatividad como aquello que da cuenta de la disolución y desaparición [l’Aufhebung] del sujeto del inconsciente. Y por otra parte, analizar el escepticismo como recurso para pensar la economía del goce lacaniano, en cuanto falta y disolución. Palabras clave: Escepticismo - pulsión de muerte - goce - sujeto barrado del inconsciente - negatividad. AbstractBased on the boarders between psychoanalysis and philosophy, this article is an attempt to re-think the principle of the death drive by confronting the approaches of Jacques Lacan and G.W.F. Hegel. This article explores“sense” and “possibilities” of speculation around and ex- death driveunder a logic-sceptical meaning of these concepts. The article explains,on the one hand, the place of negativity as accounting for the dissolutionand abolition [l’Aufhebung] of the unconscious subject; and on theother hand, it analysis scepticism as a resource to think the economy ofLacanian enjoyment.Keywords: Scepticism - death drive – enjoyment - abolition of the unconscioussubject - negativity
37
Brdar, Milan. "The Decartes’ paradox and the modern philosophy as the foundation farse." Zbornik Matice srpske za drustvene nauke, no. 177 (2021): 1–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/zmsdn2177001b.
Full textAbstract:
In this article the author identifies a paradox at the heart of Descartes? foundationalist project. The components of the paradox are as follows: on the one hand, ontological certainty of cogito, on the other hand, its epistemic uncertainty: it is impossible for the solus ipse to establish the elementary truth: at present it is impossible to determine whether it is now night or daylight. For Descartes the solution consists of introducing God and in believing in His existence. But this is no solution whatsoever, for a subject would require direct contact with God in order to receive clear and distinct ideas, which are at the same time marks of their truth. The author concludes the following: firstly, Descartes managed to establish a foundation for nothing; secondly, the Cartesian project that includes the necessity of contact with God as a way to attain the Truth, becomes completed only in Hegel?s philosophy of Absolut Knowledge (in Wiss. der Logik), along with his justification provided in the Phenoimenologie des Gesites. The post-Hegelian philosophy, however, has engendered its own paradox by abandoning Hegel?s own solution despite it being fully Cartesian in its character. This was the consequence of abandoning God and declaring Hegel?s philosophy as a deplorable conservative revival of theology; something that was beyond understanding by modern philosophers. The abandonment of God had as its consequence the return to the Cartesian paradox, which reopened the question of truth - connected to the Cogito, and the question of sense (Sinn) - connected to the sum of human subject. The neglect of God leads to the departure from ratio-centrism in two ways: the epistemic perspectivism and relativism, on the one hand, and Nihilism, voluntarism with decisionism, along with existentialism, on the other. Consequently, with the death of God, and the fall of Hegel?s system, the modern metaphysics of subjectivity reveals itself as founded merely on the Will to power - as a will for God, until Hegel, and a will against God, subsequently. Thus, Heidegger was right when he said that Nietzsche?s Will to Power was the end of the Western metaphysics. The author complements this finding by adding that this kind of metaphysic had already been concealed within the Descartes Meditations from the start, in the forms of the will for the Reason and the will for God. Finally, the author concludes that the modern philosophy completes its own Odyssey of looking for a foundation by abandoning the Hegelian solution, blind to the fact that Hegel?s solution was the only consequent Cartesian one. The ultimate result was the fall of ratio-centrism into nihilism, voluntarism, and existentialism, as promoted under a thin vail of Picodellamirandolian humanism.
38
Jarvis, Simon. "The “Unhappy Consciousness” And Conscious Unhappiness: On Adorno's Critique Of Hegel And The Idea Of An Hegelian Critique Of Adorno." Hegel Bulletin 15, no. 01 (1994): 71–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200002962.
Full textAbstract:
In the early sections of The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy, Hegel offered some advice on how not to write the history of philosophy. In the hands of the collector of philosophical opinions “philosophy is transposed to the plane of information. Information is concerned with alien objects”. But for Hegel a scarcely less inert relation to previous work in philosophy is implied when this work is taken as a series of faltering steps towards the invention of a perfected thought-technique which would spare truth the labour of error. In these circumstances “The preceding philosophical systems would at all times be nothing but practice studies for the big brains”. Research on the Phenomenology of Spirit has occasionally resembled both an aggregation of inert philological objects and a series of intellectual work-outs. But either fate may be preferable to its relegation to the honourable oblivion of Gedankendichtung, “conceptual poetry”. The phrase “Hegel-specialist” has an oxymoronic ring to it; but the separation of faculties which governs this need for experts cannot be wished away. A stuffed replica of the Phenomenology of Spirit, or even a requirement that all philosophers should speak Hegelian, can hardly today provide more than philosophical kitsch. Hegel's philosophical compositions continue mutely to reproach the graceless cerebration sometimes conducted in their name, but they are still worse served by what Hegel referred to as “the conceit that will not argue”. These considerations also apply to the content of interpretations of the Phenomenology itself and of Hegel's thought in general. Some recent readings have emphasized Hegel's Kantian and Fichtean inheritance to the point where it might almost be thought that what is distinctively interesting about Hegel has vanished altogether. But such readings represent a fair response not merely to any idea that Hegel kindly allows us to have back intact the dogmatic metaphysics harshly prohibited by Kant, but also to interpretations which forget that Hegel's critique of epistemology proceeds immanently and epistemologically rather than being shot from a pistol. Discussion of the “unhappy consciousness” might stand as an epitome for these oppositions in Hegel-reception. At one extreme lies Walter Kaufmann's suggestion that “Hegel evidently wanted to get some ideas about medieval Christianity off his chest…”; but deeper and more nuanced readings of the presence of a phenomenology of religious consciousness in this passage are not lacking, above all the monograph by Wahl and Hyppolite's discussion in his commentary.
39
de Boer, Karin. "Transformations of Transcendental Philosophy: Wolff, Kant, and Hegel." Hegel Bulletin 32, no. 1-2 (2011): 50–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200000161.
Full textAbstract:
Kant's philosophy is generally known as transcendental philosophy or transcendental idealism, terms often thought to describe the inquiry into the subjective conditions of empirical knowledge carried out in theCritique of Pure Reason. On this conception of transcendental philosophy Kant is seen to pursue a project very different from both Wolffian metaphysics and Hegelian speculative science. This view is confirmed by scholars who compare Kant's conception of transcendental philosophy to the Scholastics' conception of ‘transcendentals’ such as unity, truth, and perfection. On their account, there remains a puzzling gap between, on the one hand, the scholastic conception of the most general determinations of all beings and, on the other hand, Kant's investigation into the conditions of possibility of experience.In this article I want to challenge this common view of Kant's transcendental philosophy for two reasons. The first reason concerns the question of how theCritique of Pure Reasonitself should be read. I take the view that in the firstCritiqueKant's primary aim is to determine the conditions of synthetic a priori knowledge rather than to identify the a priori conditions of empirical knowledge. Since metaphysics was traditionally considered to be the discipline that possessed a priori knowledge of things, this view makes good sense of Kant's presentation of theCritique of Pure Reasonas a work intended to transform metaphysics into a science. In this article I hope to clarify the nature of this transformation by determining the elements which Kant's transcendental philosophy has in common with Wolff's ontology, as well as the respects in which Kant turns against Wolff. I thus hope to solve some of the riddles posed by Kant's use of the term ‘transcendental philosophy’ in theCritique of Pure Reason.
40
Reid, Jeffrey. "Hegel and the Politics of Tragedy, Comedy and Terror." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 25, no. 1 (2020): 135–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/epoche2020108172.
Full textAbstract:
Greek tragedy, in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, represents the performative realization of binary political difference, for example, “private versus public,” “man versus woman” or “nation versus state.” On the other hand, Roman comedy and French Revolutionary Terror, in Hegel, can be taken as radical expressions of political in-difference, defined as a state where all mediating structures of association and governance have collapsed into a world of “bread and circuses.” In examining the dialectical interplay between binary, tragic difference and comedic, terrible in-difference, the paper arrives at hypothetical conclusions regarding how these political forms may be observed today.
41
Krijnen, Christian. "Comprehending Sociality: Hegel Beyond his Appropriation in Contemporary Philosophy of Recognition." Hegel Bulletin 38, no. 2 (March 6, 2017): 266–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2017.1.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractContemporary philosophy of recognition represents probably the most prominent direction that presently claims to introduce an updated version of classical German idealism into ongoing debates, including the debate on the nature of sociality. In particular, studies of Axel Honneth offer triggering contributions in Frankfurt School fashion while at the same time rejuvenating Hegel’s philosophy in terms of a philosophy of recognition. According to Honneth, this attempt at a rejuvenation also involves substantial modification of Hegelian doctrines. It is shown that Honneth underestimates the implications of Hegel’s thoughts about the theme, method and systematic form of philosophy. As a consequence, Honneth’s social philosophy is, on the one hand, in need of a plausible foundation. This leads, on the other hand, to a different construction of the social within philosophy than Honneth offers.
42
Bennett, Christopher. "McTaggart on the right to be punished." Hegel Bulletin 19, no. 1-2 (1998): 85–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200001300.
Full textAbstract:
J. M. E. McTaggart's interpretation of Hegel's theory of punishment has a strange double life. On the one hand it is considered important by philosophers of punishment for setting forth an novel and suggestive account of what we are, or ought to be, doing when we punish wrongdoers. What such writers are interested in is the prospect that a “right to be punished” gives of resuscitating retributivism, giving a non-consequentialist account of punishment which is not grounded in vengeance-seeking or an ineffable intuition of justice. McTaggart's view seems to hold out the promise of such a novel retributivism.On the other hand, Hegel scholars themselves seem to regard McTaggart's account as dead in the water as an interpretation of Hegel's remarks in the Philosophy of Right (from which his view is clearly drawn). At first sight, after all, there seems to be little textual evidence to support his reading. And two more recent accounts of Hegel's remarks on punishment have nothing to say about one of the central theses for which McTaggart argues, the one which I defend as an interpretation of Hegel here. The question for those sceptical of his reading remains how someone like McTaggart could have fallen prey to such a mis-interpretation; but perhaps it can just be explained as yet another case of a thinker reading his own views into Hegel rather than reading what is there. Perhaps McTaggart was over-zealous in putting forward his own thoughts and overlooked his scholarly duties.
43
de Boer, Karin. "Tragic Entanglements: Between Hegel and Derrida." Hegel Bulletin 24, no. 1-2 (2003): 34–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200001798.
Full textAbstract:
In an early text on Bataille, Derrida notes that Bataille's reinterpretation of Hegel “is a simulated repetition of Hegelian discourse. In the course of this repetition a barely perceptible displacement disjoints all the articulations and penetrates all the points welded together by the imitated discourse. A trembling spreads out which then makes the entire old shell crack.” There is no doubt that this remark refers not just to Bataille's reading of Hegel, but also to the way in which deconstruction intends to make the old shell of Hegelianism, and hence of the history of philosophy in general, tremble. By doing this, deconstruction can be said to open up a way of reflecting on contemporary culture that from Plato onwards had been foreclosed by the predominant tendency of philosophy.According to a famous saying by Hegel, philosophy grasps its own time in thought. This is to say that philosophy explicitly articulates the implicit self-understanding of the culture to which it belongs and out of which it emerges. If contemporary philosophy still faces the task of comprehending its own time, then it should develop a logic which is as philosophical as Hegel's, but which distinguishes itself from the latter by addressing the radical finitude of any effort to bring about meaning, truth, presence, harmony, stability, or justice. Such a logic should respond to the experience that the moments in which human life threatens to lose its dignity are not cancelled out by what is commonly called ‘progress’. To my mind, it is precisely this experience that deconstruction seeks to grasp in thought. I understand deconstruction as drawing attention to that which allows something — for instance a culture — to constitute itself, yet at the same time threatens to make it fall apart. Whereas philosophy can be said to have always shied away from the insight into the radical instability of whatever human beings may venture, Derrida, on the other hand, can be considered to take this very instability as the guiding principle of his philosophy. On the basis of such a principle, the ways in which human life organizes itself will no longer be interpreted in terms of increasing self-actualization, autonomy, or control, but rather by addressing the conflicts from which the various modes of human self-organization may not be able to disentangle themselves.
44
Brown, Nahum. "The Logic of the Secret in Hegel and Derrida." Philosophy and Theology 31, no. 1 (2019): 39–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtheol2020527125.
Full textAbstract:
The aim of this article is to contrast Hegelian insights about the secret with Derrida’s literary account of the secret in the story of Abraham. Derrida outlines two kinds of secret in “Literature in Secret,” one revealable and the other apophatic. I propose that the first kind of secret is Hegelian in nature because a productive concept of contradiction underlies it. On the other hand, the second kind of secret is Derridean because it withdraws from all revelation. Through an analysis of the role of contradiction in Hegel’s Logic and Derrida’s distinction between revealable and unrevealable secrets, I aim to explore the logical and structural components of the concept of the secret.
45
Axiotis, Ares. "Fiat vita, pereat veritas Nietzsche's Untimely Reflections on Hegel's Dialectic of History." Hegel Bulletin 12, no. 1-2 (1991): 61–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200002706.
Full textAbstract:
You will indulge me if I begin with a commonplace. The term “history” is an ambiguous expression which can be taken either in the sense of res gestae or in the sense of rerum gestarum memoria. According to the former meaning, it refers to the phenomenon itself, the past course of human events, whereas, according to the latter meaning, it denotes the representation of this phenomenon.German allows Hegel to mark the difference in terms of the relation between Geschichte and Historie. He also speaks of “objective” and “subjective” history in this connection. Yet by suppressing the brute opacity of language in favour of its teleological function, he is able to turn a blind eye to history's semiotic double game, the free play between literal and figural meaning within the linguistic sign. Hegel thus propounds the view that identity and difference at the level of the signifier are ultimately recuperated as expressive moments or alienations of the signified, the pure idea of History on its circular journey to itself. Linguistic signs are capable of meaning, according to Hegel, precisely because of their dialectical structure. The proliferation of meaning in language through the play of words is not random and anarchic but guided systematically by the invisible hand of spirit.
46
Vater, Michael G. "Hymns to the Night: On H. S. Harris's “The Cows in the Dark Night”." Dialogue 26, no. 4 (1987): 645–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300018229.
Full textAbstract:
As one of the bare handful of scholars working on Schelling, I should heartily like to accept Professor Harris's argument, for all these black cows hang around one's neck more heavily than did the albatross on the ancient mariner's. I find myself obliged, however, to closely test his argument. I regret that, viewed in the context of the whole of the Phenomenology's Preface, Harris's argument is not fully convincing. I shall argue that, since the Preface's plain intent is to contrast the vitalism of a method of thought that is spirit's coming into its own with all styles of fixated propositional thinking, the “formalism” Hegel attacks is a loose aggregate of the philosophical styles of Fichte, Schelling, Reinhold and Bardili. Hegel is content to leave the label loose and unspecified and not to name names. It is not strictly fair to let the scope of the term resonate upon Schelling's “first scientific grasp of the idea”, at least not for an author who knew Schelling's work so well. But as Harris points out, it is not fair to Hegel for his public to read him with the sole, simplistic question of what positions he supports and what positions he rejects.
47
Behiels, Gert, Frederik Maes, Dirk Vandermeulen, and Paul Suetens. "Retrospective correction of the heel effect in hand radiographs." Medical Image Analysis 6, no. 3 (September 2002): 183–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1361-8415(02)00078-6.
Full text
48
Barnett, William. "Can Pietism Change the World? Reconsidering Hegel's Tutelage of 'Faith'." Ecclesiology 7, no. 2 (2011): 220–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/174553111x559472.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe legacy of the ecclesial renewal movement known as Pietism is debated on questions of how it envisions the church's relation to the world. On the one hand, there are denominations today that invoke the legacy of Pietism as a resource in constructing a missional identity and a clear ethic of social engagement and transformation. On the other hand, there are critics, such as Karl Barth, who register Pietism as a phenomenon that fosters individualism rather than social-mindedness. Barth blames Pietism's inward concept of authority. This essay is an attempt to temper the claims of such critics through a close reading of the analysis of the 'faith' consciousness found in G.W.F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. In contrast to Barth, Hegel offers a reading of Pietism's inward concept of authority as forming dissatisfied social agents, rather than atomistic individuals fundamentally alienated from one another. On Hegel's account, the Pietist experiences an essential or spiritual belonging to the actual social world, yet she is continually dissatisfied with the external actualization of this spiritual relationship. Thus, Hegel provides a way for Pietist traditions to conceptually integrate the emphasis on inward experience with a clear ethic of social participation and responsible engagement.
49
Milisavljevic, Vladimir. "Can philosophy do away with transcendence? A dialogue with Milan Brdar." Zbornik Matice srpske za drustvene nauke, no. 174 (2020): 239–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/zmsdn2074239m.
Full textAbstract:
The paper examines the interpretation of three major philosophical figures - Descartes, Kant and Heidegger - proposed in the latest monographs by Milan Brdar. I argue that these valuable books can be best understood as parts of his unique program of criticism of the Enlightenment. In particular, they converge in trying to establish a single point - the one of futility of all attempts to found philosophy which dispenses with the transcendence of God. Brdar highlights the limits of the Cartesian Cogito, which is unable to prove anything more than the existence of the self as a thinking being, as well as the necessity of a transcendent God as a warrant for our clear and distinct perceptions. On the other hand, Kant is the very type of philosopher of whom Brdar approves - the one who managed to combine knowledge and faith. As far as Heidegger is concerned, Brdar?s survey of his philosophical evolution, especially of his conception of Being as transcendence and his late turn towards a ?new religion?, is an additional argument for Brdar?s thesis. However, I argue that Hegelian philosophy represents a challenge for Brdar?s intent. On this point I depart from the conclusions on Hegel expounded in the two chapters of his monograph on Kant. In particular, I disagree with his view of Hegel, substantiated by some assertions from his writings, as a philosopher whose panlogism verges on theocentrism. In the final part of the paper I propose instead of several elements of a radically secular reading of Hegel?s logic, phenomenology and philosophy of religion. I also argue that Hegel?s philosophy sharply diverges from the foundationalist pattern of the Cartesian type.
50
Burbidge, John W. "The Word Became Flesh or The Orthodox Hegel." Hegel Bulletin 23, no. 1-2 (January 2002): 16–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200007874.
Full textAbstract:
Certain men, rejecting the truth, are introducing among us false stories and vain genealogies, which serve rather to controversies than to God's work of building up in faith. By their craftily constructed rhetoric they lead astray the minds of the inexperienced, and take them captive, corrupting the oracles of the Lord, and being evil expounders of what was well spoken.Thus did Irenaeus of Lyons initiate his treatise on the Refutation and Overthrow of the Knowledge Falsely So-called, commonly called Adversus Haereses. The targets of his polemic were the Gnostics: Valentinus, Marcion, Cerinthus and Basilides; among whom, for our purposes, we shall concentrate simply on Valentinus. According to Irenaeus, the Valentinians held that “neither was the Word made flesh, nor Christ, nor the Saviour who was made out of all the Aeons. For they allege that the Word and Christ never came into this world, and that the Saviour was neither incarnate nor suffered, but that he descended as a dove [that is, at his baptism] upon that Jesus who was made by dispensation, and when he has proclaimed the unknown Father ascended again into the Pleroma [that is, when Jesus said, ‘Into thy hands I commend my spirit.’] It is important to notice the distinction Valentinus draws between Christ, the divine Son (who simply appropriates the human Jesus for a time), and the Jesus who was born of Mary and died on Calvary. They are not to be simply identified.