Log in

Relevant bibliographies by topics / Heuristic biases / Books

To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Heuristic biases.

Books on the topic 'Heuristic biases'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 26 January 2023

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 50 books for your research on the topic 'Heuristic biases.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse books on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

1

Linda, Heath, Loyola University of Chicago. Applied Social Psychology Graduate Program., and Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues., eds. Applications of heuristics and biases to social issues. New York: Plenum Press, 1994.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Chatfield, Tom, and Tom Chatfield. Heuristics and Cognitive Biases. 2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks California 91320: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781071880029.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Thomas, Gilovich, Griffin Dale W, and Kahneman Daniel, eds. Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Heath, Linda, R. Scott Tindale, John Edwards, Emil J. Posavac, Fred B. Bryant, Eaaron Henderson-King, Yolanda Suarez-Balcazar, and Judith Myers, eds. Applications of Heuristics and Biases to Social Issues. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-9238-6.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Thomas, Gilovich, Griffin Dale W, and Kahneman Daniel 1934-, eds. Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgement. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Schwenk, Charles R. The manipulation of cognitive biases and heuristics in the creation of commitment. [Urbana, Ill.]: College of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1985.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Kahneman, Daniel. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Kahneman, Daniel. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Collins, Megan Eileen, and Thomas A. Loughran. Rational Choice Theory, Heuristics, and Biases. Edited by Wim Bernasco, Jean-Louis van Gelder, and Henk Elffers. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199338801.013.1.

Full text

Abstract:

A growing body of research on offender decision making has focused on studying the use of heuristic biases, or cognitive shortcuts taken in certain situations, when offenders make decisions in the face of uncertainty. The idea is that when offenders (or any individuals) are contemplating uncertain decisions with limited time, information, or resources to make a rational choice calculus, heuristics enable a suitable decision to be reached quickly. However, often heuristics can lead to biases, errors, preference reversals, or suboptimal decisions. This chapter considers departures from rational behavior and heuristics and biases, specifically how the latter have been integrated into the study of offenders’ choice calculus. In particular, it reviews how biases and deviations from rationality have been routinely observed when studying offender decisions.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Campbell, Marcella E. Investigating self-assessment accuracy from the heuristics and biases perspective. 2005.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Heath, Linda. Applications of Heuristics and Biases to Social Issues. Springer, 2013.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

John, Edwards, Fred B. Bryant, Linda Heath, Emil J. Posavac, and R. Scott Tindale. Applications of Heuristics and Biases to Social Issues. Springer London, Limited, 2013.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

John, Edwards, Linda Heath, and R. Scott Tindale. Applications of Heuristics and Biases to Social Issues. Springer, 2013.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Gerken, Mikkel. The Psychology of Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198803454.003.0006.

Full text

Abstract:

Chapter 5 surveys some empirical psychology and outlines some folk epistemological principles. By considering the heuristic and biases tradition, it is argued that ordinary knowledge ascriptions are standardly driven by heuristic processes and, therefore, associated with biases. This idea is integrated with a dual process framework for mental state ascriptions. On this basis, some of the central heuristic principles that govern intuitive judgments about knowledge ascriptions are articulated, and some of the biases associated with these principles are identified. The result is an account of an epistemic focal bias in intuitive judgments about knowledge ascription. Thus, Chapter 5 provides both a survey of relevant psychology and a development of the folk psychological principles governing knowledge ascriptions.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Sullivan, Meghan. Understanding Temporal Neutrality. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198812845.003.0008.

Full text

Abstract:

This chapter provides an error theory for why our time biases are persistent even though irrational. It also explains what a temporally neutral approach to rational planning does and does not require. Drawing on work in the philosophy and psychology of emotions, the chapter defends an evolved emotional heuristic theory of temporal discounting. On this account, near-biased anxiety and relief are adaptations for tracking probabilities. Similar future‐biased emotions are adaptions explained by the benefit of focusingmore attention onwhat iswithin an organism’s control. While these emotions are useful in simple planning problems, they are not evidence that time biases are rational. The chapter argues that temporal neutrality does not entail that one must live stoically or dwell on past events. And it outlines five practical consequences of temporally neutral planning.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

Group, Behavioral Research. BIAS: Encyclopaedia of Biases and Heuristics. Independently Published, 2020.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

Gilovich, Thomas, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, eds. Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511808098.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

William J. [from old catalog] Jenkins and Camille Morvan. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Taylor & Francis Group, 2017.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

19

William J. [from old catalog] Jenkins and Camille Morvan. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Taylor & Francis Group, 2017.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

20

(Editor), Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin (Editor), and Daniel Kahneman (Editor), eds. Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

Gilovich, Thomas. Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

Kahneman, Daniel, Thomas Gilovich, and Dale Griffin. Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

Priest, Henry. Biasnomics: How Biases and Heuristics Impact Economic Decisions. Independently Published, 2019.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

24

(Editor), Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin (Editor), and Daniel Kahneman (Editor), eds. Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

25

Kahneman, Daniel. Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

26

Priest, Henry. 101 Biases in Banking: Cognitive Biases and Heuristics in Banking and Financial Services. Independently Published, 2019.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

27

Priest, Henry. BIASES and HEURISTICS: The Complete Collection of Cognitive Biases and Heuristics That Impair Decisions in Banking, Finance and Everything Else. Independently Published, 2019.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

28

Priest, Henry. Behavioral Economics for Beginners: How Biases and Heuristics Impact Economic Decisions. Independently Published, 2019.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

29

Matthews, Gerald, Jeremy Burrus, Robert Schneider, Franklin Zaromb, and Abigail Gertner. What We Know about Heuristics and Biases: Learning, Work, and Everyday Life. Taylor & Francis Group, 2023.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

30

Matthews, Gerald, Jeremy Burrus, Robert Schneider, Franklin Zaromb, and Abigail Gertner. What We Know about Heuristics and Biases: Learning, Work, and Everyday Life. Taylor & Francis Group, 2023.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

31

Matthews, Gerald, Jeremy Burrus, Robert Schneider, Franklin Zaromb, and Abigail Gertner. What We Know about Heuristics and Biases: Learning, Work, and Everyday Life. Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

32

William J. [from old catalog] Jenkins and Camille Morvan. Analysis of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman's: Judgment under Uncertainty Heuristics and Biases. Macat International Limited, 2017.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

33

William J. [from old catalog] Jenkins and Camille Morvan. Analysis of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman's Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Macat International Limited, 2017.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

34

William J. [from old catalog] Jenkins and Camille Morvan. Analysis of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman's Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Macat International Limited, 2017.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

35

Alfano, Mark, and Joshua August Skorburg. Extended Knowledge, the Recognition Heuristic, and Epistemic Injustice. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198769811.003.0014.

Full text

Abstract:

This chapter argues that the interaction of biased media coverage and widespread employment of the recognition heuristic can produce epistemic injustices. It explains the recognition heuristic as studied by Gigerenzer and colleagues, highlighting how some of its components are largely external to the cognitive agent. Having connected the recognition heuristic with recent work on the hypotheses of embedded, extended, and scaffolded cognition, it argues that the recognition heuristic is best understood as an instance of scaffolded cognition. It considers the double-edged sword of cognitive scaffolding before using Fricker’s (2007) concept of epistemic injustice to characterize the nature and harm of these false inferences, emphasizing the Darfur Inference. Finally, it uses data-mining and an empirical study to show how Gigerenzer’s population estimation task is liable to produce Darfur Inferences. It ends with some speculative remarks on more important Darfur Inferences, and how to avoid them by scaffolding better.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

36

Wadeson, Nigel. Cognitive Aspects of Entrepreneurship: Decision-Making and Attitudes to Risk. Edited by Anuradha Basu, Mark Casson, Nigel Wadeson, and Bernard Yeung. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199546992.003.0004.

Full text

Abstract:

This article reviews literature on the study of the cognition of entrepreneurs, and how this affects their attitudes to risk. The review begins with the heuristics and biases approach. Various decision-making biases related to over-optimism are then considered. Following this perceived self-efficacy, intrinsic motivation and intentions-based models are discussed. Some theories dealing specifically with attitudes to risk are then covered. These include prospect theory, Kahneman and Lovalo's model of risk-taking, and Das and Teng's theory of risk horizons and future orientations. Finally, the option value and information cost approach to the analysis of entrepreneurs' decision-making is discussed. Some relevant references to culture research are also given in the conclusion.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

37

Luo, Guo Ying. Asset Price Response to New Information: The Effects of Conservatism Bias and Representativeness Heuristic. Springer London, Limited, 2013.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

38

Asset Price Response To New Information The Effects Of Conservatism Bias And Representativeness Heuristic. Springer-Verlag New York Inc., 2013.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

39

Akin, Heather, and Ashley R. Landrum. A Recap. Edited by Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Dan M. Kahan, and Dietram A. Scheufele. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190497620.013.48.

Full text

Abstract:

This synthesis chapter summarizes the central themes from the essays in Part VI of the handbook. The uniting refrain of this section is the important role of the audience, and specifically how audience choices, attention, biases, and heuristics affect interpretation of complex scientific topics. We first summarize what we term “phenomena of selection” and describes empirical insights indicating that audience and communicator choices can cause diverging views. The second focus is how audiences reason about scientific information, with particular attention to some of these biases and motivations relied on in these contexts. The unique challenges these phenomena pose to the field are then discussed, including (a) how communicators can effectively condense scientific information while retaining accuracy and the interest of audiences and (b) how science communication must accommodate for audiences’ use of values and cognitive shortcuts to make sense of these issues.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

40

Epstein, Joshua M. Introduction. Princeton University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691158884.003.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

This book describes an agent-based model dubbed Agent_Zero, which was constructed using a significant volume of contemporary cognitive neuroscience. Agent_Zero is a new theoretical entity that exhibits observable behaviors generated by the interaction of affective, cognitive, and social components. Its affective component is based on the Rescorla–Wagner model of conditioning and extinction, while its cognitive (deliberative) component reflects biases and heuristics in probability estimation. The book presents Agent_Zero as a new, neurocognitively grounded, foundation for generative social science, a simple explicit model of individual behavior in groups that includes some representation of “the passions,” of (imperfect) reason, and of social influence. This introduction explains the motivations for constructing Agent_Zero, its components, and its basic mathematical scaffolding. It also provides an overview of the book's organization.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

41

McDaniels, Magnus. How Our Brains Betray Us: Change the Way You Think and Make Better Decisions by Understanding the Cognitive Biases and Heuristics That Destroy Our Lives! Independently Published, 2022.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

42

McDaniels, Magnus. How Our Brains Betray Us: Change the Way You Think and Make Better Decisions by Understanding the Cognitive Biases and Heuristics That Destroy Our Lives! Independently Published, 2022.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

43

Orentlicher, Diane. Denial and Acknowledgment in Serbia. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190882273.003.0007.

Full text

Abstract:

A paramount hope of Serbians who supported the ICTY was that its judgments would convince Serbian society that Serbs committed mass atrocities with extensive support from the Serbian government, and would persuade Serbia’s citizens and government to condemn those crimes unequivocally. During the first five or six years following the collapse of the Milošević regime, there was palpable progress in this sphere, a trend many Serbians believe the ICTY influenced. More recent years have, however, seen a rise in denialism. This chapter explores factors that account for each of these trends. Its conclusions reflect the rich insights of Serbians who administered periodic public opinion surveys, as well as social science research illuminating dynamics behind entrenched yet false beliefs, such as confirmation biases, motivated reasoning, social identity, heuristics, and framing effects.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

44

Hilgard, Joseph, and Nan Li. A Recap. Edited by Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Dan M. Kahan, and Dietram A. Scheufele. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190497620.013.8.

Full text

Abstract:

This synthesis chapter recapitulates the major themes of Part I. The chapter proposes that science communication is challenging because science is complex, because humans interpret evidence in biased ways, and because the science–media landscape is shifting. Consequently, the mere supply of scientific information alone is not likely to guide audiences to science-consistent beliefs. Instead, science communicators must learn to navigate both the cultural implications of their work and the heuristics audiences use when deciding whom to trust. Consideration must be given to scientific knowledge and the audience’s values alike. A science of science communication provides an understanding of these multiple considerations and promotes effective dialogue between scientists and the public.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

45

Yeske, Dave, and Elissa Buie. Psychological Aspects of Financial Planning. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190269999.003.0015.

Full text

Abstract:

This chapter discusses personal financial planning, which is an interdisciplinary practice that employs a six-step process to develop integrated strategies for individuals and families to efficiently mobilize their human and financial capital to achieve their life goals. Financial planning draws from various disciplines, including counseling, psychology, finance, economics, and law. It includes budgeting and cash flow planning, risk management, insurance planning, investment planning, retirement and employee benefits planning, tax planning, and estate planning. The strategic process whereby financial planners develop integrated strategies that draw from all these fields in pursuit of client goals is the profession’s unique domain. Heuristics and mental biases to which clients may be prone overlay the entire financial planning process, however. Financial planners should understand and consider these issues when developing recommendations uniquely suited to each client, maximizing the probability that the client will embrace and implement the recommended strategies.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

46

Minelli, Alessandro. Evolvability and Its Evolvability. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199377176.003.0007.

Full text

Abstract:

No universally accepted notion of evolvability is available, focus being alternatively put onto either genetic or phenotypic change. The heuristic power of this concept is best found when considering the intricacies of the genotype→phenotype map, which is not necessarily predictable, expression of variation depending on the structure of gene networks and especially on the modularity and robustness of developmental systems. We can hardly ignore evolvability whenever studying the role of cryptic variation in evolution, the often pervious boundary between phenotypic plasticity and the expression of a genetic polymorphism, the major phenotypic leaps that the mechanisms of development can produce based on point mutations, or the morphological stasis that reveals how robust a developmental process can be in front of genetic change. Evolvability is subject itself to evolution, but it is still uncertain to what extent there is positive selection for enhanced evolvability, or for evolvability biased in a specific direction.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

47

Bovens, Mark, and Anchrit Wille. The Consequences of Diploma Democracy. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198790631.003.0008.

Full text

Abstract:

Why bother about the rise of diploma democracy? We discuss the consequences of diploma democracy for each of the elements of democracy—representation, responsiveness, accountability, and legitimacy—that we distinguished in Chapter 3. Descriptive representation matters for symbolic, heuristic, and democratic reasons. The over-representation of university graduates in parliament is simply not in line with the preferences of large parts of the electorate. Moreover, educational background is not politically neutral. Different levels of education may lead to diverging preferences and standards, particularly with regard to cultural issues. Because the higher educated are over-represented among political participants and politicians, the political agenda tends to be biased towards their priorities and preferences. This may cause cynicism and distrust. A diploma democracy may not remain stable if large parts of the population feel they are no longer represented politically, and if they have no hope of being able to improve their social position.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

48

Braman, Eileen. Cognition in the Courts. Edited by Lee Epstein and Stefanie A. Lindquist. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199579891.013.31.

Full text

Abstract:

This chapter critically evaluates how experiments are used to study cognitive processes involved in legal reasoning. Looking at research on legal presumptions, heuristic processing, and various types of bias in judicial decision-making, the analysis considers how experiments with judges, lay participants, and other legally trained populations have contributed to our understanding of the psychological processes involved in fact-finding and legal decision-making. It explores how behavioral economics, dual process models, cultural cognition, and motivated reasoning frameworks have been used to inform experimental research. The chapter concludes with a discussion of what findings add to our normative understanding of issues like accuracy and neutrality in decision-making and a call to better integrate knowledge gained through experimental methods across disciplinary boundaries.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

49

Gerken, Mikkel. On Folk Epistemology. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198803454.001.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

On Folk Epistemology is a book about how we ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others. Empirical evidence suggests that we do so early and often in thought as well as in talk. Since such knowledge ascriptions are central to how we navigate social life, it is important to understand our basis for making them. A central claim of the book is that factors that have nothing to do with knowledge may lead to systematic mistakes in everyday ascriptions of knowledge. These mistakes are explained by an empirically informed account of how ordinary knowledge ascriptions are the product of cognitive heuristics that are associated with biases. In developing this account, the book presents work in cognitive psychology and pragmatics. But it also contributes to epistemology proper. For example, it develops positive epistemic norms of action and assertion. Moreover, it critically assesses contextualism, knowledge-first methodology, pragmatic encroachment theories, and more. Many of these approaches are argued to overestimate the epistemological significance of folk epistemology. In contrast, the book develops an equilibristic methodology according to which intuitive judgments about knowledge cannot straightforwardly play a role as data for epistemological theorizing. Rather, epistemological theorizing is required to interpret empirical findings. Consequently, On Folk Epistemology helps to lay the foundation for an emerging subfield that intersects philosophy and the cognitive sciences: the empirical study of folk epistemology.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

50

Bahrami, Bahador. Making the most of individual differences in joint decisions. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198789710.003.0004.

Full text

Abstract:

Evidence for and against the idea that “two heads are better than one” is abundant. This chapter considers the contextual conditions and social norms that predict madness or wisdom of crowds to identify the adaptive value of collective decision-making beyond increased accuracy. Similarity of competence among members of a collective impacts collective accuracy, but interacting individuals often seem to operate under the assumption that they are equally competent even when direct evidence suggest the opposite and dyadic performance suffers. Cross-cultural data from Iran, China, and Denmark support this assumption of similarity (i.e., equality bias) as a sensible heuristic that works most of the time and simplifies social interaction. Crowds often trade off accuracy for other collective benefits such as diffusion of responsibility and reduction of regret. Consequently, two heads are sometimes better than one, but no-one holds the collective accountable, not even for the most disastrous of outcomes.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!