Academic literature on the topic 'Ḥikmah'

This article tries to explore Jamal's interpretation of ḥikmah in the Quran. Beside the discourse of ḥikmah still being polemic, Jamal’s decision to lay ḥikmah into fundamental place upon his broad thought is an obvious factor why they were chosen herein. One could catch the later through how Jamal in his interpretation had parallelized ḥikmah with Syafii’s particular word, qiyās. Jamal criticized Syafii’s interpretation in relation to ḥikmah which state that ḥikmah was not anything except sunnah. On another hand, he also put his construction of ḥikmah into what he called as new Islamic systematic knowledge, al-mandhumah al-jadidah li ma’rifat al-Islamiyyah. He regretted fiqh which had made many Moslems being oppressed either in thought or physic and subsequently proposed ḥikmah as the change of fiqh as the third source of new Islamic systematic knowledge. In time, there are two critical points concerning Jamal’s interpretation and the oppressed, those are Jamal’s status as a labor activist and Quranic revolution as the giant project. The article is, thus, plagued to analyze what actually Jamal desired through his interpretation regarding the new source, the Quranic revolution, and labor activist. The frame of critical discourse analysis of Van Dijk felt suitable to be employed herein.

Di antara sebab perbedaan pendapat ulama dalam masalah hukum adalah penempatan posisi sunah Nabi: setingkat dengan al-Qur'an atau berada di bawahnya. Hal ini diperkuat oleh wacana bahwa sunah adalah bagian dari wahyu melalui teori ḥikmah yang dikemukakan oleh para ulama fikih. Konsekuensi dari teori ḥikmah ini, ketentuan yang dimuat di dalam sunah memiliki otoritas setingkat dengan al-Qur'an. Kata “ḥikmah” sendiri memang disebutkan beberapa kali di dalam al-Qur'an dan menjadi argumentasi utama para ulama. Penelusuran terhadap penggunaan kata tersebut dalam al-Qur'an menunjukkan bahwa kata ḥikmah memiliki banyak arti; al-Qur'an menggunakannya tidak hanya seputar Nabi Muhammad, tetapi juga di lingkungan Nabi lain dan manusia biasa. Karena itu, mewacanakan sunah sebagai bagian dari wahyu dengan teori ḥikmah memiliki kelemahan. Selain itu, praktik para Sahabat yang memisahkan berbagai peran Muhammad: Nabi, pemimpin/kepala negara, dan manusia biasa menunjukkan bahwa ḥikmah yang otoritasnya setingkat dengan wahyu hanya dalam masalah tasyrī’ (hukum). Hal ini dikuatkan oleh unsur kemanusiaan Muhammad yang disebut dengan jelas dalam al-Qur'an.

<p><strong>Abstract :</strong> In early period of Islamic thoughts, Philosophy and Irfan were acting as if two opposite poles which are difficult, if not to say impossible, to reconcile. Philosophy more emphasizes on discursive reason as an instrument, while Irfan more believes in intuitive witnessing (mukāsyafah) and puts reason in doubt, to disclose the ultimate reality. However, Muslim philosophers through their deep investigations on both realms tried to end the controversy and to reconcile between them. This spirit has been started by a great philosopher, Suhrawardi, by means of his philosophical thoughts well-known by Illuminationism (Ḥikmah Isyraqiyyah) and found its perfect formulation in the hands of prominent philosopher, Mulla Sadra, with his Ḥikmah Muta’aliyah. This writing tries to adduce some knots of interaction between Islamic Philosophy and Irfan which were formulated by Mulla Sadra in his special and brilliant theories. He succeeded to combine some great thoughts of philosophers and ‘urafā’ in one construction of hikmah, in such a way it can create a harmony which completes each other.</p><p><em>Keywords : ḥikmah muta’aliyah, discursive reason, intuitive witnessing, ḥikmah dzauqiyyah, ḥikmah bahtsiah. </em> </p><p> </p><p><strong>Abstrak :</strong> Filsafat dan Irfan pada periode awal pemikiran Islam tampak seolah-olah dua kutub berlawanan yang sulit, jika tidak dikatakan tidak mungkin, untuk dipertemukan. Untuk menyingkap hakikat, Filsafat lebih menitikberatkan akal diskursif sebagai instrumen, sementara Irfan lebih percaya kepada penyaksian intuitif (mukāasyafah) dan meragukan akal. Namun demikian, para filosof filsuf Muslim dengan kedalaman telaah mereka terhadap kedua ranah tersebut telah berusaha mengakhiri pertentangan dan mendamaikan keduanya. Semangat ini telah dimulai oleh seorang filosof filsuf besar, Suhrawardi, dengan pemikiran filsafat Iluminasionismenya (Ḥikmah Isyraqiyyah) dan menemukan bentuknya yang lebih sempurna di tangan seorang filosof filsuf ternama, Mulla Sadra, dengan Ḥikmah Muta’aliyahnya. Tulisan ini berusaha untuk menunjukkan simpul-simpul interaksi pemikiran Filsafat Islam dan Irfan yang digagas oleh Mulla Sadra dalam teori-teorinya yang khas dan brillian. Ia berhasil memadukan berbagai pemikiran besar filosof filsuf dan ‘urafā’ dalam satu bangunan hikmah sehingga tercipta suatu keharmonisan yang saling menyempurnakan dari kedua ranah tersebut.</p><em>Kata-kata Kunci : ḥikmah muta’aliyah, akal diskursif, penyaksian intuitif, ḥikmah dzauqiyyah, ḥikmah bahtsiah.</em>

Kemajuan teknologi dan informasi yang kian berkembang pesat menjadi tantangan semua umat Islam yang ada untuk senantiasa menjaga nilai – nilai keIslaman yang telah diatur oleh agama Islam itu sendiri. Zaman yang telah modern saat ini tentu banyak bermunculan masalah – masalah baru ditengah kehidupan Islam yang dapat mengurangi kadar ketakwaan dan keimanan kepada sang Khalik. Dilihat dari segi teknik Melihat hal ini seorang Da’i haruslah mengetahui cara – cara yang akan ditempuh untuk menyampaikan dan meluruskan keadaan agar umat Islam bisa menjani kehidupan didunia sesuai dengan norma – norma yang berlaku di dalam agama Islam. Mencari celah dalam memberikan nasihat, melihat kondisi dan situasi, serta bersikap lemah lembut akan menarik minat untuk mengikuti dan mendengarkan nasihat tersebut.

Artikel ini mengetengahkan sesuatu keadaan, situasi atau masalah yang dilakukan dalam perubatan tradisional Melayu bagi mendiagnosis ketidakseimbangan badan yang berkaitan dengan empat cecair badan (akhlat) yang mempengaruhi sistem tubuh badan. Kajian ini hanya memfokuskan ciri-ciri diagnosis dan distrukturkan semula maklumat berdasarkan kategori dan justifikasi dalam amalan perubatan tradisional dalam kearifan masyarakat. Tujuan utama artikel ini adalah untuk menganalisis kandungan teks berdasarkan tiga kriteria, iaitu (i) mengenal pasti ciri-ciri diagnosis penyakit yang digunakan (ii) menganalisis elemen penting yang mempengaruhi diagnosis penyakit, (iii) kaedah asas dalam mendiagnosis penyakit berdasarkan kitab perubatan Melayu Al-Raḥmah fī al-Ṭibb wa al-Ḥikmah. Kajian ini mengaplikasikan reka bentuk kualitatif, iaitu menggunakan kaedah kepustakaan dan analisis kandungan teks. Manuskrip perubatan Melayu Al-Raḥmah fī al-Ṭibb wa al-Ḥikmah yang mengandungi lima bab, digunakan sebagai korpus kajian. Hasil daripada kajian ini mendapati amalan diagnosis di dalam perubatan Melayu berdasarkan kitab perubatan Melayu Al-Raḥmah fī al-Ṭibb wa al-Ḥikmah ini menekankan tentang ketidakseimbangan tubuh badan manusia yang dipengaruhi oleh keadaan empat cecair badan, iaitu balgham (dahak/kahak), dammi (darah), safrawi (hempedu kuning) dan sawdawi (hempedu hitam) serta mizaj (hasil campuran unsur, atau sifat tubuh badan, temperament). Justeru, dengan adanya maklumat analisis kandungan teks ini dapat menunjukkan perubatan tradisional Melayu yang menitikberatkan kaedah mengenal dan mengesan penyakit serta mengetengahkan amalan diagnosis dalam perubatan tradisional Melayu yang merupakan satu usaha penyembuhan penyakit dan mengekalkan kesihatan badan. Kaedah ini juga menyumbang kepada amalan perubatan mengubati penyakit secara sinergi dan komprehensif, iaitu mengintegrasikan perubatan tradisional dan moden.

Courtesy or adab is crucial in human life as it influences many other aspects. Addressing the current adab crisis is essential to fostering a civilized society. One solution to this crisis is the application of wisdom (ḥikmah). This research analyzes Hamkas thoughts on resolving the adab crisis through ḥikmah. The study employs a literature review method with a content analysis approach, utilizing data from Hamka’s works and books, especially Tafsīr al-Azhar, and journals related to his thoughts. Data analysis involved three steps: compare, contrast, and critique. The research reveals that Hamka defines wisdom as the result of thinking that develops through deep experience and practice, which guides individuals toward truth and wisdom in living life. Hamka proposes three main approaches to obtaining wisdom: understanding the Qur’ān deeply, thinking critically, and emulating good behavior. As a solution to the crisis of adab, he emphasizes strengthening spiritual intelligence, which consists of seven main aspects: al-rūḥ, al-qalb, al-nafs, al-’aql, īmān, ‘ibādah, and adab. This study argues that spiritual intelligence is considered fundamental in maintaining mental health and forming the character of civilized and integral individuals.

A religious experience in the neuroscience view is interpreted as a symptom of neurological disorders of the brain. The neuroscience view is one of the various views that deny the reality of religious experience. Through empirical research instruments, neuroscientists have found that the soul is identical to the brain, which means that every activity can be measured through the brain. This has implications for the experiences of the Prophets in receiving revelations as the result of brain disorders. This paper seeks to explain religious experience through its ontological basis, namely the existence of immaterial existence and the existence of the soul, as well as its epistemological basis, namely the performance of the faculty of knowledge, both of which cannot be separated. The research method used is descriptive-analytic with the philosophical approach of the soul of Al-Ḥikmah Muta’āliyah. The results of this study indicate that the Al-Ḥikmah Muta’āliyah which was founded by Mulla Ṣadrā proves the existence of the wujūd levels, including the soul, explaining the various levels of perception carried out by the soul corresponding to the various levels of existence. Ṣadrā thought can explain the concept of the soul as an immaterial substance that can perceive metaphysical objects as the emanation of God

This article attempts to trace and describe the correlation of ḥikmah (wisdom) and inclusivity in the Qur’ān along with their connection to the dynamics of development of contemporary Islamic thought. Ḥikmah in its implied meaning as wisdom of thinking—which puts emphasis on reason, acquirement, and ability—has been compatible with the inclusivity of Islamic thought in several aspects. Such inclusivity can be observed, among others, within the following aspects, are: firstly, inclusive refers to tolerance and it implies acceptance toward plurality, heterogeneity, and self-willingness to actively participate in it. Inclusive thought brings about tolerance. Tolerance explicitly comprises conformity with wisdom in which each entity highly emphasizes public benefit. Secondly, inclusive means freedom. Freedom requires one’s discretion to use reason as a means of truth search. This meaning is closely related to wisdom, which perceives thinking and reasoning as a way to reach the truth. Thirdly, inclusive also means freedom. Freedom necessitates a universal and non-coercive Islamic thought. Terminologically, it has similar meaning to wisdom where each side lays emphasis on the implementation of a universal Islamic thought. Islam provides its adherents wide space to freely choose their way of life, including right to embrace certain religious ideology.

La présente étude, centrée sur Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (549/1155-587/1191 ou début 1192) Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, développe quelques explorations préliminaires sur sa remarquable épistémologie de la présence, en mettant l'accent sur son postulat de la priorité de l'unité de l'expérience par la présence. En outre, cette étude devrait ouvrir la voie à une réponse aux défis lancés par Tony Street et d'autres sur la compatibilité de la critique de Suhrawardī à l'égard d'Ibn Sīnā avec le développement d'un syllogisme temporel et modal qui semble assez proche de celui d'Ibn Sinā. Les modalités de Suhrawardī, selon nous, devraient être comprises comme les différentes façons dont un prédicat se relie à son sujet plutôt que comme des opérateurs propositionnels. La modalité nécessairement nécessaire relie d'une part, les présences réelles du terme sujet aux présences réelles du terme prédicat immédiatement (c'est-à-dire que le prédicat s'applique à chaque individu instanciant le sujet au moment même où cette actualisation du sujet a lieu) ; d'autre part, la modalité nécessairement contingente exprime une relation entre les termes qui n'est pas basée sur la présence réelle du prédicat mais sur des présences qui pourraient devenir réelles au cours d'une certaine période de temps. De plus, la prédication nécessairement nécessaire admet soit : une simple conversion : (correspond au prédicable par définition chez Aristote, par exemple tout humain est nécessairement un être rationnel par nécessité, et tout être rationnel est nécessairement un humain par nécessité) ou non (correspond au prédicable par genre chez Aristote, par exemple tout humain est nécessairement un animal rationnel par nécessité, mais tout animal n'est pas nécessairement humain par nécessité). La prédication nécessairement contingente est nécessaire car elle attribue une capacité en tant que potentiel inhérent au sujet - c'est-à-dire qu'elle peut être attribuée en tant que capacité non actualisée de toute présence du sujet. Elle est contingente, car cette capacité s'actualise une fois et une fois non. La prédication contingente nécessaire peut également être déclinée : en admettant une simple conversion (correspond au prédicable par proprium chez Aristote, comme les capacités apprises d'être lettré ou musicien, et les capacités ou potentialités non apprises comme la capacité de rire - puisque chaque humain a le potentiel (qua human) d'être lettré ou musicien par nécessité et vice-versa) et en n'admettant pas cette conversion (correspond à une capacité inhérente au genre du sujet, comme la capacité de respirer telle qu'elle est attribuée de manière contingente aux humains par nécessité, non pas parce qu'ils sont des humains, mais parce qu'ils sont des animaux - ce qui est le genre de l'humain). Alors que l'attribution d'une capacité non acquise, telle que la respiration, à toutes les instances d'un terme sujet, implique de montrer que chaque individu qui incarne le sujet, actualise cette capacité au moins à un moment (ou à des séquences de moments) ; l'attribution d'une capacité acquise à un sujet universellement quantifié, revient à affirmer une telle contingence à l'égard du genre entier - par exemple, l'attribution de la capacité nécessaire mais contingente de l'alphabétisation aux humains suppose qu'au moins un individu, au moins à un moment, actualise l'alphabétisation (pas nécessairement toujours le même individu). Dans les dernières parties de notre thèse, nous montrerons comment ces notions façonnent la théorie du syllogisme de Suhrawardī du syllogisme. La partie 4 contenant une traduction en français de toutes les parties d'al-Ishrāq, concernant la logique, fait partie intégrante de la thèse. Son intégration comme partie de la thèse s'explique par le fait qu'à notre connaissance, il n'en existe à ce jour aucune traduction française<br>The present study, centered on Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (549/1155-587/1191 or at the beginning 1192) Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, develops some preliminary explorations on his remarkable epistemology of presence, with a special accent on his postulate of the priority of the unity of experience through presence. Furthermore, this study should pave the way to answer the challenges of Tony Street and others on the compatibility of Suhrawardī's critique of Ibn Sīnā with the development of a temporal and modal syllogism which seems quite close to that of Ibn Sinā. Suhrawardī's modalities, we claim should be understood as the different ways a predicate relates to its subject rather than as propositional operators. The necessarily necessary modality relates actual presences of the the term subject to acual presences of the predicate term immediately (i.e. the predicate applies to every individual instantiating the subject at the same very moment when that actualization of the subject takes place) ; on the other hand, the necessarily contingent modality expresses a relation between the terms that is not based on actual presence of the predicate but presences that might become actual during a stretch of time. Moreover, the necessarily necessary predication admits either : a simple conversion : (corresponds to Aristotle's predicable by definition, e.g. every human is necessarily a rational being by necessity, and every rational being is necessarily a human by necessity) or not (corresponds to Aristotle's predicable by genus, e.g. every human is necessarily an animal rational being by necessity, but not every animal is necessarily human by necessity). Necessarily contingent predication is necessary since it attributes a capacity as a potential inherent to the subject - i.e. it can be attributed as a non acualized capacity of every presence of the subject. It is contingent, since this capacity actualizes once and once not. Necessary contingent predication, can also be declined : by admitting simple conversion (corresponds to Aristotle's predicable by proprium, such as the learned capacities of being literate or being a musician, and the unlearned capacities or potentialities such as the capacity of laughing - since every human has the potential (qua human) to be literate or being a musician by necessity and viceversa) and by not admitting this conversion (corresponds to a capacity inherent to the genus of the subject, such as the capacity of breathing as contingently attributed to humans by necessity, not because they are humans, but because they are animals - which is the genus of human). Whereas predicating an unlearned ability, such as breathing, to all instances of a subject term, involves showing that each indvidual that instances the subject, actualizes this capacity at least at one moment (or sequences of moments); attributing an acquired ability to a universally quantified subject, is tantamount to asserting such a contingency with respect to the entire genus—for example, attributing the necessary but contingent capacity of literacy to humans assumes that at least one individual, at at least one time, actualizes literacy (not necessarily always the same individual) In the final parts of our thesis, we will show how these notions shape Suhrawardī theory of syllogism. Part D, containg a translation into French of all sections of al-Ishrāq concerning logic, constitutes an integral part of the thesis. Its integration as part of the thesis can be explained by the fact that, as far as we know, there is up to now no French translation of it

Mir Abu al-Qasim Findiriski (970/1560 1050/1640) a prominent scholar of the Ṣafwid period (906/1501 1148/1736) played an important role in the development of Shi'i Irfan and Ḥikmah. He was a classmate and close friend of Mir Damad (950/1543 1041/1631) and Shaykh-i Baha'i (953/1546 1030/1622). Beside the other major juridical, traditional, philosophical, and mystical accomplishments of the School of Isfahan, the philosophical and mystical contributions of Mir Findiriski are invaluable. Although he was not a fertile writer, the uniqueness of his works has drawn remarkable attention. Many considered him a great teacher of peripatetic philosophy. This thesis aims to display Mir Findiriski's achievements in these fields and attempts to exhibit the originality in his exceptional mystico-philosophical ode (qaṣidah ḥikmiyyah ). In this ode Mir Findiriski summarized the principles of ḥikmah. Considering his mystical and scientific writings, and various narrative accounts of his spirituality and super-natural powers, his reputation as a great philosopher and mystic of the Ṣafavid period appears to be well deserved. This thesis evaluates various aspects of his life in some detail and a number of ambiguities surrounding the corpus of his writings are resolved through a complete list of his works. Finally, an overview of his doctrines on ontological as well as epistemological problems in his work is presented.

L’historiographie traditionnelle considère que le druzisme – entendu comme la doctrine religieuse du tawḥīd propre aux Druzes – a connu son apogée au IXe/XVe siècle grâce à l’enseignement et à la direction spirituelle d’al-Sayyid (m. 884/1479). La présente étude a pour objectif d’analyser cette construction d’une figure mythifiée de grand saint et d’un récit peu ancré dans les réalités sociales au niveau local. Une telle révision est rendue possible par un double renouvellement : une lecture critique des sources et un élargissement du corpus à des manuscrits druzes inédits. Confronter les hagiographies sayyidiennes aux chroniques locales permet de distinguer entre les Vitae du saint et le personnage historique d'al-Sayyid, afin d’étudier sa vision, son action et son autorité dans les contrées syriennes du Ġarb et du Šūf. Les traités de droit druze livrent par ailleurs des indications précieuses sur l’organisation nouvelle mise en place par ses disciples après sa mort et sur le fonctionnement des communautés druzes au niveau local. Enfin l’articulation du pouvoir religieux des initiés avec le pouvoir politique des émirs ḥusaynides, issus des Banū Buḥtur, est révélatrice des formes de légitimation qui apparaissent alors<br>Traditional historiography considers that Druzism – understood as the religious doctrine of tawḥīd specific to the Druzes – had its heyday in the 9th/15th century through teaching and spiritual guidance from al-Sayyid (d. 884/1479). The present study aims to analyse this construction of a mythical figure of a great saint as well as that of a narrative scarcely rooted in the local social realities. Such a revision was made possible by double-renewal: a critical reading of the sources and the enrichment of the corpus with unpublished Druze manuscripts. Confronting Sayyidian hagiographies to local chronicles allows us to distinguish between the Vitae of the saint and the historical character of al-Sayyid, and thus to study his vision, action, and authority in the Syrian regions of the Ġarb and Šūf. The Druze law treaties also give valuable information on the new organisation implemented by his followers after his death as well as the functioning of Druze communities at the local level. Finally, the articulation of the religious power of initiates with the political power of the Ḥusaynid emirs from the Banū Buḥtur, reveals the forms of legitimation which then appear

AbstractThis chapter explores the interface between Islam, social work and the common good within the Muslim minority context of Europe. The ethics-law nexus in Muslim tradition is examined to argue for a transformative Islamic engagement with the secular public space. Literature on Islam and social work is limited to providing basic information about Islam to frontline practitioners. The current inquiry intends to develop an Islamic perspective on social work and wellbeing. Increasing association of Muslims with extremism form negative public perceptions of Islam in Europe. Within this discourse of suspicion, Islam is coded as a cause of public harm and ‘Shariʿa law’ is often associated with human rights violations. This study argues that a critical dialogue among the faith-embedded and secular traditions of social ethics in Europe remains vital to fostering a shared sense of common good. Contemporary discussions on social ethics in Islam are dominated by maqāṣid ash-sharī ʿa (objectives of Islamic law) and fiqh al-ʿaqalliyyāt (Muslim minority law). Whilst the former is purported to be a metaethical discourse and the latter implying a contextualising intent, both operate within strict juristic hermeneutics. Alternatively, this inquiry rethinks Shariʿa as relational ethics and practical wisdom (ḥikma), closer to the concept of phronesis in ancient Greek philosophy, guiding human relations as imagined in Qurʾanic anthropology and its vision of a just society. Shariʿa is framed within Islam’s transformative view of human flourishing, tarbiyya. The notion of relational ethics is further grounded in dialogue with phenomenology-informed discussions on ethics, particularly in the work of Levinas, and Habermas’s ‘theory of communicative action’.