Academic literature on the topic 'HISTORY, EUROPEAN (0335)'

Doctor of Philosophy<br>Department of History<br>Michael A. Ramsay<br>At the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain had acquired a vast empire that included territories in Asia, Africa, North America, and Europe that numbered more than a quarter of the earth's population. Britain also possessed the largest army that the state had ever fielded, employing nearly 250,000 troops on station throughout this empire and on fighting fronts in Spain, southern France, the Low Countries, and North America. However, the peace of 1815 and the end of nearly twenty-five years of war with France brought with it significant problems for Britain. Years of war had saddled the state with a massive debt of nearly £745,000; a threefold increase from its total debt in 1793, the year war with the French began. Furthermore, the rapid economic changes brought on by a the state that had transitioned from a wartime economy to one of peacetime caused widespread unemployment and financial dislocation among the British population including the thousands of officers and soldiers who had fought in the Napoleonic Wars and were now demobilized and back into the civilian sector. Lastly, the significant imperial growth had stretched the colonial administrative and bureaucratic infrastructure to the breaking point prompting the Colonial Office and the ruling elites to adopt short-term measures in running its empire. The solution adopted by the Colonial Office in the twenty-five years that followed the Napoleonic Wars was the employment of proconsular despotism. Proconsular despotism is the practice of governing distant territories and provinces by politically safe individuals, most often military men, who identified with and were sympathetic to the aims of the parent state and the ruling elites. The employment of this form of colonial governance helped to alleviate a number of problems that plagued the Crown and Parliament. First, the practice found suitable employment for deserving military officers during a period of army demobilization and sizeable reduction of armed forces. The appointment of military officers to high colonial administrative positions was viewed by Parliament as a reward for distinguished service to the state. Second, the practice enabled Colonial Office to employ officials who had both previous administrative and military experience and who were accustomed to make critical decisions that they believed coincided with British strategic and national interests. Third, the employment of knowledgeable and experienced army officers in colonial posts fulfilled the Parliamentary mandates of curtailing military spending while maintaining security for the colonies. Military officers of all ranks clamored for the opportunities of serving in the colonies. General and field grade officers viewed service in the colonies as a means of maintaining their status and financially supporting their lifestyles. Company grade officers, who primarily came from the emerging middle class, saw colonial service as a means of swift promotion in a peacetime army and of rising socially. Competition for overseas administrative positions was intense and officers frequently employed an intricate and complex pattern of patronage networking. The proconsular system of governing Britain's vast network of colonies flourished in the quarter century following the Battle of Waterloo. In the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars the British officer corps contributed men who became the principal source for trained colonial administrators enabling Britain to effectively manage its immense empire.

This study traces the development of violoncello bowing technique in France, Austria and Germany between the years 1785-1839. Using evidence obtained from contemporary violoncello methods, periodical reviews, iconographic materials, diaries, letters, musical manuscripts, first-edition performance repertoire, and first-hand research at the Library of Congress, Smithsonian Institute and University of California at Berkeley, the technical methodology of each school is examined. By this process, diverse qualities in the playing manner of J. P. Duport, J. L. Duport, Janson, Tricklir, Breval, J. H. Levasseur, Lamare, Hus-Desforges, Baudiot, Norblin, Vaslin and Franchomme, and that of A. Kraft, Ritter, Romberg, N. Kraft, Dotzauer, Lincke, Bohrer, Merk and Kummer are discernible. Such divergences in bowing technique form the basis of dissimilarities present in French and Austro-German violoncello performance of 1785-1839, a circumstance occasioned by a variety of contributing factors. These issues are segregated for investigation. Following the Introduction, Chapters 1 and 2 provide background information regarding the development of the instrument, bow, and bowing techniques before 1785. Chapter 3 discusses design modifications that occurred to the instrument and bow between 1785 and 1839. Chapters 4 and 5 present the biographies of each of the violoncellists examined, while Chapter 6 discusses the influence of performers from the French violin school and the musician interaction brought about by the French Revolution and subsequent wars. Analysis of the varying performance characteristics of the French and Austro-German schools begins with Chapter 7, this chapter and Chapter 8 surveying the performance methodology of each of the violoncellists included in this study. Chapters 9 and 10 assess the consequential relationship of performance technique to performance repertoire and Chapter 11 summarizes the findings of the accomplished research. These findings detail differences in the performance methodology of the French, Austrian and German violoncello schools in the period 1785-1839. The variants evinced include the manner in which the bow and instrument were held, the type of bowing techniques incorporated into the performance repertoire of each nationality and the method of their execution, the way in which the violoncello's varying sonorities were exploited, and the regard for sound quality and volume by performers of each school.<br>Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

Doctor of Philosophy<br>Department of History<br>Robert D. Linder<br>In England, 1532‐1649 was an era during which questions about obedience to rulers dominated ethical discussions. Most English people also respected biblical authority for governing certain behaviors. Obedience was central to the monarchy’s survival and the Bible was central to reformation of an English Church laden with medieval accretions. St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans 13:1‐7 was the most important biblical passage for understanding the Christian’s relationship to civil authority during this period, and interpreters had such high regard for biblical authority that the backing of this passage was crucial to the acceptance of any political theory that involved ideas about obedience or disobedience. Though eisegesis was not out of the question as a technique among these interpreters, societal and political circumstances motivated most exegetes to examine the text more closely than they might have if St. Paul’s meaning had been irrelevant. These conditions led to creative handling of the text that permitted the exegetes to continue to submit to biblical authority while advocating their varied opinions on obedience to civil authority. Some interpreters moved outside the constraints of traditional views of monarchy and obedience to develop a theory that God mediated his call to rulers through those who elected them. Acceptance of this theory finally brought about rejection of divine right monarchy, as symbolized by the execution of Charles I in 1649. By too quickly concluding that these English expositors merely sought biblical justification for their views after the fact, scholars have failed to appreciate how Romans 13 positively shaped Reformation views of the Christian’s relationship to the state. As the title suggests, this study will examine the discernable shift from seeing Romans 13:1‐7 as a text that commands non‐resistance to rulers to one that not only permits disobedience, but requires it. Thus, Romans 13 is not simply an influential political text, but stands as the most important political text of the period under consideration. This dissertation supplies a needed analysis of representative exegesis of Romans 13:1‐7 during this critical period of English history and considers the influence of these expositions on the development of republian ideals.

Master of Arts<br>Department of History<br>Brent Maner<br>During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Bavaria embarked on an ambitious program of reform that fundamentally altered the Bavarian state and society. The men responsible for such dramatic changes were Maximilian IV Joseph, the last Elector and first King of Bavaria, and Maximilian Joseph Graf von Montgelas, his closest advisor. Both Max Joseph and Montgelas sought to modernize their government through the removal of feudal remnants and increased participation of the kingdom’s subjects. Reforms in education and religion were central to this endeavor. Education reforms developed the skills necessary for improving society, increasing the state’s prosperity, and instilling a sense of loyalty to the Bavarian king. Religious reforms helped to eliminate prejudice and better integrate the Protestant and Catholic subjects into Bavarian society, particularly in the areas Bavaria gained during the Napoleonic wars. By maintaining a balance between preserving loyalty to the king and increasing participation in the state’s modernization, the Bavarian monarch hoped to reap the benefits of enlightened reform and prevent revolution. Previous histories of reform during the Napoleonic Era have focused on Austria and Prussia but Bavaria deserves attention as well. There is a pendulum-like quality to Bavarian history that swings between reform and reaction. In 1799 when Max IV Joseph and Montgelas came to Munich, reform and self-preservation in the face of the French Revolution and Napoleon, as well as the changing face of the Holy Roman Empire, served as the impetus for reform. Reform in the early nineteenth century allowed the Bavarian bureaucrats to strengthen the power of the king and increase the wealth of the state. Through a careful analysis of the reform edicts, personal papers of Montgelas, and statements from outside commentators, a clearer picture of reform in Bavaria can be pieced together and the true impact of reform during the Napoleonic Period can be seen; reform that made the Bavaria of Max Joseph almost unrecognizable from the Bavaria of his predecessor.

Doctor of Philosophy<br>Department of History<br>David Stone<br>This manuscript reveals the primary causes of Habsburg defeat both in 1866 and in 1914-1918. The choice of offensive strategy and tactics against an enemy possessing superior weaponry in the Austro-Prussian War and opponents with superior numbers and weapons in the First World War resulted in catastrophe. The inferiority of the Habsburg forces in both wars stemmed from imprudent spending decisions during peacetime rather than conservatism or parliamentary stinginess. The desire to restore the sunken prestige of Austria-Hungary and prove Habsburg great power status drove the military to waste money on an expensive fleet and choose offensive tactics to win great victories. This study shows the civil-military interaction in regard to funding and procurement decisions as well as the deep intellectual debates within the army, which refute the idea that the Habsburg military remained opposed to technology or progress.

Réalisé en co-tutelle avec l'Université Paul-Valéry-Montpellier III.<br>Quels sont les liens entre le renforcement du pouvoir monarchique, d’évolution des méthodes de prédication et la persistance des identités religieuses minoritaires? Au XVIe siècle, les vieux chrétiens d’Espagne ont fait des efforts considérables pour convertir tous les infidèles à la foi catholique. Après avoir contraints les musulmans d’Espagne à se faire baptiser, ils tentèrent de les amener à adhérer « de cœur » à la foi catholique et à se comporter en bons chrétiens. Pour cela, ils eurent recours tant à la persécution qu’à la prédication. Si les historiens ont déjà bien étudié la persécution, notre connaissance des campagnes de prédication demeurait parcellaire. Cette thèse se propose d’y remédier en étudiant les méthodes d’évangélisation des Morisques valenciens entre 1492et 1570. Pour y parvenir, cette thèse étudie les manuels publiés pour soutenir l’effort missionnaire tout au long du siècle. Elle propose que les méthodes d’évangélisation des prédicateurs ont évolué d’une période privilégiant les arguments polémiques à une période mettant l’accent sur l’instruction catéchétique. Ce faisant, les méthodes employées ont mis davantage l’accent sur la responsabilité des Morisques dans le processus de leur propre conversion, plutôt que sur la responsabilité reposant sur le prédicateur de les convaincre d’adhérer au catholicisme. Nous avons ainsi constaté que le passage à ce que nous avons qualifié de « période catéchétique » correspond à l’augmentation en intensité des persécutions. En étudiant les campagnes de prédication dans le royaume de Valence, cette thèse reconstitue les situations où les manuels de polémique (les « antialcorans ») et les catéchismes étaient utilisés. Elle montre comment les méthodes des prédicateurs étaient déterminées par les cadres institutionnels établis. Le passage de la polémique au catéchisme a été guidé en partie par le contexte européen de la réforme, qui incitait à bannir la polémique religieuse en langue vernaculaire et à catéchiser les populations, et en partie par les enjeux sécuritaires qui faisaient craindre toute révolte des Morisques. Les prédicateurs furent ainsi incités à faire preuve le plus souvent de discrétion. Par ailleurs, les campagnes ont considérablement été handicapées par la contradiction qu’il y avait à considérer les Morisques à la fois comme des musulmans qu’il fallait convaincre, des nouveaux convertis qu’il fallait instruire et des mauvais chrétiens qui devraient être châtiés. En conclusion, la thèse propose une redéfinition du concept d’intégration qui soit adaptée à la réalité de l’histoire morisque et suggère des explications pour comprendre comment les dynamiques disciplinaires de la Monarchie catholique espagnole ont favorisé le repli des Morisques sur leur ethnicité.<br>What links are there amongst the reinforcement of monarchical power, the evolution in methods of preaching, and the persistence of minority religious identities? In the XIVth century, the old Christians of Spain made considerable efforts to convert infidels to the catholic faith. After having pressured the muslims of Spain into being baptized, they attempted to open their hearts to the catholic faith and to behave like good christians. In order to do this, they had recourse as much to persecution as to preaching. While persecution has been well studied by historians, our understanding of preaching remains fragmented. This thesis seeks to remedy this by studying methods of evangelizing Valencian Moors between 1492 and 1570. In order to do so, this thesis studies the published manuals used in support of missionary efforts over the course of the century. It suggests that the evangelizing methods of preachers evolved out of a period privileging polemical argumentation over catechetical instruction. The methods used thus focussed primarily on encouraging Moors to take responsibility for their own conversion, rather than placing responsibility with the preacher to convince them to embrace Catholicism. We therefore observe that the transition to what we call the “Catechetical period” corresponds to an increase in the intensity of persecution. In studying preaching campaigns in the kingdom of Valencia, this thesis reconstructs the contexts in which these polemical manuals (“antialcorans”) and Catechisms were utilized. It shows how preaching methods were shaped by their institutional contexts. The transition from polemics to Catechism was guided in part by European reforms that sought to banish religious polemics in the vernacular and to catechize populations, and in part by security concerns and fear that that the Moors would revolt. Preachers were thus encouraged to use discretion. However, these campaigns were considerably crippled by the contradictions that lay in considering Moors at once as Muslims to be converted, new converts in need of instruction, and bad Christians to be punished. The thesis concludes by proposing a redefinition of the concept of integration, adapted to the reality of Moorish history and offers explanations in order understand how the disciplinary dynamics of the Spanish Catholic Monarchy encouraged Moors to fallback on their ethnicity.

Comment le tourisme s’est-il développé dans un territoire en pleine expansion coloniale ? Comment tourisme et colonisation se sont-ils conjugués ? Quel lien peut-on établir entre ces deux dynamiques ? C’est ce à quoi cette thèse tente de répondre en démontrant l’instrumentalisation du tourisme par les politiques coloniales. Elle se divise en sept chapitres abordant successivement le transfert des pratiques touristiques de l’Europe à l’Indochine, leurs implantations, leurs intégrations aux politiques de mise en valeur des années 1920, les conséquences spatiales de leurs implantations (construction de voies de communication et d’hébergements hôteliers) et la communication instaurée par l’Etat pour promouvoir l’Indochine comme une destination touristique auprès des Indochinois comme des touristes étrangers.<br>How did tourism develop in a rapidly expanding colonial territory? How were tourism and colonization combined? What links were established between these two processes? These are the questions that this thesis addresses by demonstrating the exploitation of tourism by colonial policies. This thesis is divided into seven chapters dealing successively with the transfer of European tourism practices to Indochina, their location, their integration into the politics of territorial development in the 1920s, the spatial consequences of their implementation (construction of roads and hotel accommodation), and the attempts of the State to promote Indochina as a touristic destination for both Indochinese and foreign tourists alike.

Dès sa création en 1966, l’ERAP s’est fixé pour but d’accroître la production du pétrole « franc », en diversifiant ses sources d’approvisionnement. Un tel objectif prend une tournure cruciale dès lors que les rapports tendus entre le groupe français et les autorités algériennes semblent menacer ses acquis dans le Sahara. Toutefois, se tailler une place sur le marché mondial semble à cette époque une tâche ardue, voire improbable, puisque les espaces les plus pétrolifères sont déjà occupés par les grandes sociétés, dites Majors. Néanmoins, la société d’État française réussit à s’implanter dans plusieurs pays producteurs, dont l’Irak en 1968, jusqu’alors considéré comme la chasse gardée de la Compagnie française des pétroles (CFP). Aussi, l’expérience irakienne, suite à l’insuccès en Algérie, incite Elf ERAP à se concentrer dans les pays pétroliers de l’Afrique subsaharienne et en Mer du Nord. Le 3 février 1968, Elf ERAP signe un accord avec la compagnie d’État pétrolière, INOC, pour se charger de la prospection et de l’exploitation d’une partie du territoire confisqué par l’État irakien à la puissante Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). En contrepartie de ses apports financiers et techniques, Elf ERAP sera rémunérée par un approvisionnement garanti en pétrole irakien : il s’agit d’un nouveau genre de partenariat, dit « contrat d’agence ». Ce dernier succède au système classique des concessions et vaut à la société d’État un franc succès dans son projet de pénétration au Moyen Orient. Très vite, les prospections donnent lieu à la découverte de gisements. La production démarre en 1976 et s’élève à 5 millions de tonnes en 1977. Dès lors, Elf ERAP, devenue la SNEA, peut envisager avec optimisme son avenir énergétique, puisque sa sécurité d’approvisionnement est, en partie, assurée par le marché irakien. Mais, contre toute attente, le groupe d’État français se retire de l’affaire en mai 1977, laissant place à l’INOC, qui prend en charge le projet deux ans avant la date prévue par le contrat initial de 1968. Ce sujet de recherche consiste à éclaircir le rôle d’opérateur joué par l’ERAP en Irak, entre 1968 et 1977. Pour tenter d’expliquer le départ prématuré d’Elf Irak, il nous faut identifier les facteurs endogènes et exogènes qui ont pu motiver une telle décision. Autrement dit, la société d’État aurait-elle subi les revers de ses propres choix énergétiques ou un tel dénouement serait-il imputable à la politique pétrolière irakienne? Quelles sont les implications de la conjoncture pétrolière internationale dans le cas d’un tel retrait? Aidée des archives historiques d’Elf et de TOTAL, nous sommes arrivée à la conclusion que la compression du marché pétrolier, entre distributeurs et producteurs, au cours des années 1970, a considérablement nui à la rentabilité des contrats intermédiaires du type agence.<br>Ever since its creation in 1966, ERAP aimed to increase oil from the “franc” zone by diversifying its supply sources. Such an aim became all the more crucial as its acquisitions in the Sahara seemed threatened by tense relations between the French group and Algerian authorities. Still, to secure a share of the world market at that time seemed to a difficult if not an impossible task, the biggest oil-producing spaces having already been occupied by the big corporations called Majors. However, the French state company managed to settle in several oil-producing countries, including Iraq in 1968, until then viewed as a private hunting ground for the Compagnie française des pétroles (CFP). Also, following its failure in Algeria, the Iraq experiment prompted Elf ERAP to set its sights on oil-rich subsaharian African countries and the North Sea. On February 3rd 1968, Elf ERAP signed an agreement with the state oil company INOC to take charge of exploration and exploitation of a part of the territory that was confiscated by the Iraqi government from the powerful Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). In return for this financial and technical input/support, Elf ERAP would be rewarded with steady supply of Iraqi oil. It was a new kind of partnership termed « service contract ». The latter replaced the old system of concessions and helped the state company succeed in its attempt to penetrate the Middle East. Exploration quickly led to the discovery of oil fields. Production started in 1976 and reached 5 million tons in 1977.This allowed the Elf ERAP, renamed the SNEA, to look with optimism at its energy supply future, the latter being provided in considerable part by the Iraqi market. Surprisingly, however, the French state company backed away from the deal in May 1977, and was replaced by the INOC which took over the project two years before the date planned by the initial contract of 1968. This research project seeks to clarify the operator role played by ERAP in Iraq between 1968 and 1977. To explain the premature departure of Elf Iraq, one needs to determine both the endogenous and exogenous factors that might have motivated such a move. In other words, did the state company suffer the repercussions of its own energy choices, or was the Iraqi oil policy responsible for such an outcome? To what extent was the withdrawal attributable to the international oil situation? With the help of Elf and TOTAL archives, we have come to the conclusion that the compression of the oil market uniting distributors and producers greatly affected the profitability of intermediary contracts « service contracts».

Dissertation Abstract “Making Jews at Home: Jewish Nationalism in the Bohemian Lands, 1918-1938.” Tatjana Lichtenstein Doctor of Philosophy, 2009 Department of History, University of Toronto This dissertation examines the efforts of Jewish nationalists to end Jews’ social marginalization from non-Jewish society in the Bohemian Lands between the world wars. Through the 1920s and 1930s, the Jewish nationalist movement sought to transform Czechoslovakia’s multivalent Jewish societies into a unified ethno-national community. By creating a Jewish nation, a process challenged by the significant socio-cultural differences dividing the country’s Jews, Jewish nationalists believed that they could restore Jews’ respectability and recast the relationship between Jews and non-Jews as one of mutual respect and harmonious coexistence. The dissertation explores Jewish nationalists’ struggle to make Jews at home in Czechoslovakia by investigating a series of Zionist projects and institutions: the creation of an alliance between Jews and the state; the census and the making of Jewish statistics; the transformation of the formal Jewish communities from religious institutions to national ones; Jewish schools; and the Jewish nationalist sports movement. Exploring a Jewry on the crossroads between east and west, the dissertation delves into broader questions of the impact of nationalism on the modern Jewish experience. Within the paradoxical context of a multinational nation-state like Czechoslovakia, Zionists adopted a strategy which sought integration through national distinctiveness, a response embodying elements of both west and east European Jewish culture. The study thus complicates the history of Zionism by showing that alongside the Palestine-oriented German and Polish factions, there were significant ideological alternatives within which ideas of Jewish Diaspora nationalism co-existed with mainstream Zionism. Moreover, the study points to the continuities in the relationship between Jews and the state. As in the time of empire, Jews cultivated partnerships with the political elite, a strategy developed to balance the interest of the state and its Jewish minority. In the interwar years, Jewish activists thus looked to the state for assistance in transforming Jewish society. This dissertation seeks to broaden our understanding of Jewish responses to nationalism, the relationship between Jews and the modern state, and more broadly, about the complex ways in which marginalized groups seek to attain respectability and assert their demands for equality within modern societies.

Ce mémoire tente de présenter la politique allemande de François Mitterrand de 1981 à 1991 à travers le discours public du président français. À cette fin, il présente la position du chef d’État socialiste sur le rôle de l’Allemagne dans la construction de l’unité européenne et dans la politique de défense et de sécurité française, ainsi que sur la question de la réunification allemande. Il tente ensuite de situer la politique allemande de François Mitterrand par rapport à celle du général de Gaulle, et de juger de la valeur du discours public du président français comme source primaire. L’hypothèse principale que nous soutenons est que le président socialiste tente, de 1981 à 1991, de s’appuyer sur la République fédérale d’Allemagne pour atteindre les objectifs de grandeur et d’indépendance fixés pour la France par de Gaulle dans les années 1960. Nous croyons qu’il souhaite d’abord se rapprocher de la RFA pour que celle-ci l’aide à unifier politiquement, économiquement et militairement l’Europe autour du couple franco-allemand. Nous croyons également que Mitterrand veut s’assurer, au début des années 1980, que la RFA restera ancrée solidement au camp occidental et qu’elle ne glissera pas vers le neutralisme, ce qui doit, selon le président français, permettre à la France d’augmenter son niveau de protection face à l’URSS et accroître son indépendance face aux États-Unis. Enfin, nous croyons que le président socialiste ne tente pas d’empêcher la réunification de l’Allemagne, mais qu’il tente d’en ralentir le processus afin de pouvoir mettre en place l’unité européenne au sein de laquelle il souhaite exercer une influence sur l’Allemagne réunifiée, et à partir de laquelle il prévoit développer sa politique d’après-guerre froide. Ces initiatives doivent permettre à la France d’absorber les contrecoups de la réunification allemande et de sauvegarder ses intérêts nationaux. Dans l’ensemble, la politique allemande de François Mitterrand est en continuité avec la politique allemande développée par le général de Gaulle de 1958 à 1964. Les deux hommes cherchent ainsi à s’appuyer sur la RFA pour créer l’unité européenne afin que celle-ci serve de tremplin à la France pour qu’elle atteigne ses objectifs de grandeur et d’indépendance. Enfin, nous croyons que le discours public du président socialiste peut être utilisé comme source primaire car il renferme une quantité importante d’information, mais son utilisation doit se faire avec précaution car comme tous les discours politiques, il vise d’abord et avant tout à convaincre l’opinion publique du bien fondé des politiques avancées.<br>This memoir presents the German policy of former French president François Mitterrand from 1981 to 1991 through his public speech. For this purpose, it shows the former president’s position on the role of Germany in building the European community, in the development of the French defence policy, and on the German reunification. It also locates the German policy of Mitterrand by comparing it to Charles de Gaulle’s, as well as it analyses the value of this public speech as a primary source. The main assumption is that François Mitterrand tries, from 1981 to 1991, to lean on the Federal Republic of Germany to achieve the goals of grandeur and independance wished for France by de Gaulle in the 1960’s. We believe that Mitterrand wishes initially to get closer to the FRG in order, along with Germany, to unify Europe politically, economically and militarily around the Franco-German couple. We also believe that Mitterrand wants to make sure, at the beginning of the 1980’s, that the FRG will stay firmly anchored to the West and will not slide towards neutralism, thus allowing, according to the French president, to increase France’s protection towards USSR and independence towards the United States. Finally, we believe that Mitterrand does not try to prevent the German reunification but that he instead tries to slow down the process in order to realize the European unity within which he wishes to exert an influence on the reunified Germany, and from which he envisages his post-cold war policy. These initiatives must allow France to absorb the by-effects of the German reunification and preserve its national interest. Globally, the German policy of François Mitterrand is in continuity with the German policy developed by general de Gaulle from 1958 to 1964. Both men seek to lean on the FRG to create European unity in order to use it as a springboard for the achievement of France’s goals of grandeur and independance. Finally, we believe that Mitterrand’s public speech can be used as primary source because it contains a significant amount of information. But its use must be done with precaution in order to avoid the usual traps provided by these sources: convincing the public opinion of the good of the advanced policies.