Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'HISTORY / Military / Afghan War (2001-)'

This thesis examines the utility of coercion theory in complex contemporary conflicts through a study of the Afghan conflict as it unfolded in the provinces of Faryab and Kunduz from 2005 to 2012. The last two decades have produced ample examples of incidents where the UN, international alliances or states have found it necessary to use force in order to coerce states or armed groups to stop unacceptable activities or change their behaviour. However, the potential of military force to induce behavioural change in such conflicts is understudied and poorly understood. In the Afghan conflict the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) together with the Afghan security forces applied force in order to influence the Taliban and other groups who violently opposed the elected government to change their behaviour. Although neither ISAF nor the participating nations had articulated a coercive strategy, force was used consistent with coercion theory on a number of occasions. Coercion theory consists of a number of assumptions and presuppositions, the existence of which should be present on the ground for theory to have utility. This thesis argues that these were generally not, or only to a limited degree present in the Afghan conflict. It further argues that in the cases where ISAF and its Afghan allies applied force consistent with theory, it did generally not translate to the desired outcomes, in particular when coercion represented the dominant effort. This thesis consequently argues that coercion theory is not well suited to provide explanatory power to or predict outcomes in conflicts that are comparable to the conflict in Afghanistan. In particular, theory’s presumption of unitary actors, the rationality presumption and the notion of the credible threat is insufficient. Theory’s notion of coercive mechanisms also assumes a connection between human behaviour and what may influence it that is overly simplistic. This consequently proposes a revised set of assumptions and presuppositions as well as a revised understanding of mechanisms that acknowledges that coercion alone is rarely sufficient to instil sustainable change.

Les guerres d’Irak et d’Afghanistan ont vu la réapparition massive de sociétés de mercenariat d’un nouveau genre.Le mercenariat occidental est ainsi passé en moins de vingt ans de structures artisanales, arrimées à la politiquepost-coloniale des grandes puissances, à un stade professionnel et industriel tendant à une transnationalisationcroissante de ses activités. Des bavures de la célèbre Blackwater à l’implication d’employés de CACI dans lescandale de la torture au sein de la prison d’Abu Grahib, en passant par les activités de la tentaculaire Aegis, lessociétés militaires privées, omniprésentes sur le champ de bataille, ont rythmé et marqué le récit de ces guerresmajeures du début du XXIe siècle. Fait crucial : c’est la première fois dans l’histoire des opérations militairesaméricaines qu’on assiste à un basculement de la démographie des forces en faveur du secteur privé. Produit del’économie de guerre permanente et ramifications expéditionnaires du complexe militaro-industriel, ces sociétésreprésentent un changement d’expression de la puissance militaire étatsunienne sans précédent. Cettemercenarisation de l’american way of war est désormais une tendance structurelle de la politique étrangère del’Empire et pourrait bien révolutionner à terme le visage même de la guerre. Cette thèse trace le récit historique deces armées privées, décrit les conditions politiques qui ont permis à ce nouveau marché de la guerre d’émerger etse propose d’analyser la portée sociopolitique de ce phénomène de mondialisation de la violence privée quant à laquestion de l’Etat. Cette question du retour du mercenariat à grande échelle dans la politique étrangère des Etats-Unis permet non seulement de former une hypothèse aiguë sur le déclin de la puissance militaire américaine maisaussi sur les évolutions de l’identité sociohistorique du monopole de la violence étatique
Iraq and Afghanistan Wars have seen a massive return of mercenary companies of a new genre. The Westernmercenaries have transformed in less than twenty years from craft structures, linked to the post-colonial politics ofgreat powers, to a professional and industrial stage that tends to a growing transnationalization of their activities.From the blunders of the famous Blackwater to the involvement of CACI’s employees in the torture scandal inAbu Ghraib prison, through the activities of the sprawling Aegis, private military companies, everywhere on thebattlefield, have marked and labeled the story of these major wars of the early twenty-first Century. Crucial fact:this is the first time in the history of U.S. military operations that we are witnessing a shift in the demographics offorces in favor of the private sector. Product of the permanent war economy and overseas branches of themilitary-industrial complex, these companies represent an unprecedented change in expression of U.S. militarypower. This mercenarization of the American way of war is now a structural trend of the foreign policy of theEmpire and could eventually revolutionize the face of the war. This thesis traces the history of these privatearmies, described the political conditions that led to the birth of this new market of war, and analyzes the scope ofthis sociopolitical phenomenon of globalization of private violence. This return of mercenaries on a large scale inthe foreign policy of the United States not only help to form a decisive hypothesis on the decline of Americanmilitary power but also on the socio-historical changes of the identity of the State monopoly of violence

Thesis (MPhil (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2008.
The primary goal of this thesis is to explore, analyse and apply the New War theory to the West African case of Sierra Leone. The motivation for conducting a study of this nature was that much literature exists on the assumption that the Sierra Leonean conflict equates to a resource war. This research project attempts to bridge the gap between the New War schools of thought and those who maintain a resource war approach. Although Kaldor’s (2006) work on New Wars is significant, she does not place much emphasis on Africa. In order to supplement this, William Reno (2001) and Paul Collier (2000) have also been studied. Both write about Africa. The RUF virtually razed the Sierra Leonean society to the ground. The overtly violent methods employed were dissimilar to the interstate and intrastate wars of the past. Blatant exploitation of the country’s mineral wealth aggravated the situation. In attempting to reach a relevant finding, this study is divided into distinctive sections. Chapter two documents the theoretical background. The writings of Kaldor (2006), Reno (2001) and Collier (2000) are explored and applied. The third chapter investigates the factors in the conflict. Issues such as the resource factor (diamonds) and poverty are discussed; the failed state in Sierra Leone; criminal networks; social conditions; arms; and the role of youth and children. The general finding of this chapter indicates that Sierra Leone fits this model. Chapter four describes and analyses the actors. Identity was not an issue in the Sierra Leone war; thus a large part of Kaldor’s theory becomes redundant. In the final assessment the study establishes what Sierra Leone’s position is: New War or merely resource war? The bulk of the applied theory proved to be applicable to this case; but the study also acknowledges the mistaken views regarding Kaldor’s identity theories. Collier and Reno’s works prove to be significantly more relevant. This study was able to determine that Sierra Leone was indeed an example of New Wars, albeit considerably affected and influenced by greed.

Evaluation des mutations de la stratégie politico-militaire américaine depuis l'occurrence de la Revolution in Military Affairs jusqu'au processus actuel de "Transformation". L'analyse des évolutions vues - y compris à l'aune des opérations menées en Afghanistan et en Irak - montre, au delà du phénomène de technicisation (i.e. le processus d'intégration de nouvelles technologies aux armées) un phénomène de "technologisation".

Dans ce cadre, le discours stratégique américain, examiné au travers des débats stratégiques et des contributions doctrinales, tendrait à être sur-déterminé par la technologie, du niveau tactique au niveau politique, de sorte que ledit discours tendrait à devenir en soi une technologie.
Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Orientador: Reginaldo Mattar Nasser
Banca: Oliveiros S. Ferreira
Banca: Shiguenoli Miyamoto
O Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais é instituído em parceria com a Unesp/Unicamp/PUC-SP, em projeto subsidiado pela CAPES, intitulado "Programa San Tiago Dantas"
Resumo: A reação inicial da administração de George W. Bush aos atentados de onze de setembro de 2001 foi atacar o governo Talebã no Afeganistão, visando a derrubar o regime do pregador religioso Omar do poder e a estabelecer bases que serviriam para a caçada à al- Qaeda, que tinha naquele país um santuário para planejar suas ações. A capital Cabul, assim como outras regiões no interior afegão, foram conquistadas rapidamente, isto teoricamente em função do plano militar estadunidense, baseado no emprego de Forças de Operações Especiais, poderio aéreo e na utilização de um parceiro local: a Aliança do Norte. O suposto sucesso dos Estados Unidos seria decorrente, conforme o discurso oficial norte-americano, da "transformação militar" que estava sendo promovida pelo secretário de Defesa Donald Rumsfeld. O chamado modelo afegão foi considerado um "novo" modo de guerra americano e, a partir de então, dentro do contexto de "guerra ao terror", as Forças de Operações Especiais passaram a ocupar, como nunca antes na história dos EUA, um lugar por demais proeminente dentro da concepção estratégica de Washington. Todavia, passados cerca de sete anos dos movimentos iniciais de invasão, a situação afegã não é das melhores, o que leva ao questionamento da validade e aparente inovação daquelas ações militares americanas.
Abstract: The initial reaction of the George W. Bush administration to the violent acts of september 11, 2001 was to attack the Taliban government in Afghanistan, aiming to bring down the Mullah Omar regime and to set up bases that would serve to the hunting of al- Qaida, organization which had that country as its sanctuary to plan its actions. The capital Cabul, as well as another regions in the countryside, were quickly conquered, theoretically because the american military plan, based on Special Operations Forces, air power and in the use of a local allie: the Northern Alliance. The supposed success of the United States would be the result, according to the official speech, of the "military transformation" that was being encouraged by the Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The afghan model was considered a "new" american way of war and the Special Operations Forces, inside the context of "global war on terror", went on to the center of the american strategic conception. However, after seven years of the invasion, the afghan situation is not good, so it is possible to question the validity and the apparent inovation of that american military actions.
Mestre

Defence date: 4 February 2008
Examining Board: Pier Paolo Giglioli (Univ. Bologna), Fritz Kratochwil (EUI) (Supervisor), Martin Shaw (Univ. Sussex), Pascal Vennesson (EUI/RSCAS)
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
In the most classical way and a less than original strategy in International Relations, this research is about power, the sources of power, and power relations. However, the unit of analysis is all but classical; on the contrary, this is something which is still an unusual presence within the discipline: the mass media. This research, indeed, aims at understanding if, how, and why the news international television networks (and CNN in particular) had power over the political and military decision-making during NATO’s intervention in Kosovo and Operation Enduring Freedom. Having analysed the existing literature to clarify concepts and theories which explain media power during international conflicts, I advanced my criticisms and presented my hypotheses about media power, and its sources, in order to develop a theoretical framework on which I could ground the empirical part of the research. It has been clarified, therefore, that the international news networks have: a) Power over the political agenda; b) Power over the process (over timing of the decision making); c) Power over the selection of communication channels; d) Power over the choice of instruments. A complex set of different methods has been used, which leads to an essentially diagnostic case analysis. This is based on the examination of those processes which, through documentation and interpretation, would be considered as effects of media power. In particular, the presence of some different effects has been detected: Agenda Setting, Real Time Policy, Media Diplomacy, and what has been labelled Media War. Research methodology is a combination of qualitative methods of both data collection and analysis, varying for each supposed effect of media power. The most important data are transcripts from CNN, newspaper articles, press agency bulletins, memoirs, and texts of original interviews conducted with policy makers, journalists, and military officials. These texts have been considered both as sources of information and as text to be rigorously analysed through a particular method of text analysis, which is semiotics, in order show how meaning is constructed by different speakers.

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (Afghanistan) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) represent one of the longest wartime deployments in the history of the American military. To date, 1.6 million American military members have deployed. Of these, an estimated 300,000 have returned with a mental health condition, such as depression or PTSD. The Department of Defense has established a robust screening program to identify and track deployment-related physical and psychiatric illnesses. The Post-Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA) is a primary tool to identify physical and psychiatric risk following a deployment. The PDHRA is a web-based survey, which is administered between 90-180 days after a deployment. This study seeks to evaluate the psychometric properties and clinical utility of the Post-Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA) for accurately identifying truama and depression among Airmen following a deployment. Descriptive statistics, confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling were used to address separate research aims. Study aims assessed the impact of deployment on military members and the clinical utility and psychometric properties of the Post-Deployment Health Reassessment. Findings suggest that the Post-Deployment Health Reassessment is a useful triage tool to identify trauma and depression among Airmen following deployment. The study makes recommendations for improving the clinical utility and psychometric properties of the Post-Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA).
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