Relevant bibliographies by topics / History of metaphysics

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers

Academic literature on the topic 'History of metaphysics'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 9 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "History of metaphysics"

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Kim, Kwangsu. "Philosophy and science in Adam Smith’s ‘History of Astronomy’." History of the Human Sciences 30, no. 3 (July 2017): 107–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0952695117700055.

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This article casts light on the intimate relationship between metaphysics and science in Adam Smith’s thought. Understanding this relationship can help in resolving an enduring dispute or misreading concerning the status and role of natural theology and the ‘invisible hand’ doctrine. In Smith’s scientific realism, ontological issues are necessary prerequisites for scientific inquiry, and metaphysical ideas thus play an organizing and regulatory role. Smith also recognized the importance of scientifically informed metaphysics in science’s historical development. In this sense, for Smith, the metaphysico-scientific link (i.e. metaphysically coherent conjecture), was a basic criterion of scientific validation by Inference to the Best Explanation. Furthermore, Smith’s comments implicitly suggest that in scientific progress there is a dialectic between metaphysics and science. These themes are illustrated primarily through his writings on the history of astronomy.
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Hughes-Warrington, Marnie. "Metaphysics as History, History as Metaphysics." Philosophical Topics 43, no. 1 (2015): 279–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics2015431/219.

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Kosykhin, Vitaly G., and Svetlana M. Malkina. "Metaphysics and Realism." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 58, no. 2 (2021): 216–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202158237.

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The article deals with the problem of the return of metaphysics within the framework of the ontological turn of philosophy and the situation of post-metaphysical thinking. The conditions for the possibility of modern metaphysical discourse in the projects of empirical metaphysics and historical ontology are revealed. Historical ontology as a meta-reflexion of philosophy over its own historical foundations is able to bridge the gap between the epistemological static nature of transcendental subjectivity and the ontological dynamism of the growth of scientific knowledge about reality by comprehending the conditions of interaction between science and metaphysics in conditions of post-metaphysical thinking and realistic reversal of ontology. Philosophical knowledge in the context of the ontological turn and the associated return of metaphysics becomes focused not so much on the sharp demarcation of science and metaphysics and postulating the incommensurability of their ontologies, but on identifying mutually enriching areas of research that could give a new impetus to their development.
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McDaniel, Kris. "Metaphysics, History, Phenomenology." Res Philosophica 91, no. 3 (2014): 339–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2014.91.3.6.

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Stoliarova, Olga. "The return of metaphysics as a subject matter of historical ontology: analytical review." Digital Scholar Philosopher s Lab 4, no. 1 (2021): 126–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.32326/2618-9267-2021-4-1-126-143.

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The article (the publication consists of two parts) presents an analytical and historiographical overview of the problems that are substantively related to the question of the role, meaning and historical fate of metaphysics. The author focuses on the phenomenon of the return of metaphysics to the philosophy of our time. This phenomenon is proposed to be analyzed from the viewpoint of historical ontology, which deals with the ontological presuppositions of knowledge and their historical dynamics. In the first part, the author highlights two directions of the historical development of metaphysical problems, one of which expresses the immediate metaphysical position, and the other represents the criticism of this position. The author associates criticism of metaphysics with the development of science and the philosophy of science. The author shows the difference between the “analytical” and “continental” approaches to metaphysical problems. The consideration of metaphysics as a historical phenomenon is associated with Hegel’s metaphilosophical historicism. The alternative, non-historical, consideration of metaphysics is placed in the context of empiricism and positivism. The concepts of scientific realism are defined as a kind of positivistically restricted analytical metaphysics. The author highlights three points of growth of post-positivist philosophy and pays special attention to the relationship between post-positivist philosophy of science, history of science, metaphilosophical history of ideas, and sociology of science. The author traces the gradual formation of theoretical conditions for the rehabilitation of metaphysics in these research fields. The author demonstrates that the historicization of Kant’s “transcendental subject” creates a specific epistemological perspective that joins historicism with contextualism. Within this perspective, the question of the ontological presuppositions of empirical (primarily scientific) knowledge, their development and change becomes of great importance.
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Tegtmeyer, Henning. "Habermas over genealogie, metafysica en godsdienst." Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 113, no. 2 (July 1, 2021): 263–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/antw2021.2.006.tegt.

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Abstract Habermas on genealogy, metaphysics and religion Habermas’s impressive history of philosophy presents itself both as a comprehensive account of the history of Western philosophy from its beginning to the 19th century and as a genealogy of post-metaphysical thinking. In this paper I argue that this twofold goal creates a serious methodological problem. I also find Habermas’s understanding of metaphysics unclear and partly misguided. If that is correct it has consequences not only for the very notion of post-metaphysical thinking but also for the understanding of the dialogue between philosophy, religion, and modern secular society that Habermas advocates.
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Velkley, Richard L. "Metaphysics, Freedom and History." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 75, no. 2 (2001): 153–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq200175217.

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Slama, Paul. "The Onto-Agathological Fold of Metaphysics: Aristotle, Plato and Heidegger." Studia Phaenomenologica 20 (2020): 281–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/studphaen20202013.

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The goal of this paper is twofold. First, it aims to identify in Heidegger’s work a determination of the history of metaphysics parallel to the famous onto-theological one, and which I will label onto-agathological. Based upon a text from the course of 1935, “Einführung in die Metaphysik,” I argue that for Heidegger the history of metaphysics is not only the Aristotelian onto-theology, but is also characterized by the Platonic pre-eminence of the good over being (Republic 509c). In short, it is an onto-agathological history. Second, and as a consequence of the first point, I will flesh out the hypothesis of another history metaphysics, and emphasize its strong phenomenological content which stands in opposition to the Neo-Kantianism of Windelband and Rickert.
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Sgarbi, Marco. "Metaphysics in Königsberg prior to Kant (1703-1770)." Trans/Form/Ação 33, no. 1 (2010): 31–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0101-31732010000100004.

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The present contribute aims to reconstruct, using the methodology of intellectual history, the broad spectrum of metaphysical doctrines that Kant could know during the years of the formation of his philosophy. The first part deals with the teaching of metaphysics in Königsberg from 1703 to 1770. The second part examines the main characteristics of the metaphysics in the various handbooks, which were taught at the Albertina, in order to have an exhaustive overview of all metaphysical positions.
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Chakravartty, Anjan. "Inferência metafísica e a experiência do observável." Principia: an international journal of epistemology 21, no. 2 (December 14, 2017): 189–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n2p189.

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Some strongly empiricist views of scientific knowledge advocate a rejection of metaphysics. On such views, scientific knowledge is described strictly in terms of knowledge of the observable world, demarcated by human sensory abilities, and no metaphysical considerations need arise. This paper argues that even these views require some recourse to metaphysics in order to derive knowledge from experience. Central here is the notion of metaphysical inference, which admits of different “magnitudes”, thus generating a spectrum of putative knowledge with more substantially empirical beliefs at one end, and more metaphysically imbued beliefs at the other. Given that metaphysical inference is required even concerning knowledge of the observable, the empiricist hope of avoiding metaphysics altogether is futile: knowledge of the observable simply involves metaphysical inferences that are of smaller magnitudes than others. Metaphysical inferences are required not only to distinguish veridical from non-veridical experience and to determine the quality of empirical information, but also in order to explain how we construct experience (through categorizations and classifications of objects, events, processes, and properties), how we extrapolate from empirical evidence to generalize about observable phenomena, and how we use this evidence to test and confirm hypotheses and theories.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "History of metaphysics"

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Issaoui, Mansouri Bilal. "Wittgenstein on Magic, Metaphysics, and the History of Philosophy." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/32228.

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This work challenges the assumption that Wittgenstein’s comments about the word “philosophy” are always either normative or descriptive. In the introduction, I demonstrate that some apparent inconsistencies of Wittgenstein’s programmatic remarks can only be resolved if we reject this distinction. Although the distinction is not central to any major interpretation of Wittgenstein’s work, rejecting it will have significant implications regarding his relation to the history of philosophy. My central task is to demonstrate that Wittgenstein’s view of the history of philosophy does not imply a strict distinction between the historical concept of philosophy and Wittgenstein’s method. The core of my argument revolves around the Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough. In this text, Wittgenstein compares magic with metaphysics and then proceeds to attack Frazer’s exceedingly critical analysis of primitive religions. I argue that Wittgenstein’s later use of the word “metaphysic” indicates that his criticism of past philosophers is not radical enough to justify a strict distinction between his philosophical program and the history of philosophy. In order to confirm the conclusions I have drawn from Wittgenstein’s use of the word “metaphysics,” I studied two conversations Wittgenstein had about Heidegger. I read Wittgenstein’s comments about Heidegger as a sign of the blurring distinction between his own program and more traditional conceptions of philosophy.
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Folk, Holly. "Vertebral vitalism American metaphysics and the birth of chiropractic /." [Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University, 2006. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3223040.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Religious Studies, 2006.
"Title from dissertation home page (viewed June 26, 2007)." Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-06, Section: A, page: 2291. Adviser: Stephen J. Stein.
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Sheffler, Daniel T. "The Metaphysics of Personhood in Plato's Dialogues." UKnowledge, 2017. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/16.

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While most scholars know, or think they know, what Plato says about the soul, there is less certainty regarding what he says about the self. Some scholars even assert that the ancient Greeks did not possess the concepts of self or person. This dissertation sets out to examine those passages throughout Plato's dialogues that most clearly require some notion of the self or the person, and by doing so to clarify the logical lineaments of these concepts as they existed in fourth century Athens. Because Plato wrote dialogues, I restrict myself to analyzing the concepts of self and person as they appear in the mouths of various Platonic characters and refrain from speculating whether Plato himself endorses what his characters say. In spite of this restriction, I find a number of striking ideas that set the stage for further philosophical development. After an introductory chapter, in Chapters 2 and 3 I argue that the identification of the person with the soul and the identification of the human being with the composite of soul and body make possible a conceptual split between person and human being. In Chapter 4, I argue that the tripartite account of the soul suggests an ideal identification of the person with the rational aspect of the soul rather than the lower aspects of one's psychology. Finally, in Chapter 5 I argue that the analogical link between rationality in us and the rational order of the cosmos leads to the conclusion that the true self is, in some sense, divine.
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McNulty, Christopher. "Pretemporal origination| A process approach to understanding the unification of the history of science and the science of history." Thesis, California Institute of Integral Studies, 2014. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=1550254.

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Philosopher of science Wilfrid Sellars argues that there are two mutually exclusive images of human-in-the-world that philosophy ought to unify: the "manifest image" of common, shared experience and the "scientific image" of imperceptible objects. Process philosophy, as a metaphysical framework, is in a unique position to allow both images to sit together in dynamic tension, rather than allowing one image to collapse into the other. Not only do I maintain that process philosophy is logically robust, but I also argue that there are several instances of empirical verification of process as an ontology.

Taking a process ontology seriously, however, requires that we re-articulate an understanding of the two grand narratives that are utilized to explain our origins: the socio-cultural evolution of consciousness and the objective evolution of the universe. I call these the history of science and the science of history, respectively. In Western academia, the science of history is usually given ontological priority; but within a process metaphysic, neither can be said to be explanatorily primary. That which holds these two narratives together, and that which produces spacetime itself, I refer to as "pretemporal origination." The mode through which this process elicits evolution is through creative-discovery, wherein creation and discovery are not two separate modes of mind-universe interaction, but unified on a continuum of constraints.

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Smith, D. S. "Politics and metaphysics : some developments in the history of Nietzsche-reception in France 1872-1972." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.332878.

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Williams, Scott Matthew. "Henry of Ghent on the Trinity : metaphysics and philosophical psychology." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.669961.

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Steele, Jeffrey W. "John Duns Scotus’s Metaphysics of Goodness: Adventures in 13th-Century Metaethics." Scholar Commons, 2015. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/6029.

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At the center of all medieval Christian accounts of both metaphysics and ethics stands the claim that being and goodness are necessarily connected, and that grasping the nature of this connection is fundamental to explaining the nature of goodness itself. In that vein, medievals offered two distinct ways of conceiving this necessary connection: the nature approach and the creation approach. The nature approach explains the goodness of an entity by an appeal to the entity’s nature as the type of thing it is, and the extent to which it fulfills or perfects the potentialities in its nature. In contrast, the creation approach explains both the being and goodness of an entity by an appeal to God’s creative activity: on this view, both a thing’s being and its goodness are derived from, and explained in terms of, God’s being and goodness. Studies on being and goodness in medieval philosophy often culminate in the synthesizing work of Thomas Aquinas, the leading Dominican theologian at Paris in the 13th century, who brought together these two rival theories about the nature of goodness. Unfortunately, few have paid attention to a distinctively Franciscan approach to the topic around this same time period. My dissertation provides a remedy to this oversight by means of a thorough examination of John Duns Scotus’s approach to being and goodness—an approach that takes into account the shifting tide toward voluntarism (both ethical and theological) at the University of Paris in the late 13th century. I argue that Scotus is also a synthesizer of sorts, harmonizing the two distinct nature approaches of Augustine and Aristotle with his own unique ideas in ways that have profound implications for the future of medieval ethical theorizing, most notably, in his rejection of both the natural law and ethical eudaimonism of Thomas Aquinas. After the introduction, I analyze the nature of primary goodness—the goodness that Scotus thinks is convertible with being and thus a transcendental attribute of everything that exists. There, I compare the notion of convertibility of being and goodness among Scotus and his contemporaries. While Scotus agrees with the mainstream tradition that being and goodness are necessarily coextensive properties of everything that exists, he argues that being and good are formally rather than conceptually distinct. I argue that when the referents of being and good are considered, both views amount to the same thing. But when the concepts of being and good are considered, positing a formal distinction does make a good deal of difference: good does not simply add something to being conceptually, but formally: it is a quasi-attribute of being that exists in the world independently of our conception of it. Thus Scotus’s formal distinction provides a novel justification for the necessary connection between being and goodness. Furthermore, I argue that Scotus holds an Augustinian hierarchy of being. This hierarchical ranking of being is based upon the magnitude or perfection of the thing’s nature. But since goodness is a necessarily coextensive perfection of being, it too comes in degrees dependent upon the type of being, arranged in terms of the same hierarchy. This account, while inspired by Augustine’s hierarchical nature approach, is expressed in terms of Aristotelian metaphysics. But this necessary connection between being and goodness in medieval philosophy faced a problem: Following Augustine, medievals claimed that “everything that exists is good insofar as it exists.”’ But how is that compatible with the existence of sinful acts: if every being, in so far as it has being, is good, then every act, insofar as it has being, is good. But if sinful acts are bad, then we seem to be committed to saying either that bad acts are good, or that not every act, in so far as it has being, is good. This first option seems infelicitous; the second denies Augustine’s claims that “everything that exists is good.” Lombard and his followers solve this problem by distinguishing ontological goodness from moral goodness and claiming that moral goodness is an accident of some acts and does not convert with being. So the sinful act, qua act, is (ontologically) good. But the sinful act, qua disorder is (morally) bad. Eventually, three distinctive grades of accidental or moral goodness will be applied to human acts: generic, circumstantial, and meritorious. I argue that Scotus follows the traditional account of Peter Lombard, Philip the Chancellor, Albert the Great, and Bonaventure in distinguishing ontological goodness from moral goodness, and claiming that only the former converts with being, while the latter is an accident of the act. Aquinas, in contrast, writing in the heyday of the Aristotelian renaissance, focuses instead on the role of the act in the agent’s perfection and posits his convertibility thesis of being and goodness in the moral as well as the metaphysical realm. Thus, when one begins a late medieval discussion with Aquinas, and then considers what Scotus says, it seems as though Scotus is the radical who departs from the conservative teachings of Aquinas. And this is just false: we need to situate both Aquinas and Scotus within the larger Sentence Commentary tradition extending back to Peter Lombard and his followers in order to understand their agreement and divergence from the tradition. Next, I turn the discussion to Scotus’s analysis of rightness and wrongness. I first explore the relationship between rightness and God’s will, and situate Scotus’s account within contemporary discussions of theological voluntarism. I argue Scotus holds a restricted-causal-will-theory —whereby only contingent deontological propositions depend upon God’s will for their moral status. In contrast to Aquinas, Scotus denies that contingent moral laws—the Second Table of the 10 Commandments (such do not steal, do not murder, etc.)—are grounded in human nature, and thus he limits the extent to which moral reasoning can move from natural law to the moral obligations we have toward one another. In conjunction with these claims, I argue that Scotus distinguishes goodness from rightness: An act’s rightness will depend on its conformity to either (1) a necessary moral truth or (2) God’s commanding some contingent moral truth. The moral goodness of an act, in contrast, involves right reason’s determination of the suitability or harmony of all factors pertaining to the act. In establishing this, also argue that much of the disparity among contemporary Scotus scholarship on the question of whether Scotus was a divine command theorist or natural law theorist should be directly attributed to a failure to recognize Scotus’s separation of the goodness of an act from the rightness of an act.
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Legacy, Jessica Lee. "Bodies in the almanac : metaphysical principles in the medieval medical folded almanac." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/31439.

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Folded almanacs are fascinating manuscripts that display astrological content relevant to the practice of medicine. However, due to the lack of primary evidence demonstrating the almanac in practice, it is difficult to ascertain their actual use. Medieval Scholars have therefore concentrated on the almanac's sources, materiality and contextual evidence of apparent medical purpose. My thesis examines the metaphysical principles within the folded almanac, which exemplify the micro/macrocosm inherent in medieval astro-medicine. I argue that the folded almanac, as a material object and compilation of medical knowledge, situates the physician, patient and constellations within metaphysical ideas of body, time and space. Using the yet unstudied folded almanac from the National Library of Scotland, Acc 12059.3 (the Borthwick almanac) as a primary model, I demonstrate how this physical object, in dealing with the corporeal body, exhibits the unity of body, time and space. This approach reveals that the folded almanac (1) is a performative object that establishes medical authority, (2) tracks the progress of health and illness using Aristotelian and Thomist concepts of time, (3) maps the intersection of celestial and human bodies onto practical textual spaces. The culmination of these findings illustrates that the folded almanac engaged with a very technical but abstract branch of medieval medicine which sought to explain how, why, when and where illness was manifested, and also operated as an interventional tool for aiding in the restoration of health.
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Berner, Ashley Rogers. "Metaphysics in educational theory : educational philosophy and teacher training in England (1839-1944)." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2007. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f604b518-5ea3-4e29-98b9-cecbe3c78843.

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In 1839 the English Parliament first disbursed funds for the formal education of teachers. Between 1839 and the McNair Report in 1944 the institutional shape and the intellectual resources upon which teacher training rested changed profoundly. The centre of teacher training moved from theologically-based colleges to university departments of education; the primary source for understanding education shifted from theology to psychology. These changes altered the ways in which educators contemplated the nature of the child, the role of the teacher and the aim of education itself. This thesis probes such shifts within a variety of elite educational resources, but its major sources of material are ten training colleges of diverse types: Anglican, Nonconformist, Roman Catholic, and University. The period covered by this thesis is divided into three broad blocks of time. During the first period (1839-1885) formal training occurred in religious colleges, and educators relied upon Biblical narratives to understand education. This first period also saw the birth of modern psychology, whose tools educators often deployed within a religious framework. The second period (1886-1920) witnessed the growth of university-based training colleges which were secular in nature and whose status surpassed that of the religious colleges. During this period, teacher training emphasized intellectual attainment over spiritual development. During the third period (1920-1944), teachers were taught to view education from the standpoint of psychological health. The teacher's goal was the well-developed personality of each child, and academic content served primarily not to impart knowledge but rather to inform the child's own creative drives. This educational project was construed in scientific and anti-metaphysical terms. The replacement of a theological and metaphysical discourse by a psychological one amounts to a secular turn. However, this occurred neither mechanically nor inevitably. Colleges and theorists often seem to have been unaware of the implications of their emphases. This thesis contemplates explanatory models other than the secularisation thesis and raises important historical questions about institutional identity and the processes of secularisation.
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Drage, Matthew Nicholas. "'Universal Dharma' : authority, experience and metaphysics in the transmission of mindfulness-based stress reduction." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2018. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/277712.

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Books on the topic "History of metaphysics"

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Hegelian metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

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Boisvert, Raymond D. Dewey's metaphysics. New York: Fordham University Press, 1988.

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Dewey's metaphysics. New York: Fordham University Press, 1988.

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White, Alan R. Methods of metaphysics. London: Croom Helm, 1987.

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Koyré, Alexandre. Metaphysics and measurement. Yverdon, Switzerland: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1992.

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Conti, Charles C. Metaphysical personalism: Analysis of Austin Farrer's metaphysics of theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

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Oldfield, Adrian. Metaphysics and history in Collingwood's thought. Salford: University of Salford, Department of Politics and Contemporary History, 1990.

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Metaphysics and grammar. London: Bloomsbury, 2014.

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Conti, Charles C. Metaphysical personalism: An analysis of Austin Farrer's metaphysics of theism. Oxford [England]: Clarendon Press, 1995.

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Whitehead and Bradley: A comparative analysis. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992.

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Book chapters on the topic "History of metaphysics"

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Bigelow, John. "Metaphysics." In History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand, 361–77. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_13.

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Thakchoe, Sonam. "Svātantrika Madhyamaka metaphysics:." In History of Indian Philosophy, 343–50. 1 [edition]. | New York : Routledge, 2017. |: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315666792-34.

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Agassi, Joseph. "A History of Anti-metaphysics." In Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, 27–43. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00117-9_2.

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Scholz, Oliver R. "Philosophy of History: Metaphysics and Epistemology." In Explanation in the Special Sciences, 245–53. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7563-3_11.

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Persson, Ulf. "The Metaphysics of Platonism." In Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Mathematical Practice, 1–18. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19071-2_2-1.

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Manser, Anthony. "The End of Metaphysics: A Comment." In Philosophy, its History and Historiography, 41–46. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5317-8_3.

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Ellis, Brian. "From Conventionalism to Scientific Metaphysics." In History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand, 329–59. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_12.

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Krause, Décio. "The Metaphysics of Non-individuality." In Brazilian Studies in Philosophy and History of Science, 257–67. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9422-3_19.

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Serbinenko, V. V. "The Russian Idea: Metaphysics, Ideology and History." In Social Identities in Revolutionary Russia, 1–17. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781403919687_1.

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Rée, Jonathan. "The End of Metaphysics: Philosophy’s Supreme Fiction?" In Philosophy, its History and Historiography, 3–26. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5317-8_1.

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Conference papers on the topic "History of metaphysics"

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Svoboda, David. "WHY SHOULD METAPHYSICS BE IMPOSSIBLE?" In SGEM 2014 Scientific SubConference on ANTHROPOLOGY, ARCHAEOLOGY, HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY. Stef92 Technology, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.5593/sgemsocial2014/b31/s11.118.

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