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1
Issaoui, Mansouri Bilal. "Wittgenstein on Magic, Metaphysics, and the History of Philosophy." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/32228.
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This work challenges the assumption that Wittgenstein’s comments about the word “philosophy” are always either normative or descriptive. In the introduction, I demonstrate that some apparent inconsistencies of Wittgenstein’s programmatic remarks can only be resolved if we reject this distinction. Although the distinction is not central to any major interpretation of Wittgenstein’s work, rejecting it will have significant implications regarding his relation to the history of philosophy. My central task is to demonstrate that Wittgenstein’s view of the history of philosophy does not imply a strict distinction between the historical concept of philosophy and Wittgenstein’s method. The core of my argument revolves around the Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough. In this text, Wittgenstein compares magic with metaphysics and then proceeds to attack Frazer’s exceedingly critical analysis of primitive religions. I argue that Wittgenstein’s later use of the word “metaphysic” indicates that his criticism of past philosophers is not radical enough to justify a strict distinction between his philosophical program and the history of philosophy. In order to confirm the conclusions I have drawn from Wittgenstein’s use of the word “metaphysics,” I studied two conversations Wittgenstein had about Heidegger. I read Wittgenstein’s comments about Heidegger as a sign of the blurring distinction between his own program and more traditional conceptions of philosophy.
2
Folk, Holly. "Vertebral vitalism American metaphysics and the birth of chiropractic /." [Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University, 2006. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3223040.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Religious Studies, 2006."Title from dissertation home page (viewed June 26, 2007)." Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-06, Section: A, page: 2291. Adviser: Stephen J. Stein.
3
Sheffler, Daniel T. "The Metaphysics of Personhood in Plato's Dialogues." UKnowledge, 2017. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/16.
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While most scholars know, or think they know, what Plato says about the soul, there is less certainty regarding what he says about the self. Some scholars even assert that the ancient Greeks did not possess the concepts of self or person. This dissertation sets out to examine those passages throughout Plato's dialogues that most clearly require some notion of the self or the person, and by doing so to clarify the logical lineaments of these concepts as they existed in fourth century Athens. Because Plato wrote dialogues, I restrict myself to analyzing the concepts of self and person as they appear in the mouths of various Platonic characters and refrain from speculating whether Plato himself endorses what his characters say. In spite of this restriction, I find a number of striking ideas that set the stage for further philosophical development. After an introductory chapter, in Chapters 2 and 3 I argue that the identification of the person with the soul and the identification of the human being with the composite of soul and body make possible a conceptual split between person and human being. In Chapter 4, I argue that the tripartite account of the soul suggests an ideal identification of the person with the rational aspect of the soul rather than the lower aspects of one's psychology. Finally, in Chapter 5 I argue that the analogical link between rationality in us and the rational order of the cosmos leads to the conclusion that the true self is, in some sense, divine.
4
McNulty, Christopher. "Pretemporal origination| A process approach to understanding the unification of the history of science and the science of history." Thesis, California Institute of Integral Studies, 2014. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=1550254.
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Philosopher of science Wilfrid Sellars argues that there are two mutually exclusive images of human-in-the-world that philosophy ought to unify: the "manifest image" of common, shared experience and the "scientific image" of imperceptible objects. Process philosophy, as a metaphysical framework, is in a unique position to allow both images to sit together in dynamic tension, rather than allowing one image to collapse into the other. Not only do I maintain that process philosophy is logically robust, but I also argue that there are several instances of empirical verification of process as an ontology.
Taking a process ontology seriously, however, requires that we re-articulate an understanding of the two grand narratives that are utilized to explain our origins: the socio-cultural evolution of consciousness and the objective evolution of the universe. I call these the history of science and the science of history, respectively. In Western academia, the science of history is usually given ontological priority; but within a process metaphysic, neither can be said to be explanatorily primary. That which holds these two narratives together, and that which produces spacetime itself, I refer to as "pretemporal origination." The mode through which this process elicits evolution is through creative-discovery, wherein creation and discovery are not two separate modes of mind-universe interaction, but unified on a continuum of constraints.
5
Smith, D. S. "Politics and metaphysics : some developments in the history of Nietzsche-reception in France 1872-1972." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.332878.
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Williams, Scott Matthew. "Henry of Ghent on the Trinity : metaphysics and philosophical psychology." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.669961.
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Steele, Jeffrey W. "John Duns Scotus’s Metaphysics of Goodness: Adventures in 13th-Century Metaethics." Scholar Commons, 2015. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/6029.
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At the center of all medieval Christian accounts of both metaphysics and ethics stands the claim that being and goodness are necessarily connected, and that grasping the nature of this connection is fundamental to explaining the nature of goodness itself. In that vein, medievals offered two distinct ways of conceiving this necessary connection: the nature approach and the creation approach. The nature approach explains the goodness of an entity by an appeal to the entity’s nature as the type of thing it is, and the extent to which it fulfills or perfects the potentialities in its nature. In contrast, the creation approach explains both the being and goodness of an entity by an appeal to God’s creative activity: on this view, both a thing’s being and its goodness are derived from, and explained in terms of, God’s being and goodness. Studies on being and goodness in medieval philosophy often culminate in the synthesizing work of Thomas Aquinas, the leading Dominican theologian at Paris in the 13th century, who brought together these two rival theories about the nature of goodness. Unfortunately, few have paid attention to a distinctively Franciscan approach to the topic around this same time period. My dissertation provides a remedy to this oversight by means of a thorough examination of John Duns Scotus’s approach to being and goodness—an approach that takes into account the shifting tide toward voluntarism (both ethical and theological) at the University of Paris in the late 13th century. I argue that Scotus is also a synthesizer of sorts, harmonizing the two distinct nature approaches of Augustine and Aristotle with his own unique ideas in ways that have profound implications for the future of medieval ethical theorizing, most notably, in his rejection of both the natural law and ethical eudaimonism of Thomas Aquinas.
After the introduction, I analyze the nature of primary goodness—the goodness that Scotus thinks is convertible with being and thus a transcendental attribute of everything that exists. There, I compare the notion of convertibility of being and goodness among Scotus and his contemporaries. While Scotus agrees with the mainstream tradition that being and goodness are necessarily coextensive properties of everything that exists, he argues that being and good are formally rather than conceptually distinct. I argue that when the referents of being and good are considered, both views amount to the same thing. But when the concepts of being and good are considered, positing a formal distinction does make a good deal of difference: good does not simply add something to being conceptually, but formally: it is a quasi-attribute of being that exists in the world independently of our conception of it. Thus Scotus’s formal distinction provides a novel justification for the necessary connection between being and goodness.
Furthermore, I argue that Scotus holds an Augustinian hierarchy of being. This hierarchical ranking of being is based upon the magnitude or perfection of the thing’s nature. But since goodness is a necessarily coextensive perfection of being, it too comes in degrees dependent upon the type of being, arranged in terms of the same hierarchy. This account, while inspired by Augustine’s hierarchical nature approach, is expressed in terms of Aristotelian metaphysics.
But this necessary connection between being and goodness in medieval philosophy faced a problem: Following Augustine, medievals claimed that “everything that exists is good insofar as it exists.”’ But how is that compatible with the existence of sinful acts: if every being, in so far as it has being, is good, then every act, insofar as it has being, is good. But if sinful acts are bad, then we seem to be committed to saying either that bad acts are good, or that not every act, in so far as it has being, is good. This first option seems infelicitous; the second denies Augustine’s claims that “everything that exists is good.” Lombard and his followers solve this problem by distinguishing ontological goodness from moral goodness and claiming that moral goodness is an accident of some acts and does not convert with being. So the sinful act, qua act, is (ontologically) good. But the sinful act, qua disorder is (morally) bad. Eventually, three distinctive grades of accidental or moral goodness will be applied to human acts: generic, circumstantial, and meritorious. I argue that Scotus follows the traditional account of Peter Lombard, Philip the Chancellor, Albert the Great, and Bonaventure in distinguishing ontological goodness from moral goodness, and claiming that only the former converts with being, while the latter is an accident of the act.
Aquinas, in contrast, writing in the heyday of the Aristotelian renaissance, focuses instead on the role of the act in the agent’s perfection and posits his convertibility thesis of being and goodness in the moral as well as the metaphysical realm. Thus, when one begins a late medieval discussion with Aquinas, and then considers what Scotus says, it seems as though Scotus is the radical who departs from the conservative teachings of Aquinas. And this is just false: we need to situate both Aquinas and Scotus within the larger Sentence Commentary tradition extending back to Peter Lombard and his followers in order to understand their agreement and divergence from the tradition.
Next, I turn the discussion to Scotus’s analysis of rightness and wrongness. I first explore the relationship between rightness and God’s will, and situate Scotus’s account within contemporary discussions of theological voluntarism. I argue Scotus holds a restricted-causal-will-theory —whereby only contingent deontological propositions depend upon God’s will for their moral status. In contrast to Aquinas, Scotus denies that contingent moral laws—the Second Table of the 10 Commandments (such do not steal, do not murder, etc.)—are grounded in human nature, and thus he limits the extent to which moral reasoning can move from natural law to the moral obligations we have toward one another. In conjunction with these claims, I argue that Scotus distinguishes goodness from rightness: An act’s rightness will depend on its conformity to either (1) a necessary moral truth or (2) God’s commanding some contingent moral truth. The moral goodness of an act, in contrast, involves right reason’s determination of the suitability or harmony of all factors pertaining to the act. In establishing this, also argue that much of the disparity among contemporary Scotus scholarship on the question of whether Scotus was a divine command theorist or natural law theorist should be directly attributed to a failure to recognize Scotus’s separation of the goodness of an act from the rightness of an act.
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Legacy, Jessica Lee. "Bodies in the almanac : metaphysical principles in the medieval medical folded almanac." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/31439.
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Folded almanacs are fascinating manuscripts that display astrological content relevant to the practice of medicine. However, due to the lack of primary evidence demonstrating the almanac in practice, it is difficult to ascertain their actual use. Medieval Scholars have therefore concentrated on the almanac's sources, materiality and contextual evidence of apparent medical purpose. My thesis examines the metaphysical principles within the folded almanac, which exemplify the micro/macrocosm inherent in medieval astro-medicine. I argue that the folded almanac, as a material object and compilation of medical knowledge, situates the physician, patient and constellations within metaphysical ideas of body, time and space. Using the yet unstudied folded almanac from the National Library of Scotland, Acc 12059.3 (the Borthwick almanac) as a primary model, I demonstrate how this physical object, in dealing with the corporeal body, exhibits the unity of body, time and space. This approach reveals that the folded almanac (1) is a performative object that establishes medical authority, (2) tracks the progress of health and illness using Aristotelian and Thomist concepts of time, (3) maps the intersection of celestial and human bodies onto practical textual spaces. The culmination of these findings illustrates that the folded almanac engaged with a very technical but abstract branch of medieval medicine which sought to explain how, why, when and where illness was manifested, and also operated as an interventional tool for aiding in the restoration of health.
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Berner, Ashley Rogers. "Metaphysics in educational theory : educational philosophy and teacher training in England (1839-1944)." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2007. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f604b518-5ea3-4e29-98b9-cecbe3c78843.
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In 1839 the English Parliament first disbursed funds for the formal education of teachers. Between 1839 and the McNair Report in 1944 the institutional shape and the intellectual resources upon which teacher training rested changed profoundly. The centre of teacher training moved from theologically-based colleges to university departments of education; the primary source for understanding education shifted from theology to psychology. These changes altered the ways in which educators contemplated the nature of the child, the role of the teacher and the aim of education itself. This thesis probes such shifts within a variety of elite educational resources, but its major sources of material are ten training colleges of diverse types: Anglican, Nonconformist, Roman Catholic, and University. The period covered by this thesis is divided into three broad blocks of time. During the first period (1839-1885) formal training occurred in religious colleges, and educators relied upon Biblical narratives to understand education. This first period also saw the birth of modern psychology, whose tools educators often deployed within a religious framework. The second period (1886-1920) witnessed the growth of university-based training colleges which were secular in nature and whose status surpassed that of the religious colleges. During this period, teacher training emphasized intellectual attainment over spiritual development. During the third period (1920-1944), teachers were taught to view education from the standpoint of psychological health. The teacher's goal was the well-developed personality of each child, and academic content served primarily not to impart knowledge but rather to inform the child's own creative drives. This educational project was construed in scientific and anti-metaphysical terms. The replacement of a theological and metaphysical discourse by a psychological one amounts to a secular turn. However, this occurred neither mechanically nor inevitably. Colleges and theorists often seem to have been unaware of the implications of their emphases. This thesis contemplates explanatory models other than the secularisation thesis and raises important historical questions about institutional identity and the processes of secularisation.
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Drage, Matthew Nicholas. "'Universal Dharma' : authority, experience and metaphysics in the transmission of mindfulness-based stress reduction." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2018. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/277712.
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Wiitala, Michael Oliver. "Truth and Falsehood in Plato's Sophist." UKnowledge, 2014. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/3.
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This dissertation is a study of the ontological foundations of true and false speech in Plato’s Sophist. Unlike most contemporary scholarship on the Sophist, my dissertation offers a wholistic account of the dialogue, demonstrating that the ontological theory of the “communing” of forms and the theory of true and false speech later in the dialogue entail one another.
As I interpret it, the account of true and false speech in the Sophist is primarily concerned with true and false speech about the forms. As Plato sees it, we can only make true statements about spatio-temporal beings if it is possible to make true statements about the forms. Statements about the forms, however, make claims about how forms “commune” with other forms, that is, how forms are intelligibly related to and participate in one another. If forms stand in determinate relations of participation to other forms, however, then forms, as the relata of these relations, must compose structured wholes. Yet if they compose structured wholes, there must be a higher order normative principle that explains their structure. This creates a regress problem. In order to ground the structure of spatio-temporal beings, forms must be the highest explanatory principles. The theory of the “communing” of forms, however, makes it seem as if the forms require further explanation.
This dissertation argues (1) that in the Sophist Plato solves the regress problem and (2) that, by doing so, he is able to ground true and false speech about the forms. I demonstrate that he solves the regress problem by differentiating a form’s nature from a form qua countable object. Then I show that this distinction between a form’s nature and a form qua countable object explains how true and false statements about the forms are possible.
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Duman, Musa. "The Growing Desert: Nihilism And Metaphysics In Martin Heidegger'." Phd thesis, METU, 2009. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/3/12610512/index.pdf.
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ABSTRACT
THE GROWING DESERT: NIHILISM AND METAPHYSICS
IN HEIDEGGER&rsquoS THOUGHT Duman, Musa Ph. D., Department of Philosophy Supervisor : Prof. Dr. Ahmet inam March 2009, 209 pages In this study, we explore Heidegger&rsquo
s understanding of nihilism as the essential dimension of metaphysics, of metaphysical experience of Being, and in the following, we address his responses to it. Heidegger takes nihilism as rooted in the metaphysical way of thinking, hence metaphysics and nihilism standing in a primordial identity. Such metaphysical way of thinking as a framework in which Being is experinced and articulated, explicitly or implicitly in all areas of Western culture, from art to science, gives us the deep history or movement of Western tradition. Heidegger considers such movement to be presenting an ever growing threat, indeed as something to be consummated in the eeriest possibility of world history, that is, total destruction of human essence as an openness for the disclosure of Being. He points out to this underlying phenomenon with various designations: forgetfullnesss of Being, abandonment of Being, darkening of the world, Gestell and devestation are some of them. In this tradition, Being, from Plato and Aristotle onwards, becomes nothing at all, that is, excluded from any thoughtful consideration, reduced to a mere abstraction. Anything nihilistic, if fully delved into, would prove to conceal at its heart an alienation to the true sense of Being. Therefore, we need to develop a way of thinking outside the dominion of metaphysics, which should not only discover No-thing as the concealment dimension of Being, thus be deeply open to our finitude, but also learn to respond thoughtfully and thankfully to the gift of Being in, through and towards which we ex-sist as human beings. Vis-a-vis the futural potentials of nihilism in this long end of Western history, the futural character of Heidegger&rsquo
s thinking, his search for a new way of thinking that would incipate the other beginning, harbours a strange Tension that is characteristic of his whole philosophy.
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Simont, Juliette. "Gérard Lebrun et les Critiques de Kant: structuralisme et histoire de la philosophie." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/210697.
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Ge, Yonghua. "The many and the one : the metaphysics of participation in connection to creatio ex nihilo in Augustine and Aquinas." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2015. https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.708985.
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Smith, Colin C. "BEING AND STRUCTURE IN PLATO’S SOPHIST." UKnowledge, 2019. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/23.
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Being and Structure in Plato’s Sophist is a study of the metaphysical notion of being as it is at play in Plato’s dialogue the Sophist, and the senses in which Plato’s conception of being entails further accounts of ontological structure and goodness. While modern metaphysics primarily concerns existence, ancient metaphysics primarily concerns what grounds what, and in this dissertation I consider the nature and value of Plato’s understanding of being as a notion of ground rather than a principle of existence. I argue that Plato conceives of being in the fundamentally unified sense of participation, which entails a self-and-other and hence complex relation. For Plato, being must be understood in its context as one among many Platonic forms, or the network of mutually co-constitutive structures of determinacy that are the grounding stability necessary for the very possibilities of becoming, knowing, and discourse. I argue that Plato inherits his view in large part from Parmenides, and that the account in the Sophist makes explicit a previously implicit aspect of the Parmenidean tradition insofar as it involves a novel sense of nonbeing not as absolute nothingness, but instead as difference in the sense of constitutive and determinate otherness. I furthermore discuss the ways in which this account helps to show the connections between seemingly disparate elements of the dialogue like its dramatic setting, the method of division, and the discussion of the great ontological kinds. In this way, the dissertation entails a study of the entire dialogue and the interrelation of its parts, as well as its context among several other key Platonic and Parmenidean texts.
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Peck, Zachary. "Das Gestell and Human Autonomy: On Andrew Feenberg's Interpretation of Martin Heidegger." Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University, 2015. https://dc.etsu.edu/honors/292.
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In my thesis, I examine the relationship between modern technology and human autonomy from the philosophical perspective of Martin Heidegger. He argues that the essence of modern technology is the Gestell. Often translated as ‘enframing,’ the Gestell is a mode of revealing, or understanding, being, in which all beings are revealed as, or understood as, raw materials. By revealing all beings as raw materials, we eventually understand ourselves as raw materials. I argue that this undermines human autonomy, but, unlike Andrew Feenberg, I do not believe this process is irreversible from Heidegger’s perspective. I articulate the meaning of the Gestell as an historical claim and how it challenges human autonomy, but may never absolutely eradicate it. Contra Feenberg’s interpretation, I argue that Heidegger’s ontology, including the Gestell, provides a crucial ground for understanding how we might salvage autonomy in a culture increasingly dominated by modern technology. Specifically, by drawing on Heidegger’s conception of Gelassenheit, I suggest that salvaging human autonomy requires a calm acceptance and opening up to the challenge of modern technology. This is not, as Feenberg suggests, a passive acceptance of the eradication of human autonomy. Rather, this is the ontological ground that provides us with the possibility of salvaging autonomy. By opening us up to the essence of modern technology, we understand the contingency of the Gestell, its essentially ambiguous nature, and are granted with the freedom to subordinate its reign to other human values and modes of understanding being.
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Pereira, Marinê de Souza. "Entre Bergson e Espinosa: eternidade ou duração?" Universidade de São Paulo, 2011. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-30092011-165030/.
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Ao afirmar que a sua filosofia vê na duração o próprio tecido de que a realidade é feita, no último capítulo de A evolução criadora, Bergson explicita o seu projeto de construção de uma nova metafísica. Sabemos que a originalidade de sua empreitada está fundamentalmente nessa exigência da apreensão do tempo, sua transitoriedade e fluidez, como aquilo de que a realidade é feita. Trata-se de declarar a realidade temporal como definição da própria existência do mundo e da experiência humana sem a duração, não se pode falar em causalidade efetiva ou livre escolha. Sendo assim, a exigência de uma metafísica da duração se colocaria de imediato em contraposição não a uma filosofia somente, mas à história da filosófica como um todo, cuja crítica é essencial para a construção e consolidação do pensamento bergsoniano. Contudo, pensamos que, na tradição filosófica, destaca-se um autor com quem Bergson dialogou intensamente, declaradamente ou não, e que pouco esteve presente nos trabalhos dos estudiosos do seu pensamento: Espinosa. Pretendemos reconstituir esse diálogo a partir de um campo de comunicação que possibilite revelar seus pontos de entrecruzamento, confrontação e encontro. Talvez assim, o desencontro maior - entre uma filosofia da duração e, outra, da eternidade- mostre-se, ao fim e ao cabo, apenas aparente.By stating that his philosophy \"sees in duration the own tissue that reality is made\" in the last chapter of Creative Evolution, Bergson explains his project to build a new metaphysics. We know that the originality of his work is based in this exigency of the sense time, its transience and fluidity, as that from which reality is made. It is time to declare the temporal reality as definition of the own existence of the world and human experience without the duration one can not speak in effective causality or free choice. Thus, the requirement of a metaphysics of duration is put immediately in opposition not only to one philosophy, but the history of philosophy as a whole, whose criticism is essential to building and consolidating of the Bergson\'s thought. However, we believe that, in the philosophical tradition, there is an author with whom Bergson spoke intensely, openly or not, and that little was present in the work of scholars of his thought: Espinosa. We intend to reconstruct this dialogue from a communication space that allows to reveal their points of intersection, confrontation and meeting. Perhaps then the biggest mismatch - between a philosophy of duration, and another, of eternity-shows, after all, only apparent.
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DeBord, Charles Eugene. "Two responses to a moment in the question of transcendence: a study of first boundaries in Plotinean and Kabbalistic cosmogonical metaphysics." Thesis, Texas A&M University, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/445.
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This thesis contrasts the Plotinean attitude towards transcendence at the cosmological level with that of certain Kabbalistic authors of the 13th-17th century. Special emphasis is placed on the different approaches taken by each of the two sides to addressing the origin of otherness. Following a brief introduction to the notion of the question of transcendence, the first major part (chapter II) is dedicated to an exploration of the Plotinean conception of metaphysical "descent" from the One to subsequent hypostases. The second major part (chapter III) focuses on Kabbalistic conceptions of the descent from the indefinite infinite to the finite (limited) realm. Finally, I attempt to illustrate the questions and concerns common to each of the two cosmologies. In so doing, I make use of semiotic concepts to clarify the contrast between the two models.
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Richard, Sébastien. "Genèse historique et logique du projet d'ontologie formelle: de l'ontologie traditionnelle à la métaphysique analytique contemporaine." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/209965.
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Ce travail est consacré à l’étude du projet d’ontologie formelle de la fin du Moyen-Âge à l’époque contemporaine. Issue des recherches du jeune Husserl, l’ontologie formelle est théorie du quelque chose ou de l'objet en général énonçant de manière ontologiquement neutre des lois analytiques, ancrées dans certaines catégories ontologico-formelles, orthogonales à toute ontologie régionale et ne se réduisant pas à celles de la logique formelle, mais leur étant néanmoins corrélées. Une première partie de notre étude visait à montrer l’émergence du réseau conceptuel qui a permis l’émergence d’une telle ontologie. Celui-ci relève de plusieurs disciplines :l’ontologie, la logique, les mathématiques et la psychologie. Ainsi, même s’il s’agit d’un projet métaphysique original, il hérite dans une certaine mesure de la tradition ontologique moderne comprise comme tinologie et issue du processus de noétisation de l’objet de la métaphysique initié par le second commencement de la métaphysique à la fin du Moyen Âge, du problème des représentations sans objet dans la tradition philosophique brentanienne dont devait sortir diverses Gegenstandstheorien, du problème des Gestalten dans cette même tradition et de l’émergence d’une nouvelle conception de la formalité dans la mathématique du XIXe siècle. Les deuxième et troisième parties de ce travail sont consacrées à l’étude systématique de la réalisation technique du projet d’ontologie formelle, en particulier au sein de sa reprise analytique à partir de la fin des années 1970, sous la forme d’une méréologie formelle et de ses multiples extensions (méréotopologie, méréologie temporelle et théorie méréologique de la dépendance existentielle), afin de pouvoir résoudre le problème de l’intégrité ontologique des objets.Doctorat en Philosophie
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
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Cruz, Ricardo Souza. "Walter Benjamin: o valor da narração e o papel do justo." Programa de Pós- Graduação em Filosofia da UFBA, 2007. http://www.repositorio.ufba.br/ri/handle/ri/10871.
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O trabalho analisa alguns aspectos do pensamento metafísico do filósofo Walter Benjamin, assim como a importância da narração oral para a formação do sujeito, e o valor da alegoria em seus escritos. Para isso recorro à figura de Rabi Nakhman, um dos últimos representantes do Hassidismo. Seus relatos são originariamente orais que mais tarde foram transpostos à forma escrita. Estes possuem uma profundidade filosófica, mas é sua obra ficcional que influenciou um dos maiores narradores do século XX, Franz Kafka. Recorro a estas duas figuras por reconhecer em suas respectivas obras os atributos do verdadeiro narrador tão importante para o pensamento de Benjamin. Uma das principais características do movimento hassidico é ter transformado a mística judaica (Cabala) numa ética. É a experiência ética do individuo na história que no pensamento de Benjamin se transforma em responsabilidade histórica, responsabilidade essa que converge num messianismo muito particular. É a expectativa messiânica que se transforma na figura do Anjo da História. Os textos selecionados como base para a pesquisa são O Narrador, Experiência e pobreza, Franz Kafka: A propósito do décimo aniversario de sua morte, Sobre a linguagem em geral, sobre a linguagem humana, A tarefa do tradutor, Sobre o conceito da história. A metodologia utilizada na dissertação se realiza por meio da análise hermenêutica dos textos. A pesquisa conclui que o pensamento de Benjamin tem as características de uma obra aberta, onde essa abertura possibilita ao leitor o exercício do comentário. O valor espiritual que Benjamin atribui ao comentário, na história se torna uma experiência ética de caráter libertário. A tensão dialética entre metafísica e materialismo histórico nos confunde sobre o caminho tomado por nosso pensador, mas nos leva a pensar a lucidez de sua obra.
Salvador
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Altman-Newell, Lucienne. "Is Bodily Resurrection Compatible with Materialism?" Scholarship @ Claremont, 2017. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/1067.
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It is widely known that at least three of the major world religions—Christianity, Islam, and (more controversially) Judaism—embrace the theory of bodily resurrection, or an event in which a person or people are brought back to embodied life after death. But is this theory compatible with materialism, or the philosophical doctrine that nothing exists except matter and its movements and modifications? In other words, if my “self” is identical with and nothing more than my body, could my unique and particular “self” come to exist again on Earth after my death? This thesis examines theories of compatibility from ancient times to the present day.
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Patton, William Donald. "James McCosh : the making of a reputation. A study of the life and work of the Rev. Dr. James McCosh in Ireland, from his appointment as a Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Queen's College Belfast 1851, to his appointment as President of Princeton Col." Thesis, Queen's University Belfast, 1993. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.359120.
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Sendyl, Surya. "The Importance of Heidegger’s Question." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2016. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1411.
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In this thesis I present a strong and universally compelling case for the importance of Heidegger’s question, namely, the question of the meaning of being. I show how the being-question has been obscured and forgotten over the past two millennia of western philosophy. I attempt to raise this question again, and elucidate why it is an important one to examine, not only for philosophy as a discipline, but for any human endeavor. My aim is to reach those of you who would normally not come across, or might even dismiss, Heidegger’s work. I hope the arguments I make will convince you, hard though it may be, that reawakening ourselves to the question of being is a task that we must undertake.
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Gomes, Charlington Alves. "A verdade como correção e Alétheia uma reconstrução do problema da verdade em Heidegger." Universidade Federal da Paraíba, 2009. http://tede.biblioteca.ufpb.br:8080/handle/tede/5596.
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Previous issue date: 2009-07-06Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES
The present dissertation intends to favor a significant contribution to the clear comprehension of the matter of truth from Heidegger, in such a way it surpasses the problematic raised by his thought, having, however, as principle focus, a reconstruction or re-reading of Heidegger investigations before the tradition, History of Philosophy, and show the metaphysical insufficiency concerning the comprehension of the truth of the being. We started from an investigation of ancient Ontology, which has as principal figure, Platoon, which according to Heidegger, is responsible for the original curve of truth: platonic conception of truth as correction, ratified by Aristóteles with the agreement concept; perpetuated concepts throughout the History of Philosophy as Metaphysics. Nevertheless, Heidegger does not treat metaphysics in a negative way, but as a place where all the problems, while question for Philosophy, get together, that is why in Heidegger existing analytics, it is necessary to step back towards appropriate comprehension, with no curves, no forgetting, that is, in such a way the thought surpasses and corrects the lack caused by metaphysics, that is why it is necessary to recover the truth as Alethéia = uncovering. In accordance with truth as correction, Heidegger ontology for truth lies in the existing ontological possibility of Dasein. Heidegger wants the truth of origin: Let-it-be, uncovering, non-concealing, Alethéia. Of origin because the word Alethéia lies in the origin of the Greek thought, of philosophy, of Heraclitus . The dissertation still brings the problem of truth in modern science and language. All the questions raised in the dissertation are upon the chive of Heidegger thought, that is why in the second part of the dissertation we treat the question of truth leaning on the existing phenomenon condition of the analytics of Heidegger: In a construction of a new ontology, this being of ontological hermeneutic nature, of the world, of men, of the truth.
A presente dissertação pretende favorecer uma significativa contribuição para o esclarecimento da questão da verdade em Heidegger, de modo que perpasse a problemática levantada pelo seu pensamento, tendo, portanto, como principal foco uma reconstrução das investigações heideggerianas perante a História da Filosofia. Mostrar a insuficiência metafísica frente o esclarecimento da verdade do ser. Partimos de uma investigação da Ontologia Antiga, nesta, tem-se como principal figura, Platão, responsável, segundo Heidegger, pelo o desvio original da verdade: concepção platônica da verdade como correção, ratificado por Aristóteles com o conceito de concordância ; conceitos perpetuados ao longo da História da Filosofia como Metafísica. Todavia, Heidegger não trata a metafísica de forma negativa, mas antes como lugar onde se encontram todos os problemas enquanto questão para a Filosofia, por isso que, na analítica existencial heideggeriana, faz-se necessário dar um passo atrás em direção a uma compreensão apropriada, sem desvios, sem esquecimentos, ou seja, de modo que o pensamento supere e corrija a falta cometida pela metafísica, por isso é necessário resgatar a verdade como Alétheia, desencobrimento. Em detrimento à verdade como correção, a ontologia de Heidegger para a verdade encontra-se na possibilidade ontológica existencial do Dasein. Heidegger quer a verdade originária: deixar-ser, desencobrimento, desocultamento, Alétheia. Originária porque a palavra Alétheia está na origem do pensamento grego, da filosofia, de Heráclito . A dissertação traz ainda o problema da verdade nas ciências modernas e na linguagem. Todas as questões levantadas na dissertação estão sobre o crivo do pensamento heideggeriano, por isso que na segunda parte da dissertação tratamos da questão da verdade amparando-se na condição fenomenológica existencial da analítica de Heidegger: numa construção de uma nova ontologia; essa de cunho ontológico da existência, do mundo, do homem, da verdade.
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Jonsson, Kjell. "Vid vetandets gräns : om skiljelinjen mellan naturvetenskap och metafysik i svensk kulturdebatt 1870-1920." Doctoral thesis, Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, 1987. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-61928.
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The object of this dissertation is to describe the opinions about the limits of natural science in their social and cultural context There exist two antagonistic positions to this matter restrictionism and expansionism. Restrictionism assumes that the natural sciences have no influence on metaphysics. Expansionism, on die other hand, argues that the natural sciences can legitimise the positions of beliefs and values. During the 1870b a restrictionist attitude on scientific knowledge established itself among influential German and British scientists. Emil Du Bois-Reymond, Rudolf Virchow, Hermann von Helmholtz and Thomas Henry Huxley were some of the famous scientists who rejected attempts to adduce science in religious and metaphysical matter. This restrictionism was rejected by other scientists and philosophers who believed that the modern natural sciences constituted a complete Weltanschauung, hostile to obsolete Christianity and philosophy. The thesis primarily deals with the debate on the limits of scientific knowledge in Sweden. We follow the development of the discussion from the 1870's to the years after the First World War. At the end of the 19th century Swedish scientists freed themselves from dominant natural philosophy and natural theology. Restrictionism was later on supported, in different ways, by recognized scientists, theologians, conservative critics, and philosophers. At the turn of the centuiy the restrictionist view of science was turned against metaphysical materialism, monism, naturalism, and an emergent, radical counter-culture. The controversies continued as long as the mechanical world picture dominated the natural sciences. With social and cultural changes, and the new physics of Rutherford, Einstein, Bohr, and Heisenberg, the debate slowly faded.digitalisering@umu
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Keynes, Laura. "William Hazlitt : an aesthetics of embodiment." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.669977.
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Amaral, Antônio Henrique Paz do. "A questão da história em Martin Heidegger." Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2018. http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/8891.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES
Martin Heidegger did not make a philosophy of history on the side of a philosophy of language, man or being. Nevertheless, the thematic of history was very relevant to his thought, which has always aspired to a unifying totality around the question of the meaning of being. What is the condition of possibility of history? What makes us historical beings? This question is the one that Heidegger calls in Being and Time, the question of the historicity of history. The starting point to think this question is found on the distinctive openness of Dasein to its proper temporality, articulated in three fundamental Ekstasis which unify themselves in the existential of care – in sequence of originality: advenient-future, essential-past and the instant-present. Assuming resolute in its Being-towards-death, the Dasein gives openness to the retrieval of past, as a repetition of utmost and most original possibilities buried by tradition. Another starting point is the questioning of history from the question of the meaning of nihilism and the death of God, which involve our epoch, through a attentive dialogue with Nietzsche’s work. So Heidegger understands our historicity since a essential remission to what that, in its late thinking phase, he calls “history of Being”.
Martin Heidegger não fez uma filosofia da história à parte de uma filosofia da linguagem, da homem, ou do ser. Não obstante, a temática da história foi de suma relevância a seu pensamento, que sempre aspirou uma totalidade unificante em torno da questão do sentido do Ser. Qual é a condição de possibilidade da história? O que faz de nós seres históricos? Esta pergunta é a que Heidegger chama, em Ser e Tempo, de a questão da historicidade da história. O ponto de partida para se pensar esta questão encontra-se na abertura distintiva do Dasein para a sua temporalidade própria, articulada em três ekstases fundamentais que se unificam no existencial do cuidado – em ordem de originariedade: o futuro-adveniente, o passado-essencial e o presente-instante. Pondo-se resoluto em seu ser-para-a-morte, o Dasein dá abertura para a retroveniência do passado, enquanto repetição das possibilidades derradeiras e mais originárias soterradas pela tradição. Outro ponto de partida, é o questionamento da história a partir da pergunta pelo sentido do niilismo e da morte de Deus, que envolvem nossa época, através de um diálogo atento com a obra de Nietzsche. Assim, Heidegger compreende a nossa historicidade desde uma remissão essencial àquilo que, em sua fase tardia de pensamento, ele nomeia de a “história do Ser”
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Pinheiro, Victor Sales. "Idea e alethea: a confrontação de Heidegger com Platão." Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2013. http://www.bdtd.uerj.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=6599.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível SuperiorO objetivo desta tese é analisar a confrontação de Heidegger com Platão, no que concerne às duas palavras fundamentais da metafísica platônica, idea e aletheia. O primeiro capítulo estuda o horizonte hermenêutico em que ocorre essa confrontação, no contexto da segunda fase da obra de Heidegger, após a viragem (Kehre) do seu pensamento: uma meditação histórico-ontológica capaz de saltar para o impensado do outro início, ao destruir a história da ontologia baseada na metafísica da idea, que constitui o primeiro início. O segundo capítulo concentra-se no conceito de idea, nos seus múltiplos aspectos: metafísico, ontológico, teoló-gico, eidético, ótico, apriorístico e dualista. A noção de ideia implica uma transição epocal no sentido filosófico da verdade, considerada não mais como aletheia, mas como correspondên-cia do pensamento à ideia, à entidade dos entes. Esse é o objeto do terceiro capítulo, que rela-ciona o acontecimento apropriativo do ser (Ereignis) à verdade histórico-ontológica da physis e à verdade metafísica da ideia.
The goal of this thesis is to analyze Heideggers confrontation with Plato, regarding the two fundamental words of platonic metaphysics, idea and aletheia. The first chapter studies the hermeneutical horizon in which occurs this confrontation, in the context of the second phase of Heideggers work, after the turn (Kehre) of his thought: a historical-ontological meditation able to leap to the unthought of the other beginning, by destroying the history of ontology based on the metaphysics of the idea, that constitutes the first beginning. The second chapter deals with the concept of idea, in its multiples aspects: metaphysical, ontological, theological, eidetic, optic and dualistic. The notion of idea imply a historical transition in the philosophical meaning of truth, considered no more as aletheia, but as correspondence of thought with the idea, the entity of beings. This is the object of the third chapter, which relates the event of appropriation of being (Ereignis) with the historical-ontological truth of physis and with the metaphysical truth of idea.
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Gaston, Thomas Edmund. "Why three? : an exploration of the origins of the doctrine of the Trinity with reference to Platonism and Gnosticism." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:962e735e-6c6a-437a-a57b-8a00160f9bd7.
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In this thesis I explore the emergence of the Christian triad with reference to two contemporary movements: Middle Platonism and Gnosticism. The earliest Christian writer to enumerate the three constituents of what would become the Christian Trinity is Justin. In addition to his three extant works, Justin’s triadology can be diagnosed from those he directly influenced – Tatian and Athenagoras – who I have (somewhat artificially) grouped under the heading the “school of Justin”. The ontological triad adopted by these Christian thinkers is compared with the triads of Middle Platonism and Gnosticism, both in terms of their structure and in terms of the function and ontological status of the individual constituents of these triads. In this thesis I propose that a liturgical triad of primitive Christianity, the trine baptismal formula, was conflated by the “school of Justin” with the ontological triad of Middle Platonism, resulting in three referents of the baptismal formula being embued with new functions and ontological status. Whilst emerging as a hierarchical triad, the logic of Platonic ontology when combined with Christian tradition required the sharp distinction between God, as Being, and all other things resulting in a Christian triad that was also a unity. This new triad became fixed as a central tenet of Christianity. I find no plausible connection between any known Gnostic triad and the triad of the “school of Justin”. There is some interaction between Gnostic and Platonic thought during this period. It is possible that the Triple-Powered One pre-empted the Being-Mind-Life triad of Neoplatonism.
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Arlig, Andrew W. "A study in early medieval mereology Boethius, Abelard, and pseudo-Joscelin /." Connect to this title online, 2005. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1110209537.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2005.Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains xiii, 338 p. Includes bibliographical references (p. 316-338). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.
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Carle, Gordon A. "Alexandria in the Shadow of the Hill Cumorah: A Comparative Historical Theology of the Early Christian and Mormon Doctrines of God." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2015. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu_etd/95.
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This work is a comparative study of the theological and historical development of the early Christian (pre-Nicene) and Mormon doctrines of God. For the Christian tradition, I follow a detailed study of the apostolic period, followed by the apologetical period, and then conclude with the pre-Nicene up to around 250 C.E. For the Mormon tradition, I cover the period beginning with the establishment of the Mormon Church in 1830 and conclude with its official doctrinal formulation in 1916. I begin this work with a chronological examination of the development of the Mormon doctrine of God, commencing with Joseph Smith's translation of the Book of Mormon and concluding with his revelations and additional translations of those books that make up the Pearl of Great Price. I then examine Brigham Young's single theological contribution, followed with the speculative contributions of Parley P. Pratt, Orson Pratt, John A. Widtsoe, B.H. Roberts, and concluding with James E. Talmage. This section covers chapters two through four. In chapters five through seven, I examine the theological contributions of Ignatius of Antioch, then Theophilus of Antioch, and conclude my study with the theological contributions of Origen of Alexandria. For the Christian tradition, I trace the development of the pre-Nicene theologians' struggle to explicate the theological and philosophical implications regarding the divinization of Christ within the context of monotheism.. At the end of chapters five through seven I include a succinct, comparative study of each father's doctrine with Mormon doctrine. This work will also address the major theological and historical factors that influenced both the Mormon and traditional Christian doctrines of God. Further, I contrast both theological systems and discuss their basic differences and similarities. My conclusion is that the fundamental difference between these two theological systems rests upon their foundational conceptions of reality as absolutist or finitist. The Mormon theological system rests upon a materialistic and monistic conception of reality, whereas traditional Christianity's system rests upon a dualistic conception of reality. In Mormon materialism, the Trinity is divided as individuated Gods; in Christian transcendence, the unity of God may only be maintained, while acknowledging the separate existences of the Persons of the Godhead, if the nature of God is understood as an incorporeal substance.
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Calhoun, Robert D. "Dynamism, Creativeness, and Evolutionary Progress in the work of Alexander Archipenko." The Ohio State University, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1460755467.
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Barbour, Susan Jean. "Elegaic materialism : the poetry and art of Susan Howe." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:4a0decd4-dec1-4f23-9457-d4d8b58c97c1.
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The American poet Susan Howe (1937-present) began her career as a visual artist, but owing to a dearth of information about her early collages it has been difficult to say anything substantive about how they might have shaped her poetic practice. In 2010, she placed her collages on archive. Along with a number of personal interviews with Howe, this heretofore unavailable material has enabled me to consider Howe's subsequent work in a new light and to establish significant links between her early visual aesthetics and the poetics of bibliography, historiography, and elegy for which she is now known. Howe's collages, like her poetry, focus on details that are at risk of vanishing from cultural memory and printed record. For this reason, I argue that her work evinces an 'elegaic materialism', or a way of reading, viewing, and thinking about texts that is attuned to loss. If “history is the record of the winners,” as Howe says, then one way of rescuing marginalized perspectives is by regarding manuscripts as drawings, thereby rescuing the concrete particulars deemed irrelevant by editors and historians. As Howe's late work turned increasingly toward elegy, her early aesthetic contributed to a nuanced poetics of personal loss and to a series of astonishing new formal tropes. The Introduction to this thesis discusses Howe's materialism in the context of current literary theory and textual scholarship. Chapter 1 concerns itself with Howe's art historical context. Chapter 2 analyses a selection of her word-drawings. Chapter 3 considers Howe's transition to poetry. Chapter 4 addresses her turn to archival documents in her middle period. Chapter 5 looks at the influence on Howe of documentary film, especially in connection with the task of representing a lost loved one, and Chapter 6 discusses her two most recent elegies, The Midnight and THAT THIS. A Coda completes the circle by once more considering Howe in the context of the visual arts at the moment she was selected to exhibit at the 2014 Whitney Biennial.
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Djian, Aurelien. "L'horizon comme problème. Contribution à une histoire plurielle de la phénoménologie." Thesis, Lille 3, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017LIL30042/document.
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L’enjeu de la thèse est à la fois d’esquisser une cartographie des usages phénoménologiques du concept d’« horizon » au XXème siècle, et en même temps de justifier l’idée d’une histoire plurielle de la phénoménologie. Plus précisément, il s’agit de montrer l’existence d’au moins deux versions alternatives de « la » phénoménologie au XXème siècle, délimitant deux cadres conceptuels et problématiques radicalement distincts qui déterminent deux manières dont il est fait usage de l’« horizon » et deux histoires de ce concept. Ainsi, chaque version — l’herméneutique phénoménologique d’inspiration heideggerienne, incluant le premier et le second Heidegger, Gadamer, Levinas, Henry, Marion vs. la phénoménologie husserlienne — repose sur une certaine conception du « phénomène » — ce qui est structurellement caché et inconstitué et est le fondement (= phénomène par excellence) de ce qui se montre (= phénomène vulgaire), raison pour laquelle il faut le laisser se montrer d’une manière herméneutique (Leben an und für sich, Sein des Seiendes, Sein als Lichtung, la vie, Autrui, la donation) vs. tout objet en tant que sens réduit constitué comme unité d’une multiplicité de conscience et exemplaire arbitraire d’une structure eidétique à décrire — qui définit le type de problèmes et d’usages de l’« horizon » en jeu dans chaque version : dans l’histoire de l’herméneutique phénoménologique, de la stabilisation de l’horizon de la vie en et pour soi et l’explicitation de l’horizon de l’être dans les Problèmes fondamentaux de la phénoménologie et Être et Temps à la nécessité de dépasser l’horizon, concept intrinsèquement lié à la métaphysique moderne de la subjectivité, chez le second Heidegger, Levinas, Henry et Marion, en passant par l’option synthétique dans Vérité et Gadamer qui assume l’horizon subjectiviste critiqué par Heidegger tout en maintenant sa critique à l’égard de la métaphysique de la subjectivité. D’un autre côté, chez Husserl, l’histoire de l’horizon commence par la détermination de son rôle local comme opérateur synthétique temporel et intentionnel entre multiplicité des perceptions externes et unité de la chose dans Chose et Espace, avant que sa fonction soit généralisée dans les Ideen I comme opérateur temporel et intentionnel de constitution du phénomène transcendant et immanent comme tel. C’est précisément la définition générale du phénomène de la phénoménologie husserlienne comme unité d’une multiplicité synthétisée par horizon qui constitue alors le catalyseur de développements théoriques concernant les trois opérations méthodiques censées être adaptées à l’étude du phénomène — l’épochè, la réduction eidétique et l’analyse intentionnelle, la réflexion phénoménologique —, développements que nous essayons de retracer, des Ideen I aux derniers textes, dans la seconde partie de ce travail. Cette analyse menée sur les deux fronts — l’horizon et la phénoménologie — nous mène alors à deux résultats importants : d’abord, nous aurons dégagé la signification du concept d’« horizon » dans ces deux versions de la phénoménologie que nous aurons radicalement distinguées ; ensuite et surtout, après avoir différencier ces deux versions de la phénoménologie sur la base du caractère alternatif des concepts de « phénomène » qui les fondent, nous aurons justifié théoriquement la possibilité d’une appropriation à venir de la phénoménologie d’inspiration husserlienne qui, plus d’un siècle après la parution des Ideen I, reste encore à accomplirMy work aims at proposing a cartography of the phenomenological uses of the concept of horizon in the 20th century, as well as justifying the idea of a plural history of phenomenology itself. In fact, both issues are intimately related for the main goal is to show the existence of (at least) two alternative versions of phenomenology in the 20th, defined by two radically different conceptual and problematic frames determining two different way of using the term « horizon », and two different histories of this notion. Thus, each version — Heidegger-inspired hermeneutical phenomenology, including Heidegger himself at his « first » and « second » stage, Gadamer, Levinas, Henry, Marion vs. Husserlian phenomenology — is based on a very distinctive conception of what a « phenomenon » is — what is structurally concealed, unconstituted, and founds what structurally shows up, reason why it has to be made hermeneutically manifest (Leben an und für sich, Sein des Seiendes, Sein als Lichtung, life, the Other, giveness) vs. any possible meaningful object constituted as a unity in a multiplicity of any possible consciousness, constitutive correlation whose character of possibility must be grasped as that of an eidetic structure the phenomenologist has to describe — which define the kind of problems and uses of the « horizon » that will be at stake: as for hermeneutical phenomenology, it all starts with Heidegger’s explicitation of the horizon of Leben an und für sich and being and ends up with the further rejection of such a concept, considered as connected to modern metaphysics of subjectivity, by the second Heidegger, Levinas, Henry and Marion, through Gadamer’s attempt to combine the use of the term of « horizon » and a renewed critic of metaphysics; on the other hand, as for Husserl’s phenomenology, the horizon is first considered in Thing and Space as a temporal and intentional synthetic function in virtue of which the unity of the thing is made out of a multiplicity of external perceptions, before its synthetic function is generalized in Ideen I to the constitution of each and every transcendant and immanent objectivity. Then it is precisely such a generalization which, as it defines Husserl’s concept of « phenomenon » itself as a unity constituted in a multiplicity synthesized through an horizon, implies theoretical developments related to phenomenology’s methodical operations — épochè, eidetic reduction and intentional analysis, phenomenological reflexion — in virtue of which such phenomena can be studied, developments we try to follow in the second part of this work. At this point, we are finally led to two main results: first, we’re from now on able to value the differentiated significance of the concept of « horizon » in both versions of phenomenology; secondly, and more importantly, by radically distinguishing those two ways of doing phenomenology, we pave the way to (and justify theoretically) a further appropriation of Husserl’s phenomenology that, more than a century after the publication of Ideen I, is still to be carried out
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Jérôme, David. "La question du système dans le Zibaldone de Giacomo Leopardi." Thesis, Lyon 3, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015LYO30030.
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Le Zibaldone est le grand journal de pensées de Giacomo Leopardi (1798-1837). Le jeune philologue et poète y consigne, sur près de quinze ans (1817-1832) et plus de 4500 pages, des pensées qu’il nomme « de philosophie variée et de belle littérature ». Et en effet, c’est bien la variété, et même la plus étonnante bigarrure qui caractérisent ce monumental magasin d’écriture : bigarrure des matières brassées (théorie de la connaissance, métaphysique, anthropologie, politique, morale, esthétique, autobiographie) ; bigarrure de ses formes (aphorisme, anecdote, maxime, remarque, citation, note érudite, essai) ; bigarrure de ses tonalités (tour à tour sarcastique ou sérieuse, docte ou familière, polémique ou poétique) ; intensité variable de ses rythmes d’écriture etc. Le Zibaldone apparaît donc tout d’abord comme un flux discontinu et disparate de pensée. Cependant, Leopardi n’entend pas y exposer une rhapsodie de vérités isolées et fragmentaires mais une véritable philosophie, un authentique système philosophique. « Il mio sistema » : « mon système se fonde sur un scepticisme raisonné », « mon système ne se fonde pas sur le christianisme mais s’accorde avec lui », « mon système ne détruit pas l’absolu mais le multiplie » etc. La philosophie de Leopardi se place sous le signe d’une assomption répétée et explicite de la systématicité : « il n’existe pas de philosophe véritable sans système ». Affronter la question du système revient alors pour lui à affronter la question de l’ordre. Il ne s’agit pas d’une simple velléité mais d’une exigence aussi bien méthodologique qu’ontologique. Manquer d’esprit de système c’est manquer d’ordre, et c’est surtout manquer l’essence même du réel, de la nature en tant que totalité , une nature qu’il ne saurait concevoir autrement, elle aussi, que comme un système et comme un ordre. Quel est donc l’ordre du système léopardien ? Et dans quelle mesure celui-ci épouse-t-il l’ordre du système de la nature ? Quel est leur fondement commun ? Répondre à ces questions revient à parcourir l’ensemble du manuscrit et à montrer en quoi cette totalité mouvante, ouverte et réticulaire qu’est le Zibaldone est le seul lieu à même d’accueillir une pensée placée devant l’urgence de statuer sur les guises de l’existence et de la contradictionThe Zibaldone is Giacomo Leopardi’s (1798-1837) famous diary of thoughts. The young philologist and poet recorded, for almost fifteen years (1817-1832) and in over more than 4,500 pages, thoughts that he calls "of varied philosophy and fine literature." And, indeed, it is its variety and even the most striking variegation which characterise this monumental magasin d’écriture: the variegation of its subject matters (theory of knowledge, metaphysics, anthropology, politics, morals, aesthetics, autobiography); the variegation of its forms (aphorism, anecdote, maxim, observation, quotation, scholarly notes, essay); the variegation of its tones (sarcastic or serious, learned or familiar, polemical or poetic); the variable intensity of its writing rhythms and so forth. So the Zibaldone appears as a discontinuous and disparate stream of thought. However, Leopardi does not mean to put forward a rhapsody of isolated and fragmentary truths but a true philosophy, a genuine philosophical system. "Il mio sistema": "my system is based on a well-argued scepticism", "my system is not based on Christianism but is compatible with it", "my system does not destroy the absolute but multiplies it", etc. Leopardi’s philosophy is placed under the sign of a repeated and explicit assumption of systematicity: "there is no true philosopher without a system." For him confronting the question of the system means confronting the question of order. It is not about a simple inclination but about a methodological as well as an ontological requirement. Lacking the spirit of a system is lacking order, and it’s above all lacking the essence of reality itself, the essence of nature as a totality, a nature he cannot conceive otherwise than as a system and an order. So what is the order of the leopardian system? And to what extent does it fit in with the order of the system of nature? What is their common foundation? Answering these questions means browsing through the whole manuscript to show to what extent this moving, open and reticular totality which is the Zibaldone is the only suitable place to receive a thought placed in front of the urgency to pronounce a judgment on the modes of existence and contradiction
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Pearse, Harry John. "Natural philosophy and theology in seventeenth-century England." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2016. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/263362.
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This thesis explores the disciplinary relationship between natural philosophy (the study of nature or body) and theology (the study of the divine) in seventeenth-century England. Early modern disciplines had two essential functions. First, they set the rules and boundaries of argument – knowledge was therefore legitimised and made intelligible within disciplinary contexts. And second, disciplines structured pedagogy, parcelling knowledge so it could be studied and taught. This dual role meant disciplines were epistemic and social structures. They were composed of various elements, and consequently, they related to one another in a variety of complex ways. As such, the contestability of early modern knowledge was reflected in contestability of disciplines – their content and boundaries. Francis Bacon, Thomas White, Henry More and John Locke are the focus of the four chapters respectively, with Joseph Glanvill, Thomas Hobbes, other Cambridge divines, and a variety of medieval scholastic authors providing context, comparison and reinforcement. These case studies offer a cross-section of seventeenth-century thought and belief; they embody different professional and institutional interests, and represent an array of philosophical, theological and religious positions. Nevertheless, each of them, in different ways, and to different effect, put the relationship between natural philosophy and theology at the heart of their intellectual endeavours. Together, they demonstrate that, in seventeenth-century England, natural philosophy and theology were in flux, and that their disciplinary relationship was complex, entailing degrees of overlap and alienation. Primarily, natural philosophy and theology investigated the nature and constitution of the world, and, together, determined the relationship between its constituent parts – natural and divine. However, they also reflected the scope of man’s cognitive faculties, establishing which bits of the world were knowable, and outlining the grounds for, and appropriate degrees of, certainty and belief. Thus, both disciplines, and their relationship with one another, contributed to broad discussions about, truth, certainty and opinion. This, in turn, established normative guidelines. To some extent, the rightness or wrongness of belief and behaviour was determined by particular definitions of, and relationship between, natural philosophy and theology. Consequently, man’s place in the world – his relationship with nature, God and his fellow man – was triangulated through these disciplines.
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Ben-Ezzer, Tirza. "Naming the Virtual: Digital Subjects and The End of History through Hegel and Deleuze (and a maybe few cyborgs)." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1626919557257155.
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Guo, Yunlong. "The structure of a metaphysical interpretation of science of history." Thesis, Cardiff University, 2018. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/115891/.
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The aim of this research is to reconstruct a metaphysical interpretation of the philosophy of history with regard to the spirit of historical thinking. The spirit of historical thinking is to emphasize the relation between what happened in the past and historical thinking about the past in the present. However, current philosophies of history, which are largely epistemologically oriented, have not adequately explored this relation. In order to investigate the relation between past and present, I refer to an Aristotelian philosophy of practice and politics, and adapt it to the domain of the philosophy of history, and argue the case for a metaphysical science of history. A metaphysical science of history contains two primary parts. They are the part on physis and the part on technê/phronēsis. With regard to physis that metaphysically investigates the natural generating progress of entities, I argue that the existence of historical events can be understood as a natural developing progress in which the events are ordered in a chronological sequence. Such chronological sequence is essentially the physis of history in the metaphysical sense (I characterize it as ‘Ordnungszeit’). For the part on technê/phronēsis, I demonstrate that Aristotelian knowing is for itself an action of knowing, which is located beyond a given temporal position in the past to both the past and the thinking present, and indicates the fundamental Beingness of history (I characterize it as ‘Geschehenszeit’). Finally I conclude that the historical eudaimonia, namely the pursuing of the completeness of historical knowledge, is the final presentation of actualizing Geschehenszeit, as it bridges the past and the present in accordance to the spirit of historical thinking.
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Paula, Wander Andrade de 1984. "O(s) Socrates de Nietzsche : uma leitura d'O nascimento da tragedia." [s.n.], 2009. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/279169.
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Orientador: Oswaldo Giacoia JuniorDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-13T16:00:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Paula_WanderAndradede_M.pdf: 1941842 bytes, checksum: 8860b07f0e10bd95a5f9641d19a80e47 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009
Resumo: A pesquisa pretende apresentar as diferentes facetas de Sócrates no Nascimento da Tragédia, de Friedrich Nietzsche. Analisaremos, para isso, a interpretação nietzschiana da morte da tragédia pelo efeito da ação combinada de Sócrates e Eurípides e, principalmente, quais as conseqüências geradas por essa destruição, que vão muito além do campo da arte. Examinaremos como a arte era produzida instintivamente pelo grego antigo e como ela passou a ser produzida de modo consciente a partir de Eurípides, invertendo a relação que o grego antigo mantinha com a tragédia. Reconstituiremos as análises de Nietzsche sobre a oposição entre pessimismo trágico e otimismo teórico, sobre o papel da arte como transfiguração e superação do pessimismo, bem como sobre a relação entre otimismo socrático e modernidade. Levando-se em conta que Nietzsche não trata somente da figura de um Sócrates paladino da ciência, analisaremos a possibilidade de outra faceta da interpretação nietzschiana acerca do socratismo, bem como as implicações geradas por ela na relação estabelecida por Nietzsche entre arte e ciência. Merecerá ainda atenção especial a originalidade da leitura nietzschiana da Grécia clássica, assim como sua oposição à filologia acadêmica de seu tempo.
Abstract: The research aims to show the several faces of Socrates at Friedrich Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy. We will analyze, for this aim, the Nietzsche's interpretation of the death of the tragedy by the effect of the combined action of Socrates and Euripides and, mainly, what are the outcomes generated for this destruction, which don't comprehend only the scope of art. We also will analyze how the art was produced instinctively by the ancient Greeks and how it passed to be produced consciously by Euripides, so as to reverse the relationship which the ancient Greeks kept with the tragedy. We will reconstitute the analyses of Nietzsche about the opposition between tragic pessimism and theoretical optimism, about the function of the art like transfiguration and overcoming of the pessimism, like that about the relationship between Socratic optimism and modernity. Considering that Nietzsche doesn't treat just of the figure of a crusader Socrates of the science, we will analyze the possibility of another facet of the Nietzsche's interpretation about the socratism, besides the implications generated from it at the relationship established by Nietzsche between art and science. We will still pay attention to the originality of the Nietzsche's analysis of the classic Greece, and his opposition to academic philology of his period.
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia
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Karlén, Jessica. "Skrattets makt : En filosofisk undersökning av komiken som meningsskapande existentiell nödvändighet." Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Institutionen för kultur och lärande, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-40027.
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The subject of this paper is the philosophy of comedy. It is an orientation through history of laughter and its connection to the essence of comedy. This investigation tries to pinpoint some characteristics of the comedian and the task of the comedian today, focusing primarily on comedy in the public sphere. This paper concludes that comedy could be something physical and biological, but also something political. Humor is general and something very common but also culturally unique. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate comedy as something highly spiritual, absolute human and animalistic. It also aims to connect comedy to the philosophical discipline and strengthen its bond to the academic field. This paper includes some theories of humor, from both an evolutionary, scientific perspective to a more philosophical and theological view. It also includes a political discussion of how one can joke about everything and why comedy is important today.
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Reuven, Genuyah S. "Commission of Two Narratives of the Psyche: Reading Poqéakh in Nella Larsen’s Quicksand and Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man." DigitalCommons@Robert W. Woodruff Library, Atlanta University Center, 2019. http://digitalcommons.auctr.edu/cauetds/170.
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This study focuses on the novels of Quicksand by Nella Larsen and Invisible Man by Ralph Ellison to explore the phenomenon of poqéakh (פֹּקֵחַ) through the fictionalized lived experiences of their protagonists, Helga Crane and invisible man. Each novelist’s representation of poqéakh offers a portrait of the protagonists’ psyches. The narratives reveal an unsettling truth for the protagonists, who are members of a population often targeted, stigmatized, and fashioned or re-fashioned by Americans and various environs in American society, that they must assimilate—not only their bodies, but their psyches too to fit the “white man’s pattern” (Larsen 4). Their realities inform them that non-conformity and/or developing or utilizing their intellect is disadvantageous—perceiving is unfavorable. Each protagonist learns that she and he will not only be limited by their imaginations or abilities, but also by persons and constructs within American society keeping them witless and amenable.
The environs presented in forms such as schools, jobs, even people who prepare each protagonist to accept all and any disparity (inequality and inequity), they are made to be persistently and surreptitiously instructive. As such, these environs are always educating (or training), always molding the psyches of the protagonists to live within a frame—the construct (American society). These ever informing boundaries thoroughly acquaint each protagonist on “how to scale down [their] desires and dreams so that they will come within reach of possibility” (Thurman 115). Poqéakh leads Helga Crane to perceive the boundaries while it prevents the invisible man from returning to unblissful ignorance, thus, for him, providing momentary periods of lucidity.
This study utilizes a qualitative research design and method, and relies on phenomenological theory to successfully analyze the novels and explicate on the representations of poqéakh. As this study will illustrate, Larsen and Ellison offer as representative via their novels two narratives of the diasporic psyche (mind), wherein their protagonists’ experiences of poqéakh lead to some unmitigated facts and disturbing truths about their reality.
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McMahan, Kathleen Ann. ""Creolization" in American religious history: The metaphysical nature of Henry Steel Olcott's Buddhism." Connect to online resource, 2008. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:1460868.
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Spaak, Claude Vishnu. "Interprétations phénoménologiques de la Physique d'Aristote chez Heidegger et Patočka." Thesis, Paris 4, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA040171.
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L’ambition de cette thèse est de confronter les interprétations heideggérienne et patočkienne des concepts fondamentaux de la Physique d’Aristote. Un point d’accord relie les deux philosophes : Aristote conçoit le mouvement comme une détermination ontologique fondamentale. Le mouvement (κίνησις/μεταβολή) se conçoit fondamentalement en effet comme un procès d’éclosion, d’advenue au paraître des étants dans la présence manifeste. Cependant, Heidegger et Patočka ne comprennent pas de la même manière le sens de ce mouvement ontologique au cœur de la nature (φύσις) : c’est à examiner ces différences que cette thèse est consacrée, de sorte à faire ressortir, à la faveur de l’interprétation d’Aristote, deux conceptions distinctes et à bien des égards opposées chez ces deux auteurs du sens et du statut de l’ontologie phénoménologique elle-même. Cette thèse conclut à l’idéalisme philosophique de Heidegger, ainsi qu’à la tendance contraire chez Patočka à un réalisme cosmologique qui conteste, jusqu’à un certain point, l’identité de l’être et du sens. Dans le cadre de cette thèse, une attention toute particulière est accordée au concept qui concentre en lui toute la charge de la tension : à savoir le concept de matière (ὕλη)This thesis confronts the Heideggerian and Patočkian interpretations of the fundamental concepts of Aristotelian Physics. Both interpretations share a point in common: according to Heidegger and Patočka, Aristotle conceives movement as a fundamental ontological determination of Being. Indeed, movement (κίνησις/μεταβολή) is conceived by Aristotle as a process of unconcealment, of coming into presence of entities in the openness of manifest being. Nevertheless, Heidegger and Patočka disagree on the way that one should understand the meaning of this ontological movement at the core of nature (φύσις). This thesis is entirely dedicated to examining these differences. Our aim is to show, through Heidegger’s and Patočka’s interpretations of Aristotle, that there are two distinct and by all means opposed conceptions of the meaning and status of phenomenological ontology itself. This thesis concludes both to Heidegger’s philosophical idealism, and to Patočka’s contrary attempt to build a cosmological realism that challenges to a certain extent the identity between Being and meaning. In the working out of this thesis, a very particular focus is drawn on the concept that concentrates the entire charge of the tension, i.e. the concept of matter (ὕλη)
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van, der Lugt Mara. "'Pierre, or the ambiguities' : Bayle, Jurieu and the Dictionnaire Historique et Critique." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:02bbbbda-7fa3-4c1c-af05-99842a9217e0.
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This thesis presents a new study of Pierre Bayle’s Dictionnaire Historique et Critique (1696), with special reference to Bayle’s polemical engagement with the theologian Pierre Jurieu. While recent years have seen a surge of interest in Bayle, there is as yet no consensus on how to interpret Bayle’s ambiguous stance on reason and religion, and how to make sense of the Dictionnaire: although specific parts of the Dictionnaire have received much scholarly attention, the work has hardly been studied as a whole, and little is known about how the Dictionnaire was influenced by Bayle’s polemic with Jurieu. This thesis aims to establish a new method for reading the Dictionnaire, under a dual premise: first, that the work can only be rightly understood when placed within the immediate context of its production in the 1690s; second, that it is only through an appreciation of the mechanics of the work as a whole, and of the role played by its structural and stylistic particularities, that we can attain an appropriate interpretation of its parts. Special attention is paid to the heated theological-political conflict between Bayle and Jurieu in the 1690s, which had a profound influence on the project of the dictionary and on several of its major themes, such as the tensions in the relationship between the intellectual sphere of the Republic of Letters and the political state, but also the danger of religious fanaticism spurring intolerance and war. The final chapters demonstrate that Bayle’s clash with Jurieu was also one of the driving forces behind Bayle’s reflection on the problem of evil; they expose the fundamentally problematic nature of both Bayle’s theological association with Jurieu, and his self-defence in the second edition of the Dictionnaire. The title of this thesis comes from Herman Melville’s novel: ‘Pierre, or the Ambiguities’.
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Draper, Michèle. "Restitution de la poésie ˸ la portée des écrits théoriques dans l'œuvre de Gerard Manley Hopkins." Thesis, Sorbonne Paris Cité, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018USPCA137.
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L’introduction rappelle l’importance et l’intérêt des proses des Journals, des Oxford Essays and Notes, et des écrits dévotionnels, qui doivent être lus en continuité avec la poésie. Le chapitre I se consacre à la restitution des phénomènes naturels et perceptifs chez Hopkins, à la description et à l’analyse des termes d’inscape et d’instress dans les Journals, à la pratique de la prose descriptive chez Hopkins. Le chapitre II examine l’héraclitéisme de Hopkins dans le poème That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the Comfort of the Resurrection. La résurrection est l’autre nom de la restitution (ou apocatastasis) qui donne la première explication de notre titre. Nous y observons le traitement de la description dynamique de la nature, en liaison avec les Journals, et l’ensemble des essais théoriques des années 1863-68, puis leur résonance sur la vingtaine d’années d’activité du poète. Le chapitre III se consacre à l’examen de l’essai « Parmenides » de 1868 qui permet de comprendre l’origine des termes essentiels d’instress et d’inscape dans la traduction commentée du Poème de Parménide, et l’emploi ultérieur de ces termes dans les définitions de la poésie. Le chapitre IV examine la définition de la poésie selon Hopkins, la constitution dialectique de la poésie, en fonction d’un triple trajet, confrontant les Essais d’Oxford, les poèmes et la tradition philosophique. On y relie de manière croisée l’interprétation de la dialectique de Platon, le réalisme d’Aristote à la question de l’imagination, de la fantaisie et de la voix. Ces éléments permettent l'analyse des liens entre langage poétique, vérité et réalité. Le chapitre V se consacre à l’analyse de la place de l’homme singulier dans cette pensée, aux définitions de la poésie, en confrontant les premiers essais d’esthétique aux usages plus tardifs des théologies hypostatiques et eucharistiques ainsi qu’à l’écriture des poèmes. La lecture de Duns Scot conduit à examiner les notions de pitch et de sake, considérées comme autant d’étapes pour parvenir à une définition poétique de l’homme. Le chapitre VI se consacre au développement de la notion d’imagination rythmique et à l’analyse du rythme bondissant, la clef de voûte de la pensée et de la pratique de Hopkins, par un examen des poèmes, des liens avec les poétiques de Wordsworth et de Coleridge, la métaphysique, la pensée du théâtre, la tradition pindarique. La conclusion tente de montrer qu’avec Hölderlin, et Coleridge, Hopkins est une des figures majeures de la pensée de la poésie, ce qui explique l’influence de ses écrits sur la poésie et la poétique du XXe siècleHopkins’ Oxford Essays and Notes as well as his prose writings are of particular relevance for the understanding of his work at large. Chapter I analyzes Hopkins’ Journals and the restitution of natural phenomena and sensations, as well as the use of inscape and instress in descriptive contexts. Chapter II analyzes Hopkins’ Heracliteanism in the poem That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the Comfort of the Resurrection. Resurrection is a synonym for restitution (or apocatastasis in Greek, explaining our choice of the title). We concentrate on the dynamic description of nature in the Journals and the resonance of the Oxford Essays over the twenty years of Hopkins’ activity as a writer and poet. The third chapter is devoted to the 1868 essay « Parmenides », in which we trace the origins of the key-terms of inscape and instress as translations from the Greek of Parmenides’ Poem. Chaper IV examines the import of these notions in Hopkins’ definitions of poetry, the constitutive dialectics of poetry by analyzing the following topics in the Oxford Essays : poetry, its relation to philosophy, to Plato’s dialectics, to Aristotle’s realism and ethics, the definition of voice, imagination and fancy, as well as the analysis of the links between poetical language, truth and reality. Chapter V concentrates on the analysis of man’s singularity by confronting Hopkins’ early aesthetical theories and his more mature uses of hypostatical and eucharistic theologies, in the light of Duns Scotus’s influence. The relation of poetry, theology and anthropology leads us to examine the key notions of pitch and sake in Hopkins’ poetic definition of man. Chapter VI is devoted to the analysis of Hopkins’ rhythmical imagination and sprung rhythm, the keystone of his thought and practice, in relation to his interpretation of Wordsworthian and Coleridgean aesthetics, metaphysics, dramatic theory, poetics and the Pindaric tradition. To conclude, we focus on the importance of Hopkins, as one of the greatest representatives of poetic thought in the XIXth Century along with Coleridge and Hölderlin, hence his influence in XXth century poetry and poetics
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Leetch, Amanda. "Weaving Meaning| Terrapsychological Inquiry and the Historic Industrial Placefield of Lowell Massachusetts." Thesis, Prescott College, 2018. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10689196.
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Places are expressive, dynamic, and responsive beings voicing themselves at different scales of emergence. Placefields are the sites of research at the complex nexus of peoples, cultures, geography, experience, mythology, and place history in terrapsychology. Children are open and receptive to these expressive qualities of place, understanding these place emanations through the context provided to them by place-based educators and other adults. This four-month study at Lowell National Historical Park utilized terrapsychological inquiry to explore youth connection to the historic industrial placefield of Lowell, Massachusetts as experienced by learners and educators, reproduced through youth placefield encounters, and iterated through self, community, and as culture across scales. The arts-based research method of terrain weaving empowered this research to connect with complex pattern languages of Lowell, surfacing the symbolic repertoire of place, the somatic and psychological components of youth place encounter, the deep patterns of place that rise through the researcher, and the expansive states of consciousness that are catalyzed through complex place relationships. The difficult histories placefields perform reproduce their traumatic and historic woundings in the visiting psyche. At the same time, the underlying resilience, strengths, and gifts of places with difficult histories are vital assets to be liberated. The experiential and embodied elements of field trips make them powerful intersections for troubling the ways historic narratives are constructed. This research concludes it is possible to radically redesign field trips and recontextualize histories to provide a nourishing, regenerative place encounter by adopting complex, expansive, and agential understandings of place.
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Lansley, Charles Morris. "Charles Darwin's debt to the Romantics." Thesis, University of Winchester, 2016. http://repository.winchester.ac.uk/161/.
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The thesis examines the principal works of Charles Darwin to determine whether there is any evidence of Romantic concepts in his writings and whether, therefore, he owes a debt to the Romantics such as Alexander von Humboldt and Goethe. The first two chapters of the thesis trace the influence of Alexander von Humboldt (1769 – 1859) on Charles Darwin (1809-1882). There are frequent references to Humboldt in Darwin’s works. Humboldt’s Romantic concepts of Nature, expressed in his Personal Narrative [1807 – 1834] and in his later Cosmos [1845], are compared to Darwin’s concepts of Nature in his On the Origin of Species [1859, first edition]. An analysis of Humboldt shows him firmly within the German Romantic school of thought with influences from Schelling and Goethe, especially concerning the concept of Mind. Humboldt’s method of analysing Nature aesthetically had a profound effect on Darwin’s own imaginative view of Nature. Further analysis of this method, coupled with Goethe’s ‘Genetic Method’ of moving between the particular and the infinite when seeing the ‘leaf’ and ‘vertebrae’ archetypes, shows strong evidence of the influence of the German Romantics on the development of Darwin’s theory of natural selection. In analysing the Romantic concept of a ‘One Reality Nature’, the thesis shows that Darwin’s evidence of a common progenitor provides a moral imperative for treating all races as equal in terms of their origins and their potential for development. In Chapter Three the origins of morality are seen by Darwin as having been generated by natural instincts rather than having come from a Creator. This is examined with reference to Darwin’s The Descent of Man [1871; 1879, second edition] within the moral and cultural context of the Victorian era in which he lived. The final Chapter Four compares The Voyage of the Beagle [1839, first edition] to Darwin’s later works to see if there are differences between his earlier and later forms of Romanticism and how easily they sit alongside Darwin the Victorian. The thesis concludes that essentially Darwin’s Romantic theme of wonder and enchantment is the same for both his early and later years. However, Darwin’s Romanticism has moved from an anthropocentric view with Man as its centre to an anthropomorphic view in which Man is seen as part of Nature but not at its centre. Darwin’s self-expression in his writing has also moved from a subjective form of poetry developed through his personal experience of Nature, to a more objective form of poetic science in which Darwin is able to step back from the science he creates. Finally, the Conclusion suggests that there is sufficient evidence in Darwin’s works to claim that he can be regarded as a Romantic materialist. This is evidenced by his view that Mind and Man’s morality have been developed by Nature’s laws out of matter. It is also evidenced by Darwin’s own mental methods of discovery through his own form of imagination and poetry, sharing some of the themes of the English Romantic poets such as Wordsworth and Tennyson.
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Lacaille, Julien. "L'empirisme spéculatif de Johannes Nicolaus Tetens." Thesis, Paris 10, 2019. http://faraway.parisnanterre.fr/login?url=http://bdr.parisnanterre.fr/theses/intranet/2019/2019PA100082/2019PA100082.pdf.
Full textAbstract:
Notre étude porte sur l’émergence du problème de l’objectivité dans la philosophie de Johannes Nicolaus Tetens (1736-1807). Prenant acte de l’échec du système wolffien, Tetens s’interroge dès le début des années 1760 sur les obstacles au progrès de la métaphysique. Pour lui la difficulté est principalement d’ordre méthodologique. Une réforme de l’ontologie lui parait nécessaire. Mais la lecture de l’"Anlage zur Architectonic" de Lambert le convainc que la difficulté centrale ne tient pas tant au manque d’intelligibilité des concepts fondamentaux ou au manque de rigueur dans l’application de la méthode euclidienne mais à l’incertitude dans laquelle se trouve l’entendement concernant la « réalité » de ses propres concepts. L’enquête sur les fondements de la métaphysique conduit ainsi Tetens en 1775 à formuler le projet d’une philosophie transcendante. La métaphysique doit partir de l’expérience et la raison être guidée dans ses spéculations par des principes transcendants. Ces principes ontologiques issus de la « théorie de la raison » doivent cependant être objectivés. La « physique de l’entendement humain », propédeutique à l’ontologie, a alors pour tâche d’examiner les modes d’action et les lois par lesquels le pouvoir de penser élabore ses propres connaissances à partir des sensations. Le problème est le suivant : comment une vérité peut-elle être objective si toutes nos représentations sont subjectives ? La solution est apportée dans les "Essais philosophiques sur la nature humaine et son développement" (1777) : Tetens propose une théorie de l’objectivité fondée sur les principes a priori de la raison. Certes nous ne connaissons que l’apparence des choses mais les rapports invariants entre les phénomènes sont des rapports objectifs. En suivant la voie de l’analogie, la raison spéculative est ainsi en mesure de s’élever aux vérités métaphysiques les plus éloignées de l’expérience humaineOur study shall focus on the emergence of Objectivity as a philosophical concern for Johannes Nicolaus Tetens (1736-1807). By the early 1760’s, aware of the failures of the Wolffian system, Tetens began reflecting on the obstacles to the progress of metaphysics, concluding that the core difficulties stem from the lack of an appropriate methodology. A reform of ontology seemed necessary; however, upon reading Lambert’s Anslage zur Architectonic, Tetens became convinced that the main difficulty resulted from the intellect’s uncertainty concerning the reality of its fundamental metaphysical concepts, and not from the lack of intelligibility of fundamental concepts, or to the lack of rigor when applying the Euclidian method. The enquiry into the foundations of metaphysics lead Tetens, in 1775, to undertake the project of a transcendent philosophy; one based on the insights that metaphysics must be grounded in experience, and reason must be guided, when speculating about transcendent principles. These ontological principles which come from the “theory of reason” must, however, be objectified. Reforming ontology seemed to him necessary. The task of the « physics of human understanding », propaedeutic to ontology, is to examine the modes of action and the laws through which knowledge is derived from sensations. The crux of the issue is: how can a truth be objective if all our representations are subjective? The solution is given by Tetens in “Philosophical Essays on Human Nature and its Development” (1777). There he suggests a theory of objectivity based on a priori principles of reason. Indeed, although we only know the appearance of things, the unchanging relations between phenomena are objective; consequently, by following the path of analogy, speculative reason is able to establish metaphysical truths beyond the bounds of human experience
Die Dissertation behandelt das Aufkommen des Problems der Objektivität in der Philosophie von Johann Nikolaus Tetens (1736–1807). In Kenntnis des Scheiterns des Wolff‘schen Systems, arbeitet Tetens seit Beginn der 1760er-Jahre daran, die Hindernisse beim Fortschritt der Metaphysik zu überwinden. Für ihn sind die Schwierigkeiten in erster Linie methodologischer Natur. Eine Reform der Ontologie scheint ihm daher zunächst unumgänglich. Die Lektüre von Lamberts Anlage zur Architectonic überzeugt ihn jedoch davon, dass die zentrale Schwierigkeit weniger in der Deutlichkeit der Grundbegriffe oder in einer mangelnden Anwendung der Methode Euklids liegt, als vielmehr in der Unsicherheit, in der sich der Verstand gegenüber der Realität seiner eigenen Begriffe sieht. Die Suche nach den Grundlagen der Metaphysik bringt Tetens 1775 dazu, das Vorhaben einer „transzendenten Philosophie“ zu formulieren. Ihr zufolge soll die Metaphysik von der Erfahrung ausgehen und die Vernunft in ihren Spekulationen von transzendenten Grundsätzen geleitet werden. Diese ontologischen Prinzipien, die aus der „Vernunfttheorie“ abgeleitet sind, müssen für Tetens allerdings objektiviert werden. Die „Physik des Verstandes“, eine Propädeutik der Ontologie, hat daher die Aufgabe, die Wirkungsarten und Gesätze zu untersuchen, denen sich die Denkkraft bedient, um aus Empfindungen ihr eigene Erkenntnisse zu gewinnen. Das Problem lautet dabei wie folgt: Wie kann eine Wahrheit objektiv sein, wenn all unsere Vorstellungen subjektiv sind? Die Lösung präsentiert Tetens in den „Philosophischen Versuchen über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung“ (1777). In ihr schlägt er eine Theorie der Objektivität vor, die auf apriorischen Prinzipien der Vernunft basiert: Zwar kennen wir die Dinge nur dem Anschein nach, die unveränderlichen Verhältnisse zwischen den Phänomenen sind allerdings objektiv. Durch Analogiebildungen ist die spekulative Vernunft so in der Lage, auch die von der menschlichen Erfahrung an den weitesten entfernten metaphysischen Wahrheiten zu ergründen
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Mare, Marin Lucio. "Leibniz's More Fundamental Ontology: from Overshadowed Individuals to Metaphysical Atoms." Scholar Commons, 2016. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/6311.
Full textAbstract:
I aim to offer an innovative interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy, first by examining how the various views that make up his ontology of individual substance involve a persistent rejection of atomism in natural philosophy and secondly, by exploring the significance of this rejection in the larger context of Seventeenth-century physics. My thesis is structured as a developmental story, each chapter analyzing the discontinuities or changes Leibniz makes to his views on individuation and atomism from his early to late years. The goal is to illuminate underrepresented views on individuals and atoms throughout Leibniz’s works and thus bring a clearer understanding of his philosophy.
I, therefore, argue that the New System of Nature, published towards the end of Leibniz’s middle period (1695), marks an important landmark in his philosophical evolution, a radical terminological and ontological shift in his metaphysics of substance. Once Leibniz elaborates the concept of “simple substance,” the future synonym of “monad,” the problem of individuation of his early and middle years (1663-1686) becomes secondary. The focus changes from what makes substances “individual” to what makes them “simple” and truly “one,” i.e., “metaphysical” atoms.
I prove that this shift was marked by a two-tiered critical confrontation: a first, direct confrontation, 1) with Descartes’ physics, through the critique of the notion of extended matter and of Descartes’ principle of individuation through shared motion and, a second confrontation, 2) with different strands of Seventeenth-century atomism, including Cartesian Gérauld de
Cordemoy’s quasi-“metaphysical” atomism and its attempt at improving Descartes’ individuating principle. I claim that this double confrontation ultimately led Leibniz to formulate a more fundamental ontology, in terms of the “metaphysical atomism” of his Monadology (1714).
My analysis complicates a persistent scholarly assumption in recent Leibniz studies, claiming that, throughout his entire career, Leibniz continued to hold the same fundamental positions on substance, individuation and, implicitly, atoms. Against this type of general continuity thesis, I show that: 1) far from being a constant concern, Leibniz’s interest in what makes substances individual fades towards the end of his life (New Essays 1703, correspondence with Samuel Clarke, 1714); 2) I trace the changing fate of some of Leibniz’s early and middle period views on substance and the individual (the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, space-time as individuating properties) in his late works; and 3) I prove the claim that Leibniz really embraced atomism, either for a short time or all throughout his philosophy is problematic. While he does refer to some sort of atoms during his Paris period (1672-1676), this is insufficient proof of a commitment to atomism. Instead, the episode has to be understood in the broader framework of a bundle of interrelated issues, such as the problem of the cohesion of bodies and the problem of minds or mind-like principles individuating those bodies.
Thus, as I show through an analysis of Leibniz’s arguments against atomism in the correspondences with his scientific contemporaries (Christiaan Huyghens 1692-1695, Nicholas Hartsoeker 1706-1714), rejecting physical atomism remains a fundamental and surprisingly constant point of his philosophy.
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Kuchenbecker, Emily E. "Lifetime." VCU Scholars Compass, 2019. https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/5838.
Full textAbstract:
Time is my bully. Time marks the start of something, as well as the end. We are all carrying out the inexorable passing of time as it relates to our impending mortalities.
I do not fear death.
The awareness of my body’s impermanence employs me to feel that much more connected to the vessel containing that of which I am.
But what am I? Am I my body- or is it much deeper?
Through the work executed during my graduate research, I have attempted to quantify my existence through the archiving my time and body. This document ushers you through my perception, my relationship to nature, and how it manifests through discovering answers to what I believe it means to be human.