Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'HistoryZhongguo gong chan dang'

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Far East, Southeast Asia, The Pacific))--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2010.<br>Thesis Advisor(s): Miller, Alice L. ; Second Reader: Chakwin, Mark. "June 2010." Description based on title screen as viewed on July 15, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Confucianism, Confucian ideals and values, PLA modernization, PLA professionalization, PLA Core Military Values. Includes bibliographical references (p. 55-60). Also available in print.

家族、移民和革命，是考察中國的僑鄉社會，尤其是民國時期的僑鄉社會所不可或缺的三大元素。傳統的華人華僑研究，多把華僑與國民黨的革命活動聯繫起來，以突出華僑對國民黨革命的重要性。然而，這些研究往往忽略了華僑跟共產黨領導的革命的繫連。在當代的潮汕地區，爲了吸引華僑投資家鄉與促進僑鄉的文化旅遊發展，部分僑鄉重構鄉村參與共產黨革命的歷史，建立起「紅色僑鄉」。<br>「紅色僑鄉」這個文化標籤的建立，成爲僑鄉、僑居地與國家之間的文化、政治關係的象徵符號。本文主要以廣東澄海後溝村為個案研究，由此討論僑鄉社會如何塑造自身的歷史與文化。本文嘗試指出，第一次國共合作破裂之後，共產黨在鄉村中秘密動員、組織農民階級對抗「地主階級」，鄉民參加革命能夠起到協調地域社區權力結構中力量的不平衡的作用。自20年代中后期在僑鄉社會中形成的關係網絡延續至抗日戰爭及解放戰爭，與海外移民網絡共同影響著鄉村的宗族和地域社會。當代僑鄉的紅色革命形象，是國家自上而下的意識形態工程所塑造的，也是地方家族、移民在追尋自身利益與政治認同的結果。<br>Lineage, migration and revolution are three major elements to study emigrant communities in China, especially in the Republican period. Traditional studies on overseas Chinese focus on the relationship between overseas Chinese and KuoMinTang’s revolutionary activities and highlight the importance of overseas Chinese to KMT revolution. However, these studies often ignore the relationship between overseas Chinese and revolutionary activities led by Chinese Communist Party. In the Chaoshan region, some of the emigrant communities, in order to attract overseas Chinese investment and develop cultural tourism, attempt to establish a "Red Emigrant Community" status through reconstructing the history of village’s participating in CCP’s revolution.<br>"Red Emigrant Community", or Hongse qiaoxiang, is a cultural label linking emigrant communities and the State. This thesis, using Hougou village as an example explores how emigrant communities shape their own "red" history and culture. After the first cooperation of KMT and CCP, CCP secretly began to mobilize and organize peasants against landlords in villages. Villager’s participation in revolutionary activities could be seen as a balance of power in the local community. Together with their overseas networks, emigrant communities’ revolutionary networks, which were formed in the 1920s and continued through the WWII and the Liberation, influenced villages’ lineage and regional structures. Red Emigrant Community is not only a top-down National projects. It is a result of pursuing interests and seeking political identity by local lineage and overseas Chinese.<br>Detailed summary in vernacular field only.<br>Detailed summary in vernacular field only.<br>王惠.<br>Parallel title from added title page.<br>Thesis (M.Phil.) Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2014.<br>Includes bibliographical references (leaves 170-187).<br>Abstracts in Chinese and English.<br>Wang Hui.

羅欣欣.<br>論文(哲學碩士) -- 香港中文大學硏究院藝術學部, 1998.<br>附參考文獻.<br>中英文摘要.<br>Luo Xinxin.<br>序言 --- p.1<br>論文摘要 --- p.2<br>插圖目錄 --- p.5<br>緒論 --- p.14<br>Chapter 第一章 --- 中共建國前的毛澤東繪畫圖像(1927-1949)<br>Chapter I. --- 毛澤東政治地位的確立 --- p.28<br>Chapter II. --- 土地革命戰爭時期(1927-1937)：毛澤東繪畫圖像的起源 --- p.30<br>Chapter III. --- 抗口戰爭時期(1937-1945)的毛澤東繪畫圖像發展 --- p.31<br>Chapter 1 . --- 魯藝木刻工作團的成立1938 --- p.32<br>Chapter 2. --- 晉西北木刻工廠1941 --- p.33<br>Chapter 3. --- 《延安文藝座談會上的講話》1942 --- p.34<br>Chapter 4. --- 赤色郵政 1944 --- p.40<br>Chapter 5. --- 中共黨報 1945 --- p.41<br>Chapter IV. --- 全國解放戰爭時期(1945-1949)的毛澤東繪畫圖像發展 --- p.43<br>小結 --- p.47<br>Chapter 第二章 --- 中共建國後的毛澤東繪畫圖像(1949-1966)<br>Chapter I. --- 中華人民共和國成立初年的毛澤東繒畫圖像發展 --- p.53<br>Chapter 1. --- 中華人民共和國的成立194 9 --- p.53<br>Chapter a. --- 延安藝術傳統的毛澤東漫畫圖像 --- p.54<br>Chapter b. --- 王朝聞的繪畫領袖像指示 --- p.56<br>Chapter 2. --- 土地改革 1950-1952 --- p.59<br>Chapter a. --- 新年畫創作運動 --- p.59<br>Chapter 3. --- 建國初年的整黨整風1950-52 --- p.66<br>Chapter a. --- 革命歷史畫創作計劃 --- p.67<br>Chapter II. --- 中蘇親密外交下的毛澤東繪畫圖像發展 --- p.70<br>Chapter 1. --- 全盤蘇化1950-55 --- p.70<br>Chapter a. --- 蘇聯宣傳畫的影響 --- p.70<br>Chapter b. --- 蘇聯油畫的影響 --- p.72<br>Chapter c. --- 蘇聯領袖像選材的影響 --- p.74<br>Chapter III. --- 中共社會經濟改革下的毛澤東繪畫圖像發展 --- p.76<br>Chapter 1. --- 第一個五年計劃1953-1957 --- p.76<br>Chapter a. --- 中國畫的改造 --- p.78<br>Chapter b. --- 油畫民族化 --- p.81<br>Chapter 2. --- 大躍進及人民公社運動1958-60 --- p.84<br>Chapter 3. --- 社會主義教育運動1962-65 --- p.88<br>Chapter a. --- 革命歷史繪畫運動 --- p.59<br>小結 --- p.91<br>Chapter 第三章 --- 文革時期的毛澤東繪畫圖像(1966-1976)<br>Chapter I. --- 文化大革命發動的原因 --- p.105<br>Chapter 1. --- 文化大革命序幕：海瑞罷官1965 --- p.105<br>Chapter 2. --- 毛澤東個人崇拜 --- p.107<br>Chapter II. --- 文革時期毛澤東繪畫圖像的發展 --- p.107<br>Chapter 1. --- 紅衛兵運動1966 --- p.107<br>Chapter a. --- 紅衛兵藝術 --- p.108<br>Chapter b. --- 《毛澤東思想照亮安源工人革命運動展覽》 --- p.113<br>Chapter c. --- 「紅、光、亮」的藝術手法 --- p.115<br>Chapter 2. --- 工農兵領導下的文化大革命1969 --- p.117<br>Chapter a. --- 工農兵繪畫運動 --- p.118<br>Chapter 3. --- 毛澤東的親密戰友一林彪的叛變1971 --- p.124<br>Chapter 4. --- 毛澤東的接班人一華國鋒1976 --- p.125<br>小結 --- p.126<br>Chapter 第四章 --- 文革後及改革開放時期的毛澤東繪畫圖像(1976-1997)<br>Chapter I. --- 文革後的毛澤東繪畫圖像發展 --- p.132<br>Chapter 1. --- 後文革時期的藝術1976-1978 --- p.132<br>Chapter a. --- 《熱烈慶祝華國鋒同志任中央主席、中央軍委主席 、熱烈慶祝粉碎四人幫篡黨奪權陰謀的偉大勝 利全國美術作品展覽》 --- p.133<br>Chapter b. --- 《慶祝中國人民解放軍建軍50周年美術作品展覽》 --- p.134<br>Chapter c. --- 毛主席紀念堂的落成 --- p.136<br>Chapter d. --- 《毛主席永遠活在我們心中´ؤ毛主席逝世一周 年美術作品展覽》 --- p.137<br>Chapter 2. --- 傷痕藝術1978-1979 --- p.139<br>Chapter 3. --- 星星美展1979-1980 --- p.140<br>Chapter II. --- 改革開放時期的毛澤東繪畫圖像發展 --- p.141<br>Chapter 1. --- 美術新思潮下的毛澤東圖像 --- p.141<br>Chapter a. --- 後八九的中國新藝術一政治波普中的毛澤東圖像 --- p.143<br>Chapter b. --- 毛澤東藝術圖像的拍賣熱潮 --- p.151<br>Chapter 2. --- 宮方持續創作的毛澤東繪畫圖像 --- p.152<br>小結 --- p.156<br>結語 --- p.161<br>附錄一 ：1.中國藝術史中毛澤東書法圖像的社會文化意義 --- p.1-1<br>2.美術展覽中的毛澤東繪畫圖像畫目 --- p.1-6<br>附錄二：參考書目 --- p.2-1<br>附錄三：現代中國藝術史中毛澤東繪畫圖像畫目 --- p.3-1<br>附錄四：圖版 --- p.4-1

國立西南聯合大學（簡稱「西南聯大」或「聯大」）是與抗戰相始終的大學。它以戰時教育聞名，成立於抗戰初期（1938 年），由國立北京大學、國立清華大學和私立南開大學聯合組成，抗戰結束後三校解散北歸（1946 年），各自復校。日本的入侵和國家的貧弱，聯大師生共有的民族情感，聯大民主自由的人文環境和「雲南王」龍雲對戰時民主力量的保護等因素，合力構成了聯大地下黨統戰工作的發展空間。這一發展空間與重要的歷史事件的時間點（如1941 年1 月「皖南事變」、1945 年8 月「抗戰勝利」和10 月「龍雲下台」）一起，構成了一個國共角逐的時空。<br>中共中央和南方局對地下黨組織統戰工作的重視和具體指導的時間恰是在聯大成立初期；在聯大中期，為適應局勢，爭取大多數「中間派師生」的支持，中共先後製定了「十六字」方針（即「蔭蔽精幹，長期埋伏，積蓄力量，以待時機」）和「三勤」（即「勤學」、「勤業」、「勤交友」）政策；在聯大後期，中共統戰的方針政策在實踐中得到檢驗，取得成效。<br>聯大地下黨的統戰工作是中共雲南省工作委員會（簡稱「雲南省工委」）統戰工作的重要組成部分。南方局和雲南省工委統戰工作的重點是介於國共兩黨間的「中間力量」。聯大地下黨統戰的人群以聯大師生為主，他們用知識份子所能接受的語言和交友方式對其做統戰工作，突出中共是眾望所歸的力量。一方面，地下黨人以「民族主義」和「愛國」來把如聯大教授等「中間力量」團結起來，通過組織集會探討時事以引發高級知識份子思考抗戰失利、貪污腐敗、物價飛漲、民不聊生的根源，由此孤立國民黨。另一方面，聯大地下黨人在品學兼優的基礎上，以「中間學生」的姿態出現，為聯大同學辦實事（如解決吃飯難問題），由此贏得了大多數「中間學生」的好感。如果說在雲南民主運動高潮到來前，聯大地下黨對「中間派師生」的統戰成效限於潛移默化的影響，那麼在1944-1946年民主運動高潮來臨時，其統戰成效已體現為促使「中間派師生」走出書齋，用文字和行動來爭取「民主與和平」，反抗國民黨當局的獨裁專制。<br>誠然，在四十年代中期，「中間力量」所認同的是介於美蘇政治體制間的「第三條道路」。因此，雲南省工委和聯大地下黨通過扛起「民族主義」和「新民主」的旗幟將聯大師生等「中間力量」凝聚在一起，在孤立國民黨的同時，促使「中間力量」放棄「第三條道路」，服膺於「新民主主義」的「革命」之路。無疑，毛澤東的話語吸引了愛國的知識份子群體，使其感到儘管中共提倡的「新民主」並非西方強調的「民主」，但卻是一條可行的救國之路，「中間力量」感到可參與其中，輔助中共並影響其決策，甚至共同決定中國未來發展的方向。的確，大多數的聯大師生等「中間力量」對於中共及其所提倡的「新民主」是有期待的。南方局、雲南省工委和聯大地下黨的統戰成效亦於此可見。<br>然而，本文也提及，在中共成為執政黨後，當「中間力量」對「革命」勝利發揮作用的歷史使命完成後，受西方教育理念影響的知識份子的「自由主義」與中共的「思想統整」間的弔詭性矛盾即被凸顯。因此，在中共建國後，對知識份子的思想改造不可避免，在這個靈魂改造的過程中，受沖擊的不僅僅是聯大師生 等「中間力量」，即使雲南省工委和聯大地下黨人亦不能幸免。<br>事實上，聯大地下黨對聯大師生等「中間力量」的統戰工作的深遠影響並未隨著聯大的解體和新中國的成立而結束。聯大地下黨人及其統戰對象聯大「中間派師生」，在經歷了新中國對知識份子的思想改造運動後，如何反思民族主義、革命與民主的關係亦值得作進一步的梳理和檢討。這是本文的一個後續研究方向。<br>"The emergence of National South-west Associated University (hereafter abbreviated as NSAU) coincided roughly with the war of the Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression. Because of the Marco Polo Bridge (Lugou Qiao) incident on 7 July 1937 and the subsequent Japanese invasion of China, three renowned universities of north China, Peking University, Tsinghua University and Nankai University, were consolidated into one temporary university, National Changsha Temporary University (hereafter abbreviated as NCTU), by the Ministry of Education and relocated to Changsha in 1937. At the end of 1937, Nanjing fell, and Wuhan was in crisis, NCTU was forced to move again then to Yunnan province in 1938 and changed its name to NSAU. NSAU, known as an exemplar of wartime education in modern China history, is an important arena of the Chinese Communist Party’s (hereafter abbreviated as CCP) United Front activities between 1938-1946. A number of factors such as Japanese invasion, the country’s poverty and weakness, the sense of nationalism of the University’s teachers and students, the humanistic environment of democracy and freedom of the University, and the protection of the democratic forces by the “King of Yunnan” Long Yun during war times had combined to form a space for the development of the underground CCP's United Front activities in NSAU.<br>NSAU, known as an exemplar of wartime education in modern China history, is an important arena of the Chinese Communist Party’s (hereafter abbreviated as CCP) United Front activities between 1938-1946. A number of factors such as Japanese invasion, the country’s poverty and weakness, the sense of nationalism of the University’s teachers and students, the humanistic environment of democracy and freedom of the University, and the protection of the democratic forces by the “King of Yunnan” Long Yun during war times had combined to form a space for the development of the underground CCP's United Front activities in NSAU.<br>NSAU’s underground party’s United Front work was an important part of the Southern Bureau’s and the CCP Yunnan Work Committee's activities. The Southern Bureau was in charge of the underground party branches in Chiang Kai-shek’s districts. The United Front work of the Southern Bureau and the CCP Yunnan Work Committee focused on “the third force” or “the middle force”. In order to win the support of almost all intellectuals especially NSAU’s students and professors, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai separately formulated the Sixteen-Character Guideline of the CCP’s underground party work: Hiding Elites (yinbi jinggan), Long-term Ambushes (changqi maifu), Saving Force (jixu liliang) and Waiting for the Opportunity (yidai shiji) and the policy of the Three Diligences that refers to Working with Diligence, Studying with Diligence, and Making friends with Diligence. The policy of the Three Diligences was the concrete application of the Sixteen-Character Guideline, according to Zhou Enlai’s idea.<br>NSAU’s underground party undertook United Front work to influence “the middle force” by cultural activities, propaganda skills and the ways of making friends that were accepted by most of the intellectuals, and stressed that CCP could meet the expectations of the patriotic masses in China. On the one hand,the Communists united “the middle force” such as NSAU’s professors who adhered to nationalism and patriotism, and isolated the Nationalists by organizing rallies and discussing current events, and then led the senior intellectuals to believe that the root cause of the defeat in the anti-Japanese war, corruption, soaring prices and hardship suffered by people wasGuomindang, the Nationalist Party. On the other hand, NSAU’s underground party members, who excelled others in both morals and studies, solved practical problems for their classmates (such as the lack of food), thus winning most of their classmates’ support.<br>Admittedly “the middle force” was identified with “the third way” whose political stand was between the American and Soviet models in mid-1940s. But the CCP Yunnan Work Committee and NSAU’s underground party combined elements of “the middle force” such as NSAU’s students and professors to isolate the Guomindang, and prompted them to give up “the third way” and believe in the revolutionary way of New Democracy.<br>There is no doubt that Mao Zedong’s words moved the patriotic intellectuals and made them feel that although the New Democracy advocated by CCP was not Western democracy, it was a feasible way to save the country, and these intellectuals and democrats could participate in and influence the CCP’s decisions on the developmental direction of China in the future. Indeed, most of followers of “the middle force” such as NSAU’s teachers and students believed in both CCP and its New Democracy. In this sense, it is obvious that the United Front activities of the Southern Bureau, the CCP Yunnan Work Committee and NSAU’s underground party were highly effective.<br>This thesis also mentions that, however, after CCP became the ruling party and “the middle force” had completed its historical mission of being an important ally and follower of CCP in the revolutionary victory, the paradoxical contradiction between the liberal intellectuals influenced by Western value on the one side, and CCP, on the other, became notable. Therefore, a movement of thought reform for intellectuals had to be launched after the founding of the People's Republic of China. In this campaign to reform the soul, those purged were not only “the middle force” including NSAU’s students and professors, but even the CCP Yunnan Work Committee and NSAU’s underground party members.<br>In fact, the profound influence of NSAU’s underground party’s United Front work on “the middle force” did not end with the disbandment of NSAU and the establishment of new China. After the movement of thought reform for intellectuals, how the former NSAU’s underground party members and their targets of United Front work (i.e., the former NSAU’s teachers and students of “the middle force”) reflected upon the relations between nationalism, revolution and democracy is worth further examination and review. This will be one of the dimensions of a follow-up study of this dissertation.<br>劉宇.<br>Thesis Ph.D. Chinese University of Hong Kong 2016.<br>Includes bibliographical references (leaves 339-365).<br>Abstracts in Chinese and English.<br>Title from PDF title page (viewed on September 8, 2017).<br>Liu Yu .<br>Detailed summary in vernacular field only.<br>Detailed summary in vernacular field only.<br>Detailed summary in vernacular field only.<br>Detailed summary in vernacular field only.<br>Detailed summary in vernacular field only.<br>Detailed summary in vernacular field only.

How does the Chinese Party-State renew its political elite and maintain its cohesion in the post-Mao era? This is a key question to understand the evolution of China’s political system and still the explanations one can find in the literature are far from satisfactory. Overall, the literature on transformation of the Chinese political elite focuses on the broad outcomes, the fact that since the 1980s officials tend to be younger and more educated, but it falls short in unveiling the mechanisms at play. It gives a limited answer to the elite renewal issue as it leaves politics aside. By focusing on educational levels and technical skills it forgets about the importance of political commitment. I approach these questions through a unique account of the role played by the Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL) in terms of cadres’ recruitment and promotion since the 1980s. Using biographical data and a snowball sample of 92 interviewees I reconstructed the trajectories of CYL cadres. Beyond my focus on the central organization of the CYL in Beijing, I compared the situation of the CYL in the capital cities of two very different provinces and in four universities. Through this mixed methods approach, I could assess the evolution of the CYL as a path to power in post-Mao China. My main findings are as follows: First, due to post-Cultural Revolution politics and the need for leaders at the time to recruit loyal young cadres, a “sponsored mobility” system was developed to renew the Party-State’s elite. College students are recruited and trained through the Party’s youth organizations. They are put then on a unique promotion path, which includes specific opportunities and trainings, and which leads them to leadership position in the Party-State. This contrasts with what happened in the Soviet case in particular. Under Khrushchev (1953-1964), the Soviet elite was renewed through the cooptation of professionals with technical skills rather than by recruiting young cadres who spent their whole career in the Party-State. Second, through the various steps of the sponsored mobility process, the young recruits develop a specific social role as future officials and transform their social circles. As a result, they cultivate a political commitment to their career in the Party-State and to the survival of the regime. Third, the decentralized nature of the Party-State and its youth organizations make it difficult for the young recruits to establish cohesive groups which could organize against the Party-State itself.

在数据分析的基础上，本文检验了两个理论假设--“政治资本假设与“冲突性偏差假设，以分析国家主导的市场化进程对共产党员收入优势的影响。主流观点认为，在中国，党员身份代表了一种政治资本，因而在经济转型期，共产党员收入优势的变化就相应地反映了市场化进程中政治资本收益（或党员身份政治资本含量）的变化，即关于党员身份的“政治资本假设。而“冲突性偏差假设则考虑了市场化进程中，政治资本和人力资本对个体的职业流动和收入回报的双向影响，以及这种双向影响在回归分析中造成的偏误。通过运用 Pearl（2000）有关冲突性偏差（ collider bias，选择偏差的一种）的分析结论，笔者推断，在市场化进程中，控制“单位体制类型和“干部位置会导致党员身份和个人收入之间出现虚假的负偏差，因此，即使党员身份带来的政治资本收益不变，“党员身份对“个人收入的回归系数（控制“单位体制类型和“干部位置后）也会因为选择偏差的上升而呈现出下降甚至转变为负的趋势。如若“党员身份对“个人收入的回归系数在控制“单位体制类型和“干部位置后变为零，反而证明“党员身份对“个人收入仍存在积极的直接效应--这就是关于市场转型期中国共产党员收入优势的悖论。通过运用 2008年中国综合社会调查（CGSS2008），回归分析结果充分验证了“冲突性偏差的经验预测。这也提醒研究者：在对当代共产党员的收入优势进行理论解读时，主流观点忽视了冲突性偏差所造成的影响。在文章的最后，笔者讨论了此发现对将来研究的启发。<br>This study examines two hypotheses for the impact of deepening marketization on the income returns to party membership in socialist China: the political capital and collider bias hypotheses. The prevailing view holds that party membership brings political capital (positional power and connections) and changing income returns reflects the changing leverage of political capital in market transition. The collider bias hypothesis acknowledges the expanding role of unobserved ability in the determination of income in the presence of party clientelism. Drawing on Pearl’s analysis of collider bias, we argue that recent marketization would lead to a paradoxical increase of negative bias on the income returns to party membership even if the political capital benefits of party membership persist as the prior literature maintains. Consequently, after conditioning on sector and cadre position, regression coefficient of party membership on income would be suppressed and become even negative. The paradox is that, if the income effect of party membership vanishes after controlling sector and/or cadre position, there must be a true positive party effect on income. Results based on the 2008 Chinese General Social Survey consistently support the predictions of collider bias hypothesis. The prevailing interpretation of previous findings is seriously undermined by ignorance of this pervasive selection bias. Implications for future research are discussed.<br>Detailed summary in vernacular field only.<br>朱灵.<br>"2012年7月"<br>"2012 nian 7 yue"<br>Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012.<br>Includes bibliographical references (leaves 34-40).<br>Abstract in Chinese and English.<br>Zhu Ling.<br>摘要 --- p.I<br>ABSTRACT --- p.II<br>目录 --- p.III<br>Chapter 第一章 --- 引言 --- p.1<br>Chapter 第一节 --- 研究背景 --- p.1<br>Chapter 第二节 --- 研究问题 --- p.2<br>Chapter 第二章 --- 文献回顾 --- p.3<br>Chapter 第一节 --- 市场转型与党员收入优势的转变 --- p.3<br>Chapter 第二节 --- 经济-政治体制双重转变：政治资本与人力资本的双重效应 --- p.8<br>Chapter 第三节 --- 总结：市场化进程中共产党员收入优势下降的谜题 --- p.10<br>Chapter 第三章 --- 冲突性偏差（COLLIDER BIAS） --- p.11<br>Chapter 第一节 --- 双重效应、冲突变量（COLLIDER VARIABLE）与冲突性偏差（COLLIDER BIAS） --- p.11<br>Chapter 第二节 --- 冲突性偏差的方向 --- p.13<br>Chapter 第三节 --- 冲突性偏差的大小：通常在被选择的群体中更显著 --- p.13<br>Chapter 第四章 --- 理论假设与实证预测 --- p.15<br>Chapter 第一节 --- 理论假设 --- p.15<br>Chapter 第二节 --- 实证预测 --- p.19<br>Chapter 第五章 --- 研究设计：数据、变量和方法 --- p.22<br>Chapter 第一节 --- 数据来源 --- p.22<br>Chapter 第二节 --- 主要变量 --- p.22<br>Chapter 第三节 --- 统计模型 --- p.24<br>Chapter 第六章 --- 模型分析及结果 --- p.25<br>Chapter 第七章 --- 结论与讨论 --- p.31<br>参考文献 --- p.34<br>Chapter 一、 --- 中文部分 --- p.34<br>Chapter 二、 --- 英文部分 --- p.35<br>图表部分 --- p.41<br>图1 --- p.41<br>图2 --- p.41<br>图3 --- p.42<br>图4 --- p.43<br>表一 --- p.44<br>表二 --- p.47<br>表三 --- p.48<br>表四 --- p.49<br>表五 --- p.50

文灼非.<br>論文 (哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 1999.<br>參考文獻 (leaves 158-175)<br>附中英文摘要.<br>Wen Zhuofei.<br>Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)-- Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1999.<br>Can kao wen xian (leaves 158-175)<br>Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao.<br>Chapter 第一章 --- 緒論 --- p.1 -26<br>Chapter 第二章 --- 中共對香港「飛地」的政策 --- p.27-54<br>Chapter 第三章 --- 「飛地」黨派報紙的政治定位與分工 --- p.55 -79<br>Chapter 第四章 --- 中共對左派報紙組織與營運的控制 --- p.80-102<br>Chapter 第五章 --- 中共與港英在「飛地」的政治衝突 ´ؤ´ؤ「三一事件」與「六七暴動」 --- p.103-126<br>Chapter 第六章 --- 左派報人對黨忠誠的悲哀 ´ؤ´ؤ羅孚個案剖析 --- p.127-150<br>Chapter 第七章 --- 結論 --- p.151-157<br>參考資料 --- p.158 -174<br>訪問人士名單 --- p.175

動員是否可以作為一種解決公共問題的治理手段？本文基於改變他人行為的三種基本要素：交換、強制、動員，重新界定了中文語境中的動員概念，進而提出了一套新的關於解決公共問題治理風格的分析框架。在不同的條件下，三種基本要素不同程度的混合運用產生了動員式治理、科層制管理、市場化處理三種治國理政風格理想類型，它們在行為動機的理性化程度、組織機構的科層化程度、解決公共問題的分工與專業化程度三個維度上相互區別開來。<br>運用這一理論分析框架，作者比較了中國共產黨在革命、建政、改革三個歷史時期治理風格的變化及其原因。中國共產黨政治地位的轉變改變了其自身組織結構特性，這一核心因素與黨在不同歷史時期中心任務的調整及指導思想的變化，決定了其對動員、強制、交換等不同手段的取捨與搭配。革命年代訓練出來的群眾動員技巧與工作方法在中國共產黨取得執政地位後，仍舊是行之有效的治理手段，並且它與群眾路線構成了中國共產黨執政合法性的重要來源。但是，隨著執政黨所能動用的強制能力與物質資源的增長，以及黨組織自身的日益科層化，在改革開放時期，動員逐漸被有意識的弱化，由此也造成了中國共產黨在日常群眾工作和社會控制方面的衰退。<br>Can mobilization be adopted as a means of governing to address the public issues? This thesis reconceptualizes the term ‘mobilization’ in the Chinese context based on three basic factors that alter human behaviors, namely, exchange, coercion, and mobilization. It puts forward a novel analytic framework of governing styles to solve the public issues. Under different circumstances, the configuration of the three basic factors adopted to different degrees will generate three ideal governing styles, that is, mobilized governance, bureaucratic management, and market-based settlement. These three ideal governing styles can be differentiated in three dimensions: the rationality of the behavior’s motives, the hierarchy of the organization, and the specialized division of labor in solving the public issues.<br>Using this theoretical framework for analysis, the author compared the changes of the governing styles of the Communist Party of China in three historical periods - revolution era, Maoist era, and reform era, and explored the reasons of the changes. The change of the party’s political status altered the characteristics of its organizational structures. This core factor, together with the adjustment of the central tasks and the changes of the guiding thoughts in the party during different historical periods, determined how these means such as mobilization, coercion and exchange were selected and combined. Mass mobilization techniques and working styles obtained in the revolution era remained effective after the party took its ruling position, and it constituted a major legitimate basis of the party’s ruling of the country together with the faithful pursuit of effective ‘mass line’ tactics. However, as the party’s coercion capacity and material resources grew over the years and it was getting more hierarchical, mobilization has been weakened and ignored, which led to the gradual failing of the party’s daily mass work and social control.<br>Detailed summary in vernacular field only.<br>Detailed summary in vernacular field only.<br>汪衛華.<br>"2013年7月".<br>"2013 nian 7 yue".<br>Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013.<br>Includes bibliographical references (leaves 179-191).<br>Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web.<br>Abstract in Chinese and English.<br>Wang Weihua.<br>內容摘要 --- p.i<br>绪 言 --- p.1<br>Chapter 一、 --- 本文主题与研究目的 --- p.1<br>Chapter 二、 --- 城市动迁的悲喜剧 --- p.3<br>《蜗居》：强制拆迁悲剧 --- p.3<br>《乔迁之喜》：动迁本来面目 --- p.6<br>Chapter 三、 --- 动迁=“动员搬迁 --- p.8<br>Chapter 第一章 --- 作为工作方法的动员：概念与分析框架 --- p.12<br>Chapter 一、 --- 动员三义 --- p.12<br>Chapter 二、 --- 交换 --- p.17<br>Chapter 三、 --- 解决公共问题的三种手段 --- p.19<br>Chapter 四、 --- 作为集体行动的社会动员 --- p.25<br>Chapter 五、 --- 作为发展手段的社会动员 --- p.28<br>Chapter 六、 --- 常规政治与动员政治 --- p.30<br>Chapter 第二章 --- 中国共产党的社会动员 --- p.36<br>Chapter 一、 --- 群众运动与社会动员 --- p.36<br>Chapter 二、 --- 群众路线与社会动员 --- p.39<br>发动者 --- p.40<br>发动者与动员对象的关系 --- p.42<br>动员对象--群众 --- p.43<br>Chapter 三、 --- 阶级分析与社会动员 --- p.45<br>阶级情感 --- p.46<br>情感与利益 --- p.47<br>Chapter 四、 --- 组织特性与社会动员 --- p.50<br>Chapter 五、 --- 客观条件 --- p.53<br>Chapter 六、 --- 微观机制与宏观效果：纵向历史比较的价值 --- p.57<br>Chapter 第三章 --- 动员之起：从对抗政治到非对抗政治 --- p.61<br>Chapter 一、 --- 安源经验：组织核心与动员技巧 --- p.61<br>Chapter 二、 --- 农民运动：有组织动员与自发暴力 --- p.69<br>Chapter 三、 --- 查田运动：社会动员 --- p.76<br>查田运动 --- p.77<br>群众工作方法 --- p.81<br>“左倾偏向 --- p.83<br>基本经验：通过乡村基层政权网络进行社会动员 --- p.85<br>Chapter 四、 --- 延安道路：中共群众动员模式的定型 --- p.89<br>延安道路 --- p.89<br>抗战背景下党组织的发展 --- p.91<br>动员式治理的初步实践：大生产与减租减息 --- p.99<br>“大胆放手 --- p.103<br>Chapter 五、 --- 本章小结 --- p.108<br>Chapter 第四章 --- 动员之承：动员式治理与科层化 --- p.112<br>Chapter 一、 --- 动员式治理主导地位的确立：客观条件与主动选择 --- p.113<br>以动员式治理为主导的客观条件 --- p.114<br>对动员式治理的主动选择 --- p.117<br>Chapter 二、 --- 动员组织与科层化的党和国家：矛盾的结合体 --- p.121<br>三重矛盾 --- p.122<br>两种组合 --- p.127<br>Chapter 三、 --- 动员青年建设边疆：动员治理与科层管理结合的经验 --- p.129<br>青年垦荒队的示范意义与实际效果 --- p.129<br>大跃进时期的支边移民 --- p.132<br>Chapter 四、 --- 作为参照的水库移民：欠制度化 --- p.137<br>前三十年水库移民概况 --- p.137<br>水库移民返迁问题 --- p.139<br>Chapter 五、 --- 动员失灵？案例比较与本章小结 --- p.142<br>Chapter 第五章 --- 动员之转：群众路线言与行 --- p.145<br>Chapter 一、 --- 不再发动群众的群众路线 --- p.145<br>Chapter 二、 --- 《人民日报》中反映出的变化 --- p.147<br>Chapter 三、 --- 组织基础的变化 --- p.153<br>党员队伍的过度壮大 --- p.153<br>基层组织的转型 --- p.154<br>向专业化迈进 --- p.157<br>Chapter 四、 --- 上海城市居民委员会变迁的实例：再行政化？ --- p.158<br>改革开放前的上海城市居委会 --- p.158<br>“两级政、三级管理与“四级网络 --- p.161<br>居民委员会的功能转型 --- p.165<br>Chapter 五、 --- 本章小结 --- p.169<br>Chapter 第六章 --- 重拾群众动员？结论与展望 --- p.170<br>人民主体地位，人民首创精神：官方话语回归的信号 --- p.171<br>动员何以重要 --- p.172<br>动员传统还可能恢复吗？ --- p.174<br>替代方案？ --- p.177<br>参考文献 --- p.179