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1
GOESCHEL, CHRISTIAN. "STAGING FRIENDSHIP: MUSSOLINI AND HITLER IN GERMANY IN 1937." Historical Journal 60, no. 1 (July 15, 2016): 149–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x15000540.
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ABSTRACTIn September 1937, Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler met in Germany. Millions of ostensibly enthusiastic Germans welcomed the Duce. Here were the world's first two fascist dictators, purportedly united in solidarity, representing the ‘115 million’ Germans and Italians against the Western powers and Bolshevism. Most historians have dismissed the 1937 dictators’ encounter as insignificant because no concrete political decisions were made. In contrast, I explore this meeting in terms of the confluence of culture and politics and argue that the meeting was highly significant. Its choreography combined rituals of traditional state visits with a new emphasis on the personality of both leaders and their alleged ‘friendship’, emblematic of the ‘friendship’ between the Italian and German peoples. Seen through this lens, the meeting pioneered a new style of face-to-face diplomacy, which challenged the culture of liberal internationalism and represented the aim of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany to create a New Order in Europe. At the same time, analysis of this meeting reveals some deep-seated tensions between both regimes, an observation that has significant implications for the study of fascist international collaboration.
2
Baxa, Paul. "A Pagan Landscape: Pope Pius XI, Fascism, and the Struggle over the Roman Cityscape." Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 17, no. 1 (July 23, 2007): 107–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/016104ar.
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Abstract This article examines the two visions of Rome put forward by Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini and Pope Pius XI and the tensions they caused. The rivalry between the two men over the meaning of the Roman landscape became sharper in the 1930s when the Fascist regime transformed the Eternal City through extensive demolition and increasing archaeological activity in the city. Pius XI increasingly viewed these activities as an attempt to “paganize” Rome. The Pope’s fears over paganism came to a head in the days of Adolf Hitler’s famous visit to Italy in May 1938. The development of closer relations between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany made Pius XI increasingly concerned about what he called the “neo-pagan” nature of these ideologies. Ultimately, the cityscape of Rome was transformed into a kulturkampf between Fascism and the Vatican which not only gives us a fuller picture of the seemingly cordial relations between Pius and Mussolini in the 1930s, but also reveals Fascism as a political religion inevitably in conflict with the other religion, Catholicism, which saw Rome as its own.
3
Rosenfeld, Gavriel D. "An American Führer? Nazi Analogies and the Struggle to Explain Donald Trump." Central European History 52, no. 4 (December 2019): 554–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938919000840.
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AbstractEver since Donald Trump announced his candidacy for the US presidency in June 2015, journalists, scholars, and other commentators in the United States have attempted to explain his political success with the aid of historical analogies. In so doing, they have sparked a wider debate about whether the Nazi past helps to make sense of the US present. One group in the debate has contended that Trump's ascent bears a worrisome resemblance to interwar European fascism, especially the National Socialist movement of Adolf Hitler. By contrast, a second group has rejected this comparison and sought analogies for Trump in other historical figures from European and US history. This article surveys the course, and assesses the results, of the debate from its origins up to the present day. It shows that historians of Germany have played a prominent role in helping to make sense of Trump, but notes that their use of Nazi analogies may be distorting, rather than deepening, our understanding of contemporary political trends. By examining the merits and drawbacks of Nazi analogies in present-day popular discourse, the article recommends that scholars draw on both the German and American historical experience in order to best assess the United States's present political movement.
4
Roche, Helen. "Mussolini’s ‘Third Rome’, Hitler’s Third Reich and the Allure of Antiquity: Classicizing Chronopolitics as a Remedy for Unstable National Identity?" Fascism 8, no. 2 (December 17, 2019): 127–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22116257-00802004.
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Abstract While it is generally acknowledged that fascist movements tend to glorify the national past of the country in which they arise, sometimes, fascist regimes seek to resurrect a past even more ancient, and more glorious still; the turn towards ancient Greece and Rome. This phenomenon is particularly marked in the case of the two most powerful and indisputably ‘fascist’ regimes of all: Benito Mussolini’s Italy and Adolf Hitler’s Germany. The author suggests that this twin turn towards antiquity was no mere accident, but was rather motivated by certain commonalities in national experience. By placing these two fascist regimes alongside each other and considering their seduction by antique myths in tandem, it is argued that – without putting forward some kind of classicizing Sonderweg – we can better appreciate the historic rootedness of this particular form of ‘chronopolitics’ in a complex nexus of political and social causes, many of which lie far deeper than the traumatic events of the Great War and its aftermath.
5
Zhu, Stella. "The The War Guilt Clause and the Rise of Adolf Hitler." European Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 1, no. 3 (June 24, 2021): 41–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.24018/ejsocial.2021.1.3.68.
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After the fall of Nazi Germany during World War II, the allied powers issued harsh reparation payments that burdened the German economy and humiliated the Germans. Most importantly, the War Guilt Clause led Germany into an economic and social turmoil, which in turn paved the path for the rise of radical extremists like Adolf Hitler.
6
Baumert, Anna, WilhelmX Hofmann, and Gabriela Blum. "Laughing About Hitler?" Journal of Media Psychology 20, no. 2 (January 2008): 43–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1864-1105.20.2.43.
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Effects of the movie My Fuehrer – The Truly Truest Truth About Adolf Hitler by Dani Levy were tested with regard to: (a) attitudes toward Hitler, (b) the perceived role of the German population in Nazi Germany, (c) the perception of present danger from national socialist tendencies, and (d) the subjective need for continued preoccupation with German history. A total of 110 Germans were invited to a cinema and randomly assigned to the control group that filled in the relevant questionnaire before the movie, or to the film group that filled in the questionnaire after the movie. The film group reported fewer negative attitudes toward Hitler than the control group and saw the German population less as victims. Attitudes toward right-wing political parties and empathy, as well as demographic variables, exerted significant moderator effects. Results are discussed with regard to the public controversy concerning a potential trivialization of Hitler and National Socialism by the movie.
7
Majeed, Hussam Al-Din Ali. "Fascism and how to eradicate it in Germany from the perspective of George Lukacs." Tikrit Journal For Political Science, no. 18 (March 26, 2020): 61. http://dx.doi.org/10.25130/poltic.v0i18.205.
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During the period between the two world wars, and among the socialists who are not Marxists in particular, the topic of re-reading and reviewing Marx's writings intellectually and building intellectual and political lines against fascism and extremism in general and Nazi in particular emerged, so that the star of a group of thinkers in this regard, and perhaps most prominent among them George Lukacs and Georg Luck Cyrus, Karl Mannheim, Walter Benjamin, and others. In such an intellectual milieu, the angle of view of the fascist phenomenon varied in terms of it being a general phenomenon or a group of special cases. There are those who believe that the term fascism should be restricted to Mussolini's case only. That is, we should call the Nazi regime Hitler, and fascism a Mussolini system, and all similar movements have their own names, given that each of them is a phenomenon that is independent and separate from the other cases.
8
Griech-Polelle, Beth Ann. "Jesuits, Jews, Christianity, and Bolshevism: An Existential Threat to Germany?" Journal of Jesuit Studies 5, no. 1 (December 21, 2018): 33–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22141332-00501003.
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The long-standing stereotypes of Jesuits as secretive, cunning, manipulative, and greedy for both material goods as well as for world domination led many early members of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party to connect Jesuits with “Jewishness.” Adolf Hitler, Alfred Rosenberg, Dietrich Eckart, and others connect Jesuits to Jews in their writings and speeches, conflating Catholicism and Judaism with Bolshevism, pinpointing Jesuits as supposedly being a part of the larger “Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy” aiming to destroy the German people. Jesuits were lumped in with Jews as “internal enemies” and this led to further discrimination against the members of the order.
9
Krake, Kristina. "Reconsidering the Crisis Agreements of the 1930s: The Defence of Democracy in a Comparative Scandinavian Perspective." Contemporary European History 29, no. 1 (November 29, 2018): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777318000607.
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This article examines the Scandinavian countries’ response to extreme political movements in the interwar period. Historians have considered the crisis agreements of the 1930s as pivotal to Scandinavian resistance to fascism. The present article revises this explanation by conducting a comparative empirical study of political practice and rhetoric. The comparison makes it clear that the socio-economic measures were primarily aimed at combating the economic crisis. However, the social democratic labour parties conceptualised their social and economic policy as a defence of democracy after Hitler seized power in Germany. The findings indicate that the social democratic solution to the depression in Scandinavia left no political space for either communism or fascism.
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Kirpenko, Pavlo. "International Situation in Europe and USSR’S Foreign Policy prior to and after the Outbreak of World War II." Diplomatic Ukraine, no. XXI (2020): 117–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.37837/2707-7683-2020-6.
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The article is devoted to the international situation in Europe and USSR’s foreign policy before and after the outbreak of World War II. The author states that from the very begin¬ning the fascist regime in Germany was favourably received by Stalin’s USSR. Hitler also claimed that the German government was ready to develop friendly relations with the Soviet Union. However, such a situation in the bilateral relations was short-lived. Seeking benevolence from Western European countries, Hitler assumed the role of an anti-communist crusader. With a view to strengthening the country’s security, countering Germany and fascism, Stalin gave up his ideological dogmas in line with the situation. Moscow came to vigorously support all politi¬cal forces, which were advocating closer relations with the USSR against fascism. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union, Stalin’s foreign policy suffered a total collapse, which was a devastating blow to the myth of his brilliance and sagacity. The glorification of fascism and the policy of its befriending came at a cost. Nearly 50 million Soviet citizens per¬ished in the war against the fascist Germany, of which 10 million were Ukrainian nationals. In Russia, both public officials and scholars still avoid the truth about the foreign policy activity of the Soviet leadership in 1939 and 1940s. In this regard, the Ukrainian histo¬rian and specialist in international relations, professor at Kyiv Pedagogical University Anatolii Trubaichuk was the first in the Soviet Union to tell the truth in his writings and lectures about the essence of the Soviet foreign policy before and after the beginning of World War II based on his profound scientific research. The author stresses that the search for full truth is to be continued. To that end, it is neces¬sary that all the archives in Russia be opened and access to documents relating to the period of World War II be provided. Keywords: World War II, foreign policy, Soviet Union, Stalin, Germany.
11
Lazuto, Yurii. "Some Aspects of Working Practices at the Department of State Protocol of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine." Diplomatic Ukraine, no. XXI (2020): 137–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.37837/2707-7683-2020-7.
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Abstract. The article is devoted to the international situation in Europe and USSR’s foreign policy before and after the outbreak of World War II. The author states that from the very beginning the fascist regime in Germany was favourably received by Stalin’s USSR. Hitler also claimed that the German government was ready to develop friendly relations with the Soviet Union. However, such a situation in the bilateral relations was short-lived. Seeking benevolence from Western European countries, Hitler assumed the role of an anti-communist crusader. With a view to strengthening the country’s security, countering Germany and fascism, Stalin gave up his ideological dogmas in line with the situation. Moscow came to vigorously support all political forces, which were advocating closer relations with the USSR against fascism. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union, Stalin’s foreign policy suffered a total collapse, which was a devastating blow to the myth of his brilliance and sagacity. The glorification of fascism and the policy of its befriending came at a cost. Nearly 50 million Soviet citizens perished in the war against the fascist Germany, of which 10 million were Ukrainian nationals. In Russia, both public officials and scholars still avoid the truth about the foreign policy activity of the Soviet leadership in 1939 and 1940s. In this regard, the Ukrainian historian and specialist in international relations, professor at Kyiv Pedagogical University Anatolii Trubaichuk was the first in the Soviet Union to tell the truth in his writings and lectures about the essence of the Soviet foreign policy before and after the beginning of World War II based on his profound scientific research. The author stresses that the search for full truth is to be continued. To that end, it is necessary that all the archives in Russia be opened and access to documents relating to the period of World War II be provided. Keywords: World War II, foreign policy, Soviet Union, Stalin, Germany.
12
Graver, Hans Petter. "Why Adolf Hitler Spared the Judges: Judicial Opposition Against the Nazi State." German Law Journal 19, no. 4 (July 1, 2018): 845–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200022896.
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The Nazi regime had loyal judges who willingly transformed the liberal German law into an instrument of oppression, discrimination and genocide. This was achieved without substantially interfering with the operation of the courts and without applying disciplinary measures on the judges. But, not all judges were congenial servants of the regime—some resisted in their capacity as judges. Based on case-studies and existing literature, this Article distinguishes between two different lines of judicial opposition to those in power: Between opposition taking place in the open and opposition in secret, and between opposition within what is accepted by those in power as being within the law and opposition that is in breach of the law. The Article then seeks to explain the deference the regime gave to judicial by employing institutional theory and the concept of path dependence. Germany was deeply embedded in the Western legal tradition of emphasis on law as an autonomous institution with an independent judiciary.
13
Nowacki, Krzysztof, and Adam Szymanowicz. "German preparations for the war in the light of documents of the Polish military intelligence (1933-1939) – selected aspects." Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces 192, no. 2 (April 1, 2019): 253–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0013.2597.
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As a result of the Treaty of Versailles the provisions concerning the issue of limitation of the armed forces were imposed on Germany. These provisions were unilaterally terminated by Germany two years after Adolf Hitler had come to power. There was introduced general and compulsory military service. On 21st May 1935, Hitler – as the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor – signed the secret Reich Defence Law, which gave the Wehrmacht command wide powers to expand the army. Thus, the intensive development of the German army was initiated. After the Nazi Party came to power in Germany, gaining new information by the Polish military intelligence became increasingly difficult. It was connected with the expansion of the German counter-intelligence services, especially the Gestapo, as well as the police supervision over the German society. Through good operational work of the Polish intelligence the Polish side already before the outbreak of the war was relatively well familiarized with the particular phases of the overall German army’s armaments, as well as the German operational doctrine and methods of warfare.
14
Figiel, Dominik. "The experience of the Hitler Youth - boys in the national-socialism." Journal of Education Culture and Society 5, no. 2 (January 6, 2020): 112–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.15503/jecs20142.112.125.
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Losing the First World War, unemployment, the generation gap and the cult of youth led to the party of Adolf Hitler gaining popularity in the Weimar Republic. Using slogans of the restoration of a strong Germany the national socialists organized structures, which formed and educated German Youth. Hitler Youth – brought up according to the rule: “youth leads youth” – was a very fertile environment for the spread of the idea of national-socialism. The specific values – racial supremacy, honour, obedience – handed down by parents were the beginning of the Nazi indoctrination. In the later period such organizations as Bund Deutscher Madel or Hitlerjugend took power over German youth. Education, upbringing, ideological content used by the institutions in Nazi Germany are described in the extensive literature on the subject. However, very important are the experiences of individual members of the Hitler Youth that show the Nazi youth activities from a time perspective. Experiences such as the wisdom of life, and gained knowledge, enable recognition and description of the reality which is discussed. The scope of historical and pedagogical research shows the essential facts constituting the full picture of the life of young people during Nazi era.
15
Moses, A. D. "The Forty-Fivers: A Generation Between Fascism and Democracy." German Politics and Society 17, no. 1 (March 1, 1999): 94–126. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/104503099782486941.
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In 1999, Germans celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Federal Republic. Unlike the fiftieth anniversary of other events in the recent national past—the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, the anti-Jewish pogrom of November 1938, and the unconditional surrender in 1945—this is not an awkward occasion for the country’s elites. On the contrary, the Federal Republic is indisputably Germany’s most successful state, and its record of stability and prosperity compares favorably with that of two prominent neighbors, France and Italy. This anniversary gives us pause to pose the basic questions about West Germany. How was it possible to construct an enduring democracy for a population that, exceptions notwithstanding, had enthusiastically supported Hitler and waged world war to the bitter end?
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Fitzpatrick, Matthew P. "The Pre-History of the Holocaust? TheSonderwegandHistorikerstreitDebates and the Abject Colonial Past." Central European History 41, no. 3 (August 21, 2008): 477–503. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938908000599.
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In chapter eleven ofMein Kampf, Adolf Hitler, having constructed aneal type “culture-bearing” Aryan race,1came to elucidate his views on the history of Jews within Germany. Until the time of Frederick the Great, he argued, “it still entered no one's head to regard the Jews as anything else but a ‘foreign’ people.”2Thereafter, he asserted, came a period of transition wherein Jews had “the effrontery to turn Germanic.”3The rest of the chapter, for Hitler, was an attempt to reverse this putative historical mistake, and presents the reader with a vitriolic casting out of Jews, described as “parasites” and a “noxious bacillus,” from the German body politic.4The aim of this textual expulsion, Hitler explained, was to ensure that the Germans would not be destroyed from within, as had “all great cultures of the past.”5To Hitler, Jews were what Julia Kristeva has called “the abject”6—that which is simultaneously part of the self but radically rejected by the self. In seeking to expel the “Germanic Jews” from theVolkskörper, Hitler sought to expel that part of the German self that, in his view, was a source of weakness and taint.7
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Herf, Jeffrey. "Nazi Germany and Islam in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East." Central European History 49, no. 2 (June 2016): 261–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938916000376.
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In his global bestseller, Inside the Third Reich, Adolf Hitler's former architect and armaments minister, Albert Speer, cited the German dictator's view that if the Arabs had won the Battle of Tours in the eighth century, “the world would be Mohammedan today.” That was the case, he continued, because “theirs was a religion that believed in spreading the faith by the sword and subjugating all nations to their faith. The Germanic people would have become heirs to that religion. Such a creed was perfectly suited to the Germanic temperament.” Yet, because of what Hitler called Arabs' “racial inferiority” and inability to handle the harsher climate, “they could not have kept down the more vigorous natives, so that ultimately not Arabs but Islamized Germans could have stood at the head of this Mohammedan Empire.” Hitler concluded, “It's been our misfortune to have the wrong religion. Why didn't we have the religion of the Japanese, who regard sacrifice for the Fatherland as the highest good? The Mohammedan religion too would have been much more compatible to us than Christianity. Why did it have to be Christianity with its meekness and flabbiness?”
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Irmer, Thomas. "Casually demystifying a sinister book: Playing with a bestseller whose content nobody is familiar with." Maska 30, no. 175 (November 1, 2015): 114–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/maska.30.175-176.114_5.
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In the framework of Kunstfest Weimar, Rimini Protokoll staged the premiere of Adolf Hitler: Mein Kampf, Vols. 1 & 2. Seventy years after the author’s death, the book’s copyright in Germany has expired, which raises the question of how much of a taboo and how dangerous the book still is. This question is also at the centre of the mentioned performance; it was made in cooperation with people connected to the book through personal stories, which sheds light on the book from other perspectives and at the same time demystifies it.
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BROWN, TIMOTHY S. "Richard Scheringer, the KPD and the Politics of Class and Nation in Germany, 1922–1969." Contemporary European History 14, no. 3 (August 2005): 317–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777305002481.
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This article examines the life and times of Richard Scheringer, an army officer and supporter of Adolf Hitler who became famous during the early 1930s for his high-profile conversion to communism. Known in the closing years of the Weimar Republic as a point-man for Communist efforts to win support from the radical right, Scheringer survived the Third Reich to become a leading figure in the postwar Communist Party. His well-documented but little-studied career, bridging critical caesurae of modern Germany history, highlights the unique political constellation of the interwar period, demonstrating fundamental continuities in the relationship of German communism to the nation before and after 1945.
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Stroup, John. "Political Theology and Secularization Theory in Germany, 1918–1939: Emanuel Hirsch as a Phenomenon of His Time." Harvard Theological Review 80, no. 3 (July 1987): 321–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0017816000023695.
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According to Goethe, “writing history is a way of getting the past off your back.” In the twentieth century, Protestant theology has a heavy burden on its back—the readiness of some of its most distinguished representatives to embrace totalitarian regimes, notably Adolf Hitler's “ThirdReich.” In this matter the historian's task is not to jettison but to ensure that the burden on Protestants is not too lightly cast aside—an easy temptation if we imagine that the theologians who turned to Hitler did so with the express desire of embracing a monster. On the contrary: they did so believing their choice was ethically correct. How could this come to pass in the homeland of the Reformation?
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Dudek, Wanilton. "“Red Fascists”: anti-Nazi Germans under suspicion of the FBI." Revista História: Debates e Tendências 19, no. 4 (December 23, 2019): 659–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.5335/hdtv.19n.4.10491.
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Since the rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany in 1933, German opponents of Nazism had look for exile on the American continent, forming complex political movements across the American continent. The presence of the Free German Movement and the Council for the Democratic German in Los Angeles has alerted the US authorities, especially because of evidence of their links with communism and their relations with political movements in Latin America. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in investigating German anti-Nazi exile groups in California and south of the United States border in the context of World War II.
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Mckibben, David. "Who Were the German Independent Socialists? The Leipzig City Council Election of 6 December 1917." Central European History 25, no. 4 (December 1992): 425–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938900021452.
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The emergence of the Independent Socialist party (USPD) in Germany during World War I had momentous and long-reaching consequences. Organized as a group of dissenters within the established German Social Democratic party (SPD), independent socialism grew into a movement that split Germany's working class into two, then three, warring factions. The result was a struggle for supremacy among socialist party factions to which subsequent writers have attributed the “failed” revolution of November 1918, a Weimar Constitution that alienated rather than satisfied German workers, and ultimately the inability of German Socialists to present a unified front against the ultimate threat to German democracy: Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich.
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JACKSON, PETER. "FRENCH INTELLIGENCE AND HITLER'S RISE TO POWER." Historical Journal 41, no. 3 (September 1998): 795–824. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x98008000.
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This article examines the French response to the rise to power of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party in Germany in January of 1933. It argues that French intelligence warned civilian and military leaders that the priorities of the new regime were rearmament and the militarization of German society in preparation for a war of conquest. This essentially accurate appreciation of the situation inside Germany had little impact on the course of French foreign policy. At this juncture French society was preoccupied with worsening economic crisis and pacifist sentiment had reached its inter-war zenith. The national focus was inward and domestic concerns took priority over the external threat from Germany. Finally, France was in a position of relative isolation and could garner no support for a policy of firmness from its erstwhile allies, Great Britain and the United States. This combination of national introspection and diplomatic isolation deterred a succession of governments from taking determined steps to meet the Nazi challenge in 1933.
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Hancock, Eleanor. "The Purge of the SA Reconsidered: “An Old Putschist Trick”?" Central European History 44, no. 4 (December 2011): 669–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938911000689.
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Early in the morning of June 30, 1934, SA Chief of Staff Ernst Röhm and other leaders of the National Socialist storm troopers, theSturmabteilungor SA, were arrested by Adolf Hitler in the Bavarian resort town, Bad Wiessee. Further arrests followed across Germany during the day. Many SA leaders, various German politicians, two generals, some dissident Nazis, and some of Röhm's friends were shot. Finally, Röhm himself was killed late the next day. This was the only violent internal party purge to occur in the entire history of Nazism. Some ninety people were killed, with the greatest proportion being in Berlin, Munich, and Silesia. At the time the purge was justified by the allegation that the SA leaders were plotting to overthrow Hitler, carry out a “second revolution,” and seize power in collusion with former Chancellor General von Schleicher (also shot) and with the aid of an unnamed foreign power (France). The need to rid the SA of corruption and decadence was emphasized; in this context Hitler's alleged discovery of Röhm's homosexuality was publicized.
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Jones, Larry Eugene. "Franz von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic." Central European History 38, no. 2 (June 2005): 191–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156916105775563670.
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No one stood more directly in the eye of the storm that descended upon Germany in 1933 than Franz von Papen. Not only did Papen play a crucial role in overcoming Reich President Paul von Hindenburg's resistance to Adolf Hitler's appointment as chancellor, but his presence in the newly formed Hitler cabinet provided it with an aura of conservative legitimacy that helped mollify the fears that many Germans might otherwise have felt about the so-called Hitler solution. To complicate matters further, Papen proved utterly incapable of containing the dynamism of the Nazi movement and watched ineffectually from the sidelines as the Nazis unleashed a veritable revolution in the spring of 1933 that either swept Germany's conservative institutions aside or, what proved more likely, forcibly coordinated them into the organizational structure of the Third Reich. Nowhere, however, was Papen's ineffectiveness—or, for that matter, his lack of civil courage—more apparent than in the summer of 1934, when the Nazis ruthlessly murdered two of his closest associates, along with several other prominent conservatives, in a two-pronged strike against both the more militant elements within the Nazi movement and a clique of anti-Nazi conspirators within Papen's own vicechancery.
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Jantzen, Kyle. "Totalitarianism: Propaganda, Perseverance, and Protest: Strategies for Clerical Survival Amid the German Church Struggle." Church History 70, no. 2 (June 2001): 295–327. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3654455.
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The Protestant historiography of the German Church Struggle has been shaped largely by its attention to two fundamental issues. The first has been the intrachurch struggle dominated by two churchpolitical factions: the Faith Movement of the German Christians and the Confessing Church. German Christians whole-heartedly endorsed the government of Adolf Hitler, campaigned to align the organization, theology, and practice of the twenty-eight German Protestant Land Churches with the racial and authoritarian values of the National Socialist regime and worked to create a centralized Reich church under a powerful Reich bishop. The Confessing Church stood for theological orthodoxy and ecclesiastical independence, rejected the authority of the Land Church governments that had fallen under the control of German Christians, and asserted itself as the uniquely legitimate church government in Germany.
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Redles, David. "The Nazi Old Guard: Identity Formation During Apocalyptic Times." Nova Religio 14, no. 1 (August 1, 2010): 24–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nr.2010.14.1.24.
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This paper describes the process of identity formation that occurred just after World War I as certain Germans converted to National Socialism. Based on the autobiographical narratives of early joiners, these self-described Old Fighters, or the Old Guard, recall the Kampfzeit (the struggle-time) as a difficult period of near apocalyptic collapse. Further, they were convinced that National Socialism and its divinely appointed leader Adolf Hitler were the only means of salvation. The Old Guard identified themselves as an elect community given a holy mission to save Germany, indeed the world, from destruction by defeating Communism and its supposed progenitor, the Jew. The Nazis hoped thereby to usher in the millennial Third Reich by creating a Volksgemeinschaft (a community of people) united by a Glaubensgemeinschaft (a community of faith).
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Graziosi, Andrea, Joshua Rubenstein, Roman Szporluk, Paul Hollander, Jeffrey Hardy, Michael Ellman, Jeffrey Rossman, and Norman Naimark. "Perspectives on Norman Naimark's Stalin's Genocides." Journal of Cold War Studies 14, no. 3 (July 2012): 149–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00250.
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This forum includes commentaries by seven experts—Joshua Rubenstein, Paul Hollander, Andrea Graziosi, Roman Szporluk, Jeffrey Hardy, Michael Ellman, and Jeffrey Rossman—on Norman Naimark's Stalin's Genocides, published by Princeton University Press in 2010. Most of the commentators praise the book highly but raise some questions about specific points, such as the use of the term “genocidal,” the application of “genocide” to the atrocities perpetrated by Iosif Stalin's regime in the Soviet Union, and the estimated numbers of Stalin's victims. Two of the commentators take stronger issue with Naimark's book, particularly the comparison one might make between Stalin's crimes and those of Adolf Hitler in Germany and Eastern Europe. The forum concludes with a reply by Naimark, who not only responds to points raised by the commentators but also elaborates on his intentions when writing the book.
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Leite, Werlayne Stuart Soares. "Berlin 1936: The Creation of the “Myth” Jesse Owens." Acta Facultatis Educationis Physicae Universitatis Comenianae 57, no. 2 (November 1, 2017): 98–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/afepuc-2017-0010.
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Abstract Throughout the twentieth century, the sport has gained much importance in society and sparked interest from various sectors, including the political. Adolf Hitler used the XI 1936 Summer Olympic Games to show the world the strength of Nazi Germany and its rebirth after the defeat in World War I and the impositions of the Versailles Treaty. However, many of the facts historically reported on the 1936 Olympics are contested. The most famous and mythical case of these Olympic Games, and one of the most famous in the history of sport, relates to events that occurred between the American athlete Jesse Owens and the Nazi Führer. The aim of this work is to try to show, as faithfully as possible, as some important facts occurred during this event (the contest between Owens and Long in the long jump; if Hitler snubbed Owens; etc.) that helped create the “myth” around Owens; and to present reports of the global media coverage, analyzing the perpetuation of these mythical reports in current media. As methodology was conducted an ample bibliographical research: reports taken from newspapers of the time and current, books, scientific papers, master's thesis, documentaries, etc. Without claiming to prove a single fact, it is intended to provide insight to the reader to draw their own conclusions.
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Schweitzer, Vladimir. "USSR and Germany: on the Way to June 22, 1941." Contemporary Europe 99, no. 6 (November 1, 2020): 202–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/soveurope62020202213.
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The article deals with the Soviet-German relations in the period of 1939‒1941. It is shoun that after signing of the Munich agreements in September, 1938, Germany generally defined its strategy of pressure on countries that fit into the Hitler’s concept of "Push to the East". Its victims in 1935 were Czechoslovakia and Poland. After the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, Great Britain and France sought to review the "policy of appeasement" of Hitler and were ready to join the USSR in the search for ways to prevent Hitler's expansion. However, the inconsistency and contradictoriness of this "change of milestones" strengthened the position of the Soviet leadership in favour of reaching agreements with Germany. The summer of 1939 was the apotheosis of fruitless negotiations between the "Troika" (the USSR, Great Britain and France), which objectively prompted Moscow to accept the German proposal for fundamentally new bilateral agreements (the Pact of August 23, 1939). Subsequent events up to June 22, 1941 showed the unreliability of agreements with Nazism, facilitated the fleeting victory of Germany over Poland and France, and the actual isolation of Great Britain. Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union did not remove from the Soviet leadership the historical guilt of being unprepared for war with fascism, for the colossal human and territorial losses of the first stage of the Great Patriotic War
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Ripsman, Norrin M., and Jack S. Levy. "Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s." International Security 33, no. 2 (October 2008): 148–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.33.2.148.
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Scholars typically define appeasement as a policy of satisfying grievances through one-sided concessions to avoid war for the foreseeable future and, therefore, as an alternative to balancing. They traditionally interpret British appeasement of Adolf Hitler in the 1930s as a naïve attempt to maintain peace with Germany by satisfying his grievances. The standard conceptualization of appeasement and the empirical treatment of the 1930s, however, are theoretically limiting and historically incorrect. Appeasement is a strategy of sustained, asymmetrical concessions with the aim of avoiding war, at least in the short term. There are three distinct variations of appeasement: (1) resolving grievances (to avoid war for the foreseeable future); (2) diffusing secondary threats (to focus on a greater threat); and (3) buying time (to rearm and/or secure allies against the current threat). British appeasement was primarily a strategy of buying time for rearmament against Germany. British leaders understood the Nazi menace and did not expect that appeasement would avoid an eventual war with Germany. They believed that by the time of the Rhineland crisis of 1936 the balance of power had already shifted in Germany's favor, but that British rearmament would work to reverse the balance by the end of the decade. Appeasement was a strategy to delay an expected confrontation with Germany until the military balance was more favorable.
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Tucci, Pier Luigi. "EPHEMERAL ARCHITECTURE AND ROMANITÀ IN THE FASCIST ERA: A ROYAL-IMPERIAL TRIBUNE FOR HITLER AND MUSSOLINI IN ROME." Papers of the British School at Rome 88 (June 4, 2020): 297–341. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0068246220000069.
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Ephemeral architecture was the antithesis of the permanent buildings typical of the ‘Fascism of stone’, and yet many architects took advantage of this paradox to create an imaginary Rome. A widespread use of ephemeral structures was made around 1938, during the Mostra Augustea della Romanità and Hitler's state visit to Italy, in order to support a political programme that marked the totalitarian turn in the Fascist regime after the foundation of the empire and aimed at strengthening the alliance between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Relying on methodologies of particular relevance to Roman art history and on various sources unknown to date, this paper investigates the relationships between ephemeral architecture and romanità. The case study is a monumental tribune built in via dei Trionfi that inevitably suffered a damnatio memoriae: a combination of classicizing and futuristic decorations, it looked back at ancient Rome and, at the same time, highlighted the Fascist regime's aspirations to might and modernity.
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Mommsen, Hans. "Changing Historical Perspectives on the Nazi Dictatorship." European Review 17, no. 1 (February 2009): 73–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s106279870900057x.
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This paper discusses the change of the leading paradigms in the field of contemporary history in the Federal Republic of Germany. While, during the early post-Second World War period, the study of the interwar period was dominated by the theory of totalitarian dictatorship and the discussion of the deficiencies of the Paris peace treaty system, thereby focusing on the charismatic leadership of Adolf Hitler, the post-war generation of German historians analysed the emerging political system of the Third Reich from a more systematic perspective, depicting behind the Hitlerian façade the antagonistic political structure that resulted in an accelerating cumulative radicalisation of the Nazi regime. This functionalist approach, however, has recently been attacked for indirectly exculpating the Nazi crimes by underlining the systemic factors leading to the accumulation of terror and violence and is about to be replaced by a rather moralist interpretation of Nazi politics, accentuating the function of the ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ and the impact of Hitler’s charismatic leadership.
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Cohen, Susan. "The British Federation of University Women: helping academic women refugees in the 1930s and 1940s." International Psychiatry 7, no. 2 (April 2010): 47–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/s1749367600005762.
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In early 1933, the members of the British Federation of University Women (BFUW), an organisation which was established in 1907 to provide a supportive network for the growing number of academic women, embarked upon a unique humanitarian mission to aid their counterparts in Europe (Sondheimer, 1957; Dyhouse, 1995). This remarkable undertaking, which came to provide academic women refugees with professional, financial and practical support, was in direct response to the growing threat from Fascism and Nazism. Almost from the moment that Hitler came to power in Germany in January 1933, the BFUW Executive Committee began to receive a steady stream of calls from German members of the International Federation of University Women (IFUW), whose lives and careers were affected by restrictions imposed upon them by the Nazi regime. Some were seeking help finding work and settling in Britain, while others were looking for temporary help as trans-migrants on their way to the USA, New Zealand or Australia.
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Maciejewski, Marek. "Wódz, naród, rasa. Ideologiczne przesłanki nazistowskich koncepcji prawa." Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem 39, no. 1 (September 8, 2017): 19–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/2300-7249.39.1.2.
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THE LEADER, THE NATION AND THE RACE. IDEOLOGICAL PREMISES OF THE NAZI CONCEPT OF LAW The subject matter of the article is devoted to discussing the ideological premises of the content, aims, and functions of Nazi law from the perspective of the legal theoreticians and practitioners of the Third Reich. Firstly, the significance and role of the supreme leader the Führer of the National Socialists and Germany in asingle person, namely Adolf Hitler, is discussed. The legal doctrine of the Nazi state perceived him — just as he did himself — to be the basic source of law and treated his political decisions as such. In fact, these decisions were even thought to stand above the Weimar Constitution of 1919 which was only formally in force and other pieces of legislation. Hitler was not merely viewed as the supreme legislator, but also as the highest judge, acting by the will of the German nation. Judicial decisions in the Third Reich were issued on his behalf. According to Nazi lawyers, Hitler as Führer embodied and articulated the will of the German nation, whose needs, interests, and aspirations were considered the purpose behind the functioning of the state and the Reich’s law. Furthermore, the German national community deutsche Volksgemeinaschaft rose to the rank of the near absolute determinant of the law’s form and content. It was, in fact, the reference for one of the important principles of Nazi law, i.e. the common good before personal good Gemeinnutz vor Eigennutz — hence, anegation of the concepts of individualism, including the unchallengeable nature of private property. In addition, the ideological premises of the Nazi concept of law also comprised racial issues. The Third Reich placed particular emphasis on racial purity and hygiene — which referred predominantly to the Germanic race — as acondition for the German national community’s healthy functioning. Nazi law, inter alia, was supposed to serve precisely that end. The legal doctrine in Germany at the time adopted the unequivocal position that the law — together with the administration of justice — should be one of the most important guards of the longevity and purity of the Germanic race sometimes referred to as the Aryan race. This stipulation, which for the most part was consistently implemented, was closely linked to the National Socialists’ almost zoological antisemitism. It was reflected in numerous normative acts by the Third Reich’s authorities targeting the Jewish population in Germany and the countries it occupied during WWII.
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Wichert, Wojciech. "Ustawa o pełnomocnictwach Ermächtigungsgesetz z 23 marca 1933 roku jako katalizator budowy państwa wodzowskiego w Niemczech." Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem 41, no. 4 (January 28, 2020): 21–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/2300-7249.41.4.2.
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The Enabling Act Ermächtigungsgesetz of 23 March 1933 as catalyst for building the Führer State in GermanyThe aim of the article is to analyze the origins and political repercussions of the Enabling Act formally known as the “law to remedy the distress of the people and the nation” of 23 March 1933. Combined with the previously passed Reichstag Fire Decree 28 February 1933, which abolished most constitutional civil liberties and transferred state rights to the central government, the act enabled Chancellor Adolf Hitler to assume dictatorial powers in the near future. Deputies from the Nazi Party, the German National People’s Party, and the Centre Party voted in favour of the act that allowed Hitler’s cabinet to pass laws without the consent or any involvement of the Reichstag parliament and the presidency. In effect it gave Hitler’s dictatorship an appearance of legality and a solid political base from which to carry out the first steps of his “national revolution” in order to seize unlimited power over every aspect of life in Germany. It was the dawn of the totalitarian regime of the Third Reich.
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Borisov, A. Yu. "The Anti-Hitler Coalition: From Enmity to Military Alliance — A Formula for Success." Moscow University Bulletin of World Politics 12, no. 3 (November 20, 2020): 7–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.48015/2076-7404-2020-12-3-7-44.
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It is unfortunate to note again today that World War II did not end, it continues in the form of the war of memory. Politicians and scholars who stand as ideological successors of collaborators are trying to rewrite the history of those tragic days, to downplay the role of the Soviet Union in the victory over fascism. They try to revive certain political myths, which have been debunked long ago, that the Soviet Union and the Nazi Germany bear equal responsibility for the outbreak of World War II, that the Red Army did not liberate Eastern Europe but ‘occupied’ it. In order to combat these attempts it is necessary to examine once again a turbulent history of the inter-war period and, particularly, the reasons why all attempts to form a united antifascist front had failed in the 1930s, but eventually led to the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition.The paper focuses on a complex set of political considerations, including cooperation and confrontation, mutual suspicions and a fervent desire to find an ally in the face of growing international tensions, which all together determined the dynamics of relations within a strategic triangle of the Soviet Union — the United States — Great Britain in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The paper shows how all attempts to establish a collective security system during the prewar period had shattered faced with the policy of appeasement, which allowed the Nazi Germany to occupy much of Europe. Only the Soviet Union’s entry into the war changed the course of the conflict and made a decisive contribution to the victory over fascist aggressors. The author emphasizes that at such crucial moment of history I.V. Stalin, F.D. Roosevelt and W. Churchill raised to that challenge, demonstrating realism, common sense and willingness to cooperate. Although within the anti-Hitler coalition there was a number of pending issues, which triggered tensions between the Allies, their leaders managed to move beyond old grievances, ideological differences and short-term political interests, to realize that they have a common strategic goal in the struggle against Nazism. According to the author, this is the foundation for success of the anti-Hitler coalition and, at the same time, the key lesson for contemporary politicians. The very emergence of the anti-Hitler coalition represented a watershed in the history of the 20th century, which has determined a way forward for the whole humanity and laid the foundations for the world order for the next fifty years.
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Wien, Peter. "COMING TO TERMS WITH THE PAST: GERMAN ACADEMIA AND HISTORICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ARAB LANDS AND NAZI GERMANY." International Journal of Middle East Studies 42, no. 2 (April 13, 2010): 311–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743810000073.
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The books that are the subject of this review essay comprise three new contributions and one revised edition about a topic that has become paradigmatic in defining scholarly and political approaches to key areas of Middle Eastern history. It has shaped studies of the historical and ideological roots of Arab nationalism, the Arab–Israeli conflict, and the emergence and perseverance of authoritarian regimes in the modern Middle East. The ways that politicians, intellectuals, political movements, and the Arab public related to Nazism and Nazi anti-Semitism have been used to contest the legitimacy of 20th-century Arab political movements across the ideological spectrum. Historians have theorized about the involvement of individuals such as Grand Mufti Amin al-Husseini in the crimes of Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, and Adolf Eichmann; the roots of Arab nationalist doctrine in German Volk ideas; the mimicry of Nazism in organizations such as the Iraqi al-Futuwwa and Antun Saadeh's Syrian Social Nationalist Party; and Arab public sympathies for Nazi anti-Semitism dating from the 1930s or even earlier. Until recently, European and Anglo-American research on these topics—often based on a history of ideas approach—tended to take a natural affinity of Arabs toward Nazism for granted. More recent works have contextualized authoritarian and totalitarian trends in the Arab world within a broad political spectrum, choosing subaltern perspectives and privileging the analysis of local voices in the press over colonial archives and the voices of grand theoreticians. The works of Israel Gershoni have taken the lead in this emerging scholarship of Arab nationalism. This approach was also the common denominator of a research project on “Arab Encounters with National Socialism,” which the Berlin Center for Modern Oriental Studies (Zentrum Moderner Orient) hosted from 2000 to 2003. Its members included the author of this review and the authors of two of the books under review (Nordbruch and Wildangel). The project used indigenous Arabic sources, especially local newspapers, for a close scrutiny of Arab reactions to the challenge of Nazism in a period when Arabs, especially nationalists, perceived that quasicolonial regimes undermined the ostensibly democratic and liberal ethos of the British and French Mandate powers.
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Reiter, Dan. "Avoiding the Coup-Proofing Dilemma: Consolidating Political Control While Maximizing Military Power." Foreign Policy Analysis 16, no. 3 (April 6, 2020): 312–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/fpa/oraa001.
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Abstract Civil-military relations scholarship forecasts that governments fearing coups d’état and facing belligerent external and internal adversaries face a dilemma. Governments can coup-proof to reduce coup risk, but such measures reduce military effectiveness. Conversely, if they eschew coup-proofing to maintain military effectiveness, they risk coups. This paper explains how governments facing coup threats and belligerent adversaries can alleviate this dilemma. It first describes five coup-proofing measures that generally reduce military effectiveness, such as politicized promotion and reduced training, and two other coup-proofing measures that do not reduce effectiveness, bribery and indoctrination. Because leaders can pick and choose which coup-proofing measures to employ, leaders facing coup and belligerent adversary threats can reduce the coup-proofing dilemma by adopting those coup-proofing measures that do not reduce effectiveness and avoiding those measures that reduce effectiveness, within availability and dependence constraints. The paper presents a case study of coup-proofing in Nazi Germany, a deviant case for coup-proofing theory and democratic victory theory because Adolf Hitler avoided being overthrown in a coup and fielded an effective military. The case study demonstrates support for the theory that a leader can simultaneously reduce coup risk and optimize military effectiveness by employing some coup-proofing tactics but not others.
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Maciejewski, Marek. "Od krytyki demokracji parlamentarnej do pochwały dyktatury. Niemiecka myśl nacjonalistyczna 1918–1933." Opolskie Studia Administracyjno-Prawne 14, no. 3 (May 31, 2016): 71–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.25167/osap.1328.
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The article deals with the question of the formation – since the end of World War One until the emergence of the Nazi regime – of various conceptions of the political system in influential and widespread intellectual circles of the so-called revolutionary conservatives who represented nationalist, anti-liberal and anti-parliamentarian views. This political ideology adopted a clearly critical position regarding political, constitutional and legal solutions adopted in the Reich after the fall of the Hohenzollern empire in 1918. Criticizing parliamentary democracy, though not necessarily democracy as such, revolutionary conservatives announced the need to establish a system of dictatorial leadership in Germany, modeled after the rule of Napoleon Bonaparte, oftentimes seeing the then President of the Reich, Paul von Hindenburg, as a suitable person for this role (they rather sporadically perceived Adolf Hitler in this way). Some of them not only approved of an authoritarian model of government understood as an opposition towards the so-called Weimar system, but also accepted the principles of totalitarianism (e.g., C. Schmitt, E. Jünger, E. Niekisch). Since 1933, the Nazis partly adopted the anti-liberal, anti-parliamentarian and authoritarian conceptions of revolutionary conservatives, reaching for – among others – Carl Schmitt’s theory of decisionism or Ernst Jünger’s idea of the total mobilization of the nation.
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Hannikainen, Lauri. "Finland’s Continuation War (1941–1944): War of Aggression or Defence? War of Alliance or Separate War?" Baltic Yearbook of International Law Online 17, no. 1 (December 20, 2020): 77–121. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22115897_01701_006.
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In September 1939, after having included a secret protocol on spheres of influence in the so-called Molotov- Ribbentrop Pact, Germany and the Soviet Union invaded Poland and divided it between themselves. It was not long before the Soviet Union approached Finland by proposing exchanges of certain territories: ‘in our national interest we want to have from you certain territories and offer in exchange territories twice as large but in less crucial areas’. Finland, suspicious of Soviet motives, refused – the outcome was the Soviet war of aggression against Finland by the name of the Winter War in 1939–1940. The Soviet Union won this war and compelled Finland to cede several territories – about 10 per cent of Finland’s area. After the Winter War, Finland sought protection from Germany against the Soviet Union and decided to rely on Germany. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Finland joined the German war effort in the so-called Continuation War and reoccupied the territories lost in the Winter War. Finnish forces did not stop at the old border but occupied Eastern (Soviet) Karelia with a desire eventually to annex it. By that measure, Finland joined as Germany’s ally in its war of aggression against the Soviet Union in violation of international law. In their strong reliance on Germany, the Finnish leaders made some very questionable decisions without listening to warnings from Western States about possible negative consequences. Germany lost its war and so did Finland, which barely avoided entire occupation by the Soviet Army and succeeded in September 1944 in concluding an armistice with the Soviet Union. Finland lost some more territories and was subjected to many obligations and restrictions in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, dictated by the Allies. This article analyses, according to the criteria of international law, Finland’s policy shortly prior to and during the Continuation War, especially Finland’s secret dealings with Germany in the months prior to the German attack against the Soviet Union and Finland’s occupation of Eastern Karelia in the autumn of 1941. After Adolf Hitler declared that Germany was fighting against the Soviet Union together with Finland and Romania, was the Soviet Union entitled – prior to the Finnish attack – to resort to armed force in self-defence against Finland? And was Finland treated too harshly in the aftermath of World War ii? After all, its role as an ally of Germany had been rather limited.
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Холод, Олександр. "Психолінгвістичні інструменти інформаційно-психологічного впливу в підписах під фотографіями (на прикладі газет Рейхскомісаріату «Україна» 1941–1944 років)." East European Journal of Psycholinguistics 3, no. 1 (June 30, 2016): 73–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.29038/eejpl.2016.3.1.kho.
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Проблема дослідження полягає у відсутності знань про конкретний перелік і якість психолінгвістичних інструментів інформаційно-психологічного впливу (ІПВ) у підписах під фотографіями (на прикладі фашистських газет Рейхскомісаріату «Україна»). У статті автор ставить мету ідентифікувати, описати й класифікувати психолінгвістичні інструменти ІПВ в підписах під фотографіями, які були розміщені в газетах, що виходили в період із 1 вересня 1941 до 10 листопада 1944 року на території Рейхскомісаріату «Україна» (далі – РКУ) й фінансувалися фашистським режимом. Дослідник звертається до таких методів: спостереження, класифікація, узагальнення, контент-аналіз, інтент-аналіз, кількісно-якісний метод. Упродовж дослідження автор піддає аналізу 81 підпис під 85 фотографіями, опублікованими в газетах, що виходили в період із 1 вересня 1941 до 10 листопада 1944 року на території Рейхскомісаріату «Україна» й фінансувалися фашистським режимом. За результатами дослідження були описані й класифіковані на 8 груп (та 23 підгрупи) психолінгвістичні інструменти інформаційно-психологічного впливу в згаданих газетах РКУ. Установлено, що в газетах РКУ найчастотнішими є психолінгвістичні інструменти інформаційно-психологічного впливу, які відносяться до груп «Німеччина» (9 підгруп) і «Інші» (6 підгруп).
Література
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Njogu, Geoffrey Karimi. "‘Radical Focusing’ as the ideal conceptual framework in addressing substance abuse." Jumuga Journal of Education, Oral Studies, and Human Sciences (JJEOSHS) 1, no. 1 (December 12, 2018): 15. http://dx.doi.org/10.35544/jjeoshs.v1i1.6.
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The article seeks to philosophically introduce “Radical Focusing” as a new concept in fighting drugs among the Kenyan youths and in the rest of the tropical Africa. By “Radical Focusing”, it means, employing the whole armour for combat in our bid to dismantle this destructive trajectory that principally threatens to wipe out the youth, and the boy-child in particular. The concept of radical focusing is largely inspired by Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s concept of the “Costly Grace.” In this concept of the costly grace in Nazi Germany of 1930s, Bonhoeffer fought injustices to the point of his own physical destruction during the era of Adolf Hitler. Owing to the sad scenarios of the day, Bonhoeffer inspired us to fight vices to the very end, and radically focus on the noble agenda throughout. The data in this article has been collected through the use of questionnaires and interview schedule. Questionnaires were administered to the interviewees, most of whom sought anonymity owing to the sensitive nature of research. Apart from the interviews, existing commissions of investigative inquiry on education such as the Ominde commission of 1964 which proposed that the government should take over from churches and eventually manage schools; and Kamunge Commission among others, have provided resourceful information to the research that gave birth to this article. It is hoped that the research findings will go a long way in reconstructing our broken society for the better, and eventually bring remedy for drug abuse to masses of people who have lost direction in this endeavor.
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Meglin, Joellen A. "Blurring the Boundaries of Genre, Gender, and Geopolitics: Ruth Page and Harald Kreutzberg's Transatlantic Collaboration in the 1930s." Dance Research Journal 41, no. 2 (2009): 52–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0149767700000656.
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In 1933, the year Hitler was named chancellor of Germany, Ruth Page and Harald Kreutzberg launched a “new and rather surprising partnership” with a joint recital in Chicago. Page and Kreutzberg were, on the surface, unlikely artistic collaborators: she, an American ballerina and he, an exponent of the German new dance. Nevertheless, their partnership lasted four years—from 1932 through 1936—a fairly long term considering the usual obstacles to collaboration magnified by physical distance. With Chicago as the focal point they toured the Midwest and other regions of the United States, Japan, and Canada. The collaboration offered the two artists a number of advantages. Page had certain difficulties to surmount in achieving her goal of becoming a choreographic entrepreneur in the post-Diaghilev international ballet world: besides being a woman—a decided disadvantage when it came to being taken seriously as a choreographer, artistic director, and impresario in the ballet world—she lived in Chicago, outside the dance mecca of New York. She could parlay her collaboration with Kreutzberg into a cosmopolitan, modernist identity, thus preempting the threat of consignment to Midwestern obscurity. Kreutzberg, for his part, was in need of a continuous and widening stream of performance venues in which to develop his unique gifts as a solo performer; moreover, he had to contend with the rising fascism and homophobic militancy of the Third Reich as a gay man whose identity was antithetical to the nation-state of which he was ultimately to become a pawn.
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Whaley, Joachim. "Book Review: Petra Rau: Our Nazis: Representations of Fascism in Contemporary Literature and Film and Karolin Machtans and Martin Ruehl (eds): Hitler Films from Germany: History, Cinema and Politics since 1945." Journal of European Studies 44, no. 2 (May 19, 2014): 188–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0047244114529889l.
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McDowell, Jennifer, and Milton Loventhal. "The Spy (K.G.B. General Alexander Orlov), the Dupe (Bertram D. Wolfe), and the Documents (The Stalin Resolutions)." Canadian-American Slavic Studies 48, no. 4 (2014): 375–417. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22102396-04804001.
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Two-hundred and forty-two consecutive, Soviet Politburo resolutions on foreign policy covering 1934–1936, some built on reports by Stalin with his actual words, and 34 pieces of 1934 espionage correspondence that traveled between the Moscow Foreign Office and its branch in the Soviet Embassy in Vienna, were purchased clandestinely by German intelligence, at the time, and as they were written. A German Sovietologist named Dr. Georg Leibbrandt authenticated them right at the time. Adolf Hitler read them. They influenced his decision to attack the Soviet Union in 1941. Captured by the U.S. Army in Germany (OMGUS) at the close of World War II, they were brought to the United States, to the National Archives and Hoover Institution. Milton Loventhal and Jennifer McDowell translated and authenticated them, using both sets of copies. The story of their authentication sheds light on the 1960–1961 machinations of one of Stalin’s foremost secret agents, master spy K.G.B. General Alexander Orlov, who fled to the United States in 1938 to escape Stalin’s terror. But this “loyal Soviet dropout” (Stanley G. Payne’s term) was in reality a cloaked agent who had never renounced his loyalty to the Soviet state. Asked by Bertram D. Wolfe to comment on the resolutions’ authenticity, Orlov informed Milton Loventhal and Wolfe that these documents were forgeries, using arguments that were proven worthless in their entirety. Untangling the web of deception Orlov wove around these detailed, complex documents is the focus of this article, shining a bright light on the power a mesmerizing secret agent can have when the rules of research are abandoned by influential experts.
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Neumann, Franz L. "Anxiety and Politics." tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society 15, no. 2 (June 27, 2017): 612–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v15i2.901.
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The English version of this article was first published in 1957. The journal tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique republished it 60 years later in 2017. In this essay, Franz L. Neumann discusses the role of anxiety in politics. The article asks: How does it happen that the masses sell their souls to leaders and follow them blindly? On what does the power of attraction of leaders over masses rest? What are the historical situations in which this identification of leader and masses is successful, and what view of history do the men have who accept leaders? For answering these questions, the author suggests a combination of political economy, Freudian political psychology, and ideology critique. He sees anxiety in the context of alienation. Alienation is analysed as a multidimensional phenomenon consisting of economic, political, social and psychological alienation. Neumann introduces the notions of Caesaristic identification, institutionalised anxiety and persecutory anxiety. The essay shows that fascism remains an actual threat in capitalist societies.Acknowledgement: The editors of tripleC express their gratitude to the Neumann and Marcuse families for their support in republishing this essay, to Simon & Schuster for granting us the rights, and to Denise Rose Hansen for her invaluable editorial assistance. Original source: From the book “The Democratic and the Authoritarian State” by Franz Neumann. Copyright © 1957 by the Free Press. Copyright renewed © 1985 by the Free Press, a division of Macmillan, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Free Press, a Division of Simon & Schuster, Inc. Originally delivered as a lecture before the Free University of Berlin and published in the series “Recht und Staat,” Tübingen,1954. Translated by Professor Peter Gay. This article is published in tripleC without a CC licence.About the AuthorFranz Leopold Neumann (1900-1954) was a political theorist associated with the Frankfurt School. He obtained a doctoral degree in legal studies at the University of Frankfurt with the dissertation „Rechtsphilosophische Einleitung zu einer Abhandlung über das Verhältnis von Staat und Strafe“ (A Legal-Philosophical Introduction to A Treatise on the Relationship between the State and Punishment). Neumann became the German Social Democratic Party’s (SPD) main legal advisor at a time when the Nazis and Hitler gained strength in Germany. At the time when Hitler came to power in 1933, the legal office had to be closed and Neumann had to flee from Germany. In London, he in 1936 obtained his second doctoral degree from the London School of Economics with the work “The Governance of the Rule of Law” under the supervision of Harold Laski and Karl Mannheim. Neumann moved to New York in 1936, where he became a member of the Institute of Social Research (also known as the “Frankfurt School”) that was then in exile in the USA. In 1942, he started working for the Office of Strategic Service (OSS), where he together with Herbert Marcuse and Otto Kirchheimer analysed Nazi Germany. In 1942, Neumann published his main book is Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933–1944 (2nd, updated edition published in 1944), one of the most profound analyses of Nazi Germany’s political economy and ideology. Franz L. Neumann died in 1954 in a car accident.
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Miller, Susan Maria, and Stacy Gallin. "An Analysis of Physician Behaviors During the Holocaust: Modern Day Relevances." Conatus 4, no. 2 (December 31, 2019): 265. http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/cjp.21147.
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Even with the passage of time, the misguided motivations of highly educated, physician-participants in the genocide known as the Holocaust remain inexplicable and opaque. Typically, the physician-patient relationship inherent within the practice of medicine, has been rooted in the partnership between individuals. However, under the Third Reich, this covenant between a physician and patient was displaced by a public health agenda that was grounded in the scientific theory of eugenics and which served the needs of a polarized political system that relied on this hypothesis to justify society’s racial hygiene laws. As part of the National Socialist propaganda, Adolf Hitler ominously argued that the cultural decline of Germany after World War I could largely be based on interbreeding and a “resultant drop in the racial level.” This foundational premise defined those who could be ostracized, labeled and persecuted by society, including those who were assimilated. The indoctrination and implementation of this distorted social policy required the early and sustained cooperation and leadership of the medical profession. Because National Socialism promised it could restore Germany’s power, honor and dignity, physicians embraced their special role in the repair of the state. This article will explore the imperative role, moral risks and deliberate actions of physicians who participated in the amplification process from “euthanasia” to systemic murder to medically-sanctioned genocide. A goal of this analysis will be to explore what perils today’s physicians would face if they were to experience the transitional and collective behaviors of a corrupted medical profession, or if they would, instead, have the fortitude and courage necessary to protect themselves against this collaboration. Our premise is that an awareness of history can serve as a safeguard to the conceit of political ascendency and discrimination.
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Barber-Kersovan, Alenka. "Rock von Rechts (Rock from the Right). By Dieter Baacke, Thier Michaela, Grüninger Christian and Frank Lindemann. Bielefeld: AJZ-Druck & Verlag, 1994. 199 pp. - Rassismus, Musik und Gewalt. Ursachen, Entwicklungen, Folgerungen (Racism, Music and Violence. Causes, Developments, Consequences). By Erika Funk-Hennigs and Johannes Jäger. Münster: LIT Verlag, 1995. 230 pp. - Tanz den Adolf Hitler. Faschismus in der populären Kultur (Dance the Adolf Hitler. Fascism in popular culture). By Georg Seeßlen. Berlin: Edition Tiamat, 1994, 189 pp." Popular Music 16, no. 1 (January 1997): 119–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026114300000074x.
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Butkus, Zenonas. "The Communist Revolt in Tallinn on the 1st of December 1924 and its Diplomatic Cover-Up." Lietuvos istorijos studijos 43 (August 8, 2019): 22–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/lis.2019.43.2.
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This article, based on the archives stored in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia and some recently published documents, investigates the coup attempted by the Soviets on December 1, 1924 in Tallinn and evaluates its consequences within the broad context of international relations. During the research, it was established that an attempt to stage a coup in Estonia had been undertaken both by the Estonian communists and the USSR leadership, which had the highest political body – the Politburo – and the Comintern, a self-crafted tool set up for spreading the communist movement around the world, at its disposal. Thus, the revolution was masterminded by the Soviet authorities, whereas the Estonian communists were mainly responsible for its implementation. The task of the coup leadership was to seize power and hold on to it for some time, long enough to request that the USSR “renders support.” Preparations were underway for such support. This is evidenced by military preparations in the northern regions of the USSR and the territory near the Estonian border as well as by the deployment of Soviet ships in the vicinity of Tallinn and the activities of the Soviet embassy located in the capital. The attempted coup turned into a putsch due to the maximum conspiracy of their organizers. The conspiracy was brought about by the then-public awareness that the revolutionary events in Germany in 1923 had been instigated by the Soviets. The attempted coup in Estonia failed due to the extraordinary defensive operations put up by the Estonian authorities and power structures as well as due to the failure to involve the workers and the other strata of society in the coup.
Latvia, Estonia’s only ally, was the first country to stand by Estonia’s side after the country withstood the attempted coup. The lessons were learnt not only by these two countries but by Lithuania as well. They began taking adequate measures to stifle communist activities. Neither France nor England or any other Western state made plans to deploy their fleets to the Baltic Sea to support the Estonians or at least show, in a demonstrative way, their support in such a trying time. They also failed to hold any diplomatic démarches against the Soviets opposing the export of revolution practiced by the Soviets. Due to diplomatic pressure imposed by the USSR, Estonia could not publicly and officially name the actual organizers of the putsch. As a result, only the local communists were indiscriminately accused. Such forced tactics, if only indirectly, had at least partially been influencing the area of historical research as well.
However, the sudden and unequivocal liquidation of the putsch in Tallinn could have prompted the USSR to no longer expand its revolutionary export to the West, and the “abstinence” of such kind had lasted until the Second World War. The war itself and the previous collusion with Adolf Hitler made it possible for Stalin to cherish even greater ambitions to renew the spread of communism in other countries.