Relevant bibliographies by topics / Hohfeld

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  2. Dissertations / Theses
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Academic literature on the topic 'Hohfeld'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 11 March 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Hohfeld"

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de Oliveira Lima, João Alberto, Cristine Griffo, João Paulo A. Almeida, Giancarlo Guizzardi, and Marcio Iorio Aranha. "CASTING THE LIGHT OF THE THEORY OF OPPOSITION ONTO HOHFELD'S FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS." Legal Theory 27, no. 1 (March 2021): 2–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352325221000070.

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AbstractAt the core of Hohfeld's contribution to legal theory is a conceptual framework for the analysis of the legal positions occupied by agents in intersubjective legal relations. Hohfeld presented a system of eight “fundamental” concepts relying on notions of opposition and correlation. Throughout the years, a number of authors have followed Hohfeld in applying the notion of opposition to analyze legal concepts. Many of these authors have accounted for Hohfeld's theory in direct analogy with the standard deontic hexagon. This paper reviews some of these accounts and extends them employing recent developments from opposition theory. In particular, we are able to extend application of opposition theory to an open conception of the law. We also account for the implications of abandoning the assumption of conflict-freedom and admitting seemingly conflicting legal positions. This enables a fuller analysis of Hohfeld's conceptual analytical framework. We also offer a novel analysis of Hohfeld's power positions.
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Frydrych, David. "HOHFELD VS. THE LEGAL REALISTS." Legal Theory 24, no. 4 (December 2018): 291–344. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352325218000150.

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ABSTRACT2018 marked the centenary of Wesley Hohfeld's untimely passing. Curiously, in recent years quite a few legal historians and philosophers have identified him as a Legal Realist. This article argues that Hohfeld was no such thing, that his work need not be understood in such lights either, and that he in fact made a smaller contribution to jurisprudence than is generally believed. He has nothing to do with theories of official decision-making that identify, among other things, “extra-legal” factors as the real drivers of judicial decision-making, nor must his schema of jural relations advance a “Realist” political agenda. Distinguishing Hohfeld from the Realists will help to correct some misunderstandings about his work and point to its utility in many more contexts than a Realist reading of it allows.
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Hoecke, Mark. "Hohfeld and comparative law." International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 9, no. 2 (June 1996): 185–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01105508.

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Kramer, Matthew H. "On No-Rights and No Rights." American Journal of Jurisprudence 64, no. 2 (September 24, 2019): 213–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ajj/auz009.

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Abstract As is well known to everyone familiar with the analytical table of legal relationships propounded by the American jurist Wesley Hohfeld, one of the eight positions in the table is that of the no-right. In most discussions of Hohfeld’s overall framework, no-rights have received rather little attention. Doubtless, one reason for the relative dearth of scrutiny is that Hohfeld devised a hyphenated neologism to designate no-rights. Each of the other positions in the Hohfeldian table is designated by a term with a solid grounding in everyday discourse and juristic discourse, whereas the hyphenated term “no-right”—in contrast with the unhyphenated phrase “no right”—does not have any comparable grounding either in ordinary discourse or in juristic discourse. That neologism is almost never employed by anyone outside the confines of discussions of Hohfeld’s categories, and it is often not employed even within those confines. Notwithstanding the enormous amount of philosophical and juristic attention bestowed on Hohfeld’s analytical framework since its elaboration in the second decade of the twentieth century, the term “no-right” has found little favor in philosophical or juristic circles. Moreover, on the rather rare occasions when the term is used rather than merely mentioned, it is almost always misused. The exploration of the correct use of that term in the first half of this paper may seem rather fussy, but the importance of that exploration for a satisfactory understanding of legal and moral relationships will become apparent in the second half of the paper. While endeavoring to vindicate the term “no-right” as a fully apposite element in the vocabulary of legal philosophy, this paper will also be replying to a recent article by Heidi Hurd and Michael Moore in this journal.
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MORSS, JOHN R. "The Legal Relations of Collectives: Belated Insights from Hohfeld." Leiden Journal of International Law 22, no. 2 (June 2009): 289–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156509005822.

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AbstractCollectives and their interrelations are central to international law. Legal relations between collectives can be analysed with reference to the classic account of Hohfeld without reducing those collectives to mere aggregates of individuals and without recourse to the legal fiction of treating the collective, for example the state, as a quasi-individual. The rights of collectives have been widely if not conclusively explored within international law, but Hohfeld's ‘field’ approach to legal relations enables the scrutiny of the range of relations, including immunities, liberties, powers, and disabilities, as well as claim-rights and the corresponding obligations in others. The main substantive topics for discussion are the legal relations of collective entities such as peoples and minorities, and closely related matters such as self-determination. Applying Hohfeldian analysis to international law highlights the centrality of international collective entities of which the state represents only one variety. The approach described here therefore takes account of the dethroning of the state within contemporary international law and contributes to the theorization of that development. Nearly one hundred years after its first appearance, Hohfeld's analytic scheme continues to generate insights for international law.
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Halpin, Andrew. "RIGHTS, DUTIES, LIABILITIES, AND HOHFELD." Legal Theory 13, no. 1 (March 2007): 23–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352325207070036.

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This article engages with Jaffey's recent contribution on the nature of no-prior-duty remedial obligations. Jaffey's use of a right-liability relation and his challenge to Hohfeld's analytical scheme are rejected as unsound. An alternative model distinguishing three pathways to account for remedial obligations and other legal consequences is proposed. This draws on the Hohfeldian scheme but extends it to permit the full expression of reflexive liabilities, mutually correlative liabilities, and the operation of nonhuman conditions. The proposed approach also recognizes a weaker form of a Hohfeldian power, which is required in considering the way that the law deals with the allocation and realization of risk.
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Barker, K. "'Damages Without Loss': Can Hohfeld Help?" Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 34, no. 4 (June 1, 2014): 631–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqu012.

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Henket, Maarten. "Hohfeld, public reason and comparative constitutional law." International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 9, no. 2 (June 1996): 202–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01105509.

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Halpin, Andrew. "Choosing Axioms of Correlativity." American Journal of Jurisprudence 64, no. 2 (October 5, 2019): 225–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ajj/auz010.

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Abstract This article explores an axiomatic approach to distinguishing different usages of correlativity and investigates Hurd and Moore’s disagreement with Hohfeldian correlativity, in terms of a choice of axioms. Detailed critical consideration is provided of three negative steps, ascribing theoretical positions to Hohfeld that Hurd and Moore wish to amend or depart from; and three positive steps taken towards vindicating their stated objectives of avoiding moral combat and providing recognition to active rights. The conclusion is reached that the actual state of any normative system, moral or legal, can best be captured by the finer-grained analysis of correlativity found within Hohfeld’s scheme of analysis. Supplementary discussion is provided on the role of Hurd’s “Correspondence Thesis” within a correlativity axiom for permission (liberty/privilege); the relationship between the correspondence thesis and a set of compossible rights; the compatibility between a logic of correlativity and deontic logic; and, the relationship between moral and legal normative systems, or, our perceptions of them.
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Hage, Jaap, and Bob Brouwer. "Basic Concepts of European Private Law." European Review of Private Law 15, Issue 1 (February 1, 2007): 3–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/erpl2007001.

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The purpose of this paper is to develop a small set of basic legal concepts in terms of which the private law of European legal systems can be expressed. The concepts should not reflect the law of any particular system, and should for this reason be suitable as a tertium comparationis for comparative law. The paper proposes for this purpose the set consisting of the concepts ‘duty’ and ‘competence’, and illustrates the possibilities offered by this small set by analyzing the concepts of right in rem, right in personam legal act, and immunity in terms of it. Moreover, it contains a comparison of the proposed set to the set of basic concepts proposed by Hohfeld. The major difference is that the Hohfeldian concepts are relational (e.g. X has a duty towards Y to do Z), while the set proposed in this paper is not (e.g. X has a duty to do Z). It is argued that the non-relational concepts are to be preferred to the Hohfeldian set of relational concepts. Résumé: L’objectif de cet article est de développer un ensemble de concepts exprimant le droit privé des législations européennes. Les concepts ne doivent pas refléter le droit d’un système particulier et doivent pour cette raison pouvoir servir de tertium comparationis pour le droit comparé. A cette fin, cet article propose l’ensemble composé des concepts ‘obligation’ et ‘compétence’ et en illustre les possibilités en analysant les concepts de droit in rem, droit in personam, acte juridique et immunité. De plus, il inclut une comparaison de l’ensemble proposé avec celui de Hohfeld. La différence majeure consiste en ceci que les concepts de Holfeld sont reliés (par exemple X a une obligation envers Y de faire Z) alors que l’ensemble proposé dans cet article ne l’est pas (par exemple Y a une obligation de faire Z). Les auteurs soutiennent que les concepts non reliés doivent être préférés aux concepts reliés. Zusammenfassung: Ziel dieses Beitrags ist die Herausarbeitung einer kleinen Anzahl von rechtlichen Konzepten, mit denen das Privatrecht innerhalb der einzelnen europäischen Rechtsysteme dargestellt werden kann. Diese Konzepte sollten dabei nicht das Recht der einzelnen Rechtsysteme wiedergeben, sondern vielmehr als ein für die Rechtsvergleichung brauchbares tertium comparationis verwendet werden. Hierzu stellt dieser Beitrag die bestehenden Konzepte der ‘Erfüllungspflicht’ sowie der ‘Geschäftsfähigkeit’ vor und erläutert anschließend die Möglichkeiten, die diese beiden Konzepte bieten, anhand des Beispiels einer Analyse der Konzepte ‘Verfügungsgeschäft’, ‘Verpflichtungsgeschäft’ sowie ihrer Unabhängigkeit zueinander. Darüber hinaus enthält dieser Beitrag auch einen Vergleich der hier vorgestellten Konzepte mit denjenigen Grundkonzepten, die Hohfeld vorgestellt hat. Der Hauptunterschied ist darin zu sehen, dass die von Hohfeld vorgestellten Konzepte relational sind (z.B. X ist verpflichtet, an Y Z zu leisten), während die in diesem Beitrag vorgestellten Konzepte nicht rational sind (z.B. X ist verpflichtet, um Z zu leisten). Es wird hier die Auffassung vertreten, die nicht-relational Konzepte den relational Konzepten von Hohfeld vorzuziehen.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Hohfeld"

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FERREIRA, DANIEL BRANTES. "WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD AND THE FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2007. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=10595@1.

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COORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR
A dissertação tem por objetivo analisar e expor a teoria de Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, sendo assim, trata-se de um corte metodológico e de uma análise puramente autoral. Nesse sentido, a primeira parte do trabalho traz uma biografia do autor para assim situar o leitor no contexto em que sua teoria foi elaborada. O segundo capítulo adentra no cerne de sua teoria, ou seja, nos conceitos fundamentais do Direito, sua principal contribuição para a teoria geral do Direito. A terceira parte do trabalho visa diferenciar, através da aplicação dos conceitos fundamentais do Direito, direitos in rem e direitos in personam, termos que sempre geraram confusão para os juristas. O quarto capítulo, por sua vez, trará críticas que alguns autores fizeram à teoria do autor. A conclusão tentará demonstrar os pontos positivos e negativos da teoria de Hohfeld dando fechamento ao trabalho.
The present work has as its main purpose to analyze and expose Wesley`s Newcomb Hohfeld theory, so the methodology used is purely authorial. Thus, the first part of the research brings the author`s biography in order to situate the reader in the theory`s elaboration context. The second chapter is about Hohfeld`s fundamental legal conceptions, his main contribution to the general law theory. The third part seeks to distinguish, applying the fundamental legal conceptions presented afore, the concepts of right in rem and right in personam, phrases that have always been confusing to jurists. Moreover, the fourth chapter will bring some critics made by important authors to Hohfeld`s theory. Furthermore, in the conclusion there will be made an attempt to expose the positive and negative topics in Hohfeld`s theory as a closure to the research.
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Hohfeld, Lena [Verfasser]. "Essays on vulnerability to poverty, migration and gender in Thailand and Vietnam / Lena Hohfeld." Hannover : Technische Informationsbibliothek und Universitätsbibliothek Hannover (TIB), 2015. http://d-nb.info/1072060582/34.

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Gero, Jesse. "Moral Injury and the Puzzle of Immunity-Violation." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2010. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/73.

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The First Amendment gives U.S. citizens a Hohfeldian legal immunity that disables Congress from removing citizens’ legal liberty to criticize the government. Any attempt by Congress to remove this liberty would fail, but such an attempt would still wrong citizens. The familiar concept of claim-violation does not fully account for this wrong. Claims name actions that ought not be performed and are violated when those actions are performed. Immunities names actions that cannot be performed. Congress would wrong citizens not by doing something it ought not do but by attempting and failing to do something it cannot do. Using elements of Jean Hampton’s expressive theory of punishment, I analyze Congress’ attempt (and other similar acts) as an expressive act that denies the existence of immunities. Congress’ immunity-“contradiction” would wrong U.S. citizens by denying the value that generates the immunity, by causing damage to the acknowledgement of the citizens’ value, and by threatening the existence of the immunity.
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Frydrych, David. "The architecture of rights." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:8a0f3763-e786-42d6-bd62-b9eee7ad36c7.

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This thesis concerns the various concepts of rights and philosophical accounts of them. Chapter 1 addresses some methodological issues affecting analytic legal philosophy and the philosophy of rights. Chapter 2 distinguishes between two kinds of philosophical accounts of rights: models and theories. Models outline the 'conceptually basic' types of rights, their differences, and their relationships with other kinds of 'normative positions' (e.g., duties, liabilities, etc.). Theories of rights serve two roles: first, to posit a supposed ultimate purpose for all rights; second, to provide criteria for determining what counts as 'a right' in the first place. The chapter also criticises both monistic models (ones positing only a single basic kind) for being under-inclusive and a subset of pluralistic ones (those positing several basic kinds) as over-inclusive. Chapter 3 clarifies the concepts of rights exercise, enforcement, remedying, and vindication. Chapter 4 explains the Interest-Will Theories of rights debate, while Chapter 5 argues that its constituents are irredeemably flawed, unnecessary, and under-inclusive. Chapter 6 further analyses the concept of rights enforceability, showing why legal rights are not invariably enforceable by legal powers. It then explains why wholly unenforceable legal rights nonetheless constitute 'imperfect' or defective cases. Chapter 7 argues there are more ways to enforce legal rights than just via powers, elucidating two such modes: legal rights can generally be claimed or invoked using legal liberties in private and social circumstances. While Chapter 8 shows why it might not always be possible to make liberty-based claims or invocations of right, it also provides reasons for thinking that legal rights that cannot be enforced in these ways are also imperfect.
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Arnold, Amy Maria. "The application of the claim-right/duty correlative relationship of Wesley N. Hohfeld to the right of expression of the Christian faithful." Online full text .pdf document, available to Fuller patrons only, 2004. http://www.tren.com.

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Féliz, De Jesús Ernesto José. "Obligations erga omnes as multilateral obligations in international law." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:174ea3f0-a62b-448b-8675-266aa4f5684b.

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So-called obligations erga omnes, owed to the international community as a whole, including all States, now form part of positive international law. These obligations protect some of the most basic values of present-day international relations. Examples include the obligations not to commit genocide or torture, to uphold the most basic human rights, to respect the self-determination of peoples, and so on. However, there is little agreement as to what these obligations imply, how they have come about, and how to identify them. In the literature, at least, there is widespread agreement that obligations erga omnes are different in essence and in nature from obligations owed by one State to another State, so-called obligations inter partes. In turn, this —alleged— radical conceptual break severs obligations erga omnes from a wealth of norms that exist in present-day, general international law, but whose origins lie farther back in time. This thesis attempts to reconcile obligations erga omnes with obligations arising in classic, general international law. It explores what it means to be owed an obligation and how it came to pass that most obligations were owed inter partes. The particular way in which sovereignty came to be conceived and the furtherance of sovereignty, at the expense of other values, forms the pattern that gave rise to obligations inter partes. But even at that time, exceptions to this pattern existed which brought about obligations analogous to those owed erga omnes today. Relevant state practice will be analysed. If obligations erga omnes could have been created in classic international law, it is unjustified to maintain that obligations erga omnes represent so radical a break with the past. Obligations erga omnes are aggregates of bilateral, primary obligations. From this perspective, it is possible to identify these obligations, their consequences, and to discern their origins.
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Biasetti, Pierfrancesco. "Lo spazio dei diritti nelle teorie morali. Ricerche normative." Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Padova, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3422507.

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In this work I will evaluate the functions of rights within the moral discourse, and I will point out the benefits and the characteristics of a moral theory that takes rights seriously. In the first chapter I will sketch a definition of rights as a moral category that can be distinguished from categories such as the ones of juridical rights and natural rights. In the second chapter, I will propose a hohfeldian analysis of the normative syntax of rights, and I will focus on the key problem of the relation between rights and duties. The issue I will deal with in the third chapter is the general function of specific rights. On this matter I will draw an hybrid solution between the orthodox proposals of the so-called interest and choice theories, and the more recent approaches provided by the past ten years literature. In the fourth and fifth chapters topics such as the conflict of rights, their violations and infringements will allow me to go deeper in the context and premises of the model of moral theory that I will take into account in the last section of this work. In the sixth chapter I will give an answer to the central questions of this research, and I will also provide a general model of abstract rights, by shading light on their original normative functions. I will use this model to investigate the possibility of justifying a moral theory on its ground, and I will compare this kind of theory with other theories structured upon different categories of normative objects – like duties and goals.
In questo lavoro cercherò di valutare quali siano le funzioni dei diritti nel contesto del discorso morale, e di individuare le caratteristiche e i vantaggi posseduti da una teoria morale che prenda i diritti sul serio. Nella primo capitolo isolerò una definizione di diritti come categoria morale – moral rights – originale rispetto ad altre declinazioni di questo concetto – in particolare, rispetto ai diritti giuridici e ai diritti naturali. Nel secondo capitolo proporrò un'analisi di matrice hohfeldiana della sintassi normativa dei diritti soffermandomi sul nodo concettuale della relazione tra diritti e doveri. La questione che affronterò nel terzo capitolo sarà quella della funzione generale dei diritti, ed elaborerò una soluzione ibrida tra le proposte ortodosse basate sulle cosiddette teorie dell'interesse e della scelta, e i più recenti approcci forniti dalla letteratura degli ultimi dieci anni. I temi del conflitto tra diritti, della loro violazione e dell'infrazione mi permetteranno di approfondire nel quarto e nel quinto capitolo il contesto e le premesse del modello di teoria morale cui farò riferimento nell'ultima sezione di questo lavoro, quella in cui cercherò di rispondere alle domande centrali della ricerca. Nel sesto capitolo fornirò infatti un modello generale di diritti, mettendone in luce le funzioni normative originali. Adopererò questo modello per vagliare le possibilità di giustificare, a partire da esso, una teoria morale, e confronterò questo tipo di teoria con alternative strutturate a partire da diverse categorie di oggetti normativi – come i doveri e gli scopi.
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Ramírez, Herrera Rodrigo Eduardo. "La naturaleza jurídica de la externalización (outsourcing) de procesos de conocimiento como contrato unitario relacional." Doctoral thesis, Universidad de Alicante, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10045/62415.

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Frydrych, David. "Taking Rights Way Too Seriously: Kant, Hohfeld, and Evaluating Conceptual Theories of Rights." Thesis, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1807/25585.

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This paper concerns the dominant conceptual or formal accounts of legal rights: the Interest and Will Theories. Section II clarifies the minimal necessary conditions for a rights model to count as a Will Theory. It also explores Kant’s Will Theory of rights and the difficulties posed to it by Hohfeld’s schema of jural relations. Kant has three alternatives: reject the schema’s utility or demonstrate his theory’s compatibility with it via molecularist or basic models of Hohfeldian rights. Although his best option is to disavow Hohfeld, Kant’s theory is ultimately undesirable on other grounds. Section III shall analyze the modern Will and Interest Theories’ biggest weaknesses according to a test proposed in Section I, which should generate bases for preferring one theory to another. It will offer a counterargument to the Inalienability charge levied against the Will Theory, and demonstrate why Interest Theory responses to the Third Party Beneficiary argument are inadequate.
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Books on the topic "Hohfeld"

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1879-1918, Hohfeld Wesley Newcomb, ed. Teoria dos direitos subjetivos: Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld e os conceitos fundamentais do direito. Rio de Janeiro: GZ Editora, 2009.

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Balganesh, Shyamkrishna, Ted M. Sichelman, and Henry E. Smith, eds. Wesley Hohfeld A Century Later. Cambridge University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108131742.

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Wesley Hohfeld is known the world over as the legal theorist who famously developed a taxonomy of legal concepts. His contributions to legal thinking have stood the test of time, remaining relevant nearly a century after they were first published. Yet, little systematic attention has been devoted to exploring the full significance of his work. Beginning with a lucid, annotated version of Hohfeld's most important article, this volume is the first to offer a comprehensive look at the scope, significance, reach, intricacies, and shortcomings of Hohfeld's work. Featuring insights from leading legal thinkers, the book also contains many of Hohfeld's previously unseen personal papers, shedding new light on the complex motivations behind Hohfeld's projects. Together, these selected papers and original essays reveal a portrait of a multifaceted and ambitious intellectual who did not live long enough to see the impact of his ideas on the study of law.
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Gilbert, Margaret. Some Central Distinctions from Rights Theory. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198813767.003.0002.

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Four relations distinguished by rights theorist Wesley Hohfeld are introduced: claims, liberties (privileges), powers, and immunities. A broader conception of powers and immunities than is standard is discussed and adopted. Hohfeld maintained that claims were rights “in the strictest sense.” Several arguments for the primacy of claims are outlined, and the idea that the assertion of a claim has a certain forcefulness is noted. Hohfeld argued that “correlative and equivalent” to anyone’s claim is someone’s duty to that person. The nature of a duty to a person or, in other terms, a directed duty, will be further probed in later chapters.
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Campbell, David, and Philip Thomas. Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld. Taylor & Francis Group, 2016.

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David, Campbell, and Philip Thomas. Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld. Taylor & Francis Group, 2016.

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David, Campbell, and Philip Thomas. Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld. Taylor & Francis Group, 2016.

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Smith, Henry E., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, and Ted M. Sichelman. Wesley Hohfeld a Century Later: Edited Work, Select Personal Papers, and Original Commentaries. Cambridge University Press, 2021.

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Smith, Henry E., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, and Ted M. Sichelman. Wesley Hohfeld a Century Later: Edited Work, Select Personal Papers, and Original Commentaries. University of Cambridge ESOL Examinations, 2021.

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Smith, Henry E., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, and Ted M. Sichelman. Wesley Hohfeld a Century Later: Edited Work, Select Personal Papers, and Original Commentaries. Cambridge University Press, 2022.

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Gilbert, Margaret. Rights and Demands. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198813767.001.0001.

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This book is the first extended treatment of demand-rights, a class of rights apt to be considered rights par excellence. Centrally, to have a demand-right is to have the standing or authority to demand a particular action from another person, who has a correlative obligation to the right-holder. How are demand-rights possible? Linking its response to central themes and positions within rights theory, Rights and Demands argues for two main theses. First, joint commitment, in a sense that is explained, is a ground of demand-rights. Second, it may well be their only ground. The first thesis is developed with special reference to agreements and promises, generally understood to ground demand-rights. It argues that both of these phenomena are constituted by joint commitments, and that this is true of many other central social phenomena also. In relation to the second thesis it considers the possibility of demand-rights whose existence can be demonstrated by moral argument without appeal to any joint commitment, and the possibility of accruing demand-rights through the existence of a given legal system or other institution construed without any such appeal. The relevance of the book’s conclusions to our understanding of human rights is then explained. Classic and contemporary rights theorists whose work is discussed include Wesley Hohfeld, H. L. A. Hart, Joel Feinberg, Immanuel Kant, Thomas Scanlon, Judith Thomson, Joseph Raz, and Stephen Darwall.
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Book chapters on the topic "Hohfeld"

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Smaw, Eric. "Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb." In Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 1–4. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_204-1.

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Maggio, Amber Rose. "Methodology: Sovereignty, Hohfeld and Coercion." In Environmental Policy, Non-Product Related Process and Production Methods and the Law of the World Trade Organization, 3–19. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61155-6_2.

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Curran, Eleanor. "Current Discussions of Hobbesian Rights. The Distorting Lens of Hohfeld." In Reclaiming the Rights of the Hobbesian Subject, 153–76. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230592742_7.

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Allen, Layman E. "From the Fundamental Legal Conceptions of Hohfeld to Legal Relations: Refining the Enrichment of Solely Deontic Legal Relations." In Workshops in Computing, 1–26. London: Springer London, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-1488-8_1.

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Duarte d’Almeida, Luís. "Hohfeld’s “Fundamental Legal Conceptions”." In Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 1–5. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_100-1.

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Penner, J. E. "Hohfeldian Liberties." In Property Rights: A Re-Examination, 59–70. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198830122.003.0003.

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This chapter examines the bilaterality, or bilateral structure, of Hohfeldian jural relations, and Hohfeld’s ‘disambiguation project’, that is, his project to ensure that the ambiguous term ‘right’ can be revealed to show that it covers four different sorts of ‘right’: right–duty, liberty–no right, power–liability, and immunity–disability. Consequently, according to Hohfeld, there being a right is necessary and sufficient to there being a duty and vice versa. The chapter discusses how this disambiguation of the term assists in legal, particularly judicial, reasoning. It then criticizes Hohfeld’s characterization of liberties, in particular showing that Hohfeld mischaracterized those areas of human conduct not regulated by law or morality.
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Penner, J. E. "Multital Jural Relations." In Property Rights: A Re-Examination, 86–116. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198830122.003.0005.

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This chapter advances a number of criticisms of Hohfeld’s ‘multital’ analysis of rights in rem. The chapter shows: (1) that Hohfeld confuses the connections between rights and duties, in particular rights in rem and general and special rights, and general duties; (2) that the claim that the general norm not to interfere with the property of others is not a public law duty, as some, relying upon Hohfeld, have claimed; (3) that the duty of care in negligence law cannot be squared with Hohfeldian analysis; and (4), that it individuates duties incorrectly.
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Halpin, Andrew. "Hohfeld and Rules." In Wesley Hohfeld A Century Later, 138–56. Cambridge University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108131742.006.

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Schauer, Frederick. "Hohfeld on Legal Language." In Wesley Hohfeld A Century Later, 99–111. Cambridge University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108131742.004.

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Balganesh, Shyamkrishna, Ted M. Sichelman, and Henry E. Smith. "Introduction: Hohfeld at the Crossroads." In Wesley Hohfeld A Century Later, 1–14. Cambridge University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108131742.001.

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Conference papers on the topic "Hohfeld"

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Allen, Layman E., and Charles S. Saxon. "Achieving fluency in modernized and formalized Hohfeld." In the sixth international conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/261618.261623.

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