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Relevant bibliographies by topics / Holdout Creditors

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Academic literature on the topic 'Holdout Creditors'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 8 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Holdout Creditors"

1

Buchheit, Lee C., and Mitu Gulati. "Deterring holdout creditors in a restructuring of PDVSA bonds and promissory notes." Capital Markets Law Journal 13, no. 2 (March 12, 2018): 148–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cmlj/kmy007.

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Ostřanský, Josef. "Sovereign Default Disputes in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Jurisdictional Considerations and Policy Implications." Groningen Journal of International Law 3, no. 1 (May 29, 2015): 27. http://dx.doi.org/10.21827/5a86a874244cc.

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In the aftermath of Argentina’s 2001 economic crisis, creditors not participating in the country sovereign debt restructuring insisted on full payment. The triplet of investment arbitration decisions upheld jurisdiction over the mass claims presented by the holdout creditors.1 Two cases were, however, accompanied by forceful dissents. Subsequently, opinions diverged into two camps on the legal appropriateness and policy desirability of using investment arbitration for solving sovereign default disputes: the first camp supporting the majority’s view, and the second siding with the dissenting arbitrators. This article analyses the two approaches as far as jurisdictional requirements for hearing the sovereign bond disputes are concerned as well as potential policy consequences of the use of investment arbitration for these types of disputes. The article assumes a critical position towards the reasoning of the three awards, mostly due to the misconceived apprehension of the requirement of territoriality. In the policy part, the article argues that even if one assumes that enhancement of the creditor’s rights is desirable (something which is debatable), investment arbitration does not seem to bring advantages towards that goal. First, the argument of better enforcement of arbitral awards seems to be more apparent than real. Second, as Bilateral Investment Treaties base their protection on nationality, this fact creates unjustifiable preference towards certain creditors and increases unpredictability. This uncertainty upsets the original contractual bargain agreed on the issuance of bonds and has negative repercussions in financial markets. The ad hoc nature of investment arbitration only furnishes the uncertainty. Lastly, investment arbitration is a tool for correcting past grievances. Tools for dealing with orderly sovereign defaults should focus on the preventive aspects of sovereign defaults. As a robust multilateral treaty system dealing with sovereign defaults is currently politically unfeasible, a better solution is to reinforce the current system of contractual protections such as collective action clauses or exit consents. Rather than attempting to expand the role of arbitration, resolving sovereign debt issues should be left to actors in financial markets (lenders and borrowers). Financial markets have always proved capable of dealing with sovereign defaults.

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Ishikawa, Tomoko. "Extraterritorial Discovery in Aid of Execution and State Immunity: Case Comment on Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U.S. ___ (2014)." Accounting, Economics and Law - A Convivium 5, no. 2 (July 1, 2015): 173–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ael-2014-0016.

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AbstractOn 16 June 2014, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the petition for a writ of certiorari stemming from the dispute over the meaning of the pari passu clause in the Argentine sovereign bonds. This decision had a dramatic impact on Argentina’s sovereign debt restructurings (SDR) – indeed, it arguably led to Argentina’s second default in 13 years on 30 July 2014. On the same day that the petition for certiorari was rejected, the Supreme Court rendered a judgment on the issue of the relationship between discovery in aid of execution against the debtor state’s extraterritorial assets and the law of state immunity. In Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., judgment of 16 June 2014, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s conclusion that the extraterritorial assets discovery against two non-party banks in aid of executing the judgments stemming from Argentina’s default of its external debt did not offend Argentina’s sovereign immunity. This comment addresses this judgment on extraterritorial discovery which, although less headline grabbing than the decisions on the pari passu clause, also marks a victory for holdout creditors. It first provides a summary of the background of the case and the judgment, and then considers its implications on the future SDR. Regarding the implications of the case on the future SDR, this comment also describes the developments of law concerning the relationship between the law on foreign investment and SDR (in investment arbitration) and the relationship between investment arbitration awards and sovereign immunity (in US courts). First, it examines the recent decisions in ICSID arbitration concerning the disputes arising from the Argentina’s default and subsequent SDR (Abaclat v. Argentina (decision on jurisdiction and admissibility of 4 August 2011) and Ambiente v. Argentina (decision on jurisdiction and admissibility of 8 February 2013)). In essence, these decisions opened the door to investment treaty arbitration for holdout creditors of international sovereign bonds, for the first time in the history of investment arbitration. It then describes the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Blue Ridge v. Argentina (judgment of 19 August 2013) in which the court concluded that the defendant state in an ICSID arbitration was considered to have waived its jurisdictional immunity under the Foreign State Immunity Act of 1976 (FSIA). It argues that the combination of: (a) Argentina v. NML, (b) Blue Ridge v. Argentina, and (c) the openness of ICSID arbitration to disputes arising from SDR will have potentially serious consequences for future SDR.

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Narayanan, Rajesh, and Cihan Uzmanoglu. "How do firms respond to empty creditor holdout in distressed exchanges?" Journal of Banking & Finance 94 (September 2018): 251–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.08.004.

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Buchheit, Lee C., G. Mitu Gulati, and Ignacio Tirado. "The Problem of Holdout Creditors in Eurozone Sovereign Debt Restructurings." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2205704.

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Hatchondo, Juan Carlos, Leonardo Martinez, and Cesar Sosa Padilla. "Sovereign Debt Standstills." IMF Working Papers 20, no. 290 (December 18, 2020). http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781513564531.001.

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As a response to economic crises triggered by COVID-19, sovereign debt standstill proposals emphasize debt payment suspensions without haircuts on the face value of debt obligations. We quantify the effects of standstills using a standard default model. We find that a one-year standstill generates welfare gains for the sovereign equivalent to a permanent consumption increase of between 0.1% and 0.3%, depending on the initial shock. However, except when it avoids a default, the standstill also implies capital losses for creditors of between 9% and 27%, which is consistent with their reluctance to participate in these operations and indicates that this reluctance would persist even without a free-riding or holdout problem. Standstills also generate a form of “debt overhang” and thus the opportunity for a “voluntary debt exchange”: complementing the standstill with haircuts could reduce creditors’ losses and simultaneously increase welfare gains. Our results cast doubts on the emphasis on standstills without haircuts.

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Thrasher, Rachel D., and Kevin P. Gallagher. "Mission Creep The Emerging Role of International Investment Agreements in Sovereign Debt Restructuring." Journal of Globalization and Development 6, no. 2 (January 1, 2015). http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2015-0018.

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AbstractThe global community still lacks a regime for sovereign debt restructuring (SDR). However, the recent financial crisis has spawned numerous efforts to fill this glaring gap in global economic governance. At the same time however, there is increasing concern that international investment agreements (IIAs) have already begun to expand their reach into the realm of SDR. Indeed, private investors have attempted to use IIAs to recoup the full value of their bonds in order to circumvent debt restructurings in Argentina and Greece. In this paper we examine the extent to which IIAs are becoming tools for creditors to circumvent debt restructurings and whether new IIAs such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership will further advance the ability of creditors to do so. We find that contemporary IIAs are increasingly interpreting sovereign bonds as being under their jurisdiction. Thus, debt restructurings may be increasingly subject to claims filed by holdout creditors wishing to recoup the full value of their bonds through private tribunals under IIAs. That said, we also find that some treaties have begun to provide exceptions for certain types of debt restructurings. While such safeguards are a step in the right direction, they will need to become broader in scope and more widespread in application in order to not interfere with the orderly workout of debt problems in the world economy.

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Turchi, Natalie A. "Restructuring a Sovereign Bond Pari Passu Work-Around: Can Holdout Creditors Ever Have Equal Treatment?" SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2578141.

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Buchheit, Lee C., and G. Mitu Gulati. "Deterring Holdout Creditors in a Restructuring of PDVSA Bonds and Promissory Notes ((CCmo disuadir a acreedores 'holdout' en una restructuraciin de bonos y pagarrs de PDVSA?)." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3058468.

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Ghosal, Sayantan, and Marcus Miller. "Writing-Down Debt with Heterogeneous Creditors: Lock Laws and Late Swaps." Journal of Globalization and Development 6, no. 2 (January 1, 2015). http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2015-0017.

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AbstractThe presence of “holdouts” in recent sovereign debt swaps poses a challenge to bargaining models which assume all creditors to be homogeneous. We modify the Rubinstein “alternating offers” framework so as to accommodate exogenous creditor heterogeneity – specifically holdouts more patient than other bondholders. The “second best” equilibrium derived is an initial offer and an associated “lock-law” sufficient to tempt impatient creditors into a prompt bond exchange. This is followed by a delayed, but more generous, swap with the patient creditors, timed to take place when the lock-law expires. In practice, however, the presence of holdouts may be

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Holdout Creditors"

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Krey, Katherine Gorter. "Sovereign Debt after Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital: Developing a Framework for Sovereign Default Arbitration." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2017. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1648.

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In July 2014, Argentina entered selective default, even as the country remained financially solvent. The default stemmed not from economic woes, but rather from protracted international litigation between Argentina and a group of hedge funds who, for years, refused to negotiate with Argentina over their bond holdings in the wake of the country’s first default in 2001. These holdouts stalled negotiations and locked Argentina out of international credit markets, damaging the country’s economy and financially harming other creditors and Argentinian citizens alike. Argentina ended up in such a dilemma because of the current sovereign debt restructuring process. No international arbitrator of sovereign debt currently exists. Instead, a country must negotiate with creditors on an ad-hoc basis, gathering support from 100% of creditors before it can restructure its debt and reenter international credit markets, an extremely inefficient system. This paper will assess the current system of sovereign default renegotiations, identifying inefficiencies in the current system, reviewing past proposals for improvements to the system, and ultimately proposing an international arbitrator for default negotiations. This text uses the development of the US Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934 as a guide for an international bankruptcy court. Prior to the passage of the law, municipalities faced many of the same challenges faced by defaulted nations today, including powerful holdouts and a lack of structure in the negotiation system. Given the similarities between the two cases, the Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Act serves as an ideal framework for sovereign default arbitration internationally.

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"Normative framework for the regulation of holdout creditors in the sovereign debt market." Tulane University, 2020.

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archives@tulane.edu
The overarching argument in this study is that although sovereign distressed debt investors can create holdout problems during the debt restructuring of a defaulting sovereign, the reality is that they remain a linchpin for an efficient sovereign debt market that guarantees the flow of private credit for capital formation in the Global South. In other words, holdout creditors are a bit of a curate's egg, a necessary feature of the sovereign debt markets. They are not the “spawn of the devil”. The presence of distressed debt investors in the market contributes to the liquidity and efficiency of the market. They enable non-litigant investors who would like to sell their debt and exit the market on their own volition to do so. In addition, they tend to put pressure on recalcitrant sovereign debtors who might not be acting in good faith. They therefore possess “nuisance value” that could spur efficiency in the sovereign debt market. In this context, a universal framework for dealing with holdout problems during the debt restructuring of a defaulting sovereign is needed and that is what this study proposes. Such rules can be developed into a soft-law mechanism spearheaded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A global normative framework that has elements of nonmarket private standard setting and nonmarket public standard setting, is therefore proposed to address the disruptive and exploitative activities of these creditors in the sovereign debt market. This normative framework would strike the delicate balance between the rights of commercial creditors on the one hand, and interests of sovereign debtors on the other hand, and inject some measure of equity into the process. In summary, this study challenges the contemporary negative and dismissive narratives about holdout creditors, and the assumption and unshaken faith placed on “restructuring or workout of sovereign debt” as the only favored path to alleviating the perennial problem of sovereign default and the attendant debt crises in the developing world.
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MARIA OLUYEJU

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Books on the topic "Holdout Creditors"

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Lee, Buchheit, and Daly Elena L. Part I Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 1 Minimizing Holdout Creditors: Carrots. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780199671106.003.0001.

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Lee, Buchheit, and Daly Elena L. Part I Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 2 Minimizing Holdout Creditors: Sticks. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780199671106.003.0002.

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Book chapters on the topic "Holdout Creditors"

1

Guzman, Martin, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. "A Soft Law Mechanism for Sovereign Debt Restructuring Based on the UN Principles." In Sovereign Debt and Human Rights, 446–57. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198810445.003.0024.

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This chapter provides a critical overview of the steps and measures taken by the United Nations and other multilateral organizations and actors to resolve chronic sovereign indebtedness and contrasts these with private practices that distort any multilateral outcomes, chiefly vulture funds and holdout creditors. These practices are further reinforced by the courts of jurisdictions willing to entertain suits against sovereigns, notwithstanding the human rights implications and the existence of debt restructuring processes, as well as the demise of sovereign immunity in the face of such suits.

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Datz, Giselle. "Placing Contemporary Sovereign Debt." In Sovereign Debt Diplomacies, 259–81. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198866350.003.0012.

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Since 2003, the battle between holdout creditors and the Argentine government in US courts has inspired a number of judicious studies on its legal underpinnings and repercussions. It has also prompted so-called ‘anti-vulture funds’ laws in countries like the UK, Belgium, and France. Despite these developments, the role of place in debt restructurings has remained relatively neglected. The paper analyses domestic laws protecting foreign debtors from minority holdout litigation and injunctive orders in federal courts that incite contractual changes as part of a fragmented landscape of local, and at times overlapping, spheres of sovereign debt governance, paradoxically embedded in a deeply integrated global financial system. A key finding of this analysis is that while contracts ground debt dynamics in specific jurisdictions (financial centres), they do not reduce uncertainty in the outcomes of sovereign debt restructurings. Moreover, financial centres have functioned not only as sites for private market-making, but also for public experimentation in international debt processes.

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