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Journal articles on the topic 'Honest signal'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 2 February 2022

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1

Polnaszek, Timothy J., and David W. Stephens. "Why not lie? Costs enforce honesty in an experimental signalling game." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 281, no. 1774 (January 7, 2014): 20132457. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2013.2457.

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Communication depends on reliability. Yet, the existence of stable honest signalling presents an evolutionary puzzle. Why should animals signal honestly in the face of a conflict of interest? While students of animal signalling have offered several theoretical answers to this puzzle, the most widely studied model, commonly called the ‘handicap principle’, postulates that the costs of signals stabilize honesty. This model is the motivating force behind an enormous research enterprise that explores signal costs—whether they are physiological, immunological, neural, developmental or caloric. While there can be no question that many signals are costly, we lack definitive experimental evidence demonstrating that costs stabilize honesty. This study presents a laboratory signalling game using blue jays ( Cyanocitta cristata ) that provides, to our knowledge, the first experimental evidence showing honesty persists when costs are high and disappears when costs are low.

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Ito, Koichi, Miki F. Suzuki, and Ko Mochizuki. "Evolution of honest reward signal in flowers." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 288, no. 1943 (January 20, 2021): 20202848. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2020.2848.

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Some flowering plants signal the abundance of their rewards by changing their flower colour, scent or other floral traits as rewards are depleted. These floral trait changes can be regarded as honest signals of reward states for pollinators. Previous studies have hypothesized that these signals are used to maintain plant-level attractiveness to pollinators, but the evolutionary conditions leading to the development of honest signals have not been well investigated from a theoretical basis. We examined conditions leading to the evolution of honest reward signals in flowers by applying a theoretical model that included pollinator response and signal accuracy. We assumed that pollinators learn floral traits and plant locations in association with reward states and use this information to decide which flowers to visit. While manipulating the level of associative learning, we investigated optimal flower longevity, the proportion of reward and rewardless flowers, and honest- and dishonest-signalling strategies. We found that honest signals are evolutionarily stable only when flowers are visited by pollinators with both high and low learning abilities. These findings imply that behavioural variation in learning within a pollinator community can lead to the evolution of an honest signal even when there is no contribution of rewardless flowers to pollinator attractiveness.

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3

Weaver, Ryan J., Rebecca E. Koch, and Geoffrey E. Hill. "What maintains signal honesty in animal colour displays used in mate choice?" Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 372, no. 1724 (May 22, 2017): 20160343. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2016.0343.

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Many of the colour displays of animals are proposed to have evolved in response to female mate choice for honest signals of quality, but such honest signalling requires mechanisms to prevent cheating. The most widely accepted and cited mechanisms for ensuring signal honesty are based on the costly signalling hypothesis, which posits that costs associated with ornamentation prevent low-quality males from being highly ornamented. Alternatively, by the index hypothesis, honesty can be achieved via cost-free mechanisms if ornament production is causally linked to core physiological pathways. In this essay, we review how a costly signalling framework has shaped empirical research in mate choice for colourful male ornaments and emphasize that alternative interpretations are plausible under an index signalling framework. We discuss the challenges in both empirically testing and distinguishing between the two hypotheses, noting that they need not be mutually exclusive. Finally, we advocate for a comprehensive approach to studies of colour signals that includes the explicit consideration of cost-free mechanisms for honesty. This article is part of the themed issue ‘Animal coloration: production, perception, function and application’.

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4

Biernaskie, Jay M., Alan Grafen, and Jennifer C. Perry. "The evolution of index signals to avoid the cost of dishonesty." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 281, no. 1790 (September 7, 2014): 20140876. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2014.0876.

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Animals often convey useful information, despite a conflict of interest between the signaller and receiver. There are two major explanations for such ‘honest’ signalling, particularly when the size or intensity of signals reliably indicates the underlying quality of the signaller. Costly signalling theory (including the handicap principle) predicts that dishonest signals are too costly to fake, whereas the index hypothesis predicts that dishonest signals cannot be faked. Recent evidence of a highly conserved causal link between individual quality and signal growth appears to bolster the index hypothesis. However, it is not clear that this also diminishes costly signalling theory, as is often suggested. Here, by incorporating a mechanism of signal growth into costly signalling theory, we show that index signals can actually be favoured owing to the cost of dishonesty. We conclude that costly signalling theory provides the ultimate, adaptive rationale for honest signalling, whereas the index hypothesis describes one proximate (and potentially very general) mechanism for achieving honesty.

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5

Hughes, Melissa. "Deception with honest signals: signal residuals and signal function in snapping shrimp." Behavioral Ecology 11, no. 6 (November 2000): 614–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/beheco/11.6.614.

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6

Ligon, Russell A., and Kevin J. McGraw. "Social costs enforce honesty of a dynamic signal of motivation." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 283, no. 1841 (October 26, 2016): 20161873. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2016.1873.

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Understanding the processes that promote signal reliability may provide important insights into the evolution of diverse signalling strategies among species. The signals that animals use to communicate must comprise mechanisms that prohibit or punish dishonesty, and social costs of dishonesty have been demonstrated for several fixed morphological signals (e.g. colour badges of birds and wasps). The costs maintaining the honesty of dynamic signals, which are more flexible and potentially cheatable, are unknown. Using an experimental manipulation of the dynamic visual signals used by male veiled chameleons ( Chamaeleo calyptratus ) during aggressive interactions, we tested the idea that the honesty of rapid colour change signals is maintained by social costs. Our results reveal that social costs are an important mechanism maintaining the honesty of these dynamic colour signals—‘dishonest’ chameleons whose experimentally manipulated coloration was incongruent with their contest behaviour received more physical aggression than ‘honest’ individuals. This is the first demonstration, to the best our knowledge, that the honesty of a dynamic signal of motivation—physiological colour change—can be maintained by the social costliness of dishonesty. Behavioural responses of signal receivers, irrespective of any specific detection mechanisms, therefore prevent chameleon cheaters from prospering.

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7

Lailvaux, Simon P., Rebecca L. Gilbert, and Jessica R. Edwards. "A performance-based cost to honest signalling in male green anole lizards ( Anolis carolinensis )." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 279, no. 1739 (March 14, 2012): 2841–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2011.2577.

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Sexual signals are considered costly to produce and maintain under the handicap paradigm, and the reliability of signals is in turn thought to be maintained by these costs. Although previous studies have investigated the costly nature of signal production, few have considered whether honesty might be maintained not by the costliness of the signal itself, but by the costs involved in producing the signalled trait. If such a trait is itself costly to produce, then the burden of energetic investment may fall disproportionately on that trait, in addition to any costs of signal maintenance that may also be operating. Under limited resource conditions, these costs may therefore be great enough to disrupt an otherwise reliable signal-to-trait relationship. We present experimental evidence showing that dietary restriction decouples the otherwise honest relationship between a signal (dewlap size) and a whole-organism performance trait (bite force) in young adult male Anolis carolinensis lizards. Specifically, while investment in dewlap size is sustained under low-resource condition relative to the high-resource treatment, investment in bite force is substantially lower. Disruption of the otherwise honest dewlap size to bite force relationship is therefore driven by costs associated with the expression of performance rather than the costs of signal production in A. carolinensis .

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8

Hardisty, Benjamin E. "Honest signal theory, meet “The Family”." Journal of Bioeconomics 14, no. 1 (February 5, 2012): 91–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10818-012-9132-6.

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9

Meacham, Frazer, Aaron Perlmutter, and Carl T. Bergstrom. "Honest signalling with costly gambles." Journal of The Royal Society Interface 10, no. 87 (October 6, 2013): 20130469. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2013.0469.

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Costly signalling theory is commonly invoked as an explanation for how honest communication can be stable when interests conflict. However, the signal costs predicted by costly signalling models often turn out to be unrealistically high. These models generally assume that signal cost is determinate. Here, we consider the case where signal cost is instead stochastic. We examine both discrete and continuous signalling games and show that, under reasonable assumptions, stochasticity in signal costs can decrease the average cost at equilibrium for all individuals. This effect of stochasticity for decreasing signal costs is a fundamental mechanism that probably acts in a wide variety of circumstances.

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10

Mock, D. W., M. B. Dugas, and S. A. Strickler. "Honest begging: expanding from Signal of Need." Behavioral Ecology 22, no. 5 (July 16, 2011): 909–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/beheco/arr091.

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11

Quillien, Tadeg. "Universal modesty in signal-burying games." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 286, no. 1906 (July 3, 2019): 20190985. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2019.0985.

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Why would individuals hide positive information about themselves? Evolutionary game theorists have recently developed the signal-burying game as a simple model to shed light on this puzzle. They have shown that the game has an equilibrium where some agents are better off deliberately reducing the visibility of the signal by which they broadcast their positive traits. However, this equilibrium also features individuals who fully broadcast their positive traits. Here, we show that the signal-burying framework can also explain modesty norms that everyone adheres to: the game contains an equilibrium where all agents who send a signal voluntarily reduce its conspicuousness. Surprisingly, the stability of the two kinds of equilibria rely on very different principles. The equilibrium where some agents brag is stable because of costly signalling dynamics. By contrast, the universal modesty equilibrium exists because buried signals contain probabilistic information about a sender’s type, and receivers make optimal use of this information. In the latter equilibrium, burying a signal can be understood as a handicap which makes the signal more honest, but honesty is not achieved through standard costly signalling dynamics.

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12

Cotton, Peter A., Alex Kacelnik, and Jonathan Wright. "Chick begging as a signal: are nestlings honest?" Behavioral Ecology 7, no. 2 (1996): 178–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/beheco/7.2.178.

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13

Turpin, Martin Harry, Mane Kara-Yakoubian, Alexander C. Walker, Heather E. K. Walker, Jonathan A. Fugelsang, and Jennifer A. Stolz. "Bullshit Ability as an Honest Signal of Intelligence." Evolutionary Psychology 19, no. 2 (April 1, 2021): 147470492110003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/14747049211000317.

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Navigating social systems efficiently is critical to our species. Humans appear endowed with a cognitive system that has formed to meet the unique challenges that emerge for highly social species. Bullshitting, communication characterised by an intent to be convincing or impressive without concern for truth, is ubiquitous within human societies. Across two studies ( N = 1,017), we assess participants’ ability to produce satisfying and seemingly accurate bullshit as an honest signal of their intelligence. We find that bullshit ability is associated with an individual’s intelligence and individuals capable of producing more satisfying bullshit are judged by second-hand observers to be more intelligent. We interpret these results as adding evidence for intelligence being geared towards the navigation of social systems. The ability to produce satisfying bullshit may serve to assist individuals in negotiating their social world, both as an energetically efficient strategy for impressing others and as an honest signal of intelligence.

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14

Blount, Jonathan D., Michael P. Speed, Graeme D. Ruxton, and Philip A. Stephens. "Warning displays may function as honest signals of toxicity." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 276, no. 1658 (November 18, 2008): 871–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2008.1407.

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Many prey species use colourful ‘aposematic’ signalling to advertise the fact that they are toxic. Some recent studies have shown that the brightness of aposematic displays correlates positively with the strength of toxicity, suggesting that aposematic displays are a form of handicap signal, the conspicuousness of which reliably indicates the level of toxicity. The theoretical consensus in the literature is, however, at odds with this finding. It is commonly assumed that the most toxic prey should have less bright advertisements because they have better chances of surviving attacks and can therefore reduce the costs incurred by signalling. Using a novel theoretical model, we show that aposematic signals can indeed function as handicaps. To generate this prediction, we make a key assumption that the expression of bright displays and the storage of anti-predator toxins compete for resources within prey individuals. One shared currency is energy. However, competition for antioxidant molecules, which serve dual roles as pigments and in protecting prey against oxidative stress when they accumulate toxins, provides a specific candidate resource that could explain signal honesty. Thus, contrary to the prevailing theoretical orthodoxy, warning displays may in fact be honest signals of the level of (rather than simply the existence of) toxicity.

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15

Roberts, Gilbert. "Honest signaling of cooperative intentions." Behavioral Ecology 31, no. 4 (May 13, 2020): 922–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/beheco/araa035.

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Abstract Trust can transform conflicting interests into cooperation. But how can individuals know when to trust others? Here, I develop the theory that reputation building may signal cooperative intent, or “trustworthiness.” I model a simple representation of this theory in which individuals 1) optionally invest in a reputation by performing costly helpful behavior (“signaling”); 2) optionally use others’ reputations when choosing a partner; and 3) optionally cooperate with that partner. In evolutionary simulations, high levels of reputation building, of choosing partners based on reputation, and of cooperation within partnerships emerged. Costly helping behavior evolved into an honest signal of trustworthiness when it was adaptive for cooperators, relative to defectors, to invest in the long-term benefits of a reputation for helping. I show using game theory that this occurs when cooperators gain larger marginal benefits from investing in signaling than do defectors. This happens without the usual costly signaling assumption that individuals are of two “types,” which differ in quality. Signaling of trustworthiness may help explain phenomena such as philanthropy, pro-sociality, collective action, punishment, and advertising in humans and may be particularly applicable to courtship in other animals.

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16

Centorrino, Samuele, Elodie Djemai, Astrid Hopfensitz, Manfred Milinski, and Paul Seabright. "Honest smiles as a costly signal in social exchange." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33, no. 6 (December 2010): 439. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x10001287.

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AbstractSmiling can be interpreted as a costly signal of future benefits from cooperation between the individual smiling and the individual to whom the smile is directed. The target article by Niedenthal et al. gives little attention to the possible mechanisms by which smiling may have evolved. In our view, there are strong reasons to think that smiling has the key characteristics of a costly signal.

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17

Cunningham, Michael. "Is Beauty an Honest Signal or a False Symbol?" Contemporary Psychology 48, no. 3 (June 2003): 321–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/000803.

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18

Heathcote, Robert J. P., Safi K. Darden, Jolyon Troscianko, Michael R. M. Lawson, Antony M. Brown, Philippa R. Laker, Lewis C. Naisbett-Jones, Hannah E. A. MacGregor, Indar Ramnarine, and Darren P. Croft. "Dynamic eye colour as an honest signal of aggression." Current Biology 28, no. 11 (June 2018): R652—R653. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2018.04.078.

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19

FitzGibbon, C. D., and J. H. Fanshawe. "Stotting in Thomson's gazelles: an honest signal of condition." Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 23, no. 2 (August 1988): 69–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00299889.

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20

Bortolotti, Gary R., Julio Blas, Juan J. Negro, and José L. Tella. "A complex plumage pattern as an honest social signal." Animal Behaviour 72, no. 2 (August 2006): 423–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2006.01.016.

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21

Schiefenhövel, Wulf. "Romantic love. A human universal and possible honest signal." human_ontogenetics 3, no. 2 (July 13, 2009): 39–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/huon.200900005.

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22

Zäske, Romi, Verena Gabriele Skuk, and Stefan R. Schweinberger. "Attractiveness and distinctiveness between speakers' voices in naturalistic speech and their faces are uncorrelated." Royal Society Open Science 7, no. 12 (December 2020): 201244. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.201244.

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Facial attractiveness has been linked to the averageness (or typicality) of a face and, more tentatively, to a speaker's vocal attractiveness, via the ‘honest signal’ hypothesis, holding that attractiveness signals good genes. In four experiments, we assessed ratings for attractiveness and two common measures of distinctiveness (‘distinctiveness-in-the-crowd’, DITC and ‘deviation-based distinctiveness', DEV) for faces and voices (simple vowels, or more naturalistic sentences) from 64 young adult speakers (32 female). Consistent and substantial negative correlations between attractiveness and DEV generally supported the averageness account of attractiveness, for both voices and faces. By contrast, and indicating that both measures of distinctiveness reflect different constructs, correlations between attractiveness and DITC were numerically positive for faces (though small and non-significant), and significant for voices in sentence stimuli. Between faces and voices, distinctiveness ratings were uncorrelated. Remarkably, and at variance with the honest signal hypothesis, vocal and facial attractiveness were also uncorrelated in all analyses involving naturalistic, i.e. sentence-based, speech. This result pattern was confirmed using a new set of stimuli and raters (experiment 5). Overall, while our findings strongly support an averageness account of attractiveness for both domains, they provide no evidence for an honest signal account of facial and vocal attractiveness in complex naturalistic speech.

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Zhang, Feng-Ping, Zachary Larson-Rabin, De-Zhu Li, and Hong Wang. "Colored nectar as an honest signal in plant-animal interactions." Plant Signaling & Behavior 7, no. 7 (July 2012): 811–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.4161/psb.20645.

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24

Furlow, F. Bryant. "Human Neonatal Cry Quality as an honest signal of fitness." Evolution and Human Behavior 18, no. 3 (May 1997): 175–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1090-5138(97)00006-8.

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25

Reed, Lawrence Ian, Yanal Matari, Molly Wu, and Revathi Janaswamy. "Emotional Tears: An Honest Signal of Trustworthiness Increasing Prosocial Behavior?" Evolutionary Psychology 17, no. 3 (July 2019): 147470491987242. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1474704919872421.

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How do our emotional tears affect the way we are treated? We tested whether tears, paired with either a neutral or a sad facial expression, elicited prosocial behavior among perceivers. Participants viewed a video clip depicting a confederate partner with or without tears displaying either a neutral or sad facial expression before making a behavioral decision in one of two economic games. In a Trust game (Experiment 1), participants who played the role of the investor were more likely to share an endowment after viewing a confederate trustee with tears (paired with either a neutral or a sad facial expression) in comparison to a confederate trustee without tears. However, in a Dictator game (Experiment 2), participants who played the role of allocator were no more likely to share an endowment after viewing a confederate recipient with tears (paired with either a neutral or sad facial expression) in comparison to a confederate recipient without tears. Taken together, these findings suggest that tears increase prosocial behavior by increasing trustworthiness as opposed to generally increasing other-regarding altruistic tendencies.

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26

Manson, Joseph H. "Rhesus macaque copulation calls: Re-evaluating the “honest signal” hypothesis." Primates 37, no. 2 (April 1996): 145–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02381402.

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27

Zollman, Kevin J. S., Carl T. Bergstrom, and Simon M. Huttegger. "Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 280, no. 1750 (January 7, 2013): 20121878. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.1878.

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Costly signalling theory has become a common explanation for honest communication when interests conflict. In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation for partially honest communication that does not require significant signal costs. We show that this alternative is at least as plausible as traditional costly signalling, and we suggest a number of experiments that might be used to distinguish the two theories.

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Wacewicz, Sławomir, and Przemysław Żywiczyński. "Human Honest Signalling and Nonverbal Communication." Psychology of Language and Communication 16, no. 2 (December 1, 2012): 113–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/v10057-012-0009-5.

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Abstract The issue of signal reliability (‘honesty’) is widely recognised in language evolution research as one of the most fundamental problems concerning the evolutionary emergence of protolanguage, i.e. early language-like communication. We propose that nonverbal communication is likely to have played an important but underestimated role in language evolution: not directly in the transfer of message contents, but rather in stabilising the emerging protolanguage. We single out one subset of nonverbal cues - nonvocal nonverbal paralinguistic adaptors (NNPAs) - based on their role as indicators of reliability in present-day communication of humans. We suggest that the relatively involuntary and therefore reliable NNPAs might have served to stabilise more volitionally controlled, and therefore less reliable, verbal communication at the initial, bootstrapping stages of its phylogenetic development.

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Sheldon, Kennon M., Mike Corcoran, and Melanie Sheldon. "Duchenne Smiles as Honest Signals of Chronic Positive Mood." Perspectives on Psychological Science 16, no. 3 (February 12, 2021): 654–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1745691620959831.

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Chronic positive mood (CPM) has been shown to confer a wide variety of social, functional, and health benefits. Some researchers have argued that humans evolved to feel CPM, which explains why most people report better than neutral mood (the “positivity offset bias”) and why particularly happy people have particularly good outcomes. Here, we argue that the Duchenne smile evolved as an honest signal of high levels of CPM, alerting others to the psychological fitness of the smiler. Duchenne smiles are honest because they express felt positive emotion, making it difficult for unhappy people to produce them. Duchenne smiles enable happy people to signal and cooperate with one another, boosting their advantages. In our literature review, we found (a) that not all Duchenne smiles are “honest,” although producing them in the absence of positive emotion is difficult and often detectable, and (b) that the ability to produce and recognize Duchenne smiles may vary somewhat by a person’s cultural origin. In the final section of the article, we consider behavioral influences on CPM, reviewing research showing that engaging in eudaimonic activity reliably produces CPM, as posited by the eudaimonic-activity model. This research suggests that frequent Duchenne smiling may ultimately signal eudaimonic personality as well as CPM.

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Caro, Shana M., Stuart A. West, and Ashleigh S. Griffin. "Sibling conflict and dishonest signaling in birds." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, no. 48 (November 7, 2016): 13803–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1606378113.

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Offspring survival can often depend on successful communication with parents about their state of need. Theory suggests that offspring will be less likely to honestly signal their need when they experience greater competition from either a greater number of nestmates or less-related nestmates. We found support for this hypothesis with a comparative analysis, examining data from across 60 species of birds. We found that offspring are less honest about their level of need when (i) they face competition from current siblings; (ii) their parents are likely to breed again, and so they are in competition with future siblings; and (iii) parental divorce or death means that they are likely to be less related to future siblings. More generally, these patterns highlight the sensitivity of communication systems to conflict between signaler and receiver while also suggesting that when there is little conflict, natural selection favors the honest.

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Carder, Michelle L., and Gary Ritchison. "Tail pumping by Eastern Phoebes: an honest, persistent predator-deterrent signal?" Journal of Field Ornithology 80, no. 2 (June 2009): 163–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1557-9263.2009.00218.x.

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32

Schaefer, H. M., K. McGraw, and C. Catoni. "Birds use fruit colour as honest signal of dietary antioxidant rewards." Functional Ecology 22, no. 2 (April 2008): 303–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2435.2007.01363.x.

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33

Abrahams, Mark V., Tonia L. Robb, and James F. Hare. "Effect of hypoxia on opercular displays: evidence for an honest signal?" Animal Behaviour 70, no. 2 (August 2005): 427–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2004.12.007.

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Akçay, Çağlar, S. Elizabeth Campbell, and Michael D. Beecher. "Individual differences affect honest signalling in a songbird." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 281, no. 1775 (January 22, 2014): 20132496. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2013.2496.

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Research in the past decade has established the existence of consistent individual differences or ‘personality’ in animals and their important role in many aspects of animal behaviour. At the same time, research on honest signalling of aggression has revealed that while some of the putative aggression signals are reliable, they are only imperfectly so. This study asks whether a significant portion of the variance in the aggression-signal regression may be explained by individual differences in signalling strategies. Using the well-studied aggressive signalling system of song sparrows ( Melospiza melodia ), we carried out repeated assays to measure both aggressive behaviours and aggressive signalling of territorial males. Through these assays, we found that aggressive behaviours and aggressive signalling were both highly repeatable, and moreover that aggressive behaviours in 2009–2010 predicted whether the birds would attack a taxidermic mount over a year later. Most significantly, we found that residual variation in signalling behaviours, after controlling for aggressive behaviour, was individually consistent, suggesting there may be a second personality trait determining the level of aggressive signalling. We term this potential personality trait ‘communicativeness’ and discuss these results in the context of honest signalling theories and recent findings reporting prevalence of ‘under-signalling’.

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35

Mueller, Ulrich. "Is fluctuating asymmetry a signal or a marker of genetic fitness?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23, no. 4 (August 2000): 617–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00573373.

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Fluctuating asymmetry is more a signal of genetic fitness than a marker observable only to the researcher. Hence, it has to be demonstrated that low FA is an honest signal of genetic quality; this has not been demonstrated in Gangestad & Simpson's otherwise useful review.

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Soltis, Joseph. "The signal functions of early infant crying." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27, no. 4 (August 2004): 443–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x0400010x.

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In this article I evaluate recent attempts to illuminate the human infant cry from an evolutionary perspective. Infants are born into an uncertain parenting environment, which can range from indulgent care of offspring to infanticide. Infant cries are in large part adaptations that maintain proximity to and elicit care from caregivers. Although there is not strong evidence for acoustically distinct cry types, infant cries may function as a graded signal. During pain-induced autonomic nervous system arousal, for example, neural input to the vocal cords increases cry pitch. Caregivers may use this acoustic information, together with other cues, to guide caregiving behavior. Serious pathology, on the other hand, results in chronically and severely abnormal cry acoustics. Such abnormal crying may be a proximate cause of adaptive infant maltreatment, in circumstances in which parents cut their losses and reduce or withdraw investment from infants with low survival chances. An increase in the amount of crying during the first few months of life is a human universal, and excessive crying, or colic, represents the upper end of this normal increase. Potential signal functions of excessive crying include manipulation of parents to acquire additional resources, honest signaling of need, and honest signaling of vigor. Current evidence does not strongly support any one of these hypotheses, but the evidence is most consistent with the hypothesis that excessive early infant crying is a signal of vigor that evolved to reduce the risk of a reduction or withdrawal of parental care.

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Skjæraasen, Jon E., Justin J. Meager, and Jeffrey A. Hutchings. "A cost of reproduction in male Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua)." Canadian Journal of Zoology 88, no. 6 (June 2010): 595–600. http://dx.doi.org/10.1139/z10-033.

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In many species, females are thought to base their choice of mate on quality, which males signal through displays and body ornamentation. One important question is whether these signals represent an honest reflection of quality so that they carry an intrinsic cost to the male. A considerable body of evidence has revealed complex mating behaviours in gadoid fish, such as Atlantic cod ( Gadus morhua L., 1758), for which male reproductive success may be related to some form of female choice. However, if present, the cost of male signalling is not clear. To test the hypothesis that male behavioural displays are energetically costly, we quantified the number of displays initiated by males during spawning, and their corresponding mass loss, in two separate experiments. The number of displays was positively associated with mass loss in both experiments, suggesting that reproductive displays are costly to males; they also may be regarded as an honest signal of quality upon which females could base their choice of mate. To our knowledge, this is the first study to demonstrate a cost of male reproductive behaviour in a broadcast-spawning fish.

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Pike, Thomas W., Jonathan D. Blount, Jan Lindström, and Neil B. Metcalfe. "Availability of non-carotenoid antioxidants affects the expression of a carotenoid-based sexual ornament." Biology Letters 3, no. 4 (May 2007): 353–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2007.0072.

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Carotenoids are responsible for much of the yellow, orange and red pigmentation in the animal kingdom, and the importance of such coloration as an honest signal of individual quality has received widespread attention. In particular, owing to the multiple roles of carotenoids as pigments, antioxidants and immunostimulants, carotenoid-based coloration has been suggested to advertise an individual's antioxidant or immune defence capacity. However, it has recently been argued that carotenoid-based signals may in fact be advertising the availability of different antioxidants, many of which (including various vitamins, antioxidant enzymes and minerals) are colourless and so would be uninformative as components of a visual signal, yet often have greater biological activity than carotenoids. We tested this hypothesis by feeding male sticklebacks ( Gasterosteus aculeatus ) a diet containing a fixed level of carotenoids and either low or high, but biologically realistic levels of the colourless antioxidant vitamins C and E. High-antioxidant diet males produced significantly more intensely coloured (but not larger) carotenoid-based regions of nuptial coloration and were preferred over size-matched males of the opposite diet treatment in mate-choice trials. Furthermore, there were positive correlations between an individual's somatic antioxidant activity and signal intensity. Our data suggest that carotenoid-based ornaments may honestly signal an individual's availability of non-carotenoid antioxidants, allowing females to make adaptive mate-choice decisions.

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Bergstrom, Carl T., and Michael Lachmann. "Signalling among relatives. I. Is costly signalling too costly?" Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences 352, no. 1353 (May 29, 1997): 609–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.1997.0041.

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Zahavi's handicap principle,originally proposed as an explanation for sexual selection ofelaborate male traits, suggests that a sufficient cost to dishonest signals can outweigh the rewards of deception and allow individuals to communicate honestly. Maynard Smith (1991) and Johnstone and Grafen (1992) introduce the Sir Philip Sidney game in order to extend the handicap principle to interactions among related individuals, and to demonstrate that stable costly signalling systems can exist among relatives. In this paper we demonstrate that despite the benefits associated with honest information transfer, the costs incurred in a stable costly signalling system may leave all participants worse off than they would be in a system with no signalling at all. In both the discrete and continuous forms of the Sir Philip Sidney game, there exist conditions under which costly signalling among relatives, while stable, is so costly that it is disadvantageous compared with no signalling at all. We determine the factors which dictate signal cost and signal benefit in a generalized version of this game, and explain how signal cost can exceed signal value. Such results raise concerns about theevolutionary pathways which could have led to the existence of signalling equilibria in nature. The paper stresses the importance of comparing signalling equilibria with other possible strategies, beforedrawing conclusions regarding the optimality of signalling.

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Cucco, Marco, and Giorgio Malacarne. "Is the Song of Black Redstart Males an Honest Signal of Status?" Condor 101, no. 3 (August 1999): 689–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1370203.

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Mazzoldi, C., M. Massironi, and M. B. Rasotto. "Yellow belly as honest signal of female quality in Knipowitschia panizzae (Gobiidae )." Journal of Fish Biology 63 (December 2003): 237. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1095-8649.2003.0216z.x.

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Murphy, Michael T., Karen Sexton, Amy C. Dolan, and Luke J. Redmond. "Dawn song of the eastern kingbird: an honest signal of male quality?" Animal Behaviour 75, no. 3 (March 2008): 1075–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2007.08.020.

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Griggio, Matteo, Valeria Zanollo, and Herbert Hoi. "UV plumage color is an honest signal of quality in male budgerigars." Ecological Research 25, no. 1 (July 16, 2009): 77–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11284-009-0632-3.

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López, Pilar, and José Martín. "Female Iberian wall lizards prefer male scents that signal a better cell-mediated immune response." Biology Letters 1, no. 4 (August 10, 2005): 404–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2005.0360.

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In spite of the importance of chemoreception in sexual selection of lizards, only a few studies have examined the composition of chemical signals, and it is unknown whether and how chemicals provide honest information. Chemical signals might be honest if there were a trade-off between sexual advertisement and the immune system. Here, we show that proportions of cholesta-5,7-dien-3-ol in femoral secretions of male Iberian wall lizards ( Podarcis hispanica ) were related to their T-cell-mediated immune response. Thus, only males with a good immune system may allocate higher amounts of this chemical to signalling. Furthermore, females selected scents of males with higher proportions of cholesta-5,7-dien-3-ol and lower proportions of cholesterol. Thus, females might base their mate choice on the males' quality as indicated by the composition of their chemical signals.

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Maestripieri, Dario, and Kristina M. Durante. "Infant colic: Re-evaluating the adaptive hypotheses." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27, no. 4 (August 2004): 468–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x04320108.

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Colic may allow infants to obtain additional investment from their parents. The lack of clear fitness costs of colic and of differences in condition between colicky and non-colicky infants is inconsistent with the hypotheses that colic is an honest signal of need or vigor. These and other characteristics of colic, however, are consistent with the hypothesis that colic is a manipulative signal.

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Vanpé, Cécile, Jean‐Michel Gaillard, Petter Kjellander, Atle Mysterud, Pauline Magnien, Daniel Delorme, Guy Van Laere, François Klein, Olof Liberg, and A. J. Mark Hewison. "Antler Size Provides an Honest Signal of Male Phenotypic Quality in Roe Deer." American Naturalist 169, no. 4 (April 2007): 481–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/512046.

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Popat, Roman, Eric J. G. Pollitt, Freya Harrison, Hardeep Naghra, Kar‐Wai Hong, Kok‐Gan Chan, Ashleigh S. Griffin, et al. "Conflict of interest and signal interference lead to the breakdown of honest signaling." Evolution 69, no. 9 (September 2015): 2371–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/evo.12751.

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Engels, S., and K. P. Sauer. "Resource-dependent nuptial feeding in Panorpa vulgaris: an honest signal for male quality." Behavioral Ecology 17, no. 4 (May 5, 2006): 628–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/beheco/ark007.

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Adamo, Shelley A., and R. Chase. "Dart Shooting in Helicid Snails: An ‘Honest’ Signal or an Instrument of Manipulation?" Journal of Theoretical Biology 180, no. 1 (May 1996): 77–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jtbi.1996.0080.

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Cécile Vanpé, Gaillard, Kjellander, Mysterud, Pauline Magnien, Delorme, Van Laere, Klein, Liberg, and A. J. Mark Hewison. "Antler Size Provides an Honest Signal of Male Phenotypic Quality in Roe Deer." American Naturalist 169, no. 4 (2007): 481. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4137011.

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