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Berggren, Jennie, and Carina Engström. "Defensive Tactics : In hostile takeovers." Thesis, Jönköping University, JIBS, Business Administration, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-469.
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Cai, Wei, and 蔡伟. "The mandatory bid rule, hostile takeovers and takeover defences in China." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2011. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B46968398.
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Khaitan, Shrivats. "Hostile Takeovers and Corporate Governance in India." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2013. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/742.
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The ability of outsiders to gain controlling interest in a firm has a large impact on managerial behavior. This threat has not been wielded in Indian corporations for the most part in spite of there being no direct regulatory hurdles in the execution of the same. This paper seeks to determine the reasons behind the lack of hostile takeover bids in India, as well as analyze the effect on corporate governance. The scrutiny of the Indian corporate sphere leads us to believe that corporate governance is in the process of being codified, but there are numerous motivations already in place to incentivize good managerial behavior, other than the threat of hostile takeover bids.
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Jansson, Andreas, and Mikael Häägg. "Hostile takeovers - motåtgärdernas påverkan på aktieägarnas aktievärde." Thesis, University of Gävle, Department of Business Administration and Economics, 2007. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hig:diva-78.
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<p>Företagsförvärv är ett fenomen som på senare år ökat markant i Sverige. Med företagsförvärv menas att kontrollen över ett företag överförs från en aktieägargrupp till en annan. Ett sätt att förvärva ett annat företag är genom uppköp. Det finns i sin tur tre olika tillvägagångssätt där fusion utgör ett av dem och som uppstår då två bolag av liknande storlekt går samman under gemensamt ägande. Sammanslagningen sker genom förhandling mellan de olika bolagen och deras aktieägare. De förvärv som sker på fientligt vis kallas för Hostile takeover (fientligt företagsförvärv). Denna form av förvärv är mer vanligt i USA och Storbritannien än i övriga Europa. De flesta fallen av fientliga förvärv görs genom att förvärvaren lämnar ett anbud direkt ämnat till målföretagets aktieägare i hopp om att få köpa deras aktier. Deras mål är att överta kontrollen över företaget utan att blanda in målföretagets ledning eller styrelse, som motarbetar affären. Motiven bakom ett företagsförvärv kan vara många. Exempelvis kan ett företag vilja utöka sin produktportfölj, expandera geografiskt eller nå ut till en ny kundgrupp. I de flesta fallen är det undervärderade företag som inte lyckats maximera sin vinst som utsätts för fientliga bud. Resultatet av ett fientligt förvärv leder oftast till en stor omstrukturering av det förvärvande företaget för att uppnå högre lönsamhet.</p><p>För att skydda sig mot att förvärvas på ett fientligt sätt finns det ett antal motåtgärder som ett företags styrelse och ledning kan använda sig av. Dessa motåtgärder bygger på två olika synsätt. Den ena kallas för ledningens självintresse och den beskriver hur ledningen använder sig av de olika motåtgärderna för att rädda sitt eget skinn på bekostnad av aktieägarna. Det andra tankesättet bygger på att ledningen tänker på aktieägarnas bästa vid användande av motåtgärderna. Detta synsätt kallas för aktieägarnas intresse. När vi definierar aktieägarnas aktievärde menar vi på det sätt aktieägarna kan få ut den maximalt möjliga avkastningen vid en specifikt uppkommen situation.</p><p>Vår frågeställning i denna uppsatts är hur användandet av de olika motåtgärderna påverkar aktieägarnas aktievärde vid ett fientligt företagsförvärv eller anbud. Syftet är att beskriva detta på ett lättförståligt vis och göra aktieägarna uppmärksamma på att det kan finnas en intressekonflikt mellan aktieägarnas bästa och företagsledningen samt styrelsens bästa. För att möjliggöra denna uppsats har vi studerat litteratur, vetenskapliga forskningsartiklar, sökt på Internet samt utfört intervjuer.</p><p>En slutsatts som vi har kunnat dra är att vi skulle vilja skilja på ägarnas aktievärde på kort respektive lång sikt. Vissa av metoderna är bra för att öka värdet för ägandet på kort sikt medan andra metoder är bättre på lång sikt. Vissa motåtgärder är uppenbart dåliga för ägarnas aktievärde. En av våra intervjupersoner, Gunnar Ek på Aktiespararna, erkände han att man utan tvekan kan misstänka att det finns stunder då styrelse och företagsledning tänker mer på sig själva än vad som är bäst för företaget och ägarna. I dessa fall kan vi tydligt relatera till ledningens självintresse sätt. Vi spår även att fenomenet med fientliga företagsförvärv kommer att fortsätta öka i Sverige.</p><br><p>Acquisition of a company is a phenomena that has increased during the latest years in Sweden. Hostile takeovers is a type of acquisitions that are made in a hostile way. The controll of the company is moved from one group of stockholders to another. One way of acqire another company is to buy it. There are three types of procedures of buying a company. Fusion is one, when two companies of the same size becomes one. The fusion precede with negotiations between the companies and the stockholders. The acquires that are made in a hostile way is callaed hostile takeover. These types of acusitions are more common in USA and in Great Britain than in the rest of Europe. In the most common case of hostile takeovers, the acqusitior gives a bid to the stockholders to make them sell their stocks.The acquisitiors intrest is to take over the power of the company, whithout dealing with the board of the company. The aim of the takeover can vary. Maybe the acquisitors want to expand their portfolio of products, reach out over a new market theratory, or get into contact with new customers. The target company for a hostile takeover is often a company that are underestimated and had faild to maximise their profit. A hostile takeover often results in a big change in the company’s organisation to make a better result</p><p>When a hostile takeover arise there are several defences that the board or the management can take. These defences are built upon two diffrent approaches. One of them is called the ”Management entrenchment hypothesis”, the board is acting more in their own interest than in the stockholders interests. The other approach is to achieve the stockholders interests. When we define the stockholders interests we mean that way that the stockholders will get the highest possible profit in the specific case.</p><p>Our question at issue is in which way the different defences relates to the stockholders interests. The purpose is to describe the relation in an easy way and to make the stockholders aware of that there is a conflict betwwen the interests of the management and the stockholders. During the writing of this article we have studied and used litterature, articles in science and research and the Internet. We have also perform some interviews.</p><p>Our conclusion is that we have to seperate the meaning of stockholders interest, depending on wheter it is a short-term interest, or wheter it is a long-term interest. Some defences results in an increase of value in short term, and some in the long-term. also that some of the defences can not been used at all to achieve the stockholders interests. In one of our interviews, Gunnar Ek at Aktiesparana expreses his thought that there is cases in which the board is acting more in their own interest than in the stockholders interests.In this cases we mean that the ”Management entrenchment hypothesis” is used. We also predict that the phenomena hostile takeovers will continue to increase in Sweden</p>
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Johansson, Markus, and Martin Torstensson. "Hostile Takeovers : The Power of the Prey." Thesis, Jönköping University, JIBS, Business Administration, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-1321.
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<p>Takeovers are used as a mean for companies to grow and gain entry to new markets. Hos-tile takeovers, apart from the friendly takeovers, is when an acquirer tries to takeover a corporation against the will of management, shareholders and board of directors of the target company. All listed companies run the risk of being a target for a hostile takeover, and to-day many companies are trying to involve actions protecting them from possible threats. Lacking protection can evolve into a costly defense program with actions with fictitious names such as White knight, Pac-man and Poison pills. The purpose with this thesis is to describe and analyze hostile takeovers and hostile takeover attempts in Sweden, and the defense tactics involved in the process.</p><p>In this thesis a deductive approach will be used, where theories are used as guidance when searching for explanations. On the basis of the defense tactics described in the theory empirical data has been gathered with the purpose of seeing if the expectations reflect reality, and conclusions about their efficiency. The thesis has used a quantitative research method where the focus is on what, where and when. The aim of the thesis is to classify targeted features and count them, with the intent to construct statistical models with an underlying purpose of explaining what is observed.</p><p>The most frequently used defense tactic used by the target company in a hostile takeover in the Swedish market is to attack the logic of the bid. Around 56 percent of the targets in a hostile takeover or a hostile takeover attempt have used this defense tactic to avoid a hos-tile takeover. The aim with an implemented defense tactic is to avoid a hostile bid or making it impossible for the hostile bidder to proceed with the bid and close the deal. The White knight and White squire defense tactic is the most successful defense tactic when it comes to not finalizing the hostile bid, in 90 percent of the cases the deal is not closed if the target chooses to use a White knight as a defense tactic. A secondary objective with a defense tactic is to force the hostile bidder to increase the bid and pay more for the target company. In the Swedish market, the use of Corporate restructuring as a defense tactic has made the hostile bidder to increase the bid in 67 percent of the cases and the use of Positive public information has forced the hostile bidder to increase the bid in more than half of the cases.</p><p>The question why these defense tactics are the most frequently used strategies, is explained by two variables. The first one is the cost and simplicity variable, where Attack the logic of the bid and Public information ends up. These defense tactics are cost efficient and can be seen as natural step for the target company when deciding not to approve of the offer made by the acquirer. The second variable is the proven efficiency, where the target knows if implementing this defense tactic the risk of being acquired by the hostile bidder is relatively low, a good example of this is the White knight defense.</p>
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Hansen, Arne. "“Hostile” takeovers an investment performance of acquirers and targets." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/23631.
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Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) can be either “hostile” or “friendly” in nature. This study looks at the corresponding long-term investment performance of “hostile” and “friendly” takeovers within the mining sector, pre and post the takeover of targets, with the aim to investigate whether there are statistically significant differences about which the investor community should be aware.36 months of monthly share price performance, pre and post first formal merger/takeover announcement date, are studied, for each acquirer is compared with the bourse mining index to calculate the percentage time the acquirer outperforms the market (mining index). Research of the major mining stock exchanges of the world – New York, Toronto, Australia, London and Johannesburg – reveals that the investment performances of “hostile” acquiring mining companies, pre first formal announcement date, are statistically significantly greater than post first formal announcement date. No statistically significant difference was found pre and post first announcement date for “friendly” acquiring mining companies. Although clear differences in post first formal announcement date investment performance are noted between “hostile” acquirers and “friendly” acquirers, there is no statistically significant difference between the investment performances of “friendly” versus “hostile” acquirers.<br>Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2010.<br>Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS)<br>unrestricted
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Shivdasani, Anil. "The board of directors, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers." The Ohio State University, 1991. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1259096201.
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Renneboog, Luc D. R. "Ownership, managerial control and the governance of poorly performing companies listed on the London and Brussels stock exchanges." Thesis, London Business School (University of London), 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.244802.
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Smadja, Clément. "Hostile takeovers and directors' duties: from Delaware to Brussels, what's best for shareholders?" Thesis, McGill University, 2008. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=18727.
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This thesis attempts to address the crucial issue of the appropriate role of corporate boards in response to hostile takeover bids. In such circumstances, directors face an obvious conflict of interests: since they might lose their jobs and benefits once the acquisition is completed, they may use their corporate powers to erect takeover defenses or to simply veto the offer. As a matter of doctrine, the debate falls into two schools of thoughts. The managerialist school supports that boards should be permitted to erect defenses and/or veto on the grounds that directors are better placed to protect the interests of shareholders whereas the shareholder choice school relies on the conflict of interest to support boards' passivity. As a matter of practice, the U.S. system adopts an approach that is more consistent with managerialism, while the recent European takeover directive advocates in essence that shareholders are the only ones that should take the ultimate decision. At the end of the day, we must ask ourselves “What's best for shareholders?”<br>Pléthore d'hypothèses, de théories et d'arguments ont été développées au sujet du rôle des dirigeants de sociétés cotées lors d'offres publiques d'achat hostiles. Le conflit d'intérêts dont les intéressés font face est évident: le risque notable de se voir remercier à la suite de l'acquisition, et de facto de perdre les avantages pécuniaires directement associés à leurs positions, les conduit le plus souvent à rejeter une offre, fut-elle favorable aux actionnaires. De ce débat éminemment important pour le droit des sociétés, deux écoles se distinguent. L'école « managériale », que les Etats-Unis ont pris comme modèle, se fait l'avocate d'un système dans lequel les dirigeants garderaient les pouvoirs de négocier et éventuellement de refuser une offre, ceci dans l'intérêt de leurs actionnaires. L'école actionnariale, au contraire, argue de la nocivité du conflit d'intérêt ainsi que des droits fondamentaux des actionnaires de pouvoir se prononcer sur le destin de la société, afin de leur conférer l'autorité décisionnelle. Ainsi se positionne la toute récente directive européenne sur les offres publiques d'achat. Reste la question cruciale dont la présente thèse s'attache à répondre: lequel de ces deux systèmes bénéficie au mieux les actionnaires ?
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Buitseva, Darja. "Fientliga uppköpserbjudanden : Vilka åtgärder från målbolagsstyrelsens sida i samband med ett fientligt uppköpserbjudande kan anses vara förenligt med god sed på aktiemarknaden?" Thesis, Karlstads universitet, Handelshögskolan, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kau:diva-45387.
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Fientliga företagsförvärv har under en lång tid varit en del av den globala finansmarknaden och är numera inte främmande för de svenska aktörerna. Ett företagsförvärv blir fientligt när bolagets styrelse råder aktieägarna att avslå det framlagda budet. Är budet intressant för aktieägarna, som ofta strävar efter att maximera sin kapitalvinst, kan det dock lätt uppstå en intressekonflikt inom bolaget då styrelsen, till skillnad från aktieägarna, är snarare intresserad av att behålla sin makt och anställning. Detta kan resultera i att styrelsen blir frestad att vidta åtgärder för att förhindra uppköpet. I samband med fientliga uppköpserbjudanden har det på den amerikanska aktiemarknaden utarbetats en rad försvarsåtgärder som kan vidtas av bolagsstyrelsen i syfte att försvåra eller förhindra ett företagsförvärv. På den svenska aktiemarknaden är vidtagande av åtgärder som har till syfte att förhindra eller försvåra att ett uppköpserbjudande framläggs eller genomförs icke tillåtna enligt 5 kap. 1 § lagen om offentliga uppköpserbjudanden på aktiemarknaden (LUA). Motiveringen till detta förbud framkommer i bland annat Aktiemarknadsnämndens uttalande AMN 2005:47:”ett offentligt erbjudande anses vara en angelägenhet mellan målbolagets aktieägare och budgivaren, varför målbolagets styrelse inte ska tillåtas försämra förutsättningarna för att ett erbjudande lämnats”. Av denna anledning har styrelsen i ett målbolag som är ett aktiebolag en relativt svag position, då den beslutsfattande makten är hos de enskilda aktieägarna vid exempelvis antagandet av ett framlagt bud och hos bolagsstämman avseende vidtagande av eventuella försvarsmetoder. Dock har det genom AMN:s uttalanden framkommit i en rad praktiska fall att målbolagets styrelse hittat möjligheter att agera och i viss mån kringgå förbudet. Uppsatsen är en komparativ studie med den svenska och amerikanska rättregleringen i fokus. Paralleller och samband dras även mellan det svenska, europeiska och engelska systemet. Syftet med arbetet är att undersöka svenska företagsledningarnas möjligheter och handlingsutrymme vid tillämpning av internationella försvarsmetoder för att avvärja ett oönskat uppköpserbjudande. I uppsatsen undersöks även de åtgärder som kan vidtas i ett preventivt syfte. Möjligheten till genomförandet av ett bolagsuppköp är ett nyckelmoment för skapandet av en effektiv värdepappersmarknad där svaga bolag upphör att existera och starka bolag har utvecklings- och tillväxtmöjligheter. Att avgöra vad som stämmer överens med god sed kan dock bli problematiskt, då regleringen på området är oerhört spridd och i viss mån inkoherent. Trots dessa svårigheter har det i praktiken genomförts ett antal företagsuppköp som har visat på att tillämpningen av försvarmetoder är i viss utsträckning möjlig om den går att motivera genom att bolagets eller/och aktieägarnas intressen tillgodoses. Enligt aktiebolagslagen (ABL) är föremålet för aktiebolagets verksamhet att ge vinst till fördelning för aktieägarna. Samtidigt är aktieägarnas förtroende centralt för väl fungerande värdepappersmarknader. En mer omfattande rätt för bolagsstyrelsen i målbolaget att fatta beslut om försvarsåtgärder skulle kunna skada dessa grundläggande ändamål med ABL och den börsrättsliga regleringen. På så sätt skulle en betydligt större makt hos bolagsstyrelsen kunna ha en skadlig effekt, då det är aktieägarnas vinster och förtroende som bör prioriteras. Genom att analysera samspelet mellan de bolagsrättsliga och börsrättsliga principerna och relevanta praktiska avgöranden går det att se att den nationella regleringen är konstruerad på bästa möjliga sätt för att upprätthålla en god sed på den svenska finansmarknaden, trots sina potentiella brister i sammanhanget.<br>Hostile takeovers have for a long time been a part of the global financial market and are nowadays not an unknown phenomenon on the Swedish stock market. A takeover attempt becomes hostile when the board of directors of the target advises the shareholders to reject the submitted bid. That particular situation can, however, easily become the reason for conflict of interests within the company. The bid can be valuable for the shareholders, who primarily seek ways to maximize their profit at the same time, as the members of the board of directors desire to keep their employment and position within the company. The board can therefore as a result be willing to take action in order to prevent the takeover. During the mid-20th century, due to a takeover-wave, the American stock market developed a series of defence measures that could be used by the board in order to impede or prevent an acquisition. However, measures that are intended to prevent or impede a takeover offer are prohibited on the Swedish stock market under Ch. 5 § 1 in the Act on Public Takeover Offers. The justification for this prohibition is found in, inter alia, the Swedish Securities Council's (Aktiemarknadsnämnden) statement AMN 2005: 47 where they indicated that a public offer is considered to be a matter between the target company's shareholders and the bidder, why the offeree company should not be allowed to impair the prerequisites for an offer submitted. For this reason, management has a relatively weak position in Swedish corporations, since the decision-making power is not with the board but with the separate shareholders when it comes to accepting a potential bid or the shareholders’ meeting of the corporation when a decision must be made if measures should be enact in order to prevent a bid. However, the boards of directors in some target companies have found opportunities to act and to some extent circumvent the ban posed in the Act on Public Takeover Offers. The thesis is a comparative study with Swedish and American legal regulations in focus. Parallels are also drawn between the Swedish, European and English systems. The aim is to investigate the ability of the board of directors in Swedish corporations to use different defence methods to fend off an unwanted takeover bid. The paper also examines the measures that can be taken before the bid and as a result have a preventive function. The possibility of implementing a company takeover is a key element for the creation of an efficient financial market in which weak companies cease to exist and strong companies have development and growth potential. A determination on what actions can be consistent with good practice can be problematic, since the regulations in this area are extremely widespread and somewhat incoherent. Despite these difficulties, the legal practice in this area has shown that the application of the defence methods is to some extent possible if the board of directors focus on supporting the will to defend the company and / or shareholder interests. To give the board of directors extended powers could have a detrimental effect on profits and trust. By analysing the interaction between the principles in company law and securities law as well as some relevant decisions by the Swedish Securities Council, it is possible to see that the Swedish national regulation is designed in the best possible way to maintain good practices on the Swedish stock market despite some shortcomings.
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Johnson, Henrik, and Daniel Josefsson. "The relationship between ownership structure and hostile takeovers in Sweden with an interntational perspective." Thesis, Internationella Handelshögskolan, Högskolan i Jönköping, IHH, Företagsekonomi, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-15454.
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Background: Throughout the last century mergers and acquisitions have been categorized by changes in the global economy. Globalization and changes in legislations has brought forward so called waves that are rooted in the market for the United States. Where the act of acquisitions can be divided into both friendly and hostile takeovers, history shows that hostile takeovers are frequent in the US but less evident in the Swedish market. As for Sweden the existence of control enhancing mechanisms are utilized to enable control of a firm without owning a proportionate share of equity. While the trend of takeover activity is replicated elsewhere, the hostile aspect finds another route. The market for corporate control governs the hostile aspect where firms should be replaced with new managers if agency problems arise between the management and the shareholders. Thus looking at Sweden, corporate governance issues and the establishment of national laws are of certain importance. Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the ownership structure in Swedish listed companies impacts on the occurrence of hostile takeovers and what implications a potential change in the corporate governance structure would have on it. Moreover we intend to map Sweden internationally to give a broad picture of the research area. Methodology: We have made use of a quantitative method for the empirical section and thereafter derived conclusions through the hypothetico-deductive approach. For testing the outcome of hostile bids in Sweden, chi-square tests for independence have been conducted and in regards of an international comparison we have implemented a correlation analysis. Conclusions: With the result at hand we concluded that the theory was partially aligned with the empirical data. The market for corporate control is not fully efficient in Sweden. The reason for that is the multiple voting rights implemented in the target firms which impede the successfulness in replacing a management. The hostile bid frequency has increased over the years, mainly due to potential agency problems among target firms. But parallel to this, which in some regards contradicts theory, is that firms neglects the prevalent ownership structure in Sweden and acquires a foothold as to make their hostile acquisition. In regards of the empirical data, concentrated ownership solely does not harm the market for corporate control in Sweden. Internationally, the correlation between ownership concentration and hostile bid frequencies proved to be negative where Sweden despite this attracts hostile acquirers.
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Pinkowitz, Lee. "The determinants of hostile takeovers and the efficiency of the market for corporate control /." Connect to resource, 2000. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view.cgi?acc%5Fnum=osu1261160262.
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Pinkowitz, Lee F. "The determinants of hostile takeovers and the efficiency of the market for corporate control." The Ohio State University, 1999. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1261160262.
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Pinkowitz, Lee. "The determinants of hostile takeovers and the efficiency of the market for corporate control /." The Ohio State University, 1999. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1488192119261976.
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Clarke, Blanaid. "Directors and the frustration of hostile takeovers of Irish listed companies : legal and regulatory responses." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2001. https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.488108.
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Hanisch, Alexandra. "The use of defensive measures in hostile takeovers : a comparative study of takeover regulation in the US, the UK, Canada, the EU and Germany." Thesis, McGill University, 2002. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=78216.
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This Master's Thesis is a comparative study of the regulation of defensive measures in hostile takeovers. It consists of two main parts: In the first, the subject is approached from a theoretical point of view. The relevant factors for the regulation of defensive measures are outlined and analysed, followed by a discussion of the different ways of drafting such rules. This part concludes with a proposition concerning the most favourable form and content of a regulation. The second part describes hostile takeover regulation in the US, the UK, Canada, the EU and Germany, showing the diversity in that field of regulation in practice and the underlying reasons. It highlights and assesses the characteristics of each country and its regulation in the light of the considerations made in the first part, and provides an outlook concerning the future development of the regulation of defensive measures in hostile takeovers.
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Nachemson-Ekwall, Sophie. "An institutional analysis of cross-border hostile takeovers : shareholder value, short-termism and regulatory arbitrage on the Swedish stock market during the sixth takeover wave." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Institutionen för Företagande och Ledning, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-1907.
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Taking a sociological perspective on the market for corporate control this thesis calls into question financial capitalism with its preference for clear shareholder-value governance of the corporation. The institutional setting chosen to show this is Sweden, with its particularly shareholder friendly governance regime and its very active takeover market. To this is added three longitudinal case studies of cross-border hostile takeover processes during the sixth takeover wave in Europe. These reveal that the success of cross-border hostile bids has little to do with the theory of the market for corporate control, as a market where contests enable “good managers” to win over “bad managers”, with the overarching goal of enhancing wealth creation for society at large. Instead the most successful actors on a market for corporate control are those who best understand that market’s power dynamics – including the use of regulatory and moral arbitrage between different national frameworks and the leveraging of short-termism of institutional investors. The case studies are then analyzed in relation to the revised Swedish takeover rules of 2009. This shows that the revision did not address the problems detected, focusing instead on enhancing deal making and further limiting the board’s ability to work for long term value creation. As a whole this thesis calls for a development of a theory of a market for corporate control that in a more sustainable way will enable board of directors to focus on the corporation as value accretive entity. Sophie Nachemson-Ekwall has conducted her PhD work at the Stockholm School of Economics and is today a researcher
at the Center for Management and Organization at the Stockholm School of Economics Institute for Research (SIR). She has a background as a prize winning financial journalist for over 20 years and has co-authored three books about delicate issues in large Swedish corporations.<br><p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2012</p>
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Papadopoulos, Panagiotis [Verfasser]. "Hostile Takeovers - The use of Attack and Defence Strategies : A Literature Review of possible theoretical approaches / Panagiotis Papadopoulos." München : GRIN Verlag, 2011. http://d-nb.info/1182342531/34.
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Ericson, Mona. "Iggesundsaffären : rationaliteter i en strategisk förvärvsprocess." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Företagslednings- och Arbetslivsfrågor (A), 1991. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-911.
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Företagsförvärv är ofta baserade på företagsledningars förväntningar om skalekonomiska fördelar, förbättrad lönsamhet och ökad konkurrensförmåga. Att dessa förväntningar inte alltid realiseras kan ha att göra med att viktiga förhållanden förbises redan i den process som föregår själva förvärvet, dvs i det s k "strategiska förspelet". Det som händer före ett förvärv har stor betydelse för dess utfall, vilket indikerats inom tidigare förvärvsforskning. Få forskare har dock uppmärksammat strategiska förspel som ett specifikt studieområde. Denna avhandling behandlar huvudmäns och exekutivs handlingar vid strategiska förspel i samband med fientliga uppköpserbjudanden. Boken innehåller en beskrivning av "Iggesundsaffären" 1980-1983 och ett försök att utveckla teoribildningar om vetandet om strategiska förvärvsprocesser. Det fall som studeras gäller bakgrunder till konsekvenser av Stora Kopparbergs och Billeruds ledningars uppköpserbjudande riktat till Iggesunds aktieägare den 29 april 1981. Detta uppköpserbjudande väckte stor offentlig uppmärksamhet och initierade genomgripande strukturella förändringar inom svensk skogsindustri och påverkade även ytterst sammanslagningen av MoDo, Iggesund och Holmen till det s k "Tredje Blocket".<br>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk.
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Schaik, Dimitri van. "M&A in Japan : an analysis of merger waves and hostile takeovers = M&A in Japan : een analyse van fusiegolven en vijandige overnames /." Rotterdam : Rotterdam : Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), Erasmus University Rotterdam ; Erasmus University [Host], 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13693.
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Nagy, Sandra. "Hostile takeovers in the face of the Business Judgment Rule : A comparative analysis between Sweden and the United States of America in regard to the Business Judgment Rule and the Unocal test." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Juridiska institutionen, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-306969.
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In cases concerning a hostile takeover occurring in the United States, the board of directors must fulfill the duties set forward by the Unocal test. If the board of directors succeed, it implies that the decision, regardless if it is a bad decision, is protected by the Business Judgment Rule. The Business Judgment Rule presumes that the board of directors in good faith made an informed decision in the line of the corporations’ interests. The Business Judgment Rule is inherently unique for American companies. In Sweden liability for directors is based on a culpa evaluation which in turn is based on principles deriving from tort law. This is the result from the corporate law only providing for a very limited part concerning liability. In this thesis, the different judicial systems are explained with focus on differences and similarities based on duties of the board. Moreover, the different liabilities from a Swedish and an American perspective will be discussed. Concluding, it is hard to distinguish a Swedish version of the Business Judgment Rule, however, the creation of one would most likely be beneficial since it, to a large extent, provides for a better business world.<br>Vid ett fientligt företagsförvärv i USA måste styrelseledamöterna visa att de uppfyller de krav som framställts genom Unocal-testet. Lyckas styreledamöterna uppfylla kraven så blir de skyddade från skadeståndsrättsligt ansvar i enlighet med the Business Judgment Rule, oavsett om beslutet ledde till en dålig affär. The Business Judgment Rule presumerar att styrelseledamöterna i god tro fattat ett välgrundat affärsbeslut som ligger i bolagets intresse. The Business Judgment Rule är unikt för amerikanska bolag. I Sverige utgår skadeståndsansvar för styrelseledamöter från en culpabedömning, vilket baseras på allmänna skadeståndsrättsliga principer då den aktiebolagsrättsliga skadeståndsdelen är begränsad. I denna uppsats redogörs de olika rättssystemen med fokus på likheter och skillnader i styrelseuppdraget. Vidare diskuteras styrelseledamöternas skadeståndsansvar utifrån ett amerikanskt och ett svenskt perspektiv. Slutligen visas det att det är svårt att se en svensk version till the Business Judgment Rule, men att en sådan troligen skulle vara att föredra då regeln ger effekter som bidrar till en bättre affärsvärld.
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Ahlqvist, Malin. "Alternatives to the use of unequal voting rights : a propos the potential threat to their effectiveness as a takeover defense." Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, 2004. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-2179.
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<p>Background: The origin of this study was the negotiations around a EU takeover directive, aimed at making the market for corporate control more open. One of the proposals was to neutralise shares carrying multiple rights in takeover situations when a potential acquirer obtains 75% of the total share capital. For many Swedish ownership groups, this would mean that the system of unequal voting rights, constituting an important defense to their control, would decrease in effectiveness. In the middle of writing this thesis, an EU agreement was finally reached, making the proposal voluntary to adopt. The imminent threat posed to the Swedish system faded, but has though not disappeared since the present rules anew will be brought under inspection in five years. </p><p>Purpose: To give examples on potential tactics to adopt if unequal voting rights would risk to become neutralised in takeover situations, these tactics dependent on two different scenarios: (1) Present Swedish ownership structure is considered advantageous for the country and thus to be remained or (2) A more open market for takeovers is desired. Course of action: Interviews have been conducted with parties within Swedish trade and industry, partly in order to assess the value and necessity of the content of this thesis. </p><p>Conclusion: The threat of an abolition of the unequal voting rights is not perceived as imminent by parties within Swedish trade and industry and few alternative resistance strategies are suggested. If current Swedish ownership structure is to be remained, the author proposes competition-reducing defenses, if a more open market for takeovers is aimed for, auction-inducing resistance strategies. The choice of how to proceed should depend on how afraid the Swedish Government and Swedish companies are of a change in present ownership structure.</p>
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Rossi, Luis Filipe. "Fusões e aquisições: hostis 'Takeovers'." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/34.
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Sontheimer, Christoph, and Benjamin Czubacki. "Shark Repellents : Predicting the Takeover-Likelihood by Means of Pre-emptive Anti-Takeover Provisions & Key Performance Indicators." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Företagsekonomi, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-157457.
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This study is concerned with public companies (listed on the stock exchange) which are threatened by an unwanted takeover-attempt. Particularly, the investigation is centered around opportunities for such companies to defend themselves against hostile takeovers. Therefore, this study covers defense strategies, the so-called anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) or shark repellents. More specifically, pre-emptive ATPs were analyzed in order to determine whether they are effective measures for a takeover-target to avoid being acquired. This question is widely discussed by existing literature that is concerned with the overall topic of mergers & acquisitions, whereby findings of prior researchers often are contradicting or inconclusive. Moreover, there is a lack of literature examining the case of takeover-attempts which are characterized by a hostile deal-attitude specifically. As the adoption of pre-emptive ATPs does have its pitfalls, we aimed to find implications for the management of publicly traded companies concerning the question if they should deploy pre-emptive ATPs or not. We analyzed hostile takeover-events which took place within the timeframe of 2003-2018, whereby target-companies where located all over the world. As done by other researchers before, the level of resistance against takeovers has been measured by forming an index (in this study denoted by G-Index*), which accounts for the number of pre-emptive ATPs adopted by the takeover-target. That index was used subsequently to test, if companies with a low/high level of resistance against takeovers were more/less likely to be acquired. As not only the resistance against takeovers is an influencing factor on the outcome of a takeover-event, we also measured the impact of performance- and contextual factors. Those comprise key performance indicators (KPIs) for efficiency and profitability, as well as the context factors region and industry. That measurement has been carried out using the binary logistic regression, whereby all mentioned aspects were included in one model to form a representative model of takeover-events. This model was used to examine the individual impacts of all variables on the one hand, and for predicting the takeover-likelihood for each company on the other hand. Subsequently, the predicted takeover-likelihood was tested via the Pearson correlation with the number of pre-emptive ATPs adopted by the public companies. By using the binary regression, we found that a higher level of managerial resistance against takeovers is decreasing the probability for a company to be acquired. High resistance against takeovers, measured by a high number of pre-emptive anti-takeover provisions adopted, does have a statistically significant negative effect on the takeover-likelihood. Moreover, another key finding is that a company which is more efficient than the average of its industry, is more likely to be acquired. High efficiency (measured by gross profit margin) does have a statistically significant positive effect on the takeover-likelihood. By using the Pearson correlation, we found a statistically significant relation between the number of pre-emptive ATPs adopted and the predicted takeover-likelihood. The predicted takeover-likelihood correlates negatively with the number of pre-emptive ATPs. These results show that pre-emptive ATPs can be an effective measure against hostile takeovers.
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Kangueehi, N. C. "Mergers and acquisitions as a strategy for business growth : a comparative overview." Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/5179.
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Magister Legum - LLM<br>This paper focuses on mergers and acquisitions as tools for business growth, how these have come into existence, their strengths, and mainly the reasons for their failure. Taking a closer look on how these have emerged in the United States, United Kingdom and South Africa. Amongst the various ways that companies are able to get business financing, mergers and acquisitions have emerged as one of the most popular strategies for business diversity and growth. Mergers and acquisitions are agreed upon by companies to achieve certain strategic and financial goals. This is usually achieved by the bringing together of two companies with often contrasting corporate personalities, cultures and value systems.¹ The field of mergers and acquisitions has grown greatly over the past half century. At one point, mergers and acquisitions was mainly a US phenomenon but during the 1990‘s their volume in Europe started rivaling that of the USA. By 2000's mergers and acquisitions had become commonly used corporate strategies for companies‘ worldwide.² Even though the number of mergers and acquisition seems to increase and decrease in waves, they have been studied frequently. A study revealed that in 2004 an acquisition was made every 18 minutes all year round. There was normally not a business day that would go by without the news of a merger or an acquisition in the media. The decision to merge, usually taken by the board and shareholders of a company is always preceded by extensive planning and implementation.³ Mergers and acquisitions are part of the continuing process of the growth of companies and as a result of the separation of ownership and management, it is management which will play the dominant part in the initiation of such mergers and acquisition and their motives could be primarily self-interest.⁴ It is expected that merging mostly results in the creation or formation of larger companies or units and if those large companies merge with others, even larger units will result therefrom. The result of that large unit can be a commercial or financial institution which is capable of exerting pressure on a country's economy.⁵ Despite their popularity, most mergers and acquisitions result in financial failures and may produce results that are undesirable for the stakeholders of the company. Some consequences that are usually detrimental to investors are share underperformance, which usually takes place months after the acquisition.⁶ Success
of mergers mostly depends on how well the organisations are integrated. This paper will examine mergers and acquisitions in depth, its overview, the motivation of companies to undertake mergers and acquisitions and the reason for its failures. The paper will also examine the regulations and the success of mergers and acquisitions in the United States, United Kingdom and South Africa. Lastly, the last chapter will conclude with a finding of whether mergers and acquisitions can be
said to be a strategy for business growth.
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Ducros, Éric. "Les engagements contractuels des actionnaires de référence lors de l'introduction en bourse." Phd thesis, Université Paris-Est, 2009. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00491909.
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Ce travail vise à déterminer dans le cadre des sociétés s'introduisant en bourse les facteurs explicatifs de la présence d'engagements contractuels par les principaux actionnaires d'une part et leur impact sur la valeur de la firme d'autre part. Le terme " engagement contractuel " fait référence à deux mécanismes mis en place au moment de l'introduction en bourse : les engagements de conservation d'actions par les dirigeants et les pactes d'actionnaires. Notre étude porte sur un échantillon de 292 entreprises introduites en bourse entre 1996 et 2000 sur le nouveau marché et le second marché de la bourse de Paris. Nos résultats montrent que la présence et la durée des engagements de conservation d'actions des dirigeants servent à signaler la valeur de la firme lorsque l'asymétrie d'information est grande mais aussi à compenser certaines inefficiences du système de gouvernance de l'entreprise. Nous observons également un impact négatif sur la valeur de la firme des engagements de conservation des dirigeants alors que ceux concernant les sociétés de capital risque l'influence positivement. Concernant les pactes d'actionnaires, nos travaux montrent que leur mise en place est d'autant plus probable que les dirigeants anticipent une cession future de l'entreprise. Ils ont par ailleurs une influence positive sur la valeur de la firme tant qu'ils ne protègent pas les signataires d'une prise de contrôle hostile ; dans ce dernier cas l'effet sur la valeur de la firme est négatif. Finalement, nous montrons qu'il existe une réaction négative du cours de bourse autour du jour de l'expiration des engagements de conservation.
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Pfeffer, Stephen T. "Hostile Takeover: The New Right Insurgent Movement, Ronald Reagan, and the Republican Party, 1977-1984." Ohio University / OhioLINK, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1345147645.
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Zhou, Xin, Teuta Alija, and Owoicho Ochoche. "Poison Pills : A management-shareholder benefits comparison." Thesis, Jönköping University, JIBS, Business Administration, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-12413.
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<p><strong>Abstract</strong></p><p><strong>Problem</strong>: The problem of this thesis involves the controversy that the implementation of poison pills generates. The conflict amongst various stakeholders that are affected directly or indirectly by the implementation of the poison pill also contributes significantly to the problem of this thesis.</p><p><strong>Purpose</strong>: The purpose of this thesis is to investigate and compare the benefits of the poison pill adoption on shareholder and management interests. We also seek to evaluate arguments for and against pill adoption, and determine if these arguments are valid in view of facts established from our study.</p><p><strong>Conclusions</strong>: Our study in this thesis has brought us to five conclusions about the poison pill policy in fulfillment of the purpose. We state in our conclusion that arguments for and against the poison pill can both be validated depending on the case, we also state that a general conclusion cannot be drawn as to the negative or positive effect of the poison pill on stakeholders. We proceed to argue that the pill is a very effective fighting toll in the current business world and state that more should be done to regulate pill implementation. We finish up our conclusion by identifying what appears to be an inverse relationship between management and shareholders benefits from the implementation of the pill.</p><p><strong> Originality</strong>: The uniqueness of our study resides in the theoretical framework that is developed from two prevailing hypotheses in the academic research of the poison pill. The previous studies either take on the management entrenchment hypothesis (MEH) or the shareholder interest hypothesis (SIH). However, we have combined the elements of both hypotheses and jointly revealed the advantages and disadvantages of the pill adoption for both management and shareholders via our original management shareholder benefits comparison matrix.</p>
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Parkinson, Christine. "Contested takeover bids 1975-1984 : an empirical study of the share price performance, financial characteristics, and defence strategies of companies which successfully defend a hostile takeover bid." Thesis, University of Bradford, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.262294.
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Reeves, Robert Coleman. "Mergers and acquisitions : an analysis of strategies for corporations desiring to hold undervalued real estate without threat of hostile takeover." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/77520.
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Thesis (M.S.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning, 1989.<br>Vita.<br>Includes bibliographical references (leaves 62-63).<br>by Robert Coleman Reeves, Jr., CPA.<br>M.S.
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Harris, Christopher Andrew. "Informing offeree shareholders : a comparative analysis of the circulars issued in England and Switzerland by the offeree board of directors in response to a hostile takeover offer /." [St. Gallen : s.n.], 2005. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/484927027.pdf.
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Maouche, Samia. "Les moyens de défense contre les OPA hostiles." Thesis, Sorbonne Paris Cité, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017USPCB231.
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Opérations particulièrement complexes, les offres publiques d'acquisition ne cessent de faire parler d'elles, plus particulièrement lorsqu'elles présentent un caractère hostile pour la société visée. De nombreux efforts législatifs ont été mis en œuvre en vue d'encadrer les OPA et de lutter contre les prises de contrôle rampantes. L'analyse du droit positif permet de mettre en lumière ces différents efforts ainsi que leur mise en œuvre à travers diverses techniques par les sociétés visées. Ces dernières ont par ailleurs développé un certain nombre de mécanismes de défense anti-OPA particulièrement efficaces, mais se révélant le plus souvent insuffisants face à l'ingéniosité dont peut faire preuve l'initiateur. Le droit positif montre ainsi ses limites face à des pratiques qui ne cessent d'évoluer. L'analyse prospective du droit anti-OPA permet d'observer les nouvelles mutations que subit le droit positif au regard des nouveaux enjeux économiques. Elle permet également d'envisager de nouveaux modes d'appréhension des OPA hostiles. Il est ainsi possible d'observer que le gouvernement d'entreprise prend une place considérable dans la vie des sociétés cotées. De même, la montée en puissance de la régulation et l'interventionnisme de l’État sont de plus en plus marqués ; et les salariés s'impliquent de plus en plus dans la gestion de l'entreprise. L'ensemble de ces paramètres marquent un glissement progressif vers une réorganisation du mode de fonctionnement des sociétés, ce qui a amené au développement du soft law, un droit à la frontière du droit positif et des pratiques des sociétés. Le soft law constitue à ce titre une approche inédite des OPA hostiles, dont l'analyse permet de cerner les apports liés à la mutation du droit positif et d'envisager l'émergence de nouveaux moyens de défense. Celui-ci doit toutefois demeurer complémentaire au cadre législatif et réglementaire existant<br>No abstract
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Nedvědová, Nikola. "Převzetí společnosti skrze insolvenční řízení (SAZKA, a.s.)." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2012. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-162866.
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This thesis deals with takeovers in the Czech environment according to the Insolvency Act No. 182/2006 Coll., which passed an amendment to the 1. 1. 2008. There are methods of resolving insolvency of the debtor and principles of insolvency proceedings which should be followed during the insolvency process. Work distinguishes friendly and hostile takeover. The theoretical part provides an overview of possible ways of takeover, the reasons that motivate new owners to think about a possible takeover and globally applicable defense strategies. Another theoretical starting point is consideration of the reorganization of the company, which may be conducted by both the debtor and of the creditor(s). The practical part describes the hostile takeover of SAZKA from its history, through description of the key moments of crisis to insolvency proceedings which resulted in the bankruptcy of the debtor. Subsequent hostile takeover was directed by PPF and KKCG, which bought up commitment wagers and therefore became important creditors (controlling the betting and lottery activities) and later winner of the tender for the sale of the entire company. This case is a textbook example of takeover of the company, which had fallen into financial distress. The battle for the largest lottery company in the country was very hard, long and eventually resulted in a very profitable business, which fell into the arms of a single owner.
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Mendia, Twardowsky Bianca. "Le droit français des OPA - un modèle pour le droit brésilien ?" Thesis, Sorbonne Paris Cité, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017USPCB237.
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L'objectif de cette thèse est d'analyser le système juridique français et brésilien concernant les stratégies de défense contre les offres publiques d'acquisition visant à prendre le contrôle des sociétés cotées en bourse. Les offres publiques d'acquisition font l'objet d'un vif débat, plus particulièrement lorsqu'elles présentent un caractère hostile pour la société cible. En France, de nombreux efforts législatifs ont été mis en œuvre en vue d'encadrer les OPA et de lutter contre les prises de contrôle rampantes. L'analyse du droit positif permet de mettre en lumière ces différents efforts ainsi que leur mise en œuvre à travers diverses techniques par les sociétés visées. Grâce à l'analyse juridique des stratégies anti-OPA en France, le système brésilien peut prendre connaissance de cette expérience et trouver la meilleure approche juridique pour les sociétés cotées ayant un capital flottant important. Au Brésil, la récente vague d'IPO a été possible grâce à la réforme dans la bourse BM&FBOVESPA. Dorénavant, la BM&FBOVESPA présente le scénario idéal pour prendre le contrôle des sociétés cotées. Ainsi, l'importance de ce thème est le résultat de la dispersion de l'actionnariat après la première vague d'introduction en bourse dans le marché de capitaux brésilien, et en France, elle se traduit par l'évolution dans environnement légal des défenses anti-OPA face à des pratiques qui ne cessent d'évoluer<br>The objective of this thesis is to analyse the French experience and the Brazilian legal environment concerning the defense strategies against hostile corporate takeovers aimed at taking control over public companies. Through the analysis of the French legal system of the anti-takeover strategies, the Brazilian system will be able to acquire this experience and find the best legal approach for Brazilian public companies with dispersed ownership. The importance of this theme is the result of the ownership dispersion following the first IPOs in the current Brazilian securities exchange market, which provides the ideal scenario for taking control of these publicly-traded companies, as well as the changes and the evolution in the French legal environment
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Liu, Junzhe. "Hostile takeovers in China? : so different a picture." 2004. http://link.library.utoronto.ca/eir/EIRdetail.cfm?Resources__ID=95112&T=F.
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WU, YU-LUNG, and 吳郁隆. "Research on Corporate Acquisition Systems and an Investigation of Hostile Takeovers and Takeover Defense Strategies." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/60063728335503700243.
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碩士<br>國立臺灣大學<br>會計學研究所<br>94<br>Following the changes in economic environment and the transformation of the industrial structure, the upgrading of industry and the globalization of business have become important new trends. In the process, the merging of companies plays an important role. The purpose of these mergers is obviously different from those in the past. Previously, companies intended to expand their market share and to diversify their operations. In contrast, the current mergers, which take international competition into consideration, focus on timing control, cost reduction, acquisition of intellectual property rights and obtainment of high value-added brands and channels. The new trends have made mergers become important strategies for business development.
In response to these trends, it is essential for Taiwanese companies to utilize the extensive foreign experiences in merging activities over the past years for research and reinforcing the domestic regulations in regard to mergers. It is vital to provide a fair and efficient merging environment for Taiwanese companies in order to assist them in acquiring the necessary techniques, intellectual property rights, raw materials, capacities, production capacity, channels, brands and markets, and hence become successful international enterprises and make Taiwan more visible in the world.
As the kinds of mergers are varied and extensive, this thesis intends to focus on the study of “ Acquisition”, including the definition of acquiring assets and shares from legal perspective, the related tax preferences and the practice of acquisition. Additionally, as the public are concerned about issues regarding “ Public Tender Offer” and “ Hostile Acquisition and its defense strategy” in recent years, we also analyze these two practices in conjunction with the illustration of case studies. We hope that this research will provide valuable information to companies that utilize the related merging tools, and to regulators who need a clearer direction when amending “ Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act”, “The Financial Institutions Merger Act” and “The Financial Holding Company Act”
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HSIEH, YI-HSIU, and 謝伊琇. "A Comparative Study of Hostile Takeovers of Taiwan and China." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/8wjpxn.
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碩士<br>東吳大學<br>法律學系<br>106<br>We have tried to analyze the differences between the two sides of the legal rules and regulations, and the concepts, requirements, advantages and disadvantages of both sides of the legal system, as well as the ways in which the two sides of the legal rules and regulations are often observed, and to give a good idea and a good warning on the improvement of the laws and regulations of the two sides.
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Huang, Tzu-Yi, and 黃子懿. "A cases study of hostile takeovers of china from legal perspective." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/upcrec.
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碩士<br>國立政治大學<br>法律學系<br>107<br>With the rapid internationalization and liberalization of economic development, in order to pursue the success of the business in terms of economy of scale, operational efficiency, market share expansion, sustainable competitive advantages. Corporations are increasingly compelled to accelerate advancement in competitiveness via mergers and acquisitions. In 2016, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) witnessed a spike in mergers and acquisitions due to widespread national policy support. This research paper presents an introduction and an explanation of the legitimacy of antitakeover defenses centered on the commercial legal systems in China.
The actions taken by the party initiating hostile takeover and the target company often led to corporate control contests, making both parties and the shareholders suffer losses. We use event study’s result as evidence for whether the stock holder’s wealth had changed significantly during the event period. As mergers and acquisitions are an important means of competition for corporations, how to enable corporations to utilize takeover mechanisms without the restrictions of the letter of the law or government oversight. This thesis begins by introducing and explaining the comparative definition of mergers and acquisitions, and hostile takeovers in China and United States. It also introduces the legislative history of mergers and acquisitions, states anti-takeover statutes, and judicial review standards in China. Furthermore, it discusses the legitimacy of antitakeover defenses in the U.S. and Taiwan. Finally, this thesis formulates conclusions and suggestions.
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Van, Schaik Dimitri. "M&A in Japan : an analysis of merger waves and hostile takeovers /." 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13693.
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SHENG, CHAO CHIEN, and 趙建昇. "A Study on the Law of Hostile Takeovers-- An Example of Tender Offer." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/83376875789066509803.
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Snyder, Matthew. "Hostile Takeovers and Corporate Purpose: The Role of Poison Pills in Ontario Securities Law." Thesis, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1807/42941.
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This paper examines the Ontario Securities Commission's regulation of poison pills as well as several proposals to reform the current regulatory regime. In particular, the paper argues that regulation and reforms should be viewed within the context of two fundamental, normative questions that underlie much of corporate law: what is the purpose of the corporation, and who should determine whether these goals are being met. After outlining several competing theories, the paper explains why a corporate model based on the shareholder-centric, wealth maximization theory is best suited for hostile takeover situations. Additionally, the paper argues that a structural bid reform that would require hostile bidders to include minimum tender conditions and additional opportunities for target company shareholders to tender following a successful bid would provide the best way to incorporate this corporate model into Ontario securities regulation.
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Yu, Tang-Hsien, and 余唐賢. "The Studies of the Announcement Effects of Hostile Takeovers and Their Impacts on Shareholder Wealth." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/7kqj87.
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碩士<br>銘傳大學<br>管理研究所<br>95<br>After Taiwan joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2002 and passed the Business Mergers and Acquisitions Laws (BMALs), domestic enterprises must improve their operations and search for merge or acquisition(M&A) targets against competition from transnational corporations. Meanwhile, the presence of hostile takeover results in severe fights of ownership and managerial control among domestic firms. The study focuses on the announcement effects of hostile M&As from acquiring firms and those of resisting targets respectively. The study investigates the possibility of significant abnormal returns from these announcements according to the event study. The findings are as follows. Firstly, according to the Corrado rank test and t-test, during the period of hostile takeover announcements, abnormal returns are not statistically significant for acquiring firms. Nevertheless, they are significantly positive for target firms. Secondly, during the period of anti-hostile takeovers, the abnormal returns are not statistically significant for both acquiring and target firms. As a whole based on the above findings, the announcements of hostile takeovers and anti-hostile takeovers do not result in abnormal and provide a semi-strong efficient market in Taiwan.
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Copoiu, Ruxandra Alina. "Hostile takeovers and the role of the target's board of directors : a transatlantic review of the existing regulations and practices." Master's thesis, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/17658.
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DalbakovaSayana and 謝娜. "The Comparative Analysis of Hostile Takeovers and Antitakeover Tactics from the Perspective of the Laws of Russia, Taiwan and the USA." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/87803934920445391854.
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碩士<br>國立成功大學<br>法律學系<br>100<br>This paper provides a comparative analysis of hostile takeovers and antitakeover tactics in USA, Taiwan and Russia. At the present time of globalization and close international cooperation, it is important to define the basic directions of activity the world should follow. Thus, taking in consideration that the number of corporations in the world has been increasing over the years, and most of them are becoming international actors, the necessity of this research is out of the discussion. As we know, the Delaware state has one of the most reputable legal and judicial systems of corporate regulation. Therefore, the author of the research pays a lot of attention to the best practices of Delaware Court to develop the basic directions that Taiwan and Russia should follow.
The research contains theoretical discussion on economic rationale of hostile takeovers and defensive measures in corporate governance. Basing on existing scientific views and practical conclusions of outstanding researches, the author assesses positive and negative aspects of hostile takeovers. In the process, the author inclines that hostile takeovers, being an instrument for corporate growth and a functioning method for manager’s incentive, are valuable for market of corporate control.
Further, the discussion concerns the question of defenses against hostile takeovers. In this respect, the main outlined directions of the discussion are as follows: what negative and positive impacts in adopting antitakeover tactics are; what kind of concessions corporations should make to carry on the defense; what kind of defenses there are in corporate governance and what kind of defenses or combinations thereof are more suitable for corporations. Thus, the research contains the classification of takeover defenses, definition and description of the most common tactics. The author concludes that the combination of staggered board and poison pill is an effective tool against hostile takeover. At the same time, the combination restrains the possibility of mobile restructuring of Company and the Board of the Directors in particular.
The practical part of the research contains the analysis of legal regulations concerning hostile takeovers in USA, Taiwan and Russia. The main objective of the analysis is to detect possible ways of improvement for Russian law in corporate governance. Thus, comparing the USA legal system with the systems of Taiwan and Russia, we can say that the big advantage of the US system is the precedent law. Taiwan and Russia, being adherent to Continental model of legal system, lose their mobility to smoothly change legal regulations on corporate governance. However, it is not the single disadvantage that Taiwan and Russia should work on. Accordingly, the other problems of imperfect system of corporate governance in Russia lie in its history, namely the process of privatization, which led to criminal wars, corruption and further by the State into all sectors of the economy.
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Hung, Yi-Lin, and 洪怡琳. "The Game Theory Study of Answering Policy for Target Firm Hostile Takeovers─Take the Microsoft Merger and Acquisition Yahoo for An example─." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/19451356554711943177.
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碩士<br>嶺東科技大學<br>國際企業研究所<br>97<br>ABSTRACT
In recent years, with the liberalization of the global market as well as the increasing integration of company law, such a hostile takeovers between the two countries was in the United Kingdom the United States occur more frequently with the means of the type of Merger and Acquisition, has been active in the global market gradually, become the main tool for rapid expansion and growing of the territory of enterprises. Therefore, our practice and the academic community forecast, Hostile takeovers will be the future of our country and around the world in general, show a trend. The only types of hostile takeovers, the target company as a result of a violation of the wishes of the incumbent operator, the target company for the incumbent operators to resist hostile takeovers and acquisitions, which will take a variety of defensive measures, however, whether the target company operators have to take defensive measures to resist the hostile takeovers?
Therefore, based on the above issues, the target enterprises（Yahoo）will be the main goal, how to deal with when the target enterprise（Microsoft） at the time of the face of hostile takeovers strategy on model, while as the theme of this paper, The Game Theory Study of Answering Policy for Target Firm Hostile Takeovers, research on the subject of a theoretical foundation, then explore the meaning of hostile mergers and acquisitions as well as various types of hostile mergers and acquisitions, while the application of game theory to reasoning, and to propose measures to respond to business objectives, and finally to the take the case Microsoft hostile takeovers Yahoo for an example.
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Tseng, Hsin-Yi, and 曾心怡. "ASE's Hostile Takeover of SPIL." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/466yxx.
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碩士<br>國立清華大學<br>科技管理研究所<br>105<br>On August 21, 2015, there was a merger and acquisition (M&A) case in Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. When TAIEX index took a nosedive even fell below the lowest record of the past decade, Advanced Semiconductor Engineering (ASE), the world-leading packaging and testing industry firm launched an offer to acquire nearly 25 percent stake of competitor Siliconware Precision Industries Co. Ltd. (SPIL) whose annual output value is the third-ranked in the world. If the M&A program is successfully completed, the result will enable ASE become a majority shareholder of SPIL. Since SPIL claimed they knew nothing about the M&A plan beforehand, they issued a statement accusing ASE of conducting a “hostile takeover”.
The research is conducted by collecting and collating multiple sub-data which the total number of articles are about 14,000, and identifies the motivation and related effect of the M&A case from SPIL’s point of view. First of all, understanding the history and management style of SPIL and ASE separately. Second, discussing the characteristics of the semiconductor packaging industry and analyzing its trends in recent years. Finally, because the attack and defense between them do not stop in a short time, it is suggested that this M&A case about ASE and SPIL is worthy of attention in the future.
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Ren, Ke. "Re-examining the hostile takeover." Thesis, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/9029.
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The thesis purports to examine the phenomenon of hostile takeovers in the United States
and Canada. The thesis starts with a review of history of takeover waves in the United
States and the various theories attempting to explain the hostile takeover and customise the
role of target management in this context. The author argues that the hostile takeover is a
heterogeneous phenomenon. The heterogeneity of the hostile takeover demands a
differential approach of regulation that encourages wealth-creating takeovers, and chills
wealth-transferring takeovers.
The hostile takeover may serve as a crucible to the soundness of a corporate governance
structure. The thesis surveys the different approaches the courts of United States (mainly
the Delaware courts) and Canada employ to tackle the issue of directors' duties in the
context of hostile takeover bids. The author argues that the Delaware "Business Judgement
Rule" approach is comparatively more coherent and effective in addressing the issue than
the Canadian approach of proper purpose test.
The author further reviews the regulatory regimes regarding takeovers in the United States
and Canada. The author argues that generally both regimes have successfully fulfilled the
goal of full and fair disclosure of information in hostile takeover bids, and a level playing
field for acquirers and target companies. However, new regulatory development
represented by the state antitakeover statutes purporting to eliminate the hostile takeover
has begun to change the landscape of takeover regulation in the United States. The author
argues that the elimination of hostile takeovers should be considered premature unless
alternative mechanisms of corporate accountability are available.
Are there any alternative schemes of corporate accountability available to replace hostile
takeovers? Are there efficiencies made possible in the absence of hostile takeovers? The
thesis strives to answer these questions by reviewing evidence from Japan, Germany and the
United Kingdom. Two leading alternative schemes of corporate accountability - Gilson and
Kraakman's independent directors and the Cadbury Report's Code of Best Practice - are
also discussed. Finally, the author concludes that there are viable alternative schemes of
corporate monitoring available for the United States and Canada to adopt, which may
effectively render hostile takeovers obsolete as wasteful and controversial corporate
monitors. There are also tangible movements toward the establishment of such alternative
mechanisms in the North America. Hostile takeovers, a heterogeneous and controversial
phenomenon that has enthralled academia and the business world for decades, will
eventually fade into the history.
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Chou, Chih-Chun, and 周芝君. "A Study on Hostile Takeover and Defensive Tactics." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/37841713420722740295.
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碩士<br>國立臺北大學<br>法律學系一般生組<br>96<br>In order to fight for the possession of management between companies for the past few years in our country, the most of merger and acquisition purchase the stock of the target company in call market, or proxy contest. After Negotiable securities exchange law added some more law about the tender offer, and amended the "proxy rule" on the proxy solicitation in 1995, the cases of processing hostile takeover by way of tender offer are gradually increased. The hostile takeover would be a trend in near future. It is necessary to survey the existing rules about the hostile tender offer whether achieve the regulations objective or not.
This text illustrates the meaning, type and attack strategy of merger and acquisition and hostile takeover. Then it makes clarify whether hostile takeover and defensive tactics are appropriate with examples of America which hostile takeover is more active. Moreover, according to the legal system experiences about England, America and European Union, it also makes a description of our country’s standpoint about defensive tactics. And in a point of view of ownership structure, regulations environment and moderation of conflict of interests between merger and acquisition parties, it analyzes our country’s attitude about the policy of hostile takeover.Body of abstract starts here.
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Lo, Hsueh-yu, and 羅學禹. "Attack and Defense Strategies of Hostile Takeover ：A Case of China Development Financial Holding Company(CDFHC)Hostile Takeover Taiwan International Securities Corporation(TISC)." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/60044928929793929494.
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Chiung, Ming-Lung, and 江明龍. "The Determinant of Hostile Takeover in Taiwan''s Public Offering Companies." Thesis, 1997. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/27361071164940022455.
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