Academic literature on the topic 'Human and organizational errors'
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Journal articles on the topic "Human and organizational errors"
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Gronewold, Ulfert, and Michaela Donle. "Organizational Error Climate and Auditors' Predispositions toward Handling Errors." Behavioral Research in Accounting 23, no. 2 (November 1, 2011): 69–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/bria-10061.
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ABSTRACT Handling their own errors effectively is important for auditors to assure audit quality. Similarly, how auditors deal with their clients' errors may affect clients' cooperativeness, which is a prerequisite for conducting audits effectively and efficiently. Auditors' predispositions will likely influence how they actually approach errors. We introduce the constructs of (and develop measures for) the error climate of audit organizations and auditors' predispositions toward handling their own errors and client errors and relate them in a theoretical model. Empirical results from a sample of 284 external, internal, and public sector auditors support that an audit organization's error climate positively influences auditors' predisposition toward handling their own errors, which, in turn, positively influences their predisposition toward handling client errors. These results imply that an appropriately shaped error climate may serve as a “soft” management control mechanism by fostering predispositions toward functional error handling behaviors. We discuss implications for research and practice. Data Availability: Contact the first author.
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Göktürk, Söheyda, Oguzhan Bozoglu, and Gizem Günçavdi. "Error management practices interacting with national and organizational culture." Learning Organization 24, no. 4 (May 8, 2017): 245–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/tlo-07-2016-0041.
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Purpose Elements of national and organizational cultures can contribute much to the success of error management in organizations. Accordingly, this study aims to consider how errors were approached in two state university departments in Turkey in relation to their specific organizational and national cultures. Design/methodology/approach The study follows a qualitative case study design, and the data were collected through five focus groups. The cases under consideration were two state university departments of different organizational sizes. Findings The results showed that organizational and national culture elements (collectivism, high power distance and relatively low future orientation) significantly interacted with error management practices. In both of the organizations studied, there were found to be limited attempts to prevent the errors unless there was an emergent situation. Error detection was shown to be slow and hindered because of indirect communication among staff. Ultimately, effective error management in these organizations was identified as being unattainable because of negative emotional reactions to errors, lower reporting, restricted communication, potential face loss considerations and lack of feedback. Originality/value The findings of the current work extend earlier error management research with empirical data drawn from two cases in the higher education domain. Thus, the study offers preliminary research into the error process in education, and contributes to future research relating organizational culture to error processes.
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Tomić, Silvia, Milovan Lazarević, Leposava Grubić-Nešić, Danijela Ćirić Lalić, and Jelena Kanjuh. "Human error management approach in practice: the use of HERCA tool for a systematic analysis of human errors." Journal of East European Management Studies 27, no. 4 (2022): 637–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0949-6181-2022-4-637.
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In recent years, human errors have been perceived as circumstances contributing to the organizational learning process. On the other hand, as inevitable products of human performance, human errors have been cited as a factor with a high impact on various types of losses for organizations. To reduce the negative consequences of human errors and increase the potential of their positive impact, it is of tremendous importance for organizations to manage them. This study applied the Human Error Root Cause Analysis (HERCA) tool to analyze human errors and their real causes. Based on the literature review, additional parameters were identified and included in data collection to increase the quality of the data collection phase as a crucial step for understanding the circumstances that led to an error. Research for this study was conducted on a sample of 176 human errors in a floor-producing company.
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Tang, Jun Xi, Li Cheng Wang, Peng Jia Shi, Zhao Li, Su Hong Pang, and Chuang Xin Guo. "Research on the Influence Factors System of Human Error in Power System." Advanced Materials Research 988 (July 2014): 687–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.988.687.
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Along with the development of science and technology, equipment reliability is improving and human error has become an increasingly important threat to the power system reliability and safety. However, there is seldom research for the human errors in electric power generation. In this paper, the classification and the main causes of human errors in power system are analyzed firstly. Then, the influence factors of human error are divided into several groups, which are organizational factors, mission factors, individual factors, environment and equipment factors. By analyzing the impact of different influence factors, an influence factors system of human error in power system is proposed and lays a foundation for the further explorations.
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Paramanantham, Shampave, and Sidath Liyanage. "Assessing the Impact of Human Error Assessment on Organization Performance in the Software Industry." International Journal of Information Systems and Social Change 14, no. 1 (January 1, 2023): 1–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijissc.314563.
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The influence of human errors on organizations is wide-ranging concerning customer service, productivity, teamwork, quality, execution, decision-making, and loss (Irmi.com, 2018). When the employee makes an error, this may prompt an operational failure, effectively affecting whatever is being assessed. There is a commonly accepted connection between human errors and organizational performance. However, the theory is all hypothesis without confirmation since there is minimal literature writing in this research. Data was gathered from 365 employees of IT export companies in Sri Lanka. 5 people working as project managers in IT export companies were interviewed to get their opinion about human errors. The findings show that human errors such as skill-based, design, quality testing, and maintenance errors can significantly influence performance outcomes, namely sales growth, return on investment, customer satisfaction, innovation development, and product and service quality.
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Emby, Craig, Bin Zhao, and Jost Sieweke. "Audit Senior Modeling Fallibility: The Effects of Reduced Error Strain and Enhanced Error-Related Self-Efficacy on Audit Juniors' Responses to Self-Discovered Errors." Behavioral Research in Accounting 31, no. 2 (June 1, 2019): 17–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/bria-52471.
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ABSTRACT This paper examines the relationship between audit seniors discussing their own experiences with committing and correcting errors (modeling fallibility), and audit juniors' thinking about errors and error communication (openly discussing their own self-discovered errors). The paper investigates the direct relationship between senior modeling fallibility and juniors' responses, and whether the relationship is mediated through error strain and error-related self-efficacy. Survey data from 266 audit juniors from two Big 4 Canadian accounting firms showed a direct positive association between audit senior modeling fallibility and audit juniors' thinking about errors, and error communication. This relationship is positively mediated through error-related self-efficacy. We also found that the relationship is mediated by error strain. However, although audit senior modeling fallibility was associated with reduced error strain, error strain was positively related to both thinking about errors and error communication, contrary to our hypothesis. The paper discusses the theoretical and practical implications of these results.
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Shi, Xiaobo, Yan Liu, Dongyan Zhang, Ruixu Li, Yaning Qiao, Alex Opoku, and Caiyun Cui. "Influencing Factors of Human Errors in Metro Construction Based on Structural Equation Modeling (SEM)." Buildings 12, no. 10 (September 21, 2022): 1498. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/buildings12101498.
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Safety problems in metro construction occur frequently, causing substantial economic losses and even resulting in injuries and fatalities. Studies have shown that human errors, which are usually caused by complex reasons, are an important cause of safety related accidents. However, little research has analyzed the causes of accidents from the perspective of human errors. To explore the factors influencing human errors, the factors were systematically sorted out and studied based on theoretical analysis. Firstly, the theoretical hypothesis and model were formulated through a literature review. Secondly, the scale was developed for mental factors, physical factors, technical factors, environmental factors, organizational factors, cultural factors, and human errors. Thirdly, the research data were obtained by distributing questionnaires, and the validity and reliability tests were conducted using the data and the structural equation model was tested and run. Finally, the theoretical hypotheses were tested using the structural equation models and came up with the paths of the six factors of human errors. The results of the study showed that mental factors, physiological factors, and technological factors are found to be the direct influencing factors of human errors. However, environmental and cultural factors are the indirect influencing factors. The influencing paths are environment-mental-human errors, environment-physiological-human errors, culture-physiological-human errors, and culture-technology-human errors. Organizational factors can affect human errors directly or indirectly through cultural factors. These findings could provide practical implications for reducing the safety related accidents caused by human errors during metro construction.
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Ramanujam, Rangaraj, and Paul S. Goodman. "Latent errors and adverse organizational consequences: a conceptualization." Journal of Organizational Behavior 24, no. 7 (2003): 815–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/job.218.
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Grohnert, Therese, Roger H. G. Meuwissen, and Wim H. Gijselaers. "Valuing errors for learning: espouse or enact?" Journal of Workplace Learning 29, no. 5 (July 10, 2017): 394–408. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jwl-11-2016-0102.
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Purpose This study aims to investigate how organisations can discourage covering up and instead encourage learning from errors through a supportive learning from error climate. In explaining professionals’ learning from error behaviour, this study distinguishes between espoused (verbally expressed) and enacted (behaviourally expressed) values with respect to learning from errors. Design/methodology/approach As part of mandatory training sessions, 150 early-career auditors completed an online questionnaire measuring error orientation and help-seeking behavior after making an error as attitude- and behavior-based measures, next to measuring perceived organizational learning from error climate. Multiple mediation analysis is used to explore direct and indirect effects. Findings Covering up errors was negatively and learning from errors positively related to an organisation’s learning from error climate. For covering up, this relationship is an indirect one – espoused and enacted values need to match. For learning from errors, this relationship is direct: espoused values positively relate to learning behaviour after errors. Practical implications By designing a supportive learning from error climate in which members at all hierarchical levels role-model learning from errors behaviour, organisations can actively discourage covering up and encourage learning from errors. Originality/value This study applies the theory of espoused versus enacted values to learning from error using a triangulation of measures in an understudied research setting: auditing.
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Asgarian, Azadeh, Keivan Ghassami, Farahnaz Heshmat, Abolfazl Mohammadbeigi, and Mohammad Abbasinia. "Barriers and Facilitators of Reporting Medical Errors in a Hospital: A Qualitative Study." Archives of Hygiene Sciences 10, no. 4 (October 1, 2021): 279–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.32598/ahs.10.4.251.2.
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Background & Aims of the Study: Reporting human errors in healthcare agencies is often accompanied by embarrassment and the fear of punishment; such errors can highlight motivation, the lack of attention, and enough education. Thus, there is a tendency to hide them. This study aimed to investigate the barriers and facilitators of reporting medical errors in hospitals. Materials and Methods: A qualitative study design with a conventional content analysis approach was used. The data were collected through in-depth semi-structured interviews with a purposive sample of 13 employers working in the hospital in Qom Province, Iran. Interviews were transcribed and finally analyzed through conventional content analysis. Accordingly, its results were presented in a theme, subcategories, and categories. Results: Our findings indicated that the employees had a multilevel perspective of medical error, viewing facilitators, and barriers to a medical error concerning several system levels. The barriers to medical error included individual, organizational, and social barriers. The facilitators of medical errors consisted of education, organizational, and cultural facilities. Conclusion: Findings suggested the need for support and security for employees and consideration of facilities to prevent the nonreporting of errors. Managers must provide the necessary personal, professional, and legal support to employees to remove barriers to encourage them to report the mistakes effectively.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Human and organizational errors"
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Taylor-Hyde, Dr Mary Ellen. "Human Resource Strategies for Improving Organizational Performance to Reduce Medical Errors." ScholarWorks, 2017. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/3580.
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Preventable medical errors are the third leading cause of death in the United States. Healthcare leaders must consistently promote the delivery of quality and safe care of patients to reduce unnecessary errors and prevent harm. The purpose of this case study was to explore human resource strategies for improving organizational performance to reduce medical errors. The study included face-to-face interviews with 5 healthcare clinical managers who work within a multifaceted health system in the Midwestern region of the United States. Complex adaptive systems theory was used to frame this study. Interview notes, publicly available documents, and audio recordings were transcribed and analyzed to identify themes regarding strategies used by managers to find effective ways for improvement. Four themes emerged: addressing seminal/never events, ongoing training programs, communication/collaboration, and promoting a culture of safety and quality. Results may directly benefit healthcare managers by facilitating successful strategies to reduce preventable medical errors through education, feedback, innovation, and leadership. Implications for social change for healthcare managers include continued training, building a culture of safety, and using collaborative and communicative efforts while making contributions to the best practices within healthcare organizations to reduce the likelihood of medical errors.
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Baltazar, Ana Rita Duarte Gomes Simões. "Erro humano e erro organizacional nas atividades de manutenção das aeronaves na perspetiva da Grounded Theory : o caso nacional." Doctoral thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/20577.
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Doutoramento em GestãoNos últimos anos ocorreram situações que demonstram que os acidentes em organizações de elevada fiabilidade têm consequências catastróficas que precisam de ser contidas ou evitadas. As medidas para a contenção e prevenção do erro estão estabelecidas nesse tipo de organizações, mas focalizam-se em evitar as consequências negativas dos erros, não analisando as consequências positivas dos mesmos (quando existem). A literatura aponta como consequências positivas a aprendizagem, a inovação e a resiliência. O trabalho conclui que de forma conceptual a consequência positiva dos erros é um aumento da Segurança Organizacional através de processos de melhoria associados à Aprendizagem Organizacional. O erro humano não deve ser primariamente entendido como a principal causa dos acidentes, mas antes como uma possível consequência da atividade organizacional. Foi necessário compreender como (How) ocorre e porque (Why) ocorre o erro organizacional; e, ainda, qual a relação entre os diferentes níveis de erro (humano, de equipa e organizacional) e os fatores organizacionais. Esta abordagem transportou o investigador para a necessidade de uma análise aprofundada do conceito de condições/erros latentes. O conhecimento das causas primárias de um incidente/acidente poderá levar a que se criem indicadores que sirvam de alertas em situações futuras e/ou se alterem essas mesmas condições para que se evitem situações idênticas. Verificou-se neste trabalho que cada incidente/acidente, depois de estudado, é uma fonte de informação absolutamente essencial para a melhoria do sistema. No entanto, existem outras fontes que necessitam de ser mais estimuladas, nomeadamente, o reporte de ocorrências e a correspondente análise e partilha de resultados na Organização. A investigação recorre a uma metodologia qualitativa e os resultados aplicam-se apenas à Organização em estudo. O modelo final explica como através do erro de manutenção aeronáutica, na Força Aérea Portuguesa, se aumenta a Segurança Organizacional.
In recent years, situations have occurred which demonstrate that accidents in High Reliability Organizations have catastrophic consequences that need to be restrained or avoided. Measures to contain and prevent errors are established in this type of organizations, but focus on avoiding the negative consequences of errors, thus not analyzing their positive consequences (when they exist). The literature points to positive consequences of learning, innovation and resilience. The study concludes that, in a conceptual way, the positive consequence of the errors is an increase of the Organizational Security through processes of improvement associated with the Organizational Learning. Human error should not be primarily understood as the main cause of accidents, but rather as a possible consequence of organizational activity. It is necessary to understand how and why organizational errors occur; and the relationship between the different levels of error (human, team and organizational) and organizational factors. This approach transported the researcher to the need for an in-depth analysis of the concept of latent conditions / errors. Knowing the root cause of an incident / accident may lead to the creation of indicators that serve as warnings in future situations and / or change the same conditions, so that similar situations are avoided. It was verified in this study that each incident / accident, once studied, is an absolutely essential source of information for the improvement of the system. However, there are other sources that need to be more stimulated, namely the reporting of occurrences and the corresponding analysis and sharing of results in the organization. The research uses a qualitative methodology and the results apply only to the organization being studied. The final model explains how the Organizational Safety is increased, through the aeronautical maintenance error in the Portuguese Air Force.
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Barbarini, Luiz Henrique Maiorino. "Análise de risco para embarcações com sistemas de alarmes com foco nos fatores humanos e organizacionais." Universidade de São Paulo, 2012. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/3/3135/tde-19102012-104521/.
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Este trabalho apresenta uma proposta de modelo de análise de risco para embarcações, incorporando em sua formulação a influência das interações entre os sistemas de alarmes e os fatores humanos e organizacionais presentes a bordo. De acordo com estatísticas de sociedades classificadoras, o homem é o maior responsável por acidentes marítimos, e, desta forma, é um dos principais componentes da segurança de uma embarcação. A relevância do elemento humano se dá pelo fato de que ações e decisões humanas estão relacionadas tanto à causa, quanto à prevenção de acidentes. O sistema de alarmes é um equipamento de segurança obrigatório, e com direta participação na dinâmica de um acidente, fornecendo informação para a tomada de decisão das ações por parte da tripulação na resolução do problema. O estudo da interação entre este equipamento e o elemento humano a bordo permite a gestores e armadores elaborar diretrizes para investimentos em sistemas de segurança e políticas que influenciam o desempenho humano, e, portanto, a segurança a bordo. O modelo proposto, inspirado em relatório de acidentes marítimos, tem como ponto de partida uma estrutura sequencial do acidente e leva em consideração uma sucessão usual e simplificada dos eventos ocorridos, iniciando a partir de uma falha no sistema físico. O elemento humano, então, é incorporado à análise de risco através das técnicas de análise de confiabilidade humana, as quais têm como princípio a visão do homem como mais um componente do sistema, ou o liveware interagindo com software e hardware. Sob este ponto de vista, uma abordagem sócio-técnica é aplicada, ou seja, considera-se que um navio é composto não apenas de sua estrutura e máquinas, mas também de toda a tripulação. Com o objetivo de exemplificar passos e hipóteses de uma aplicação do modelo proposto, é apresentada a aplicação ao caso do acidente da embarcação Maersk Doha, ocorrido em outubro de 2006 nos Estados Unidos, cujo relatório de investigação do acidente é de acesso público via Internet, no site da Marine Accident Investigation Branch MAIB.This work presents a risk analysis model for ships, focusing on the scenarios where the crew interacts with the alarm and monitoring system. According to statistics of classification societies, humans are largely responsible for accidents on board and, therefore, are considered a major component of the safety of vessels. The relevance of the human element is given by the fact that human decisions and actions are related to the cause of accidents, either being the direct causative factor of failure or influencing the probability of failure, and the prevention of accidents or mitigation of the consequences. The alarm system is a mandatory component of certified vessels, with direct participation in an accident. It supplies information for the decision making process of the crew, considering their actions to recover the system. The study of the interactions between this automation equipment and the human element on board provides guidelines to managers and owners to invest in proper security systems and policies that influence human behavior, and therefore the safety on board. The model, inspired in accident reports, has as starting point a sequential structure of the accident, and takes into account a typical and simplified sequence of events, starting from a failure in the physical system. The human element is incorporated into the risk analysis through techniques of human reliability analysis, which place man as another component of the system, or the \"liveware\" interacting with software and hardware. From this point of view, a socio-technical approach is applied, considering that a ship is composed of not only its structure and machinery, but also of the entire crew. In order to illustrate the steps and assumptions to be done by an analyst applying the proposed model, the accident of the vessel Maersk Doha, occurred in October of 2006 in the United States, is analyzed. The report on the investigation of this accident is public and accessible via the Internet site of the Marine Accident Investigation Branch MAIB.
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Videira, Rogerio Luiz da Rocha. "Acurácia diagnóstica, análise da decisão e heurísticas relacionadas à decisão clínica intuitiva de usar antagonista de bloqueador neuromuscular." Universidade de São Paulo, 2010. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/5/5152/tde-01022011-165044/.
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INTRODUÇÃO: A curarização residual está associada a maior risco de morte após anestesia. Erros diagnósticos após o uso de bloqueador neuromuscular (BNM) estão relacionados com prevalência de 65-88% de curarização residual pré-extubação traqueal (CRPE). Esse estudo analisou a decisão clínica intuitiva de usar antagonista de BNM antes da extubação traqueal. MÉTODOS: Após aprovação do Comitê de Ética em Pesquisa, a decisão clínica dos anestesiologistas da nossa instituição foi auditada em 150 pacientes. A participação foi voluntária e anônima. As decisões, como se fossem resultados de um teste diagnóstico, foram comparadas à aceleromiografia, com TOF < 0,9 definido como CRPE. Uma árvore de decisão foi estruturada para comparar as diferentes estratégias e uma pesquisa sequencial (Delphi), realizada entre 108 anestesiologistas, extraiu as heurísticas (regras simplificadoras) mais usadas. RESULTADOS: A prevalência de CRPE foi de 77%. A intuição clínica apresentou sensibilidade de 0,35 (0,23-0,49) e especificidade de 0,80 (0,54- 0,94) para CRPE (P= 0,0001). Em uma escala de 0-10 a utilidade esperada da intuição foi menor do que sempre antagonizar (4,1 + 4,4 vs. 8,4 + 3,0, P< 0,05). As heurísticas mais proeminentes foram O intervalo desde a última dose de BNM foi curto e O padrão respiratório está inadequado, citadas por 73% e 71% dos anestesiologistas, respectivamente. Uma hora após dose única de atracúrio comparada ao rocurônio, 69,3% vs. 47,1% (P= 0,0035) dos anestesiologistas não usam antagonista antes da extubação traqueal. Os anestesiologistas têm a percepção de que a prevalência de curarização residual clinicamente significativa é maior na prática dos seus colegas do que na sua própria prática clínica (razão de chances 7,8 (3,8-16,2) P< 0,0001). CONCLUSÕES: A intuição clínica não deve ser usada para descartar a presença de curarização residual. Sempre usar o antagonista é uma estratégia melhor do que usar a intuição clínica para decidir. Os anestesiologistas tomam a decisão intuitiva baseados em uma previsão da duração dos efeitos do BNM e no julgamento qualitativo da adequação do padrão respiratório do paciente. Eles se consideram mais capacitados para evitar a curarização residual do que os colegas. Demonstram confiança excessiva na própria capacidade de prever a duração de ação do BNM e de descartar intuitivamente a presença de CRPEBACKGROUND: Residual curarization is associated with a higher risk of death after anesthesia. Diagnostic errors after the use of neuromuscular blocking agents (NMBA) are related to 65-88% prevalence of preextubation residual curarization (PERC). This study analyzed the clinical intuitive decision of antagonizing NMBA before tracheal extubation. METHODS: After IRB approval, this clinical decision was audited in 150 patients. Participation in the study was voluntary and anonymous. Decisions, as if a diagnostic test, were compared to acceleromyography, with TOF<0.9 defined as PERC. A decision tree was structured to compare different decision strategies. A sequential survey (Delphi) was conducted among 108 anaesthesiologists to elicit the most frequently used heuristics (rules of thumb). RESULTS: PERC prevalence was 77%. Clinical intuition presented sensitivity of 0.35 (0.23-0.49) and specificity of 0.80 (0.54-0.94) (P=0.0001). In a 0-10 rating scale, expected utility of intuition was lower than always antagonize all patients (4.1 + 4.4 vs. 8.4 + 3.0, P<0.05). The most salient heuristics were Short interval since the last NMBA dose and Breathing pattern is inadequate stated by 73% and 71% of the anesthesiologists, respectively. One hour after a single dose of atracurium compared with rocuronium, 69.3% vs. 47.1% (P= 0.0035) of the anesthesiologists do not use antagonist before tracheal extubation. They perceive that prevalence of clinically significant residual curarization is higher in their colleagues practice than in their own clinical practice (odds ratio 7.8 (3.8- 16.2), P< 0.0001). CONCLUSIONS: Clinical intuition should not be used to rule out residual curarization. Routine antagonism is a better strategy than the use of clinical intuition to make this decision. Clinicians make this intuitive decision based on a forecast of the duration of the effects of NMBA and on a qualitative judgement about the adequacy of the patients breathing pattern. They consider themselves more capable of avoiding residual curarization than their colleagues. They are overconfident in their own capacity to predict NMBA duration and intuitively rule PERC out
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Humanson, Richard, and Patrik Nordeman. "Proactive Crisis Management (PCM) : Perceptions of crisis-awareness and crisis-readiness in organizations in relation with their actual strategic initiatives against industrial crises caused by human errors." Thesis, Blekinge Tekniska Högskola, Institutionen för industriell ekonomi, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:bth-15519.
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Abstract Purpose: In a competitive and constituently changing global business environment, it is almost impossible for organizations to avoid crises of various types and magnitude. The objective of this study is to display relationships between perception of crisis awareness, crisis readiness and the organizations` actual crisis management initiatives against major industrial crises. This thesis also aims to clarify if the perception of crisis-awareness and crisis-readiness could be affected by other factors that should be in considerations, which in turn could affect the outcomes of crisis-management initiatives and actions in industrial organizations. Methodology: By way of introduction, the problem, which is related to the industrial crises and proactive crisis-management and which also refers to the core topic of the study was formulated and discussed. Research questions about “How the employee’s perception of crisis- awareness and crisis-readiness affects the outcomes of an organization's crisis-management initiatives?” and “How top managements could affect the employee’s perception of crisis- awareness and crisis-readiness positively toward PCM in their organization?” were identified. The covering and important data was collected through scientific literatures and articles and was presented in the theory part. Collected data and empirical findings from the world’s two largest automaker namely, Volkswagen and Toyota, whom has been involved in scandals and crises related to core research of this paper. Empirical findings has been analyzed and finally the answer to the research questions were proposed. Findings: The result of the research indicates that the perception of crisis awareness and crisis readiness in organization have a direct impact on the organizations crisis management initiatives and activities and also there are elements like Corporate Culture, Personnel Education in Crisis Management and Corporate Communication and also other factors, which would affect the perceptions in organizations. Implication: The study suggest that by effective use of elements presented here, organizations could influence employees crisis awareness and crisis readiness positively, thus strengthening the organizations crisis management capacities.
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Al-Shirawi, Ali. "Medical errors: defining the confines of system weaknesses and human errors." Thesis, McGill University, 2011. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=97142.
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Notwithstanding the innovative changes in biotechnology, medical devices and other therapeutics, errors in medicine continue to cause harm to patients. Current definitions of medical error do not reflect the full reality of error causation. Medical error taxonomy is narrowly focused on system weaknesses in health institutions and human error. System weaknesses in licensing and monitoring organizations, health care suppliers, health profession self-regulation and government regulating organizations, conduct by leading health professionals and medical research industry risks, all lead to significant harm that is not recognized in medical error accountability. These players do not fulfill their mandates. Evidence demonstrates negligence, incompetence, unethical conduct and institutional interest and self-interest in the decision-making process. Both the principled approach and institutional ethics (IE) principles are powerful tools to require accountability from stakeholders. The contemporary understanding of medical errors is deficient and unsustainable. It has not contributed to a decrease in errors. Appropriate definitions of the confines of systems weaknesses and human error are required. This thesis outlines a method to perceive medical errors in a broader way, combining the many agents of error/harm into one system, thereby highlighting accountability and paving the way for reform.Malgré les changements innovateurs dans la biotechnologie, l'équipement médical et d'autres approches thérapeutiques, les erreurs dans la pratique de la médecine continuent à provoquer des problèmes médicaux pour un nombre important de patients. Les définitions actuelles d'erreurs médicales ne reflètent pas la réalité complète de la causalité d'erreurs. La taxinomie d'erreurs médicale est aussi strictement concentrée sur les faiblesses du système dans les institutions de santé et l'erreur humaine. Les faiblesses des systèmes qui autorisent et contrôlent les organisations, les fournisseurs de santé publique, les règlements des professions de la santé, les organismes de règlements gouvernemental des professions de la santé et la conduite des professionnels de la santé, et les risques de l'industrie de recherche médicale, tous causent des problèmes importants qui ne sont pas actuellement explicitement reconnu pour leur responsabilité d'erreurs médicales. Ces joueurs ne réalisent pas leurs autorité actuelle. L'évidence démontre de la négligence, de l'incompétence, d'une conduite non étique, d'un intérêt institutionnel et d'un intérêt personnel dans le processus de prise de décision par ces instances. C'est-à-dire, l'approche du principe que les principes de l'éthique institutionnelle sont des instruments puissants pour contraindre la responsabilité de tous les joueurs. La vision contemporaine des erreurs médicales est déficiente et non durable. Une telle vision est déficiente et non supportable. Elle n'a pas contribué à la réduction d'erreurs médicales. Une formulation sur les définitions nécessaires des limitations des systèmes liés à l'être humain est nécessaire. La proposition de cette thèse expose une façon de percevoir les erreurs médicales dans le but de rejoindre les nombreux agents d'erreur et de mal dans un système en mettant ainsi l'emphase sur la responsabilité, et ainsi ouvrant la voie à la réforme.
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Abu, Hawwach Mohammed. "Human errors in industrial operations and maintenance." Thesis, Mälardalens högskola, Innovation och produktrealisering, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mdh:diva-54794.
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Within maintenance activities and industrial operations, human is subjected to different kind of stresses and situation that could result in mistakes and accidents. The human errors in maintenance and manufacturing are an unexplored latter such that a little focusis invested in this area. The report aims to widen up the understanding of the human error in maintenance and manufacturing area. Aviation and marine operations are the most sectors that are subjected to human errors according tothe literature. There aredifferent types of human error that have effect on quality and overall effectivity. Human reliability models are one method to quantify human errors and usually used for the identification of human errors and HEP calculation. The most common reliability measurement methods are HEART, THERP and SLIM which are used depending on application and industry. As a part of efforts to define differences between those reliability models, literature including different industries is used and itis found that expert judgement influences the success and accuracy of such methods. There are many causes for human errors depending on the application but, communication and procedures followed are the most contributing factors. There is always a probability of existence of human errors as the mistake done by workers are inevitable. Industry 4.0 can help in decreasing human errors through the introduction of operator 4.0 as well as other approaches like training and upgrading organizational standards.
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Khan, Mohammad Ali, and Majid Nasir. "Human Errors and Learnability Evaluation of Authentication System." Thesis, Blekinge Tekniska Högskola, Sektionen för datavetenskap och kommunikation, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:bth-4054.
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Usability studies are important in today’s context. However, the increased security level of authentication systems is reducing the usability level. Thus, to provide secured but yet usable authentication systems is a challenge for researchers to solve till now. Learnability and human errors are influential factors of the usability of authentication systems. There are not many specific studies on the learnability and human errors concentrating on authentication systems. The authors’ aim of this study is to explore the human errors and the learnability situation of authentication systems to contribute to the development of more usable authentication systems. The authors investigated through observations and interviews to achieve the aim of this study. A minimalist portable test lab was developed in order to conduct the observation process in a controlled environment. At the end of the study, the authors showed the list of identified human errors and learnability issues, and provided recommendations, which the authors believe will help researchers to improve the overall usability of authentication systems. To achieve the aim of the study, the authors started with a systematic literature review to gain knowledge on the state of art. For the user study, a direct investigation, in form of observations and interviews was then applied to gather more data. The collected data was then analyzed and interpreted to identify and assess the human errors and the learnability issues.This study addressed the usability experiences of users by exploring the human errors and the learnability situation of the authentication systems. Authors conducted a case study to explore the situation of human errors and learnability of authentication systems. Observation and interviews were adapted to gather data. Then analysis through SHERPA (to evaluate human errors) and Grossman et al. learnability metric (to evaluate learnability) had been conducted. First, the authors identified the human errors and learnability issues on the authentication systems from user’s perspective, from the gathered raw data. Then further analysis had been conducted on the summary of the data to identify the features of the authentication systems which are affecting the human errors and learnability issues. The authors then compared the two different categories of authentication systems, such as the 1-factor and the multi-factor authentication systems, from the gathered information through analysis. Finally, the authors argued the possible updates of the SHERPA’s human error metric and additional measurable learnability issues comparing to Grossman et al. learnability metrics. The studied authentication systems are not human errors free. The authors identified eight human errors associated with the studied authentication systems and three features of the authentication systems which are influencing the human errors. These errors occurred while the participants in this study took too long time locating the login menu or button or selecting the correct login method, and eventually took too long time to login. Errors also occurred when the participants failed to operate the code generating devices, or failed to retrieve information from errors messages or supporting documents, and/or eventually failed to login. As these human errors are identifiable and predictable through the SHERPA, they can be solved as well. The authors also found the studied authentication systems have learnability issues and identified nine learnability issues associated with them. These issues were identified when very few users could complete the task optimally, or completed without any help from the documentation. Issues were also identified while analyzing the participants’ task completion time after reviewing documentations, operations on code generating devices, and average errors while performing the task. These learnability issues were identified through Grossman et al. learnability metric, and the authors believe more study on the identified learnability issues can improve the learnability of the authentication systems. Overall, the authors believe more studies should be conducted on the identified human errors and learnability issues to improve the overall human errors and learnability situation of the studied authentication systems at presence. Moreover, these issues also should be taken into consideration while developing future authentication systems. The authors believe, in future, the outcome of this study will also help researchers to propose more usable, but yet secured authentication systems for future growth. Finally, authors proposed some potential research ares, which they believe will have important contribution to the current knowledge. In this study, the authors used the SHERPA to identify the human errors. Though the SHERPA (and its metrics) is arguably one of the best methods to evaluate human errors, the authors believe there are scopes of improvements in the SHERPA’s metrics. Human’s perception and knowledge is getting changed, and to meet the challenge, the SHERPA’s human error metrics can be updated as well. Grossman et al. learnability metrics had been used in this study to identify learnability issues. The authors believe improving the current and adding new metrics may identify more learnability issues. Evaluation of learnability issues may have improved if researchers could have agreed upon a single learnability definition. The authors believe more studies should be conducted on the definition of learnability in order to achieve more acceptable definition of the learnability for further research. Finally, more studies should be conducted on the remedial strategies of the identified human errors, and improvement on the identified learnability issues, which the authors believe will help researchers to propose more usable, but yet secured authentication systems for the future growth.
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Seastrunk, Chad Stephen. "Algorithm to Systematically Reduce Human Errors in Healthcare." NCSU, 2005. http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/theses/available/etd-12012005-073356/.
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The purpose of the research was to develop an algorithm to permanently reduce human errors in the healthcare industry. The algorithm will be able to be applied to all healthcare organizations and provide a preventative approach to errors. The research involved looking at past methods of error reduction/prevention. Certain methods proved to be useful in generating the algorithm like the Healthcare Failure Modes and Effects Analysis while others like Root Cause Analysis proved to only have limited success. The algorithm takes a three phase approach to reducing errors. Phase One identifies the potential error producing situations. Phase Two uses error proofing principles and known solution directions to generate solutions while Phase Three uses a new method developed called Solution Priority Number to rank and evaluate the solutions. Throughout the algorithm many worksheets have been developed to aid in a team?s progression through the process. Two case studies were performed. The first case study followed a traditional team through the error prevention process while the second case used the algorithm. When comparing the two cases the team using the algorithm finished the process in shorter time, produced more effective failure modes, and generated a richer set of solutions to error proof the process.
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Barroso, Monica Frias da Costa Paz. "Human error and disturbance occurrence in manufacturing systems." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.342060.
Full textBooks on the topic "Human and organizational errors"
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Gesine, Hofinger, and Buerschaper Cornelius, eds. Crisis management in acute care settings: Human factors and team psychology in a high stakes environment. Berlin: Springer, 2008.
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Advances in human factors and ergonomics in healthcare. Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2011.
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Gill, Geoffrey W. Maritime error management: Discussing and remediating factors contributory to casualties. Atglen, PA: Cornell Maritime Press, 2011.
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Turkstra, Carl J. Human error and organization factors in bridge design and construction. Downsview, Ont: Research and Development Branch, Ontario Ministry of Transportation, 1991.
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Robert, Tannenbaum, Margulies Newton, and Massarik Fred, eds. Human systems development. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1985.
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Human performance consulting: Transforming human potential into productive business performance. Houston, Tex: Gulf Pub., 2000.
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Sue, Bogner Marilyn, ed. Human error in medicine. Hillsdale, N.J: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1994.
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RN, Jones Terry L., ed. Creating a just culture: A nurse leader's guide. Danvers, MA: HCPro, 2011.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Human and organizational errors"
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Licao, Dai, Li Hu, Chen Jianhua, Lu Wenjie, and Li Pengcheng. "Organizational Resilience Model in a Nuclear Power Plant." In Advances in Human Error, Reliability, Resilience, and Performance, 235–43. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20037-4_21.
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Lu, Yi, Huayan Huangfu, Shuguang Zhang, and Shan Fu. "Organizational Risk Dynamics Archetypes for Unmanned Aerial System Maintenance and Human Error Shaping Factors." In Advances in Human Error, Reliability, Resilience, and Performance, 75–87. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20037-4_7.
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Kontogiannis, Tom, and Stathis Malakis. "Human Error Detection and Recovery." In Cognitive Engineering and Safety Organization in Air Traffic Management, 163–96. Boca Raton : CRC Press, Taylor & FrancisGroup, 2017.: CRC Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/b22178-6.
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Kore, Akshay. "Handling Errors." In Designing Human-Centric AI Experiences, 281–323. Berkeley, CA: Apress, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-8088-1_6.
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Leacock, Claudia, Martin Chodorow, Michael Gamon, and Joel Tetreault. "Collocation Errors." In Synthesis Lectures on Human Language Technologies, 63–71. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-02137-4_7.
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Carbery, Ronan. "Organizational Learning." In Human Resource Development, 84–102. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-36010-6_5.
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Lovallo, Dan. "From Individual Biases to Organizational Errors." In Organization and Strategy in the Evolution of the Enterprise, 103–23. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-13389-5_5.
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Chèze, Laurence. "Errors in Measurement." In Kinematic Analysis of Human Movement, 59–72. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119058144.ch4.
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Philip, Pierre, Cyril Chaufton, Lino Nobili, and Sergio Garbarino. "Errors and Accidents." In Sleepiness and Human Impact Assessment, 81–92. Milano: Springer Milan, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-5388-5_7.
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Leacock, Claudia, Martin Chodorow, Michael Gamon, and Joel Tetreault. "Annotating Learner Errors." In Synthesis Lectures on Human Language Technologies, 81–90. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-02137-4_9.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Human and organizational errors"
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Terwel, Karel. "Should we focus on human or organizational factors?" In IABSE Workshop, Helsinki 2017: Ignorance, Uncertainty, and Human Errors in Structural Engineering. Zurich, Switzerland: International Association for Bridge and Structural Engineering (IABSE), 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2749/helsinki.2017.017.
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When structural failures occur, usually the first, and sometimes the only focus is on technical causes of failure. However, from several researches it is known that 90-95% of failures stems from procedural origins, or so called human and organizational factors. This paper will first define human and organizational. Furthermore, critical human and organizational factors influencing structural safety will be highlighted. Critical factors are those factors that make a difference in successful or not successful projects regarding structural safety. Finally, suggestions are given with measures to improve human and organizational factors. E.g. a risk analysis approach should be elaborated that focuses on structural failures, and not primarily on planning and budget issues.
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Hohberg, Jörg-Martin. "Risk-Based Thinking and Knowledge in Engineering Organizations." In IABSE Workshop, Helsinki 2017: Ignorance, Uncertainty, and Human Errors in Structural Engineering. Zurich, Switzerland: International Association for Bridge and Structural Engineering (IABSE), 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2749/helsinki.2017.009.
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Against the personal background of working in computational research, in design and in quality management, personal views on uncertainties, on human error and learning are presented. They refer to ground-breaking work from ETH Zurich in the 1970s and expand on the Swiss approach to a holistic quality management in the construction sector, which may seem “old-fashioned” in today’s price-driven market. Organizational dispositions, both on company level and within professional societies are addressed. In the context of risk and knowledge management, the revised FIDIC/EFCA guide on quality management (ISO 9001:2015) is briefly presented.
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Passalacqua, Roberto, and Fumiaki Yamada. "Human Reliability and the Current Dilemma in Human-Machine Interface Design Strategies." In 10th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering. ASMEDC, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/icone10-22061.
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Since human error dominates the probability of failures of still-existing human-requiring systems (as the Monju reactor), the human-machine interface needs to be improved. Several rationales may lead to the conclusion that “humans” should limit themselves to monitor the “machine”. For example, this is the trend in the aviation industry: newest aircrafts are designed to be able to return to a safe state by the use of control systems, which do not need human intervention. Thus, the dilemma whether we really need operators (for example in the nuclear industry) might arise. However, social-technical approaches in recent human error analyses are pointing out the so-called “organizational errors” and the importance of a human-machine interface harmonization. Typically plant’s operators are a “redundant” safety system with a much lower reliability (than the machine): organizational factors and harmonization requirements suggest designing the human-machine interface in a way that allows improvement of operator’s reliability. In addition, taxonomy studies of accident databases have also proved that operators’ training should promote processes of decision-making. This is accomplished in the latest trends of PSA technology by introducing the concept of a “Safety Monitor” that is a computer-based tool that uses a level 1 PSA model of the plant. Operators and maintenance schedulers of the Monju FBR will be able to perform real-time estimations of the plant risk level. The main benefits are risk awareness and improvements in decision-making by operators. Also scheduled maintenance can be approached in a more rational (safe and economic) way.
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Yang, Shen, Geng Bo, and Li Dan. "Based on Human Behavior Process of Human Error Defensive Management Research for NPP." In 2017 25th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/icone25-66007.
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According to the research of nuclear power plant human error management, it is found that the traditional human error management are mainly based on the result of human behavior, the event as the point cut of management, there are some drawbacks. In this paper, based on the concept of the human performance management, establish the defensive human error management model, the innovation point is human behavior as the point cut, to reduce the human errors and accomplish a nip in the bud. Based on the model, on the one hand, combined with observation and coach card, to strengthen the human behavior standards expected while acquiring structured behavior data from the nuclear power plant production process; on the other hand, combined with root cause analysis method, obtained structured behavior data from the human factor event, thus forming a human behavior database that show the human performance state picture. According to the data of human behavior, by taking quantitative trending analysis method, the P control chart of observation item and the C control chart of human factor event is set up by Shewhart control chart, to achieve real-time monitoring of the process and result of behavior. At the same time, development Key Performance Indicators timely detection of the worsening trend of human behavior and organizational management. For the human behavior deviation and management issues, carry out the root cause analysis, to take appropriate corrective action or management improvement measures, so as to realize the defense of human error, reduce human factor event probability and improve the performance level of nuclear power plant.
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Torres, Yaniel, Sylvie Nadeau, and Kurt Landau. "Analysis of Assembly Errors using Systems Thinking Approach: Application of the HFACS Framework." In 13th International Conference on Applied Human Factors and Ergonomics (AHFE 2022). AHFE International, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.54941/ahfe1001568.
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Using a systemic and human-centered approach to analyze quality deficiencies in complex manual assemblies can help to shift the focus towards the role of systems failures instead of focusing on the operators' actions. This paper features the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework, to identify several contributing factors to quality deficiencies in a manufacturing environment. Overall, 34 factors were identified. Some 56% were associated with the human operator and operating environment, while 44% were related to organizational influences and supervisory factors. The latter included inadequate design/update of working instructions, variability in production demands, high complexity of product design, and lack of guidelines on shift scheduling and overtime allocation best practices. Although HFACS was able to provide a "big picture" of the situation analyzed, it requires that the user possess a good understanding of the operational aspects of the system and have ample access to data and information. Particularly for latent conditions, which are not so easy to detect.
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Ujita, Hiroshi, and Naoko Matsuo. "Human Performance Improvement Activities for Risk Reduction." In 13th International Conference on Applied Human Factors and Ergonomics (AHFE 2022). AHFE International, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.54941/ahfe1002642.
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Inflexible or unchangeable organization is clearly supposed to include fatal risk in the system under current highly and fast developing situation, no matter how its size is. It means that any system doesn't reach the best results even if anyhow behavior's done, being not adjustable for risk reduction, due to variety and change in the system design or the organization decision-making. Namely, the Key for “the most rational optimization along with keeping the development” is actualized by using risk management adjustable to all organization or system, to solve the complicated issues struggling in current fast-changing international situation.System safety in a huge complex system is an activity that aims to improve safety by the balanced system without excess or deficiency by designing (hardware / software) and operating (human) [1]. In other words, it is the risk reduction activities to treat from the top priority of the risk. At present, the existing huge complex systems have been reduced in hardware / software risk through its countermeasures and quality assurance activities based on safety logic, so the remaining risk can be said to be an event involving humans. For this reason, risk reduction activities can be described as human performance improvement activities. Furthermore, continuing this activity will eventually lead to the improvement of the safety culture. In other words, what we want to emphasize here is that "system safety", "risk reduction activities", "human performance improvement activities", and "improvement of safety culture" have similar purposes and contents.In order to reduce the risk, it must be firmly suppressed in the original design process, so the safety concept is thoroughly incorporated into the system based on risk management at the design stage before operation. Next step, implement risk reduction measures are considered based on risk management at the construction or operation stages. As a response to the problem that remains even after taking measures in advance, that is, a risk that occurs at the stage of using equipment or processes, an error is detected and the countermeasure is taken. Therefore, we will first understand the vulnerabilities at the time of implementation and the weaknesses in human relationships between organizations and teams. As countermeasures, it is most important to give feedback to the hardware, next to software, and when it is not possible, it is important to take countermeasures by the organization or team, not to blame the individual. Measures against human errors are implemented by the devices and the mechanisms rather than the discipline. In summary, it is necessary to enhance performance for dealing with problems that are anticipated in advance, and then to enhance error detection that remains even after setup.Humans always make an error with a certain probability, but they are also flexible entities that can respond to ingenuity in any event. HPI, Human Performance Improvement is a system safety activity to reduce risk due to the human behavior in the system by understanding and optimizing human characteristics by using the Cause Analysis and the Risk Analysis. While humans can demonstrate high abilities, they have the characteristic that misrecognition and judgment errors are easy to occur in some circumstances. In such situation, HPI tools such as Tool Box Meeting, Peer Review, etc. are useful for preparing high reliable activities at the site. HPI means creating the environment where human abilities can be maximized. References[1] Ujita, H., Matsuo, N.: ‘System Safety, Risk Management, and Human Performance Improvement’, HCI2020, 2020.7, Virtual.
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Bridle, Peter Vincent. "Catastrophic Events and Human Error: A Few Rotten Apples or Organizational Dysfunction?" In SPE Trinidad and Tobago Section Energy Resources Conference. SPE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.2118/200942-ms.
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Abstract In July 2021, commemorations will be held to mark the 33 years since the 1988 Piper Alpha tragedy in the UK sector of the North Sea where 167 oil field workers lost their lives. Without question, the incident was a watershed event for the international oil and gas industry not simply because of the immediate toll in human lives lost, but also in terms of the devasting aftermath endured by countless friends, families and loved ones whose lives were forever changed. The tragedy also served to illustrate just how poorly the oil and gas industry really understood and managed those operating risks that possessed the potential for catastrophic loss, both in terms of business cost and overall reputational impact. In the wake of the public enquiry that followed and chaired by Lord Cullen of Whitekirk, one of the principal recommendations required that the international oil and gas industry do a much better job in determining both its major hazards (i.e. major operating risks) and also in creating the necessary operating conditions to demonstrate that such things were being well managed. The objective being to provide tangible assurance that the likelihood of the industry ever incurring such a calamitous event again in the future had been reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). In taking its responsibilities very seriously, the international oil and gas industry responded by raising the profile of the management of Health, Safety and the Environment (HSE) across the wide spectrum of its global operations. By the mid-nineties, the industry had implemented comprehensive and structured systems of work within the framework of purposely built HSE Management Systems using templates designed and developed for the industry via the International Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP)*.
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Bridle, Peter. "Catastrophic Events and Human Error: A Few Rotten Apples or Organizational Dysfunction?" In SPE Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition. SPE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.2118/205858-ms.
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Abstract By July of 2021, it would have been 33 years since the 1988 Piper Alpha tragedy in the UK sector of the North Sea where 167 oil field workers lost their lives. Without question, the incident was a watershed event for the international oil and gas industry. And not simply because of the immediate toll in human lives lost, but also in terms of the devasting aftermath endured by countless friends, families and loved ones whose lives were forever changed on that fateful day. The tragedy also served to illustrate how much work would be needed by the oil and gas industry to fully understand and better manage those operating risks that possessed the potential for catastrophic loss in terms of business cost and reputational impact. In the wake of the public enquiry that followed and chaired by Lord Cullen of Whitekirk, one of the principal recommendations resulting from the disaster required that the international oil and gas industry do a much better job in determining both its major hazards (i.e. major operating risks) and in creating the necessary operating conditions to demonstrate that such things were being well managed. The objective being to provide tangible assurance that the likelihood of the industry ever incurring such a calamitous event again in the future had been reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). In taking its responsibilities very seriously, the international oil and gas industry responded by raising the profile of the management of Health, Safety, and the Environment (HSE) across the wide spectrum of its global operations. By the mid-nineties, the industry had implemented comprehensive and structured systems of work within the framework of purposely built HSE Management Systems using templates designed and developed for the industry via the International Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP)*.
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Kim, Yoonik, Kwang-Won Ahn, Chang-Hyun Chung, Kil Yoo Kim, and Joon-Eon Yang. "Use of Influence Diagrams and Fuzzy Theory to Develop Assessment Method of Organizational Influences on Component Maintenance." In 10th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering. ASMEDC, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/icone10-22323.
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Organization can make influences on all the systems. Especially in case of nuclear power plants in which safety is established to be one of the most important operating goals, there have been a lot of research efforts for the hardware advancement. However in recent years, it has been widely recognized that organizational factors in nuclear power plants have an important influence on the safety attitudes and the safe behavior of individuals. Until now, any means to include assessments of organizational structure in probabilistic risk assessments have not been universally accepted. The objective of this work is to develop a method to assess organizational influences on component maintenance. Influence diagrams are introduced in this method as a decision making tool and fuzzy theory is used to reflect the vagueness in considering relevance of human activities in maintenance tasks. Introducing fuzzy theory to assess the organizational factors is deemed to a somewhat new trial, which makes it possible to convert linguistic vague descriptions into mathematical ones. Fuzzy linguistic descriptions offer an alternative and often complementary language to conventional, i.e., analytic approaches to modeling systems. Among the existing methodologies to assess organizational factors, the concept of the ω-factor model is utilized and the mechanism that organizational factors have influences on component maintenance is evaluated through composing influence diagrams. These influences go to failure rates and eventually affect component unavailability. Further study will make it possible that the influences of organizational factors on human error probabilities are incorporated into human reliability analysis and furthermore probabilistic safety assessment.
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Matahri, Naoe¨lle. "Link Between Operational Experience Data and Pre-Accidental Data." In 16th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering. ASMEDC, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/icone16-48488.
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RECUPERARE method has been developed for operating feedback analysis and has been built on the French Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) principles. It is used to study the causes of human errors or technical failures occurred in French PWRs and the recovery process of events. Based on an event classification (6 categories) model according to the nature of the link between failure and recovery, the identified and recorded data are: • the causes of the defects (technical, human, organizational) and the context in which they appear; • the factors of the recovery performance (depending on technical and organizational aspects); • a chronological analysis, designed to collect delays between failures and their detection/recovery for each event. About 4500 events reported in French PWRs (1997–2006) have been reviewed through this model. Initially, the weight of factors and the most important factors, which influenced the detection and recovery delay, are defined. For this purpose, the regression Partial Least Square (PLS) is used. Then, to link RECUPERARE results with pre-accidentals data, conditional probabilities of events linked between them by a cause and effect relationship are calculated. For this, the Bayesian method with a Bayesian network is built with the PLS obtained results and applied. This constitutes a first approach to take into account the human and organizational factors in HRA highlighted by operating feedback.
Reports on the topic "Human and organizational errors"
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Petrowski, Michael, Joe Lockwood, and Jason Smith. Human Performance Improvement Task Group Task 21-1 Best Practice: Using virtual capabilities or options for HPI application (to reduce errors, strengthening defenses, strengthening the organization, and/or increasing capacity). Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), February 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1766973.
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Murrell, Emily. Organizational Culture Change Resulting From Human Resources Outsourcing. Portland State University Library, January 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.15760/honors.144.
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POND, DANIEL J., F. KAY HOUGHTON, and WALTER E. GILMORE. CONTRIBUTORS TO HUMAN ERRORS AND BREACHES IN NATIONAL SECURITY APPLICATIONS. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), August 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/801246.
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Bartel, Ann, Ciaran Phibbs, Nancy Beaulieu, and Patricia Stone. Human Capital and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Healthcare Sector. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w17474.
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Henriksen, K., R. D. Kaye, R. Jones, D. S. Morisseau, and D. I. Serig. Human factors evaluation of teletherapy: Training and organizational analysis. Volume 4. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), July 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/91921.
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Daniellou, François, Marcel Simard, and Ivan Boissières. Human and organizational factors of safety: a state of the art. Fondation pour une culture de sécurité industrielle, January 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.57071/429dze.
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This document provides a state of the art of knowledge concerning the human and organizational factors of industrial safety. It shows that integrating human factors in safety policy and practice requires that new knowledge from the social sciences (in particular ergonomics, psychology and sociology) be taken on board and linked to operational concerns.
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Barriere, M. T., W. J. Luckas, J. Wreathall, S. E. Cooper, D. C. Bley, and A. Ramey-Smith. Multidisciplinary framework for human reliability analysis with an application to errors of commission and dependencies. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), August 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/106594.
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Drillings, Michael, Leonard Adelman, Angel Manzo, and Michael D. Shaler. Human and Organizational Issues in the Army After Next: A Conference Held 13-15 November 1997. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, November 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada357651.
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Callan, J. R., R. T. Kelly, and M. L. Quinn. Human factors evaluation of remote afterloading brachytherapy. Supporting analyses of human-system interfaces, procedures and practices, training and organizational practices and policies. Volume 3. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), July 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/93757.
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