Academic literature on the topic 'Human being dignity'

Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Análisis Económico<br>Autor no autoriza el acceso a texto completo de su documento<br>Over the last two decades there has been an important shift in the way economists understand welfare and development. The discipline has gone from assessing wellbeing in terms of an unideminsional measure like income, to multidimensional measures that take into account non-economic variables such as what individuals do and can do, how they feel, and the natural environment they live in (Alkire, 2002; Stiglitz et al., 2009; Alkire and Foster, 2011; Alkire and Santos, 2014). In the vein of Amartya Sen's in uential work, development is seen as the process of expanding freedoms that people value and have reason to value (Sen, 1999). Two important aspects of this freedom linked to the basis of social rights are agency and human dignity (Gauri, 2004). Agency freedom refers to what the person is free to do and achieve in pursuit of whatever goals or values he or she regards as important (Sen, 1985). On the other hand, dignity is related with social inclusion, taking part in the life of the community (Sen, 1999).1 This paper explores the importance of agency, and dignity in explaining subjective well- being. We are speci cally interested in measures of life satisfaction and job satisfaction. Our work uses a unique dataset of Chilean households, the \Other Dimensions of Household Quality of Life" survey, especially designed by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) to gather internationally comparable indicators on employment quality, empowerment, physical safety, human dignity and psychological and subjective wellbeing, sometimes referred as the missing dimensions of poverty (Alkire, 2007). Our hypothesis is that agency is positively correlated with individual's subjective wellbe- ing, because it re ects the capacity the individual has to do what he values. The measure we use for agency is related with the individual's perception of freedom to decide for himself how to lead his life. A natural interpretation of the hypothesis is thus that the more freedom an individual has to decide how to lead her life, more wellbeing she experiences. On the other hand, our hypothesis is that individuals less likely to regularly experience shame in public are associated with higher subjective wellbeing. In particular, we focus on two aspects of dignity: shame proneness and discrimination. Therefore, individuals that experience more shame or feel discriminated should experience less wellbeing. Our rst set of results provides correlational evidence on the importance of agency, shame and discrimination in life satisfaction. The results suggest that agency, shame and discrimi- nation are correlated with life satisfaction. Next, we explore if agency and discrimination at work are correlated with job satisfaction. The results show that both agency and discrimi- nation at work explain job satisfaction. An important potencial source of bias in our estimates is the absence of personality traits. It has been shown that genetics factor are strongly correlated with happiness (Lykken and Tellegen, 1996; Inglehart and Klingemann, 2000). Moreover, personality traits as repressive- defensiveness, trust, emotional stability, locus of control-chance, desire for control, hardiness, positive a ectivity, private collective self-esteem, and tension have been linked to subjective wellbeing (DeNeve and Cooper, 1998; Diener et al., 2003). In order to attenuate the potencial bias for omitting personality traits, we follow Van Praag and Ferrer-i Carbonell (2008) and we construct a measure of personality traits that we in- clude in our regressions.The results show an important positive bias in the estimates of the relationship between subjective wellbeing, agency, shame and discrimination. In particular, after controlling by personality traits the OLS parameters associated with agency and shame decrease their magnitude in nearly 50% in the life satisfaction estimates. Also, the parameter associated with discrimination decreases in magnitude and becomes statistically insigni cant. On the other hand, the bias is less important in the estimates of job satisfaction, agency and discrimination. Overall, our results show that the di erence in life satisfaction between individuals who feel they have freedom to decide for themselves how to lead their life in comparison with the individuals that don't, has the same magnitude as the di erence in life satisfaction between people from the rst and fth quintile of income. Also, being in the fth quintile of the shame proneness index in comparison with the rst quintile has the same e ect on life satisfaction as the di erence in life satisfaction between the people from the second and fth quintile of income. Finally, perceived discrimination is not associated with life satisfaction. On the other hand, individuals with more agency at work are more satis ed with their job. In particular, individuals that do their job only because they need the money are less satis ed with their job in comparison with the individuals that do their job because they find almost twice the e ect related with working part-time. This study contributes to the recent but vast literature on subjective wellbeing and the literature on multidimensional wellbeing in development, more speci cally to recent studies emphasizing the importance of measuring dimensions of wellbeing that seem central to human development traditionally ignored in empirical work. Our results related with the relationship between agency and subjective wellbeing are consistent with international evidence (Veen- hoven, 2000; Welzel et al., 2003; Inglehart et al., 2008; Verme, 2009; Welzel and Inglehart, 2010; Fischer and Boer, 2011; Victor et al., 2013). The same can be said with respect to the results related with the relationship between perceived discrimination and subjective well- being (Werkuyten and Nekuee, 1999; Pascoe and Smart Richman, 2009). To our knowledge the association between subjective wellbeing and shame proneness has not been explored before. More closely related to our paper, Inglehart et al. (2008) and Welzel and Inglehart (2010) provide cross country evidence of the link between subjective wellbeing and freedom. In particular, Welzel and Inglehart (2010) presents a human development model that links agency to subjective wellbeing. Using data form the World Values Survey, they show that people that have more opportunities in life put more emphasis on emancipative values, and, in turn, their gains in agency have a greater impact in their subjective wellbeing. On the other hand, Verme (2009) tries to address the role of personality traits in the relationship of agency and subjective wellbeing. He argue that the locus of control plays an important role in how humans value freedom of choice. Using a combination of all rounds of the World and European Value Surveys, he nds that the variables that measures freedom of choice and the locus of control predicts life satisfaction better than any other factors included in the study. In particular, people who believe that the outcome of their actions depends on internal factors appreciate more having freedom than people who believe that the results of their actions are determined by external factors. This work, highlights the importance of taking into account personality traits when analyzing the relationship between agency and subjective wellbeing. Our paper contributes to the literature mainly in three ways. First, alongside with Verme (2009) we make a special e ort in order to control by personality traits which allow us avoid bias in the estimates of the relationship between subjective wellbeing, agency, shame and discrimination. Second, we explore the relationship between subjective wellbeing and shame. Third, we analyze the relationship between job satisfaction, agency and discrimination. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and introduces our measures of agency and dignity. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the estimation results. Section 5 concludes.

A presente dissertação é fruto de uma investigação filosófica, inserida na linha de pesquisa de Ética. Esse trabalho aprofunda uma discussão polêmica no contexto da Bioética, a saber: a manipulação de células embrionárias. Contudo, o autor não envereda seus esforços nas conse-quências éticas advindas das novas tecnologias produzidas pela Engenharia Genética, mas adentra na causa do problema, isto é, pretende antes saber se o embrião humano é ser vivo, ser humano e, principalmente, pessoa. Assim, o autor tem como objetivo principal investigar o status ontológico e moral do embrião humano. Nesse contexto, investiga o conceito de identidade pessoal, examinando-o - brevemente - à luz de duas teorias da Filosofia da Mente: internalista, que defende a construção do eu por bases internas; e a externalista, que advoga a construção do eu por bases externas. Elenca e analisa os atributos essenciais que concebe uma pessoa. Também pesquisa o conceito de dignidade humana e sua vinculação ao conceito de pessoa, tendo como base a filosofia moral de Immanuel Kant, através de sua obra Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes. Além desta e da bibliografia utilizada sobre o tema, a fonte principal dessa discussão é a obra Ética Prática, do filósofo Peter Singer. Vale destacar que existem três posições dominantes dentro dessa temática: a) Teoria Concepcionalista, a qual argumenta que o embrião é pessoa desde a concepção e, por isso, desautoriza qualquer manipulação; b) Teoria Genético-Desenvolvimentista, a qual defende a pessoalidade do embrião a partir de diferentes etapas do seu desenvolvimento biológico e, desse modo, defende as pesquisas biomédicas; c) Teoria da Potencialidade da Pessoa, a qual advoga que o embrião ainda não tem a pessoalidade, no entanto, é um potencial ser humano e pessoa, e, por essa razão, sua integridade deve ser preservada. Ao final, o autor enumera as principais implicações éticas, psicológicas, sociais e jurídicas, uma vez determinados os estatutos ontológico e moral do embrião humano.<br>This dissertation is the result of philosophical inquiry, inserted in the line of research ethics. This study further develops a raging debate in the context of bioethics, namely the manipulation of embryonic cells. However, the author doesn`t embarks their efforts on ethical consequences arising from new technologies produced by genetic engineering, but enters into the cause of the problem, ie, does it want to know whether the human embryo is a living being, human being, and especially people. So the author's main objective is to investigate the ontological and moral status of human embryo. In this context, investigates the concept of personal identity, examining it - briefly - in the light of two theories of the Philosophy of Mind: internalist, which advocates the construction of the self by internal bases, and the externalist, defending the construction of the self by external bases. It lists and analyzes the essential attributes that a person is conceived. It also searches the concept of the humans dignity and its relationship to the concept of person, based on Immanuel Kant`s moral philosophy, through his work Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. In this and the vast bibliography on the topic, the main source of the work is Practical Ethics, of the philosopher Peter Singer. It is worth mentioning that there are three dominant positions within this theme: a) Conception Theory, which argues that the embryo is a person from conception and therefore disallows any manipulation, b) Genetic, Developmental Theory, which defends the personhood of the embryo from different stages of their biological development and therefore supports biomedical research, c) Theory of the Potential of People, which advocates that the embryo does not have "personhood," however, is a potential human being and person, and therefore its integrity must be preserved. In the end, the author lists the main ethical, psychological, social and legal, since given the ontological and moral statutories of human embryo.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:22:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcio Cursino dos Santos.pdf: 510808 bytes, checksum: 173497eed682fb35dea850dc6b5d7535 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-11-25<br>The following dissertation has as an scope the coping of the State s right of monitoring the arrested that have on their disfavor the decree of any of the precautionary arrestments, considering that in our times the utilization of the current criminal sentence monitoring condemnatory with transit in the judged already is part of the toil of the Execution Criminal Law, with the right of the intimacy of the arrested that from the monitoring and intensification of the State under the individual becomes more intense, therefore the State instead of providing a pseudo freedom, actually intensify the surveillance of that citizen preventively arrested aims on this research show that the electronic monitoring mitigates some constitutional values in the Democratic State of Law<br>A presente dissertação tem por escopo o enfretamento do direito do Estado de monitorar os presos que tem em seu desfavor o decreto de qualquer das prisões cautelares, haja vista que hodiernamente a utilização do monitoramento decorrente de sentença penal condenatória com trânsito em julgado já faz parte da labuta do Direito Penal de Execução, com o direito a intimidade do preso que a partir do monitoramento a intensificação do Estado sob o indivíduo se torna mais intensa, assim sendo o Estado ao invés de proporcionar uma pseudo liberdade, na verdade intensifica a vigilância daquele cidadão preso preventivamente, pretende nesta pesquisa demonstrar que o monitoramente eletrônico mitiga alguns valores constitucionais no Estado Democrático de Direito

Submitted by CARLA MARIA GOULART DE MORAES (carlagm) on 2015-05-05T19:29:43Z No. of bitstreams: 1 TaisFerrazGomes.pdf: 1007475 bytes, checksum: e0c2daec9417a26d3d2312929ee20edc (MD5)<br>Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-05T19:29:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TaisFerrazGomes.pdf: 1007475 bytes, checksum: e0c2daec9417a26d3d2312929ee20edc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-09-05<br>Nenhuma<br>La responsabilité civile et leurs bases ont évolué afin de s’adapter au développement technologique de la société contemporaine et à l’émergence des nouveaux dommages qui doivent être protegés, en particulier, des nanotechnologies aux niveaux mondial et brésilien. Le mouvement d’adéquation de cette conception de responsabilité est doté d’un caractère solidaire, en harmonie avec le principe de la dignité de la personne humaine, établi dans le premier article, III, de la Constitution Fédérale Brésilienne, en démontrant l’approche des droits public et privé. Le potentiel des dommages technologiques est aussi inconnu; cependant, on voit que la responsabilité technologique pourra entraîner des dommages potentiels et qu’elle, malgré la non positivation dans l’ordre juridique brésilien, devra être protégée par le Droit. Les alternatives seront l’usage de la clause générale du risque, de l’abus de droit et des dispositifs du Code de Défense du Consommateur, des hypothèses de l’incidence de responsabilité objective tujours en harmonie avec la tutelle de la personne humaine. On admet aussi la flexibilisation des présupposés de la responsabilité civile: le dommage et le lien de causalité. Il y a de cas où l’on demandera des mesures de précaution afin d’éviter l’occurrence de dommages, et d’autres où l’on partira d’une vérification effective d’un préjudice. Dans les deux hypothèses, la viabilité d’adaptation des nanotechnologies au Droit brésilien est seulement possible à travers de l’usage de concepts ouverts et à travers de critères herméneutiquement constitués. La société ne peut rester sans protection faute d’une règle juridique spécifique à la responsabilité nanotechnologique. Une nouvelle responsabilité “précaution” doit être, premièrement, prise et, après, leurs conséquences doivent être protégées, toujours observées les péculiarités du cas concret dont on demandera une précompréhension.<br>A responsabilidade civil e seus pressupostos evoluíram com o intuito de se enquadrar no desenvolvimento tecnológico verificado em sociedade e o concomitante surgimento de novos danos a serem protegidos, principalmente das nanotecnologias nos cenários mundial e brasileiro. O movimento de adequação desse instituto é marcado por um caráter solidário, consentâneo com o princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana, estabelecido no inciso III do artigo 1o da Constituição Federal, com a aproximação do Direito Público e do Direito Privado. A potencialidade dos danos nanotecnológicos ainda é desconhecida, porém é sabido que a responsabilidade nanotecnológica poderá causar potenciais danos e, embora não esteja positivada no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, deverá ser protegida pelo Direito. As alternativas consistirão na utilização da cláusula geral do risco, do abuso do direito e de dispositivos do Código de Defesa do Consumidor, hipóteses de incidência de responsabilidade objetiva, sempre em consonância com a tutela da pessoa humana, admitindo-se a flexibilização dos pressupostos da responsabilidade civil: dano e nexo de causalidade. Há casos em que se propugnará por medidas de precaução, a fim de evitar a ocorrência de danos, e outros em que se partirá da verificação efetiva de um prejuízo. Nas duas hipóteses, a viabilidade de enquadramento das nanotecnologias ao Direito brasileiro somente é possível mediante a utilização de conceitos abertos e a partir de critérios hermeneuticamente constituídos. A sociedade não poderá ficar desprotegida pela falta de uma norma jurídica específica à responsabilidade nanotecnológica. Uma nova responsabilidade deve ser, primeiramente, precavida e, posteriormente, suas consequências devem ser protegidas, sempre observadas as peculiaridades do caso concreto em que se propugnará por uma pré-compreensão.<br>Civil liability and its assumptions as well has evolved to fit the social technological development, and the concomitant emergence of new damage to be protected from, especially the nanotechnologies both in the world and in Brazil. The movement to adjust this institute is marked by a joint responsible character consistent with the principle of the individuals? dignity, established in the First Article, subsection III, of the Brazilian Federal Constitution, by bringing together public right and private right. Nanotechnological potential damage is still unknown; what is already known is that nanotechnological responsibility can trigger potential harm. Despite not implemented by the Brazilian legal order yet, it has to be protected by the law. Alternatives encompass the usage of the general risk clause, the Consumer?s Rights Defense law abuse and provisions, some hypotheses of objective incidence liability always in consonance with the human person?s guardianship and by acknowledging the flexibility of civil liability assumptions: causal damage and nexus. Instances exist when precautionary measures will be advocated to prevent damage from occurring; in other instances the effective investigation of harm will be the departure point. For both hypotheses, to make the framing of nanotechnologies into the Brazilian Law viable open concepts have to be used, and hermeneutically developed criteria have to become the foundation. Society can not be left unprotected due to a lack of rules of law specific to nanotechnological liability. New liability has to be, first of all, judicious and, second of all, its outcomes must be protected, and the oddities of the actual case must always be abided by, a situation where previous understanding will be advocated.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:34:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Maria Eugenia Andrade Liste.pdf: 631265 bytes, checksum: 192d5364fa8e26433ae6822bd42feb95 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-04-14<br>Fundo Mackenzie de Pesquisa<br>The present work approaches the principles, especially of the priority of the norm most favorable to the human being, foreseen in treated international to human rights, as alternative to surpass the existing conflict of norms it enters the norms of the international law and the domestic law, in favor of the fullness of the person human being. It presents a constitutional solution to the conflict from the interpretation, application and integration of the principles. It analyzes just the beginning of the priority of the norm most favorable from its historical antecedents fortifying the argument of its imprescindibilidade in the application of a right and concrete. It uses to advantage the lições of the new hermeneutics, with the topical method of interpretation, to integrate the right to the reduction of the social disparidades. The USA the principle biggest of the dignity of the person human being as central instrument of the legal hermeneutics, demanding of the professional of the right the recognition of its social responsibility effectively to find real solutions to the right of each one. It verifies, at last, still majoritária the positivista position in the Brazilian right, fighting it through the concretista hermeneutics (tópica) and of the apt principles to privilege the maximum protection of the human being. Objective, in conclusion, to materialize an ideal humanist from the essential bedding of the Democratic State of Right of the dignity of the person human being.<br>O presente trabalho aborda os princípios, especialmente o da primazia da norma mais favorável ao ser humano, previsto em tratados internacionais de direitos humanos, como alternativas para superar o conflito de normas existente entre as normas do direito internacional e o direito interno, em prol da plenitude da pessoa humana. Apresenta uma solução constitucional ao conflito a partir da interpretação, aplicação e integração dos princípios. Analisa o princípio da primazia da norma mais favorável a partir de seus antecedentes históricos fortalecendo o argumento da sua imprescindibilidade na aplicação de um direito justo e concreto. Aproveita as lições da nova hermenêutica, com o método tópico de interpretação, para integrar o direito à diminuição das disparidades sociais. Usa o princípio maior da dignidade da pessoa humana como instrumento central da hermenêutica jurídica, exigindo do profissional do direito o reconhecimento de sua responsabilidade social de efetivamente encontrar soluções reais ao direito de cada um. Verifica, enfim, a posição positivista ainda majoritária no direito brasileiro, combatendo-a através da hermenêutica concretista (tópica) e dos princípios aptos a privilegiar a máxima proteção do ser humano. Objetiva, em conclusão, concretizar um ideal humanista a partir do fundamento essencial do Estado Democrático de Direito da dignidade da pessoa humana.

This thesis aims to examine which views of the human being that are manifested in the Swedish and Dutch legislation on prostitution. The theoretical framework consists of the humanist, the christian and the naturalistic views of the human being in combination with the concepts of autonomy and human dignity. The question is which views of the human being are manifested in the Swedish and Dutch legislation on prostitution? According to this thesis all three views of the human being can be traced in the legislations. The humanist view of the human being is most clearly manifested, in both the Swedish and Dutch legislation on prostitution, however their views are from different angles. Whereas the view of the Swedish legislation is that the autonomy and human dignity of the seller is violated in prostitution, the Dutch legislation on the other hand sees autonomy as the seller’s right to choose prostitution. In Dutch legislation both seller and buyer are seen as autonomous beings with ability to reason, and prostitution is seen as a trade transaction. In Swedish legislation the seller is seen as vulnerable and exposed and the buyer is seen as a criminal, and both seller and buyer are in need of change and help, in different ways.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:30:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Segio Cedano.pdf: 520776 bytes, checksum: d40ba592a42bcc774f416247c65860d0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-04-13<br>The administrative function is eminently teleological, since it is related to satisfying primary interests, and as such, finds itself supported by two basic principles: the supremacy of public interest over the private and the inalienability of public interests. In order to be valid, all administrative actions must follow the human being s principle of dignity, whether in its negative sense, aiming at stopping the State s arbitrary actions, or in its positive perspective, in which the State must have as permanent objective the protection of life in all its connotations. In the exercise of the administrative function, the State realizes activities such as intervention on social domain, by means of public policies and activities to support the administration, the management of public assets and the power of the police. The state inaction is considered illegitimate and an illegal practice, in such a way as providing individuals who had their rights violated the right to make demands on the State. The Federal Constitution, paragraph 9 or article 23, defined as common administrative competence of the Union, the States, Federal District and Municipalities, the promotion of programs to build homes and to improve the living conditions and basic sanitation. Therefore, it is observed that the issue of having a residence is inserted in the context of the right-power of the State, included in the scope of the minimum vital space or existential minimum for the execution of the subjective right of a dignified life (art. 6, CF). The Constitutional Text, establishing expressly that property must have its social function (art. 5, 23) and, especially when it is considered everyone s existence with dignity as a principle of the economic order, according to the social justice (art. 170, 2 e 3), resulted in the emergence of a new internal structure of the concept of property. The inclusion of the social function principle modifies the structure of the right of ownership, in that to own leaves the condition of a mere observer of erga omnes respect, as a mere universal passive subject, and starts to consider subjective rights, following the superior constitutional consideration of the social right of residence and the consequent access to minimum vital assets, including in the relation with the State<br>A função administrativa é eminentemente teleológica, porquanto está adstrita a satisfazer interesses públicos primários e, para tanto, encontra-se lastreada em dois princípios basilares, quais sejam: supremacia do interesse público sobre o privado e o da indisponibilidade dos interesses públicos. Toda a atuação administrativa, para ser válida, deve obediência ao princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana, seja na sua acepção negativa, objetivando impedir a atuação arbitrária do Estado, seja na perspectiva positiva, em que o Estado deverá ter como meta permanente a proteção da vida em todas as suas acepções. No exercício da função administrativa, o Estado realiza atividades como a intervenção no domínio social, por meio das políticas públicas e atividades de fomento administrativo, a gestão de bens públicos e o poder de polícia. A inação estatal reveste-se de ilegitimidade e configura-se como prática ilegal, de modo a conferir direitos públicos subjetivos aos administrados lesados. A Constituição Federal, no inciso IX do art. 23, definiu como matéria de competência administrativa comum da União, dos Estados, do Distrito Federal e dos Municípios promover programas de construção de moradias e a melhoria das condições habitacionais e de saneamento básico. Percebe-se, portanto, que a questão da moradia está inserida no contexto do dever-poder do Estado, eis que incluída no âmbito do piso vital mínimo ou do mínimo existencial para a efetividade do direito subjetivo a uma vida digna (art. 6º, CF). O Texto Constitucional, ao estabelecer expressamente que a propriedade deverá atender a sua função social (art. 5º, XXIII) e, especialmente, quando reputou como princípio da ordem econômica a existência digna de todos, conforme os ditames da justiça social (art. 170, II e III), provocou o surgimento de uma nova estrutura interna do conceito de propriedade. A inclusão do princípio da função social modifica a estrutura do direito de posse, na medida em que o possuir deixa a condição de mero observador de respeito erga omnes, como mero sujeito passivo universal, e passa a titularizar direitos subjetivos, em atenção à superior previsão constitucional do direito social de moradia e o conseqüente acesso aos bens vitais mínimos, inclusive na relação com o Estado

Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-10T10:46:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 SERGIO FRANCO LEAO.pdf: 1033985 bytes, checksum: e11d0b6e76966588d7e087db7a6d137f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-03-16<br>The life is considered as the basic right more precious than a human being can intend to fight and to be tutored person for the State. However, the manifestation of the life deserves to be carried through with dignity. The life finds its opposing extremity in the occurrence of the death. The dignity of the person human being, as bigger bedding, must be preserved and be respected, also at the moment of the death. The dignity human being is printed in the right to reveal on the proper autonomy of each individual, in special, for the form that this opts so that its death can occur. The autonomy of the freedom human being is the recognition of its proper condition as human being and that it must prevail in a democratic and plural society, with respect to the individual decisions, since that interests or rights of third parties are not affected with the chosen decision. The Bioetica, to the side of the Biodireito, ahead presents individual the basic principles that must direct the medical behaviors and of a delicate subject that is the option for a worthy death. The Ethics, as science, determines the beddings necessary for the justification of a citizen in fondness not to be taken care of by medical team when if to find at moment of terminalidade of its physical existence. The Right, for its turn, establishes criteria and defines the principles that must be invoked to support the taken decision then. It appears, therefore, the vital will that if presents as alternative instrument to allow and to recognize the right to the individual freedom and the option for ahead not receiving treatments medical from the diagnosis of irreversible picture. The option for a worthy death, ahead of irreversible pictures of health, deserves to be dealt with as a question public health. The freedom of choice of each individual, through the anticipated declaration of the will, represents the recognition of the dignity of the person human being at the moment of its death, so that this can, as sequência of the life, to occur of worthy form.<br>A vida é considerada como o direito fundamental mais precioso que um ser humano pode pretender lutar e ser tutelado pelo Estado. Todavia, a manifestação da vida merece ser realizada com dignidade. A vida encontra o seu extremo oposto na ocorrência da morte. A dignidade da pessoa humana, como fundamento maior, deve ser preservada e respeitada, inclusive no momento da morte. A dignidade humana está estampada no direito de manifestar sobre a autonomia própria de cada indivíduo, em especial, pela forma que este opta para que a sua morte possa ocorrer. A autonomia da liberdade humana é o reconhecimento de sua própria condição como ser humano e que deve prevalecer em uma sociedade democrática e plural, com respeito às decisões individuais, desde que interesses ou direitos de terceiros não sejam afetados com a decisão escolhida. A Bioética, ao lado do Biodireito, apresentam os princípios fundamentais que devem direcionar as condutas médicas e individuais diante de um assunto delicado que é a opção por uma morte digna. A Ética, como ciência, determina os fundamentos necessários para a justificativa de um cidadão em não querer ser atendido por equipe médica quando se encontrar em momento de terminalidade da sua existência física. O Direito, por seu turno, estabelece critérios e define os princípios que devem ser invocados para amparar a decisão então tomada. Surge, portanto, o testamento vital que se apresenta como instrumento alternativo para permitir e reconhecer o direito à liberdade individual e a opção por não receber tratamentos médicos diante do diagnóstico de quadro irreversível. A opção por uma morte digna, diante de quadros irreversíveis de saúde, merece ser tratada como uma questão de saúde pública. A liberdade de escolha de cada indivíduo, através da declaração antecipada da vontade, representa o reconhecimento da dignidade da pessoa humana no momento de sua morte, para que esta possa, como sequência da vida, ocorrer de forma digna.