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1
Schäfer, Elisabeth. "Figurations of Immanence." Performance Philosophy 3, no. 3 (December 21, 2017): 671. http://dx.doi.org/10.21476/pp.2017.33137.
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If anything, Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, makes all living beings, including the human subjects, very much ‘part of nature’. Calling for an embodied philosophy of radical immanence marks the start of a bodily philosophy of relations. The body in this perspective is a relation to what is not itself. It is basically a movement or an activity. Could certain processes of writing be described as immanent to such movements or activities?
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Biocca, Frank. "Inserting the Presence of Mind into a Philosophy of Presence: A Response to Sheridan and Mantovani and Riva." Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments 10, no. 5 (October 2001): 546–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/105474601753132722.
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This article considers the following question: What is the best foundation for a theory of presence? After establishing criteria for a philosophy of presence, the article applies these criteria to a set of articles on the philosophy of presence by Sheridan (1999), Mantovani and Riva (1999), and others. Although we share common goals, it is suggested that these articles advance a philosophy of presence that may be ill suited to support theory and research on presence. Several arguments are advanced to support this judgment. J. J. Gibson's work may be misinterpreted to accommodate relativistic models of physical reality. By directly referencing Gibson's writings, especially his concepts of ecological invariants, the article details how Gibson's work could not be used to support cultural, relativistic, or “engineering” arguments about “different realities”, perceptual or otherwise, without significant modification of Gibson's work and violation of his apparent intent. Another source of problems for a philosophy of presence is traced. There appears to be a terminological and theoretical confusion about the difference between epistemology and ontology. This article proposes that ontological debates about divine presence represented by these authors may be inappropriate or sterile for three reasons: (1) although perceptual presence (that is, phenomenal states of distal attribution) and “divine presence” (that is, immanence of God) share the term presence, they are fundamentally different philosophical problems; (2) the concept of divine presence and Sheridan's associated “estimation paradigm” is framed at such a level of generality to be incapable of supporting specific, actionable, and researchable theories about perceptual presence; and (3) any theory about “virtual reality”, a technology with a misleading oxymoronic term, provides no more ontological insight into reality than does theory and research on any other communication medium such as photography, film, or sound recording. Finally, the article proposes a remedy. The philosophy of presence might be most fruitfully approached via the philosophy of mind. Specifically, it is suggested that presence opens the door to related problems in the science of human consciousness, notably the mind-body problem. The article also suggests that the problem of presence bridges the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of technology on the issue of mediated embodiment, that is, the fuzzy boundary between the body and technological extensions of the body.
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Beaulieu, Alain. "L'Éthique de Spinoza dans l'œuvre de Gilles Deleuze." Dialogue 42, no. 2 (2003): 211–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300004492.
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AbstractDeleuze calls Spinoza the “Prince” of philosophers. He devotes two books to him, Spinoza et le probleme de l'expression and Spinoza. Philosophie pratique But Deleuze's entire body of work also gives him an opportunity to work on Spinoza's conceptuality. Deleuze does not arrive at Spinoza by making a leap from the principle of reason to reconquer an original and forgotten past. The immanence of Spinoza is more like an arrow found inadvertently and shot again into the immensity of the universe. We propose to define this timelessness by highlighting the main points of convergence between Deleuze's thought and that of Spinoza. These convergences will be examined using excerpts selected from the five parts of the Ethics in which the following themes will be broached: the principle of reason, panpsychism, experimentation of the body, notion of power, and liberty. We will see how Deleuze gives a new and yet strangely faithful spin to Spinozist thought on which he establishes his notions of pluricosmism, non-human becomings, ethology, deterritorialization, and escape lines.
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DYKE, CHRISTINA VAN. "Human identity, immanent causal relations, and the principle of non-repeatability: Thomas Aquinas on the bodily resurrection." Religious Studies 43, no. 4 (November 7, 2007): 373–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412507009031.
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AbstractCan the persistence of a human being's soul at death and prior to the bodily resurrection be sufficient to guarantee that the resurrected human being is numerically identical to the human being who died? According to Thomas Aquinas, it can. Yet, given that Aquinas holds that the human being is identical to the composite of soul and body and ceases to exist at death, it's difficult to see how he can maintain this view. In this paper, I address Aquinas's response to this objection (Summa Contra Gentiles, IV.80–81). After making a crucial clarification concerning the nature of the non-repeatability principle on which the objection relies, I argue that the contemporary notion of immanent causal relations provides us with a way of understanding Aquinas's defence that renders it both highly interesting and philosophically plausible.
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Ferm Almqvist, Cecilia, and Linn Hentschel. "The (female) situated musical body." Per Musi, no. 39 (April 11, 2019): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.35699/2317-6377.2019.5288.
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The starting point for the study presented in this article is constituted by experiences of using Simone de Beauvoir’s philosophy and Iris Marion Young theories aiming to describe and understand the becoming of musical women in Swedish schools. Earlier research conducted outside the area of music shows that Beauvoir’s theories can help to explain – and provide means of change for – situations where there is a risk that traditional gender roles will be conserved. A majority of gender studies in the field of music education are based on the performativity theory of Judith Butler. In comparison, de Beauvoir states that repetitions and habits are stratified in the body as experiences, and that human beings are able to make choices in a situation. The aim of the study is to explore how caring is nurtured among girls in Swedish music educational settings. Material generated through two phenomenological studies conducted within specialist music programs in lower respectively higher secondary education in Sweden, constituted the empirical base for conducting re-analysis. This re-analysis followed a hermeneutical phenomenological analytical model. Examples of how caring seemed to be nurtured among girls in music education appeared at different levels and in different situations. It concerns actions made by the girls aiming to make the social and musical setting function in agreed upon ways, namely in the form of taking initiatives, filling “gaps”, and being flexible. Finally we reflect upon causes and changes in relation to actions that seem to establish and maintain female students as immanent, and non-able to run their own projects.
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de Pee, Christian. "Circulation and flow: Immanent metaphors in the financial debates of Northern Song China (960–1127 CE)." History of Science 56, no. 2 (June 2018): 168–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0073275317724706.
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The Song Empire (960–1279 CE) had a larger population, a higher agricultural output, a more efficient infrastructure, and a more extensive monetary system than any previous empire in Chinese history. As local jurisdictions during the eleventh century became entangled in empire-wide economic relations and trans-regional commercial litigation, imperial officials sought to reduce the bewildering movement of people, goods, and money to an immanent cosmic pattern. They reasoned that because money and commerce brought to imperial subjects the goods they required to survive, money and commerce must be beneficent, and because they were beneficent, they must conform to the immanent pattern of the moral cosmos, as did everything else that was enduringly sustaining of life and wellbeing. And because money and commerce conformed to the moral cosmos, officials attempted to understand their workings by analogy with other phenomena that sustained human life, such as the flow of water and the circulation of vital essences through the human body. During the 1030s and 1040s, officials and scholars believed that knowledge of the cosmic pattern lay within their grasp, and that this knowledge would allow them to align culture with nature, and the present with hallowed antiquity. By the 1080s, however, this intellectual optimism had been defeated by irreconcilable disagreements about financial and economic policy. The failure of the attempt to understand finance by natural analogy draws attention to the underlying ideological insistence on moral learning as the basis for political power, and to the very limited range of economic discourse that has been preserved in eleventh-century texts.
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Gupta, Meenu. "Reflections of Indian Philosophy in Deleuze's ‘Body without Organs’." Deleuze and Guattari Studies 12, no. 1 (February 2018): 13–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/dlgs.2018.0293.
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As the title suggests, this paper looks at the Deleuzian concept of body without organs and compares it with Indian Philosophy. In the Indian context, the concept of moksha/nirvana comes near to it as both are practices that aim at liberation; here, ‘liberation’ is never the awaited end of the process but the process itself. The traditional western substantialism rests on things whereas Deleuze, like Indian Philosophy, celebrates ‘experience’ and the ‘incorporeal’. Thus, body without organs plays a role in individuation. It hints at a journey beyond ‘the self’ which is full of ecstasy or the ananda of the Indian thought system. The question of Being, which not only is conceptual identification, is presented in terms of the virtual and the actual. For Deleuze and Guattari, every actual body has a virtual dimension, a vast reservoir of potentials, and this is the body without organs. The actual emerges from it and carries it with it. Further, the plane of immanence is a field in which concepts are produced. It is neither external to the Self nor forms an external self or a non-self. It is ‘an absolute outside’, very much like Brahman. The pragmatics of Deleuzian theory is that it explains life to be ‘immanence of immanence, absolute immanence’ – an utter beatitude – which has a Vedantic counterpart where the essential Brahman is a combination of three attributes – sat (being), chit (mind) and ananda (bliss). Thus, this paper aims at the interesting comparison between Deleuzian theory and Indian Philosophy.
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Böhler, Arno. "Immanence: A life… Friedrich Nietzsche." Performance Philosophy 3, no. 3 (December 21, 2017): 576. http://dx.doi.org/10.21476/pp.2017.33163.
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I will argue in this text that the very foundation of a transcendent interpretation of life is based on a hidden aggression of living beings against life itself. Nietzsche was probably the first who discovered the fact that “metaphysical believes” are finally grounded in a false image of thought, which avoids––not arbitrarily, but constitutively––to have a close look at the instinctive activities, operative in a body.In order to understand what is finally at stake for Nietzsche in the problem transcendence versus immanence, one therefore has to understand his new concept of the body. The body, not as a massive thing in itself, but a worldwide being, exposed to a multitude of forces, subconsciously operative in the cellar regions of a body as well as in the worldwide affections, a body is exposed to in its being-in-the-world.In the second part of my paper I will address the research-festival Philosophy on Stage#4, Nietzsche et cetera (Tanzquartier Wien 2015) as an example, in which philosophy is realized as an artistic research practice that gives back to philosophy its corporeality, materiality and fleshly sensibility by staging philosophy. A way of philosophising, which counters the classical ascetic image of thought and thus demands a new species of “artist-philosophers,” able and willing to demand, in line with Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, to “stay true to the earth”.
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Bonai, Julija. "Psychological and Ontological Aspects of Causality According to the Philosophy of Sāṃkhya and the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze." Deleuze and Guattari Studies 12, no. 1 (February 2018): 104–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/dlgs.2018.0298.
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Sāṃkhya, or the philosophy of Yoga, is considered to be one of the most influential traditional philosophies in India. A close reading of it can lead to the conclusion that Sāṃkhya's and Deleuze's philosophy share similar ontological assumptions, especially regarding the material field of immanence that manifests itself through every mode of being. Both philosophies assume modes or degrees of material coexistence that extend from the virtual, potential field of immanence, as something conditional and causal, to actual manifestation that is more or less structured, graspable and shaped. Additionally, they both consider the human psyche to be material that, as materiality itself, manifests itself through different modes of (un)conscious existence. On the other hand, they also share the assumption about the transcendental field of impersonal consciousness immersed in the material field of immanence. This paper identifies and explains the causal relationship among these different modes of being from the point of view of a particular understanding of time, and offers insight into how the comprehension of causality could be implied in ethical theory.
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Bergo, Bettina. "Ontology, Transcendence, and Immanence in Emmanuel Levinas' Philosophy." Research in Phenomenology 35, no. 1 (2005): 141–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1569164054905474.
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AbstractThis essay studies the unfolding of Levinas' concept of transcendence from 1935 to his 1984 talk entitled "Transcendence and Intelligibility." I discuss how Levinas frames transcendence in light of enjoyment, shame, and nausea in his youthful project of a counter-ontology to Heidegger's Being and Time. In Levinas' essay, transcendence is the human urge to get out of being. I show the ways in which Levinas' early ontology is conditioned by historical circumstances, but I argue that its primary aim is formal and phenomenological; it adumbrates formal structures of human existence. Levinas' 1940s ontology accentuates the dualism in being, between what amount to a light and a dark principle. This shift in emphasis ushers in a new focus for transcendence, which is now both sensuous and temporal, thanks to the promise of fecundity. Totality and Infinity (1961) pursues a similar onto-logic, while shifting the locus of transcendence to a non-sexuate other. The final great work, Otherwise than Being or beyond Essence (1974) offers a hermeneutic phenomenology of transcendence-in-immanence. It rethinks Husserl's focus on the transcendence of intentionality and its condition of possibility in the passive synthesis of complex temporality. If the 1974 strategy 'burrows beneath' the classical phenomenological syntheses, it also incorporates unsuspected influences from French psychology and phenomenology. This allows Levinas to develop a philosophical conception of transcendence that is neither Husserl's intentionality nor Heidegger's temporal ecstases, in what amounts to an original contribution to a phenomenology both hermeneutic and descriptive.
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van Eeden, Rikus. "Levinas’s Political Chiasmi: Otherwise than Being as a Response to Liberalism and Fascism, Humanism and Antihumanism." Religions 10, no. 3 (March 7, 2019): 170. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel10030170.
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In this article, I approach the relationship between the ethical and political in Levinas from the perspective of the hermeneutic strategy he employs when engaging with political thought. I argue that, in two key texts—“Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism” and Humanism of the Other—Levinas situates seemingly opposed traditions of political thought in chiastic relation to one another: liberalism and fascism, and humanism and antihumanism, respectively. Furthermore, I argue that Levinas’s views on the relationship between the ethical and political in Otherwise than Being can be read as a response to the chiasmi found in the above texts. The relationship between the ontologies of liberalism and fascism is chiastic, because the latter’s fatal embrace of embodied and historical existence relies on the dualism the former establishes between the subject as transcendent and the body as immanent. Humanism and antihumanism are in chiastic relation in terms of the question of violence. The latter critiques the former for the violence of its Platonist devaluation of historical cultures, and argues instead for the equivalence of cultures; however, in locating intelligibility in structures of which specific cultures are merely configurations, antihumanism repeats the devaluation of specific cultures. In an altered manner, it is, therefore, also a potentially violent view of intercultural relations. Levinas’s analysis of sensible proximity to the human other is an attempt to account for the gravity of culturally situated meaning without turning it into an irrevocable fatality. I argue that the ethical does not detract from the situatedness of intelligibility, but demonstrates that we are bound to our cultural situation, not by fate, but by responsibility.
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Toadvine, Ted. "Life beyond Biologism." Research in Phenomenology 40, no. 2 (2010): 243–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156916410x509940.
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AbstractIn a move that has puzzled commentators, Derrida’s The Animal that Therefore I Am rejects claims for continuity between the human and the animal, aligning such claims with the ideology of “biologistic continuism.” This problematization of the logic of the human-animal limit holds implications for how we are to understand life in relation to auto-affection, immanence in relation to transcendence, and naturalism in relation to phenomenology. Derrida’s abyssal logic parallels the “strange kinship” described by Merleau-Ponty, though only if this strangeness is intensified as “hetero-affection” by incorporating death into life. Following Merleau-Ponty and Elizabeth Grosz, we locate the creative moment of this abyssal intimacy in the transformative productions of sexual difference. This positive account of the excess of hetero-affection reconciles phenomenology with evolution and offers a figure for thinking the thickening and multiplying of the differences between human and non-human, living and nonliving, corporeal and cosmic.
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Calogero, Stephen. "What is Contemplation?" International Philosophical Quarterly 59, no. 4 (2019): 385–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq2019108140.
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The argument is developed by drawing on the thought of Søren Kierkegaard, Eric Voegelin, and Bernard Lonergan. Contemplation is possible because the self is constituted by self-presence in its engagement with being. Self-presence does not precede one’s engagement with being and is not an alternative to this engagement, but is the unique mode of human participation in being. Immersed in the frenetic give and take of the world, one is present to oneself. Self-presence also includes the unique quality of human existence in tension between the immanent and transcendent. The contemplative experience is characterized by awe, humility, joy, and mystery. In contemplation, one cedes for a time the practical preoccupations evoked by the pull of immanence and gives way to the questing disposition—what the Greeks called wonder—toward transcendence. Contemplation is the questing disposition of self-presence toward being.
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Weston, Michael. "Philosophy and Religion in the Thought of Kierkegaard." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 32 (March 1992): 9–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100005622.
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Kierkegaard is often regarded as a precursor of existential philosophy whose religious concerns may, for philosophical purposes, be safely ignored or, at best, regarded as an unfortunate, if unavoidable, consequence of his complicity with the very metaphysics he did so much to discredit. Kierkegaard himself, however, foresaw this appropriation of his work by philosophy. ‘The existing individual who forgets that he is an existing individual will become more and more absent-minded’, he wrote, ‘and as people sometimes embody the fruits of their leisure moments in books, so we may venture to expect as the fruits of his absent-mindedness the expected existential system—well, perhaps, not all of us, but only those who are as absent-minded as he is’ (Kierkegaard, 1968, p. 110). However, it may be rejoined here, this expectation merely shows Kierkegaard's historically unavoidable ignorance of the development of existential philosophy with its opposition to the idea of system and its emphasis upon the very existentiality of the human being. How could a form of thought which, in this way, puts at its centre the very Being of the existing individual, its existentiality, be accused of absent-mindedness? Has it not, rather, recollected that which metaphysics had forgotten? Yet the impression remains that Kierkegaard would not have been persuaded himself that such recollection could constitute remembering that one is an existing individual, for he remarks, of his own ignoring of the difference between Socrates and Plato in his Philosophical Fragments, ‘By holding Socrates down to the proposition that all knowledge is recollection, he becomes a speculative philosopher instead of an existential thinker, for whom existence is the essential thing. The recollection principle belongs to speculative philosophy, and recollection is immanence, and speculatively and eternally there is no paradox’ (Kierkegaard, 1968, p. 184n). We must ask, therefore, whether the recollection of existentiality can cure an existential absent-mindedness or remains itself a form of immanence for which there is no paradox.
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Wicks, R. "KANT ON BEAUTIFYING THE HUMAN BODY." British Journal of Aesthetics 39, no. 2 (February 1, 1999): 163–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjaesthetics/39.2.163.
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Vest, Matthew. "Beyond Re-enchantment: Christian Materialism and Modern Medicine." Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality 25, no. 3 (November 5, 2019): 266–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cb/cbz011.
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Abstract This article explores enchantment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment in reference to modern medicine’s view of the body. Before considering Weber’s enchantment paradigm, I question some core assumptions regarding sociology as methodologically scientific and value-free. Furthermore, I draw on Jenkins who helps to illustrate the difficulty of rooting terms such as enchantment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment; the question remains “which” historical and cultural period is employed as the basis for such sociological terms. Such questions are critical, but not entirely dismissive of modern medicine as “disenchanted”; with some more explicit foundational and presuppositional context, disenchantment can be a helpful notion for approaching questions of the “new body.” St. Gregory Palamas’ Christian materialism and mystical anthropology present such an explicit foundation. Moreover, this Patristic foundation moves past the postmodern aporia of emphasizing either immanence or transcendence—two polar attractions that factor heavily in the way modern medicine views the body.
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Gilliam, Christian. "Vrais Amis: Reconsidering the Philosophical Relationship Between Foucault and Deleuze." Foucault Studies, no. 25 (October 22, 2018): 191. http://dx.doi.org/10.22439/fs.v25i2.5580.
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In the current literature addressing the Foucault/Deleuze relationship, there is a clear tendency to either replicate and expand Foucault’s over-simplified rejection of Deleuzian desire as already caught in a discursive trap or play of power; or to replicate Deleuze and Guattari’s over-simplified reading of Foucault’s dispositif, in which power and resistance are deemed opposed and thus understood via a structure of negativity. In either case, each thinker is accused of referring to an asocial or essentialist multiplicity, typically in the form of a real transcendence (positive Body), which is deemed ‘inconsistent’ with their post-structuralist yearnings. This article argues that there is in fact a real and enduring consistency between the two thinkers, which is to be found in the mutual use of an ontology of ‘pure’ or ‘disjunctive’ immanence – as derived from and developed through Nietzsche’s method of genealogy – as a way to construe power/subjectification, with pleasure/desire taken as the affective inside of this power. That said, the somewhat semantic difference between desire and pleasure being proposed does lead to a slight, though tangible, divergence in politico-ethical and practical possibilities. This article concludes that it is this divergence that should from the real basis of debate.
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Dissanayake, Wimal, Michel Feher, Ramona Naddaff, and Nadia Tazi. "Fragments for a History of the Human Body." Philosophy East and West 41, no. 2 (April 1991): 276. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1399781.
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Gortok, S. G. "TRACES ON THE HUMAN BODY: DECORATION, PROVOCATION OR PHILOSOPHY?" Вестник Восточно-Сибирского государственного института культуры 174, no. 1 (July 2, 2018): 108–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.31443/2541-8874-2018-1-5-108-113.
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KIVLE, INETA. "P. CHEYNE, A. HAMILTON, M. PADDISON (EDS.) PHILOSOPHY OF RHYTHM: AESTHETICS, MUSIC, POETICS. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019 ISBN 978-0-19-934778-0." HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES 10, no. 1 (2021): 312–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2021-10-1-312-319.
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The review provides an outline of the collective monograph The Philosophy of Rhythm: Aesthetics, Music, Poetics, edited by Peter Cheyne, Andy Hamilton and Max Paddison, published by Oxford University Press, 2019. Concept of rhythm is analysed from different perspectives—philosophical, musicological and psychological. It considers a multidisciplinary approach and also includes both analytic and continental philosophical traditions. Rhythm is viewed as a pulse that is going through various metric structures including particular pieces of music, paintings, examples of poetry and philosophy. Twenty eight authors from the entire world discuss rhythm and specify definitions of rhythm. They try to give answers on crucial questions uniting experienced rhythm in philosophy and arts, thus giving an important contribution to rhythm studies. The book is organised thematically and based on different aspects of rhythm manifestations. The main questions of the research are as follows: How is rhythm experienced? Does rhythm necessarily involve movement? Why rhythm is so deeply rooted in human? How can static configurations be rhythmic? How does a rhythmic structure change from a stable pattern to a flexible texture? All these questions concern two interwoven issues common for the volume in general: immanence of rhythm to arts and human experience of it.
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Magrì, Elisa. "The Problem of Habitual Body and Memory in Hegel and Merleau-Ponty." Hegel Bulletin 38, no. 1 (January 23, 2017): 24–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2016.65.
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AbstractIn this paper, I shall focus on the relation between habitual body and memory in Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. Both Hegel and Merleau-Ponty defend a view of the self that is centred on the role of habituality as embodied activity situated in a context. However, both philosophers avoid committing to what Edward Casey has defined habitual body memory, i.e., an active immanence of the past in the body that informs present bodily actions in an efficacious, orienting and regular manner. I shall explore the reasons why neither Hegel nor Merleau-Ponty develops an explicit account of habitual body memory. This will shed light not only on Hegel’s account of lived experience, but also on Hegel and Merleau-Ponty’s common concern with the habitual body.
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Vento, Maria Alves. "Rousseau: a philosophy of the interested will." Educativa 20, no. 1 (September 29, 2017): 95. http://dx.doi.org/10.18224/educ.v20i1.5866.
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ROUSSEAU: UMA FILOSOFIA DO "INTERESSE"
Resumo: nos dias atuais, diante da substituição das prioridades públicas por interesses mesquinhos, a análise rousseauniana e sua distinção entre amor de si e amor próprio deixou um legado original sobre a noção de interesse que se revela bastante atual. Essa distinção resultou nos pares de oposições marcantes da sua obra: interesse verdadeiro/interesse falso, interesse absoluto/interesse relativo, interesse geral/interesse particular, cuja elucidação, permite compreender como seria possível o acordo de interesses numa sociedade ou, para empregar os termos de Rousseau, o “ponto sobre o qual todos os interesses concordam”, sem o qual não poderia haver sociedade legítima.
Palavras-chave: Amor de si. Amor próprio. Imanência. Interesse.
Abstract: nowadays, on the replacement of public priorities by narrow interests, the Rousseau’s analyses of human self-love and his distinction between its two basic varieties: amour-propre and amour de soi, left us an original legacy on the notion of interest which is very current. This distinction resulted in pairs of striking contradictions of his work: true interest/false interest, absolute interest/ relative interest, general interest/ private interest, whose elucidation, allows us to understand how could the agreement of interests in a society or, to use the Rousseau’s terms, the "point on which all interests agree," without which there could be no legitimate society.
Keywords: Amour de soi. Amour proper. Immanence. Interest.
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Jonkus, Dalius. "INTERSUBJEKTYVAUS KŪNO FENOMENOLOGIJA: PRISILIETIMO PATIRTIS." Problemos 75 (January 1, 2008): 129–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2008.0.1991.
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Straipsnis analizuoja Edmundo Husserlio, Jeano-Paulo Sartre’o ir Maurise Merleau-Ponty požiūrį į kūno vaidmenį intersubjektyviuose santykiuose. Jeanas-Paulas Sartre’as atmeta dvigubų jutimų sampratą. Jis neigia galimybę patirti kūną kaip subjektą ir objektą vienu metu. Sartre’as akcentuoja, kad kitas vizualiai pažįstamas tik jį paverčiant objektu. Edmundas Husserlis ir Maurise Merleau-Ponty ieško sąryšio su kitu kūniškumo plotmėje. Atrasdami prisilietimo grįžtamąjį ryšį su savimi, o vėliau išplėtodami šią kvazirefleksijos sampratą ir kitų juslių lygmeniu, Husserlis ir Merleau-Ponty sugriauna tradicinę sąmonės ir savasties sampratą. Sąmonė nebegali būti suprantama kaip vidujybė, o kūnas kaip išorybė. Pats kūnas atrandamas kaip susidvejinęs – patiriantis kitą ir save tuo pat metu. Suskyla ir savasties substanciškumas. Savastis visada pasirodo kitame, kitam ir per kitą. Kartu pasikeičia ir santykio su kitu traktuotė. Kitas nėra kažkoks transcendentiškas objektas, kurį reikia pažinti ar užvaldyti. Santykis su kitu atsiskleidžia kartu kaip santykis su savimi ir santykis su pasauliu. Jei mano kūnas nėra vien mano kūnas, bet jis yra tarp manęs ir kitų, tai tada galime suvokti, kodėl aš negaliu savęs sutapatinti su vieta, kurioje esu. Ir mano vieta, kaip ir mano kūnas, yra mano tiktai kitų atžvilgiu. Mano savastį iš esmės apibrėžia šis tarpkūniškumas, kurio patirtis sudaro sąlygas ne tik įsisąmoninti savąjį socialumą, bet ir suvokti savosios būties tarp – pasauliškumą. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: fenomenologija, intersubjektyvumas, kitas, gyvenamas kūnas, tarpkūniškumas, savipatirtis. Phenomenology of Intersubjective Body: the Experience of TouchDalius Jonku Summary The article deals with the conception of intersubjective body in Edmund Husserl’s, Jean-Paul Sartre’s and Maurice Merleau-Ponty philosophy. Jean-Paul Sartre rejects the conception of double sense, i.e. he denies the possibility to have bodily experience as a subject and an object at the same time. He argues that we can know Other visually only as an object. Husserl and Merleau-Ponty are in search of connection with the Other on a new plane. They investigate the preconditions of the openness to the Other. Their attention is focused on the bodily self-awareness in the experience of touch. Both philosophers develop the conception of bodily quasi-reflection. They transform the traditional conception of selfhood and show its paradoxical alienation from itself. The one’s own body is revealed as insisting on the otherness. The analysis of double senses in the experience of the sense of touch reveals the experience of “my” body as an inter-corporality. That’s because both philosophers can reject the prejudice of immanence and transcendence. The experience of a living body is always a relation with “myself”, with the other and with the world. Keywords: phenomenology, intersubjectivity, interreflectivity, Other, living body, self-awareness.ibri, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 17px;">
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Fischer, Clara. "Feminist Philosophy, Pragmatism, and the “Turn to Affect”: A Genealogical Critique." Hypatia 31, no. 4 (2016): 810–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12296.
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Recent years have witnessed a focus on feeling as a topic of reinvigorated scholarly concern, described by theorists in a range of disciplines in terms of a “turn to affect.” Surprisingly little has been said about this most recent shift in critical theorizing by philosophers, including feminist philosophers, despite the fact that affect theorists situate their work within feminist and related, sometimes intersectional, political projects. In this article, I redress the seeming elision of the “turn to affect” in feminist philosophy, and develop a critique of some of the claims made by affect theorists that builds upon concerns regarding the “newness” of affect and emotion in feminist theory, and the risks of erasure this may entail. To support these concerns, I present a brief genealogy of feminist philosophical work on affect and emotion. Identifying a reductive tendency within affect theory to equate affect with bodily immanence, and to preclude cognition, culture, and representation, I argue that contemporary feminist theorists would do well to follow the more holistic models espoused by the canon of feminist work on emotion. Furthermore, I propose that prominent affect theorist Brian Massumi is right to return to pragmatism as a means of redressing philosophical dualisms, such as emotion/cognition and mind/body, but suggest that such a project is better served by John Dewey's philosophy of emotion than by William James's.
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McDonald, Terrance H. "Conceptualizing an Ethology of Masculinities." Men and Masculinities 21, no. 1 (June 2, 2016): 56–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1097184x16652662.
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Rather than a definition or redefinition of masculinity, or masculinities, this article asks what can masculinities do? To explore this question, I map the possibilities that Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of immanence offer masculinities theory. Through a theoretical encounter with Deleuze, Guattari, Spinoza, and Gatens, I seek to open up an alternative conceptualization of masculinities that moves away from morality—transcendent judgments of good or bad—and toward an ethics that privileges our capacities for affecting and being affected. While masculinities studies and gender theory has proposed related notions concerning gender fluidity and resisting gender binaries, this article proposes an alternative through Deleuze’s and Gatens’ readings of Spinoza’s Ethics that radically challenges the mind–body split that informs traditional lineages of Western philosophy. What is at stake for this essay is the ability to conceive of masculinities as creative force with no allegiance to the male body other than its capacity to affect or be affected.
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Russon, John. "On Human Identity: The Intersubjective Path from Body to Mind." Dialogue 45, no. 2 (2006): 307–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300000585.
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Friesen, J. Glenn. "95 THESES ON HERMAN DOOYEWEERD." Philosophia Reformata 74, no. 2 (November 17, 2009): 78–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22116117-90000465.
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Philosophy gives an account of our experience 1. Philosophy does not begin with rational propositions or presuppositions, but rather with our experience. Dooyeweerd begins A New Critique of Theoretical Thought by contrasting the continuity of our pre-theoretical experience with the way that theoretical experience splits apart this continuity.1 He says later, “The apriori structure of reality can only be known by experience. But this is not experience as it is conceived by immanence-philosophy.”2 Human experience is not limited to our temporal functions of consciousness.3 Our experience is not an ‘Erlebnis’ of mere psychical feelings and sensations,4 but rather “a conscious enstatic5 ‘Hineinleben.’” — the experience of our supratemporal selfhood enter ing into and living within all aspects of temporal reality.
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Nicolay, Deniz Alcione. "A PEDAGOGIA DO AFETO EM NIETZSCHE-SPINOZA: considerações a partir da leitura de Deleuze." Cadernos de Pesquisa 22, no. 2 (August 31, 2015): 45. http://dx.doi.org/10.18764/2178-2229.v22.n2.p.45-57.
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O presente texto trata do encontro Nietzsche-Spinoza. Tal encontro é promovido, sobretudo, pela filosofiadeleuziana. A partir dessa perspectiva filosófica, este texto discute as noções de imanência e afetividade. Volta-se para o livro III da Ética de Spinoza na intenção de operar com a teoria dos afetos nas relações entre conhecimentoe vida, corpo e espírito. Por isso, analisa as distinções utilizadas por Nietzsche e Spinoza no que concerne aouso dos conceitos de Vontade de Potência e conatus. Identifica a alegria como o elo que anima essa relação, querseja na dimensão intensiva, quer seja na dimensão trágica. O fato é que a filosofia de ambos enobrece o esforçohumano em dar forma a natureza, a arte e a cultura. Nesse sentido, em contraponto as pedagogias da essência,apresentamos a possibilidade de pensar uma pedagogia do afeto. Em tal pedagogia o conhecimento é uma aventurainfinita, mas não impossível de ser vivida. Trata-se de uma pedagogia da realidade, que visa à superação debarreiras (psíquicas ou institucionais), utilizando a positividade como parâmetro, a grandeza como modelo. Por fim,pregando um estatuto de cientificidade ao afeto, essa pedagogia não isola a vida do processo, mas é a vida mesmanas suas variações de potência.Palavras-chave: Afetividade. Conhecimento. Paixão. Alegria. THE PEDAGOGY OF AFFECTION IN NIETZSCHE-SPINOZA: considerations fromDeleuze readingAbstract: This paper deals with the meeting Nietzsche-Spinoza. This meeting is organized mainly by Deleuzianphilosophy. From this philosophical perspective, this paper discusses the notions of immanence and affectionateness.Back to the book III of Spinoza’s Ethics, aiming to operate on the theory of affects in relations between knowledgeand life, body and spirit. Therefore, analyzes the distinctions used by Nietzsche and Spinoza about use of theconcepts “Desire for Power” and “conatus”. Identifies the joy as the link that animates this relationship, whether inthe intensive dimension, whether in the tragic dimension. The fact is that the philosophy of both ennobles the humaneffort in shaping the nature, art and culture. In this sense, contrasting the pedagogies of the essence, we present thepossibility of thinking a pedagogy of affection. In such a knowledge, the pedagogy is an endless adventure, but notimpossible to be lived. It is a pedagogy of reality, which aims at overcoming barriers (mental or institutional) usingthe positivity as a parameter, the greatness as a model. Finally, preaching a scientific status to the affection, thispedagogy does not isolate the process of life but is life itself in its power variations.Keywords: Affectivity. Knowledge. Passion. Joy LA PEDAGOGÍA DEL AFECTO EN NIETZSCHE-SPINOZA: consideraciones delectura DeleuzeResumen: Este artículo trata de la reunión Nietzsche-Spinoza. Este encuentro está organizado principalmente porla filosofía Deleuziana. Desde el punto de vista filosófico, este documento analiza los conceptos de la imanencia yel afecto. Volver al libro III de la Ética de Spinoza se pretende utilizar en la teoría de los afectos en las relacionesentre el conocimiento y la vida, el cuerpo y el espíritu. Por lo tanto, los análisis de las distinciones utilizadas por Nietzschey Spinoza en respecto al uso de la voluntad de los conceptos de voluntad de poder y conatus. Identifica laalegría como el vínculo que anima a esta relación, ya sea en la dimensión intensiva, ya sea en la dimensión trágica.El hecho es que la filosofía de ambos ennoblece el esfuerzo humano en la conformación de la naturaleza, el artey la cultura. En este sentido, en contrapunto de las pedagogías de la esencia, se presenta la posibilidad de pensaruna pedagogía del afecto. En tal conocimiento pedagogía es una aventura sin fin, pero no imposible de ser vivido.Es una pedagogía de la realidad, que pretende superar las barreras (mental e institucional), utilizando la positividadcomo parámetro, la grandeza como modelo. Por último, predicando un estatus científico a afectar, esta pedagogíano aísla el proceso de la vida, pero es la vida misma en sus variaciones de potencia.Palabras clave: Afectividad. Conocimiento. Pasión. Alegría.
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Gallagher, Shaun. "Lived Body and Environment." Research in Phenomenology 16, no. 1 (1986): 139–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156916486x00103.
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AbstractMerleau-Ponty developed a phenomenology of the body that promoted a non-dualistic account of human existence. In this paper I intend to develop Merleau-Ponty's analysis further by questioning his account of the body on the issues of body perception, and the body's relation to its environment. To clarify these issues I draw from both the phenomenological tradition and recent psychological investigations.
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Schoonheim, Liesbeth. "The Productive Body." Philosophy Today 63, no. 2 (2019): 471–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtoday2019813277.
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This essay aims to correct the widely-held view that Arendt is hostile to the body due to its physical needs. By focusing on two modes of corporeality that are distinguished by the production of bodily substances—the digestive body and the crying body—I argue that Arendt (1) deployed various notions of corporeality that thematize, in different ways, the uncontrollability our bodies; and (2) argues for the affirmation of this unmasterablity because it corresponds to the conditioned nature of human existence. Firstly, Arendt criticized the Greek, narcissistic aspiration toward physical beauty, exemplified in the figure of Achilles, for its attempt to subjugate the digestive body to a preconceived end—a criticism that equally applies to Connolly’s plea for strategically altering our affects. Secondly, Arendt’s appreciation of Homer’s description of a crying Odysseus shows that the acknowledgment of events constitutive of one’s life consists in a publicly visible somatic reaction.
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Levin, David Michael. "The body politic: Political economy and the human body." Human Studies 8, no. 3 (1985): 235–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00142994.
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Tumanov, Vladimir. "Philosophy of Mind and Body in Andrei Tarkovsky's Solaris." Film-Philosophy 20, no. 2-3 (October 2016): 357–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/film.2016.0020.
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Andrei Tarkovsky's film Solaris (1972) is studied through the lens of philosophy of mind. The question of memory and personhood, as developed by John Locke and then expanded by Derek Parfit, is applied to the status of Hari – the copy of the protagonist's deceased wife. The key question addressed by this paper is on what basis Hari can (or should?) be considered human. Hari's personhood is further analyzed in the context of Cartesian dualism, the response to Descartes by reductionism and the rebuttal of reductionism by the functionalist theories of Hilary Putnam. Descartes' thoughts on animal suffering and the bête-machine are pitted against Hari's experience in Solaris. The key question is whether Hari can be reduced to her alien structure or should be considered in terms of her behavior. The moral implications of these questions are extended to human sociality, human emotional response and the role of the body in the human condition.
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VĒGNERS, ULDIS. "HUSSERL AND DIMENSIONS OF TEMPORALITY: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF TEMPORAL EXPERIENCE." HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES 10, no. 1 (2021): 186–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2021-10-1-186-211.
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Temporality is one of the key components of our experience, but the experience of time is hardly one and the same for all of us throughout our lives. The experience of time in its entirety is not solid and simple. It is a fluid and complex phenomenon consisting of a multitude of dimensions. In medical phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology there are ample cases of different temporal experiences analysed in the context of the illness experience. However, only a few attempts have been made to propose a conceptual framework that could not only be used to conduct a concrete analysis in a more systematic manner, but also provide a solid and comprehensive theoretical basis. The aim of this article is to draw on the rich distinctions found in Husserl’s phenomenology to outline a framework of different temporal dimensions for the analysis of temporal experience. The framework could provide conceptual tools to analyse temporal experiences in any field of study that deals with the human experience, including medical phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology. The resulting analysis would be not only clearer, more comprehensive and precise, but also more systematic and conceptually consistent. The framework consists of fourteen dimensions of temporal experience ordered in seven binary distinctions: (1) change and structure, (2) immanence and transcendence, (3) ownness and intersubjectivity, (4) passivity and activity, (5) receptivity and spontaneity, (6) presentation and representation, (7) unthematized temporality and thematized temporality.
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Adriaenssen, Han Thomas. "Antoine Le Grand on the identity over time of the human body." British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26, no. 6 (March 2018): 1084–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2018.1437539.
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Jarrett, Charles. "SPINOZA'S DENIAL OF MIND-BODY INTERACTION AND THE EXPLANATION OF HUMAN ACTION." Southern Journal of Philosophy 29, no. 4 (December 1991): 465–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1991.tb00604.x.
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McMahon, J. A. "The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding, by Mark Johnson." Mind 118, no. 471 (July 1, 2009): 843–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzp078.
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Resnik, David. "Stakes and Kidneys: Why Markets in Human Body Parts are Morally Imperative." Journal of Moral Philosophy 5, no. 1 (2008): 169–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/174552408x306771.
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Moser, Paul K. "GOD, SUFFERING, AND CERTITUDE: FROM TRANSCENDENCE TO IMMANENCE." Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 44, no. 140 (January 2, 2018): 461. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v44n140p461/2017.
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Abstract: Philosophy of religion suffers from inadequate attention to the specific moral character of a transcendent God worthy of worship. This deficiency often results from an unduly abstract conception of a transcendent God, including correspondingly abstract notions of divine goodness and power. A Christian approach to God has a unique solution to this problem, owing to its understanding of Jesus Christ as the perfect human representative of God’s moral character or personality. This article identifies some important consequences of this perspective for divine emotion and suffering and for human relating to God in a fitting manner, including for human certitude about God’s existence. It also identifies how philosophy of religion can be renewed, in its relevance, by its accommodation of divine redemptive immanence and suffering. In a fitting relation to God, God respects free human agency by not coercing any human will to yield to God or even to receive salient evidence of God’s reality. The article considers this prospect. In particular, what if God does not impose a divine self-manifestation on humans but instead has them allow or permit it? This would entail that God does not stalk humans coercively with regard to their decisions about God’s existence. An important issue would concern how we humans allow or permit God to emerge as self-manifested (as God) in our experience, thereby expressing God’s unique moral character in our experience. If Jesus and the New Testament offer any clue, we would allow divine self-manifestation to us in allowing a morally relevant kind of death-and-resurrection in our lives, that is, a kind of dying into life with God. This article explores that clue in connection with redemptive suffering, transcendent and immanent. It explains how such divine self-manifestation can underwrite certitude about God’s existence, courtesy of interpersonal evidence from God. Such evidence is no matter for mere reflection, but instead calls for imitatio Dei as the means to participate in God’s moral character and redemptive suffering.Resumo: A Filosofia da Religião manifesta uma atenção inadequada ao caráter especificamente moral de um Deus transcendente digno de culto. Esta deficiência resulta com frequência de uma conceituação indevidamente abstrata da transcendência de Deus, à qual corresponde uma noção igualmente abstrata da sua bondade e poder. A abordagem cristã de Deus tem uma solução única para esse problema em função de sua compreensão de Jesus Cristo como a perfeita representação humana do caráter ou personalidade moral de Deus. Este artigo identifica de maneira justa algumas consequências importantes desta perspectiva, quanto ao sentimento e ao sofrimento divino e quanto à relação do ser humano com Deus, incluindo a certeza humana acerca da existência de Deus. Ela também indica como a Filosofia da Religião pode ser renovada em sua relevância por sua integração da imanência redentora e do sofrimento divino. Numa relação apropriada com Deus, Deus respeita a livre operação humana, ao não coagir a vontade humana a ceder a Deus ou mesmo a receber uma evidência óbvia de sua realidade. O artigo considera esta perspectiva. Em particular, que pensar se Deus não impõe aos seres humanos uma auto-manifestação divina, mas em vez disso deixa que eles a permitam. Isto implicaria que Deus não acossa coercitivamente os seres humanos a respeito de suas decisões sobre a existência de Deus. Uma questão importante seria como deixamos ou permitimos que Deus emirja como auto-manifestado (como Deus) em nossa experiência, expressando assim o caráter moral único de Deus em nossa experiência. Se Jesus e o Novo Testamento oferecem alguma chave, permitiríamos a manifestação divina a nós, ao aceitar uma espécie moralmente relevante de morte-e-ressurrreição em nossas vidas, i.e., uma espécie de morte para vida com Deus. O artigo explora esta chave em conexão com o sofrimento redentor, transcendente e imanente. Explica como esta auto-manifestação divina pode assegurar a certeza a respeito da existência de Deus, a cortesia de uma evidência interpessoal da parte de Deus. Esta evidência não é uma questão de mera reflexão, mas, pelo contrário, chama à imitatio Dei como a maneira de participar no caráter moral e no sofrimento redentor de Deus.
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Prueitt, Catherine. "Human Being, Bodily Being: Phenomenology from Classical India, by Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad." Mind 129, no. 516 (September 8, 2019): 1291–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzz052.
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Abstract In the matter of the body, even comparative language—the very use of English today—is soaked through and through with the Cartesian version of the intuition of dualism: the idea that we are fundamentally a mind and a body that must be either related ingeniously, or else reduced to one another. Instead, by deliberately looking at genres that pertain to other aspects of being human, I seek to go deeper into texts that simply start elsewhere than with intuitions of dualism, even while being engrossed in the category of the experiential ‘body’ (in all its translational variety in Sanskrit and Pali). (Ram-Prasad 2018, p. 11)
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Yu, Hong. "“All things are already complete in my body”: An explanation of the views of the Taizhou School on the human body." Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5, no. 3 (August 25, 2010): 396–413. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11466-010-0105-3.
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Browton, Hugh. "Book Review: Bodies for Sale: Ethics and Exploitation in the Human Body Trade." Journal of Moral Philosophy 2, no. 1 (2005): 114–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/174046810500200112.
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Cuffari, Elena. "Habits of Transformation." Hypatia 26, no. 3 (2011): 535–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01186.x.
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This essay argues that according to feminist existential phenomenology, feminist pragmatism, and feminist genealogy, our embodied condition is an important starting place for ethical living due to the inevitable role that habits play in our conduct. In bodies, the phenomenon of habit uniquely holds together the ambiguities of freedom and determinism, transcendence and immanence, and stability and plasticity. Seeing habit formation as a matter of self-growth and social justice gives fresh opportunity for thinking of “assuming ambiguity” as a lifelong endeavor made up of many small projects and practices of situated resistance to stagnation. Transcendence, understood as ameliorative transformation, is found in cultivating habits of learning from our bodily living. I articulate this argument via a reading of Simone de Beauvoir's The Coming of Age, John Dewey's Human Nature and Conduct, and Ladelle McWhorter's Bodies and Pleasures. I discuss two domains wherein the ethical significance of habit formation appears: cognitive psychological research on neural plasticity, and certain projects of self-cultivation that risk turning into overdetermining “cult of the self” practices that close off possibilities for personal and collective transformation.
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Bevilacqua, Silvia. "The Cartography of Childhood. A Parcours of Philosophy for Children / Community and Cartography." ETHICS IN PROGRESS 10, no. 1 (May 30, 2019): 54–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/eip.2019.1.5.
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The following reflections are born from some practical and theoretical trajectories undertook by the writer – already since a few years in my research scope – around philosophy for children/community and philosophical practices. The experience of some activities proposed at the Liceo Vasco/Beccaria/Govone in Mondovì during the Cespec Summer School 2017 around the issue of Humanitas in the contemporary society was recently added to these reflections. It is a theme that engaged us in several experiences of Philosophy for Community. Throughout these gatherings, we proposed a cartographic writing and philosophical approach. In particular, this contribution will explore the concept of children cartography (cartografia d’infanzia), as an occasion of translating the philosophical discourse into a map of a philosophical debate, also mutuating the concept of philosophical confluence considered by Pierpaolo Casarin. The adopted perspective is the transdisciplinary border where human geography, philosophy, and writing, as disciplinary subjects, can confound their identities and boundaries in a space of immanence in the making. Summarizing, we intend to highlight the themes, concepts, and practical propositions around some practical and theoretical research trajectories, current and future, which hold implications for all of us (and for humanity). Such practices allow again – and still – the possibility of orienting and losing oneself thanks to the Humanitas.
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Gesa Lindemann and Millay Hyatt. "The Lived Human Body from the Perspective of the Shared World (Mitwelt)." Journal of Speculative Philosophy 24, no. 3 (2010): 275. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jspecphil.24.3.0275.
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Olson, Carl. "The Human Body as a Boundary Symbol: A Comparison of Merleau-Ponty and Dogen." Philosophy East and West 36, no. 2 (April 1986): 107. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1398450.
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Lindemann, Gesa, and Millay Hyatt. "The Lived Human Body from the Perspective of the Shared World (Mitwelt)." Journal of Speculative Philosophy 24, no. 3 (2010): 275–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jsp.2010.0012.
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George, Alexandra. "Is `Property' Necessary? On Owning the Human Body and its Parts." Res Publica 10, no. 1 (2004): 15–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:resp.0000018186.87396.fc.
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Charlton, William. "Is the mind-body relationship mysterious?" Philosophy 94, no. 04 (August 23, 2019): 673–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819119000305.
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AbstractWhy do some philosophers (Nagel, McGinn, Chomsky), despite all we know about evolution and embryology, think that consciousness makes the mind-body relation a problem still unsolved and perhaps insoluble by those with human brains? They ask how consciousness arises in matter, not in living organisms, whereas non-philosophers ask how far down the ladder of life it extends and when it arises in individuals of sentient and intelligent species. They desire the privacy of Locke's closet, furnished with phenomenological properties; and besides replacing Aristotle's ‘folk’ conception of causation by Hume's, they mathematicise physical explanation in line with Newton's First Law of Motion. Non-philosophers operate with ‘vague’ concepts of life, sentience and intelligence which allow them to treat these things as truly and naturally emergent. Machines that perform intelligent tasks are no more conscious of the reasons for their movements than actors performing them on the stage.
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Lee, Patrick. "Book Review: Theologies of the Body: Human and Christian." Linacre Quarterly 65, no. 1 (February 1998): 89–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00243639.1998.11878439.
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OLKOWSKI, DOROTHEA. "Politics: The Highest Form of Philosophy?" PhaenEx 7, no. 1 (May 26, 2012): 41. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/p.v7i1.3366.
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According to Hannah Arendt, action is the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter. From this point of view, action is the basis of political life. But, although human actions are direct human interactions, each person must have a body and senses, a sensation of reality and a feeling of realness—and do we not share these characteristics with animals? Therefore, do we have the right to claim that human interaction and consciousness of an acting self are uniquely, humanly political? For example, what if we were to maintain that language is a second-order conventionalization of the expressive body immersed in an atmosphere, assimilating and being assimilated. If this were to be the case, how then can we explain the passage from elemental life, the life we share with all living things, to the acting in and among human pluralities that Hannah Arendt identifies with the political? Kant tried to do this by separating reason from sensation and separating respect from nature’s purely physical, causal forces. This essay examines Arendt’s claim that it is uniquely the activity that passes between humans that makes it possible for humans to consider themselves political.