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Journal articles on the topic 'Hungarian Communist Party'
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1
Kelemen, Paul. "The Hungarian Communist Party, ethno-nationalism and antisemitism." Twentieth Century Communism 4, no. 4 (May 31, 2012): 200–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.3898/175864312801786283.
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Kenez, Peter. "The Hungarian Communist Party and the Catholic Church, 1945–1948." Journal of Modern History 75, no. 4 (December 2003): 864–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/383356.
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Ziblatt, Daniel F. "The Adaptation of Ex-Communist Parties to Post-Communist East Central Europe: a Comparative Study of the East German and Hungarian Ex-Communist Parties." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31, no. 2 (June 1, 1998): 119–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0967-067x(98)00003-8.
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The “Ex-communist party” label has often been used to describe the political ideas and political behavior of the former ruling communist parties operating in post-communist political systems. Yet, the former ruling communist parties have not only followed diverse paths of organizational transformation, but also have developed very different strategic visions of their role in the politics of post-communism. By comparing the political environments faced by the former ruling organizations of East Germany and Hungary and then utilizing content analysis to identify the strategic visions of each of the two organizations, this article demonstrates how different post-communist national political settings have resulted in divergent strategic visions for successor parties in Germany and Hungary.
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Pirro, Andrea L. P. "Populist Radical Right Parties in Central and Eastern Europe: The Different Context and Issues of the Prophets of the Patria." Government and Opposition 49, no. 4 (September 11, 2013): 600–629. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2013.32.
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The recent electoral performances of the Bulgarian Ataka, Hungarian Jobbik, and the Slovak National Party seem to confirm the pervasive appeal of the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe. Unlike their Western counterparts, these parties do not stem from a ‘silent counter-revolution’. Populist radical right parties in the region retain features sui generis, partly in relation to their historical legacies and the idiosyncrasies of the post-communist context. After distinguishing between pre-communist, communist and post-communist issues, this article discerns commonalities and differences in the ideology of the three parties by a content analysis of the party literatures. The analysis shows that populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe are fairly ‘like minded’, yet they do not constitute an entirely homogeneous group. While a minimum combination of ideological features reveals that only clericalism and opposition to ethnic minorities are shared by all three parties, a maximum combination would extend this to irredentism, anti-corruption and Euroscepticism.
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Szakádát, István, and Gábor Kelemen. "Career types and mobilization channels in the Hungarian Communist Party, 1945–90." Journal of Communist Studies 8, no. 3 (September 1992): 46–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523279208415162.
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Rainer, János M. "The Development of Imre Nagy as a Politician and a Thinker." Contemporary European History 6, no. 3 (November 1997): 263–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777300004616.
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Imre Nagy, Prime Minister during the Hungarian revolution of 1956, was above all a politician. In his frame of mind, his mentality and his actions, he largely conformed to the archetype of a ‘functionary’ that typified leading figures in the Communist movement at the time. The two main features of this mentality were belief in the infallibility of the Communist Party, and belief in the role, mission and vocation of the Party and its functionaries to redeem the world, according to András Hegedüs (member of the Hungarian Politburo 1951–6, and Prime Minister 1955–6 and a dissident sociologist in the 1960s). Another important trait of functionaries in East-central Europe was to see themselves as local representatives of a worldwide Soviet empire, not just of the Party. Although the life and personality of Nagy resembled this pattern, it departed from it in a number of ways that became dramatically manifest, most of all in his final years. One explanation for this departure lies in the ‘intellectual attributes’ or leanings of Nagy as a leading Party functionary. This side of his character prompted him to undertake an intellectual appraisal of political problems on several occasions in his life. In the period leading up to the Hungarian revolution, it made him the leading figure in an expressly intellectual movement: the opposition among the Party intelligentsia. This study is an attempt to trace the specific intellectual path taken by Nagy as a politician.
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Szilágyi, Anna. "“Threatening other” or “role-model brother”?" Contemporary Discourses of Hate and Radicalism across Space and Genres 3, no. 1 (October 2, 2015): 151–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/jlac.3.1.07szi.
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In the late 2000s far-right parties made significant gains in numerous countries of the European Union. Sharing the same agenda and discourse of discrimination, many of these parties collaborate today at the European level as well. Yet, it is unclear whether the contemporary European far-right is indeed homogenous in terms of ideology. This project in critical discourse analysis shows that the far-right in the EU is actually characterized by ideological diversity. The paper compares and contrasts how China, an emerging great power with a booming economy, has been portrayed in the early 2010s by far-right parties in the UK and Hungary. By identifying major references, metaphors, frames and argumentation schemes, the article concludes that despite belonging to the same party family, and being actual political allies, the British National Party (BNP) and the Jobbik party in Hungary construct fundamentally different images of the “Chinese Other”. The far-right in the UK, a major Western power, presents China clearly in hostile terms, mainly as a “dangerous, threatening intruder” into the British market. Additionally, in the discourse of the British far-right China is primarily identified as a communist dictatorship and used as a metaphor of oppression in the domestic UK context. Meanwhile, in Hungary, a post-communist country in Eastern Europe and a relatively recent member of the European Union, an opposite picture of China is constructed by the far-right. Here, China serves as a tool to distance Hungary from the West. China is positioned by the Hungarian far-right as a state where communism has lost its significance. By stressing the Asian origin of Hungarians, brotherhood is claimed among Hungarians and Chinese and China is presented as a “role model country” which successfully resisted “Western dominance”.
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Anderle, Ádám. "El calvario de los brigadistas húngaros." Acta Hispanica 18 (January 1, 2013): 63–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.14232/actahisp.2013.18.63-71.
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The elite of the Hungarian volunteers of the Spanish Civil War became victim of the Communist terror after World War II (1949-1950). The main role was played by the brigadist, László Rajk, who, before the trial, was the secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, Minister of the Interior, and then Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was charged with spying for the “imperialists” and Tito as well as with high treason and anti-Semitism. In the show trial of “Rajk and his associates” 155 people were charged and convicted, 15 of them, including Rajk, were condemned to death. In the indictment Rajk was condemned for his activity during the Spanish Civil War: he was accused of being a fascist, and then an imperialist agent, as well as a “Trockyist”, just like the twenty other Hungarian Brigadists. The background of the trial has been thoroughly analysed in Hungarian historiography, but the accusation connected to the Spanish period has not been examined or criticized. The present study, based on new sources, such as the reports of the Hungarian Communist Secret Service, the papers of the KGB Archives in Moscow, and the Comintern, raises the issue emphasizing the negative role of Ernő Gerő (“Pedro”), who was the representative of the Comintern and the PCIA (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs), in the process.
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Sygkelos, Yannis. "The National Discourse of the Bulgarian Communist Party on National Anniversaries and Commemorations (1944–1948)." Nationalities Papers 37, no. 4 (July 2009): 425–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905990902985678.
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During the early post-war years (1944–1948), the newly established communist regimes in Eastern Europe followed the Soviet example. They honoured figures and events from their respective national pasts, and celebrated holidays dedicated to anti-fascist resistance and popular uprisings, which they presented as forerunners of the new, bright and prosperous “democratic” era. Hungarian communists celebrated 15 March and commemorated 6 October, both recalling the national struggle for independence in 1848; they celebrated a martyr cult of fallen communists presented as national heroes, and “nationalized” socialist holidays, such as May Day. In the centenary of 1848 they linked national with social demands. In the “struggle for the soul of the nation,” Czech communists also extensively celebrated anniversaries and centenaries, especially in 1948, which saw the 600th anniversary of the founding of Prague's Charles University, the 100th anniversaries of the first All-Slav Congress (held in Prague) and the revolution of 1848, the 30th anniversary of the founding of an independent Czechoslovakia, and the 10th anniversary of the Munich Accords. National holidays related to anti-fascist resistance movements were celebrated in Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia; dates related to the overthrow of fascism, implying the transition to the new era, were celebrated in Romania, Albania, and Bulgaria.
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Pendzey, I. "Károly Grósz: the Main Priorities of the Policy of Reforms (1987-1989)." Problems of World History, no. 6 (October 30, 2018): 118–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.46869/2707-6776-2018-6-9.
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The socio-economic reforms of the government of Károly Grósz, his activities as secretary general of the Communist Party, are analyzed. The peculiarities of the world-view vision of the Hungarian “young reformers” of the urgent problems of social development of the country and the ways of their solution proposed by them are revealed. Sharing the prevalent in Hungarian and Russian historiography of critical perception of K. Grósz’s work at the highest state and party posts, an attempt is made to give a more balanced assessment of his role in the country’s transition to a new social and political phenomenon – multiparty, parliamentary democracy, human rights, that is, the actual change of system. The article illustrates the international activity of K. Grósz, estimates of his reforms by M. Gorbachev and R. Reagan. K. Grósz’s activities are characterized by the deterioration of key indicators of the country’s development, the crisis of one-party socialism, and international challenges. Considerable attention is paid to the characterization of the process of the ideological and organizational breakdown in the ruling party, the activities of radical reformist forces, which were grouped around I. Pozsgay, clarifying the circumstances of reducing the influence of “young reformers” and removing K. Grósz from politics. He failed to overcome the inheritance of the errors of the HSWP, defending it in renewed clothes, not supported by the Hungarians in the 1990 parliamentary elections.
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Bottoni, Stefano. "Reassessing the Communist Takeover in Romania." East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures 24, no. 1 (January 21, 2010): 59–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325409354355.
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This article analyzes the communist takeover in Romania as the successful outcome of a long-term policy aiming to make the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) a national force. Such an attempt deserves a new analytical explanation of the highly controversial notions of institutional continuity and of “nationalization” of its membership. While mainstream explanations still focus on factors of change motivated by external (Soviet) pressure and stress that violence, coercion, and intimidation have been main instruments used by the Communist Party to implement its goals, the author argues that a reevaluation of the real extent of popular support is needed. PCR became a national mass party immediately after the coup d’état of 23 August 1944. At that time a marginal political force, traditionally ruled by non-Romanian elements and devoted to the strictest internationalism, turned national without falling into discrimination against minority groups, with the exception of the Germans. In multiethnic Transylvania the ethnic power balance consciously created by PCR with Soviet assistance helped the party to strengthen its political legitimacy among different national and social groups. Unlike the Romanian historical parties and the Hungarian nationalists, the PCR and the Petru Groza—led coalition government behaved as a transnational body and pursued integrative policies. In the troubled context of postwar reconstruction, this call for cooperation and peaceful ethnic coexistence distinguished the PCR and its allies from the opposition parties and significantly contributed to make early communist rule more acceptable to large masses of Romanians and non-Romanians, as well.
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GINSBURGES, GEORGE. "Kadar and the Resurrection of the Hungarian Communist Party: A Study in Political Techniques*." Australian Journal of Politics & History 10, no. 1 (April 7, 2008): 16–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8497.1964.tb00729.x.
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Granville, Johanna. "In the Line of Fire: The Soviet Crackdown of Hungary, 1956-58." Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, no. 1307 (January 1, 1999): 56. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/cbp.1999.80.
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About forty years ago, the first major anti-Soviet uprising in Eastern Europe-the 1956 Hungarian revolt-took place. Western observers have long held an image of the Soviet Union as a crafty monolith that expertly, in the realpolitik tradition, intervened while the West was distracted by the Suez crisis. People also believed that Soviet repressive organs worked together efficiently to crack down on the Hungarian "counterrevolutionaries. " Newly released documents from five of Moscow's most important archives, including notes ofkey meetings of the presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) taken by Vladimir Mal in, reveal that the Soviet Union in fact had difficulty working with its Hungarian allies.
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Kim, Dae Soon. "The rise of European right radicalism: The case of Jobbik." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49, no. 4 (September 12, 2016): 345–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2016.08.001.
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Based on the qualitative research of elite interviews and narrative analysis of Hungarian documents, the main aim of this article is twofold: (1) to elucidate the transformation of Jobbik from a marginal extra-parliamentary youth focused movement to an influential parliamentary party; (2) to discuss the impact of Jobbik's ascension on the main centre-right Fidesz only as a pre-conclusion. It argues that the rise of Jobbik is not a protest phenomenon that simply demonstrates a social disenchantment with the transitional economy. Jobbik's transformation is a unique post-Communist political development that is rooted in elements of Hungarian nationalism. These national elements include underlying social prejudice against Roma and Jews, a preference for paternalistic economic systems, and even attraction to the historical narrative of mythic Turanism in the debate over the origins of Hungarian national identity. Jobbik manipulates all of these national elements for the transformation of its own party identity, emerging as a main challenger to the Fidesz.
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Granville, Johanna. "“If Hope is Sin, Then We Are All Guilty”: Romanian Students’ Reactions to the Hungarian Revolution and Soviet Intervention, 1956–1958." Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, no. 1905 (January 1, 2008): 80. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/cbp.2008.142.
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The events of 1956 (the Twentieth CPSU Congress, Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, and the Hungarian revolution) had a strong impact on the evolution of the Romanian communist regime, paving the way for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania in 1958, the stricter policy toward the Transylvanian Hungarians, and Romania’s greater independence from the USSR in the 1960s. Students complained about their living and studying conditions long before the outbreak of the Hungarian crisis. Ethnic Hungarians from Transylvania listened closely to Budapest radio stations, and Romanian students in Budapest in the summer of 1956 were especially affected by the ferment of ideas there. For the Gheorghiu-Dej regime, the Hungarian revolution and Soviet invasion provided a useful excuse to end the destalinization process and crack the whip conclusivel —carrying out mass arrests, but also granting short-term concessions to ethnic minorities and workers. Of all segments of the Romanian population, university students were the most discontented. Drawing on archival documents, published memoirs, and recent Romanian scholarship, this paper will analyze and compare the student unrest in Bucharest, Cluj, Iaşi, and Timişoara. Due to a combination of psychological, logistical, and historical factors, students in the latter city were especially vocal and organized. On October 30 over 2,000 students from the Polytechnic Institute in Timişoara met with party offi cials, demanding changes in living and study conditions, as well as the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania. Another 800-1,000 students convened on October 31, calling for the release of students who were arrested the day before. Obvious discrepancies between the Romanian and Hungarian media sparked their curiosity about events in Hungary, while their cramped dorm rooms actually facilitated student meetings. In the Banat region itself, a tradition of anti-communist protest had prevailed since 1945. Although arrested en masse, these students set a vital precedent—especially for the Timişoarans who launched the Romanian Revolution thirty-three years later.
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Mëhilli, Elidor. "Defying De-Stalinization: Albania's 1956." Journal of Cold War Studies 13, no. 4 (October 2011): 4–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00169.
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Drawing on recently declassified Albanian, Soviet, East German, and Western archival sources, as well as a rich historiography on Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech and the Hungarian revolution of 1956, this article investigates the little-known events of 1956 in Albania. Rejecting de-Stalinization, the Albanian Communist leader Enver Hoxha was able to vindicate his position against Yugoslavia's brand of socialism abroad, fortify his rule at home, and claim more aid from Moscow, Beijing, and the Soviet bloc. This article discusses the Tirana Party Conference of April 1956, treating the Albanian Party of Labor (the Communist party) as an “information society.” The article assesses deliberations over security and ideology at the highest levels and demonstrates how tiny Albania came to embody, in exaggerated form, both the promises and the perils of socialist exchange, in addition to mirroring the profound inconsistencies of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign.
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Barnes, Andrew. "Comparative Theft: Context and Choice in the Hungarian, Czech, and Russian Transformations, 1989-2000." East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures 17, no. 3 (August 2003): 533–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325403255250.
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At the beginning of the twenty-first century, some post-communist political economies were burdened by impenetrable cross-ownership groups, money-laundering banks, and captured states, while others had effectively limited corruption and laid the groundwork for long-term development. Study of post-communist corruption, however, has been hampered by a tendency to treat it as an undifferentiated phenomenon across the region. Based on purposively selected case studies of Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Russia, this article begins by systematically describing the political economies of those countries in a way that allows for a useful comparison. It then argues that the varied outcomes in the former Soviet bloc grew out of a combination of two factors: (1) the context of state-economy relations at the end of the Communist Party era and (2) the choices made by new governments on how to control the transfer of state assets to the private sector. In making that argument, the article clarifies which legacies from the old regime, which policy choices in the new era, and which aspects of state capacity are most important in shaping post-communist transformations.
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O'Neil, Patrick H. "Revolution from Within: Institutional Analysis, Transitions from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary." World Politics 48, no. 4 (July 1996): 579–603. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.1996.0017.
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The Hungarian transition from socialism stands out from other examples of political change in the region, in that the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP) suffered an erosion of political power generated largely from within the party itself. The study shows how the Communist Party, after its destruction in the revolution of 1956, sought to institutionalize its rule through a course of limited liberalization and the broad co-optation of the populace. This policy helped create a tacit social compact with society, particularly in co-opting younger intellectuals who identified with the goals of reform socialism. However, the party eventually marginalized this group, creating an internal party opposition that supported socialism but opposed the MSZMP. Consequently, when the limits of Hungarian reform socialism became evident in the mid-1980s, rank-and-file intellectuals within the party began to mobilize against the party hierarchy, seeking to transform the MSZMP into a democratic socialist party. These “reform circles,” drawing their strength primarily from the countryside, spread to all parts of the party and helped undermine central party power and expand the political space for opposition groups to organize. Eventually, the reform circles were able to force an early party congress in which the MSZMP was transformed into a Western-style socialist party prior to open elections in 1990.The case is significant in that it indicates that the forms of transition in Eastern Europe were not simply the specific outcome of elite interaction. Rather, they were shaped in large part by the patterns of socialist institutionalization found in each country. Therefore, studies of political transition can be enriched with an explicit focus on the institutional characteristics of each case, linking the forms of transitions and their posttransition legacies to the institutional matrix from which they emerged. In short, the study argues that the way in which an autocratic order perpetuates itself affects the manner in which that system declines and the shape of the new system that takes its place.
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Levine, Zachary Paul. "Concealed in the Open: Recipients of International Clandestine Jewish Aid in Early 1950s Hungary." Hungarian Cultural Studies 5 (January 1, 2012): 26–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/ahea.2012.67.
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This article discusses the emergence of the semi-clandestine efforts of a network of international Jewish philanthropies and the Israeli government to send material and financial aid to Jews in early-communist Hungary. Post Second World War Hungary was a special focus for Jewish aid organizations in the west and the Israeli government. They poured resources into Hungary, both to feed, cloth and provide medical care to hundreds of thousands of Jews, and to assist thousands of Jews migrating west through Hungary. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, the dominant Jewish aid organization in the world at the time, ran its largest and most expensive program in Hungary. Working with Israeli and Hungarian authorities, it financed a network of welfare services, often through the importation of scarce consumer goods and raw materials. As the Communist Party reshaped the economy, and pushed out “undesirable elements” from Hungarian life, this aid program served a growing population of impoverished, sick, and religious Jews, some exiled in Hungary’s countryside. This program increasingly took advantage of black market networks to distribute aid. Yet, after conditions deteriorated so much that this program ceased officially, Jewish aid providers in the US and Israel adapted their earlier practices and networks to take advantage of the impoverished consumer economy in program to distribute aid clandestinely to Hungarian Jews, with the cooperation of Hungary’s communist authorities.
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Rácz, Barnabás. "Voting Patterns on Hungarian Parliamentary Elections in 2002–2006." Hungarian Cultural Studies 2 (January 1, 2009): 18–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/ahea.2009.14.
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In the post–communist transitional era, Hungarian elections show diverse results among various areas, raising the question if there are firmly embedded differences between some parts of the country. In the light of the election returns between 1985–2006, it appears that there is a more or less definite pattern. This study will examine the 2006 legislative returns and compare the results with the previous trends and especially the 2002 data, testing the validity of the findings indicating the presence of some fairly constant regional standards of voting. As a main indicator of past trends we use mostly the territorial (party) lists which provide more accurate picture of voting preferences that individual districts which in runoffs carry an indirect distortion of voters’ primary preferences by other considerations.2 For a deeper analysis of the recent 2002 and 2006 elections, we will compare the first run individual district voting outcomes, as they give the more accurate picture of the voters’ real preferences.
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Fuchs, Christian. "Marx’s Centenary (1918) in the Light of the Media and Socialist Thought." tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society 16, no. 2 (May 4, 2018): 717–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v16i2.1036.
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This article takes a historical view on Marx’s anniversary: It analyses how Marx’s centenary (5 May 1918) was reflected in the media and socialist thought. 1918 not just marked Marx’s 100th anniversary but was also the year in which the First World War ended. It was the year that saw the immediate aftermath of the Russian Revolution and the start of the Russian Civil War, the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; the formation of the Weimar Republic, Austria’s First Republic, the Czech Republic, the Hungarian Republic, the Second Polish Republic; the founding of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), and the independence of Iceland from Denmark. The cultural forms, in which Marx’s centenary was reflected in 1918, included press articles, essays, speeches, rallies, demonstrations, music, and banners. The communists as well as left-wing socialists of the day saw themselves in the tradition of Marx, whereas revisionist social democrats based their politics on a criticism or revised reading of Marx. This difference resulted in different readings of Marx.
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Mark, J. "Agents of Moscow: The Hungarian Communist Party and the Origins of Socialist Patriotism, 1941-1953." English Historical Review CXXIII, no. 501 (April 1, 2008): 522–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ehr/cen063.
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Samarghitan, Crina, Victor Cioara, Sergiu Gherghina, and Adrian Muica. "The Evolution of the Party System and Cleavages in Post- Communist Hungary." Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science 8 (September 30, 2004): 37–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.22151/politikon.8.4.
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The post-Communist countries suffered many transformations in a short period of time; their political, economic and social system is in a continuous change. All the countries from Central and Eastern Europe try to cope with the Western political systems, try to avoid the third wave of authoritarianism, wave that usually comes after a democratization one. One country’s political system is impressing and interesting in many ways. We decided to approach and to analyze only a part of the political system in a country that relatively succeeded on its way towards democracy – Hungary. The evolution of Hungarian cleavages allows us to identify the emergence of parties and from that point on to deeply analyze the party system from 1990 until now. One main advantage of our study is that we make a dynamic evaluation of the party system, using some variables that were applied in the case of other party systems. The variables and indicators were used by well-known scholars to observe some variations in the Western party systems and to realize some categories. The conclusions obtained have a degree of specificity; they cannot be entirely applied to the countries in the region. The research can be improved by analyzing the electoral system and by searching new indicators for the already used variables.
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Bottoni, Stefano. "Talking to the System: Imre Mikó, 1911–1977." East Central Europe 44, no. 1 (June 23, 2017): 47–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18763308-04401002.
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Taking a cue from an intelligence file produced by the Romanian political police on Transylvanian Hungarian intellectual Imre Mikó (Cluj, 1911–1977), the article analyzes the various patterns of accomodation with the political system, which represents a key to the understanding of how social legitimacy was built and maintained by the communist regimes of Eastern Europe. The framework in which this story takes place is especially interesting due to the Romanian context. On the one hand, the analysis of an unconventional collaboration established during the 1970s between the security organs of a national communist system and a prominent conservative intellectual stimulates us to rethink the state-society relationship in Ceaușescu’s Romania in more dynamic terms. Among the multiple reasons that led Mikó to accept the role of informer, one finds the communitarian ideology of “serving the people”, but also his belief that cooperation with the state security on relevant issues to the Transylvanian Hungarian community did not represent a betrayal of national ideals but the only way to achieve certain political goals, such as informing the Western public opinion on the worsening condition of the Hungarian minority. The case of Mikó can be compared with other files unveiled in Romania during the last years, and shows that often uncritically accepted definition of “collaboration” require serious conceptual reshaping. During the last decades of the communist regimes, significant parts of the formerly persecuted elite came to work together with the state security organs. They did not “talk to the system” with the purpose of spying on fellow citizens, but seeked to push forward their own cause with the infrastructural support of the state security, in a context where non-party members had been denied any access to the political sphere, and they regarded personal contact with a high-raking state security officer as a counterbalance of their marginality.
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Litkei, József. "The Molnár Debate of 1950: Hungarian Communist Historical Politics and the Problem of the Soviet Model." East Central Europe 44, no. 2-3 (December 11, 2017): 249–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18763308-04402005.
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By tracing the developments that led to a historical debate in 1950, this article questions some assumptions concerning the Stalinization of Hungarian history writing, in particular the notion of a predetermined continuity between the national-communist line followed by Hungarian communists before and after 1949. Contrary to the understanding of the Sovietization of historiography in Hungary as a straightforward process, guided by a firmly-established ideological line, this article shows that the period between early 1949 and 1950 was characterized by a certain level of uncertainty, caused, on the one hand, by the ideological and institutional changes brought about by Sovietization, and, on the other, by a temporary lack of firm interpretative guidance from the Party leadership. A closer look into the efforts to elaborate a new periodization of Hungarian history reveals not only the existence of competing Marxist interpretations (a “national” state-oriented and an “internationalist” one with a focus on socioeconomic phenomena), but also that for a while it was unclear which of them would emerge as the basis of the Stalinist canon. Although the question was ultimately settled by a political intervention in favor of the more national line, the Hungarian case shows that it was far from evident what the Soviet model was supposed to mean when transferred to local contexts—and that adaptation depended on numerous factors, the ambitions of the interpreters being one of them. This contingency, and the relative plurality of “useable pasts”—which is also reflected in the lack of uniformity in the ways Soviet Bloc regimes treated their respective national histories—cautions against treating the historical representations these regimes produced as self-explanatory outcomes of Stalinization: the examination of the dilemmas that marked the process of creating these canons should be given just as much consideration as the analysis of the end products themselves.
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Norkus, Zenonas. "Political Development of Lithuania: A Comparative Analysis of Second Post-communist Decade." World Political Science 8, no. 1 (September 27, 2012): 217–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/wpsr-2012-0012.
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AbstractThe goal of this paper is to put into focus and explain distinctive features of the political developments in Lithuania during second post-communist decade, comparing them with other Baltic States (Latvia and Estonia) and those Central European countries with political systems which resembled most closely Lithuania (Poland and Hungary) by the end of the first post-communist decade. In all these countries, second post-communist decade witnessed the rise of the new successful populist parties. The author argues that this populist rise is the proper context for understanding of Rolandas Paksas’ impeachment in Lithuania in 2003–2004. His Order and Justice Party has to be classified together with the Kaczynski twins Law and Justice Party and its even more radical allies in Poland, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz and Gábor Vona’s Jobbik in Hungary, Juhan Part’s Res Publica in Estonia and Einars Repše’s New Era in Latvia. They all were right-wing populist parties, proclaiming in their anti-establishment rhetoric the war on corruption of the (ex-communist) elite and the coming of new politics. While the rise of right-wing populism did not change the political system in Estonia and Latvia, its outcome in Hungary and Poland was the breakup of the ex-communist and anti-communist elites pact which was the foundation of the political stability during first post-communist decade. The Kaczynski twins founded Rzecz Pospolita IV (4th Republic of Poland), grounded in the thorough and comprehensive lustration of the ex-communist cadres. Fidesz leader Orban used the two-thirds majority in the Hungarian parliament to promulgate a new constitution. Lithuania is unique in that the ex-communist and anti-communist elites pact was not abolished, but preserved and consolidated thanks to the collaboration of all, by this time, established and left-of-center populist parties during the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment of Paksas can be considered as the stress test of the young Lithuanian liberal democracy just on the eve of the accession of Lithuania to the European Union and NATO. An unhappy peculiarity of the stress tests is that they sometimes break or damage the items tested. Preventing the transformation of liberal post-communism into populist post-communism in Lithuania, the impeachment as stress test was a success. However, against the expectation of many observers, it did not enhance the quality of democracy of Lithuania. The legacy of impeachment are disequilibrium of the balance of power between government branches in favor of the Constitutional Court, strengthening of the left-of-centre populist political forces and the interference of secret services into Lithuanian politics with the self-assumed mission to safeguard Lithuanian democracy from the perils of populism.
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Tréfás, David. "The Squaring of the Circle: The Reinvention of Hungarian History by the Communist Party in 1952." Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 6, no. 2 (June 28, 2008): 27–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-9469.2006.tb00147.x.
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Todosijević, Bojan. "The Structure of Political Attitudes in Hungary and Serbia." East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures 22, no. 4 (September 8, 2008): 879–900. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325408319103.
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The article presents a comparative examination of the structure of political ideology in two post-communist countries, Serbia and Hungary. A broad set of indicators of specific political attitudes is reduced to a smaller number of latent ideological dimensions via factor analysis. The precise meaning of the dimensions is determined after the analysis of their relationships with authoritarianism, out-group sympathy, prejudices, ideological self-identification, party-preference, and socio-demographic variables. Hungarian mass attitudes vary along dimensions of (1) alienation—socialism and (2) nationalist—antisocialism. Results for Serbia revealed the convergence of nationalist and pro-communist attitudes into a single dimension while another factor joined egalitarianism with social alienation. In both countries, authoritarianism is an important determinant of ideological dimensions, especially of pro-communist nationalism in Serbia and alienation— socialism in Hungary. Socio-demographic background variables are weaker determinants of ideological dimensions in Serbia compared with Hungary. In both countries, attitudinal factors differentiate supporters of the main political parties.
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Le Blanc, Paul. "Spider and Fly: The Leninist Philosophy of Georg Lukács." Historical Materialism 21, no. 2 (2013): 47–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1569206x-12341298.
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Abstract From 1919 to 1929, the great Hungarian Marxist philosopher Georg Lukács was one of the leaders of the Hungarian Communist Party, immersed not simply in theorising but also in significant practical-political work. Along with labour leader Jenö Landler, he led a faction opposing an ultra-left sectarian orientation represented by Béla Kun (at that time also associated with Comintern chairman Zinoviev, later aligning himself with Stalin). If seen in connection with this factional struggle, key works of Lukács in this period – History and Class Consciousness (1923), Lenin: A Study in the Unity of His Thought (1924), Tailism and the Dialectic (1926) and ‘The Blum Theses’ (1929) – can be seen as forming a consistent, coherent, sophisticated variant of Leninism. Influential readings of these works interpret them as being ultra-leftist or proto-Stalinist (or, in the case of ‘The Blum Theses’, an anticipation of the Popular Front perspectives adopted by the Communist International in 1935). Such readings distort the reality. Lukács’s orientation and outlook of 1923–9 are, rather, more consistent with the orientation advanced by Lenin and Trotsky in the Third and Fourth Congresses of the Communist International. After his decisive political defeat, Lukács concluded that it was necessary to renounce his distinctive political orientation, and completely abandon the terrain of practical revolutionary politics, if he hoped to remain inside the Communist movement. This he did, adapting to Stalinism and shifting his efforts to literary criticism and philosophy. But the theorisations connected to his revolutionary politics of the 1920s continue to have relevance for revolutionary activists of the twenty-first century.
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Brown, Karl. "‘For Girls it is an Honor …’: Women, Work, and Abortion in Communist Hungary, 1948–56." Journal of Contemporary History 55, no. 3 (March 25, 2019): 602–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022009418824390.
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Concerned with a falling birth rate in the early 1950s, the Hungarian communist regime banned abortion and encouraged motherhood. A closer inquiry into the 1953 abortion ban and the broader cultural context of crime and policing in early communist Hungary suggests that repression alone was inadequate, as an underground abortion network provided some respite for women seeking to control their reproduction. However, the regime’s pronatalist policy aligned well with the interests and biases of skilled male workers: redirecting women’s efforts from productive to reproductive labor both removed them as competitors at work and returned them to their “proper”, subordinate place. Internal Party documents and interviews with refugees and émigrés conducted before and after 1956 reveal that although women exerted some control over their reproduction throughout the entire period, they were thwarted as much by men’s resistance to working women as by the regime’s intrusive pronatalist policy.
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Herman, Lise Esther. "Re-evaluating the post-communist success story: party elite loyalty, citizen mobilization and the erosion of Hungarian democracy." European Political Science Review 8, no. 2 (February 23, 2015): 251–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773914000472.
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In light of the instability of several Central Eastern European democracies following their accession to the European Union, most dramatically embodied by the ‘constitutional revolution’ taking place in Hungary since April 2010, this paper offers a critical reading of the dominant, rational-institutionalist model of democratic consolidation. Drawing on the Hungarian case, it argues that the conditions set out by this model are insufficient for ensuring a democratic regime against erosion. On this basis, the paper considers additional elements to understand Fidesz’s reforms: the importance of deeper commitments to democracy among the leadership of mainstream parties, and the pivotal role of party strategies of citizen mobilization in the consolidation of young democracies. Drawing on these insights, the paper argues for approaching democratic consolidation as an agent-led process of cultural change, emphasizing the socializing role of mainstream parties’ strategies of mobilization in the emergence of a democratic political culture. The last section concludes with methodological and empirical considerations, outlining a three-fold agenda for future research.
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Pető, Andrea, and Ildikó Barna. "‘Unfettered Freedom’ Revisited: Hungarian Historical Journals between 1989 and 2018." Contemporary European History 30, no. 3 (July 19, 2021): 427–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777321000229.
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In his 1992 article, ‘Today, Freedom is Unfettered in Hungary,’ Columbia University history professor István Deák argued that after 1989 Hungarian historical research enjoyed ‘unfettered freedom. Deák gleefully listed the growing English literature on Hungarian history and hailed the ‘step-by step dismantling of the Marxist-Leninist edifice in historiography’ that he associated with the Institute of History at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) under the leadership of György Ránki (1930–88). In this article he argued that the dismantling of communist historiography had started well before 1989. Besides celebrating the establishment of the popular science-oriented historical journal, History (História) (founded in 1979) and new institutions such as the Európa Intézet – Europa Institute (founded in 1990) or the Central European University (CEU) (founded in 1991) as turning points in Hungarian historical research, Deák listed the emergence of the question of minorities and Transylvania; anti-Semitism and the Holocaust; as well as the 1956 revolution. It is very true that these topics were addressed by prominent members of the Hungarian democratic opposition who were publishing in samizdat publications: among them János M. Rainer, the director of the 1956 Institute after 1989, who wrote about 1956. This list of research topics implies that other topics than these listed before had been free to research and were not at all political. This logic interiorised and duplicated the logic of communist science policy and refused to acknowledge other ideological interventions, including his own, while also insisting on the ‘objectivity’ of science. Lastly, Deák concluded that ‘there exists a small possibility that the past may be rewritten again, in an ultra-conservative and xenophobic vein. This is, however, only a speculation.’ Twenty years later Ignác Romsics, the doyen of Hungarian historiography, re-stated Deák's claim, arguing that there are no more ideological barriers for historical research. However, in his 2011 article Romsics strictly separated professional historical research as such from ‘dilettantish or propaganda-oriented interpretations of the past, which leave aside professional criteria and feed susceptible readers – and there are always many – with fraudulent and self-deceiving myths’. He thereby hinted at a new threat to the historical profession posed by new and ideologically driven forces. The question of where these ‘dilettantish or propaganda-oriented’ historians are coming from has not been asked as it would pose a painful question about personal and institutional continuity. Those historians who have become the poster boys of the illiberal memory politics had not only been members of the communist party, they also received all necessary professional titles and degrees within the professional community of historians.
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Szegő, Iván. "The “Serbian connection” in the age of the beat revolution in Hungary." Muzikologija, no. 27 (2019): 187–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/muz1927187s.
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The music market of Hungary was manipulated by state authorities and the communist party from the 1960s until the 1980s. That distorted environment is the reason why the careers of two of the greatest Hungarian beat stars of the Sixties differed so much: Levente Sz?r?nyi and Zor?n Sztevanovity were both partially or fully of Serbian origin, both were lead singers of their bands, and both were (in the first phase of their career) very careful with politics; however, their Serbian heritage and their family experiences were totally different, which explains their different behaviour during and after the Beat Revolution in Hungary.
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Montgomery, Kathleen A., and Gabriella Ilonszki. "Stuck in the Basement: A Pathway Case Analysis of Female Recruitment in Hungary's 2010 National Assembly Elections." Politics & Gender 12, no. 04 (May 3, 2016): 700–726. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1743923x1600012x.
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Women's legislative underrepresentation has emerged as perhaps the most stable feature of the postcommunist Hungarian political system, resisting Europeanization, changes in the electoral and party systems, and a new constitution. Early research on the decline in women's access to power in postcommunist transitional democracies focused on common legacies of communist rule, but those legacies cannot account for widening disparities in women's representation across the region over time or the persistent underrepresentation of women in Hungary. Using a pathway case analysis of Hungary's 2010 parliamentary elections, this research examines how cultural, structural, and institutional factors interacted to keep Hungary stuck in the basement with respect to women's legislative recruitment.
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Ahmetović, Amir. "Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Constitution assembly of the Kingdoms of Serb, Croats and Slovenes and the transformation of social splits into political divisions." Historijski pogledi 3, no. 4 (December 30, 2020): 66–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.52259/historijskipogledi.2020.3.4.66.
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Based on the available literature, social division is defined as a measure that separates community members into groups. When it comes to Bosnia and Herzegovina and its population who spoke the same language and shared the same territory, the confessional (millet) division from the time of Turkish rule, as a fundamental social fact on the basis of which the Serbian and Croatian national identity of the Bosnian Catholic and the Orthodox population remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina even after the departure of the Austro-Hungarian administration in 1918. Historical confessional and ethnic divisions that developed in the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian periods became the key and only basis for political and party gatherings and are important for today's Bosnia and Herzegovina segmented society. The paper attempts to examine the applicability of the analytical framework (theory) of Lipset and Rokan (formulated in the 1960s) on social divisions in the case of the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Constituent Assembly of the Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in 1920? Elements for the answer can be offered by the analysis of the relationship between the ethno-confessional affiliation of citizens, on the one hand, party affiliation, on the other and their acceptance of certain political attitudes and values on the third side. If there is a significant interrelation, it could be concluded that at least indirectly the lines of social divisions condition the party-political division. The political system, of course, is not just a simple reflex of social divisions. One should first try to find the answer to the initial questions: what are the key lines of social divisions? How do they overlap and intersect? How and under what conditions does the transformation of social divisions into a party system take place? The previously stated social divisions passed through the filter of political entrepreneurs and returned as a political offer in which the specific interests and motives of (ethnic) political entrepreneurs were included and incorporated. After the end of the First World War, ethnic, confessional and cultural divisions were (and still are) very present in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The key lines of division in the ethnic, confessional and cultural spheres, their development and predominantly multipolar (four-polar) character through changes in the forms and breadth of interest and political organization have influenced political options (divisions) and further complicating and strengthening B&H political splits. The concept of cleavage is a mediating concept between the concept of social stratification and its impact on political grouping and political institutions and the political concept that emphasizes the reciprocal influence of political institutions and decisions on changes in social structure. Thanks to political mobilization in ethno-confessional, cultural and class divisions, then the "history of collective memory" and inherited ethno-confessional conflicts, mass political party movements were formed very quickly in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an integral part of the Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs ( Yugoslav Muslim organization, Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Yugoslav Democratic Party, Croatian Farmers' Party, Croatian People's Party, Farmers' Union, People's Radical Party ...). The lines of social divisions overlap with ethnic divisions (Yugoslav Muslim Organization, Croatian Farmers' Party, Croatian People's Party, Farmers' Union, People's Radical Party ...) but also intersect them so that several ethnic groups can coexist within the same party-political framework (Communist Party of Yugoslavia). The significant, even crucial influence of party affiliation and identification on the adoption of certain attitudes speaks of the strong feedback of the parties and even of some kind of created party identity. The paper discusses the first elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina organized during the Kingdom of SCS and the formation of Bosnia and Herzegovina's political spectrum on the basic lines of social divisions.
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Junger, Mykhailo. "“Process of Philosophers” in 1973 as an Attempt to Stop the Development of the Dissent in Hungary." Mìžnarodnì zv’âzki Ukraïni: naukovì pošuki ì znahìdki, no. 26 (November 27, 2017): 290–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/mzu2017.26.290.
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The aim of the article is to examine the little-known in the Ukrainian historiography moments of the Hungarian-Soviet relations, which have been linked with a critical perception of the economic reform in Hungary in 1968 by the Soviet Union Communist Party. Following the crackdown on the Prague Spring, Hungary remained the only one among member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which continued to reform the economy for higher living standards in 1969–1972. It evokes a negative reaction of the SUCP leadership, which J. Kádár could not ignore. One of the indirect consequences of the Kremlin demands to stop the economic reform was the “philosophers’s process” 1973. The paper considers the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party’s response to ideological criticism of the Hungarian scientists conserning philosophical foundations of socialism in general and the political consequences of its implementation in particular. It provides the evaluation of HSWP analysts on key provisions of leading representatives of the Budapest school of philosophy: G. Márkus, A. Heller, M. Vajda, sociologist A. Hegedüs. In these papers argued that don’t exist authentic marxism, socialist revolution is not led to radical changes in the forms of social life, so there were no revolutions, revolutionary nature of the working class and the labor movement in socialist countries were questionable, socialism is not built, however modernization was implemented. This article demonstrates the nature of the personal position of J. Kádár, whish consists of balance between the demands of the Kremlin and the needs of Hungarian social development. It was found that the future leaders of the urban opposition group J. Kis and G. Bence were among philosophers, who were expelled from the HSWP or subjected to administrative pressure. It was their first conflict with the state power, which promoted awareness of the need of conversion into opposition activity. Article first time in Ukrainian historiography gives a complete picture of the conditions under which formed critical views of the scientific community in Hungary to socialism. The Hungarian archival materials unknown by this time were used.
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Richter, Pál. "Dance house under the socialist regime in Hungary." Studia Musicologica 56, no. 4 (December 2015): 407–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/6.2015.56.4.8.
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At the beginning of the 1970s there was a drastic turn in the history of Hungarian folklorism brought by the ‘dance house’ [táncház] movement. This movement, based on civil initiative, aimed to evoke and revive the patterns of peasant dance and music culture of local communities, preserving its aesthetic values. Within its confines, many young people followed the example of the initiators, Ferenc Sebő and Béla Halmos through the intensive appropriation of instrumental folk music. Their professional leaders were such folklore researchers as Lajos Vargyas, Imre Olsvai, and György Martin, later the amateur activity ignoring scientific requirements came to play a determinant role. (N.B. the “dance house method” was inscribed in 2011 on UNESCO’s Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity.) As an urban subculture rooted in the peasant traditional culture, it expanded independently from the centrally supervised cultural establishment — without the control of the communist party. It seemed to be dangerous from ideological point of view, because it could have involved the ideas of nationalism, liberty, and self-organized communities as well.
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Revesz, Bela. "Draft for Understanding the Historical Background of Changes in the Ideological Language and Communication of Secret Services in 20th Century’s Hungary." International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique 33, no. 3 (August 11, 2020): 855–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11196-020-09759-w.
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Abstract Words can mean different things to different people. This can be problematic, mainly for those working together in a bureaucratic institution, such as the secret service. Shared, certified, explicit and codified definitions offer a counter to subjective, solitary and/or culturally dominant definitions. It’s true that codified secrecy terms for secret services can be seen to involve a number of political, cultural, subcultural “languages”, but if words come from unclassified or declassified files, memorandums and/or records, one needs a deep understanding of the secret services. A remarkable feature of this bureaucratic language is the evolving nature of, certain “keywords” as important signifiers of historical transformation. Thus, the changes in the language of the secret services depends at least as much on the internal changes of the secret services as on the transformation in the external political-social environment. In spite of the confusion of Hungarian secret services in the revolutions of 1918–1919 and the disintegration of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, in the early 1920’s became a stable system. Between the two World Wars, the Hungarian State Police directed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (hereinafter referred to as MIA), the Military Intelligence and Counter-Espionage directed by the Ministry of Defence (hereinafter referred to as MoD), and the Hungarian Royal Gendarmerie directed by both of the Ministries had their own operational service. This structure existed unchanged until 1945. Simultaneously with the forward advance of the soviet troops, government began to re-establish the former system of the secret services in the eastern part of the country. After WWII, in 1946, the “State-protection Department” as political police became independent from the police. However, from the beginning, they remained under the control of the Communist Party. After 1950, the State Security Authority provided special services for the MIA and the Military Political Directorate of the MoD. After quashing the revolution in 1956, in the spring of 1957, the MIA Political Investigation Department was established which—with slight modifications—kept the structure created during the “state protection era”. The MIA III. The State-Protection General Directorate was established in 1962. The reorganization was finalized in the middle of the 1960’s, which resulted in the new system, which—with the structure of Directorates—became the ultimate structure of the state secret police until the abolishment of the MIA General Directorate III in January 1990. These organizational transformations were largely the result of exogenous historical-political changes. Moreover, each new period had a major impact on the organizational communication, language use and vocabulary of the secret services. This study seeks to interpret these historical transformations.
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Borhi, L. "MARTIN MEVIUS. Agents of Moscow: The Hungarian Communist Party and the Origins of Socialist Patriotism 1941-1953. (Oxford Historical Monographs.) Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 2005. Pp. xv, 296. $99.00." American Historical Review 111, no. 4 (October 1, 2006): 1277–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/ahr.111.4.1277.
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Pittaway, Mark. "Review: Martin Mevius, Agents of Moscow: The Hungarian Communist Party and the Origins of Socialist Patriotism, 1941—1953, Oxford Historical Monographs, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 2005; 312 pp., 6 illus.; 9780199274611, £69 (hbk)." European History Quarterly 38, no. 1 (January 2008): 164–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/02656914080380010429.
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Borhi, László. "Agents of Moscow: The Hungarian Communist Party and the Origins of Socialist Patriotism, 1941-1953. By Martin Mevius. Oxford Historical Monographs. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. xv, 296 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Illustrations. Photographs. $99.00, hard bound." Slavic Review 65, no. 4 (2006): 812–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4148472.
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Heller, Ágnes. "A Discussion of Péter Krasztev and Jon Van Til’s The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy." Perspectives on Politics 15, no. 2 (June 2017): 542–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592717000378.
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In the wake of the Revolutions of 1989, Hungary was long considered one of the “success stories” of post-communist transition to liberal democracy. Yet in recent years the Hungarian government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orban, has pioneered a new conception of “illiberal democracy.” In a July 2014 speech, Orban indeed declared that “the era of liberal democracies is over.” Similar declarations can be heard in other parts of post-communist Eastern Europe. The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy, is a collection of essays by Hungarian social scientists and intellectuals reflecting on both the sources of this emergent illiberalism and the sources of opposition to it. Because it is important for American political scientists to understand the way their colleagues in other parts of the world reflect on the challenges of democracy, and because the Hungarian situation is significant for the future of Europe and the EU, we have invited a wide range of scholars to comment on the book and on its topic—the significance of the emergence of “illiberal democracy” in Hungary and in Europe.
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Haraszti, Miklos. "A Discussion of Péter Krasztev and Jon Van Til’s The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy." Perspectives on Politics 15, no. 2 (June 2017): 545–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s153759271700038x.
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In the wake of the Revolutions of 1989, Hungary was long considered one of the “success stories” of post-communist transition to liberal democracy. Yet in recent years the Hungarian government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orban, has pioneered a new conception of “illiberal democracy.” In a July 2014 speech, Orban indeed declared that “the era of liberal democracies is over.” Similar declarations can be heard in other parts of post-communist Eastern Europe. The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy, is a collection of essays by Hungarian social scientists and intellectuals reflecting on both the sources of this emergent illiberalism and the sources of opposition to it. Because it is important for American political scientists to understand the way their colleagues in other parts of the world reflect on the challenges of democracy, and because the Hungarian situation is significant for the future of Europe and the EU, we have invited a wide range of scholars to comment on the book and on its topic—the significance of the emergence of “illiberal democracy” in Hungary and in Europe.
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Fodor, Eva. "A Discussion of Péter Krasztev and Jon Van Til’s The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy." Perspectives on Politics 15, no. 2 (June 2017): 547–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592717000391.
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In the wake of the Revolutions of 1989, Hungary was long considered one of the “success stories” of post-communist transition to liberal democracy. Yet in recent years the Hungarian government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orban, has pioneered a new conception of “illiberal democracy.” In a July 2014 speech, Orban indeed declared that “the era of liberal democracies is over.” Similar declarations can be heard in other parts of post-communist Eastern Europe. The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy, is a collection of essays by Hungarian social scientists and intellectuals reflecting on both the sources of this emergent illiberalism and the sources of opposition to it. Because it is important for American political scientists to understand the way their colleagues in other parts of the world reflect on the challenges of democracy, and because the Hungarian situation is significant for the future of Europe and the EU, we have invited a wide range of scholars to comment on the book and on its topic—the significance of the emergence of “illiberal democracy” in Hungary and in Europe.
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Mueller, Jan-Werner. "A Discussion of Péter Krasztev and Jon Van Til’s The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy." Perspectives on Politics 15, no. 2 (June 2017): 549–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592717000408.
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In the wake of the Revolutions of 1989, Hungary was long considered one of the “success stories” of post-communist transition to liberal democracy. Yet in recent years the Hungarian government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orban, has pioneered a new conception of “illiberal democracy.” In a July 2014 speech, Orban indeed declared that “the era of liberal democracies is over.” Similar declarations can be heard in other parts of post-communist Eastern Europe. The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy, is a collection of essays by Hungarian social scientists and intellectuals reflecting on both the sources of this emergent illiberalism and the sources of opposition to it. Because it is important for American political scientists to understand the way their colleagues in other parts of the world reflect on the challenges of democracy, and because the Hungarian situation is significant for the future of Europe and the EU, we have invited a wide range of scholars to comment on the book and on its topic—the significance of the emergence of “illiberal democracy” in Hungary and in Europe.
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Ost, David. "A Discussion of Péter Krasztev and Jon Van Til’s The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy." Perspectives on Politics 15, no. 2 (June 2017): 551–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s153759271700041x.
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In the wake of the Revolutions of 1989, Hungary was long considered one of the “success stories” of post-communist transition to liberal democracy. Yet in recent years the Hungarian government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orban, has pioneered a new conception of “illiberal democracy.” In a July 2014 speech, Orban indeed declared that “the era of liberal democracies is over.” Similar declarations can be heard in other parts of post-communist Eastern Europe. The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy, is a collection of essays by Hungarian social scientists and intellectuals reflecting on both the sources of this emergent illiberalism and the sources of opposition to it. Because it is important for American political scientists to understand the way their colleagues in other parts of the world reflect on the challenges of democracy, and because the Hungarian situation is significant for the future of Europe and the EU, we have invited a wide range of scholars to comment on the book and on its topic—the significance of the emergence of “illiberal democracy” in Hungary and in Europe.
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Wittenberg, Jason. "A Discussion of Péter Krasztev and Jon Van Til’s The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy." Perspectives on Politics 15, no. 2 (June 2017): 553–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592717000421.
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In the wake of the Revolutions of 1989, Hungary was long considered one of the “success stories” of post-communist transition to liberal democracy. Yet in recent years the Hungarian government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orban, has pioneered a new conception of “illiberal democracy.” In a July 2014 speech, Orban indeed declared that “the era of liberal democracies is over.” Similar declarations can be heard in other parts of post-communist Eastern Europe. The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy, is a collection of essays by Hungarian social scientists and intellectuals reflecting on both the sources of this emergent illiberalism and the sources of opposition to it. Because it is important for American political scientists to understand the way their colleagues in other parts of the world reflect on the challenges of democracy, and because the Hungarian situation is significant for the future of Europe and the EU, we have invited a wide range of scholars to comment on the book and on its topic—the significance of the emergence of “illiberal democracy” in Hungary and in Europe.
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Waterbury, Myra A. "Internal Exclusion, External Inclusion: Diaspora Politics and Party-Building Strategies in Post-Communist Hungary." East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures 20, no. 3 (August 2006): 483–515. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325405280897.
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This article examines the domestic politics behind Hungary’s controversial 2001 “Status Law,” which granted special cultural and economic benefits to ethnic Hungarians who are citizens of other states. It argues that Hungary’s increasingly interventionist policy toward ethnic Hungarians beyond its borders in the late 1990s was driven not by a growing sense of ethnic nationalism in society or as a reaction to the plight of ethnic kin but by the party-building strategy of right-wing elites. These elites utilized and co-opted transnational ties with the diaspora to further their own political goals. Specifically, engagement with the diaspora issue provided the then-governing Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) government with symbolically charged ideological content, important organizational resources, and the basis of a longer-term strategy for governance and institutional embeddedness.
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Leafstedt, Carl. "Rediscovering Victor Bator, founder of the New York Bartók Archives." Studia Musicologica 53, no. 1-3 (September 1, 2012): 349–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/smus.53.2012.1-3.24.
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Bartók’s American estate dates its origins to 1943, when he entrusted his music manuscript collection to the care of two fellow Hungarian emigrés, Gyula Báron and Victor Bator, both then living in the United States. After his death in 1945 the estate devolved into their care, in accord with the legal provisions of the will. For the next 22 years it was carefully managed by Bator, a lawyer and businessman who lived in New York City for the rest of his life. The onset of Cold War politics in the late 1940s presented numerous challenges to the estate, out of which emerged the tangled thicket of rumor, litigation, misunderstanding, confusion, and personal animosity that has been the American Bartók estate’s unfortunate legacy since the 1950s.As one of Hungary’s most significant cultural assets located outside the country’s borders, the American Bartók estate has since 1981 been under the control and careful supervision of Peter Bartók, now the composer’s only remaining heir. All but forgotten is the role Victor Bator played in managing the estate during the difficult years after World War II, when its beneficiaries became separated by the Iron Curtain, setting in motion legal and emotional difficulties that no one in the immediate family could have predicted. Equally overlooked is the role he played in enhancing the collection to become the world’s largest repository of Bartók materials.A considerable amount of Bator’s personal correspondence related to the early years of the Bartók estate has recently come to light in the U.S. Together with U.S. court documents and information gleaned from recent interviews with Bator’s son, Francis Bator, still living in Massachusetts, and the late Ivan Waldbauer, we can now reconstruct with reasonable accuracy the early history of Bartók’s estate. A strikingly favorable picture of Bator emerges. Bartók, it turns out, chose his executors wisely. A cultivated and broadly learned man, by the late 1920s Victor Bator had gained recognition as one of Hungary’s most prominent legal minds in the field of international business and banking law. His professional experience became useful to the Bartók estate as the Communist party gradually took hold of Hungary after World War II, seizing assets and nationalizing property previously belonging to individual citizens. His comfort in the arena of business law also thrust him into prominence as a public advocate for increased fees for American composers in the late 1940s - a matter of tremendous urgency for composers of serious music at the time. By reconstructing Bator’s professional career prior to 1943 his actions as executor and trustee become more understandable. We gain new insight into a figure of tremendous personal importance for Bartók and his family.
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Andrássy, György, and Miklos Fülöp. "Prospects of a Free and Democratic Society in Hungary." Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 4, no. 1 (1992): 121–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jis199241/27.
Full textAbstract:
This essay is an historical approach to the thesis that present changes in Hungary are, despite all appearances, parts and results of a long process. Western liberal democracies have served as models for various Hungarian political movments and social classes for some two centuries, and political changes similar to contemporary ones have occurred repeatedly in Hungary. An important feature of Hungarian political and civil attitudes is that these changes usually take the shape of "lawful revolutions." Most political, legal, and social conditions needed to complete the transition from a communist system to a free and democratic Hungary are now present. However, the process is endangered by a tremendous national debt and national conflicts in the region.