Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Ignorance of the law is no excuse'

This article addresses the antinomy concerning to profit sharing to the workers. Through an analysis of the classic criteria of antinomy solutions and particulars of the Labour Law, the author recognize the prevalence of the classic criteria.<br>El presente artículo aborda la antinomia referente al pago de utilidades a los trabajadores. Realizando un análisis sobre los criterios de solución de antinomias clásicas y particulares del Derecho del Trabajo, el autor reconoce la prevalencia de los criterios clásicos.

Includes bibliographical references<br>The focal area of research is to ascertain, if whether the delivery of non-conforming goods, may or may not exist as an excusable impediment under Article 79 of the CISG? To determine this I have taken a different approach, than that, of the more conventional approach of critiquing the prevailing arguments. Essentially by analyzing the commentary of the relevant Advisory Council Members as well as other major contributors to the debate, of which one argument finds its basis on legislative intent of the negotiating parties (Travaux preparatoires) and the other being ascertained on a purely textual interpretation of Article 79. In order to reach a more precise conclusion, the author of this dissertation has funneled these two arguments through the different interpretative methods of treaties to discern which of the two arguments should be regarded as the more appropriate choice, which should be adopted. The existing question therefore would be, should we find a definitive conclusion with the fact that negotiators to the Sales Convention have decided that the delivery of non-conforming goods should not be excused under Article 79? Or should we side with a purely textual approach? Based on the phrase 'failure to perform any of his obligation', the words "any" and "obligation" would consequently include the obligation of the seller to meet the level of conformity as expressed under the contract according to Article 35 of the CISG.

Telle qu’elle est conçue à l’origine par les jurisconsultes romains, la distinction entre fait etdroit a une fonction méthodologique. Elle oppose, pour l’essentiel, deux types d’enquêtes dont peutdépendre la résolution d’un conflit en justice. L’une a une portée générale, la quaestio iuris ; l’autrene regarde que la seule espèce en cause, la quaestio facti. Les juristes apprécient, suivant chaquesituation envisagée, celle des deux approches qui résoudra le litige de la manière la plusconvaincante.Leurs réflexions sont conditionnées, à cet égard, par les difficultés que suscite l’interpretatiofacti. Le risque de dissoudre l’expression du ius dans l’extraordinaire disparité des faits inciteparfois à privilégier des raisonnements de portée générale. La démarche se caractérise alors par soncaractère artificiel : le fait envisagé est, dans cette hypothèse, le fruit d’une construction. Par uneffort de définition, chaque circonstance est réduite en une notion générique, avant d’êtreconfrontée à la règle de droit. La qualification est alors proprement juridique : elle permet derésoudre le conflit dans le cadre d’une quaestio iuris.Cependant, certaines situations concrètes, par leur singularité, rendent de tels raisonnementsinadaptés. Aussi une autre approche est-elle parfois privilégiée. Elle suppose d’étendre les pouvoirsde l’interprète, en lui permettant d’apprécier chaque circonstance en cause dans le cadre d’unexamen d’espèce. La qualification procède alors d’une quaestio facti. Cette démarche caractérise laprotection prétorienne de la possession ; elle inspire surtout, en substance, la concession des actionsin factum<br>As originally conceived by Roman jurists, the distinction between fact and law has amethodological purpose. It confronts, essentially, two types of inquiries used to resolve a dispute incourt. One is general in scope, the quaestio iuris ; the other pertains only to a single case, thequaestio facti. According to each situation, jurists assess the approach that will resolve the disputein the most convincing way.Their thoughts are conditioned, in this respect, by the complexity of interpretatio facti. Therisk of dissolving the ius in the extraordinary disparity of facts may at times lead to a reasoning thatis general in scope. The approach is then artificial : the fact is considered, in this case, as a result ofa construction. A definition allows each circumstance to be reduced to a generic concept, beforebeing confronted to the legal rule. In this case, the evaluation is precisely legal : it resolves theconflict in the frame of a quaestio iuris.However, such appreciation may be inadequate for certain singular situations. Thereforeanother approach is sometimes favored. It involves extending the powers of the interpreter in orderto assess a circumstance through the examination of each concrete case. The evaluation is thencarried out within the quaestio facti framework. This characterizes the Praetorian protection ofpossession, and inspires above all, in essence, the concession of actiones in factum

La expansión que ha tenido la figura de la ignorancia deliberada dentro del derecho penal Iberoamericano, a raíz de la adopción por parte del Tribunal Supremo español de la doctrina de la willful blindness, justifican la realización del presente trabajo. Desde esta perspectiva se pretende dar respuesta a qué es la willful blindness en su esencia. Para ello, se realiza una acercamiento al funcionamiento del sistema jurídico del common law con la finalidad de comprender el desarrollo de la willful blindness y proponer una aproximación conceptual de esta figura jurídica a partir de un doble enfoque sustantivo y procesal. Al finalizar, se estará en la capacidad de responder a las siguientes interrogantes: ¿A qué se hace referencia cuando se habla de willful blindness y por qué un determinado individuo decide ignorar lo que las circunstancias del hecho le está planteando como probable?;¿Es exactamente lo mismo hablar de willful blindness y de ignorancia deliberada?; ¿Es necesaria la utilización o el acceso a un recurso como la willful blindness para tratar los supuestos de desconocimiento provocado de los elementos del tipo objetivo en el derecho continental? La tesis se estructura en tres partes: (i) El sistema jurídico del common law; (ii) La doctrina de la willful blindness; (iii) Aproximación al concepto de willful blindness.<br>The expansion that the willful blindness doctrine has had within Ibero-American criminal law, following the adoption by the Spanish Supreme Court of this doctrine, justifies this investigation. From this perspective it is intended to answer what is the essence of the willful blindness doctrine. To achieve this task, an approach to the common law legal system is carried out in order to understand the development of the willful blindness doctrine, and a conceptual proposal to this legal entity based on a substantive and procedural approach is submitted. At the end, we will be in the ability to answer the following questions: What is referred to when we talk about willful blindness, and why a particular individual decides to ignore what the attendant circumstances suggests as probable? It is exactly the same to talk about willful blindness and deliberate ignorance? Is it necessary to use such a resource like willful blindness doctrine to deal with cases of contrived ignorance of the objective elements of the crime in the continental law? The thesis is structured in three parts: (i) The legal system of common law; (ii) The doctrine of the willful blindness; (iii) A conceptual approach to willful blindness.<br>L'expansió que ha tingut la figura de la ignorància deliberada dins el dret penal Iberoamericà, arran de l'adopció per part del Tribunal Suprem espanyol de la doctrina de la willful blindness, justifiquen la realització del present treball. Des d'aquesta perspectiva es pretén donar resposta a què és la willful blindness en la seva essència. Per a això, es realitza una aproximació al funcionament del sistema jurídic del common law amb la finalitat de comprendre el desenvolupament de la willful blindness i proposar una aproximació conceptual d'aquesta figura jurídica a partir d'un doble enfocament substantiu i processal. En acabar, s'estarà en la capacitat de respondre a les següents interrogants: ¿A què es fa referència quan es parla de willful blindness i per què un determinat individu decideix ignorar el que les circumstàncies del fet li està plantejant com a probable?; És exactament el mateix parlar de willful blindness i d'ignorància deliberada ?; És necessària la utilització o l'accés a un recurs com la willful blindness per tractar els supòsits de desconeixement provocat dels elements del tipus objectiu en el dret continental? La tesi s'estructura en tres parts: (i) El sistema jurídic del common law; (ii) La doctrina de la willful blindness; (iii) Aproximació al concepte de willful blindness.

La mise en œuvre de la prescription de l'action publique n'est pas, en principe, subordonnée à la connaissance de l'infraction par les personnes pouvant déclencher les poursuites pénales. Le législateur retient en effet comme point de départ du délai de prescription le jour de la commission des faits et non celui de leur découverte. Cette règle connaît toutefois une exception lorsque l'infraction est dite clandestine. Parce que le ministère public et la victime n'ont pas pu avoir connaissance de l'existence de cette infraction, la prescription ne court pas tant que les faits ne sont pas apparus et n'ont pu être constatés dans des conditions permettant l'exercice de l'action publique. L'exception de clandestinité empêche donc le temps de produire son effet destructeur sur l'action publique. Sa mise en œuvre évite ainsi que certaines infractions restent impunies par le seul jeu de l'écoulement du délai. S'il ne fait aucun doute que la clandestinité d'une infraction constitue un obstacle à la prescription de l'action publique, la notion même de clandestinité reste à circonscrire. Elle recouvre en effet, en droit positif, de multiples réalités qui rendent impossible sa systématisation. Aux termes de la recherche, il apparaît que le critère déterminant de la clandestinité consiste dans l'ignorance légitime de l'existence de l'infraction par les personnes habilitées à mettre en mouvement l'action publique. En application de l'adage contra non valentem agere non currit praescriptio, cette ignorance caractérisée devrait autoriser le report du point de départ de la prescription de l'action publique de toute infraction au jour où les faits peuvent être constatés par le ministère public ou par la personne lésée.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:21:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Nayara Graciela Sales Brito.pdf: 1228124 bytes, checksum: 994fcb02f2abcb654e77ed919e77f2fa (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-07-06<br>The scope of this study is to examine the ignorance of the law issue beginning with a historical study of criminal liability and mistake, moving on to the birth of culpability theories and the approaches to the knowledge of unlawfulness. This study addresses the development of culpability and mistake of law in Brazil, mainly through the study of Brazilian criminal statutes and bills. To this end, this study shows the development of the theory around the object of the knowledge of unlawfulness, and the prevailing opinions of Brazilian jurists in the sense of considering it to be in opposition to the established order of the community. This study is justified by the complexity and importance of the topic, both to crime theory and legal pragmatics, especially when one considers the numerous statutes enacted in Brazil, many of which date from the post-industrial period, as a means of keeping up with the risks posed by a global and technological society. The theoretical framework follows the historical and chronological line, and is not intended to exhaust the approaches to the subject nor is it aimed at offering solutions to all the lines of thought herein mentioned. This study covers different conceptions of culpability: psychological, normative, finalist, and the functional views of Claus Roxin and Günther Jakobs. Next, formal, material and intermediary theories of the object of the knowledge of unlawfulness is addressed in order to attain a critical view of inexcusable nature of the ignorance of the law defense in the face of the dignity of the human person<br>Esta dissertação tem como escopo a análise da especial questão do desconhecimento da lei penal, partindo-se do estudo histórico da responsabilidade criminal e do erro até o advento das teorias da culpabilidade e os respectivos tratamentos sobre a consciência da ilicitude. Examina-se a evolução da culpabilidade e do erro de proibição no Brasil, sobretudo por meio do estudo dos diversos diplomas penais, como também de alguns projetos de lei. Expõem-se o desenvolvimento teórico sobre o objeto da consciência da ilicitude e a posição majoritária da doutrina brasileira no sentido de considerá-lo como sendo a contrariedade à ordem comunitária. Justifica-se o trabalho pela complexidade e relevância do tema, tanto para a teoria do delito, quanto para a pragmática jurídica, mormente em se considerando a edição de inúmeras leis que ingressam no ordenamento jurídico pátrio, muitas delas advindas do período pós- industrial, como meio de se acompanhar os riscos da sociedade globalizada e tecnológica. O percurso teórico filia-se à linha histórico-cronológica, sem a pretensão de esgotar as abordagens relativas ao assunto, nem oferecer soluções para todas as correntes de pensamento expostas. Apresentam-se as concepções sobre a culpabilidade: psicológicas, normativas, finalistas e as visões funcionalistas de Claus Roxin e de Günther Jakobs. Em seguida, o estudo perpassa pelas teorias formal, material e intermediária do objeto da consciência da ilicitude, para se alcançar um posicionamento crítico da inescusabilidade da ignorância da lei penal em face do princípio da culpabilidade e da dignidade da pessoa humana

La connaissance des règles par les sujets de droit est un impératif et un défi. Elaborées pour les membres de la société, les règles doivent être diffusées dans la sphère sociale pour être reçues par leurs destinataires.Pourtant, leur multiplication, leur complexité, leur instabilité rendent l'acquisition des connaissances difficile alors même que« nul n'est censé ignorer la loi». La nécessité d'assurer l'accès au droit et l'effectivité des règles a conduit au développement de l'obligation d'information sur les règles de droit. Ce dispositif est celui par lequel une personne -le débiteur- porte à la connaissance d'une autre - le créancier - des informations concernant les règles de droit applicables. Ces informations portables parviennent à la connaissance des personnes sans que celles-ci ne les demandent. Cette obligation d'informer est un moyen d'assurer la protection des personnes en situation de faiblesse en les éclairant sur leur environnement juridique pour qu'elles fassent preuve de discernement dans leurs décisions et agissent en vue de la satisfaction de leurs intérêts.Cette thèse propose d'analyser l'obligation d'information sur les règles de droit en exposant sa singularité puis son régime. L'étude invite, plus largement, à s'intéresser aux rapports entre la règle de droit et les citoyens, à rechercher les raisons pour lesquelles la connaissance des règles est considérée comme nécessaire par les pouvoirs publics qui multiplient les obligations d'informer. Elle est ainsi l'occasion de s'interroger sur les conditions de la réalisation des règles de droit et, plus particulièrement, sur le rôle joué par la connaissance des règles dans leur réalisation<br>The knowledge of the rules of the law appears to be equally imperative and challenging. The rules of the law are created for the benefit of members of the society. Their vocation is to be spread across the social sphere in order to reach their recipients, the citizens. However the acquisition of this knowledge is proving testing due to its complexity, inconsistency and abundance, yet, all should be aware of the law. The necessity to ensure access to the law and the effectiveness of the rules, has Iead to the development of the obligation of information on the rules of the law. This proposal has for effect to enable a persan "the debtor" to inform another "the creditor" of the informations regarding the rules of the law in effect. These are known as "push informations" which are supplied to anyone without being requested. This obligation of information is a way to ensure the protection of people in a position of weakness, it also provides guidance regarding the legal environment. lt is essential in order to exercise sound judgment to ensure the welfare of the persan.This thesis proposes to analyse the obligation of information on the rules of the law. lt will expose its singularity and organisation. On a wider scale, the study calls on the connection between the rules of law and the citizen. The focus is on the investigation of the reasons the authorities consider, the ever expanding knowledge of the rules, essential. Thereby, it is the opportunity to ponder the conditions of implementing the rules of the law, and more specifically, the role played by the knowledge of the rules in their implementation

Le discernement est traditionnellement rattaché à l’étude de l’élément moral de l’infraction.Sous l’empire du Code pénal de 1810, des fondements de droit naturel sont à l’oeuvre, si bien que le discernement fut défini par emprunt au droit canon comme une aptitude à distinguer le bien du mal. Mais cette acception ne révèle pas la teneur originelle du critère du libre-arbitre :il correspondait à la connaissance de la loi divine dont le droit séculier n’était que le reflet.L’analyse du droit positif laïcisé invite à découvrir l’existence d’une présomption de connaissance de la loi toujours aussi impérative que dans les systèmes de pénalité antiques.Le discernement peut alors être défini comme une conscience réflexive : la connaissance des droits et devoirs reconnus à chaque personne, au sein de statuts juridiques que la prolifération des normes contribue à préciser. Aussi, la culpabilité n’est pas une connaissance de l’illicéité d’un résultat ; elle procède de l’ignorance des prescriptions légales chez celui qui est présumé en connaître l’existence. En procédure pénale, cette présomption devient protectrice des droits du mis en cause. Aucun acte coercitif ne peut être exercé à son encontre s’il n’a été avisé du statut dont il relève. Cette information assure ainsi la finalité rétributive de la peine chez celui qui n’ignore pas les raisons de sa condamnation. En tout état de cause, la soumission des individus au droit pénal est le seul objectif poursuivi en la matière, ce qui nécessite parfois la présence de victimes au procès pénal, à la seule fin de préserver leur foi en son impérativité<br>Discernment is traditionally attached to the study of the « moral element » of the offense. Under the influence of the Penal Code of 1810, the foundations of natural law are at work, so that the discernment was defined by canon law as the ability to distinguish good from evil. But this understanding does not reveal the content of the original criterion of free will: it used to correspond to the knowledge of the divine law which secular law was only the reflection. The analysis of positive law secularized invites you to discover the existence of a presumption of knowledge of the law as imperative as it was in the systems of ancient penalty. Discernment can then be defined as a reflexive consciousness: the awareness of rights and obligations identified to each person within legal statutes that the proliferation of standards helps to clarify. Also, guilt is not a knowledge of the wrongfulness of an outcome; it proceeds fromignorance of the legal requirements in the person who is presumed to know of its existence. In criminal proceedings, this presumption becomes protective of the rights of the suspect. No coercive act can be exercised against him if he has not been notified of the status to which he belongs. This information ensures the retributive purpose of punishment, for the one who can’t ignore the reasons for his conviction. In any event, the submission of individuals to the established rules is the only objective of the criminal law, which might imply that it accepts the presence of victims in criminal proceedings, for the sole purpose of preserving their faith in his imperativity

L’abus d’une dépendance ou d’une faiblesse engendre automatiquement un déséquilibre dans le contrat. Surtout que, les relations contractuelles sont traditionnellement régies par le principe de l’autonomie de volonté et ses corollaires : de force obligatoire et de liberté contractuelle.Dans une ambition de compléter et de présenter un apport au système législatif égyptien : nous avons entamé nos travaux en 2016 par une étude approfondie de la notion d’exploitation en droit égyptien et de celle de la violence économique en droit français. Bien que la théorie d’exploitation soit consacrée en 1948 lors de la grande réforme législative égyptienne, sauf qu’elle demeure inactive et restreinte. Le législateur égyptien l’a limitée à deux cas d’altération morale : la légèreté notoire et la passion effrénée, de peur de l’insécurité juridique que celle-ci pourrait entraîner. Outre l’étude de ces notions, nous procédons à une étude similaire pour la notion d’équilibre contractuel. Afin de mettre en place celui-ci, nous devons, prima facie, savoir sa teneur et son ampleur.Et dans un but de présenter une expérience professionnelle inédite, nous avons décidé d’intégrer dans cette comparaison le droit anglais, un système juridique de common law : pensons ainsi à des résultats bien fructueux. Nous constatons, à ce stade, l’efficacité de certains mécanismes anglais dans le domaine tels que l’economic duress, l’undue influence (créée par l’equity), l’ unconscionability, l’inequality of barganining power et la consideration.Mais, nous nous rendons compte que les trois systèmes juridiques n’apportent des remèdes aux déséquilibres contractuels résultant des situations d’abus de dépendance qu’à postériori, c’est-à-dire en terme correctif et non pas préventif.À notre sens, la consécration du vice d’abus de dépendance n’est qu’un remède temporaire pour la correction des déséquilibres et des abus qui peuvent résulter de cette situation et pour réaliser ainsi un équilibre contractuel. Elle ne constitue pas une solution radicale pour les déséquilibres qui résultent des abus des situations de dépendance.Au final, la solution que nous envisageons et que nous conseillons au droit égyptien : c’est la consécration d’un principe directeur d’équilibre contractuel. Celui-ci présenterait le remède préventif, à priori qui permettrait de vérifier une justice des contrats. D’ailleurs, ce principe reconnaîtrait la tendance internationale, européenne et française actuelle de proposer des principes directeurs du droit des contrats dans chaque système juridique. Il répondrait ainsi à un contexte contractuel bien différent de celui connu depuis le Code Napoléon de 1804 et qui a eu un impact considérable sur le Code civil égyptien.Je ne suis pas la première a tenté de faire passer de la justice dans le contrat. Lacordaire un prédicateur du 19ème siècle, avait énoncé : « Entre le fort et le faible, entre le riche et le pauvre, entre le maître et le serviteur, c’est la liberté qui opprime, et la loi qui affranchit », Raymond Saleilles, un juriste éminent du début du 20ème siècle ne déclarait-il que : « Les juristes veulent pouvoir dire : ‘cela est juste parce que cela a été voulu’. Il faut désormais que l’on dise ‘cela doit être voulu, parce que cela est juste’ »<br>The objective of this thesis is to establish a principle of contractual justice, especially in Egyptian law, thus benefiting from French and English experiences in this regard. In terms of precision, we deal with situations of dependence where contracts are formed, from the outset, unbalanced. The idea for this thesis was implemented due to the French reform of contract law in 2016. The latter has been devoted to article 1143 of the Civil Code a new vice of consent: the vice of abuse of dependence related to the duress. In this perspective, we had the idea of comparing this new vice with the fourth vice; in the Egyptian law known as the vice of exploitation, which mainly deals with abuses of the moral weakness of the parties. In order to present an unprecedented comparative experience, we decided to integrate the English law in our field of research. The originality of this subject also appears in the fact of simultaneously treating dependence and contractual equilibrium. However, the subject of this thesis encounters several difficulties which concerns not only dependence, but also contractual justice. First of all, concerning the dependence: its concept has so far been unclear. The dependence is surrounded by several other notions which only hide it instead of clarifying it such as the state of necessity, the vulnerability, the state of need, the state of weakness, the constraint, the subordination, the ignorance, and the inexperience. In addition, dependence, mainly in French law, was known at the outset to special law, that is to say in criminal, consumer or competition law. It had no precise concept in contract law. We note in the end that dependence is a subjective state of moral weakness, but which must also widen to encompass adhesion or standard contracts and contracts including unfair terms. This perspective would provide real protection for weaker parties.As far as contractual balance is concerned, in addition to its conceptual imprecision, it encounters a more serious difficulty. This is contrary to the traditional and usual logic of autonomy of will known in the three legal systems. That is to say that the contract is correctly formed from the moment the parties grant their consents, even if the contract itself is unequal or unbalanced from the formation.However, the contract is properly formed unless proven otherwise. This gives a vision of the legal philosophy adopted: this is a corrective philosophy and not a preventive one. The legal sanction for unbalanced contracts is a posteriori and not a priori sanction. That is to say, the law establishes contractual balance through contractual imbalance.In our view, the contractual context in general must be strengthened by a legal principle competing with that of autonomy of will. This principle is the contractual justice. The latter would counterbalance the contractual relations usually governed by the principle of the autonomy of the will. It would make it possible to control the justice of contracts a priori.This solution might seem to some "utopian". It is, on the contrary, a very practical solution because balance in contractual relations is a supreme end which will help to decrease the cases of unbalanced contracts or the cases of contracts vitiated by the abuse of dependence

Present Canadian legislation provides for only one gender-specific “defence” which appears in the Criminal Code as the crime of infanticide. English law recognizes severe Premenstrual Syndrome (PMS) as a mitigating factor in charges of murder. No common law country has yet accepted PMS as a full defence. Feminists have criticized this type of genderbased defence on the ground that (1) it relies on unsubstantiated theories of biological determinism and perpetuates the negative stereotyping of all women; and (2) legal recognition of conditions like PMS can be used as a sword against women. This study tests the thesis that, unless law reformers deliberately take into account the nature and tenacity of sexual mythology, gender-specific additions to criminal defences will merely perpetuate gender bias and sexual inequality. As preparation for legal analysis, a number of myths related to the female and male human bodies and to disease are compared and contrasted. This study examines the notion of woman as the victim of postpartum, premenstrual and menopausal “raging hormones” that force her into behaviour that is characterized as either criminal or sick. It compares her with the “ideal” man and with the man who deviates from this ideal for gender-specific reasons such as sexual impotence, abnormal chromosomes or pedophilia. Epilepsy, a disease common to both sexes, is used as a non-gender-specific comparison. The medicalization of gender-specific disorders in both men and women are examined, taking into account the influence of “scientific” language formulated mainly by men. This is compared with equivalent histories of epilepsy and diabetes. Criminological theories based solely on either biological or environmental factors are criticized, and the role of the “expert witness” is discussed. Cases that attempt to utilize biological defences are analyzed and law reform proposed. There is strong evidence for the existence of biological conditions in both sexes that contribute to states of mind that should entitle the sufferer to legitimate defences. These should be incorporated within general defences rather than separate categories. However, until genuine disorders are separated from benign conditions experienced by most people, courts should exercise caution in implementing such defences.

Ce mémoire aborde la question des fondements moraux de la défense de provocation. Les concepts actuellement utilisés pour analyser ces fondements sont habituellement ceux de justification et d'excuse. À notre avis, la défense de provocation doit plutôt être interprétée comme une articulation particulière des principes gouvernant la détermination de la peine. Les deux premiers chapitres seront consacrés respectivement au concept de justification et d'excuse, et auront pour objet d'écarter leur paradigme de l'analyse des fondements de la défense de provocation. Le troisième chapitre montre comment il est possible de conceptualiser le moyen de défense comme une articulation des principes de détermination de la peine.<br>The present work addresses the question of the moral basis for the defense of provocation. The concepts used today to analyze these bases are usually those of justification and excuse. It is suggested that the defense of provocation should rather be interpreted as a particular articulation of the principles governing the sentencing. The first two chapters cover, respectively, the concepts of justification and excuse, and aim to refute the paradigms of analysis attached to each concept regarding the basis of the defense of provocation. The third chapter demonstrates that it is quite easily possible to conceptualize the defense of provocation as an articulation of the sentencing principles.

Insanity: Comparison of Czech and American legal concept Abstract The aim of this thesis is to capture the essence of the institute of insanity from the substantive point of view according to the Czech and American legislation and to deduce any differences from them. First, the continental legal system on which the Czech legal order is based is compared with the Anglo-American legal system from which the American legislation is derived. Subsequently, the basic pillars of the Czech legal order including the position of criminal law are defined. Attention is also paid to the political system of the United States, because, as a result of federalism, there are two levels of law that have a significant impact on national legislations. Hereupon, the structure of criminal liability according to Czech law is analyzed. Since the prerequisite of criminal liability is the commission of a criminal offense, this is also defined. For the purposes of comparison, circumstances excluding punishability as well as circumstances excluding liability are outlined. Due to the fact that US law is based on common law, criminal liability is defined both from the perspective of common law and the Model Penal Code, which are of the basic sources of US criminal law. Next part of the thesis is focused on the institute of insanity in the...