Relevant bibliographies by topics / Incentive for innovation

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Incentive for innovation'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 15 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Incentive for innovation"

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Liu, Baohua, Wan Huang, and Lei Wang. "Performance-based equity incentives, vesting restrictions, and corporate innovation." Nankai Business Review International 10, no. 1 (February 21, 2019): 138–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/nbri-10-2018-0061.

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Purpose Based on the institutional background of mandatory requirement of performance-based executive equity incentives, this paper aims to investigate the impacts of executive equity incentives, vesting periods and vesting performance conditions on corporate innovation. Design/methodology/approach The empirical analysis is based on the detailed data of equity incentives in China’s listed companies from 2006 to 2014, the Tobit method is implemented to estimate the regression coefficients, and the instrumental variable (IV) approach, Heckman two stage regression, propensity score matching and difference-in-difference models are adopted to solve the problem of endogeneity in several robust tests. Findings This paper documents that equity incentives and vesting periods are significantly and positively related to corporate innovation measured by R&D investment and patent applications, yet requirements on vesting performance impede corporate innovative activities. Specifically, compared with non-equity incentive companies, the R&D investment and the number of patent applications of equity incentive companies are 40 and 46.2 per cent higher, respectively. A one year increase in equity incentive duration can correspondingly increase the R&D investment by 15 per cent and the patent applications by 18.3 per cent. However, a one standard deviation increase in industry-adjusted ROE target reduces corporate R&D investment by 5 per cent and the patent applications by 8.39 per cent. The main empirical findings still hold after several robust tests. Research limitations/implications This paper confirms that the impact of performance-based compensation system on corporate innovation depends on its structure. Specifically, the empirical findings suggest that equity incentive plans being correctly designed can enhance corporate innovative activities, but myopic managers will damage the corporate innovation. Originality/value This paper investigates the influence of equity incentive structure on equity incentive effect based on the institutional background of mandatory requirement of performance-based executive equity incentives. It provides an opportunity to understand the mystery of equity incentives, which helps to enrich the structure of equity incentive theoretically. The empirical evidence confirms the importance of tolerating short-term failure and extending the horizon of managerial decision-making on promoting innovation. Overall, the research indicates that only well-designed equity incentive plans can promote innovation, which contributes to regulators and practitioners to form a rational understanding of the premise of equity incentives in promoting innovation and provides a reference for their decision-making.
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Schneckenberg, Dirk. "Strategic Incentive Systems For Open Innovation." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 30, no. 1 (December 30, 2013): 65. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v30i1.8283.

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<p class="AbsKeyBibli">Our paper presents a cross-sectional study of incentive systems for open innovation practices. Organisations face the challenge to design and implement strategic incentive systems which reward active contributions of individuals to open innovation practices. We refer to contributions from psychology and economics to develop a framework for organisational incentive systems. We have conducted semi-structured interviews with 10 experts in Germany and the Netherlands. The experts work in firms which are both international top players and open innovation pioneers in their respective industries. The results show that all organisations in the sample develop incentives for open innovation. The key strategic function of incentive systems is to open mind-sets of the workforce and to overcome mental barriers of the 'not invented here' syndrome. Immaterial and in particular task content incentives have been judged to have a more efficient long-term impact than material incentives. While experts have emphasised the importance of aligning incentives systems to open innovation strategies, in practice many incentive approaches still remain patchwork and lack a clear strategic focus.</p>
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Korostelkina, Irina Alekseevna, and Anastasiya Olegovna Androsova. "Effectiveness of tax incentives for innovative activity in the Russian Federation: assessment and calculation." Тренды и управление, no. 1 (January 2020): 38–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0730.2020.1.33232.

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The subject of this research is tax incentive that is a part of the process of innovative activity. Taxation is viewed as a tool for advancement of innovations. The experience of foreign countries demonstrates that government support in the form of funding, tax incentives, government subsidized loans, and creation of essential infrastructure play a big role in modernization processes. Expansion of the practice of implementation of tax incentives for stimulating innovations requires a theoretical comprehension of this process. This article examines the coefficient that characterizes economic effectiveness of tax incentives as correlation of separate indexes of innovation activity of recipients and benefits from tax spending. Assessment is conducted on the effectiveness of tax incentives in accordance with the data on innovation activity and tax revenue from different sectors that are leaders in the innovation sphere. The following conclusions were made: tax mechanism of stimulating innovation activity are not very popular and effective; precision of calculation is significantly affected by the current issues with the information base: complete absence of information with respect to stimulus recipients; the results of analysis demonstrate that the rate of increase of decreasing budget revenue surpasses the rate of growth that characterizes innovation activity of the taxpayer that testifies to the insufficient effectiveness of the provided tax incentives, prompting suggestion of new means for stimulation of tax incentives. The author proposes to amend statistical tax report, highlighting the information on the entire range of existing tax incentives. Consideration and control over rationality of tax incentive mechanisms would allow optimizing the list of tax incentives for innovation activity, as well as expand the list of sectors that use such incentives.
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Zivin, Joshua Graff, and Elizabeth Lyons. "The Effects of Prize Structures on Innovative Performance." AEA Papers and Proceedings 111 (May 1, 2021): 577–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20211119.

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Successful innovation is essential for the survival and growth of organizations, but how best to incentivize innovation is poorly understood. We compare how two common incentive schemes affect innovative performance in a field experiment run in partnership with a large life sciences company. We find that a winner-takes-all compensation scheme generates significantly more novel innovation relative to a compensation scheme that offers the same total compensation but shares it across the ten best innovations. Moreover, the winner-takes-all scheme does not reduce innovative output on average and, among teams of innovators, generates more output than the less risky prize structure.
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Song, Bo, Penghao Jin, and Liangjie Zhao. "Incentive Mechanism of R&D Firms’ Collaborative Innovation Based on Organisational Ambidexterity." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2019 (January 8, 2019): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/6750123.

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From the perspective of organizational ambidexterity, we consider the choice of innovation strategy among R&D firms. By building on contractual arrangements and employing a dynamic game model, we focus on the incentive mechanism of R&D Firms’ collaborative innovation and analyze incentive contracts of benefits distribution and cost-sharing when two firms conduct market-driven innovation (exploitative innovation) strategy and technological research-driven innovation (exploratory innovation) strategy respectively, and collaborate for innovation with each other. We also discuss the influence of exploratory and exploitative innovation effects on decision-making of R&D firms regarding whether to choose collaborative innovation under different incentive contracts. The results show that the effects of exploratory innovation acts as the intrinsic motivation of collaborative innovation while exploratory innovation could be improved to some degree by exploitative innovation. In addition, both investment levels of exploratory and exploitative innovation would decrease (increase) when innovation cost (innovative efficiency) increases. Moreover, compared with a benefit-distribution contract, cost-sharing contracts would not only lead exploitative innovation to realize optimal revenue, but also provide incentives for exploratory innovation more effectively.
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Tang, Yongli, Xinyue Hu, Claudio Petti, and Matthias Thürer. "Institutional incentives and pressures in Chinese manufacturing firms’ innovation." Management Decision 58, no. 5 (June 17, 2019): 812–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/md-08-2018-0933.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate how Chinese firms’ innovation is related to their perceived incentives and pressures from the transitioning institutional environment. Design/methodology/approach A sample of 166 manufacturing firms located in Guangdong Province (China) is analyzed using binomial and moderated multiple regression models. Findings The results show that institutional incentives are more effective in promoting incremental innovations than radical ones, whereas institutional pressures are more pronounced in facilitating radical innovations than incremental ones. In addition, the interaction between the two divergent institutional forces is negatively related to innovation performance. Practical implications The findings inform managers and policy makers in institutional transition environments to consider and balance the effects of institutional forces. Firms should match the institutional incentives and pressures with their own innovation objectives in terms of incremental or radical goals, and take caution to deal with the divergent institutional directions, so as to avoid the negative interaction effects. Policy makers should take a systems approach when considering the incentive-based and/or command-and-control designs of innovation policies and regulations. Originality/value The study contributes to existing literature on institutions and innovation by disentangling incentive and pressure effects of institutions, regulation and innovation policies, as well as the combined and interaction effects intrinsic within institutional mixes.
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Tan, Teck Yong. "Knowledge as Property Rights Under the Ratchet Effect of Innovation." Journal of the European Economic Association 18, no. 5 (October 14, 2019): 2677–714. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvz056.

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Abstract This paper studies how reduced oversight creates an incentive for process innovation. With incomplete contracts, tight monitoring of workers creates a ratchet effect of innovation. Under reduced oversight, a worker accrues private knowledge about his innovation, which serves as a substitute for its inalienable property rights. The resulting asymmetric information generates an information rent for the worker, which feeds back as an innovation incentive ex ante. A weak early production incentive is required to complement it. Innovations are generally underutilized ex post, and mildly successful innovations are not distinguished from failed innovation attempts.
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Zhu, Yue, Ziyuan Sun, Ling Wang, Xiaoping Wang, and Lu Zhang. "Research on Innovation Catering Behavior and Its Economic Consequences—An Empirical Analysis Based on Threshold Regression Model." Sustainability 12, no. 19 (October 5, 2020): 8198. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12198198.

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The purpose of this research is to develop the subjective initiative and enhance the sense of independent innovation in the process of high-tech enterprises, so as to guarantee the sustainable development of innovation ability. Based on the relevant data of high-tech enterprises from 2012 to 2017, a threshold regression model was established to study the existence of innovative “incentive” catering behaviors in the process of identifying high-tech enterprises. First, the empirical test results support the hypothesis of innovative “incentives” catering behavior, identified by high-tech enterprises, with a threshold of 0.0370. The empirical results show that the one-size-fits-all objective identification standard will indeed encourage some companies to adopt catering behaviors. Next, the paper verifies that high-tech companies that do not adopt “incentive” catering behaviors will have higher innovation efficiencies. Moreover, the R&D investment and R&D subsidy of high-tech enterprises without catering behaviors will be higher. Finally, through a stepwise regression test, it was found that R&D investment and R&D subsidies play an intermediary role in the relationship between innovation “incentives” catering behavior and corporate innovation efficiency. High-tech enterprises affect the innovation efficiency of enterprises through the transmission mechanism of R&D investment and R&D subsidies.
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Unger, Darian. "Business Education Innovation: How Common Exams Can Improve University Teaching." American Journal of Business Education (AJBE) 3, no. 9 (September 1, 2010): 67–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/ajbe.v3i9.482.

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Although there is significant research on improving college-level teaching practices, most literature in the field assumes an incentive for improvement. The research presented in this paper addresses the issue of poor incentives for improving university-level teaching. Specifically, it proposes instructor-designed common examinations as an incentive for teaching improvement and uses empirical data from business school student tests to illustrate the utility of such assessments. Results were drawn from almost 250 college students who had different professors for the same course. Comparing the data from a common assessment revealed important differences about what students learn and created opportunities and incentives to improve teaching practices in a way few other methods can.
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Drake, Andrea R., Susan F. Haka, and Sue P. Ravenscroft. "Cost System and Incentive Structure Effects on Innovation, Efficiency and Profitability in Teams." Accounting Review 74, no. 3 (July 1, 1999): 323–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.1999.74.3.323.

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The small number of full-scale adoptions of activity-based costing (ABC) coupled with ABC implementation failures have fueled a debate about the costs and benefits of ABC relative to more traditional volume-based costing (VBC) systems. ABC differs from VBC by focusing attention on activities and resources that are under the control of multiple workers. Reducing these costs often requires a coordinated effort. Therefore, incentives that motivate workers to cooperate are a prerequisite to successful process improvements based on ABC. Alternatively, when competitive incentives are combined with ABC, the result can be unexpected and negative. We examine how accounting cost system and incentive structure choices interact. We find that profits are highest when ABC is linked with group-based incentives, which provide high motivation to cooperate. In contrast, the lowest level of profit occurs when the same information-rich cost system, ABC, is coupled with tournament-based incentives. VBC, a cost system that provides a lower level of cost driver information, moderates the incentive effect. Thus, our results demonstrate that the effectiveness of ABC relative to traditional VBC is influenced by its interactive effect with incentive compensation.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Incentive for innovation"

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Campbell, Georgina A. (Georgina Amy). "Incentive competitions as a policy tool for technological innovation." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/65500.

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Thesis (S.M. in Technology and Policy)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, Technology and Policy Program, 2011.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 76-78).
Large incentive competitions are becoming increasingly popular amongst policymakers and philanthropists as a mission-orientated tool for inducing innovation, particularly in areas of national priority where market incentives and conventional tools such as patents and procurements tend not to be sufficient. Using inducement mechanisms (motivators) such as a large financial reward, demanding deliverables, and technical support, incentive competitions seek to motivate innovators to exert effort and develop creative solutions to pre-defined problems. According to the literature, these motivators can be powerful mechanisms for influencing effort and creativity but their effectiveness very much depends on the combination of motivators used and conditions under which they are executed. There is a serious lack of empirical evidence on the motivators and conditions of large incentive competitions and their effectiveness to influence behaviour and outcomes. Therefore, we cannot fully appreciate the role of large incentive competitions in the innovation policy tool kit. A small body of empirical data exists on the impact of motivators within small online prizes but these prizes are very different to large incentive competitions in terms of the intended motivators incorporated and the competition environment. Through qualitative and quantitative analysis of one large incentive competition- the Progressive Automotive XPRIZE (PIAXP), this thesis aims to explore the motivators incorporated into PIAXP and their ability to orient people towards a specified mission and induce innovative behaviour. In turn, this thesis aims to 1) better understand the role incentive prizes as an innovation tool and 2) identify the motivators and prize design that can be used in incentive competitions to promote desired outcomes. My research identifies two unique features of PIAXP, which can provide insight into large incentive competitions in general. 1) PIAXP effectively attracted and focused a diverse set of solvers on a specific problem, who otherwise would not or could not pursue the prize objective(s). For example, 35% of teams did not exist before. Of those teams that did exist, 30% were informal and 17% were non-vehicle- related, all turning to formal vehicle teams for the PIAXP; 2) PIAXP facilitated the development of participating teams and ideas, and actively induced innovative behaviour during the competition. These findings emphasize the important of motivators and prize design to attract and support the development of solvers and solutions. In terms of competition design, participants and organizations were influenced in different ways. Influential motivators included: recognition (validation, publicity, and personal pride), performance accelerators (business and personal), and intrinsic passion for the cause. Other elements of design that influenced entry levels and behaviour included: structure (length/ barriers to entry), categories (broad, specific or multiple), collaborative events, and support (for the organization and individual). Success within PIAXP was positively correlated with compensation and competition but negatively correlated with recognition. Effort was positively correlated with reputation but negatively correlated with fun.
by Georgina A. Campbell.
S.M.in Technology and Policy
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Basheer, Shamnad. "The invention of an investment incentive for pharmaceutical innovation." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:b53d2ab0-dcdd-4adc-8728-cdf32e948df6.

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Pharmaceutical drugs are often hailed as the poster child for the proposition that patents foster accelerated rates of innovation. This sentiment stems, in large part, from the significantly high research and development (R&D) costs endemic to the pharmaceutical sector. I argue that if the role of the patent regime is one of fostering higher amounts of investment in the R&D process, it is better served by a direct investment protection regime, where the protection does not depend upon whether or not the underlying idea behind the drug is 'new' and 'inventive', the two central tenets of patent law. Rather, any drug that successfully makes it past the regulatory filter ought to be entitled to protection, since its discovery and development entail significant investment and risk. Owing to the inadequacy of the current patent regime in appropriately protecting intensive pharmaceutical R&D investments from free-riders, I propose a comprehensive investment protection regime that protects all the investment costs incurred during the drug discovery and development process. Though similar to existing data protection regimes in some respects, it differs in others. Firstly, it enables a recovery of all R&D costs, and not only costs associated with clinical trials. Secondly, unlike patents and data exclusivity which offer uniform periods of protection, it rewards investments in a proportionate manner, wherein drug originators are entitled to protection against free-riders only until such time as they recoup their specific investments and earn a rate of return on investment that is dependent on the health value of the drug. Given that a pure market exclusivity based investment protection regime is likely to foster excessive pricing and subject the market to the dictates of a single firm, I advocate a compensatory liability model based on a novel cost sharing methodology, where follow-on entrants are free to manufacture the drug, but must pay a reasonable amount of compensation to the originator.
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Colombo, Daniel Gama e. "Economic analysis of innovation tax incentives in Brazil: essays on the impacts of law 11,196/05 on industrial innovation." Universidade de São Paulo, 2017. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/12/12140/tde-01092017-171755/.

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The objective of this thesis is to empirically assess how the tax incentives of Law 11,196/05 have affected the landscape of private industrial innovation in Brazil. The main point is to verify to what extent this tax relief has contributed to the fostering of innovation in the country. To achieve this broad objective, three specific research questions were devised as axes of investigation, and they are addressed in each of the stand-alone papers that comprise this thesis. I begin by assessing whether the incentives have impacted the volume of innovation investment of beneficiary firms. This first analysis also considers the effect of the policy on innovation outputs and firms\' performance. The second research question considers the behavioral additionality, estimating changes caused by the incentives on the composition of the bundle of innovation investments and on the type of innovation pursued by firms. The third investigation assesses whether the reduction of the tax burden has attracted international innovation investment by diverting it from alternative destinations, thus testing the \'footloose R&D\' argument for the Brazilian case. The first two papers use microdata on Brazilian firms from the Industrial Innovation Survey (PINTEC) and other sources, and the impact is estimated through propensity score matching with difference-in-differences. The third study relies on aggregate country data, mainly on activities of foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals and international patent applications; and panel data estimators are applied to measure and test the correlation of the Brazilian policy with international innovation investment directed to other countries. The main findings of the thesis are: (a) the average impact of the policy on R&D expenditures in 2011 was around five hundred thousand Brazilian reais, or 6.8% of the mean R&D spending of beneficiary firms, which is less than the average benefit per firm in the same year, suggesting some level of crowding-out in the short-run; (b) incentives also positively affected the size of R&D personnel (average effect represents 16% of the average size of R&D staff); (c) the policy raised the chances of firms to innovate between 2009 and 2011 by 16%; (d) incentives positively impacted company\'s growth around 5% of the mean number of employees of incentivized enterprises in 2011; (e) R&D intensity of the bulk of innovative activities increased 9.5% because of the incentives; (f) part of the R&D increase was counterbalanced by a reduction effect on spending with acquisition of external knowledge and introduction of innovations in the market; (g) beneficiary firms hired more researchers with undergraduate degrees only as an effect of the policy (18.5% of the average number of their research personnel with such educational level); and (h) in the case of multinational groups, the increase in innovation investment does not seem to have been caused by the diversion of investment from other countries. The empirical investigations present clear evidence of the three dimensions of policy impact: input, output and behavioral additionality. A number of implications are drawn from the studies for the improvement of the policy design.
O objetivo desta tese é avaliar empiricamente os impactos dos incentivos fiscais da Lei 11.196/05 na inovação industrial brasileira. O ponto central é identificar em que medida essa redução tributária vem contribuindo para impulsionar a inovação no país. Para atingir esse objetivo, três perguntas de pesquisa foram concebidas como eixos de investigação, cada uma sendo abordada em um dos ensaios que compõem esta tese. A primeira questão é se os incentivos fiscais elevaram o volume de investimentos das empresas beneficiárias em inovação. Essa primeira análise também considera o efeito da política sobre os resultados desses investimentos e desempenho das firmas. A segunda parte pergunta de pesquisa considera os efeitos da política sobre o comportamento das empresas, estimando as mudanças ocasionadas na composição dos investimentos e no tipo de inovação perseguido pelas firmas. O terceiro ponto de estudo é se a redução da carga tributária atraiu investimentos internacionais em inovação em detrimento de outros países, testando o argumento de \'footloose R&D\' para o caso brasileiro. Nos dois primeiros trabalhos são utilizados microdados de empresas brasileiras constantes da Pesquisa de Inovação Industrial (PINTEC) e outras fontes, sendo aplicado o escore de propensão com diferenças-em-diferenças para estimar o impacto. O terceiro estudo baseia-se em dados agregados de países, essencialmente sobre atividades de filiais estrangeiras de multinacionais norte-americanas e pedidos internacionais de patentes, sendo aplicados estimadores de painel para mensurar e testar a correlação da política fiscal brasileira com o investimento internacional em inovação direcionado para outros países. As principais conclusões da tese são: (a) o impacto médio da política nos gastos em P&D em 2011 foi de aproximadamente quinhentos mil reais, ou 6,8% da média dos investimentos em P&D das firmas beneficiárias; esse valor é inferior ao benefício médio por firma no mesmo ano, o que sugere algum nível de crowding-out da política no curto prazo; (b) os incentivos também afetaram positivamente o tamanho das equipes de pesquisa (efeito médio representa 16% do tamanho médio das equipes de P&D); (c) a política elevou as chances das firmas inovarem no período de 2009 a 2011 em 16%; (d) os incentivos impactaram positivamente o crescimento das firmas em cerca de 5% da força de trabalho das firmas beneficiárias em 2011; (e) a intensidade de P&D no conjunto de atividades inovativas cresceu 9,5% devido à política; (f) parte do incremento em P&D foi contrabalanceada por um redução nos gastos com aquisição de conhecimento externo e introdução de inovações no mercado; (g) empresas beneficiárias elevaram a contratação de pesquisadores com diploma de graduação (18.5% do número médio de pesquisadores com esse nível educacional nas firmas beneficiárias em 2011); e (h) no caso de grupos multinacionais, o aumento nos investimentos em inovação não parece ter sido causado pela realocação de investimentos de outros países. As análises empíricas apresentam evidência das três dimensões de impacto da política fiscal: insumos, resultados e comportamental. Diversas lições são extraídas dos estudos para o aprimoramento do desenho da política.
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Mackeviciute, Agne, and Stanislav Iacubitchi. "The impact of Enterprise 2.0 tools on Innovation processes : The Case Study of Incentive at IBS." Thesis, Jönköping University, JIBS, Business Informatics, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-12609.

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The impact of Web 2.0 technologies has crossed the Internet borders and is increasingly af-fecting not only individuals but also organizations as entities. The emergence of the Enter-prise 2.0 concept, which presumes the application of Web 2.0 tools within the organiza-tional context, is being intensively adopted by many organizations of all types and sizes world-wide. Authors suggest that there is a direct impact of Enterprise 2.0 system on such organizational aspects as communication, collaboration, cooperation, co-creation and even innovation activities. There is though a sort of informational gap in the literature that would address these concepts (Enterprise 2.0 and Innovation) simultaneously and this was one of the main reasons that motivated the authors of this master thesis to investigate this topic.

In conducting this research all kinds of informational resources were used and these find-ings were combined with the results obtained from a real business case study, which is an example of an Enterprise 2.0 platform (Incentive) implemented within an organization (IBS). The overall research can be described in three main parts. In the first part analysis of the theoretical aspects related to Innovation and Enterprise 2.0 is made. A preliminary re-search framework is build based on these findings and this framework represents an at-tempt to bridge these theoretical dimensions. In the second part the investigation of the „Colin‟ case study was presented. With this case investigation the research gains access to primary data and information. This strengthens the initial research framework and also de-livers new insights and perspectives in connection to the highlighted topic. The findings re-lated to the impact of Enterprise 2.0 on Innovation processes are analyzed and discussed in the final part of the research from theoretical and empirical perspectives.

An enhanced framework, representing the result of the theoretical and empirical studies, is ultimately suggested. This model represents an attempt to portray how can an Enterprise 2.0 system support innovation activities in a more generic way, addressing together major factors that are critical for an innovation process. This investigation has also determined that such Enterprise 2.0 tools as Wikis, Blogs, Social Networking, Micro-blogging, Forums & Discussions, Search Engines, Tagging etc. are having the highest impact on innovation related activities. Additionally, the managerial aspect in relation to Enterprise 2.0 influence on Innovation has proved to be extremely important, especially during the implementation phase.

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Meirelles, Jorge Luís Faria. "Inovação tecnológica na indústria brasileira: investimento, financiamento e incentivo governamental." Universidade de São Paulo, 2008. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/18/18140/tde-30012009-085108/.

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O objetivo geral do presente trabalho foi identificar e caracterizar os aspectos financeiros do processo de implementação de inovações tecnológicas na indústria brasileira, no período 1998-2005. Em tal processo foram analisados o financiamento e os mecanismos financeiros de incentivo governamental para a realização de investimentos em atividades inovativas na indústria brasileira. Os dados utilizados foram obtidos em fontes secundárias, como Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia (MCT), Organização para Cooperação Econômica e Desenvolvimento (OCDE) e Oficina Estatística da União Européia (EUROSTAT). Especificamente sobre inovação tecnológica na indústria brasileira, foram utilizados os dados da Pesquisa Industrial sobre Inovação Tecnológica (PINTEC), do IBGE. Tais dados foram comparados com os resultados da quarta versão da Community Innovation Survey (CIS IV), da EUROSTAT. Há, na indústria brasileira, uma larga predominância das inovações que correspondem a aprimoramento de produtos e ou processos já existentes na empresa, ou de inovações para a própria empresa, mas já existentes no setor, no Brasil. O investimento nacional em P&D é relativamente baixo e a execução de P&D está associada mais ao governo. O setor empresarial executa cerca de 40% da P&D no Brasil. Na indústria brasileira, cerca de metade dos recursos investidos em atividades inovativas é destinada à aquisição de máquinas e equipamentos para inovar. Em segundo lugar aparecem os investimentos em atividades internas de P&D e em terceiro lugar as atividades de projeto industrial. Dentre as diferentes fontes de financiamento para inovação, o percentual de recursos próprios utilizados no financiamento das atividades inovativas é maior, principalmente no caso das atividades de P&D, em comparação com o financiamento dos investimentos em geral. Com relação aos recursos de terceiros, o percentual de utilização de recursos privados é maior no caso do financiamento das demais atividades inovativas, quando comparado com o percentual de recursos privados no financiamento da P&D, ainda que o percentual de recursos públicos seja maior que o de linhas de mercado, tanto no financiamento da P&D como das demais atividades inovativas. As possibilidades de utilização de linhas de financiamento de mercado para financiamento da P&D são reduzidas, por conta do risco elevado de tais atividades. A possibilidade de utilização de financiamento público para as atividades inovativas, principalmente a P&D, torna-se particularmente importante. As empresas maiores, com 500 ou mais pessoas ocupadas, têm melhor acesso aos recursos públicos, quando a base de comparação utilizada é o percentual de empresas que receberam financiamento público para realização de P&D e de aquisição de máquinas e equipamentos para inovar. O percentual de empresas inovadoras que utilizaram incentivos fiscais à P&D também apresentou grande disparidade entre as empresas maiores (com 500 ou mais pessoas ocupadas) e as menores. Essa disparidade é conseqüência das características dos benefícios previstos pela legislação.
The general purpose of the present study was the identification and characterization of the financial aspects of the process of implementation of technological innovation in the Brazilian industry, from 1998 to 2005. Funding and incentive mechanisms provided by the government to enhance investments in innovation in the Brazilian industry were assessed. The data used in this study were obtained from secondary sources, such as the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Statistical Office of the European Union (EUROSTAT). Concerning specifically technology innovation in the Brazilian industry, data from IBGEs Industrial Research on Technological Innovation (PINTEC) were used. Such data were compared to the results obtained in the fourth version of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS IV) by EUROSTAT. Innovation in the Brazilian industry is mostly based on the improvement of existing products and processes, or else on the introduction of processes that constitute an innovation in a given company, but already exist in the industry segment of the country. Brazilian investment levels in R&D are relatively low and most R&D activities are carried out by the government. Around 40% of R&D activities in Brazil are carried out by the entrepreneurial segment. Approximately half of the resources invested in innovation in the Brazilian industry are devoted to the purchase of machinery and implements to be used in innovation processes. Investments in in-house R&D activities come next and, finally, investments in industrial projects. Considering the various sources of financing innovation, the largest percentage corresponds to enterprises own funds, particularly in R&D activities, compared to the funding of investments in general. With regard to third-party funding, a greater percentage of private resources is used in other innovative activities compared to the percentage of private resources used in the funding of R&D activities, although the percent of public funding is greater than the private funding lines both for R&D and other innovative activities. There are few private funding lines for financing innovative activities, particularly R&D, due to the high risk of such activities. Therefore, the use of public funding in innovative activities, particularly R&D activities, becomes an important alternative. Larger companies, with 500 or more employees, have better access to public funding, when the comparative basis used is the percentage of companies that obtained public funding for performing R&D activities and the purchase of machinery and equipment for innovation purposes. The percentage of innovative companies that used fiscal incentives for R&D activities also showed a great disparity between larger companies (with 500 or more employees) and smaller companies. Such disparity results from the characteristics of the benefits stipulated by legislation.
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6

Kay, Luciano. "How do prizes induce innovation? learning from the Google Lunar X-prize." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/41193.

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Inducement prizes-where cash rewards are given to motivate the attainment of targets--have been long used to encourage scientific research, develop technological innovations, or stimulate individuals, groups, and communities to accomplish diverse goals. Lately, prizes have increasingly attracted the attention of policy-makers, among others, due to their potential to induce path-breaking innovations and accomplish related goals. Academic research, however, has barely investigated these prizes in spite of their long history, recent popularity, and notable potential. This research investigates prizes and the means by which they induce innovation. It uses an empirical, multiple case-study methodology, a new model of innovation applied to prizes, and multiple data sources to investigate three cases of recent aerospace technology prizes: a main case study, the Google Lunar X Prize (GLXP) for robotic Moon exploration; and two pilot cases, the Ansari X Prize (AXP) for the first private reusable manned spacecraft and the Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge (NGLLC) for flights of reusable rocket-powered vehicles. The investigation unveils the dynamics of prizes and contributes a better understanding of their potential and disadvantages in a context in which more traditional mechanisms are used to induce innovation. This research shows that prizes are a more complex mechanism and their investigation requires analyzing entrant- and context-level factors generally not considered by the literature. Prizes complement and not replace patents and other incentive mechanisms. The incentives offered by prizes attract entrants with diverse characteristics, including unconventional entrants--individuals and organizations generally not involved with the prize technologies. Entrants are generally attracted by the non-monetary benefits of participation and the potential market value of the technologies involved in competitions. Many more volunteers, collaborators, and partners also participate indirectly and support official entries as they also perceive opportunities to accomplish their personal and organizational goals. The monetary reward is important to position the competition in the media and disseminate the idea of the prize. Prizes can induce increasing R&D activities and re-direct industry projects to target diverse technological goals, yet the evolution of prize competitions and quality of the technological outputs is generally difficult to anticipate. The overall organization of prize R&D activities and their outputs depend on entrant-level factors and can only be indirectly influenced by setting specific competition rules. The most remarkable characteristic of prize R&D activities is their interaction with fundraising efforts which, in some circumstances, may constrain the activities of entrants. Prizes can also induce innovation over and above what would have occurred anyway, yet their overall effect depends significantly on the characteristics of the prize entrants and the evolution of the context of the competition. The ability of prizes to induce innovation is larger when there are larger prize incentives, more significant technology gaps implicit in the prize challenge, and open-ended challenge definitions. To successfully induce technological breakthroughs, prizes may require complementary incentives (e.g. commitments to purchase technology) or support (e.g. seed funding.) Prizes are particularly appropriate to, for example, explore new, experimental methods and technologies that imply high-risk R&D; induce technological development to break critical technological barriers; accelerate technological development to achieve higher performance standards; and, accelerate diffusion, adoption, and/or commercialization of technologies. They involve, however, higher programmatic risks than other more traditional mechanisms and their routine use, and/or challenge definitions that overlap, can weaken the incentive power of the mechanism. Successful implementation of competitions requires many parameters to be properly set.
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Tae, H. J. "Technological innovation in Korea : An empirical investigation into the effect of government innovation incentive policies, market pressure and competition, and firm's organisation structure." Thesis, Henley Business School, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.383775.

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Sioncke, Yoann. "Fiscalité et innovation." Thesis, Paris 1, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PA01D082.

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L'innovation est aujourd'hui l'une des variables essentielles de la croissance économique et de l'emploi. Toutefois, son financement est complexe. Ce qui justifie l'intervention des pouvoirs publics. Ainsi en France, la puissance publique dispose de deux outils principaux pour inciter les entreprises à augmenter leurs dépenses de R&D, les aides directes et apparentées et les incitations fiscales. Toutefois, c'est une mesure d'aide fiscale, le crédit d'impôt recherche (CIR), qui constitue le dispositif majeur de soutien à l'innovation en France. Puissant instrument d'encouragement à la R&D depuis 1983, il est devenu depuis sa dernière grande réforme, en 2008, le dispositif incitatif le plus prisé des entreprises et la deuxième dépense de l'État. Une sortie de l'anonymat suivie d'une entrée dans la polémique car en raison de son poids de plus en plus prégnant dans l'économie française, le CIR soulève plusieurs interrogations. La plus partagée concerne naturellement la réalité de son efficacité, opposant partisans et détracteurs de la mesure. Mais celle-ci appelle pourtant d'autres questions et d'autres observations. Car s'il semble partagé que ce crédit présente de nombreux avantages pour ses bénéficiaires, la sécurité fiscale de ceux-là apparaît néanmoins fragile. Puis, le choix même de la dépense fiscale comme mesure de soutien interpelle, tant s'agissant de son opportunité réelle dans l'ordre interne que de son articulation avec la réglementation européenne des aides d'État. Ce qui pourrait justifier une adaptation du mécanisme à partir des modalités d'un autre dispositif opérant dans un autre secteur et ne souffrant pas à ce jour des mêmes carences que le CIR
Today, innovation is one of the essential variables of the growth of the economy and employment. However, its financing is complex. This justifies the intervention of public authorities. In France, the public powers therefore have two main tools for encouraging companies to increase their R&D expenses, direct aids (and similar) and tax incentives. However, the main mechanism in support of innovation in France is a fiscal aid measure, namely the research tax credit. A powerful instrument for encouraging R&D since 1983, it has become, since its last major reform in 2008, the preferred incentive measure of companies and, at the same time, the State's second leading expenditure. A departure from anonymity followed by a step into controversy, since due to its increasing weight within the French economy, the research tax credit is prompting many questions. The most widely-shared question naturally relates to the reality of its efficiency, with supporters and detractors in equal measure. But this mechanism also elicits other questions and other observations. Since while it seems to be agreed that this credit offers many advantages for its beneficiaries, the fiscal security of the latter nevertheless appears to be fragile. Moreover, the very choice of a fiscal expenditure as a support measure is of concern, both with regard to its actual advisability within the internal order and in terms of its linkage with the European regulations relative to State aid. This could justify an adaptation of the mechanism on the basis of the provisions of another system used in another sector, but that does not currently have the same deficiencies as the research tax credit
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Schoettner, Anja. "Essays on incentive contracts under moral hazard and non-verifiable performance." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/15287.

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Diese Dissertation enthält vier Aufsätze zur Theorie der Anreizsetzung bei nicht-verifizierbaren Leistungsmaßen. Es werden positive Dominanzanalysen für Anreizmechanismen durchgeführt, die in realen wirtschaftlichen Situationen Anwendung finden. Der erste Aufsatz analysiert zwei Bonus-Wettbewerbe in Unternehmen. Der Prinzipal kann entweder einen Bonuspool festlegen, dessen Aufteilung von der Leistung der Agenten abhängt, oder bereits ex ante die Höhe der Boni fixieren. Eine höhere Präzision der Leistungsmessung führt nur im zweiten Fall zu stärkeren Anreizen. Die optimale Wahl des Wettbewerbs hängt von den Präferenzen der Agenten, ihren Liquiditätsbeschränkungen und den Kosten der Leistungsmessung ab. Der zweite Aufsatz untersucht die optimale Zuordnung von Aufgaben auf Stellen wenn relationale Verträge basierend auf subjektiven Leistungsmaßen explizite Anreizverträge ergänzen können. Die Spaltung von Aufgaben ist optimal, wenn die glaubhafte Bindung an relationale Verträge nicht möglich ist. Dagegen sollten Aufgaben immer dann gebündelt werden, wenn relationale Verträge bereits bestehen. Im dritten Aufsatz möchte ein Käufer eine Innovation erwerben. Um qualitätssteigernde Investitionen bei potentiellen Anbietern zu induzieren, kann der Käufer entweder einen fixen Preis ausschreiben oder einen Auktionsmechanismus nutzen. Obwohl Investitionen unter der Auktion immer höher sind, bevorzugt der Käufer einen fixen Preis wenn die Grenzkosten der Qualitätsmessung hoch sind oder die Produktionstechnologie starken Zufallseinflüssen unterliegt. Im letzten Aufsatz möchte ein Prinzipal das Produktionsergebnis zweier Agenten maximieren, die vor der Produktion in eine kostenreduzierende Innovation investieren können. Dabei kommt es zu Spillover-Effekten. Bei einer allgemeinen Preissubvention sind Investitionen stets zu gering, während ein Innovationswettbewerb zu Unter- und Überinvestitionen führen kann. Der Prinzipal bevorzugt eine Preissubvention bei starken Spillover-Effekten.
This thesis consists of four self-contained essays that compare real-world incentive schemes used to mitigate moral hazard problems under non-verifiable performance. The first essay contrasts the impact of the precision of performance measurement on wage costs in U- and J-type tournaments. In U-type tournaments prizes are fixed. In J-type tournaments only an overall wage sum is specified. The principal prefers a U-type tournament if workers receive a rent under limited liability and the costs of increasing precision are low. However, if workers are inequity-averse and have unlimited liability, the J-type tournament leads to lower wage costs. The second essay analyzes optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. Task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By contrast, if an agent who performs a given set of tasks receives an implicit bonus, the principal always benefits from assigning an additional task to this agent. The third essay compares an auction and a tournament in a procurement setting with non-contractible quality signals. Signals are affected by firms' non-observable investments in R&D and the procurer's precision of quality measurement. Although investments are always higher with the auction, the procurer may prefer the tournament if marginal costs of quality measurement are high or the production technology for quality is highly random. In the last essay, a principal wants to induce two agents to produce an output. Agents can undertake non-contractible investments to reduce production cost of the output. Part of this "innovation" spills over and also reduces production cost of the other agent. Agents always underinvest with a general output price subsidy, while they may or may not do so with an innovation tournament. Strong spillovers tend to favor a general output price subsidy.
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Alkrdi, Bashar, and Jonas Lindberg. "Ankarskenor i byggandet." Thesis, Malmö universitet, Fakulteten för teknik och samhälle (TS), 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-20944.

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Vårt examenarbete om ankarskenor i byggandet omfattar implementering av en ny teknik i byggandet i form av föringjutna ankarskenor för installationer av VS rör, ventilation, sprinkler och EL. I en allt mer globaliserad värld råder en allt högre konkurrensutsatt marknad, vilket gör att det också ställs högre krav på entreprenörerna inom byggsektorn. Att man inom produktionen ägnar sig åt aktiviteter som inte tillfört något värde till slutprodukten klassas som slöseri. Konsten att effektivisera sina arbetsmetoder för att därmed uppnå en mer effektiv produktion, samt minska rådande slöseri anses inte vara en enkel uppgift inom byggindustrin. Byggindustrin har uppfattningen om att branschen är unik i sitt slag då förutsättningarna ständigt förändras. En betydande del av detta slöseri är aktiviteter knutna till internhanteringen av material. Slöseriet kan visa sig i form av väntan, materialspill, skador och produktionsstörningar.Byggbranschen anmäler fler arbetsolyckor med sjukfrånvaro än genomsnittet för samtliga branscher. Byggbranschen har i jämförelse med många andra branscher även en betydligt mer fysiskt påfrestande arbetsmiljö. Det handlar då bland annat om tunga lyft, buller och vibrationer. Alla de intervjuade var eniga om att de besparingar som görs med ankarskenor i förhållande till traditionell montering är att momenten borrning och montering av skruvankare eller slagankare försvinner. Analysen visar att tiden för montering har reducerats för alla yrkesgrupper förutom EL. Det visar sig att sprinkler har mest att vinna på monteringen av ankarskena, då de får en reducering på 66% av tiden för montering. VS och ventilation får en minskning på 50% vardera för tidsåtgången vid montering. En våning på vårdbyggnad BY 35 i norra sjukhusområdet är 3480m2. De tidsmässiga besparingarna med ankarskenor är 45,41h per våning. Vilket ger en total tidsmässig besparing för installationerna med ankarskenorna på 0,013 h/m2. Arbetsmomenten för en montering och utmätning på ett Peri skydeck normalvalv på 2200m2 med skenor tar cirka 30 timmar att utföra. I tillägg kommer sedan en rengöring av skenorna där gummiskyddet ska plockas ut och betongrester tas bort maskinellt med en mejselhammare. Den processen tar armerarna cirka 50 timmar att utföra, vilket ger en tidsåtgång för utsättning och rengöring på 0,036h/m2. Utsättningen äter därför upp besparingarna som görs med ankarskenorna i förhållande till traditionell montering.Alla nya metoder har sina utmaningar när de implementeras på arbetsplatsen Även ankarskenorna har detaljer som behöver förbättras enligt brukarna. Arbetare som använder dem eller är involverade har följande förslag på hur ankarskenorna kan förbättras med hänsyn till tid och arbetsmiljö. På de stråken där det hänger mycket rör bör avstånden och placering ses över. Projektörerna måste vara uppmärksamma på vad där ligger. Skenorna skulle varit lika höga som distanserna för armeringen. Då skulle de kunna användas som distanser för att få ett bättre tryck när armeringen pressar ner skenan på armeringen. Skenorna spikas på plats vilket kan ses som en nackdel. Skenorna hade suttit bättre om de hade skruvats på plats. Momentet som inte har tittats på är när det väl är gjutet ska skumgummilisten som sitter i tas bort. Man bör finna ett smidigare sätt att göra det på. När den dras kommer mycket betongvatten. Ett tunt betongskikt på en millimeter som spjälkas loss när den dras bort leder till att det kommer mycket smuts på golvet eller armeraren som drar bort det. Man borde använda sig av heltäckande skyddsglasögonen av typen goggles, vilket skulle reducera risken för damm och partiklar i ögat vid borrning och rengöring av ankarskena.Noggrannheten och precisionen av hur ”korrekta” tiderna som uppgetts är kan ifrågasättas även om det är projektledare och ledande montörer med flera års erfarenhet som kalkylerat tiderna. Det bör tänkas att det vid upphandling oftast är entreprenörer som ger det lägsta priset som vinner. En sådan upphandling leder till att det är en låg vinstmarginal. Det finns således ett vinstintresse för projektledarna och ledande montörer när de kalkylerar tiderna för montering. Slutsatsen är att tiden för ankarskenorna blir längre än för den traditionella tiden för montering. Det är utsättning och rengöring som bidrar till att det blir en tidsförlust i förhållande till traditionell montering. De tidsmässiga vinsterna i form av mindre städning och hämtning av material kan inte mätas och jämföras per m2. De vinster som ankarskenorna bidrar med tidsmässigt är av mer teoretiskt slag om hur arbetsmomenten kan förändras vid montering. Arbetsmiljön för montörerna förändras och förbättras i form att risken för arbetsskador minimeras eller elimineras. För montörerna försvinner de tunga lyften de måste utföra under borrningen när ankarskenan inte kan användas. Buller, vibrationer, flygande partiklar och kvartsdamm elimineras helt med ankarskenan. För armerarna blir arbetsmiljön sämre då de måste rengöra ankarskenan efter gjutning, risker som rengöringen medför är att arbeta med tunga maskiner som ger buller och vibrationsskador.
Our thesis on anchor rails in construction comprises the implementation of a new technology in construction in terms of precast anchor rails for the installation of VS pipes, ventilation, sprinkler, and electrical equipment. The purpose of the study is to critically evaluate the differences between the traditional installations of VS pipes, ventilation, sprinklers, and electricity in relation to installations with precast anchor rails. Our methods include literature studies, semi-structured interviews, and observations. Our study is a field case study that comprises the implementation of anchor rails in the construction project for the two new care buildings in Malmö hospital area for Region Skåne. The result is based on interviews from fitters of the installations, senior installers and project managers.The analysis shows that sprinklers reduces its time by 66%, pipefitters and ventilation by 50% by eliminating the drilling when installing. The time saved with mounted anchor rails is 45,41hrs per floor which gives a time saving, for installations with anchor rails, of 0,036h/m2. The work activities to mount, measure and clean on a 2200m2 Peri skydeck normal vault with rails, take about 80 hours to carry out. The time spent on placement and cleaning is 0,036m2.The accuracy and precision as to how “correct” the times stated are can be questioned even if they have been calculated by project managers and senior installers with years of experience.The conclusion is that the amount of time required to mount anchor rails is greater than that for traditional mounting. It is placement and cleaning that contribute to a time loss in relation to traditional mounting. The installers’ working environment changes or improves as the risk for work related injuries is minimized or eliminated. Noise, vibrations, flying particles and quartz dust is eliminated when using the anchor rail. For concrete workers, the working environment becomes worse when they must clean the anchor rail after molding as the risks include working with heavy machinery that can cause noise and vibration damage.
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Books on the topic "Incentive for innovation"

1

Lerner, Joshua. Innovation and incentives: Evidence from corporate R&D. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.

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Office, European Patent. Patents in Europe: Spirit of innovation-incentive for the economy. Munich: EPO, 1998.

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Oklahoma. Dept. of Commerce. Rules and regulations for the Oklahoma Economic Innovation Network Public/Private Partnership and Job Development Incentive Program. [Oklahoma City]: The Department, 1990.

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Jie, Tae Hong. Technological innovation in Korea: An empirical investigation into the effect of government innovation incentive policies, market pressure and competition, and firm's organisation structure to the technological innovation behaviour in Korean firms. Uxbridge: Brunel University, 1988.

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Scotchmer, Suzanne. Innovation and incentives. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2006.

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Innovation and incentives. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005.

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Klemmer, Paul. Environmental innovation: Incentives and barriers. Berlin: Analytica, 1999.

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Hawaii. Legislature. Office of the Legislative Auditor. A review of the Incentive and Innovation Grant Review Panel of the Department of Education: A report to the Governor and the Legislature of the State of Hawaii. Honolulu (465 S. King St., Rm. 500, Honolulu 96813): The Auditor, 1994.

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Simmons, Patrick E., and Samuel T. Jordan. Economics of innovation, incentives and uncertainty. Hauppauge, N.Y: Nova Science Publishers, 2012.

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Garber, Alan M. Insurance and incentives for medical innovation. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.

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Book chapters on the topic "Incentive for innovation"

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Li, Jian. "Incentive and guarantee mechanisms for cultivating teachers’ academic innovation competence in China." In Innovation Competency Model, 131–39. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021. | Series: China perspectives: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003056935-13.

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Digilina, Olga B., and Daria V. Lebedeva. "Resource Provision for Innovation: State and Incentive Measures." In Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems, 1254–63. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69415-9_137.

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Hoppe-Fischer, Eva I. "Public-Private Partnerships versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering." In Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision, 45–77. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9_3.

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Baron, David P. "Information, Incentives, and Commitment in Regulatory Mechanisms: Regulatory Innovation in Telecommunications." In Price Caps and Incentive Regulation in Telecommunications, 47–75. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-3976-6_4.

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Liu, Rui, and Yan Xu. "Comparison of International Incentive Policy of Green Building." In Proceedings of the 5th International Asia Conference on Industrial Engineering and Management Innovation (IEMI2014), 319–23. Paris: Atlantis Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6239-100-0_58.

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Eschenbrenner, Brenda. "Information Technology Adoption: Do Performance Objectives and Incentive Structures Make a Difference?" In HCI in Business, Government, and Organizations: eCommerce and Innovation, 502–10. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39396-4_46.

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Duanxiang, Fu. "Study on Innovation in Compensation Management in Modern Enterprise with Incentive Orientation." In Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing, 85–91. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29637-6_12.

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Ren, Wenju, Tongjian Zhang, and Mingxing Li. "The Incentive Effect Analysis of Intellectual Property Strategy to Autonomous Technological Innovation." In Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing, 417–25. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25538-0_60.

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Zhuang, Lianghong, and Hao Ren. "The Incentive System of Human Capital Innovation in Science and Technology Enterprise." In Proceedings of the 2012 International Conference on Cybernetics and Informatics, 171–78. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-3872-4_22.

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Shaobo, Wu. "Study on the Optimal Incentive Contract of Cooperative Innovation in Knowledge Chain." In Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing, 485–90. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27866-2_59.

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Conference papers on the topic "Incentive for innovation"

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Li, Min-na, and Tie-nan Wang. "Executive equity incentive and technological innovation." In 2014 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE). IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2014.6930417.

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Kai, Li, Su Hui-qing, Liu Zhi-hui, and Chen Wei-hua. "Countervailing power and upstream product innovation incentive." In 2013 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2013.6586360.

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Hao, Xianfeng, Yun Sun, Wenyan Tian, and Zheyu Pan. "Analysis on Innovation Incentive Policy in China." In 2015 International Conference on Education, Management, Information and Medicine. Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/emim-15.2015.114.

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Cai, Hongfang. "Research on Green Innovation Incentive of Environmental Regulation." In 5th International Conference on Social Sciences and Economic Development (ICSSED 2020). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.200331.021.

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Guo, Yang, Kexin Zhang, and Xin Dai. "Study of Incentive Mechanism Innovation in Private Universities." In 7th International Conference on Education, Management, Information and Mechanical Engineering (EMIM 2017). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/emim-17.2017.222.

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Martynova, T. M. "TAX INCENTIVE INSTRUMENTS INNOVATION ACTIVITY IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION." In Modern Technologies in Science and Education MTSE-2020. Ryazan State Radio Engineering University, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.21667/978-5-6044782-5-7-46-51.

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Zhong, Heping. "Optimization of Incentive Contracts for Marketing Personnel's Technological Innovation." In 2010 2nd International Workshop on Intelligent Systems and Applications (ISA). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iwisa.2010.5473553.

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Zhu, Xin, and Shiwen Liao. "Employee Innovation in the Perspective of Differentiated Incentive Mechanism." In Proceedings of the 2019 5th International Conference on Social Science and Higher Education (ICSSHE 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icsshe-19.2019.135.

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Ulises Solis Lastra, Javier. "Tax Incentive to Promote Research Development and Innovation in Peru." In 2018 IEEE Sciences and Humanities International Research Conference (SHIRCON). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/shircon.2018.8593197.

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Liwei, Yang. "Research on the incentive mechanism of reverse logistics." In 2011 6th International Conference on Product Innovation Management (ICPIM). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icpim.2011.5983627.

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Reports on the topic "Incentive for innovation"

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Garber, Alan, Charles Jones, and Paul Romer. Insurance and Incentives for Medical Innovation. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12080.

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Lerner, Josh, and Julie Wulf. Innovation and Incentives: Evidence from Corporate R&D. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w11944.

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Li, Xuelin, Andrew Lo, and Richard Thakor. Paying off the Competition: Market Power and Innovation Incentives. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w28964.

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Coughlan, Peter J., and William Gates. Innovations in Defense Acquisition: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contract Design. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, December 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada529452.

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Moretti, Enrico, and Daniel J. Wilson. State Incentives for Innovation, Star Scientists, and Jobs: Evidence from Biotech. W.E. Upjohn Institute, July 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.17848/wp14-203.

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Moretti, Enrico, and Daniel Wilson. State Incentives for Innovation, Star Scientists and Jobs: Evidence from Biotech. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w19294.

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Bano, Masooda, and Zeena Oberoi. Embedding Innovation in State Systems: Lessons from Pratham in India. Research on Improving Systems of Education (RISE), December 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.35489/bsg-rise-wp_2020/058.

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Abstract:
The learning crisis in many developing countries has led to searches for innovative teaching models. Adoption of innovation, however, disrupts routine and breaks institutional inertia, requiring government employees to change their way of working. Introducing and embedding innovative methods for improving learning outcomes within state institutions is thus a major challenge. For NGO-led innovation to have largescale impact, we need to understand: (1) what factors facilitate its adoption by senior bureaucracy and political elites; and (2) how to incentivise district-level field staff and school principals and teachers, who have to change their ways of working, to implement the innovation? This paper presents an ethnographic study of Pratham, one of the most influential NGOs in the domain of education in India today, which has attracted growing attention for introducing an innovative teaching methodology— Teaching at the Right Level (TaRL) – with evidence of improved learning outcomes among primary-school students and adoption by a number of states in India. The case study suggests that while a combination of factors, including evidence of success, ease of method, the presence of a committed bureaucrat, and political opportunity are key to state adoption of an innovation, exposure to ground realities, hand holding and confidence building, informal interactions, provision of new teaching resources, and using existing lines of communication are core to ensuring the co-operation of those responsible for actual implementation. The Pratham case, however, also confirms existing concerns that even when NGO-led innovations are successfully implemented at a large scale, their replication across the state and their sustainability remain a challenge. Embedding good practice takes time; the political commitment leading to adoption of an innovation is often, however, tied to an immediate political opportunity being exploited by the political elites. Thus, when political opportunity rather than a genuine political will creates space for adoption of an innovation, state support for that innovation fades away before the new ways of working can replace the old habits. In contexts where states lack political will to improve learning outcomes, NGOs can only hope to make systematic change in state systems if, as in the case of Pratham, they operate as semi-social movements with large cadres of volunteers. The network of volunteers enables them to slow down and pick up again in response to changing political contexts, instead of quitting when state actors withdraw. Involving the community itself does not automatically lead to greater political accountability. Time-bound donor-funded NGO projects aiming to introduce innovation, however large in scale, simply cannot succeed in bringing about systematic change, because embedding change in state institutions lacking political will requires years of sustained engagement.
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Khan, B. Zorina. Prestige and Profit: The Royal Society of Arts and Incentives for Innovation, 1750-1850. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w23042.

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Dechezleprêtre, Antoine, Elias Einiö, Ralf Martin, Kieu-Trang Nguyen, and John Van Reenen. Do tax Incentives for Research Increase Firm Innovation? An RD Design for R&D. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w22405.

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McDermott, K. A., K. A. Bailey, and D. W. South. Examination of incentive mechanisms for innovative technologies applicable to utility and nonutility power generators. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), August 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/10180949.

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