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Journal articles on the topic 'Incentive for innovation'
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1
Liu, Baohua, Wan Huang, and Lei Wang. "Performance-based equity incentives, vesting restrictions, and corporate innovation." Nankai Business Review International 10, no. 1 (February 21, 2019): 138–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/nbri-10-2018-0061.
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Purpose Based on the institutional background of mandatory requirement of performance-based executive equity incentives, this paper aims to investigate the impacts of executive equity incentives, vesting periods and vesting performance conditions on corporate innovation. Design/methodology/approach The empirical analysis is based on the detailed data of equity incentives in China’s listed companies from 2006 to 2014, the Tobit method is implemented to estimate the regression coefficients, and the instrumental variable (IV) approach, Heckman two stage regression, propensity score matching and difference-in-difference models are adopted to solve the problem of endogeneity in several robust tests. Findings This paper documents that equity incentives and vesting periods are significantly and positively related to corporate innovation measured by R&D investment and patent applications, yet requirements on vesting performance impede corporate innovative activities. Specifically, compared with non-equity incentive companies, the R&D investment and the number of patent applications of equity incentive companies are 40 and 46.2 per cent higher, respectively. A one year increase in equity incentive duration can correspondingly increase the R&D investment by 15 per cent and the patent applications by 18.3 per cent. However, a one standard deviation increase in industry-adjusted ROE target reduces corporate R&D investment by 5 per cent and the patent applications by 8.39 per cent. The main empirical findings still hold after several robust tests. Research limitations/implications This paper confirms that the impact of performance-based compensation system on corporate innovation depends on its structure. Specifically, the empirical findings suggest that equity incentive plans being correctly designed can enhance corporate innovative activities, but myopic managers will damage the corporate innovation. Originality/value This paper investigates the influence of equity incentive structure on equity incentive effect based on the institutional background of mandatory requirement of performance-based executive equity incentives. It provides an opportunity to understand the mystery of equity incentives, which helps to enrich the structure of equity incentive theoretically. The empirical evidence confirms the importance of tolerating short-term failure and extending the horizon of managerial decision-making on promoting innovation. Overall, the research indicates that only well-designed equity incentive plans can promote innovation, which contributes to regulators and practitioners to form a rational understanding of the premise of equity incentives in promoting innovation and provides a reference for their decision-making.
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Schneckenberg, Dirk. "Strategic Incentive Systems For Open Innovation." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 30, no. 1 (December 30, 2013): 65. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v30i1.8283.
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<p class="AbsKeyBibli">Our paper presents a cross-sectional study of incentive systems for open innovation practices. Organisations face the challenge to design and implement strategic incentive systems which reward active contributions of individuals to open innovation practices. We refer to contributions from psychology and economics to develop a framework for organisational incentive systems. We have conducted semi-structured interviews with 10 experts in Germany and the Netherlands. The experts work in firms which are both international top players and open innovation pioneers in their respective industries. The results show that all organisations in the sample develop incentives for open innovation. The key strategic function of incentive systems is to open mind-sets of the workforce and to overcome mental barriers of the 'not invented here' syndrome. Immaterial and in particular task content incentives have been judged to have a more efficient long-term impact than material incentives. While experts have emphasised the importance of aligning incentives systems to open innovation strategies, in practice many incentive approaches still remain patchwork and lack a clear strategic focus.</p>
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Korostelkina, Irina Alekseevna, and Anastasiya Olegovna Androsova. "Effectiveness of tax incentives for innovative activity in the Russian Federation: assessment and calculation." Тренды и управление, no. 1 (January 2020): 38–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0730.2020.1.33232.
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The subject of this research is tax incentive that is a part of the process of innovative activity. Taxation is viewed as a tool for advancement of innovations. The experience of foreign countries demonstrates that government support in the form of funding, tax incentives, government subsidized loans, and creation of essential infrastructure play a big role in modernization processes. Expansion of the practice of implementation of tax incentives for stimulating innovations requires a theoretical comprehension of this process. This article examines the coefficient that characterizes economic effectiveness of tax incentives as correlation of separate indexes of innovation activity of recipients and benefits from tax spending. Assessment is conducted on the effectiveness of tax incentives in accordance with the data on innovation activity and tax revenue from different sectors that are leaders in the innovation sphere. The following conclusions were made: tax mechanism of stimulating innovation activity are not very popular and effective; precision of calculation is significantly affected by the current issues with the information base: complete absence of information with respect to stimulus recipients; the results of analysis demonstrate that the rate of increase of decreasing budget revenue surpasses the rate of growth that characterizes innovation activity of the taxpayer that testifies to the insufficient effectiveness of the provided tax incentives, prompting suggestion of new means for stimulation of tax incentives. The author proposes to amend statistical tax report, highlighting the information on the entire range of existing tax incentives. Consideration and control over rationality of tax incentive mechanisms would allow optimizing the list of tax incentives for innovation activity, as well as expand the list of sectors that use such incentives.
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Zivin, Joshua Graff, and Elizabeth Lyons. "The Effects of Prize Structures on Innovative Performance." AEA Papers and Proceedings 111 (May 1, 2021): 577–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20211119.
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Successful innovation is essential for the survival and growth of organizations, but how best to incentivize innovation is poorly understood. We compare how two common incentive schemes affect innovative performance in a field experiment run in partnership with a large life sciences company. We find that a winner-takes-all compensation scheme generates significantly more novel innovation relative to a compensation scheme that offers the same total compensation but shares it across the ten best innovations. Moreover, the winner-takes-all scheme does not reduce innovative output on average and, among teams of innovators, generates more output than the less risky prize structure.
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Song, Bo, Penghao Jin, and Liangjie Zhao. "Incentive Mechanism of R&D Firms’ Collaborative Innovation Based on Organisational Ambidexterity." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2019 (January 8, 2019): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/6750123.
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From the perspective of organizational ambidexterity, we consider the choice of innovation strategy among R&D firms. By building on contractual arrangements and employing a dynamic game model, we focus on the incentive mechanism of R&D Firms’ collaborative innovation and analyze incentive contracts of benefits distribution and cost-sharing when two firms conduct market-driven innovation (exploitative innovation) strategy and technological research-driven innovation (exploratory innovation) strategy respectively, and collaborate for innovation with each other. We also discuss the influence of exploratory and exploitative innovation effects on decision-making of R&D firms regarding whether to choose collaborative innovation under different incentive contracts. The results show that the effects of exploratory innovation acts as the intrinsic motivation of collaborative innovation while exploratory innovation could be improved to some degree by exploitative innovation. In addition, both investment levels of exploratory and exploitative innovation would decrease (increase) when innovation cost (innovative efficiency) increases. Moreover, compared with a benefit-distribution contract, cost-sharing contracts would not only lead exploitative innovation to realize optimal revenue, but also provide incentives for exploratory innovation more effectively.
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Tang, Yongli, Xinyue Hu, Claudio Petti, and Matthias Thürer. "Institutional incentives and pressures in Chinese manufacturing firms’ innovation." Management Decision 58, no. 5 (June 17, 2019): 812–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/md-08-2018-0933.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate how Chinese firms’ innovation is related to their perceived incentives and pressures from the transitioning institutional environment. Design/methodology/approach A sample of 166 manufacturing firms located in Guangdong Province (China) is analyzed using binomial and moderated multiple regression models. Findings The results show that institutional incentives are more effective in promoting incremental innovations than radical ones, whereas institutional pressures are more pronounced in facilitating radical innovations than incremental ones. In addition, the interaction between the two divergent institutional forces is negatively related to innovation performance. Practical implications The findings inform managers and policy makers in institutional transition environments to consider and balance the effects of institutional forces. Firms should match the institutional incentives and pressures with their own innovation objectives in terms of incremental or radical goals, and take caution to deal with the divergent institutional directions, so as to avoid the negative interaction effects. Policy makers should take a systems approach when considering the incentive-based and/or command-and-control designs of innovation policies and regulations. Originality/value The study contributes to existing literature on institutions and innovation by disentangling incentive and pressure effects of institutions, regulation and innovation policies, as well as the combined and interaction effects intrinsic within institutional mixes.
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Tan, Teck Yong. "Knowledge as Property Rights Under the Ratchet Effect of Innovation." Journal of the European Economic Association 18, no. 5 (October 14, 2019): 2677–714. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvz056.
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Abstract This paper studies how reduced oversight creates an incentive for process innovation. With incomplete contracts, tight monitoring of workers creates a ratchet effect of innovation. Under reduced oversight, a worker accrues private knowledge about his innovation, which serves as a substitute for its inalienable property rights. The resulting asymmetric information generates an information rent for the worker, which feeds back as an innovation incentive ex ante. A weak early production incentive is required to complement it. Innovations are generally underutilized ex post, and mildly successful innovations are not distinguished from failed innovation attempts.
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Zhu, Yue, Ziyuan Sun, Ling Wang, Xiaoping Wang, and Lu Zhang. "Research on Innovation Catering Behavior and Its Economic Consequences—An Empirical Analysis Based on Threshold Regression Model." Sustainability 12, no. 19 (October 5, 2020): 8198. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12198198.
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The purpose of this research is to develop the subjective initiative and enhance the sense of independent innovation in the process of high-tech enterprises, so as to guarantee the sustainable development of innovation ability. Based on the relevant data of high-tech enterprises from 2012 to 2017, a threshold regression model was established to study the existence of innovative “incentive” catering behaviors in the process of identifying high-tech enterprises. First, the empirical test results support the hypothesis of innovative “incentives” catering behavior, identified by high-tech enterprises, with a threshold of 0.0370. The empirical results show that the one-size-fits-all objective identification standard will indeed encourage some companies to adopt catering behaviors. Next, the paper verifies that high-tech companies that do not adopt “incentive” catering behaviors will have higher innovation efficiencies. Moreover, the R&D investment and R&D subsidy of high-tech enterprises without catering behaviors will be higher. Finally, through a stepwise regression test, it was found that R&D investment and R&D subsidies play an intermediary role in the relationship between innovation “incentives” catering behavior and corporate innovation efficiency. High-tech enterprises affect the innovation efficiency of enterprises through the transmission mechanism of R&D investment and R&D subsidies.
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Unger, Darian. "Business Education Innovation: How Common Exams Can Improve University Teaching." American Journal of Business Education (AJBE) 3, no. 9 (September 1, 2010): 67–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/ajbe.v3i9.482.
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Although there is significant research on improving college-level teaching practices, most literature in the field assumes an incentive for improvement. The research presented in this paper addresses the issue of poor incentives for improving university-level teaching. Specifically, it proposes instructor-designed common examinations as an incentive for teaching improvement and uses empirical data from business school student tests to illustrate the utility of such assessments. Results were drawn from almost 250 college students who had different professors for the same course. Comparing the data from a common assessment revealed important differences about what students learn and created opportunities and incentives to improve teaching practices in a way few other methods can.
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Drake, Andrea R., Susan F. Haka, and Sue P. Ravenscroft. "Cost System and Incentive Structure Effects on Innovation, Efficiency and Profitability in Teams." Accounting Review 74, no. 3 (July 1, 1999): 323–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.1999.74.3.323.
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The small number of full-scale adoptions of activity-based costing (ABC) coupled with ABC implementation failures have fueled a debate about the costs and benefits of ABC relative to more traditional volume-based costing (VBC) systems. ABC differs from VBC by focusing attention on activities and resources that are under the control of multiple workers. Reducing these costs often requires a coordinated effort. Therefore, incentives that motivate workers to cooperate are a prerequisite to successful process improvements based on ABC. Alternatively, when competitive incentives are combined with ABC, the result can be unexpected and negative. We examine how accounting cost system and incentive structure choices interact. We find that profits are highest when ABC is linked with group-based incentives, which provide high motivation to cooperate. In contrast, the lowest level of profit occurs when the same information-rich cost system, ABC, is coupled with tournament-based incentives. VBC, a cost system that provides a lower level of cost driver information, moderates the incentive effect. Thus, our results demonstrate that the effectiveness of ABC relative to traditional VBC is influenced by its interactive effect with incentive compensation.
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Joachim Breunig, Karl, Tor Helge Aas, and Katja Maria Hydle. "Incentives and performance measures for open innovation practices." Measuring Business Excellence 18, no. 1 (March 11, 2014): 45–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mbe-10-2013-0049.
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Purpose – To guarantee alignment between ongoing activities and organizational goals, innovation management theory emphasizes management control and explicit innovation strategies as prerequisites for innovation performance. However, the theory on open services innovation emphasizes individual autonomy and incentives to foster open innovations. The aim of this paper is to explore this inconsistency. Design/methodology/approach – An explorative research design involving 25 semi-structured interviews in five large scale-intensive service firms is explored. Scale-intensive service firms are strategically sampled for this study since these firms experience tension between open service innovation characteristics and efforts to standardize. Findings – The authors show how individual autonomy facilitates the internal and external networking required in open innovations. However, individualized incentives do not suffice to motivate, mobilize and direct the collaboration and collective effort needed to ensure successful implementation of open innovation processes. Innovation performance is a collective effort, and the findings suggest that firms' business strategy works as a collective incentive system. Practical implications – The findings imply that firms should not rely on individualized incentives alone to implement open innovation processes successfully. The implementation of more collectively oriented incentives is also necessary to motivate the collective effort required to succeed with open innovation. Originality/value – The study extends previous work and shows how innovation practices are collective efforts that also involve the mobilization of external resources. The incentives observed have an effect on individual behaviour, while performance measures, to a larger degree, cater to the collective level. The authors present three propositions for further empirical investigation.
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Zhang, Xueyu, and Wenyong Li. "Research on the incentive of Government subsidy in the Innovation ecosystem of Guangzhou New Energy Automobile Industry." E3S Web of Conferences 235 (2021): 01001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202123501001.
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Led by made in China 2025 and the 13th five-year Plan of Guangdong Province, the development of strategic emerging industries in Guangdong Province needs to build an innovation ecosystem. In the development of industrial innovation, the management and development of enterprises are affected by policy environment, technological innovation, talent incentive and so on. The profit transformation ability, research and task development ability of core enterprises still need to be improved. On this basis, this paper takes Guangzhou as an example to investigate the current situation of incentive implementation of innovative industry and the role of industrial technological innovation from the starting point of government subsidy policy.Through the analysis of the different roles in each stage of the innovation process to achieve complementary advantages, the transformation of enterprise management mechanism, highlight the incentive mechanism of the innovation ecosystem, and achieve the healthy development of the industrial innovation ecosystem.
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Drake, Andrea, Susan F. Haka, and Sue P. Ravenscroft. "An ABC Simulation Focusing on Incentives and Innovation." Issues in Accounting Education 16, no. 3 (August 1, 2001): 443–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/iace.2001.16.3.443.
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Current textbooks advocate activity-based costing (ABC) because it provides more detailed information on resource usage, leading to better cost control and reengineering of production processes. However, there is often little attention paid to how other organizational control features can affect the use of the information provided by ABC systems. This active learning simulation demonstrates that incentives can have a significant impact on how workers use ABC information to manage costs and innovate a production process. The simulation involves two student teams that are furnished with identical ABC cost driver information and either a tournament- or group-based incentive structure. The teams simulate a factory environment by creating products using a simple manufacturing process, while the remaining students observe the process and record differences in communication, innovative activity, and resulting profitability. The teams' outcomes under the two separate incentives illustrate the interaction of a firm's cost system with its incentive system. Typically, we find that more communication occurs among team members, more team-based innovations are created, and profit is higher under group incentives. We conclude that the use of ABC, without consideration of employee incentives, may not result in the desired cost control and process reengineering benefits. In this simulation, students are directly involved in providing the data, so they find the inferences drawn to be compelling.
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Sanches, Eder Angelo, Sanderson César Macêdo Barbalho, and Adriana Regina Martin. "An Exploratory Analysis of Possible Effects of “Nudge” On Public Policies to Support Innovation in Brazil: The Case of Inovar-Auto Program." International Journal of Innovation and Technology Management 18, no. 04 (June 2021): 2150015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219877021500152.
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This study presents a proposal to improve public policies for supporting innovation in Brazil’s automotive industry by using a conceptual model with incremental benefits based on nudge concepts. This new model aims to reduce the complexity of the current fiscal mechanism. It makes the tax incentive mechanism more dynamic and stimulates innovative companies to improve their innovative performance. For this, a qualitative comparative analysis of the effects (empirical and simulated) of a public innovation policy — an automotive policy called Inovar-Auto — compares a consolidated traditional tax incentive mechanism with the new model. It is concluded that the incremental scale of benefits stimulates the companies-government interaction more safely and effectively, reducing the complexity of the current tax incentive mechanism and offering new paths and choice possibilities. This study contributes to the literature by presenting an innovative tax incentive mechanism, a “nudge” for changing companies’ behavior, which can be applied in other countries.
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Wolfe, Christopher, and Tina Loraas. "Knowledge Sharing: The Effects of Incentives, Environment, and Person." Journal of Information Systems 22, no. 2 (September 1, 2008): 53–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jis.2008.22.2.53.
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ABSTRACT: We study factors that promote knowledge sharing in a professional service firm. We performed two laboratory experiments with MBA students acting as participants. Our results indicate that an incentive must be considered sufficient to promote full knowledge sharing regardless of the incentive's type (monetary or nonmonetary). However, we find that the nonmonetary incentives used in our experiment were not deemed sufficient when participants self-determined incentive sufficiency. Additionally, when the peer environment promoted knowledge hoarding, knowledge sharing dropped the most when incentives were initially deemed sufficient. Finally, we find that competitive individuals are active sharers of valuable, proprietary knowledge only when heir competitiveness is team-oriented. To promote knowledge sharing, our results suggest careful monitoring of perceived incentive sufficiency, especially in the case of nonmonetary incentives, and a culture that directs employee competitiveness between teams.
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Inderst, Roman, and Manuel Klein. "Innovation, endogenous overinvestment, and incentive pay." RAND Journal of Economics 38, no. 4 (December 2007): 881–904. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00117.x.
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JIN, JUN, YING DONG, and JIN CHEN. "INCENTIVE POLICIES TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE IN CHINA." International Journal of Innovation and Technology Management 09, no. 04 (August 2012): 1250031. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219877012500319.
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China has launched a set of policies and projects to address climate change, one of the most serious problems in the world. This paper reviews the Chinese policies and national plans on the encouragement of environmentally beneficial and energy-saving innovations. Policies on the energy industry and the development of new energy vehicle industry are taken as cases to illustrate in detail the Chinese policies on climate change. The research reveals that actions on the low carbon innovation, such as the innovation on new energy vehicles, not only benefit the dealing with climate change, but also contribute to the strategies of catching up advanced countries.
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Борисова and N. Borisova. "Motivational Strategy for Personnel Management in the System of Innovation-Oriented Human Resource Management." Management of the Personnel and Intellectual Resources in Russia 3, no. 6 (December 15, 2014): 58–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/7293.
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The paper analyzes motivational personnel management strategy within the conditions of transiting to the innovative economy and evidences the objective
need and nature of the new approach to management. The subject of inquiry is the system of innovation-oriented human resource management (HRM) system,
created with the aim to facilitate sustainable growth of human resources potential. The author’s model of how such a system functions reveals the essence of
managerial activity in the aspect of utilizing and developing personnel innovative potential for the purpose of enhancing competitive stance of the organization.
As the conceptual apparatus of the issue in hand is rather debatable the author fi nds it reasonable to specify meaning of such concepts as «personnel», «human
resources», «innovative potential» and «innovativeness of the personnel». Assuming that in the realities of innovative economy organizational staff ’s innovative
potential is an essential quality, refl ecting the degree of personnel’s innovativeness in terms of capabilities to generate new knowledge, and further to transform
these knowledge in practical innovations, thus contributing to business worth and competitiveness of the employing company. Motivational strategy of
personnel management is considered because it serves as the key element of the innovations-oriented HRM, which is of particular importance for achieving
organization’s strategy goals. To successfully implement motivation strategy of personnel management there should be in place some powerful incentive
system, conducive to systematical growth of workers’ innovation potential based on up-to-date motivational techniques, tools and methods. The paper focuses
mainly on corporate business-training and gives priority to extended forms of training and couching, which, as the author shows, are capable of forging strong
incentives for professional and intellectual development of personnel and enhancing the workers’ competitiveness in terms of innovations. The author presents
fi ndings of her own research, which are helpful in identifying top trends in modern HRM development and ways to improve incentives to motivate personnel
under conditions of building the innovative economy in Russia.
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Long, Yue-e., and Xinyi Huang. "Do equity incentives for the managements have impact on stock-pricing efficiency? Evidence from China." International Journal of Accounting & Information Management 28, no. 4 (June 1, 2020): 703–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijaim-03-2020-0031.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impacts of equity incentive on stock pricing efficiency, as well as the institutional investors’ response to equity incentive and its role in stock pricing efficiency. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of 1,842 companies that announce implementing equity incentive schemes during the period 2009-2018, the authors compare the pricing efficiency between the firms with equity incentive and those without equity incentive, and companies that implement equity incentive before and after the implementation of equity incentive by using multiple regression and propensity score matching -DID (difference in difference) method. In addition, the multiple regression model is built to test the response of institutional investors to equity incentive and its role in the efficiency of stock pricing. Findings The empirical results indicate that a company’s stock price is influenced more by firm-specific information than systematic factors after it announces a stock-based compensation scheme. Institutional investors respond positively to companies that implement equity incentives. Among the companies that have implement equity incentive, the higher the shareholding ratio of institutional investors, the higher the efficiency of stock pricing. Originality/value The authors innovatively establish a connection between the implementation of equity incentive and the operation of stock market. The results imply that besides alleviating the agency problem, equity incentives can also improve the efficiency of stock pricing, which provide empirical evidence to support the positive effect of equity incentive.
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Hamada, Kojun. "Incentive for innovation and the optimal allocation of patents." Australian Journal of Management 42, no. 4 (April 4, 2017): 692–707. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0312896216686152.
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This article theoretically investigates how different ownership structures of patents affect ex ante and ex post incentives for innovation by applying a property rights approach. We explore a model in which two research laboratories invest in R&D to obtain an innovative patent, and after successfully obtaining the patent they determine an ownership structure for the patent. The two parties consider how the determined patent ownership would affect their noncontractible relation-specific investments for commercialisation. We demonstrate that joint ownership of a patent between two parties is optimal. More concretely, if a selfish (altruistic) relation-specific investment is more important than an altruistic (selfish) investment, a joint ownership with no (bilateral) veto is optimal to maximise the joint value. Moreover, when both parties do not commit themselves to joint ownership in advance, they have greater incentive to invest in R&D than committing, even if they understand that joint ownership is desirable ex post.
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Wang, Shuang, Shukuan Zhao, Dong Shao, and Hongyu Liu. "Impact of Government Subsidies on Manufacturing Innovation in China: The Moderating Role of Political Connections and Investor Attention." Sustainability 12, no. 18 (September 18, 2020): 7740. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12187740.
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Although government subsidies have gradually become a crucial means of endorsing public innovation policies, there remains no unified conclusion on the mechanism of their role in enterprise sustainable innovation investment. Employing sample data of listed Chinese manufacturing companies between 2011 and 2019, this study aims to discuss the incentive effect of government subsidies on enterprise innovation investment based on different enterprise ownership. With the combination of resource dependency theory and stakeholder theory, the findings suggest that the intensity of government subsidies exerts an incentive effect on corporate innovation investment; however, the incentive effect is different under the influence of political connections and investor attention. In particular, political connections inhibit the incentive effect and investor attention promotes the incentive effect. Overall, this study provides empirical evidence for the rational allocation of resources by the Chinese government and the acquisition of innovation investment by enterprises of different ownerships and the development of innovation capabilities.
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Njau, Luka S., Christopher P. Mahonge, and Fatihiya A. Massawe. "Resources Capability of Government Co-operatives Supporting Organizations for Innovations Dissemination to Primary Co-operative Societies in Tanzania." Journal of Innovation Management 7, no. 4 (October 23, 2019): 77–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.24840/2183-0606_007.004_0005.
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This study assessed resources capability of government co-operative supporting organizations (GCSOs) in innovations dissemination to primary co-operative societies (PCSos) in Tanzania. Case study research design using multiple cases was used involving five cases. Primary data were collected using key informant interviews, focus groups discussions, documentary reviews and personal observations. Data were analyzed using content analysis. Findings indicate that, most GCSOs in Tanzania were poor in terms of resources to disseminate innovations to PCSos. Most GCSOs were also not determined at prioritizing and utilizing available resources for dissemination of innovations to PCSos. Further, some external factors e.g. inadequate government resources commitment, employment freezing and others have been adversely affecting GCSOs resources capability to disseminate innovations to PCSos. Moreover, there were no formal and comprehensive incentive systems to reward innovation dissemination activities in most of the GCSOs. It is recommended that GCSOs should mobilize more internal resources and ensure sufficient innovation resources prioritization and utilization to adequately facilitate innovations dissemination to PCSos. The GCSOs should also establish clear incentive systems to reward innovation dissemination activities.
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Tao, Linzhi. "Research on the Application of Educational Incentive Mechanism in Class Management in Primary Schools." Modern Management Forum 5, no. 1 (April 10, 2021): 61. http://dx.doi.org/10.18686/mmf.v5i1.3291.
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Improving the level of primary school class management can effectively adapt to the development of modern basic education in China; as an efficient means of class management, educational incentives are effective for students’ academic progress, teacher professionalism, class management efficiency, friendly teacher-student relationship, and school innovation and development. There’s important meaning. Through the analysis of the current situation of the application of educational incentive mechanism in elementary school class management, in view of the problems of teachers who have not fully mastered the incentive mechanism, the incentive strategy does not meet the needs of students and the single incentive model, etc. It is proposed that re-education improves teachers’ comprehensive ability in class management, teaching students in accordance with their aptitude to strengthen communication between teachers and students, changing the way of thinking to promote the diversification of incentive methods.
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Xu, Chenggang. "The pitfalls of a centralized bureaucracy." Acta Oeconomica 69, no. 1 (March 2019): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/032.2019.69.1.1.
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The incentive problem is a vital issue in all transition economies and China is not an exception. This paper summarises how China partially solved this problem at early stages of post-Mao reforms and why the Chinese solution is only transitory, which explains severe problems that China is facing now. The paper also discusses the incentive mechanisms in the judicial system and the effect of the soft budget constraint (SBC) syndrome on incentives, including the relationship between institutions and innovation.
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Huang Bo, Meng WeiDong, and Li Yuyu. "Optimal Bilateral Incentive Contract for Cooperative Innovation." Journal of Convergence Information Technology 8, no. 8 (April 30, 2013): 275–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.4156/jcit.vol8.issue8.34.
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Clancy, Matthew S., and GianCarlo Moschini. "Mandates and the Incentive for Environmental Innovation." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 100, no. 1 (October 9, 2017): 198–219. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aax051.
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Nolan, John M., Emad U. Samad, Lawrence F. Jindra, and Stephen G. Brozak. "Seeking Innovation: Incentive Funding for Biodefense Biotechs." Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 8, no. 4 (December 2010): 365–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1089/bsp.2010.0044.
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Burton, Daniel F., and Kathleen M. Hansen. "German Technology Policy: Incentive for Industrial Innovation." Challenge 36, no. 1 (January 1993): 37–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05775132.1993.11471640.
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Nikityuk, Lyubov. "Innovation incentive mechanism in the construction industry." IOP Conference Series: Materials Science and Engineering 667 (November 28, 2019): 012067. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1757-899x/667/1/012067.
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Jiang, Jie, Yan Li, Lidan Li, Changchun Zhou, Yuxiang Huo, and Qian Li. "An Innovation Design Approach for Product Service Systems Based on TRIZ and Function Incentive." Complexity 2021 (March 19, 2021): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5592272.
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Good balance between product and service is the key in the innovative design of product service systems (PSS). In this study, the evolution route of the PSS based on Teoriya Resheniya Izobretatelskikh Zadatch ideal final result was provided. The function model of the PSS was constructed according to the service blueprint and function system diagrams. On this basis, an innovation design method of the PSS based on function incentive was established. The function incentive strategies included function synergy, function supplement, and function substitution. Finally, the PSS design process of agricultural machinery based on computer-aided innovation platform was analyzed to verify this method.
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Liu, Ming Yue, and Xiang Qian Zhang. "Environment Protection with Analysis of Relations between Independent Innovation and Development of the Green Economy." Advanced Materials Research 886 (January 2014): 240–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.886.240.
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Independent innovation and the green economy is the two power of environment protection.In this article ,by analyzing meaning of independent innovation and green economy from environmental perspective, thus demonstrating dialectical interaction between them, then preparing context diagram about their relationship. Then discussing the existing problems of the independent innovation and the green economy development, such as: insufficient incentives for the development of green economy in independent innovation, insufficient supply capacity of independent innovation in green economy, promoting greening independent innovation slowly in traditional industries. Finally putting forward suggestions from the perspective of environment protection, such as: using national independent innovation as the keynote to overall green economic development, using industrial independent innovation as the bridge to construct green economic development, green incentive System of industrial independent innovation.
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Yang, Junda, Yun Xia, Liu Yang, and Zhongtao Zhang. "An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Fiscal and Tax Incentives on Enterprise Technological Innovation - Taking Listed Companies on GEM as Examples." International Business Research 11, no. 12 (November 21, 2018): 42. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ibr.v11n12p42.
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Enterprise technological innovation is the backbone of the transformation of economic development mode in China, the optimization of economic structure, and the realization of national innovative development strategy. In order to promote the transformation and upgrading of the economic structure and encourage the the development of technological innovation of enterprises, a series of fiscal and tax policies which encourage technological innovation are introduced in China. Although the fiscal and tax incentives are generally adopted by the governments of the world, the research conclusions of the academia on the implementation effect of fiscal and tax policies are not unified. For this reason, in this paper, based on the data of listed companies on the Growth Enterprise Market from 2011 to 2017, the STATA 14.0-version software is used to analyze the sample data, and the relationship between the current fiscal policies and technological innovation is explored. The study results show that the fiscal and tax incentives positively affect the technological innovation of enterprises, which provides an important theoretical basis for the government to further improve fiscal and tax policies. Finally, based on the previous research contents, the corresponding conclusions are summarized, and relevant suggestions for improving the fiscal and tax incentive policies are proposed.
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Mao, Connie X., and Chi Zhang. "Managerial Risk-Taking Incentive and Firm Innovation: Evidence from FAS 123R." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 53, no. 2 (March 20, 2018): 867–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002210901700120x.
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We investigate how chief executive officers’ (CEOs) risk incentive (VEGA) affects firm innovation. To establish causality, we exploit compensation changes instigated by the FAS 123R accounting regulation in 2005 that mandated stock option expensing at fair values. Our identification tests indicate a positive and causal effect of CEOs’ VEGA on innovation activities. Furthermore, dampened managerial risk-taking incentive after the implementation of FAS 123R leads to a significant reduction in innovation related to firms’ core business and explorative inventions. It implies that managers diversify their innovation portfolios and decrease explorative inventions to curtail business risk when their risk-taking incentive is reduced.
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Špaček, Kluvánková, Gežík, Baštáková, Štecová, and Louda. "Role Board Games as a Tool for Reconfiguration of Innovation Factors in Forest Ecosystem Services Governance." Proceedings 30, no. 1 (November 8, 2019): 13. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/proceedings2019030013.
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Forest ecosystem services (FES) are considered as public or common goods facing diverging individual and societal interests affecting the quality of ecosystems and well-being of the communities. This may result in overuse, degradation or unsustainable behaviour, as well as it can create also barriers for cooperation, economic profit and innovative business initiatives. The paper introduces the methodological approach which is applied within six different innovation regions (conceptualised as social-ecological systems) within the InnoForESt H2020 project. Each region uses innovative approaches in governance of FES and payments schemes. They are situated in Austria, the Czechia and Slovakia, Finland, Germany, Italy and Finland. All are characterised by manifold, sometimes diverging, FES, such as timber, recreation, regulation services or education. In order to get a better understanding of the role and the impact of key innovation factors for the regions, we have designed a behavioural [lab] experiment in the form of a Role board game (RBG). The proposed experimental game builds on Cardenas et al. (2013) and Castillo et al. (2011) as an interactive agent-based model arranging for repeated interaction and learning in real-world situations. It contributes to testing the effectiveness of incentives provision for the sustainable production of FES and the acceptance of such an intervention by FES communities (Kluvankova et al., in press). The game enables the adaptation to the specifics of each innovation region but at the same time it keeps the same internal experimental mechanism which will enable the comparison across the regions. The main question to be addressed by the RBG is: How to create conditions to enable innovations in forest management/governance for sustainable use and well-being in innovation regions under the diverging interest of FES users? We plan to test combinations of key innovation factors as preferred future scenario for sustainable FES provisions in regions, including fundamental policy interventions (e.g. strict regulation vs. payments for ecosystem services scheme), business incentives and external risk factors. RBG will allow testing stakeholders’ specific behaviour for resource use, and innovation activities, to create economic incentive, knowledge and social value. We argue that this will help to set conditions for successful development of policy and business innovations in innovations regions and to foster collaboration on FES provision for sustainability among stakeholders in a long term.
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Hongfei, Guo, Gong Pei, Zhang Ru, Fang Jiaxin, He Zhihui, Qu Ting, Li Congdong, and Huang Guoquan. "The Influence of Education and Scientific Research System on China's Science and Technology Innovation Capability." International Journal of Contemporary Education 1, no. 2 (September 19, 2018): 19. http://dx.doi.org/10.11114/ijce.v1i2.3642.
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This article outlines their impact on China's technological innovation capabilities from nine aspects including primary and secondary education to university education, the shortcomings of scientific research evaluation system, the forward-looking of educational investment and the rationality of research funding, the negative feedback of the employment market on innovative research, intellectual property protection and incentive mechanism, The basic social system and its incentive mechanism combined with learning and research, the incentive mechanism and cultural atmosphere of enterprises and administrative institutions, and the origin of China's modern education model. The comprehensive analysis shows that changing the status quo of China's lack of innovation is a systematic project. A single ministry cannot complete many specific measures of reform, and must have a national-level top-level design. Through reform, the education and scientific research system has reasonable design and strong self-repairing ability. It is the need of innovation to promote industrial upgrading. Its effectiveness directly determines whether China can cross the middle income trap and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
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Wang, Liang, Tingjia Xu, and Jie Chen. "Research on decision-making behavior of crowdsourcing task based on loss aversion and incentive level." Kybernetes 49, no. 5 (August 21, 2019): 1507–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/k-12-2018-0689.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study the decision-making behavior of the initiator and the participant under innovative and project-based tasks, respectively. It further explores the impact of the participant’s loss aversion and the initiator’s incentive level on the participant’s optimal effort level to reveal the implicit managerial mechanism. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses the Principal-agent Theory, Prospect Theory and Game Theory to study the decision-making behavior in crowdsourcing tasks. First, according to the return at the reference point, it establishes the utility function models of the participant and the initiator. Second, based on diverse loss aversion coefficient and incentive coefficient, it constructs the decision-making models of two types of task respectively. Third, it verifies the validity of models through simulation analysis. Findings For innovative task, the participant’s optimal effort level increases with the increment of loss aversion and incentive level, but decreases with the increase of his effort cost. For project-based task, the participant’s optimal effort level rises with the decrease of loss aversion; if the initiator does not take appropriate incentives, information asymmetry will lead to the task becoming a low-level innovation approach. Moreover, under innovative task, when the participant has loss aversion (or loss aversion reversal), his optimal effort level is higher (or lower) than that with no loss aversion, while the result under project-based task is just the opposite. Originality/value This paper characterizes two types of crowdsourcing task. Based on the prospect theory, it develops the decision-making models of the participant and the initiator under innovative and project-based tasks, thus exploring the impact of loss aversion and incentive level on their decision-making behavior. According to the findings in this paper, the initiator may effectively speculate the participant’s effort level and adopt reasonable monetary incentive measures to optimize the crowdsourcing return. In addition, this study can provide some reference for the design of incentive mechanism in crowdsourcing tasks and improve the relevant research of crowdsourcing.
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An, Xuejiao, Lin Qi, Jian Zhang, and Xinran Jiang. "Research on dual innovation incentive mechanism in terms of organizations’ differential knowledge absorptive capacity." PLOS ONE 16, no. 8 (August 30, 2021): e0256751. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256751.
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Differences in the capacity for absorption between different organizations will have an important impact on an organization’s choices of innovation exploration and exploitive innovation strategies. Organizations need to explore correct strategic decisions under different policies for long-term development. This study with limited rational first-mover and late-mover organizations as the research object, based on the evolutionary game theory model, using visualization system deduced first-mover and late-mover organizations in the knowledge absorptive capacity differences and incentive policies under the condition of different strategies selection process. The research shows that the rationality of policy incentive setting has a direct impact on the choice of organizational dual innovation strategy with different knowledge absorption capacities. The market pattern is stable and organizational knowledge absorption capacity is different. The higher the policy incentive level is, the more the organization is inclined to carry out exploratory innovation activities. Under the environment of stable market structure, different organizational knowledge absorption capacity, and no policy incentive, late-mover cannot adopt exploratory innovation strategy alone. When the market pattern is stable and the absorptive capacity of the organization is different, whether the late-mover can adopt the exploratory innovation strategy depends on the policy incentive level. In this case, the optimal situation is to have the opportunity to change to exploratory innovation at the same time as the first-movers.
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Morel, Chantal M., and Suzanne E. Edwards. "Encouraging Sustainable Use of Antibiotics: A Commentary on the DRIVE-AB Recommended Innovation Incentives." Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 46, S1 (2018): 75–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1073110518782918.
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The ability to sustain antibiotic efficacy is directly affected by incentive models aiming to stimulate antibiotic research and development. This paper analyzes the extent to which the models proposed by the Innovative Medicine Initiative-funded research project DRIVE-AB can be expected to support sustainable use, drawing on basic economic theory and the incentives that derive from it. It then discusses the use of minimal safeguards that will be needed to support sustainable use where industry incentives have not been re-aligned with those of public health.
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Poudineh, Rahmatallah, Donna Peng, and Seyed Reza Mirnezami. "Innovation in regulated electricity networks: Incentivising tasks with highly uncertain outcomes." Competition and Regulation in Network Industries 21, no. 2 (March 4, 2020): 166–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1783591720906582.
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Traditional regulatory models of natural monopoly network utilities are designed to incentivise cost-efficiency, subject to the firm achieving a certain level of reliability. With the rise of decarbonisation as a key policy goal, facilitating innovation in electricity networks has become of vital importance. Innovation and cost-efficiency may overlap and exhibit the same risk profile. However, we show that when there is a difference in their risk profile, incentivising these two tasks using the same incentive scheme is ineffective. This means incentive regulations need to be enhanced with additional modules that take into account the level of risk to which companies are exposed to for their stage of innovation activity. We also demonstrate that the issue of risk can distort the outcome of a competitive scheme for allocating innovation funds when bidders are heterogeneous in their risk attitude and there is uncertainty about recovering initial investments needed to prepare the project proposal. Thus, competitive schemes need to be designed such that they factor in risk attitude heterogeneity among bidders.
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Hanushchak-Yefimenko, Liudmyla M. "КОНЦЕПТУАЛЬНІ ПРИНЦИПИ УПРАВЛІННЯ РОЗВИТКОМ ІННОВАЦІЙНО АКТИВНИХ ПІДПРИЄМСТВ АГРАРНОЇ СФЕРИ." Bulletin of the Kyiv National University of Technologies and Design. Series: Economic sciences 151, no. 5 (March 30, 2021): 87–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.30857/2413-0117.2020.5.9.
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The article presents the research findings on managing the development of innovation active agribusiness enterprises along with providing a well-reasoned approach to managing agricultural innovations. An in-depth analysis of fundamental conceptual premises revealed the presence of a strong correlation between scientific and technological progress and economic innovation process putting special emphasis on the dominant role of science and technology advances, the core of which is innovation. Innovations being a separate segment of the investment market and its object, both at a time, are closely intertwined with investment since investment beyond innovation often does not make sense, as far as it is hardly possible to keep effectively reproducing the same capital equipment, technology or organizational structure. Moreover, innovations are doomed to fail without attracting investment. Given the crucial significance of innovations for the agribusiness development, the need to build an innovation strategy that ensures the overall alignment of business innovation goals and investment objectives is considered paramount. Apart from the above, the study also offers a detailed overview on the best practices of implementing effective incentive mechanisms to encourage new forms of interaction and cooperation in science and technology between research institutions and industry which operate as integrated structures of different types. Such organizational paradigm of agribusiness innovative activities contributes to tackle the issues of fundamentally new innovative development associated with building new technological modes that spur the emergence of new management patterns for the “science – technology – industry” cycle. It is argued that the ultimate assessment of management effectiveness of innovative agribusiness development could be performed only after the completion of the final phase of innovation implementation since only after bringing a novelty to market one can evaluate the market demand satisfaction rate.
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Benson, Alan M., and Sima Sajjadiani. "Are Bonus Pools Driven by Their Incentive Effects? Evidence from Fluctuations in Gainsharing Incentives." ILR Review 71, no. 3 (August 10, 2017): 567–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0019793917726066.
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Bonus pools, in which a worker’s realized bonus depends both on a worker’s share of the pool (which serves as the incentive) and on the size of the pool (which is largely outside of the worker’s control), are a common method for distributing incentive pay. Using data on the variation in the size of the bonus pool generated by a US manufacturing plant’s gainsharing plan, which varies incentives for quality and worker engagement, the authors evaluate the conditions under which such bonuses have incentive effects. Overall, results are cautionary: The evidence suggests gainsharing’s benefits operate outside of the incentive channel, and incentives may backfire if they are too small or too diluted by group performance metrics. The authors illustrate how random variation in the size of bonus pools offers researchers a powerful, readily available, and underused tool for studying how workers respond to the availability and strength of incentives.
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Ackiron, Evan. "Patents for Critical Pharmaceuticals: The AZT Case." American Journal of Law & Medicine 17, no. 1-2 (1991): 145–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0098858800007954.
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Patents and other statutory types of market protections are used in the United States to promote scientific research and innovation. This incentive is especially important in research intensive fields such as the pharmaceutical industry. Unfortunately, these same protections often result in higher monopoly pricing once a successful product is brought to market. Usually this consequence is viewed as the necessary evil of an incentive system that encourages costly research and development by promising large rewards to the successful inventor. However, in the case of the AIDS drug Zidovudine (AZT), the high prices charged by the pharmaceutical company owning the drug have led to public outcry and a re-examination of government incentive systems.This Note traces the evolution of these incentive programs — the patent system, and, to a lesser extent, the orphan drug program — and details the conflicting interests involved in their development. It then demonstrates how the AZT problem brings the interest of providing inventors with incentives for risky innovative efforts into a sharp collision with the ultimate goal of such systems: ensuring that the public has access to the resulting products at a reasonable price. Finally, the Note describes how Congress and the courts have attempted to resolve these problems in the past, and how they might best try to solve the AZT problem in the near future.
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Su, Nina, Zhuqin Shi, Xianqi Zhu, and Yunsheng Xin. "An Evolutionary Game Model of Collaborative Innovation Between Enterprises and Colleges Under Government Participation of China." SAGE Open 11, no. 1 (January 2021): 215824402199485. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2158244021994854.
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The three-party evolutionary game model of government, enterprises, and institutions of higher learning is established, and the dynamic evolution process of collaborative innovation behavior is discussed under the two strategies of “incentive” and “non-incentive” chosen by the government. The results show that under the premise of stronger innovation consciousness of the government and institutions and smaller the innovation cost of enterprises, the system is easier to reach the ideal state. The incentive degree of government should be controlled within a reasonable range to prevent enterprises from falling into a bad state because of the temptation of economic interests.
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Moura, Dulcineia Catarina, Maria José Madeira, Filipe A. P. Duarte, João Carvalho, and Orlando Kahilana. "Absorptive capacity and cooperation evidence in innovation from public policies for innovation." International Journal of Innovation Science 11, no. 1 (March 26, 2019): 2–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijis-05-2017-0051.
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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to better understand whether firm cooperation and absorptive capacity foster success in seeking public financial support for innovation activities and, by doing so, how they contribute to innovation output.Design/methodology/approachThe authors therefore extend the existing literature focusing on the effects of cooperation and absorptive capacity on specific public financial support for innovation activities in Portuguese firms from local or regional government, central administration and the European Union by using available data from the Community Innovation Survey CIS 2010 and the application of logistic regression models. The empirical analysis enabled a better understanding of the positive relationship of the variables that determine the form of public financial support in the integration of incentives within firms to stimulate innovation.FindingsTherefore, as the level of absorptive capacity in Portuguese firms increases, so does the demand for benefits from public financial support to stimulate innovation from the European Union also increases. The same analysis, now considering the determinant cooperation, notes the positive effects of institutional sources of information and cooperation, in the propensity for seeking public financial incentives from the Central Administration and the European Union. As for internal information and cooperation sources, they are positively related to the integration of incentive measures from the local or Regional Administration and Central Administration.Originality/valueThe paper presents results that allow us to propose some suggestions that both the firms and those responsible for the implementation of public policies can undertake to increment innovation performance.
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Bunje, Paul, Jyotika Virmani, and Marcius Extavour. "XPRIZE provides incentive for radical breakthroughs in innovation." MRS Bulletin 41, no. 07 (July 2016): 504–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1557/mrs.2016.142.
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Agrell, Per J., Peter Bogetoft, and Jørgen Tind. "Incentive plans for productive efficiency, innovation and learning." International Journal of Production Economics 78, no. 1 (July 2002): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0925-5273(00)00097-9.
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Cheng, Hua, Zhiying Zhang, Zhongju Liao, Yong Wei, and Joseph Martial Nkongo Mvondo. "Different policy instruments and the threshold effects on collaboration efficiency in China." Science and Public Policy 47, no. 3 (March 16, 2020): 348–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scaa016.
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Abstract University–industry R&D collaboration is an important means to improve innovation efficiency; many governments have issued policies to promote it. The most frequent policy instruments implemented by policy-makers to foster firms’ innovation are subsidies and tax incentives. The article elaborated on how subsidies and tax incentives influence the R&D collaboration efficiency through a panel dataset from 2009 to 2015 in China. The result showed that subsidies and tax incentives have a positive effect on collaboration efficiency, and the effect of subsidies on output is bigger than that of tax incentives. Taking the intensity of subsidy as a threshold variable, there is a significant single threshold effect on collaboration efficiency. However, there is no threshold effect when the intensity of the tax incentive used as the threshold variable.
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Jullien, Nicolas, and Karine Roudaut. "Can Open Source projects succeed when the producers are not users? Lessons from the data processing field1." Management international 16 (September 20, 2012): 113–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1012397ar.
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Free/Libre Open Source Software (FLOSS) proposes an original way to solve the incentive dilemma for the production of information goods, based on von Hippel (1988)’s user-as-innovator principle: as users benefit from innovation, they have incentive to produce it, and as they can expect cumulative innovation on their own proposition, they have incentive to share it. But what is the incentive for producers when they are not users? We discuss this question via a qualitative study of FLOSS projects in “algorithm-based industries”. We find that in this case producers hardly participate in such projects.
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Pham, Hai Yen, Richard Chung, Eduardo Roca, and Ben-Hsien Bao. "CEO incentive compensation and stock returns: Evidence from Australia." Corporate Ownership and Control 13, no. 4 (2016): 24–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv13i4p3.
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We investigate the relation between CEO compensation and stock returns in Australia and find evidence that firms managed by CEOs with higher incentive pay earn higher returns in a period up to three years. The relation is more pronounced for firms led by younger CEOs and firms operating in research-intensive industries. In addition, we find some evidence indicating that innovation serves as a channel though which incentive pay affects stock returns. In particular, higher incentive pay induces CEOs to take more risk by investing more in risky projects, such as innovative activities which consequently make firms riskier and have higher expected stock returns
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Mugisha, Silver, Sanford V. Berg, and William T. Muhairwe. "Using internal incentive contracts to improve water utility performance: the case of Uganda's NWSC." Water Policy 9, no. 3 (June 1, 2007): 271–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.2166/wp.2007.010.
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The achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015 requires significant managerial innovation and creativity, especially in low-income countries where utility inefficiencies are still most prevalent. This paper describes approaches that have been used in Uganda's National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC). We outline the potential for internal incentive contracts in delivering efficiency gains under public–public water management settings. No simple recipe for promoting efficiency exists. However, this paper highlights useful ingredients, including proper contract framework design, competition for managerial responsibility, effective business planning, performance monitoring and the use of managerial incentives. We conclude that these factors require careful consideration during the planning and implementation of incentive contracts.