Academic literature on the topic 'Indian Army'

The recruitment to military in modern nation states, by and large, is voluntary. Although it is commonly assumed that a soldiers’ job in the army is to fight against the enemies of their motherland, the Indian Army has a regiment of Tibetan soldiers who are not Indians as per the law of the land. Known as Special Frontier Force (SFF), this regiment was until recently a secret wing of the Indian Army. Joining the Indian Army during the heydays of their diasporic dispersal due to the Chinese territorial aggrandizement and Sino-Indian war of 1962, with a hope of direct encounter with their enemies, Tibetans continue to be voluntarily recruited to the now non-secret SFF. As part of the Indian Army, they should be ready to fight the enemies of their host country. In fact, over the decades, they have been requested by India to take part in several military exercises. In the changed international geopolitics, Tibetans in exile may not get another opportunity to fight against their own enemies. The trajectory of the value orientations of the Tibetan soldiers in the Indian Army constitutes the axial concern of this article.

In response to the perceived inability of the Indian military to leverage its conventional superiority to end Pakistan's “proxy war” in Kashmir, the Indian Army announced a new offensive doctrine in 2004 intended to allow it to mobilize quickly and undertake limited retaliatory attacks on its neighbor, without crossing Pakistan's nuclear threshold. This Cold Start doctrine marks a break with the fundamentally defensive military doctrines that India has employed since gaining independence in 1947. Requiring combined arms operating jointly with the Indian Air Force, Cold Start represents a significant advance in India's conventional military capabilities. Yet, despite the Indian Army's intentions, it risks provoking or escalating a crisis on the subcontinent that could breach the nuclear threshold. Recent military exercises and associated organizational changes indicate that although the Indian Army has made progress toward developing an operational Cold Start capability, particularly in the area of network-centric warfare, the doctrine remains in the experimental stage. Nevertheless, this is a development that deserves further study. As the Indian Army enhances its ability to achieve a quick military decision against Pakistan, the political pressure to employ such a strategy in a crisis will increase—with potentially catastrophic results.

AbstractThis article, based on new archival materials, reconstructs the experiences and observations of an Indian war correspondent from 1944 to 1946 as he covered the advance of Indian soldiers of the British-led Indian Army from northeast India, through Burma to Malaya at the war's end, then to their eventual deployment with the South East Asian Command in Java after the Japanese surrender. As it transpired, Captain P. R. S. Mani worked as an enlisted public relations officer of the British-led Indian Army but also sustained his commitment as a patriotic Indian nationalist, who gathered intelligence on the Indian diaspora in Southeast Asia and on the impact of Subhas Chandra Bose's Indian National Army. Relatively little scholarship has focused on Asian war journalism. Mani's tension-ridden role as a self-styled ‘Indian Army observer’ provides an illuminating insight into the way in which Britain's lines of communication were appropriated and subverted during wartime and beyond, and into the way his own nationalism was reshaped by his unofficial transnational activities.

Netaji’s Secret Service ‘Indian National Army’ essentially revolutionary organisation. It is well known the leftist played a crucial role in Subhas Bose getting elected as the President of the Tripuri Congress. In 1939 found the Left Consolidation Committee (LCC), but the tenuous coalition of the leftists in the Committee soon broke but CPI remained with Bose. However, after the Second World War broke out, Bose decided to leave India. The Communists helped Subhas in his escape; the main operator was Achhar Singh Chhina, who was best known by the Soviets as Larkin, Akbar Mia of Forward Bloc and Ajoy Ghosh of CPI. Bose’s after the escape to contact the Soviet leaders for enlisting them as India’s ally, was also helped by the communists. In the War theatre, Subhas Bose Was in favour of Link. Before his departure, All India Revolutionary Committee code-named ‘MARY’ in Delhi communicated with Kabul link station codenamed ‘OlIVER’ and with German link codenamed ‘TOM’. T. Holt Writes ‘channel “SILVER” was one of the great deception double agent channels of the war, real name Bhagat Ram Talwar’. 1 ‘SILVER’ the game Master, one of the closest person of Bose, was a communist, a Master of disguise, Knowledgeable about the various revolutionaries Movements in India. Silver kept the soviet posted on his work as the Link between the Axis legation in Kabul and Bose sympathisers in India. Silver’s intelligence system as a high-grade source. But Silver remained a Communist first and foremost, and whenever he entered Afghanistan, practical control passed to the Soviets. Eventually Bose could make his way to Rangoon where a new arrangement was made by the Axis. Subhas codenamed ‘RHINO’ sponsored by the Japanese and codename ‘ELEPHANT’ sponsored by the Germans to remain in touch with ‘MARY’ in Delhi. Netaji set up a pro-Axis Provisional Government of Free India in Andaman and Nicobar Islands. PG operated successfully military deception plans with military intelligent tactics. Netaji began to broadcast anti-British Propaganda as the Voice of Azad Hind. He made it clear that neither his armed forces nor his Azad Hind Radio Service could be used for anti-Soviet purposes. Unfortunately, the strategic deception role of Netaji remained secret for decades.

The British-led 14th Army was the Indian Army’s principal formation fighting against the Imperial Japanese Army in Burma from 1942 to 1945. Successive defeats in the Far East made the Indian Army the object of disdain, ridicule and scorn expressed by the senior political and military leadership in London. This leadership dismissed their socially inferior Indian Army counterparts as a “second xi”, commanding a second-rate organization comprising “black” troops. The Indian Army, however, had learnt from its earlier mistakes and had undergone a remarkable recovery and successful organizational transformation amidst bitter combat against their Japanese foe. Improvements in leadership, training and morale, tactical innovations, and the brilliant execution of operational strategy helped resolve London’s strategic impasse over the war against Japan. The end result was the greatest Japanese military defeat in history until it was eclipsed by the Red Army’s decisive blow against Japanese forces in Manchuria in August 1945.

The study aims to highlight the occupation level on occupational stress, psychological well-being, and quality of life of Indian Army Personnel. The study was conducted on one hundred fifty Indian male Army Personnel of different rank belonging to 25 years to 45 years of age group. The cross-sectional design was used. The sample was selected through the purposive sampling technique. The tools measures like the Occupational Stress Index, Psychological Well-Being Scale and WHO Quality of Life-BREF Hindi was individually administered. The data were analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics. One way Analysis of Variance results revealed that there is a significant difference in occupational levels on occupational stress, psychological well-being, and quality of life among Indian Army personnel. Pearson product-moment correlations coefficient showed a significant negative relationship between occupational stress with psychological well-being and quality of life and showed a significant positive relationship between psychological well-being and quality of life among Indian Army Personnel.

The basic as well as desirable needs of a person for decent survival in today’s materialistic and globalised world demand corresponding financial resources in hand. Irrespective of the profession and societal strata, individuals have their own financial aspirations and challenges. Financial literacy enables a person with understanding of financial terms and concepts besides imbibing skills, consciousness, talent and attitude to take important financial decisions. Military service having peculiar service conditions and limited exposure to financial field further makes it imperative to study the subject for inclusivity as very few studies have looked into financial issues pertaining to military personnel. The main aim of this research paper is to ascertain financial literacy of Commissioned Officers of Indian Army. For the study, 133 serving Commissioned Officers of Indian Army of varying age and length of service constituted the sample. Non-Probability technique of selecting sample has been used for the study wherein Purposive sampling is used to draw responses from the sample units. A structured questionnaire was developed to collect Primary data from serving Commissioned Officers of Indian Army. Detailed analysis has been carried out for the collected data using various tools and techniques in Microsoft Excel and SPSS. The study has brought out that financial literacy levels of serving commissioned officers of Indian Army are high. Though the demographic variables and financial literacy levels of Indian Army officers are not statistically associated, however overall high levels of financial literacy indicate their maturity of thought and quest for learning. Overall, the study outcomes indicate a healthy state for the organization and the Nation in terms of financial literacy of serving Commissioned Officers of Indian Army with respect to personal financial planning.