Journal articles on the topic 'Indigenous Liberian'

Some of the late nineteenth century success of Liberia coffee, sugar, and other commodities can be attributed to the leasing of plantations to enterprising foreigners, although a few leading politicians did own successful farms … For most Americo-Liberians, the role of dirt farmer was decidedly beneath their station.Yet the reasons for this apathy among most Americo-Liberians for agriculture, which prevailed up to the early 1870s, were not far to seek. The majority of them being newly emancipated slaves, who had in servitude in America been used to being forced to work, erroneously equated their newly won freedom with abstinence from labour.Both arguments are inaccurate, yet the authors made essential contributions to the writing of Liberian history. J. Gus Liebenow became renowned within Liberian academic circles for his earlier book, Liberia: the Evolution of Privilege. In that book he analyzed the policy that enabled the minority Americo-Liberians (descendants of free blacks from the United States who founded Liberia in 1822), to monopolize political and economic power to the exclusion of the majority indigenous Africans for more than a century. M. B. Akpan dissected Liberia's dubious political history and concluded that Americo-Liberian authority over the indigenous population, was identical to the discriminatory and oppressive policy practiced by European colonizers in Africa.

In 1822 Liberia was founded as a place where free(d) enslaved African Americans could find freedom and liberty. While many of them did, the indigenous African population was, for a long time, excluded from citizenry despite fulfilling one of the essential criteria to be eligible for Liberians citizenship: Being Black. This prerequisite remains part of Liberian law today, rendering non-Blacks ineligible for Liberian citizenship. Today, this mostly affects the Lebanese community who originally came as traders and entrepreneurs to Liberia. This article analyses why Liberians defend race-based exclusionary citizenship practices.

AbstractIn the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Liberia was in the unusual position of being a colony with no metropole. Without military or financial support, the settlers’ control over their territory remained weak. Surrounding European empires preyed on this weakness, and Americo-Liberian rule was often at risk from coalitions of European forces and indigenous African resistance. From the early twentieth century, the political elite took on the concept of “development” as a central part of government policy in an attempt to gain political and economic control of the hinterland areas and stave off European incursions. This policy involved the extension and reinforcement of labor policies and practices that had developed through the nineteenth century as means to incorporate settlers and indigenous people into Liberian society. When these plans failed, huge swathes of territory were turned over to foreign commercial interests in an attempt to bolster Liberian claims to sovereignty. And after the Second World War, new policies of “community development” introduced by international agencies again tried to solve Liberia's “land and labor” problem through resettlement. At each stage developmentalist rationales were deployed in order to facilitate greater government control over the Liberian interior territory.

This study examines factors of land grabbing in Liberia, especially from tribal communities, due originally to different social expectations regarding land and contracts between indigenous people and settlers from America. In addition, land appropriation throughout the history of the Liberian nation is due largely to the Americo-Liberian oligarchy and public corruption. The study analyzes survey, empirical, and concession contracts data gathered by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Sustainable Development Institute, Government of Liberia, Center for Transparency and Accountability in Liberia, and United Nations Mission in Liberia. It then correlates associations between a number of concession companies, their land acreage under operation, county acreage, and incidence of land grabbing to demonstrate an increase in disputes during the early 2000s due to practices of corrupt public officials. This has resulted from the consistent implementation of inequitable land laws, which have perpetuated land transfer from tribal communities to mostly Americo-Liberian descendants and foreign concessionaires. This land appropriation has fostered public corruption, increased land related disputes, and raised the level of conflict in Liberian society.

For the first time in the history of Africa, a regional conflict, such as that in Liberia, has succeeded in producing an indigenous regional mechanism for conflict management. The conflict may not yet be resolved, but its management demands an in-depth understanding. This attempts an interpretation of the Liberian crisis from Nigeria’s perspective.

Every country institutes policy to take a course of action in favour of its citizens’ welfare. The view of indigenization policy in alignment with employment and workers treatment in Liberia takes different dimension. Liberia problem of unemployment cannot be compared to its underemployment and bad working conditions. The Liberian Indigenous policy has not reaped its fruit with marginalization, exploitation dispossession and poverty in commonplace. This study addresses the ineffectiveness of the indigenous employment policy and the state of workers’ well-being in foreign corporations in Liberia. This study adopts cross sectional method, and employs primary data. Information from 400 employees working with foreign-owned corporation was extracted from survey conducted in 2018 by the authors on the state of welfare of foreign-owned corporations’ employees in Liberia. The key explanatory variables are healthcare, social insurance, safety measures, stable job assignment, stable work hour, promotion on the job, and job security. The binary logistic regression was applied using version 22 of SPSS to examine association between the response and explanatory variables. The outcomes of this study showed that indigenous environmental policy was significant with worker’s well-being (p<0.05). The study concluded that indigenous employment policy has significant influence on the foreign-owned corporation workers’ well-being in Liberia.

After the end of Liberia’s civil war in 2003, the country embarked upon the reform of its forest and land legislation. This culminated in the adoption of the 2009 Community Rights Law with Respect to Forest Lands and the 2018 Land Rights Act, which NGOs and donors have described as being amongst the most progressive laws in sub-Saharan Africa with regard to the recognition of customary land tenure. Given these actors commitment to human rights, this article takes the indigenous right to self-determination as a starting point for analysing customary property rights and their implementation in Liberia. This includes the examination of the Liberian concept of the 1) recognition and nature of customary land rights, 2) customary ownership of natural resources, 3) jurisdiction over customary land, 4) the prohibition of forcible removal, and 5) the right to free, prior and informed consent.

In this paper I consider how an African historian, Sieh Jeto, plotted his narratives. Sieh was a citizen of Jlao/Sasstown, a Kru polity in Southeastern Liberia. Jlao also author and perform other past-oriented accounts in different genres, and I have written on some of these. There is not room here to discuss all the ways in which Jlao refer to their pasts, and scene-setting is equally brief. I also confine myself to Sieh Jeto's plotting of narrative.I first encountered Jlao in 1972, and spent a year there in 1975/76. The new regime of President Tolbert at first promised reform, but emergent contradictions and rising opposition culminated in the coup of 1980. Kru groups had several times fought against the ‘Americo Liberian’ government, and in the 1930s Sasstown was the focus of a long war (in which the League of Nations at first intervened) which they lost after painful struggles. No history could be neutral there, and some people were very cautious about provoking official wrath by talking about these times. While fanpote, ‘old time business’, of a distant past might be safer, it was denied in the official ideology that indigenous Liberians had a significant history at all.It now seems to me that the performances I recorded at different times were part of general changes of consciousness in the country. Sieh Jeto was recommended to me by an eminent Jlao man in Monrovia.

Numerous recent field and laboratory experiments find that elections cause higher subsequent levels of collective action within groups. This article questions whether effects observed in these novel environments apply when traditional institutions are democratized. The authors test the external validity of the experimental findings by examining the effects of introducing elections in an indigenous institution in Liberia. They use a break in the process of selecting clan chiefs at the end of Liberia’s civil wars to identify the effects of elections on collective action within communities. Drawing on survey data and outcomes from behavioral games, the authors find that the introduction of elections for clan chiefs has little effect on community-level and national-level political participation but that it increases contentious collective action and lowers levels of contributions to public goods. These findings provide an important counterpoint to the experimental literature, suggesting that elections have less salutary effects on collective action when they replace customary practices.

Across much of the Spanish empire in the Americas, indigenous and African-descent peoples lived in close contact. The entangled nature of labor, both in urban centers and on massive complexes, gave them the opportunity to measure themselves against one another. Law that developed across the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries suggested an eventual clarity about their separate conditions, but experience revealed the muddiness of both definitions and enforcement. Indigenous and Black subjects used those colonial discourses about freedom and hierarchy to understand their own positions and to argue for comparable protections and privileges. Rather than consider indigenous and Black lives separately, the essay argues for a more integrative approach to reading legal documents produced by and about them.

It is obvious that, for any country that is anticipating to be successful in today's end-users' community, that country's sectors' managers need to apply some sufficient efforts in order to render assistance to the indigenous mining companies to outcompete the other firms in the region. Among many possible activities, cost reduction in mineral beneficiation is regarded as one of the core areas presenting enormous opportunities for the West country, Liberia. The country like Liberia who is endowed with an impressive stock of mineral reserves and has traditionally relied on mining, namely iron ore, gold, and diamonds, as a major source of income is not exempted.

Argentina was born from the crossing of the ideas of “culture” and “barbarism”. Freedom was recognized as a driving force for its development from the beginning. Both works, Martin Fierro and Facundo, value and praise it (especially the first one), but always as a part of the civilization process undertaken by President Sarmiento, who accepted some people, forgetting about the victims of the Desert Campaign (1878-1885). The article reflects on freedom expressed by such authors as Sarmiento, Echeverría, Mármol or Gutiérrez. One of the lesser known authors, Lucio V. Mansilla, the author of Una excursión a los indios ranqueles (1870), is the one who sees the situation of the Indians with his own eyes, observing how the concept of freedom changes into its opposite when efforts are made to “civilize” Pampa and the border with the Andes by force. In the 19th century, only he was aware of the hypocrisy of the expected “progress”. Then, in the 20th century, there appear authors who want to renew patriotic consciousness. They suggest putting on a post -romantic “civilization” that is of little benefit to the nation. They see the falsehood in the concept of “freedom” when building an Argentine national identity, not including indigenous communities.

Simian immunodeficiency virus (SIV) is a Lentivirus that exhibits both morphological and genomic similarities to HIV. SIV has been isolated from sooty mangabeys in several primate colonies, and has been shown to be about 80% related to HTV-2. Since HIV-2 and sooty mangabeys are both indigenous to West Africa, isolation of a virus from sooty mangabeys in West Africa would be of great interest in determining the origins of these two viruses. We report here thin section transmission electron microscopy of a lentivirus from a pet sooty mangabey living in Liberia, West Africa.Peripheral blood mononuclear cells (PEMC) from a healthy pet sooty mangabey in Liberia were frozen in liquid nitrogen and shipped to the California Primate Research Center. The cells were thawed and stimulated for 72h with 0.5μg/ml Staphylococcal enterotoxin A in RPMI 1640 containing 10% fetal calf serum. 2×106 PEMC were then co-cultivated with 2×106 CEMxl74 cells and processed for EM.CEMxl74 cells co-cultivated with infected PBMC exhibited syncytial giant cells with patchy foamy cytoplasm (Fig 1). large numbers of virus particles were observed within these vacuoles (Fig 2).

Amartya Sen has written that for justice to be realized, freedom needs to be expanded. Fair Trade, a model of global trade that puts into motion billions of dollars, purports to promote justice, and therefore expands freedom. Fair Trade is a four-pillar structure comprised of institutions, producers, consumers, and government/policy. An economic, ethnographic study of Bolivia’s indigenous women working within the Fair Trade model for the past 15 years reported mixed results. The women questioned the justice of the model based on negative experiences induced by irregular work, stress, and unsupportive communities. At the same time, women acknowledged enhanced capabilities and opportunities emanating from skills development, empowerment, and income. Although it increased women’s freedom, there are ways in which Fair Trade could be made fairer through transparency, reciprocity, and public reasoning. This work is significant in the sense that it creates a new understanding of justice and trade that enables women’s voices to be heard.Amartya Sen ha planteado que para lograr justicia, se necesita expandir la libertad. El Comercio Justo, un modelo de comercio global que pone en movimiento miles de millones de dólares, pretende promover la justicia y, por consiguiente, expandir la libertad. El Comercio Justo es una estructura de cuatro pilares que comprende instituciones, productores, consumidores y gobiernos/políticas gubernamentales. Un estudio económico y etnográfico de mujeres indígenas de Bolivia que han trabajado con este modelo de comercio los últimos 15 años reportó resultados muy diversos. Las mujeres cuestionaban la justicia de un modelo basado en experiencias negativas resultado del trabajo irregular, del estrés y de la falta de apoyo por parte de las comunidades. Al mismo tiempo, las mujeres reconocían mejoras en las capacidades y oportunidades que emanaban del desarrollo de habilidades, el empoderamiento y los ingresos. Aunque incrementó la libertad de las mujeres, hay maneras por las cuales el Comercio Justo podría llegar a ser más justo a través de transparencia, reciprocidad y razonamiento público. Este trabajo es importante en la medida que crea una nueva interpretación de la justicia y del comercio que permite escuchar la voz de las mujeres.

In the nineteenth century, François Libermann, a converted Jew who became a priest, is attracted by the ministry to the Black people of the French Colonies and Africa. Having obtained a mission site in Guinea, he sent his first vicar apostolic, Benoît Truffet, who set up the beginnings of a pedagogy of Pauline evangelization, according to the will of Libermann. In 1930, about eighty years later, the Directory for Missions, under the leadership of Bishop Alexandre Le Roy, was an indispensable summary of missionary teaching methods developed by the Holy Ghost Fathers in Africa. After analyzing it, we outline a two-step process. The first step is that of the Pauline insertion, “all in all” marked by kenosis, learning of indigenous languages and the insertion of the missionary in local life. The second step is that of inculturation which consists in making use of the culture as a vehicle for the new faith, then in practising a hermeneutics of cosmogonies and finally in establishing a suitable pastoral approach which should lead to the emergence of a native clergy. This process corresponds to that applied in Oceania.

AbstractIn violent conflicts in places like Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone, economic interests have crowded out ideologically articulate mass-based social movements for reform or revolutionary change to a degree that was not apparent during earlier anti-colonial struggles. Some scholars offer a ‘looting model’ of rebellion that explains the predations of politicians and warlords but it is not clear why people who receive few benefits from this – or even suffer great harm from them – fail to support ideologues instead, or why self-interested violent entrepreneurs do not offer political programmes to attract more followers. Yet some groups defy this ‘looting model’. Explaining why armed groups vary so greatly in their behaviour provides a means to address important questions: is it possible to construct public authorities out of collapsed states in the twenty-first century, or do local predations and global conditions preclude indigenous state-building in these places? Why do social movements for reform there seem so ineffective? What conditions have to be present for them to succeed? This article considers the nature of rebellion in failing states, focusing on Nigeria to find clues to explain variations in the organization of armed groups.

In March 1836, nine Hanover College and Indiana Theological Seminary students, almost certainly including Benjamin Franklin Templeton, a former slave enrolled in the seminary, formed an antislavery society. The society’s Preamble and Constitution set forth abolitionist ideals demanding an immediate emancipation of Southern slaves with rights of citizenship and “without expatriation.” Thus they encountered the ire of Hanover’s Presbyterian trustees—colonizationists who believed instead that free blacks and educated slaves, gradually and voluntarily emancipated by their owners, should leave the United States and relocate to Liberia, where they would experience greater opportunity, equality, and justice than was possible here in the United States and simultaneously exercise a civilizing and Christianizing influence on indigenous West Africans. By separating the races on two different continents with an ocean between them, America’s race problem would be solved. The efforts of the colonizationists failed, in part because of a lack of sufficient resources to transport and resettle three million African Americans. Then, too, few Southern slaveholders were willing to emancipate their slaves and finance those former slaves’ voyages, and most free blacks refused to leave the country of their birth. In Liberia, left largely to their own resources, colonists encountered disease, the enmity of local tribes, the threat of slavers, and difficulties in farming that left these former slaves struggling for existence, even if free blacks who engaged in mercantile trade there fared well. In the United States, the trustees’ conviction that American society was racist beyond reform, together with their refusal to confront the system of slavery in the South in hope of preserving the Union and their refusal to allow even discussion of the subject of slavery on the Hanover campus, left their central question unanswered: Would it ever be possible for people of color and whites to reside together in the United States peaceably and equitably? The trustees’ decision exerted another long-term impact as well. Although today the campus is integrated, Hanover College would not admit an African American student until 1948.

A great deal has been written in recent decades about the Atlantic slave trade, including the mechanics and terms of purchase, but relatively little about what Africans received in return for the slaves and other exports such as gold and ivory. And yet, if one is trying to reconstruct the material culture of, say, the Guinea Coast of West Africa during the slave-trade period, the vast European input cannot be ignored.The written evidence consists of many thousands of surviving bills of lading, cargo manifests, port records, logbooks, invoices, quittances, trading-post inventories, account books, shipping recommendations, and orders from African traders. English customs records of commerce with Africa during the eighteenth century, when the slave trade peaked, alone contain hundreds of thousands of facts. A thorough analysis of all available data would call for the services of a research team equipped with computers, and fill many volumes. Using a portable typewriter (now finally abandoned for WordPerfect) and a card file, and sifting hundreds of published sources, I have over the years compiled an annotated master list of European trade goods sold on a portion of the Guinea Coast from Portuguese times to the mid-nineteenth century. The geographic focus is the shoreline from Liberia to Nigeria; from it more slaves left for the New World than from any comparable stretch of the African coast. I call the area “Kwaland” for the Kwa language family to which nearly all the indigenous peoples belong.

This article 1 underscores the key role that Tom Coffee, an ethnic Kru migrant from Sasstown, Liberia, played in founding the Soudan Interior Mission (SIM). Coffee journeyed with Walter Gowans and Thomas Kent up into what is now northern Nigeria in 1894 to help establish SIM. Gowans and Kent died before they reached their destination, the walled city of Kano. SIM's other co-founder, Rowland Bingham, did not travel with his friends, and thus lived to tell his version of their story. By using materials written in the 1890s and secondary sources published more recently, this work provides new insights into SIM's first trip to Africa. The article begins by giving background information about the Kru and Sasstown and the impact that the Methodist Episcopal Church had on some of the people who lived in Sasstown after it established a mission there in 1889. Coffee's likely connection with the Methodist Church would have helped him understand the goal and strategy of his missionary employers. The article then discusses the journey Coffee and the two SIM missionaries took up into the hinterland. The fortitude that Coffee showed as he travelled into the interior reflects the ethos of his heritage and town of origin. Coffee represents just one of millions of indigenous peoples – the vast number whose stories are now not known – who worked alongside expatriate missionaries to establish Christianity around the world. It is fitting, during SIM's quasquicentennial, to tell this story about this African who helped the three North American missionaries establish SIM.

Este documento pretende mostrar una problemática macrosocial al considerar la construcción de derechos humanos religiosos y de los pueblos indígenas en los ámbitos internacional y nacional, y cómo son o no retomados por las instancias nacionales no solo para la solución de conflictos religiosos sino también para garantizar los derechos humanos religiosos de los pueblos indígenas. Desde esta perspectiva interesa también, a la luz de los conflictos religiosos, observar cómo son ejercidos los derechos políticos y sociales por los indígenas y si los operadores de la justicia los toman en cuenta. ABSTRACT This document aims to demonstrate a set of macrosocial problems regarding the construction of religious human rights and the human rights of indigenous peoples in the international and national spheres, and how they are or are not considered by national authorities, not only in resolving religious disputes, but also protecting the religious human rights of indigenous peoples. From this perspective, and in light of ongoing religious conflicts, the document also looks at how political and social rights are exercised by indigenous peoples, and whether said rights are taken into account by the administrators of justice.

During the second half of the twentieth century, Christianity underwent an epochal transformation from a predominantly Western religion to a world religion largely defined by non-Western adherents in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Broadcast media, spearheaded by American evangelical missionaries, played an important role in the globalization of Christianity. After WWII, conservative Protestant missionaries from the United States established a ``far-flung global network" of radio stations around the world with the avowed purpose of proselytizing the entire globe. In Liberia, American missionaries organized Station ELWA, the first evangelical station in Africa. The medium of radio proved well suited to the ``universal" mission of American evangelicals, particularly after the expansion of worldwide ownership in transistor radios during the 1960s. Yet the success of missionary radio stations such as ELWA rested on an extensive process of translation into local customs and practices. Between 1954 and 1970, ELWA officials and workers constructed transmission platforms, political relations, language services, receiver distribution campaigns, and community networks. These constructs functioned as the crucial grids through which the ``universal" meaning of evangelicalism was produced at the grass-roots level. As the history of ELWA in Liberia makes clear, American evangelical broadcasters acquired converts only by adapting their gospel message to fit particular churches, cultures, and contexts across the globe. Localizing missionary radio required the appropriation of indigenous cultural capital, the transposition of national partners, and the active agency of audiences on the ground.

Resumen La resocialización constituye una estrategia de reinserción de los privados de libertad al sistema penitenciario. En el presente artículo, se analiza la visión resocializadora del pabellón 10 del establecimiento penitenciario y carcelario de mediana seguridad del municipio del Espinal – Tolima, Colombia, específicamente se generaliza una intervención a través del modelo de análisis del contexto carcelario. La metodología es descriptiva de campo y se seleccionaron seis (6) grupos excepcionales, entre los que se encuentran: Extranjeros, personas en condición de discapacidad, comunidad LGTBI, indígenas, afrodescendientes y adultos mayores. Los hallazgos evidencian que el fundamento principal del estudio, estuvo orientado mediante ejercicios pedagógicos de intervención, a la participación de la comunidad carcelaria para promover e incentivar el liderazgo en los privados de la libertad como estrategia para dar cumplimiento a los programas de tratamiento y a la función resocializadora que le compete al Instituto Nacional Penitenciario y Carcelario. Se concluye que el liderazgo es una estrategia que fortalece la cultura carcelaria interna, basada en el respeto por los demás y consigo mismo, cuyo fundamento son los procesos de formación que se deben promover desde los sujetos clave de definir la política carcelaria. Abstract Resocialization constitutes a strategy for the reintegration of those deprived of liberty into the prison system. In this article, the resocializing vision of pavilion 10 of the medium-security penitentiary and prison establishment of the Espinal municipality - Tolima, Colombia is analyzed, specifically an intervention is generalized through the model of analysis of the prison context. The methodology is descriptive in the field and six (6) exceptional groups were selected, among which are: Foreigners, people with disabilities, LGTBI community, indigenous people, Afro-descendants and the elderly. The findings show that the main foundation is oriented through pedagogical intervention exercises, the participation of the prison community to promote and encourage leadership in those deprived of liberty as a strategy to comply with the treatment programs and the resocializing function that It is the responsibility of the National Penitentiary and Prison Institute. It is concluded that leadership is a strategy that strengthens the internal prison culture, based on respect for others and with oneself, whose foundation is the training processes that must be promoted from the key subjects of defining prison policy.

Sin lugar a dudas una de las inundaciones más impresionantes que ha sufrido el estado de Chiapas en los últimos años ha sido la del mar de tinta vertido desde el levantamiento zapatistade 1994. A partir de ese primero de enero que se ha vuelto ya, a justo título, referenda histórica obligada, cientos de plumas y miles de páginas, impresas o cibernéticas, han buscado proveer al público de asideros informativos con base en los cuales explicarse lo que ocurría y ocurre en la porción más meridional de México. Los resultados de tan ingente labor, bien intencionada en muchos casos, francamente oportunista y tendenciosa en otros, tuvieron un impacto sin duda disímil: lograron mostrarla compleja realidad chiapaneca, pero poco contribuyeronen aclarar allector no avezado acercade lo que allf se estaba gestando y sobre lasanejas raices de tal gestaci6n. Chatas y a menudo superficiales, cuando no claramente amarillistas y a históricas, las contribuciones periodisticas y otras pseudocientíficas, surgidas de "chiapanecólogos" hechos al vapor, nos ofrecencon excesiva frecuencia una visión amorfa y homogeneizadora de la situación chiapaneca que privilegia las dicotomías simplistas y abona el terreno de satanizaciones y canonizaciones.

Madison, G. B., Paul Fairfield and Ingrid Harris, eds. Is There a Canadian Philosophy? Reflections on the Canadian Identity. By Marc Poulin 426Macklem, Patrick. Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada. By Janet Ajzenstat 426Dupuis, Renée. Quel Canada pour les Autochtones? La fin de l'exclusion. Par Édith Garneau 428Gammer, Nicholas. From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis. By Ann L. Griffiths 430Timpson, Annis May. Driven Apart: Women's Employment Equality and Child Care in Canadian Public Policy. By Kathy Teghtsoonian 432Young, Lisa. Feminists and Party Politics. By Brenda O'Neill 434Powe, Jr., Lucas A. The Warren Court and American Politics. By Carolyn N. Long 435Bland, Douglas L., ed. Backbone of the Army: Non-Commissioned Officers in the Future Army. By James H. Joyner, Jr. 437Brossard, Yves et Jonathan Vidal. L'éclatement de la Yougoslavie de Tito. Désintégration d'une fédération et guerres interethniques. Par Dany Deschênes 438Bowler, Shaun and Bernard Grofman, eds. Elections in Australia, Ireland, and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote: Reflections on an Embedded Institution. By Abraham Diskin 440Marques-Pereira, Bérengère et Patricio Nolasco, coordinateurs. La représentation politique des femmes en Amérique latine. Par Stéphanie Rousseau 441Parsa, Misagh. States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines. By David Close 444Ellis, Stephen. The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War. By Larry A. Swatuk 445Santoro, Michael A. Profits and Principles: Global Capitalism and Human Rights in China. By John Fuh-Sheng Hsieh 447Norman, E. Herbert. Japan's Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period. By John S. Brownlee 448Kleinberg, Romanda Bensabat and Janine A. Clark, eds. Economic Liberalization, Democratization and Civil Society in the Developing World. By Jorge A. Schiavon 450Plattner, Marc F. and Alexander Smolar, eds. Globalization, Power, and Democracy. By Erkki Berndtson 452Eriksen, Erik Oddvar and John Erik Fossum, eds. Democracy in the European Union: Integration through Deliberation? By Antje Wiener 453Offen, Karen. European Feminisms 1700-1950: A Political History. By Penelope Deutscher 454Tomasi, John. Liberalism beyond Justice: Citizens, Society, and the Boundaries of Political Theory. By Alfonso J. Damico 456Dufour, Frédérick-Guillaume. Patriotisme constitutionnel et nationalisme. Sur Jürgen Habermas. Par Donald Ipperciel 458O'Neill, Michael and Dennis Austin, eds. Democracy and Cultural Diversity. By Steven Roach 461Newell, Peter. Climate for Change: Non-State Actors and the Global Politics of the Greenhouse. By Debora L. Vannijnatten 463Mayall, James. World Politics: Progress and Its Limits. By Robert Jackson 465Giddens, Anthony, ed. The Global Third Way Debate. By Phillip Wood 466

‘Bitzer,’ said Thomas Gradgrind. ‘Your definition of a horse.’‘Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely twenty-four grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy countries, sheds hoofs, too. Hoofs hard, but requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by marks in mouth.’ Thus (and much more) Bitzer.‘Now girl number twenty,’ said Mr. Gradgrind. ‘You know what a horse is.’— Charles Dickens, Hard Times (1854)Dickens’s famous pedant, Thomas Gradgrind, was not an anomaly. He is the pedagogical manifestation of the rise of quantification in modernism that was the necessary adjunct to massive urbanisation and industrialisation. His classroom caricatures the dominant epistemic modality of modern global democracies, our unwavering trust in numbers, “data”, and reproductive predictability. This brief quotation from Hard Times both presents and parodies the 19th century’s displacement of what were previously more commonly living and heterogeneous existential encounters with events and things. The world had not yet been made predictably repetitive through industrialisation, standardisation, law, and ubiquitous codes of construction. Theirs was much more a world of unique events and not the homogenised and orthodox iteration of standardised knowledge. Horses and, by extension, all entities and events gradually were displaced by their rote definitions: individuals of a so-called natural kind were reduced to identicals. Further, these mechanical standardisations were and still are underwritten by mapping them into a numerical and extensive characterisation. On top of standardised objects and procedures appeared assigned numerical equivalents which lent standardisation the seemingly apodictic certainty of deductive demonstrations. The algebraic becomes the socially enforced criterion for the previously more sensory, qualitative, and experiential encounters with becoming that were more likely in pre-industrial life. Here too, we see that the function of this reproductive protocol is not just notational but is the sine qua non for, in Althusser’s famous phrase, the manufacture of citizens as “subject subjects”, those concrete individuals who are educated to understand themselves ideologically in an imaginary relation with their real position in any society’s self-reproduction. Here, however, ideology performs that operation through that nominally least political of cognitive modes, the supposed friend of classical Marxism’s social science, the mathematical. The historical onset of this social and political reproductive hegemony, this uniform supplanting of time’s ineluctable differencing with the parasite of its associated model, can partial be found in the formation of metrics. Before the 19th century, the measures of space and time were local. Units of length and weight varied not just between nations but often by municipality. These parochial standards reflected indigenous traditions, actualities, personalities, and needs. This variation in measurement standards suggested that every exchange or judgment of kind and value relied upon the specificity of that instance. Every evaluation of an instance required perceptual acuity and not the banality of enumeration constituted by commodification and the accounting practices intrinsic to centralised governance. This variability in measure was complicated by similar variability in the currencies of the day. Thus, barter presented the participants with complexities and engagements of skills and discrete observation completely alien to the modern purchase of duplicate consumer objects with stable currencies. Almost nothing of life was iterative: every exchange was, more or less, an anomaly. However, in 1790, immediately following the French Revolution and as a central manifestation of its movement to rational democratisation, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand proposed a metrical system to the French National Assembly. The units of this metric system, based originally on observable features of nature, are now formally codified in all scientific practice by seven physical constants. Further, they are ubiquitous now in almost all public exchanges between individuals, corporations, and states. These units form a coherent and extensible structure whose elements and rules are subject to seemingly lossless symbolic exchange in a mathematic coherence aided by their conformity to decimal representation. From 1960, their basic contemporary form was established as the International System of Units (SI). Since then, all but three of the countries of the world (Myanmar, Liberia, and the United States), regardless of political organisation and individual history, have adopted these standards for commerce and general measurement. The uniformity and rational advantage of this system is easily demonstrable in just the absurd variation in the numeric bases of the Imperial / British system which uses base 16 for ounces/pounds, base 12 for inches/feet, base three for feet/yards, base 180 for degrees between freezing and cooling, 43,560 square feet per acre, eights for division of inches, etc. Even with its abiding antagonism to the French, Britain officially adopted the metric system as was required by its admission to the EU in 1973. The United States is the last great holdout in the public use of the metric system even though SI has long been the standard wanted by the federal government. At first, the move toward U.S. adoption was promising. Following France and rejecting England’s practice, America was founded on a decimal currency system in 1792. In 1793, Jefferson requested a copy of the standard kilogram from France in a first attempt to move to the metric system: however, the ship carrying the copy was captured by pirates. Indeed, The Metric Conversion Act of 1975 expressed a more serious national intention to adopt SI, but after some abortive efforts, the nation fell back into the more archaic measurements dominant since before its revolution. However, the central point remains that while the U.S. is unique in its public measurement standard among dominant powers, it is equally committed to the hegemonic application of a numerical rendition of events.The massive importance of this underlying uniformity is that it supplies the central global mechanism whereby the world’s chaotic variation is continuously parsed and supplanted into comparable, intelligible, and predictable units that understand individuating difference as anomaly. Difference, then, is understood in this method not as qualitative and intensive, which it necessarily is, but quantitative and extensive. Like Gradgrind’s “horse”, the living and unique thing is rendered through the Apollonian dream of standardisation and enumeration. While differencing is the only inherent quality of time’s chaotic flow, accounting and management requite iteration. To order the reproduction of modern society, the unique individuating differences that render an object as “this one”, what the Medieval logicians called haecceities, are only seen as “accidental” and “non-essential” deviations. This is not just odd but illogical since these very differences allow events to be individuated items so to appear as countable at all. As Leibniz’s principle, the indiscernibility of identicals, suggests, the application of the metrical same to different occasions is inherently paradoxical: if each unit were truly the same, there could only be one. As the etymology of “anomaly” suggests, it is that which is unexpected, irregular, out of line, or, going back to the Greek, nomos, at variance with the law. However, as the only “law” that always is at hand is the so-called “Second Law of Thermodynamics”, the inconsistently consistent roiling of entropy, the evident theoretical question might be, “how is anomaly possible when regularity itself is impossible?” The answer lies not in events “themselves” but exactly in the deductive valorisations projected by that most durable invention of the French Revolution adumbrated above, the metric system. This seemingly innocuous system has formed the reproductive and iterative bias of modern post-industrial perceptual homogenisation. Metrical modeling allows – indeed, requires – that one mistake the metrical changeling for the experiential event it replaces. Gilles Deleuze, that most powerful French metaphysician (1925-1995) offers some theories to understand the seminal production (not reproduction) of disparity that is intrinsic to time and to distinguish it from its homogenised representation. For him, and his sometime co-author, Felix Guattari, time’s “chaosmosis” is the host constantly parasitised by its symbolic model. This problem, however, of standardisation in the face of time’s originality, is obscured by its very ubiquity; we must first denaturalise the seemingly self-evident metrical concept of countable and uniform units.A central disagreement in ancient Greece was between the proponents of physis (often translated as “nature” but etymologically indicative of growth and becoming, process and not fixed form) and nomos (law or custom). This is one of the first ethical and so political debates in Western philosophy. For Heraclitus and other pre-Socratics, the emphatic character of nature was change, its differencing dynamism, its processual but not iterative character. In anticipation of Hume, Sophists disparaged nomos (νόμος) as simply the habituated application of synthetic law and custom to the fluidity of natural phenomena. The historical winners of this debate, Plato and the scientific attitudes of regularity and taxonomy characteristic of his best pupil, Aristotle, have dominated ever since, but not without opponents.In the modern era, anti-enlightenment figures such as Hamann, Herder, and the Schlegel brothers gave theoretical voice to romanticism’s repudiation of the paradoxical impulses of the democratic state for regulation and uniformity that Talleyrand’s “revolutionary” metrical proposal personified. They saw the correlationalism (as adumbrated by Meillassoux) between thought and thing based upon their hypothetical equitability as a betrayal of the dynamic physis that experience presented. Variable infinity might come either from the character of God or nature or, as famously in Spinoza’s Ethics, both (“deus sive natura”). In any case, the plenum of nature was never iterative. This rejection of metrical regularity finds its synoptic expression in Nietzsche. As a classicist, Nietzsche supplies the bridge between the pre-Socratics and the “post-structuralists”. His early mobilisation of the Apollonian, the dream of regularity embodied in the sun god, and the Dionysian, the drunken but inarticulate inexpression of the universe’s changing manifold, gives voice to a new resistance to the already dominate metrical system. His is a new spin of the mythic representatives of Nomos and physis. For him, this pair, however, are not – as they are often mischaracterised – in dialectical dialogue. To place them into the thesis / antithesis formulation would be to give them the very binary character that they cannot share and to, tacitly, place both under Apollo’s procedure of analysis. Their modalities are not antithetical but mutually exclusive. To represent the chaotic and non-iterative processes of becoming, of physis, under the rubric of a common metrics, nomos, is to mistake the parasite for the host. In its structural hubris, the ideological placebo of metrical knowing thinks it non-reductively captures the multiplicity it only interpellates. In short, the polyvalent, fluid, and inductive phenomena that empiricists try to render are, in their intrinsic character, unavailable to deductive method except, first, under the reductive equivalence (the Gradgrind pedagogy) of metrical modeling. This incompatibility of physis and nomos was made manifest by David Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) just before the cooptation of the 18th century’s democratic revolutions by “representative” governments. There, Hume displays the Apollonian dream’s inability to accurately and non-reductively capture a phenomenon in the wild, free from the stringent requirements of synthetic reproduction. His argument in Book I is succinct.Now as we call every thing custom, which proceeds from a past repetition, without any new reasoning or conclusion, we may establish it as a certain truth, that all the belief, which follows upon any present impression, is deriv'd solely from that origin. (Part 3, Section 8)There is nothing in any object, consider'd in itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it; ... even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience. (Part 3, Section 12)The rest of mankind ... are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. (Part 4, Section 6)In sum, then, nomos is nothing but habit, a Pavlovian response codified into a symbolic representation and, pragmatically, into a reproductive protocol specifically ordered to exclude anomaly, the inherent chaotic variation that is the hallmark of physis. The Apollonian dream that there can be an adequate metric of unrestricted natural phenomena in their full, open, turbulent, and manifold becoming is just that, a dream. Order, not chaos, is the anomaly. Of course, Kant felt he had overcome this unacceptable challenge to rational application to induction after Hume woke him from his “dogmatic slumber”. But what is perhaps one of the most important assertions of the critiques may be only an evasion of Hume’s radical empiricism: “there are only two ways we can account for the necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects: either experience makes these concepts possible or these concepts make experience possible. The former supposition does not hold of the categories (nor of pure sensible intuition) ... . There remains ... only the second—a system ... of the epigenesis of pure reason” (B167). Unless “necessary agreement” means the dictatorial and unrelenting insistence in a symbolic model of perception of the equivalence of concept and appearance, this assertion appears circular. This “reading” of Kant’s evasion of the very Humean crux, the necessary inequivalence of a metric or concept to the metered or defined, is manifest in Nietzsche.In his early “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” (1873), Nietzsche suggests that there is no possible equivalence between a concept and its objects, or, to use Frege’s vocabulary, between sense or reference. We speak of a "snake" [see “horse” in Dickens]: this designation touches only upon its ability to twist itself and could therefore also fit a worm. What arbitrary differentiations! What one-sided preferences, first for this, then for that property of a thing! The various languages placed side by side show that with words it is never a question of truth, never a question of adequate expression; otherwise, there would not be so many languages. The "thing in itself" (which is precisely what the pure truth, apart from any of its consequences, would be) is likewise something quite incomprehensible to the creator of language and something not in the least worth striving for. This creator only designates the relations of things to men, and for expressing these relations he lays hold of the boldest metaphors.The literal is always already a reductive—as opposed to literature’s sometimes expansive agency—metaphorisation of events as “one of those” (a token of “its” type). The “necessary” equivalence in nomos is uncovered but demanded. The same is reproduced by the habitual projection of certain “essential qualities” at the expense of all those others residing in every experiential multiplicity. Only in this prison of nomos can anomaly appear: otherwise all experience would appear as it is, anomalous. With this paradoxical metaphor of the straight and equal, Nietzsche inverts the paradigm of scientific expression. He reveals as a repressive social and political obligation the symbolic assertion homology where actually none can be. Supposed equality and measurement all transpire within an Apollonian “dream within a dream”. The concept captures not the manifold of chaotic experience but supplies its placebo instead by an analytic tautology worthy of Gradgrind. The equivalence of event and definition is always nothing but a symbolic iteration. Such nominal equivalence is nothing more than shifting events into a symbolic frame where they can be commodified, owned, and controlled in pursuit of that tertiary equivalence which has become the primary repressive modality of modern societies: money. This article has attempted, with absurd rapidity, to hint why some ubiquitous concepts, which are generally considered self-evident and philosophically unassailable, are open not only to metaphysical, political, and ethical challenge, but are existentially unjustified. All this was done to defend the smaller thesis that the concept of anomaly is itself a reflection of a global misrepresentation of the chaos of becoming. This global substitution expresses a conservative model and measure of the world in the place of the world’s intrinsic heterogenesis, a misrepresentation convenient for those who control the representational powers of governance. In conclusion, let us look, again too briefly, at a philosopher who neither accepts this normative world picture of regularity nor surrenders to Nietzschean irony, Gilles Deleuze.Throughout his career, Deleuze uses the word “pure” with senses antithetical to so-called common sense and, even more, Kant. In its traditional concept, pure means an entity or substance whose essence is not mixed or adulterated with any other substance or material, uncontaminated by physical pollution, clean and immaculate. The pure is that which is itself itself. To insure intelligibility, that which is elemental, alphabetic, must be what it is itself and no other. This discrete character forms the necessary, if often tacit, precondition to any analysis and decomposition of beings into their delimited “parts” that are subject to measurement and measured disaggregation. Any entity available for structural decomposition, then, must be pictured as constituted exhaustively by extensive ones, measurable units, its metrically available components. Dualism having established as its primary axiomatic hypothesis the separability of extension and thought must now overcome that very separation with an adequacy, a one to one correspondence, between a supposedly neatly measurable world and ideological hegemony that presents itself as rational governance. Thus, what is needed is not only a purity of substance but a matching purity of reason, and it is this clarification of thought, then, which, as indicated above, is the central concern of Kant’s influential and grand opus, The Critique of Pure Reason.Deleuze heard a repressed alternative to the purity of the measured self-same and equivalent that, as he said about Plato, “rumbled” under the metaphysics of analysis. This was the dark tradition he teased out of the Stoics, Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, Nicholas d’Autrecourt, Spinoza, Meinong, Bergson, Nietzsche, and McLuhan. This is not the purity of identity, A = A, of metrical uniformity and its shadow, anomaly. Rather than repressing, Deleuze revels in the perverse purity of differencing, difference constituted by becoming without the Apollonian imposition of normalcy or definitional identity. One cannot say “difference in itself” because its ontology, its genesis, is not that of anything itself but exactly the impossibility of such a manner of constitution: universal anomaly. No thing or idea can be iterative, separate, or discrete.In his Difference and Repetition, the idea of the purely same is undone: the Ding an sich is a paradox. While the dogmatic image of thought portrays the possibility of the purely self-same, Deleuze never does. His notions of individuation without individuals, of modulation without models, of simulacra without originals, always finds a reflection in his attitudes toward, not language as logical structure, but what necessarily forms the differential making of events, the heterogenesis of ontological symptoms. His theory has none of the categories of Pierce’s triadic construction: not the arbitrary of symbols, the “self-representation” of icons, or even the causal relation of indices. His “signs” are symptoms: the non-representational consequences of the forces that are concurrently producing them. Events, then, are the symptoms of the heterogenetic forces that produce, not reproduce them. To measure them is to export them into a representational modality that is ontologically inapplicable as they are not themselves themselves but the consequences of the ongoing differences of their genesis. Thus, the temperature associated with a fever is neither the body nor the disease.Every event, then, is a diaphora, the pure consequent of the multiplicity of the forces it cannot resemble, an original dynamic anomaly without standard. This term, diaphora, appears at the conclusion of that dialogue some consider Plato’s best, the Theaetetus. There we find perhaps the most important discussion of knowledge in Western metaphysics, which in its final moments attempts to understand how knowledge can be “True Judgement with an Account” (201d-210a). Following this idea leads to a theory, usually known as the “Dream of Socrates”, which posits two kinds of existents, complexes and simples, and proposes that “an account” means “an account of the complexes that analyses them into their simple components … the primary elements (prôta stoikheia)” of which we and everything else are composed (201e2). This—it will be noticed—suggests the ancient heritage of Kant’s own attempted purification of mereological (part/whole relations) nested elementals. He attempts the coordination of pure speculative reason to pure practical reason and, thus, attempts to supply the root of measurement and scientific regularity. However, as adumbrated by the Platonic dialogue, the attempted decompositions, speculative and pragmatic, lead to an impasse, an aporia, as the rational is based upon a correspondence and not the self-synthesis of the diaphorae by their own dynamic disequilibrium. Thus the dialogue ends inconclusively; Socrates rejects the solution, which is the problem itself, and leaves to meet his accusers and quaff his hemlock. The proposal in this article is that the diaphorae are all that exists in Deleuze’s world and indeed any world, including ours. Nor is this production decomposable into pure measured and defined elementals, as such decomposition is indeed exactly opposite what differential production is doing. For Deleuze, what exists is disparate conjunction. But in intensive conjunction the same cannot be the same except in so far as it differs. The diaphorae of events are irremediably asymmetric to their inputs: the actual does not resemble the virtual matrix that is its cause. Indeed, any recourse to those supposedly disaggregate inputs, the supposedly intelligible constituents of the measured image, will always but repeat the problematic of metrical representation at another remove. This is not, however, the traditional postmodern trap of infinite meta-shifting, as the diaphoric always is in each instance the very presentation that is sought. Heterogenesis can never be undone, but it can be affirmed. In a heterogenetic monism, what was the insoluble problem of correspondence in dualism is now its paradoxical solution: the problematic per se. What manifests in becoming is not, nor can be, an object or thought as separate or even separable, measured in units of the self-same. Dogmatic thought habitually translates intensity, the differential medium of chaosmosis, into the nominally same or similar so as to suit the Apollonian illusions of “correlational adequacy”. However, as the measured cannot be other than a calculation’s placebo, the correlation is but the shadow of a shadow. Every diaphora is an event born of an active conjunction of differential forces that give rise to this, their product, an interference pattern. Whatever we know and are is not the correlation of pure entities and thoughts subject to measured analysis but the confused and chaotic confluence of the specific, material, aleatory, differential, and unrepresentable forces under which we subsist not as ourselves but as the always changing product of our milieu. In short, only anomaly without a nominal becomes, and we should view any assertion that maps experience into the “objective” modality of the same, self-evident, and normal as a political prestidigitation motivated, not by “truth”, but by established political interest. ReferencesDella Volpe, Galvano. Logic as a Positive Science. London: NLB, 1980.Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repetition. Trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia UP, 1994.———. The Logic of Sense. Trans. Mark Lester. New York: Columbia UP, 1990.Guenon, René. The Reign of Quantity. New York: Penguin, 1972.Hawley, K. "Identity and Indiscernibility." Mind 118 (2009): 101-9.Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon, 2014.Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1929.Meillassoux, Quentin. After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency. Trans. Ray Brassier. New York: Continuum, 2008.Naddaf, Gerard. The Greek Concept of Nature. Albany: SUNY, 2005. Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Birth of Tragedy. Trans. Douglas Smith. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008.———. “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense.” Trans. Walter Kaufmann. The Portable Nietzsche. New York: Viking, 1976.Welch, Kathleen Ethel. "Keywords from Classical Rhetoric: The Example of Physis." Rhetoric Society Quarterly 17.2 (1987): 193–204.