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Journal articles on the topic 'Information theory in economics Econometrics'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 February 2022

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1

Maasoumi, Esfandiar. "A compendium to information theory in economics and econometrics." Econometric Reviews 12, no. 2 (1993): 137–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07474939308800260.

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2

Stock, James H., and Mark W. Watson. "Twenty Years of Time Series Econometrics in Ten Pictures." Journal of Economic Perspectives 31, no. 2 (2017): 59–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.31.2.59.

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This review tells the story of the past 20 years of time series econometrics through ten pictures. These pictures illustrate six broad areas of progress in time series econometrics: estimation of dynamic causal effects; estimation of dynamic structural models with optimizing agents (specifically, dynamic stochastic equilibrium models); methods for exploiting information in “big data” that are specialized to economic time series; improved methods for forecasting and for monitoring the economy; tools for modeling time variation in economic relationships; and improved methods for statistical infe

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3

Brocas, Isabelle, Juan D. Carrillo, and Thomas R. Palfrey. "Information gatekeepers: theory and experimental evidence." Economic Theory 51, no. 3 (2011): 649–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0615-9.

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4

Pennerstorfer, Dieter, Philipp Schmidt‐Dengler, Nicolas Schutz, Christoph Weiss, and Biliana Yontcheva. "INFORMATION AND PRICE DISPERSION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE." International Economic Review 61, no. 2 (2020): 871–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iere.12443.

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5

Allen, Beth. "The Future of Microeconomic Theory." Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 1 (2000): 143–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.14.1.143.

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The question of what constitutes good economic theory is analyzed. Current good and bad aspects of its methodologies are discussed. Interdisciplinary work that goes beyond the social sciences is advocated. The future predictions are presented concerning research in game theory and the economics of information. Finally, the importance of technology and the need for microeconomists to understand it better are argued.

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6

Baldwin, Marjorie. "An Asymmetric Information Theory of Labor Market Discrimination." Southern Economic Journal 57, no. 4 (1991): 1148. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1060342.

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7

Shin, Hyun Song, and Eric Rasmusen. "Games and Information: An Introduction to Games Theory." Economic Journal 99, no. 397 (1989): 864. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2233782.

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8

Caminal, Ramon, and Xavier Vives. "Why Market Shares Matter: An Information-Based Theory." RAND Journal of Economics 27, no. 2 (1996): 221. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555924.

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9

Chen, Chen-Wen, and Victor W. Liu. "Corporate governance under asymmetric information: Theory and evidence." Economic Modelling 33 (July 2013): 280–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2013.04.010.

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10

Michalowski, Arthur. "Information theory in ecosystems." Journal of Bioeconomics 13, no. 2 (2011): 125–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10818-011-9105-1.

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11

Arrow, K. "Some Developments in Economic Theory Since 1940: An Eyewitness Account." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 4 (April 20, 2010): 4–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2010-4-4-23.

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The article considers the evolution of some branches of modern economic theory from the perspective of the authors biography as a scientist and his professional formation. It describes problems of econometrics, general equilibrium theory, uncertainty, economics of information, and growth. It is shown how different authors representing various fields came to similar conclusions simultaneously and independently, what were the problems, in response to which economists of the second half of last century developed their theories, and what were the contexts of such development.

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12

Jann, Ole, and Christoph Schottmüller. "An Informational Theory of Privacy." Economic Journal 130, no. 625 (2019): 93–124. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ej/uez045.

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Abstract Privacy of consumers or citizens is often seen as an inefficient information asymmetry. We challenge this view by showing that privacy can increase welfare in an informational sense. It can also improve information aggregation and prevent inefficient statistical discrimination. We show how and when the different informational effects of privacy line up to make privacy efficient or even Pareto-optimal. Our theory can be applied to decide who should have which information and how privacy and information disclosure should be regulated. We discuss applications to online privacy, credit de

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13

Dreher, Axel, Kai Gehring, Christos Kotsogiannis, and Silvia Marchesi. "Information transmission within federal fiscal architectures: theory and evidence." Oxford Economic Papers 70, no. 1 (2017): 243–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpx036.

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Abstract This paper explores the role of information transmission and misaligned interests across levels of governments in explaining variation in the degree of decentralization across countries. We analyse two alternative policy-decision schemes—‘decentralization’ and ‘centralization’— within a two-sided incomplete information principal–agent framework. The quality of communication depends on the conflict of interests between the government levels and on which government level controls the degree of decentralization. We show that the extent of misaligned interests and the relative importance

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14

Clarke, Bertrand, Jennifer Clarke, and Chi Wai Yu. "Statistical Problem Classes and Their Links to Information Theory." Econometric Reviews 33, no. 1-4 (2013): 337–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07474938.2013.807190.

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15

Hervés-Beloso, Carlos, V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha, and Paulo K. Monteiro. "Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and infinitely many states." Economic Theory 38, no. 2 (2008): 295–320. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0359-3.

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16

Einav, Liran, and Steve Tadelis. "Jonathan Levin: 2011 John Bates Clark Medalist." Journal of Economic Perspectives 26, no. 2 (2012): 207–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.26.2.207.

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Jonathan Levin, the 2011 recipient of the American Economic Association's John Bates Clark Medal, has established himself as a leader in the fields of industrial organization and microeconomic theory. Jon has made important contributions in many areas: the economics of contracts and organizations; market design; markets with asymmetric information; and estimation methods for dynamic games. Jon's combination of breadth and depth is remarkable, ranging from important papers in very distinct areas such as economic theory and econometric methods to applied work that seamlessly integrates theory wi

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17

Park, Jaehong, and George C. Davis. "The Theory and Econometrics of Health Information in Cross‐Sectional Nutrient Demand Analysis." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 83, no. 4 (2001): 840–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0002-9092.00213.

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18

Carrera, César, and N. R. Ramírez-Rondán. "INFLATION, INFORMATION RIGIDITY, AND THE STICKY INFORMATION PHILLIPS CURVE." Macroeconomic Dynamics 23, no. 07 (2017): 2597–615. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s136510051700089x.

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The Great Moderation is characterized as a period of stable macroeconomic conditions, especially with regard to inflation. Under the sticky information theory, this environment may provide a few incentives for agents to update information on inflation, thus, producing a new slope of the sticky information Phillips curve. We estimate the degree of information rigidity implied by the sticky information Phillips curve. Using threshold models, we identify two regimes of high and low inflation, finding that each identified regime is associated with a specific degree of information stickiness. This

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19

Gibbons, Robert. "An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory." Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 1 (1997): 127–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.11.1.127.

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This paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists. The author gives simple definitions and intuitive examples of four kinds of games and their corresponding solution concepts: Nash equilibrium in static games of complete information; subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in dynamic games of complete information; Bayesian Nash equilibrium in static games with incomplete (or 'private') information; and perfect Bayesian (or sequential) equilibrium in dynamic games with incomplete information. The main theme of the paper is that there are important differences among the games but

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20

Bellalah, Mondher, and Bertrand Jacquillat. "Option Valuation with Information Costs: Theory and Tests." Financial Review 30, no. 3 (1995): 617–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6288.1995.tb00849.x.

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21

Sealey, C. W., and Robert Heinkel. "Asymmetric information and a theory of compensating balances." Journal of Banking & Finance 9, no. 2 (1985): 193–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0378-4266(85)90017-2.

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22

Acquisti, Alessandro, Curtis Taylor, and Liad Wagman. "The Economics of Privacy." Journal of Economic Literature 54, no. 2 (2016): 442–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.54.2.442.

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This article summarizes and draws connections among diverse streams of theoretical and empirical research on the economics of privacy. We focus on the economic value and consequences of protecting and disclosing personal information, and on consumers' understanding and decisions regarding the trade-offs associated with the privacy and the sharing of personal data. We highlight how the economic analysis of privacy evolved over time, as advancements in information technology raised increasingly nuanced and complex issues. We find and highlight three themes that connect diverse insights from the

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23

Diskin, Abraham, and Moshe Koppel. "Voting power: an information theory approach." Social Choice and Welfare 34, no. 1 (2009): 105–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0390-8.

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24

Bertomeu, Jeremy, and Iván Marinovic. "A Theory of Hard and Soft Information." Accounting Review 91, no. 1 (2015): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-51102.

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ABSTRACT We study optimal disclosure via two competing communication channels: hard information whose value has been verified, and soft disclosures such as forecasts, unaudited statements, and press releases. We show that certain soft disclosures may contain as much information as hard disclosures, and we establish that: (1) exclusive reliance on soft disclosures tends to convey bad news, (2) credibility is greater when unfavorable information is reported, and (3) misreporting is more likely when soft information is issued jointly with hard information. We also show that a soft report that is

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25

Reny, Philip J. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information." Journal of Economic Theory 59, no. 2 (1993): 257–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1017.

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26

Dixit, Avinash, and Timothy Besley. "James Mirrlees' Contributions to the Theory of Information and Incentives." Scandinavian Journal of Economics 99, no. 2 (1997): 207–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9442.00059.

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27

Bartoš, Vojtěch, Michal Bauer, Julie Chytilová, and Filip Matějka. "Attention Discrimination: Theory and Field Experiments with Monitoring Information Acquisition." American Economic Review 106, no. 6 (2016): 1437–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20140571.

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We integrate tools to monitor information acquisition in field experiments on discrimination and examine whether gaps arise already when decision makers choose the effort level for reading an application. In both countries we study, negatively stereotyped minority names reduce employers' effort to inspect resumes. In contrast, minority names increase information acquisition in the rental housing market. Both results are consistent with a model of endogenous allocation of costly attention, which magnifies the role of prior beliefs and preferences beyond the one considered in standard models of

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28

Lang, Ruitian. "Try before you buy: A theory of dynamic information acquisition." Journal of Economic Theory 183 (September 2019): 1057–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.07.014.

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29

Chatterjee, Satyajit, Dean Corbae, and José-Víctor Ríos-Rull. "A finite-life private-information theory of unsecured consumer debt." Journal of Economic Theory 142, no. 1 (2008): 149–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.018.

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30

Podczeck, Konrad, and Nicholas C. Yannelis. "Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and with infinitely many commodities." Journal of Economic Theory 141, no. 1 (2008): 152–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.011.

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31

Okada, Akira. "A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: Verifiable types." Journal of Economic Theory 163 (May 2016): 318–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.002.

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32

Rovinskaya, T. "Information Society: Theory and Practice." World Economy and International Relations, no. 9 (2010): 81–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2010-9-81-90.

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The research is devoted to the information society phenomenon analysis both in theoretical aspect (the term genesis, the concept development) and in practice. The historical evolution of the information transfer technical means and social communication models is thoroughly analyzed. Primary attention is focused on modern technologies, which enabled the emergence of new social relations: the hypermedia (including the interactive television) and Internet platforms (Web 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0). Creation of a "virtual reality" predetermined the introduction of the so called "Network Society" – a society

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33

Besley, Timothy. "Nonmarket Institutions for Credit and Risk Sharing in Low-Income Countries." Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, no. 3 (1995): 115–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.9.3.115.

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The design credit and risk institutions in low-income countries provides one of the most exciting testing grounds for theories of contracting with imperfect information and limited enforcement. This paper reviews some of the recent literature, with a special focus on nonmarket institutions that cope with risk and provide credit. This literature attempts to bring together insights from economic theory, especially information economics, contract theory, and mechanism design theory. However, it is also applied, being motivated by the circumstance of the poor countries that their authors have visi

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34

Choi, Syngjoo, José-Alberto Guerra, and Jinwoo Kim. "Interdependent value auctions with insider information: Theory and experiment." Games and Economic Behavior 117 (September 2019): 218–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.06.007.

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35

Anshuman, V. Ravi, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam. "Price Limits, Information Acquisition, and Bid-ask Spreads: Theory and Evidence." Economic Notes 28, no. 1 (1999): 91–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0300.00006.

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36

Innes, Robert. "A Theory of Consumer Boycotts Under Symmetric Information and Imperfect Competition." Economic Journal 116, no. 511 (2006): 355–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01084.x.

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37

Gallin, Joshua, and Randal J. Verbrugge. "A theory of sticky rents: Search and bargaining with incomplete information." Journal of Economic Theory 183 (September 2019): 478–519. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.06.003.

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38

Mann, Stefan, and Henry Wüstemann. "Public governance of information asymmetries—The gap between reality and economic theory." Journal of Socio-Economics 39, no. 2 (2010): 278–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2009.10.009.

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39

DALEY, BRENDAN, and BRETT GREEN. "An Information-Based Theory of Time-Varying Liquidity." Journal of Finance 71, no. 2 (2016): 809–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12272.

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40

ANCTIL, REGINA M., JOHN DICKHAUT, CHANDRA KANODIA, and BRIAN SHAPIRO. "Information Transparency and Coordination Failure: Theory and Experiment." Journal of Accounting Research 42, no. 2 (2004): 159–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2004.00134.x.

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41

Athreya, Kartik, Xuan S. Tam, and Eric R. Young. "A Quantitative Theory of Information and Unsecured Credit." American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 4, no. 3 (2012): 153–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mac.4.3.153.

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Important changes have occurred in unsecured credit markets over the past three decades. Most prominently, there have been large increases in aggregate consumer debt, the personal bankruptcy rate, the size of bankruptcies, the dispersion of interest rates paid by borrowers, and the relative discount received by those with good credit ratings. We find that improvements in information available to lenders on household-level costs of bankruptcy can account for a significant fraction of what has been observed. The ex ante welfare gains from better information are positive but small. (JEL D14, D82,

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42

Fehrler, Sebastian, and Niall Hughes. "How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 10, no. 1 (2018): 181–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160046.

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We investigate the potential of transparency to influence committee decision-making. We present a model in which career concerned committee members receive private information of different type-dependent accuracy, deliberate, and vote. We study three levels of transparency under which career concerns are predicted to affect behavior differently and test the model's key predictions in a laboratory experiment. The model's predictions are largely borne out—transparency negatively affects information aggregation at the deliberation and voting stages, leading to sharply different committee error ra

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43

Sandmo, Agnar. "Asymmetric Information and Public Economics: The Mirrlees-Vickrey Nobel Prize." Journal of Economic Perspectives 13, no. 1 (1999): 165–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.13.1.165.

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This paper surveys the contributions of Nobel laureates James Mirrlees and William Vickrey to the study of asymmetric information in economics, particularly as they relate to problems in public economics. It discusses and interprets Mirrlees's work on optimal income taxation and relates it to previous work on optimal distribution of income, including that of Vickrey. It also describes Vickrey's fundamental contribution to auction theory and its importance for the more general field of preference revelation. It also includes an evaluation of the prize winners' work in other areas of public econ

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44

Simon, Herbert A. "Organizations and Markets." Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 2 (1991): 25–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.5.2.25.

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The economies of modern industrialized society can more appropriately be labeled organizational economies than market economies. Thus, even market-driven capitalist economies need a theory of organizations as much as they need a theory of markets. The attempts of the new institutional economics to explain organizational behavior solely in terms of agency, asymmetric information, transaction costs, opportunism, and other concepts drawn from neoclassical economics ignore key organizational mechanisms like authority, identification, and coordination, and hence are seriously incomplete. The theory

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45

Machina, Mark J. "Choice Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved." Journal of Economic Perspectives 1, no. 1 (1987): 121–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.1.1.121.

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Fifteen years ago, the theory of choice under uncertainty could be considered one of the “success stories” of economic analysis: it rested on solid axiomatic foundations, it had seen important breakthroughs in the analytics of risk, risk aversion, and their applications to economic issues, and it stood ready to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the newly emerging “information revolution” in economics. Today choice under uncertainty is a field in flux: the standard theory is being challenged on several grounds from both within and outside economics. The nature of these challenges, and o

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46

Saam, Nicole J. "Asymmetry in information versus asymmetry in power: Implicit assumptions of agency theory?" Journal of Socio-Economics 36, no. 6 (2007): 825–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2007.01.018.

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47

Alatas, Vivi, Abhijit Banerjee, Arun G. Chandrasekhar, Rema Hanna, and Benjamin A. Olken. "Network Structure and the Aggregation of Information: Theory and Evidence from Indonesia." American Economic Review 106, no. 7 (2016): 1663–704. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20140705.

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We use unique data from over 600 Indonesian communities on what individuals know about the poverty status of others to study how network structure influences information aggregation. We develop a model of semi-Bayesian learning on networks, which we structurally estimate using within-village data. The model generates qualitative predictions about how cross-village patterns of learning relate to network structure, which we show are borne out in the data. We apply our findings to a community-based targeting program, where citizens chose households to receive aid, and show that the networks that

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48

Schmitz, Patrick W. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach." American Economic Review 96, no. 1 (2006): 422–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/000282806776157722.

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The property rights approach to the theory of the firm suggests that ownership structures are chosen in order to provide ex ante investment incentives, while bargaining is ex post efficient. In contrast, transaction cost economics emphasizes ex post inefficiencies. In the present paper, a party may invest and acquire private information about the default payoff that it can realize on its own. Inefficient rent seeking can overturn prominent implications of the property rights theory. In particular, ownership by party B may be optimal, even though only the indispensable party A makes an investme

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49

Sonin, K. I. "The principles of auction theory (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences 2020)." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 1 (January 12, 2021): 5–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2021-1-5-32.

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Auction theory is the core of modern economic theory, and standard auctions are the basic elements of many models in microeconomics, public economics, and finance. Theoretical studies of auctions have shaped the modern understanding of the economic role of information in competitive market, and of price theory. Applied analysis of auctions has underpinned important practical mechanisms — for example, mechanisms of privatization and re-privatization of electromagnetic spectrum and public procurement. The 2020 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences was awarded to Robert Wilson and Paul Milgro

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50

Heinle, Mirko S., Nicholas Ross, and Richard E. Saouma. "A Theory of Participative Budgeting." Accounting Review 89, no. 3 (2013): 1025–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-50686.

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ABSTRACT This paper complements the ongoing empirical discussion surrounding participative budgeting by comparing its economic merits relative to a top-down budgeting alternative. In both budgeting regimes, private information is communicated vertically between a principal and a manager. We show that top-down budgeting incurs fewer agency costs than bottom-up budgeting whenever the level of information asymmetry is relatively low. Although the choice between top-down and bottom-up budgeting ultimately determines who receives private information within the firm, we find that both the principal

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