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Journal articles on the topic 'Informational asymmetries'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 7 February 2022

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1

Venezian, Emilio C., and Joseph A. Fields. "Informational Asymmetries in Retroactive Insurance." Journal of Risk and Insurance 54, no. 4 (1987): 780. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/253124.

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2

Scorsone, Eric, and Stephan Weiler. "New Markets as Informational Asymmetries." Economic Development Quarterly 18, no. 3 (2004): 303–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0891242404265139.

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3

Donner, Herman, and Fredrik Kopsch. "Housing Tenure and Informational Asymmetries." Journal of Real Estate Research 40, no. 2 (2018): 155–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2018.12091496.

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4

Smith, Michael L., and Robert C. Witt. "Informational Asymmetries in Retroactive Insurance: A Response." Journal of Risk and Insurance 55, no. 3 (1988): 548. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/253264.

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5

Ahn, T. K., Robert Huckfeldt, and John Barry Ryan. "Communication, Influence, and Informational Asymmetries among Voters." Political Psychology 31, no. 5 (2010): 763–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00783.x.

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6

Einav, Liran. "Informational Asymmetries and Observational Learning in Search." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 30, no. 3 (2005): 241–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11166-005-6563-7.

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7

Basile, Achille, Chiara Donnini, and Maria Gabriella Graziano. "Economies with informational asymmetries and limited vetoer coalitions." Economic Theory 45, no. 1-2 (2009): 147–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0473-x.

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8

Smith, Bruce D. "Informational asymmetries in macroeconomics and finance: An introduction." Economic Theory 12, no. 3 (1998): 451–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050231.

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9

Ligon, James A., and Paul D. Thistle. "Information Asymmetries and Informational Incentives in Monopolistic Insurance Markets." Journal of Risk and Insurance 63, no. 3 (1996): 434. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/253620.

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10

Herander, Mark G., and Brad Kamp. "TARIFF POLICY AND ENTRY WITH COST-BASED INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES." Economic Inquiry 37, no. 1 (1999): 60–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1999.tb01416.x.

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11

Kessler, Anke S. "Representative versus direct democracy: The role of informational asymmetries." Public Choice 122, no. 1-2 (2005): 9–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-1682-x.

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12

Berry, Thomas D., and Erica Wagner. "The Relationship between Firm Innovation and Corporate Social Responsibility." Business and Professional Ethics Journal 38, no. 2 (2019): 137–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/bpej201942578.

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Firm innovation creates an informational asymmetry between the firm and outside stakeholders. Since CSR activities have been shown to reduce asymmetries and risk we surmise that firms use discretionary CSR activities to reduce the asymmetries from innovation. We study an innovation intense industry (technology) and find results that support the hypothesis that firms use CSR to signal long term viability of innovative activities.

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13

Johansson, Robert C. "Watershed Nutrient Trading Under Asymmetric Information." Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 31, no. 2 (2002): 221–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1068280500004020.

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This study evaluates first- and second-best trading policies for regulating watershed phosphorus under asymmetric information. The trading policies are differentiated on the degree to which regulators observe point and nonpoint source abatement efforts. The efficiency losses attributable to these informational asymmetries and those of the second-best policies can be measured in social welfare, and provide regulators the shadow value of foregoing first-best measures. Given representative monitoring costs from national water monitoring programs, it is shown that under asymmetric information, the

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14

Proeger, Till, and Li Kathrin Rupieper. "Asymmetrische Information auf dem Handwerksmarkt – eine qualitative Analyse." Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik 68, no. 2 (2019): 149–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/zfwp-2019-2010.

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Abstract The code of craft regulation constitutes the legal base for craft and trade occupations in Germany. Resulting from a deregulation in 2004, the requirement to obtain a degree of higher occupational training, which used to be obligatory for founding a business, was dropped for about half of the occupations regulated by this code. While this deregulation has been frequently analyzed from a competition economics’ perspective, evidence regarding the information economics’ aspect of this deregulation is lacking. It is of particular relevance whether the deregulation fostered market failures

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15

Herander, Mark G., and Brad Kamp. "Quantitative Restrictions in the Presence of Cost-Based Informational Asymmetries." Southern Economic Journal 65, no. 4 (1999): 870. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1061281.

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16

Bernardo, Antonio E., and Kenneth L. Judd. "Asset market equilibrium with general tastes, returns, and informational asymmetries." Journal of Financial Markets 3, no. 1 (2000): 17–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1386-4181(99)00011-7.

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17

Mody, Ashoka, and Mark P. Taylor. "International capital crunches: the time-varying role of informational asymmetries." Applied Economics 45, no. 20 (2013): 2961–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2012.657355.

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18

Twigg‐Flesner, Christian. "Dealing with informational asymmetries under the proposed CESL and CISG." Journal of International Trade Law and Policy 11, no. 3 (2012): 281–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/14770021211267388.

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19

Capasso, Salvatore. "Financial Markets, Development and Economic Growth: Tales of Informational Asymmetries." Journal of Economic Surveys 18, no. 3 (2004): 267–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0950-0804.2004.00222.x.

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20

Mody, Ashoka, and Mark P. Taylor. "International Capital Crunches: The Time-Varying Role of Informational Asymmetries." IMF Working Papers 02, no. 43 (2002): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451846331.001.

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21

Herander, Mark G., and Brad Kamp. "Quantitative Restrictions in the Presence of Cost‐Based Informational Asymmetries." Southern Economic Journal 65, no. 4 (1999): 870–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.1999.tb00205.x.

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22

Bachelet, Maria Jua, Leonardo Becchetti, and Stefano Manfredonia. "The Green Bonds Premium Puzzle: The Role of Issuer Characteristics and Third-Party Verification." Sustainability 11, no. 4 (2019): 1098. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su11041098.

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An implication of our findings is that the issuer’s reputation or green third-party verifications are essential to reduce informational asymmetries, avoid suspicion of green (bond)-washing, and produce relatively more convenient financing conditions.

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23

Srivastava, Joydeep, and Dipankar Chakravarti. "Channel Negotiations with Information Asymmetries: Contingent Influences of Communication and Trustworthiness Reputations." Journal of Marketing Research 46, no. 4 (2009): 557–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.46.4.557.

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This article reports three experiments that examine how communication types (informational, relational, and coercive messages) and mutual trustworthiness reputations influence sequential bargaining between an uncertain manufacturer and an informed distributor in a marketing channel. In Experiment 1, bargainers use informational and relational messages to establish a positive social tenor in the interaction. Compared with when bargainers communicate only through offers and counteroffers, explicit communication produces quicker and more efficient agreements. The effects are stronger when manufac

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24

Drain, Maxwell, and Patricia A. Reuter-Lorenz. "Object-centered neglect for letters: Do informational asymmetries play a role?" Neuropsychologia 35, no. 4 (1997): 445–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0028-3932(96)00097-8.

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25

Pinheiro, Marcelo. "Informational asymmetries and a multiplier effect on price correlation and trading." Annals of Finance 1, no. 4 (2005): 395–421. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10436-005-0017-8.

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26

Green, Nile. "Shared infrastructures, informational asymmetries: Persians and Indians in Japan,c.1890–1930." Journal of Global History 8, no. 3 (2013): 414–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1740022813000351.

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AbstractDrawing on primary materials in Persian, Urdu, and English, this article compares Persian and Indian travel accounts to assess the similarities and differences of contemporaneous encounters with Japan. By linking Persian and Urdu writings from either side of 1900 to the differential impact of industrial communications (vernacular printing, steam travel) on Persia and India, the article reconstructs the global connections and inter-Asian networks that suddenly rendered Japan an important touchstone for intellectuals in the Middle East no less than South Asia. By presenting a triangulate

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27

Werner, Arndt, and Alwine Mohnen. "Informational Asymmetries in Job Markets and Its Impact on Companiesï¿½ Recruiting Success." Academy of Management Proceedings 2012, no. 1 (2012): 16424. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2012.16424abstract.

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28

Flaherty, Susan, Joanne Li, and Kenneth Small. "Evidence on board size and information asymmetry: A capital markets perspective." Corporate Ownership and Control 4, no. 2 (2007): 248–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i2c2p1.

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We examine the relation of board size with market liquidity and adverse selection costs using a sample of Fortune 200 companies. After controlling for firm specifics, equity characteristics, and ratio of insiders, we find a direct relation between board size and equity market liquidity. Our findings indicate that board size is positively and significantly related to dollar depth but has no impact on bid-ask spreads. Furthermore, using the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread as a proxy for transparency, we find that larger boards reduce information asymmetries, but the ratio of in

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29

Kamenica, Emir. "Contextual Inference in Markets: On the Informational Content of Product Lines." American Economic Review 98, no. 5 (2008): 2127–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.5.2127.

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Context can influence decisions. This malleability of choice is usually invoked as evidence that people do not maximize stable preference orderings. In a market equilibrium, however, context conveys payoff-relevant information to consumers. Consequently, these consumers rationally violate naïve formulations of standard choice theoretic principles. I identify informational asymmetries under which apparently anomalous behaviors, namely the compromise effect and choice overload, arise as market equilibria. Firms respond to consumers' contextual inference; in case of the compromise effect, a firm

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30

Rogers, Catherine. "A Window into the Soul of International Arbitration: Arbitrator Selection, Transparency and Stakeholder Interests." Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 46, no. 4 (2015): 1179. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v46i4.4888.

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New Zealand Law Foundation International Dispute Resolution Lecture 2013, delivered at Stone Lecture Theatre, University of Auckland Faculty of Law, 26 November 2013. This essay derives from that lecture, which considers the important issue of arbitrator selection, appointment and challenge standards and procedures, and introduces the Arbitrator Intelligence project – a proposed solution for informational asymmetries that can affect the fairness of arbitrator selection and appointment.

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31

Noyce, Abigail, Nishmar Cestero, Barbara Shinn-Cunningham, and David Somers. "Space Depends On Time: Informational Asymmetries in Visual and Auditory Short-Term Memory." Journal of Vision 15, no. 12 (2015): 1054. http://dx.doi.org/10.1167/15.12.1054.

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32

Wardrop, John. "Capital market imperfections: Informational asymmetries, financing constraints and New Zealand corporate investment behaviour." New Zealand Economic Papers 27, no. 2 (1993): 135–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00779959309544205.

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33

Farooq, Omar Farooq. "Do Multinational And Local Corporations Differ In Their Leverage Policies? Evidence From The MENA Region." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 32, no. 1 (2015): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v32i1.9482.

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<p>This paper examines the leverage policies of multinational corporations (MNCs) in comparison to those of local corporations in the MENA region during the period between 2006 and 2012. Our results show that MNCs have lower leverage levels than local firms. We argue that MNCs have higher information asymmetries than other firms. As a result, managerial opportunism may be higher in these firms, thereby minimizing their ability to raise debt. In case of local firms, we show that their debt ratios are not different from other firms. Furthermore, we also show that our results do not hold fo

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34

Block, Walter, and Robert A. Lawson. "Promotion, turnover and preemptive wage offers." Humanomics 22, no. 3 (2006): 133–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/08288660610703302.

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PurposeThe reason for writing the paper is to cast doubt on the claim that the informational asymmetries uncovered by Bernhardt and Scoones constitute a market failure.Design/methodology/approachThe main method used is to quote these authors, and then critically comment upon their views. The theoretical scope of the paper is the premise that markets are efficient, effective and ethical.FindingsIt was found in the course of the work that Bernhardt and Scoones were in error in their contentions.Research limitations/implicationsSuggestions for future research; this paper is but the tip of the ice

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35

Faia, Ester. "A NOTE ON CREDIT RISK TRANSFER AND THE MACROECONOMY." Macroeconomic Dynamics 22, no. 4 (2018): 1096–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1365100516000390.

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The recent financial crisis highlighted the limits of the originate to distribute model of banking, but its nexus with the macroeconomy remains unexplored. I build a business cycle model with banks engaging in credit risk transfer (CRT) under informational externalities. Markets for CRT provide liquidity insurance to banks, but the emergence of a pooling equilibrium can also impair the banks' monitoring incentives. In normal times and in face of standard macro shocks the insurance benefits of CRT prevail and the business cycle is stabilized. In face of financial/liquidity shocks the extent of

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36

Klempt, Charlotte, Kerstin Pull, and Manfred Stadler. "Asymmetric Information in Simple Bargaining Games: An Experimental Study." German Economic Review 20, no. 1 (2019): 29–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12138.

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Abstract Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at stake: in some cases, the proposer is better informed, in others, it is the responder. We analyze the effects of both types of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two different situations which allow for a variation of responder veto power: the ultimatum and the dictator game. We find that the extent to which proposers demand less in the ultimatum as compared to the dictator game is (marginally) smaller when the proposer is in the superior information posit

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37

Bernhard, William. "A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence." American Political Science Review 92, no. 2 (1998): 311–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2585666.

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Although central banks possess a similar function across the industrial democracies, their institutional structures—their levels of independence—differ greatly. My explanation of this variation emphasizes the informational asymmetries of monetary policymaking. Government ministers have informational advantages in the policy process, potentially creating conflicts with backbench legislators and, in a multiparty government, coalition partners. An independent central bank can help alleviate these conflicts. Politicians will choose an independent bank (1) if government ministers, party legislators

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38

Singh, J. P. "Stock Market Modeling in the Langevin Formalism." GIS Business 13, no. 2 (2018): 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.26643/gis.v13i2.3294.

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A Langevin formalism is proposed for stock market dynamics with modeling of various economic market features from first principles. Various processes and effects that occur in the stock market are mathematically incorporated in the said formulation. The Fokker Planck equation corresponding to the Langevin equation so obtained is solved and shows deviation from Gaussian behavior of the rate of change of stock price PDF. The deviation relates to factors such as market efficiency, market depth, liquidity of the relevant stock and informational asymmetries.

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39

Bernhagen, Patrick. "Business and International Environmental Agreements: Domestic Sources of Participation and Compliance by Advanced Industrialized Democracies." Global Environmental Politics 8, no. 1 (2008): 78–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/glep.2008.8.1.78.

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This article analyzes the political influence of business in the context of international environmental cooperation. Locating the sources of business power in three distinct factors—organizational strength, structural privilege, and informational advantage—the article evaluates the contributions of these factors to explanations of states' ratification of, and compliance with, international environmental agreements. Using data on 35 advanced industrialized democracies, the results suggest that business influence can be best explained by reference to informational asymmetries. While countries wh

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40

Kim, Duol. "The Next Best Thing to Getting Married: Partnerships among the Jewelry Manufacturers in the Providence/Attleboro Area during the Nineteenth Century." Enterprise & Society 8, no. 1 (2007): 106–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s146722270000879x.

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This study aims at enhancing our understanding of how industrial conditions affect the choice of a firm's ownership structure. The Providence/Attleboro area was a center of jewelry production during the nineteenth century. Because of the differentiated nature of the product, the Providence/Attleboro jewelers needed to promote their products among the wholesalers in distant markets. These geographical and industrial conditions motivated the entrepreneurs to organize partnerships for ameliorating informational asymmetries and for mobilizing the capital required to achieve economies of scale in s

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41

Rossi, Paolo. "Looking for an emergency door." International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 36, no. 1/2 (2016): 102–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijssp-12-2014-0121.

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Purpose – The paper investigates the role of information asymmetries and sensegiving processes of citizens claiming for social services. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the relevance of applicants’ agency, since it has been generally neglected in the analysis of social services provision. On the contrary, the paper proposes an alternative view, considering applicants as actors who are able to develop dialectic strategies for claiming specific forms of social assistance. Design/methodology/approach – The paper is based on a qualitative research, conducted following an inductive approa

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42

Clarke, Harry. "Asymmetric Information, Public Goods and Central Control: A Critique of the West Review's Education Policy." Australian Journal of Education 44, no. 1 (2000): 76–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000494410004400107.

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The ‘West Review’ argues that the determination of tertiary sector education program offerings should be decentralised by basing funding on student preferences. Research activities should be centrally prioritised with access to training being also dependent on such preferences. These views are questionable. Informational asymmetries imply that student sovereignty is a poor basis for designing programs and allocating research funds. Central prioritising cannot provide the benefits achievable in liberal structures which promote diversity. The Review's endorsement of centralised university manage

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43

Downs, William M. "A project ‘doomed to succeed’? Informational asymmetries, euroscepticism, and threats to the locomotive of integration." Contemporary Politics 17, no. 3 (2011): 279–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2011.597143.

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44

Elkjær, Mads Andreas. "What Drives Unequal Policy Responsiveness? Assessing the Role of Informational Asymmetries in Economic Policy-Making." Comparative Political Studies 53, no. 14 (2020): 2213–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414020912282.

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Recent scholarship on inequality and political representation argues that economic elites are dominating democratic policy-making, yet it struggles to explain the underlying mechanisms. This article proposes that unequal responsiveness reflects asymmetries in information about fiscal policy across income classes, as opposed to being a structural bias inherent in capitalist democracy. I test the argument in a pathway case study of economic policy-making in Denmark, using a new data set that combines preference and spending data spanning 18 spending domains between 1985 and 2017. I find that gov

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45

Chung, Kee H., John Elder, and Jang-Chul Kim. "Corporate Governance and Liquidity." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 45, no. 2 (2010): 265–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109010000104.

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AbstractWe investigate the empirical relation between corporate governance and stock market liquidity. We find that firms with better corporate governance have narrower spreads, higher market quality index, smaller price impact of trades, and lower probability of information-based trading. In addition, we show that changes in our liquidity measures are significantly related to changes in the governance index over time. These results suggest that firms may alleviate information-based trading and improve stock market liquidity by adopting corporate governance standards that mitigate informationa

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46

Nagarajan, Nandu J., K. Sivaramakrishnan, and Sri S. Sridhar. "Managerial Entrenchment, Reputation and Corporate Investment Myopia." Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 10, no. 3 (1995): 565–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0148558x9501000309.

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In this paper, we demonstrate that informational asymmetries within a firm along with managerial labor market concerns can jointly result in investment myopia being equilibrium behavior. In contrast to earlier studies (like that of Shleifer and Vishny [1989]), we find that in the presence of both reputation and entrenchment incentives, managers invest in long-term projects for reputation building and short-term projects to entrench themselves. Further, we establish conditions under which delegating project selection is optimal, even though it requires that the owner tolerate short-term project

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47

Charoenwong, Ben, Alan Kwan, and Tarik Umar. "Does Regulatory Jurisdiction Affect the Quality of Investment-Adviser Regulation?" American Economic Review 109, no. 10 (2019): 3681–712. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180412.

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The Dodd-Frank Act shifted regulatory jurisdiction over “ midsize” investment advisers from the SEC to state-securities regulators. Client complaints against midsize advisers increased relative to those continuing under SEC oversight by 30 to 40 percent of the unconditional probability. Complaints increasingly cited fiduciary violations and rose more where state regulators had fewer resources. Advisers responding more to weaker oversight had past complaints, were located farther from regulators, faced less competition, had more conflicts of interest, and served primarily less-sophisticated cli

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48

Hurley, Terrance. "Commentary: Is It Possible to Determine the Extent to Which Informational Asymmetries and Prejudice Bias Responses?" Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 37, no. 4 (2009): 594–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-720x.2009.00433.x.

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49

Khanum, Ayesha. "A Note on the Information Content of Corporate Dividend Policy." Lahore Journal of Business 2, no. 1 (2013): 133–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.35536/ljb.2013.v2.i1.a6.

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This note discusses the significance of the information content of dividends, which is reflected through the market price reactions to a firm’s dividend decisions. Informational asymmetries are the main reason for signaling whereby firm managers are likely to have better information than external participants, implying that their financial decisions will tend to convey the firm’s future prospects to the market. An efficient signaling equilibrium is that optimal combination of signaling costs and agency costs that minimizes any dissipative costs. An important consideration is the preference of

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50

Affuso, Antonio. "A propensity score analysis of public incentives: The Italian case." Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets and Institutions 1, no. 1 (2011): 85–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/rgcv1i1art6.

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Public support to firms has been a traditional and important industrial policy measure in many countries for several decades. One of the reasons for public intervention is the existence of market failures or imperfections. Informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders of funds in particular are used to justify subsidies to firms, especially small and medium-sized enterprises. Within this framework, the main purpose of public subsidies is offsetting market imperfections. This paper makes a contribution to current empirical literature by examining the effects of public funding on credi

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