Relevant bibliographies by topics / Initial Public Offerings firms

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  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
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Academic literature on the topic 'Initial Public Offerings firms'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 10 January 2023
Last updated: 28 January 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Initial Public Offerings firms"

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Prasad, Sameer, David C. Porter, and Linda Yu. "Modeling Internet Operations Using Initial Public Offerings." American Journal of Business 20, no. 2 (October 28, 2005): 25–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/19355181200500009.

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In this research we test the generalizability of an existing model for classifying information‐intensive services that can be globally disaggregated to Internet services. This categorization allows us to judge which types of Internet Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) are likely to have superior performance. Specifically, we hypothesize that Internet firms with higher information intensity, lower physical presence and lower customer contact needs will have a greater probability of generating larger risk‐adjusted returns. We test these hypotheses on 340 Internet IPOs and find partial support for the model. In particular, Internet firms with high information intensity and low customer contact need yield superior performance. However, firms with low physical presence underperform in our sample.
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DERRIEN, FRANÇOIS, and AMBRUS KECSKÉS. "The Initial Public Offerings of Listed Firms." Journal of Finance 62, no. 1 (January 11, 2007): 447–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01212.x.

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Finkle, Todd A. "The Relationship between Boards of Directors and Initial Public Offerings in the Biotechnology Industry." Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 22, no. 3 (April 1998): 5–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/104225879802200301.

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Utilizing the entire population of public biotechnology firms from 1980-1994, three models were tested to determine If a relationship exists between the size and composition of the board of directors and performance. Results indicate significant positive relationships between director expertise and the size of a firm's initial public offering. Going public during hot markets and larger firms were also related to larger Initial public offerings. These findings will benefit practitioners in the formation of boards within the biotechnology Industry. Managers of firms within the biotechnology industry who are contemplating a public offering will be able to proactively address the composition of their boards.
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Prasad, Dev, George S. Vozikis, Garry D. Bruton, and Andreas Merikas. "“Harvesting” through Initial Public Offerings (IPOs): The Implications of Underpricing for the Small Firm." Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 20, no. 2 (January 1996): 31–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/104225879602000204.

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The existence of the phenomenon of “underpricing” has been well established for common stock initial public offerings (CSIPOs). However, the extent of underpricing varies from firm to firm. An examination of the prospectuses of different firms reveals that the motivation for going public varies, and that there are three types of offerings: pure primary offerings; pure secondary offerings; and mixed offerings. This study compares the average level of underpricing for pure primary offerings with that of mixed offerings for small firms in the over-the counter (OTC) capital market. The results of the study suggest that there are Implications of the type of offering for both the firm and the selling “harvesting” shareholders as well as the incoming investors.
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Batool, Zahira. "Long Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in Pakistan." Business and Management Horizons 6, no. 2 (December 30, 2018): 95. http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/bmh.v6i2.14195.

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This study is aimed to analyze long run performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in Pakistan by taking the sample of 15 firms for the period of 2006 to 2011. We took secondary data for our research from KSE, SBP, and Brecorder. Stock returns of IPO firms are considered as dependent variables and firm size, firm age, profitability and leverage ratios are considered as explanatory variables for the long run performance of IPOs. Previous literature on IPOs indicates that IPOs underperform in the long run. Firm’s size and profitability have some significant positive correlation with the IPOs long run performance. All the findings of this research paper depend upon the background of the different industry sectors, the perspective of the study and sample distribution. And the Leverage ratio and Age of the firms are negatively correlated with the long run performance of the IPOs.
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Helwege, Jean, and Nellie Liang. "Initial Public Offerings in Hot and Cold Markets." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 39, no. 3 (September 2004): 541–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109000004026.

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AbstractThe literature offers many explanations for why the IPO market cycles from hot to cold. These include theories in which hot markets represent clusters of IPOs in a new industry, and signaling models that predict that hot markets draw in better quality firms. Others suggest hot market IPOs' stock returns reflect their poor quality. We compare IPOs over cycles during 1975–2000 and find that hot and cold IPO markets do not differ so much in the characteristics of the firms that go public as in the quantity of firms that go public. Both hot and cold IPOs are largely concentrated in the same narrow set of industries and they have few distinctions in profits, age, or growth potential. Our results suggest that hot markets are not driven primarily by changes in adverse selection costs, managerial opportunism, or technological innovations, but more likely reflect greater investor optimism.
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Andreas, Enni Savitri, Tatang Ary Gumanti, and Nurhayati. "Earnings management and initial public offerings among Indonesian manufacturing companies." Investment Management and Financial Innovations 18, no. 3 (August 2, 2021): 27–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.18(3).2021.03.

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Earnings management (EM) refers to the common use of accounting techniques in various economic settings, such as Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), to produce financial statements. This study, therefore, analyzes the effect of firm size, operating cash flow, the used IPO proceeds, earnings changes, and leverage on EM of manufacturing companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 1989 to 2013. This sector comprises the essential chemical industry, miscellaneous organizations, and consumer goods, with 63 firms being used to meet the selection criteria. The regression analysis showed that the intended use of funds and leverage had a negative and significant impact on EM. Furthermore, the process is measured using Friedlan’s (1994) Discretionary Current Accruals model with similar results found in each industry group and their insignificant differences used to regulate the level of discretionary accruals between the three sectors. This study implies that the EM level is qualitatively similar among IPO companies in the three sub-sectors examined. AcknowledgmentsThe authors are grateful to the audience for their comments during the 11th Environmental and Sustainability Management Accounting Network-Asia Pacific (EMAN-AP) Conference held at the Danang University of Economics, Danang, Vietnam, 12-13 August 2019. The early draft was titled “Earnings Management and Initial Public Offerings on Manufacturing Sectors Companies”.
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Luo, Yan, Xiaolin Qian, and Jinjuan Ren. "Initial public offerings and air pollution: evidence from China." Journal of Asia Business Studies 9, no. 1 (January 5, 2015): 99–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jabs-08-2014-0056.

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Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of firms’ financing activities on the environment. Faced with a deteriorating global environment, both corporations and regulatory bodies have become more responsive to environmental conservation problems. However, existing literature has not adequately addressed the question of whether and how firms’ business activities influence the environment. Design/methodology/approach – Using the daily air pollution indices of 120 Chinese cities from 2001 to 2012, this study found that air pollution is alleviated after firms’ initial public offerings (IPOs). This paper proposes that firms’ IPOs influence the ambient air pollution through three channels: production scale, technical reform and corporate governance effects. Findings – The authors of this study found that the proceeds acquired in IPOs result in enlarged production scales that increase pollution, while the investment of these proceeds in social responsibility-related technical reform and enhanced corporate governance reduce pollution. Moreover, the authors discover that firms with a higher state ownership emit fewer pollutants, thus supporting the positive monitoring role of the Chinese government. Originality/value – Although this study investigates the impact of IPOs on air quality in China, the proposed analytical framework also applies to studies of other financing activities in global markets. This study has important policy implications for government regulations in environmental controls.
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Nagata, Kyoko, and Toyohiko Hachiya. "Earnings Management and the Pricing of Initial Public Offerings." Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 10, no. 04 (December 2007): 541–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219091507001197.

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This study investigates whether the extent of earnings management has any impact on offer price in initial public offering (IPO). Using a sample of 581 JASDAQ IPO firms, we find that offer price reflects earnings management to some extent. Firms with conservative earnings management tend to have higher offer prices, and firms managing earnings aggressively tend to be discounted when they fail to exhibit smooth earnings growth. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that underwriters adjust for the effect of earnings management to appropriately pricing the issues. Overall, our evidence could lead to another explanation for IPO underpricing.
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Eyssell, Thomas H., and Donald R. Kummer. "Signalling, Insider Trading, And Post-Offering Performance: The Case Of Initial Public Offerings." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 9, no. 3 (September 29, 2011): 80. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v9i3.6040.

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Previous IPO studies have concluded that, on average, (1) the shares of firms going public are underpriced at the time of the offering, (2) prices adjust rapidly in the aftermarket, and (3) IPOs are generally poor performers over the longer-term. This study reevaluates the IPO pricing phenomenon utilizing more recent data and empirically tests the signaling models of Leland and Pyle (1977) and Gale and Stiglitz (1989), which imply that both first-day and aftermarket returns may be related to insiders transactions. Our results suggest that initial returns are inversely related to the proportion of the offering representing insiders share and that corporate insiders are, on average, net sellers in the year subsequent to the initial public offering. We also find that the greatest volume of post-offering insider sales occurs in those firms in which insiders are sold shares at the offering.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Initial Public Offerings firms"

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Khurshed, Arif. "Initial public offerings : an analysis of the post-IPO performance of the UK firms." Thesis, University of Reading, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.297620.

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Black, Janine Noelle. "RAMIFICATIONS OF SARBANES-OXLEY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LEGISLATION ON INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS OF RESEARCH-INTENSIVE FIRMS." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2013. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/216518.

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Business Administration/Strategic Management
Ph.D.
The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of July 2002 was created to address the financial malfeasance revealed during the investigations of several large firms by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Act required public companies traded on U.S. exchanges to provide increased transparency in financial statements. Key portions of the legislation required firms to create internal financial controls and placed personal accountability with top executives. SOX mandated and standardized a greater degree of self-regulation. In the years following SOX, firms experienced significantly higher compliance costs, but they also benefited from the reduction of statement errors and fraud, increased accuracy in reporting, and greater investor confidence. After the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002, anecdotal evidence suggested that SOX impeded small, research intensive firms. We looked at research intensive firms going public before and after SOX to determine if there was a change in volume and quality of research intensive firms post-SOX. We found that firms that went public after SOX were fewer and had lower patenting activity. In the case of small and medium size firms, the cost of SOX compliance is likely to divert funds from research investments. We speculate that highly research intensive firms are more likely post-SOX to divert their IPO to non-U.S. exchanges, delay going public, or dismiss the idea of going public, as proposed in a “3Ds” model. The 2002 SOX US Congressional Act levied millions of dollars in new compliance costs on each foreign or domestic firm that went public on U.S. exchanges. Funding for regulatory expenditures must come from somewhere. We proposed that one likely candidate was research budgets, as research efforts have a more distant, less immediately visible, long term effect on firm performance. We suggested that large firms more easily absorbed the additional costs of SOX with a reduced effect on research and development budgets, while small firms were less able to maintain research budgets after SOX. In the aftermath of SOX, research spending did go down, most visibly in Biotech and Electronics. As the total number of IPO firms decreased dramatically after SOX, these two research intensive industries, plus Computer Software, were the only industries with a large enough sample size to evaluate. We saw that research intensive firms diminished dramatically, along with many non-research intensive firms, from IPO events after SOX. Where we had sufficient sample size, in computer software, biotechnology, electronics, and “other”, we noted that research-intensive firms generally resisted the temptation to raid research budgets, finding funding for compliance elsewhere within the company or from the additional cash flow at time of IPO. Where firms did appear to greatly reduce research budgets was in the non-research intensive industries, where research budgets might be more of a discretionary expense. Firm size was not a factor in whether research intensive firms could better absorb the costs of SOX, although smaller firms tended to spend proportionally more on research in an effort to grow faster. After the enactment of SOX, we observed an indication that the markets valued research intensity even more than prior to SOX, perhaps understanding the vulnerability of research budgets being diverted to compliance costs. Overall, the data suggested that the effect of SOX was underestimated in this study, as the firms that were deterred from going public on U.S. exchanges were not in the sample evaluated. We only analyzed those firms prepared to accept the higher costs of SOX. The data set consisted of survivors, selected firms still willing to pay for SOX compliance as well as for research programs.
Temple University--Theses
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Zhang, Lei. "An empirical study of unit IPOS in the UK : why do firms include warrants in initial public offerings?" Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2010. http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/1238/.

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The main objective of this thesis is to identify the reasons why firms choose to issue unit IPOs instead of share-only IPOs. Evidence is found that unit firms are smaller, riskier, with higher level of agency costs and higher levels of information asymmetry than share-only firms and unit IPOs are underwritten by less reputable underwriters. The initial return results provide strong support to the Agency Cost hypothesis that unit IPOs is significantly more underpriced than share-only IPOs. Unit firms have lower survival rate than that of share-only IPO firms; however, unit firms that do survive are more likely to issue seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) for further funding. A clear pattern of price run-up is observed before SEO announcements by unit firms and a significant negative price adjustment is found when the SEOs are announced. In the long-term, this thesis provides evidence that unit IPOs present significantly worse underperformance comparing to both the matching share-only IPOs and various market indices. Such results contradict both the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses and imply that unit firms cannot significantly improve performance by simply attaching warrants, regardless as whether they are used to reduce agency costs or to signal firm value.
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Thiess, Rolf C. "Corporate governance, professionalisation and performance of IPO firms. The role of founders and venture capitalists." Thesis, University of Bradford, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10454/4458.

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Combining agency theory and the resource-dependence perspective as well as signalling theory, this thesis examines the role venture capitalists (VCs) and founders play with respect to both structural board characteristics and board capital in terms of experience and prestige and whether these are linked to performance. It claims that VCs and founders shape the governance system of the firms going public and are influential in the professionalisation of the ventures especially in terms of human and social capital of its board of directors. It also argues that the board of directors represents a signal of firm quality in the initial public offering (IPO) market and should thus be linked to performance. Similarly, according to the venture capital certification hypothesis, being funded by VCs signals a firm¿s quality and potential. In order to assess these claims, this thesis employs a unique sample of matched venturecapital- backed and non-venture-capital-backed entrepreneurial IPOs that floated either on the London Stock Exchange¿s Official List or the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). Extending previous research this thesis employs more fine-grained measures and introduces new conceptually relevant variables in the analysis. The findings indicate that VCs and founders are influential in shaping corporate governance of IPO-stage ventures both from an agency and resource-provision perspective. Findings from the examination of governance and professionalisation characteristics with respect to IPO short-run performance (underpricing) indicate that it may the involvement of prestigious auditors that signal firm quality while a founder bias discount seems to exist. While evidence is found that VC involvement (and to a lesser extent director/board characteristics) is related to post-IPO market performance, this seems to depend on the time period following the IPO examined, whereas auditor prestige shows a positive association in all of these time periods.
Bradford University School of Management
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Thiess, Rolf Christian. "Corporate governance, professionalisation and performance of IPO firms : the role of founders and venture capitalists." Thesis, University of Bradford, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10454/4458.

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Combining agency theory and the resource-dependence perspective as well as signalling theory, this thesis examines the role venture capitalists (VCs) and founders play with respect to both structural board characteristics and board capital in terms of experience and prestige and whether these are linked to performance. It claims that VCs and founders shape the governance system of the firms going public and are influential in the professionalisation of the ventures especially in terms of human and social capital of its board of directors. It also argues that the board of directors represents a signal of firm quality in the initial public offering (IPO) market and should thus be linked to performance. Similarly, according to the venture capital certification hypothesis, being funded by VCs signals a firm's quality and potential. In order to assess these claims, this thesis employs a unique sample of matched venturecapital- backed and non-venture-capital-backed entrepreneurial IPOs that floated either on the London Stock Exchange's Official List or the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). Extending previous research this thesis employs more fine-grained measures and introduces new conceptually relevant variables in the analysis. The findings indicate that VCs and founders are influential in shaping corporate governance of IPO-stage ventures both from an agency and resource-provision perspective. Findings from the examination of governance and professionalisation characteristics with respect to IPO short-run performance (underpricing) indicate that it may the involvement of prestigious auditors that signal firm quality while a founder bias discount seems to exist. While evidence is found that VC involvement (and to a lesser extent director/board characteristics) is related to post-IPO market performance, this seems to depend on the time period following the IPO examined, whereas auditor prestige shows a positive association in all of these time periods.
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Matanova, N. "Private equity and venture capital investors' involvement in firms post initial public offering." Thesis, City University London, 2015. http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/11893/.

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The capital provided by private equity (PE) and venture capital (VC) investors represents an alternative type of financing available to firms in comparison to more traditional financial intermediaries such as banks, equity from owners or angel investors. These financial sponsors not only provide funding, but also complete intense restructuring, improve corporate governance, align interest of managers and shareholders, provide certification and improve performance (Jensen 1986, 1989; Baker and Wruck, 1989; Baker and Gompers, 2003; Hochberg, 2012; Acharya et al, 2009). These investors are likely to realize their highest returns by bringing their sponsored firms to the stock market in the form of initial public offerings (IPOs). However, in practice PE and VC investors do not always exit fully at the IPO date (Celikyurt et al, 2014; Krishnan et al, 2011; Cao, 2011). They tend to maintain a block ownership in some IPOs, which allows them to remain actively involved in shaping firms' corporate policies. It is of great importance to academics, practitioners and other market participants to understand why these investors carry on investing in firms they brought to the market and whether such holdings create or destroy value. These issues motivate my research agenda. I focus on investigating PE and VC investors' post-IPO presence in firms, their effect on corporate policies and impact on the long-run performance. In particular, the three chapters of my thesis pursue the following three distinct objectives: (i) to answer the fundamental question concerning the motivation of PE and VC investors to retain ownership in the post-IPO period and whether this retention affects the firm’s aftermarket performance (ii) to examine whether PE and VC investors remain active monitoring agents and exert significant influence on various corporate policies (iii) to investigate the effect of PE and VC ownership retention on firms' cash reserves, which, as documented in previous studies, can lead to significant agency conflicts. Hence, the main objective of my thesis is to explore the extent, type and channels of private equity and venture capital investors' involvement in firms post-flotation, and its impact on the long-run performance. To answer these research questions, I use a large sample of US and UK IPOs over the 1997 and 2010 period. In this dissertation, I differentiate and analyse separately firms backed by PE and VC investors because these investors are different in many respects, particularly since they provide capital to distinctive type of companies, as VCs invest mainly in young, growing, high-tech firms, while PE investors are likely to back high cash flow mature firms in stable industries. I provide a comparative analysis across these investors to assess whether, after controlling for these fundamental characteristics, their involvement, investment and strategies with their IPOs in the post flotation period are homogeneous. I also contrast the US and the UK markets which I found to be significantly different in terms of the composition of these two types of investors, but also the characteristics and annual distributions of IPOs. In the first empirical study, I focus on the motivations of PE and VC funds to retain voluntarily ownership, defined as holdings outside the lockup restrictions, in the post-IPO period. I test the monitoring and signalling hypotheses, which suggest that IPOs in which VC and PE firms retain their holdings in the post-IPO period are more likely to generate higher returns because of these funds’ certification and their ability to monitor companies in which they hold large stakes. I find that in contrast to UK, where both type of financing play an equally important role in bringing companies to the stock market, the relative importance of VC-backed IPOs in the US is time varying. Moreover, the VC-backed IPOs are equally distributed across various industries in the UK, whereas VC financing is more prominent in certain industries in the US such as high-tech, telecommunications and healthcare. I find a non-monotonic (convex) relationship between financial sponsors’ voluntary ownership and firm performance. Hence, in contrast to managers who become entrenched at higher levels of ownership, financial sponsors create value in companies they hold more concentrated equity stakes. More specifically, I document that financial sponsors’ ownership is positively related to firm value when PE and VC investors’ stake is above 1.83%. Therefore, continued involvement of financial sponsors in the post-flotation period is beneficial for the shareholders. Also, I present evidence that compulsory and voluntary financial sponsors’ equity retention is used to mitigate potential managerial expropriation of outside shareholders. I demonstrate that a different institutional framework in UK and US has a significant impact on financial sponsors’ divestment extent at the IPO date and in the post-flotation period. I find that investment banks impose significantly stricter lockup restrictions (in terms of how much shares to retain) on financial sponsors involved in US backed IPOs than in UK ones. This is driven by more dispersed ownership in US companies, whose market is defined by a lower prevalence of institutional investors and the largest group of shareholders in the US being individual investors. In addition, I find that PE/VC house and underwriter reputations are only considered to be alternative commitment devices in the UK. I also highlight a number of other factors which affect voluntary ownership of PE and VC investors in the post-IPO period. In particular, I show that PE and VC fund characteristics (syndicate size, PE/VC fund’s bank-affiliation and low proximity to IPO firm headquarters) partially explain compulsory and voluntary holdings of financial sponsors post-flotation. This paper extends the literature on IPOs' performance by demonstrating that financial sponsors divest fully from stronger firms at the IPO date, while commit their resources to underperforming ones in which they create value in the post-flotation period. The second empirical study focuses on examining whether PE and VC investors create value by actively shaping IPO firms’ corporate policies in the post-flotation period. In this paper I focus on three corporate policies, namely the corporate governance, as reflected in the structure of the board of directors, the investments’ spending patterns, and the payout policy. These decisions are identified in prior literature to have a direct impact on firm value. I demonstrate that PE and VC investors with retained ownership continue to extensively monitor their backed IPOs. However, the two types of investors implement different monitoring approaches, which are driven by fundamentally different characteristics of the firms they finance: PE investors’ ownership has a significant positive effect on the board’s size, while VC investors primarily focus on the proportion of independent directors on the board of directors. Moreover, I find that the ownership structure of financial sponsors has a material impact on monitoring of portfolio firms, as IPOs backed by bank-affiliated PE funds have significantly larger boards. In terms of investment decisions, VC investors minimize expenditures in all retained IPO firms. PE sponsors’ only reduce expenditures in IPOs with low proximity, so when PE investors’ monitoring abilities are significantly constrained by distance and hence costs of monitoring are higher. In contrast to non-backed IPOs, I find that financially sponsored companies are more likely to initiate a payout via dividends.
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Uzonwanne, Nnamdi John. "Firm and industry characteristics, long-term returns and survival of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) : a critical re-evaluation." Thesis, University of Leeds, 2013. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/5854/.

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This study tracks IPOs from the time of their entry into the public domain up to at least six years post-listing. In the first part of this study, the post-listing performance of these firms relative to that of a set of control firms in event and calendar time is evaluated, using a fresh sample of 746 IPOs in the UK market over the period 1999-2006 and stepwise matching algorithms that select the matching firms from the general population on the basis of key firm risk factors that includes three new factors – pre-IPO performance, turnover growth and earnings yield – employing a refined matching technique and a battery of methods. Given that the majority of the studies in the literature find that IPOs are poor investments in the long-term, the findings in the first part suggest firstly, that investing in IPOs beyond the immediate after-market may not be a bad trading strategy since the relative after-market performance is dependent on the proportions in which the stocks are stacked in the investor’s portfolio; secondly, value-weighted performance does not provide strong evidence against market efficiency when compared to an equally-weighted measure of abnormal performance [which tends to suggest that the former may provide a more useful benchmark in assessing the post-event risk-adjusted performance of IPO firms since it more accurately captures the investors’ wealth effects] and; thirdly, the under-performance of new issues of common stock remains an anomaly that really challenges the efficient market hypothesis only when performance is equally-weighted. In the course of analysing the performance of the firms in the first part, this work finds that the under-performance is more prevalent in some groups of IPOs than others. Hence, in the second part of the work, the economic importance and significance of key firm and industry risk factors prior to or at the IPO that may predict or explain this under-performance is tested. The author’s findings reveal that industry risk factors of IPO surplus value, profitability, market-to-book and equity volatility in addition to firm risk factors of size, market-to-book, past performance, underwriter reputation and the ‘hot’ IPO market can help distinguish the best performing from the worst performing firms. More importantly, the industry effects here are economically large and are first documented in this study. In the third and final part of the work, the firms are tracked in event and calendar time, equally using only that information that is available prior to or at the IPO. The author’s findings reveal that industry risk factors of IPO surplus value and profitability in addition to firm risk factors of size, past performance, initial market return volatility [IPO risk], underwriter prestige and the ‘hot’ IPO market can foreshadow an IPO’s survival. More importantly, the industry effects here are also first documented in this study. More particularly, the evidence here on past performance and underwriter prestige is strong and overwhelming with the results suggesting that firms desirous of going public should first build a track record of profitable performance, while the latter lays credence to the fact that firms underwritten by prestigious underwriters are less likely to fail. The results also suggest that potential IPO investors, IPO firms and their investment bankers should consider industry risk factors prevailing at the time of the IPO to provide them with additional information on whether or not to invest in the IPO [in the case of the investor] or go ahead with the IPO, or alternatively, withdraw and re-launch at a more auspicious date [in the case of the issuing firm and its investment banker].
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Jiao, Jian, and Xuan Guo. "Do Chinese underwriters grandstand to attract more firms when they are ready to go public?" Thesis, Umeå University, Umeå School of Business, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-34920.

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The concept of grandstanding comes from Gompers (1996), in his article, he defined “to grandstand” as “to act or conduct oneself with a view to impressing onlookers”. The idea of grandstanding does not only apply solely to venture capital but also could apply to underwriters of IPOs industry as well.

IPOs activities provide huge revenues for underwriters, so underwriters compete with each other for IPO business. China’s stock market grows explosively after 2006, and it has the highest underpricing, as well as more and more underwriters have emerged recently, so our paper is constrained under Chinese stock market environment. We empirically examine whether inexperienced underwriters grandstand when they conduct IPOs in order to achieve more market shares, for example by deliberate underpricing or charging lower fee rates.

This study is conducted from the underwriter’s perspective. We use two kinds of reputation measurement methods to define “inexperienced” and “prestigious underwriters” and employ a quantitative approach to analyze the data. Evidence from a sample of 392 IPOs from June 19, 2006 to March 24, 2010 suggests that inexperienced underwriters do not have incentives to grandstand. The number of IPOs that underwriters have conducted and recent IPO performance do not always contribute to a gain of market share directly. Therefore, inexperienced underwriters do not provide more underpriced IPOs nor do they charge lower fee rates. Evidence also marginally supports that underwriters do not intend to conduct small offer sized IPOs.

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Wigren, Anna, and Tobias Rådman. "Do Innovative Firms Leave More Money on the Table?" Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-446546.

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This study examines the relationship between firm innovation and Initial Public Offering (IPO) underpricing in the Swedish stock market by examining 287 firms that went public on the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and Nasdaq First North during the years 2010 – 2020. An OLS regression model is utilized to analyze the relationship between underpricing, measured as the initial returns, and firm innovation, measured as patents and Research and Development (R&D). The average initial returns for the sample were (+8,16 %) showing that IPOs are, on average, underpriced in the Swedish stock market. While the connection between patents and underpricing was negligible, the results indicated that firms that reported R&D expenditures separately, specifying how much of their expenditures were spent on R&D, experienced a small decrease in IPO underpricing. Also, a slightly larger decrease in IPO underpricing was found for the firms that both had patents and reported their IPO expenditures separately. Thus, these results indicate that firms with a higher level of innovation are “leaving less money on the table”.
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Eriksson, Johan. "Earnings management within IPO firms and private equity backing : Earnings management's affect on stock market reaction and IPO's adjustable offering." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-256335.

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In order to boost the exit value, it is not uncommon that issuers report earnings in excess of cash flow generated by its operations at the initial public offering (IPO). The discretionary activity of performing earnings management can mislead investors about the intrinsic value of the newly public firm. Within this study, I examine how earnings management will affect the stock market reaction upon the lockup expiration date, the IPO adjustable offering size, and how the backing of private equity or venture capital (PEVC) affects earnings management tendencies within IPO firms. Using a unique, hand-collected dataset of 56 Swedish newly public firms from 2007 - 2014, I show that IPO firms (i) manage their earnings at the full fiscal year prior to the IPO and that earnings management will result in a negative stock market reaction upon the lockup expiration date. More importantly, I show that (ii) high adjustable offerings do not affect this relationship indicating that earnings management has no impact on the adjustable part of the offering size within IPOs. I also find that (iii) IPO firms backed by PEVC firms are more eager to manipulate their earnings, and (iv) highly reputable PEVC firms do not mitigate the manipulation of earnings within IPO firms. The results taken together suggest that studying the stock market reaction on the lockup expiration date is important for manipulative IPO firm detection, and that a participation in IPOs backed by PEVC firms must be done with caution.
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Books on the topic "Initial Public Offerings firms"

1

Ibbotson, Roger G. Initial public offerings. [New Haven, CT]: Yale School of Organization and Management, 1993.

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Wall, David K. Underpricing of initial public offerings. Dublin: University College Dublin, 1993.

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Aggarwal, Reena. Ownership structure and initial public offerings. Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2003.

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Jovanovic, Boyan. Interest rates and initial public offerings. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004.

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1956-, Gregoriou Greg N., ed. Initial public offerings: An international perspective. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2006.

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Keloharju, Matti. Three essays on initial public offerings. Helsinki: Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration, 1992.

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Zattoni, Alessandro, and William Judge, eds. Corporate Governance and Initial Public Offerings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139061513.

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Anderson, Seth C., T. Randolph Beard, and Jeffery A. Born. Initial Public Offerings: Findings and Theories. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-2295-9.

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Randolph, Beard T., and Born Jeffery A, eds. Initial public offerings: Findings and theories. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995.

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Shiller, Robert J. Initial public offerings: Investor behavior and underpricing. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1988.

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Book chapters on the topic "Initial Public Offerings firms"

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Krinsky, I., and W. Roteberg. "The Valuation of Initial Public Offerings : The Small Firm Case." In Advances in Small Business Finance, 1–18. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3462-0_1.

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Dalziel, Thomas, Robert E. White, Jonathan D. Arthurs, and Robert E. Hoskisson. "Initially Distracted: The Influence of Boards on Agency Costs in Initial Public Offering (IPO) Firms." In New Frontiers in Entrepreneurship, 11–30. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-0058-6_2.

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Ising, Peter. "Initial Public Offerings." In Earnings Accruals and Real Activities Management around Initial Public Offerings, 5–10. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-03794-9_2.

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Derrien, Francois. "Initial Public Offerings." In Behavioral Finance, 475–90. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118258415.ch25.

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LoBue, Robert M. "Start-Up Investor Governance Case." In Management for Professionals, 9–13. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48606-8_3.

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AbstractIn the current age of innovative business financing opportunities available from fintech apps, social media crowdfunding sites such as Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and RocketHub, et.al., and friends and family private equity investors, start-up firms can strategically source their venture capital funds from many globally disperse organizations and individuals. As the firm in this case learned, the benefit of alternative investing sources comes with a critical hidden risk for corporate governance. After a financial restructuring, a typical Silicon Valley software start-up found itself with close to 300 external individual shareholders, some of whom had not been documented as accredited investors. The regulatory agency could decide that the prior actions of the founders and the decisions of the board had been prejudicial to the interests of the minority investors. The management of this small private company faced an atypical investor relations dilemma, before its initial public offering (IPO).
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Anderson, Seth C., T. Randolph Beard, and Jeffery A. Born. "Initial Public Offerings: An Introduction." In Initial Public Offerings: Findings and Theories, 1–4. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-2295-9_1.

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Torrence, Phillip D. "Legal Considerations in Initial Public Offerings." In Private Equity, Second Edition, 85–109. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119203391.ch5.

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Wirtz, Bernd W., and Eva Salzer. "Das Management von Initial Public Offerings." In IPO-Management, 3–14. Wiesbaden: Gabler Verlag, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-92966-2_1.

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Dimovski, Bill. "Initial Public Offerings of Energy Companies." In Energy Economics and Financial Markets, 235–50. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30601-3_13.

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Megginson, William L., and Kathleen A. Weiss. "Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial Public Offerings." In Venture Capital, 371–95. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315235110-22.

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Conference papers on the topic "Initial Public Offerings firms"

1

Xiaolu, Chen, Xu Jing, and Yao Kaohua. "Earnings Management and Ownership Retention for Initial Public Offering Firms in China." In 2010 International Forum on Information Technology and Applications (IFITA). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ifita.2010.135.

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Mohamad, Maslinawati, and Noor Ayuernie Ibrahim. "Governance oversight roles on the voluntary disclosure of internal control systems and its impact on firms performance of Malaysian initial public offerings (IPOs)." In 2012 IEEE Symposium on Business, Engineering and Industrial Applications (ISBEIA). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isbeia.2012.6422886.

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Hruška, Domagoj, Hruška Milković, and Maja Daraboš Longin. "INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CROATIA." In 14th Economics & Finance Conference, Lisbon. International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.20472/efc.2020.014.006.

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Cao, Lantao, Yidan Hu, Jiachen Liu, and Yuwei Mao. "Media Coverage Influence on Initial Public Offerings (IPO)." In 2022 7th International Conference on Financial Innovation and Economic Development (ICFIED 2022). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.220307.148.

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Cheng, Jao-Hong, Huei-Ping Chen, and Sun-Far Chang. "A Research on Information Spillover Effects in Initial Public Offerings." In Third International Conference on Natural Computation (ICNC 2007). IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icnc.2007.130.

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Pu, Danlin, and ShanPing Wang. "Empirical research on the underpricing of initial public offerings in China." In EM). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icieem.2009.5344622.

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Hruška, Domagoj, Dražen Milković, and Maja Daraboš Longin. "ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND UNDERPRICING OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: EVIDENCE FROM CROATIA." In 14th Economics & Finance Conference, Lisbon. International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.20472/efc.2020.014.007.

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Meng, Dan. "A Neural Network Model to Predict Initial Return of Chinese SMEs Stock Market Initial Public Offerings." In 2008 IEEE International Conference on Networking, Sensing and Control (ICNSC). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icnsc.2008.4525247.

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Chang-chun, Lv, Sun Jing-chun, and Wang Jian-wei. "Governance Structure and Operating Performance of Initial Public Offerings in China: A New Explanation." In 2006 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering. IEEE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2006.314005.

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Mishra, Abhishek, and Yogendra Sisodia. "Roberta Goes for IPO: Prospectus Analysis with Language Models for Indian Initial Public Offerings." In 9th International Conference on Foundations of Computer Science & Technology (CST 2022). Academy and Industry Research Collaboration Center (AIRCC), 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.5121/csit.2022.121905.

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With the advent of large-scale language models in natural language processing (NLP), extracting valuable information from financial documents has gained popularity among researchers, and deep learning has boosted the development of effective text mining models. Prospectus text mining is very important for the investor community to identify major risk factors and evaluate the usage of the amount to be raised during an IPO. In this paper, we investigate how the recently introduced pre-trained language model Roberta can be adapted for this task. We also introduced prospectus-specific sentence transformers for semantic textual similarity along with a dataset to verify the efficacy of our work.
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Reports on the topic "Initial Public Offerings firms"

1

Jovanovic, Boyan, and Peter Rousseau. Interest Rates and Initial Public Offerings. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w10298.

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Shiller, Robert. Initial Public Offerings: Investor Behavior and Underpricing. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w2806.

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Gale, Ian, and Joseph Stiglitz. The Informational Content of Initial Public Offerings. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3259.

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Aggarwal, Reena, Nagpurnanand Prabhala, and Manju Puri. Institutional Allocation In Initial Public Offerings: Empirical Evidence. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9070.

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Gompers, Paul, and Josh Lerner. The Really Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings: The Pre-NASDAQ Evidence. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w8505.

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Maksimovic, Vojislav, Gordon Phillips, and Liu Yang. Do Public Firms Respond to Investment Opportunities More than Private Firms? The Impact of Initial Firm Quality. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24104.

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Maksimovic, Vojislav, Gordon Phillips, and Liu Yang. Do Public Firms Respond to Industry Opportunities More Than Private Firms? The Impact of Initial Firm Quality. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w25634.

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