Academic literature on the topic 'Insider trade'

We set up a model to study the voluntary disclosure of information by insiders of publicly traded companies. We consider a trading framework as in [14] with many assets and one insider per asset. There is one discretionary liquidity trader who can allocate his trades across the different assets and many noise traders who trade with equal intensity in all assets. Before trade begins, insiders can disclose information in order to attract the discretionary liquidity trades. We show that if the level of noise trading is above a certain threshold, then there is an equilibrium where all insiders do not disclose any information. Below this threshold, equilibria are such that some information is always revealed by insiders. We also find that the greater the number of assets, the smaller the intensity of noise trading must be in order to induce insiders to disclose some information, and we find that insiders reveal all their information when the intensity of noise trading approaches zero.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the underlying option impacts an insider’s propensity to purchase and sell before corporate announcements, the proportion of insiders’ trading after announcements relative to before announcements, and the insider’s profitability around corporate announcements. Design/methodology/approach The authors test whether the timing information and option have impacted on the tendency of insider trade, the percentage of all shares traded by insiders in the post-announcement to pre-announcement periods and the average cumulative abnormal stock returns during the pre-announcement period. Findings Insiders’ propensity to trade before announcements is higher for stocks without options listed than for stocks with traded options. This result is stronger for unscheduled announcements than for scheduled ones. The proportion of insiders’ trade volume after announcements relative to before announcements in stocks that have not options listed is higher than those in stocks with traded options. The positive relationship between the insiders’ signed volume and the informational content of corporate announcements is stronger in stocks without traded options than in stocks with options listed. Insider trades prior to unscheduled announcement are more profitable than those before scheduled ones. Research limitations/implications The paper examines whether there is a difference between the effects of optioned stock and non-optioned stock. Roll et al. (2010) use the relative trading volume of options to stock ratio (O/S) to proxy for informed options trading activity. Future research could explore the impact of O/S. Moreover, the authors examine how insiders with private information use such information to trade in their own firms. Mehta et al. (2017) argue that insiders also use private information to facilitate trading (shadow trading) in linked firms, such as supply chain partners or competitors. Therefore, future research could consider the impact of shadow trading. Social implications Since the insider’s propensity to buy before announcements in stocks without options listed is larger than in stocks with traded options and the relationship is stronger for unscheduled announcements than for scheduled ones, the efforts of regulators should focus on monitoring insider trading in stocks without options listed prior to unscheduled announcements. Originality/value First, Lei and Wang (2014) find that the increasing pattern of insider’s propensity to trade before unscheduled announcements is larger than that before scheduled announcements. The authors document the underlying option has impacted the insider’s propensity to purchase and sell, and the relationship is stronger for unscheduled announcements than for scheduled ones. Second, related studies show insider’s trading activity has shifted from periods before corporate announcements to periods after corporate announcements to decrease litigation risk. This paper find the underlying option has influenced the proportion of insiders’ trading after announcements relative to before announcements when the illegal insider trade-related penalties increase.

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the legal insider trading activities by directors of companies listed on the Hong Kong Exchange over the period 1993 to 1999. One characteristic of insider trading in Hong Kong is the high frequency of transactions and the large amounts of money involved. Inside purchases appear to signal and correct undervaluation and inside sales appear to signal and correct overvaluation. In contrast to research from Britain and the United States, insider sales are more informative than purchases. On average, insiders earn HK$91,297 per trade, while outsiders who mimic insiders' transactions earn minimal returns. Many firms suffer from infrequent trading and our results are consistent with directors engaging in inside transactions so as to help create a market for the shares. In additional tests, we find that the frequency of insider trading is a function of information asymmetry.

Abstract This paper investigates insider trading activities in German stocks during the first year following implementation of the new Insider Law on 1 July 2002. It can be observed that insiders act as contrarian investors. They buy stocks after prices have fallen and sell stocks after prices have risen. In general, insider trades are very profitable. A typical stock purchased by an insider yields an abnormal return of almost 3 per cent during the 25 days following the transaction. In contrast, a typical stock that has been sold by insiders achieves an abnormal return of nearly -3 per cent over the same time period. Outsiders who copy the transactions of insiders can achieve nearly the same abnormal returns. Abnormal returns remain substantial even after transaction costs. The results suggest that prices of stocks in which insiders trade do not seem to be semi-strong efficient.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate how insiders’ trades are executed and whether and how outside investors can mimic outperforming insiders and reap substantial portfolio returns that withstand the erosion from adjustments for both the standard factors and stock characteristics in the asset pricing literature. Design/methodology/approach – The authors design a metric for measuring insiders’ trade execution quality: the trading alpha. The authors run regression analysis to control for trade difficulty, insider reputations and the corporate role ranks of insiders and document the existence of the abnormal trading alpha. The authors further form portfolios based on the abnormal trading alpha and document a significant abnormal return that is robust to both standard asset pricing factors model and the stock characteristics adjustments. Findings – Outperforming insiders at the aggregate level resemble value investors who trade on long-term fundamental information, trade patiently and earn rents from providing liquidity. Outside investors can mimic the outperforming insiders and reap significant abnormal portfolio returns. Research limitations/implications – Data limitations on insider trades and their association/interaction with their brokers prevent us from having a conclusive investigation of the trading skill hypothesis. The authors hope to further research along the lines of the trading skill hypothesis as compared to investment style hypothesis with more detailed data about the brokers used by insiders. Practical implications – The findings can be applied for money management profession in that outsider investors can monitor the trading execution and construct portfolios based on the adjusted abnormal trading alpha. The resulting portfolio has been documented to be highly profitable after risk adjustments using standard asset pricing factors as well as stock characteristics. Social implications – Professional money managers and outsider investors should be able to benefit from the findings in this paper and use the proposed trading alpha metric to construct and rebalance real-time investment portfolios. Originality/value – Outperforming insiders at the aggregate level resemble value investors who act on long-term fundamental information, trade patiently and earn rents from providing liquidity. From the perspective of investment implications, outside investors can mimic the outperforming insiders and reap substantial portfolio returns that withstand the erosion from adjustments for both the standard factors and stock characteristics in the asset pricing literature.

ABSTRACT Securitizations are complex and opaque transactions. We hypothesize that bank insiders trade on private information about banks': (1) securitization-related recourse risks, (2) not-yet-reported current-quarter securitization income, and (3) securitization-based business model sustainability. We provide evidence that proxies for each of these types of insider information are positively associated with insider trading. Specifically, we find that net insider sales in the 2001Q2–2007Q2 pre-financial crisis quarters predict not-yet-reported non-performing securitized loans and securitization income for those quarters, and that net insider sales during 2006Q4 predict write-downs of securitization-related assets during the 2007Q3–2008Q4 crisis period. We find that net insider sales are more negatively associated with banks' subsequent stock returns in their securitization quarters than in other quarters. In supplemental analysis, we show that the above findings are driven by trades by banks' CEOs and CFOs, and that insiders avoid larger stock price losses through 10b5-1 plan sales than through non-plan sales. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources.

An important aspect of corporate governance is how directors discharge their duty to shareholders as monitors of management’s opportunistic behavior. The insider trading by officers and directors before seasoned equity offerings (SEO) provide an opportunity to examine this issue, because insiders’ sales of the firm’s stock are incongruent with the objective of the firm to maximize the proceeds of the SEO. Since the market is aware that firms attempt to inflate their proceeds by managing earnings upwards, these trades may signal that the stock is overvalued. In this study, we compare the earnings management activity and the corresponding market response to earnings management and sales by senior officers and directors. We study a sample of 233 firms that conducted SEOs in the 1987-2004 period and either their directors and/or their senior officers traded in the firm’s shares. We find that 15% have insider trading by directors only, and 85% by both directors and senior officers. The market discounts the insider trading at the issuance date (the discount increases in the volume of insiders sales), but it treats insider trading by directors as a favorable signal that reduces the discount. Our study then identifies two ways directors monitor opportunistic insider trading before SEO. One is to ban it, as evident by the fact that under our selection criteria, 791 firms conducted SEOs in the 1987-2004 period. The other is to trade too as a positive signal to the market.

Purpose This study aims to measure the magnitude of information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders in Indian equity market. The study also investigates the effect of major information sources that affect information asymmetry namely, the informativeness of financial statements, news reports about the company and analyst follow-up. Design/methodology/approach Six-month profitability of insider trade was used as the proxy to measure information asymmetry. Fama-MacBeth two-stage regression was used to analyse the effect of information sources upon information asymmetry. Findings The results of the analysis demonstrate that in comparison with findings of similar studies the level of information asymmetry is comparatively high in India. On an average, profitable insider traders in India earn 19.28 per cent return than outside investors. Purchase transactions are more profitable than sales transactions, while the size of company and information asymmetry is associated inversely. Further, news and analyst follow-up are inversely associated with information asymmetry whereas informativeness of financial statements has little effect on information asymmetry. Practical implications The study have important insights for corporates in insider information management and legal compliance of insiders’ market activities. Results pointing to the requirements of a deeper Regulatory monitoring and stringent legal framework. Social implications The result validates the concerns of investor protection against informed trade. Originality/value The measurement of information asymmetry using profitability of insider trade is novel in Indian context even though the methodology is often used in the literature.