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Zembrzuski, Michał. "Alberta Wielkiego koncepcja intelektu możnościowego i czynnego a ujęcie Tomasza z Akwinu." Rocznik Tomistyczny (2024) 13 (December 30, 2024): 261–80. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14544893.
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The aim of this article is to present the concept of the possible and active intellect in the philosophical texts of Albert the Great. Subsequently, to note to what extent the divisions concerning the intellect were adopted by Thomas Aquinas. In his early work De homine, there is a presentation of various concepts from the Peripatetic tradition, which Albert interprets in his own way, using mainly the settlements of Avicenna and Algazel. It is noteworthy that, apart from the discussions that Averroes led, Albert the Great was the first to present a comprehensive account, while emphasizing that the solutions in some authors were divergent. In his treatise De anima, on the other hand, recognizing the importance of the solutions of Aristotle himself, in whom exclusively there were two intellects, he begins a critique of the alternative interpretations operating among the Peripatetics. At the same time, he develops the issue of the possible and active intellect, seeing that what happened next with this concept should always be reduced to the original Aristotelian distinction. In this work, the overall concept of the four intellects already appears, three of which are expressions of the gradual development of the original possibility. This will mean that Albert’s understanding of the intellect will go a long way toward showing the continuous growth of the intellect until the development of the sacred intellect (intellectus sanctus), the concept of which he also takes over from Avicenna. The treatise De intellectu et intelligibili will already be a mere synthetic justification and demonstration of specific intellectual activities that are directed toward the goal of approaching God through the form of the assimilated intellect (intellectus assimilativus).
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Schneider, Jakob Hans Josef. "Teorias do Intelecto na Idade Média Latina. De anima III, cap. 5 de Aristóteles e sua tradição medieval." EDUCAÇÃO E FILOSOFIA 34, no. 72 (2021): 1445–522. http://dx.doi.org/10.14393/revedfil.v34n72a2020-53142.
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Resumo: No capítulo 5 do Livro III De anima (430a10-19) Aristóteles distingue entre o νοῦς ποιητικός (nous poietikós), chamado pelos Latinos intellectus agens (intelecto agente), e νοῦς παθητικός (nous pathetikós), chamado pelos Latinos intellectus passivus, ou seja, intellectus possibilis (intelecto possível), termos técnicos e filosóficos mais comuns. O capítulo 5 é de grande importância não só para a filosofia antiga e para os comentadores das obras de Aristóteles, como os comentários de Teofrasto, de Alexander de Afrodisias, de Simplício e Themístius entre outros, mas também para a filosofia do mundo árabe e da Europa latina. Sabe-se que Aristóteles não escreveu um tratado próprio sobre o intelecto, embora possam ser encontradas várias observações acerca do intelecto em suas obras. Os tratados do Intelecto começam com Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicena e sobretudo Averróis, e se refletem, num sentido crítico e afirmativo, (nos debates) dos tratados latinos, por exemplo, nos tratados de Alberto Magno, de Tomás de Aquino, de Sigério de Brabant entre outros. Este artigo apresenta observações preliminares e preparatórias ao projeto de traduções bilíngue (Latim-Português) dos tratados medievais sobre o intelecto ‘Teorias do Intelecto na Idade Média’ que está em desenvovlimento no Centro Internacional de Estudos Medievais da UFU.
 Palavras-chaves: unidade do intelecto, imaginação, intencionalidade, luz intelectual e cognição
 Theories of the Intellect in the Latin Middle Ages. De anima III, cap. 5 of Aristotle and his Medieval Tradition
 Abstract: In the chapter 5 of the III. Book of De anima (430a10-19) Aristotle distinguishes between the νοῦς ποιητικός (nous poietikós) called by the Latins intellectus agens (agent intellect) and the νοῦς παθητικός (nous pathetikós) called by the Latins intellectus passivus, or intellectus possibilis (possible intellect), most common technical and philosophical terms. The chapter 5 is of great importance not only to ancient philosophy and to the commentators of Aristotle’s works such as the commentaries of Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, of Simplicius, and Themistius among others, but also to the philosophy of the Arabic World and the Latin Europe. One knows well that Aristotle does not have written a proper treatise on intellect; although there are several observations about the intellect in his works. Separate treatises begin with Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and especially Averroes, which Latin treatises as of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant among others reflect in a critical as well as an affirmative sense. This article can be read as preliminary and preparatory observations to a bilingual (Latin-Portuguese) translation project of treatises corresponding to ‘Theories of Intellect in the Middle Ages’ which is ongoing at the International Center for Medieval Studies at UFU.
 Key-words: Unity of the Intellect, Imagination, Intentionality, Intellectual Light, and Cognition
 Theorien des Intellekts im Lateinischen Mittelalter. De anima III, 5 des Aristoteles und seine mittelalterliche Tradition
 Zusammenfassung: Im 5. Kapitel des III. Buchs von De anima (430a10-19) unterscheidet Aristoteles zwischen dem νοῦς ποιητικός (nous poietikós), von den Lateinern intellectus agens (tätiger Intellekt) genannt und dem νοῦς παθητικός (nous pathetikós), von den Lateinern intellectus passivus oder auch intellectus possibilis (möglicher Intellekt) genannt, gemeinhin bekannte technische und philosophische Begriffe. Dieses 5. Kapitel ist von grösster Bedeutung nicht nur für die antike Philosophie und die Kommentatoren der Werke des Aristoteles wie die Kommentare des Theophrastus, des Alexander von Aphrodisias, Simplicius und Themistius unter anderen, sondern auch für die Philosophie der arabischen Welt und des lateinischen Europas. Bekanntlich hat Aristoteles keinen eigenen Traktat über den Intellekt geschrieben, obgleich sich viele Beobachtungen zum Intellekt in seinem Werk antreffen. Selbständige Traktate über den Intellekt beginnen mit Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicenna und besonders Averroes, die sich in den lateinischen Traktaten, z.B. des Albertus Magnus, Thomas von Aquin, Siger von Brabant und anderen zustimmend wie kritisch widerspiegeln. Dieser Artikel kann als vorläufige und vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einem zweisprachigen (lateinisch-portugiesischen) Übersetzungsprojekt von Texten gelesen werden, welche „Theorien des Intellekts im Lateinischen Mittelalter“ betreffen. Dieses Projekt ist am Internationalen Zentrum für Mittelalterstudien der UFU in Arbeit genommen worden.
 Schlüsselwörter: Verstand, Vernunft, Intentionalität, Anschauung und Erkenntnis
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Brewer, Kimberly. "Kant's Theory of the Intuitive Intellect." History of Philosophy Quarterly 39, no. 2 (2022): 163–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/21521026.39.2.05.
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Abstract Kant's theory of the intuitive intellect has a broad and substantial role in the development and exposition of his critical philosophy. An emphasis on this theory's reception and appropriation on the part of the German idealists has tended to divert attention from Kant's own treatment of the topic. In this essay, I seek an adequate overview of the theory Kant advances in support of his critical enterprise. I examine the nature of the intuitive intellect's object; its epistemic relation to its object; its mode of comprehension; the relationship between these cognitive elements; and I ask which minds Kant regards as intuitive intellects.
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Salem, Maryam, and Maryam Kheradmand. "Survey of the Active Intellect in Transcendent Theosophy." Comparative Islamic Studies 12, no. 1-2 (2019): 139–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/cis.35585.
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Mull? ?adr? (1572–1640) can, as we will argue in this article, be considered the greatest philosopher in Islamic world, because he has tried to eliminate the shortcomings of all previous schools. He claimed that man unites with the Active Intellect in the process of his intellectual perception, which is the highest perceptive status of the soul. This union, in its intense form, dissolves the human soul in the Active Intellect. In this theory, Mull? ?adr? assimilates some specific principles which belong only to what Seyyed Hossein Nasr has defined as Transcendent Theosophy: the primacy of existence, graded unity of being, substantial motion, the evolutional motion of the soul in all perceptive steps, the unity of the intellect, the intelligent, and the intellegible and identity of knowledge and being. Since the Active Intellect is the archetype of humanity from Mull? ?adr?’s view, i.e. among the horizontal intellects or the same Platonic Ideas, and there is no plurality in the world of intellect, the main problem raised is how an Active Intellect is distinguished from other intellects, and the human soul is united with and eventually destroyed. Hence, Mull? ?adr?, in his theory of expanded emanation, envisages that the plurality of the universe is due to the quiddity, which is an ideational (?i?tib?ri) thing. Thus, according to him, we can say that the plurality of the world of the intellect is subjective and comes to the fore to justify the relation of God to the world of pluralities; so the theory of intellects is based on the substantive and natural view into the universe, which is the general view of the philosophers; however, the theory of expanded emanation is a particular view of Mull? ?adr?, which is in full harmony with important philosophical foundations of him. The present study tries to explain these issues through Mull? ?adr?’s texts.
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Gerson, Lloyd. "The Unity of Intellect in Aristotle's De Anima." Phronesis 49, no. 4 (2004): 348–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1568528043067005.
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AbstractThe perennial problem in interpreting De Anima 3.5 has produced two drastic solutions, one ancient and one contemporary. According to the first, Aristotle in 3.5 identi fies the 'agent intellect' with the divine intellect. Thus, everything Aristotle has to say about the human intellect is contained mainly in 3.4, though Aristotle returns to its treatment in 3.6. In contrast to this ancient interpretation, a more recent view holds that the divine intellect is not the subject of 3.5 and that throughout the work Aristotle is analyzing the nature of the human intellect. But this view contends that the properties Aristotle deduces for this intellect, properties that have encouraged the view that Aristotle must be speaking about a divine intellect, are in fact to be discounted or interpreted in such a way that they do not indicate the immortality and immateriality of the human intellect. In this article I argue that close attention to the text and the sequence of argument supports the conclusion that Aristotle is speaking throughout De Anima of a uni fied human intellect, possessed of the properties Aristotle explicitly attributes to it. This intellect functions diff erently when it is and when it is not separate from the hylomorphic composite. I argue further that it is Aristotle's view that if we were not ideally or essentially intellects, we could not engage in the diverse cognitive activities of this composite.
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Milidrag, Predrag. "The basic mechanism of the intellectual cognition in Thomas Aquinas." Theoria, Beograd 65, no. 1 (2022): 5–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2201005m.
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The article analyses and interprets the basic structure of the process of intellectual cognition in Thomas Aquinas. After a short chapter on sense cognition, Aquinas?s understanding of the active intellect is presented, that is the illumination of the phantasms and the abstraction of the intelligible species by the active intellect. Special attention is given to the difference between the phantasm and the intelligible species. Consideration of the possible intellect shows two steps, the reception of the intelligible species and the creation of the concept, inner word or intentio intellecta. After that, two basic operations of the possible intellect are analyzed, simple apprehension and judgment. The article ends with a series of questions, pointing to possible problems in Aquinas?s understanding.
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Lernould, Alain. "Sur le sens de μεταβατικός chez Proclus". Chôra 21 (2023): 495–507. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/chora2023/202421/2221.
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Proclus posits the following triad of particular souls : divine souls – superior souls – human souls. These three orders of souls hold in common the fact that the intellect in them can intelligize the divine transcendent Forms, not in the way of an intellection properly speaking, which is specific to Intellects, which intelligize the Forms all at once (ἀθρόως), but in the way of an intellection which Proclus calls „metabatic” (μεταβατικός, μεταβατική), that is „transitive”, to mean that the intellect passes from one Form to another. What differentiates the metabatic intellection of human souls from that of the divine and of the daemonic souls is the fact that in the case of the former ones the intellection is not continuous, but occurs only occasionally (ποτέ), when the intellect in us acts together with the Particular Intellect, which is established directly above our essential nature.
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Opsomer, Jan, and Bob Sharples. "Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Intellectu 110.4: ‘I Heard this from Aristotle’. A modest proposal." Classical Quarterly 50, no. 1 (2000): 252–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cq/50.1.252.
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The treatise De intellectu attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias can be divided into four sections. The first (A, 106.19–110.3) is an interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of intellect, and especially of the active intellect referred to in Aristotle, De anima 3.5, which differs from the interpretation in Alexander's own De anima, and whose relation to Alexander's De anima, attribution to Alexander, and date are all disputed. The second (B, 110.4–112.5) is an account of the intellect which is broadly similar to A though differing on certain points. The third (Cl, 112.5–113.12) is an account of someone's response to the problem of how intellect can enter the human being ‘from outside’ if it is incorporeal and hence cannot move at all; in the fourth (C2, 113.12–24) the writer who reported Cl criticizes that solution and gives his own alternative one.
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Kukreja, Vinay. "Fuzzy AHP-TOPSIS approaches to prioritize teaching solutions for Intellect Errors." Journal of Engineering Education Transformations 35, no. 4 (2022): 50–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.16920/jeet/2022/v35i4/22104.
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Abstract: The teaching fraternity and intellects play an important role in students’ careers as they make students industry-ready. During their teaching, they make different types of errors. One of the neglected aspects during teaching is intellect errors and these directly or indirectly impact students learning capabilities. The scattered literature shows that there are twelve types of intellect errors like ‘error of coincidence’, ‘senses error’, ‘analogy error’, ‘subjectivity error’, etc. To minimize these errors, six solutions have been identified like ‘selection of right instruments’, ‘developmeand least rated intellect errors respectively. Thent of critical thinking in the students’, ‘aware about knowledge engineering development’ etc. This study aims to identify and prioritize the solutions to overcome the errors of the intellect that has been the ignored aspect of the teaching till now. A hybrid approach of fuzzy AHP (Analytical Hierarchy Process) and Fuzzy TOPSIS (Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution) has been proposed to rank the solutions that minimize the intellect errors. Fuzzy AHP is used to compute the weights for intellect errors by doing the pairwise comparison and fuzzy TOPSIS is used to rank the identified solutions with the help of generated weights of fuzzy AHP. The results show that “error of proximity” and “senses error” are the highest topmost rated solution to handle errors of the intellect is “development of critical thinking in the students”. Keywords: Intellect errors, fuzzy AHP, fuzzy TOPSIS, industry-ready
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FORTUNY, Francesç. "El intelecto en Guillero de Ockham." Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval 9 (October 1, 2002): 147. http://dx.doi.org/10.21071/refime.v9i.9344.
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The ontological theory about the two aristotelical intellects, created in the 13th century, finishes finally its itinerary with Ockham's epistemological theory. The realistic-propositionalist Ockham's epistemological theory reduces the intellect to a connotation: intellect denotes the soul, or better, the thinking subject whole and one; but connotes the man's cognitival function. The man is essentially free and directs his knowledge to its object, it is life and activity; but the denoted acognitival function is passive.
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Sousa, Meline Costa. "Avicenna and his Sources: Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius (Part 1)." DoisPontos 18, no. 1 (2023): 45–56. https://doi.org/10.5380/dp.v18i1.74894t.
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This article is part of a broader investigation on Avicenna and his Greek Aristotelian sources. It aims to discuss the relation between Avicenna, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Themistius from their theory about the intellect. Nowadays, there is a long debate among scholars concerning Avicenna’s noetic theory. One of its issues is the nature of the agent intellect and its relationship with the human intellect. However, since it is a difficult subject, the following lines are the first part of the mentioned investigation. They will be restricted to a general introduction to those three interpretations of the nature of the productive (or agent) intellect. One finds an analysis of the relation between Avicenna and his Greek sources based on the strict association (sometimes a strong dependence) of Avicenna’s theory with Alexander’s and Themistius’ ones. Thus, I will discuss their interpretation of Aristotle’s De anima 430a10-25 concerning the description and distinction of the intellects. Then, I will indicate some difficulties related to this strict association.
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Podsiadło, Jacek, Elżbieta Wójcik-Leese, and W. Martin. "Intellect." Chicago Review 46, no. 3/4 (2000): 275. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/25304633.
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King, Kenneth. "Intellect." College English 51, no. 8 (1989): 832. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/378082.
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Zembrzuski, Michał. "Tomaszowe rozumienie wiary jako aktu intelektu i kwestia intelektualności treści wiary (intellectus fidei)." Rocznik Tomistyczny 12, no. 1 (2023): 87–105. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10517771.
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The aim of this paper is to turn attention to works of Thomas on the human intellect in the context of faith, especially to understanding faith as an act of the potential intellect. Its aim is also exploration of the topic of intellectuality (cognoscobility) of truths which are considered the object of faith (<em>intellectus fidei</em>). This differentiation seems to be in line with the thought of Aquinas who in a different way presents the role of the intellect in the context of faith than he does in domain of theology (<em>sacra doctrina</em>). In the entire different way Thomas presents the intellect as that which acknowledges- directed by the will- statements about God and His relation to the creatures and the intellect which penetrates, recognises, justifies and allows the will to rejoice truths flowing from the systematic presentation of the dogmas of faith. In this article we show faith as an act of the intellect along with doubt, conviction about something and hence acknowledging some statement or certainty. Faith is not any of the above acts but it consists of something that relates to them. Faith is an act of the intellect who recognised a statement on the basis of authority of a speaker, hence on the basis of truth which presents. In this paper we also present faith as one of the theological virtues and the role of intellectual activities in the area of faith and theology.
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Soipova, Mavjuda. "Fazl Ibn Ahmad: Philosophical Reflections on The Socio-Political Context of His Era." Indonesian Culture and Religion Issues 2, no. 2 (2025): 6. https://doi.org/10.47134/diksima.v2i2.184.
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This article provides information about the philosophical analysis of the social, economic, political, and cultural environment during the time of Fazl ibn Ahmad. The work “Iddatul Uqul” and “Umdatul Ma’qul” (The Promise of the Intellects and the Basis of What is Pleasing to the Intellect) presents thoughts on the soul, purity, spirit, and knowledge. In the process of building New Uzbekistan, the ideas of Fazl ibn Ahmad remain crucial in today’s complex era, particularly in nurturing the youth into spiritually developed individuals and raising them morally. In the current context, the effective use of Fazl ibn Ahmad’s “Iddatul Uqul” and “Umdatul Ma’qul” (The Promise of the Intellects and the Basis of What is Pleasing to the Intellect) is highlighted as a priority in social development, societal well-being, and the fulfillment of human needs.
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Conolly, Brian Francis. "Averroes, Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome on How is Man Understands." Vivarium 45, no. 1 (2007): 69–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853407x183180.
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AbstractGiles of Rome, in his early treatise, De plurificatione possibilis intellectus, criticizes the arguments of Thomas Aquinas against the Averroist doctrine of the uniqueness of the possible intellect on the grounds that Aquinas does not fully appreciate the distinction between material and intentional forms and the differences in how these forms are generated. Nevertheless, like Aquinas, he argues that Averroes' doctrine still results in the apparently absurd consequence that homo non intelligit, i.e., the individual, particular man, this man, does not understand. Giles, however, attempts to respond to certain "radical" Averroists, who, in a bold and clever maneuver, affirm that homo non intelligit. While Giles does effectively argue that homo non intelligit is not the opinion of Averroes, he is unable to demonstrate the absurdity of homo non intelligit in a manner that would be convincing to the Averroists. This is because Giles, like Aquinas, maintains that the intellect is a power of the soul, and thus has a different conception of the relation between body and intellect than do the Averroists, who emphasize the separateness of the intellect.
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Fatemeh Khiveh, Omid Asemani, Sedigheh Ebrahimi, Seyed Ziaeddin Tabei , MD, and Farokh Bahram, Sekaleshfar, MD. "The Modalization and Evolution of Human Intellect (Cognitive Systems): Following in the Prophets' Footsteps." MAQOLAT: Journal of Islamic Studies 3, no. 2 (2025): 180–94. https://doi.org/10.58355/maqolat.v3i2.142.
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Because the sacred texts, encompassing the Qur'an and the Testaments, offer paramount insights into the realization of human excellence and given the Qur'an's authenticity and its complementary nature to preceding scriptures, our study delves into discerning verses from the Qur'an, consulting the perspectives of philosophers and thinkers, and delving into the narratives of divine prophets – who exemplify perfected intellects. The Quran's timeless relevance and universal messages have influenced the development of human intellect across diverse cultures and civilizations. By examining the profound lessons and moral values conveyed through these stories, we can gain a deeper understanding of the perfection of human intellect and its enduring relevance in today's world. Through this exploration, we unveil a sequential progression in the development of human cognition, consisting of distinct phases: Sensory Perception, Apprehension, imaginalization, intellection, and Intuition. As we meticulously examine the accounts of the prophets as recounted from Adam to the seal of prophethood, it becomes evident that these cognitive and intellectual stages have been manifested in the world through these divine messengers. Much like the narratives of the prophets within the Qur'an, human intellects must initially contend with apprehensions, then transition away from their hold, and subsequently engage in a battle against these apprehensions at the opportune moment, triumphing over them. This iterative process enables the intellect to reach its zenith of refinement and perfection, guided by the teachings of the prophets and the constructive, regulatory counsel of these profoundly sanctified and inherently sublime beings, ultimately progressing toward the state of Intuition. The fundamental objective of our inquiry lies in exploring the advancement of human intellect by emulating the archetypal portrayals of the divine prophets found in the Qur'an.
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Şenol, KORKUT. "Themistius'un Faal Akıl Teorisi." Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 6, no. 10 (2019): 147–84. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2595526.
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<strong>Themistius’un Faal Akıl Teorisi</strong> <strong>Öz </strong>Themistius felsefe tarihinde Aristotelesçi <em>Ruh Üzerine</em> geleneği bağlamında önemli bir yerde durmaktadır. Themistius Aristotles’in <em>Ruh Üzerine</em> adlı eserine bir şerh yazmış, bu şerh Arapça’ya çevrilmiş ve ruh teorileri bağlamında İslâm Felsefesi alanında etkili olmuştur. Themistius faal aklı aşkın veya ilahi bir içerikten ziyade insana ait bir yeti olarak vasıflandırmıştır. Bu yorum, faal aklı Tanrı olarak yorumlayan İskender’in anlayışına ve ilahi kimlikli yorumlayan şarihlerin görüşlerine karşıt bir durumdur. Themistius’a göre faal akıl bilkuvve akla iştirak etmekte, onun üzerinde hareket etmekte ve bilkkuvve düşünceleri bilfiil hale getirmektedir. Fakat bunu dışardan bir güç olarak değil insan ruhunun en üst formu olarak yapmaktadır. Böylelikle faal akıl ruhun ve maddi aklın nihai ereği konumundadır. Ruha dışardan gelen bir karışım değildir. Faal akıl Tanrı veya Tanrısal bir gücün insan ruhu üzerindeki bir uzantısı değildir. Themistius’a göre faal akıl birdir; hatta bilkuvve, bilfiil ve faal akıl ayrımları bir çokluğa değil aynı birliğin varyantlarına işaret etmektedir. Böylelikle Themistius Aristotles’in <em>Ruh Üzerine</em>’sini ruhun birliği bağlamında Eflatuncu bir bakış açısıyla yorumlamıştır. <strong><em>Themistius’ Agent Intellect Theory</em></strong> <strong>Abstract</strong> Themistius stands in an important place in the history of philosophy in context of the tradition of commentary of Aristotle’s <em>De Anima. </em>Themistius wrote a commentary on Aristotle’s <em>De Anima, </em>This Commentary translated to Arabic and Themistius effected theories on spirits in Islamic Philosophy by this Commentary. Themistius has characterized agent intellect as human power rather than transcendent or divine content. This type of commentary about agent intellect contrary to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ ideas as agent intellect should be God and commentators interpreted agent intellect should be extension of a transcendent entity in human mind. According to Themistius, agent intellect participated in human material intellect, leading to human material intellect, and converting to potential intelligible to actual intelligible. However, agent intellect performing these issues as superior form of human spirit not as an external power. Thus, agent intellect is the ultimate form of soul and potential mind. Agent intellect is not a mixture from the outside. Agent intellect is not God or is not an extension of a divine power on the human soul. According to Themistius, Potential intellect and Agent intellect is not many but One, in fact potential intellect, actual intellect, and agent intellect are not reference to multitude but they are oneness. Thus, Themistius interpreted the Aristotle’s <em>De Anima</em> on the basis of a Platonic view in the context of spiritual unity. <strong>Keywords: </strong>De Anima, Themistius, Potential Intellect, Actual Intellect, Agent Intellect. <strong>Extended Abstract</strong> Themistius (317-385) was a multifaceted scholar raised in late-period Roman Empire. He wrote commentaries to the works of Aristoteles on logic, physics and psychology. Themistius had an important place in the history of philosophy in terms of the commentary tradition written on the work of Aristoteles named <em>De Anima</em>. The work of Themistius named <em>Commentary De Anima </em>was a text that had challenges in itself as emphasized by Schoder. Unlike the triple spirit concept of Plato, Themistius adopted the idea of Aristoteles arguing that the spirit is a simple and thinking unity. According to Themistius, we are not creatures that constantly think, we sometimes think and sometimes do not think. This phenomenon shows that the potential intellect is not always <em>de facto</em> in charge. For this reason, the existence of the potential intellect is absolutely compulsory. If we do not think continuously, we have to accept the existence of the potential intellect. Likewise, the potential intellect cannot become the active intellect without being involved in some functionalities. According to Themistius, potential intellect exists when humans are baby. When this type of intellect abstracts the universals from the intellect objects, and when it derives imaginations from them, this means that it has received some kind of training about these. For example, a man that has the material of information but that does not have any functionality on this information refers to the potential intellect level, and a man that both has the material of information and a functionality on it refers to the active intellect level. Likewise, potential intellect becomes an object of thinking. According to Themistius, light makes potential colors become materialized, and in the same way, agent intellect converts the potential intellect into an active being. Agent intellect produces all the thoughts in the human mind; potential intellect, on the other hand, becomes the material of all these thoughts. However, agent intellect cannot perform this function as a skill from among the integrity of the human mind. When potential intellect joins actual intellect, it acquires the ability to transform into active intellect, or the ability to think, and can join and differentiate thoughts and view them in other aspects. According to Themistius, agent intellect is not activated, it is unmixed and is the power that gives immortality to man. Potential intellect may be disrupted/mortal; however, agent intellect is immortal, and man can achieve immortality with the help of agent intellect. Depending on time, reasoning, loving, hating and similar feelings are not the elements that the agent intellect may be affected by. When man dies, all these feelings will also disappear; however, agent intellect will keep its immortality because it is without activation. According to Themistius, those who interpret agent intellect as the divine intellect cannot explain how it is functional in the human soul. According to him, when Aristoteles argued that agent intellect was immortal and eternal, he was not referring to God. In the philosophy of Aristoteles, God is not the sole existence that is eternal. The human soul, and the agent intellect, which is the uttermost form of this soul, like celestial bodies, are also immortal. For this reason, Aristoteles seems to have approved that agent intellect is one aspect of the man or that it belongs to man. The ore that will make man immortal is the agent intellect. According to Themistius, since there will not exist an agent intellect for each potential intellect, agent intellect is unique. One single agent intellect manages the thoughts, which appear differently in each human. In other words, agent intellect enlightens all ideas that appear in the name of thinking like a source of light. The potential and agent intellect have a certain unity and integrity in the human mind not two separate powers. If a teacher and a student can have the same realization about a piece of information or a concept, this shows that they both have a mutual intellect. With these views, Themistius showed the first example of the theory of unity of intellects, which brought a vast field of debate in the medieval philosophy. Likewise, Themistius argued that agent intellect was a humane power, and interpreted the thesis of Aristoteles claiming that this intellect was something “outer” within the limits of an extremely humane epistemology. For this reason, he brought an alternative interpretation to the commentaries arguing that agent intellect was a God or an intermediary power between man and God. According to him, agent intellect is an ability that is in consistence with the process defined by Aristoteles about the developmental stages of the nature; and constitutes the peak of the human intellect. In this respect, potential intellect, active intellect and agent intellect are the different sides of the human soul, and they have a hierarchical sequence as the one that is below is the material, and the one at the top is the form. Again, Themistius exemplified this hierarchical relation over the developmental stages of flowers and fruits on a tree. To sum up, the commentaries written on the work of Aristoteles, <em>De Anima</em>, has brought different interpretations about the basic problems in this work. The concept “Nous”, which was mentioned by Aristoteles in part 3.5 in this work, has been investigated by many commentators in different dimensions based on agent intellect throughout Hellenistic and Medieval Times. Alexander of Aphrodisias, who is a prominent one among these commentators, argued that the intellect that was mentioned by Aristoteles in part 3.5 in <em>De Anima </em>was the divine intellect. However, Themistius, as the most important commentator of <em>De Anima </em>after Alexander of Aphrodisias, interpreted this intellect as the uttermost form of human intellect. Themistius interpreted the agent intellect under the influence of Neo-Platonism, which was a dominant philosophical school in his period, and supported this thesis by gathering the approvals mentioned in the collected works of Plato and by giving approving examples from the interpretations of Theophrastus.
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Carolina, Sparavigna Amelia. "The Ten Spheres of Al-Farabi: A Medieval Cosmology." International Journal of Sciences Volume 3, no. 2014-06 (2014): 34–39. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3348739.
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Abu Nasr Al-Farabi, who lived in the ninth century, left a valuable heritage for Islamic thinkers after him. In the framework of his metaphysics, he developed a theory of emanation describing the origin of the material universe. Ten intellects or intelligences are coming in succession from the First Being, and, from each of them, a sphere of the universe is produced. The first intellect created the outermost sphere and a second intellect. From this second intelligence, the sphere of the fixed stars and a third intellect had been generated. The process continues, through the spheres of the planets, downwards to the sphere of the Moon. From the Moon, a pure intelligence, defined as the "active intelligence", provides a bridge between heavens and earth. In the paper, we discuss this cosmology, comparing it to the cosmology of Robert Grosseteste, an Oxonian thinker of the thirteen century.Read Complete Article at ijSciences: V3201405517 AND DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18483/ijSci.517
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Popa, Mihai. "Asupra conceptului de dogmă la Lucian Blaga." Studii de istorie a filosofiei românești 2024, no. 20 (2024): 91–100. https://doi.org/10.59277/sifr.202420.06.
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The meaning Blaga assigns to dogma implies a logical impasse and a transcendent solution. The intellect is often confronted with choices that appear contradictory when it directs its efforts toward providing abstract meaning to ontological significances that exceed its sphere of applicability. In Blaga's view, dogma represents any intellectual formula that, in radical disagreement with understanding, posits a transcendence of logic, thereby coming into conflict with the usual functions of the intellect. Recognizing these crises, the intellect attempts to find methods to resolve the arising antinomies, but the problem cannot be solved with the intellect’s logical-abstract tools. A different type of logic, or another mode of ordering a reality that surpasses logically represented elements, is necessary. Our study examines how Blaga developed the concept of dogma in parallel with, and in relation to, the idea of transcendence.
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Ehrlich, Cyril. "Probing Intellect." Musical Times 132, no. 1782 (1991): 404. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/965914.
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Quinn, James Brian, Philip Anderson, and Sydney Finkelstein. "Leveraging intellect." Academy of Management Perspectives 10, no. 3 (1996): 7–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ame.1996.9704111471.
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Quinn, James Brian, Philip Anderson, and Sydney Finkelstein. "Leveraging intellect." Academy of Management Perspectives 19, no. 4 (2005): 78–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ame.2005.19417909.
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Shover, Neal. "Torrential intellect." Global Crime 11, no. 3 (2010): 346–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2010.490643.
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Bloom, James D. "Hollywood Intellect." Canadian Review of American Studies 34, no. 3 (2004): 233–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/cras-s034-03-02.
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Rowan, John. "The Intellect." Journal of Humanistic Psychology 31, no. 1 (1991): 49–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022167891311004.
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Leaming, Allison. "Mergent Intellect." Charleston Advisor 18, no. 2 (2016): 32–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5260/chara.18.2.32.
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Wahl, William. "Obama's intellect." New Scientist 203, no. 2715 (2009): 25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0262-4079(09)61776-0.
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Moran, Jamie. "Beyond Intellect." Self & Society 23, no. 1 (1995): 20–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03060497.1995.11085511.
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Alecia Singletary, Kimberly. "Interdisciplinary intellect." Arts and Humanities in Higher Education 11, no. 1-2 (2011): 109–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1474022211427363.
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This article explores the role of the Humanities, Arts, Science, and Technology Advanced Collaboratory (HASTAC) in facilitating and encouraging a collaborative community of junior and senior scholars on issues of technology and humanistic learning. As a result of its emphasis on collaboration and discussion, HASTAC encourages a form of collective intelligence that can serve as a model for future iterations of online communities formed to address problems and highlight advances in teaching and technology. Written from the perspective of a graduate student who also is a HASTAC scholar, the article discusses the positive impact HASTAC can have in terms of opportunities for professional advancement for junior scholars, as well as encouraging collaboration across disciplinary boundaries on issues relating to teaching methodologies, the humanities, and technology.
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Virno, Paolo. "General Intellect." Historical Materialism 15, no. 3 (2007): 3–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156920607x225843.
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AbstractAs part of the Historical Materialism research stream on immaterial labour, cognitive capitalism and the general intellect, begun in issue 15.1, this articles explores the importance of the expression 'general intellect', proposed by Marx in the Grundrisse, for an analysis of linguistic and intellectual work in contemporary capitalism. It links the notion of general intellect to the crisis of the law of value, the political significance of mass intellectuality, and the definition of democracy in a world where knowledge is a productive force in its own right.
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Byrne, Richard W. "BRUTE INTELLECT." Sciences 31, no. 3 (1991): 42–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.2326-1951.1991.tb02307.x.
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Haldane, John. "Rational and Other Animals." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 41 (September 1996): 17–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100006020.
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The soul has two cognitive powers. One is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows things existing in individual matter; hence sense knows only the singular. But there is another kind of power called the intellect. Though natures only exist in individual matter, the intellectual power knows them not as individualised, but as they are abstracted from matter by the intellect's attention and reflection. Thus, through the intellect we can understand natures in a universal manner; and this is beyond the power of sense. (St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 12, a. 4; responsio.)
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OP, Paul D. Hellmeier. "Der Intellekt ist nicht genug. Das proklische „unum in nobis“ bei Berthold von Moosburg." Philosophisches Jahrbuch 126, no. 2 (2019): 202–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0031-8183-2019-2-202.
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Abstract. In his commentary on the Elementatio theologica of Proclus, Berthold von Moosburg claims that the Proclean supersapientia is superior to Aristotelian metaphysics because it has a cognitive principle that is superior to the intellect. This unum in nobis also establishes a cognitive habitus, which consists in the union with the divine. This article shows how Proclean science leads to deification and to what extent it is the expression and conscious realization of deification. Examining the relationship between the “one in us” and the intellect, it becomes clear that Berthold does not equate them with each other. Nevertheless, the intellectus adeptus, in whose conception Berthold is more oriented to Albertus Magnus than to Dietrich von Freiberg, is a necessary and never fully obsolete precursor for the union with the divine. With this view, Berthold integrates the Arabic-Peripatetic doctrine of the acquired intellect into the Proclean doctrine of the five modes of knowledge, thus returning them to their historical and systematic origin.
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Mudin, Moh Isom, and Andin Desnafitri. "Al-Attas on Intelect and It’s Relevance to The Islamization of Knowledge: Sufism philosophical Approach." Khatulistiwa 9, no. 2 (2020): 5–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.24260/khatulistiwa.v9i2.1479.
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The intellect has two aspects such as cognitive or theoretical intellect (‘alimah) and active or practical intellect (‘amilah). This cognitive intellect have four aspect such as material intellect (al-‘aql al-hayulani), possible intellect (al-‘aql al-mumkin) or possessive intellect (al-‘aql bi’l malakah) or intellect in action (al-‘aql bi’l-fi’l), potential intellect (al-‘aql al-quwwah), and acquired intellect (al-‘aql al-mustafad) called by the holy spirit (al-ruh al-Quds). the intellect function as the aspect of soul such as the vegetative (al-nabatiyyah), the animal (al-hayawaniyah) and the human (al-insaniyyah) or the rational (al-nathiqah). Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas take the important step to solve this problem and analyze the linguistic problem as the one step to perform the Islamization of contemporary knowledge which developed with the key of Islamic term concept as intellect
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Efremova, Natalia V. "The Islamization of Aristotelism in the Metaphysics of Ibn Sina." RUDN Journal of Philosophy 24, no. 1 (2020): 39–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2020-24-1-39-54.
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The article analyzes the activity of the greatest classic of the Islamic philosophy - Ibn Sina (Avicenna, 980-1037), aimed at the revision of Aristotelianism, mainly in terms of its synthesis with Islamic monotheism. Preferential attention is paid to the metaphysical section of Avicennian multivolume encyclopedia “The Healing” (c. 1020-1027). Instead of Aristotelian God / the Prime Mover as the final cause, which serves as the source of the movement of the world, Avicenna establishes God / Necessary Being, who acts as the Giver of being. Developing the ontological foundation of creationism, i.e. the creation of every thing in the world, the philosopher introduces a distinction between essence and existence ( māhiyyawujūd , lat. essentia-existentia), which will pass through the subsequent history of philosophy. Ibn Sina thoroughly modifies the Aristotelian doctrine of the unity of God and His essential cataphatic attributes. The intellectual narcissism of God, Who only knows Himself in Stagirite, he changes with the concept of Divine Omniscience and His providence of all existents. Ibn Sina transforms Aristotelian eternalism into eternalistic creationism, modifying the emanationist scheme of cosmogenesis advanced by al-Farabi (d. 950), in which the process of proceeding of the existents from the First Principle appears as an intellectual act. The Muslim philosopher complements Aristotelian cosmology with the doctrine of angels, whom he identifies with cosmic intellects and souls as the governors of the celestial spheres. Avicennian radical innovation is in the doctrine of Active Intellect ( al-‘akl al-fa‘‘al , lat. intellectus agens ), who is not only the ruler of the sublunar world, but actually is its demiurge. This intellect is assigned with the function of the illumination of the human intellect, as well as with the role of the archangel Gabriel the transmitter of divine revelation according to Muslim tradition. From the philosophical perspective, Avicenna develops alien to Aristotelianism topics related to the prophecy and revelation, the immortality of the soul and its otherworldly fate.
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Eden, Lynn. "Charles Thorpe.Oppenheimer: The Tragic Intellect.:Oppenheimer: The Tragic Intellect." American Historical Review 113, no. 2 (2008): 530–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/ahr.113.2.530.
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Caston, Victor. "Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal." Phronesis 44, no. 3 (1999): 199–227. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685289960500033.
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AbstractIn De anima 3.5, Aristotle argues for the existence of a second intellect, the so-called "Agent Intellect." The logical structure of his argument turns on a distinction between different types of soul, rather than different faculties within a given soul; and the attributes he assigns to the second species make it clear that his concern here - as at the climax of his other great works, such as the Metaphysics, the Nicomachean and the Eudemian Ethics - is the difference between the human and the divine. If this is right, we needn't go on a wild goose chase trying to invent a role for the so-called Agent Intellect to play. God moves our intellects as he moves the heavenly spheres, "as a beloved": he constitutes the complete actualization towards which all of our intellectual striving is directed. Aristotle regards such final causation as an efficient cause, but not in a way that would make it part of what we would call the causal processes or mechanisms of human psychology. But, he would insist, it is essential for appreciating who we are and what our place is in the world.
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Mouflier, Camille. "L’articulation des chapitres 19 et 20 du traité VI, 2 [43] de Plotin. La priorité du genre sur ses espèces." Elenchos 44, no. 1 (2023): 153–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/elen-2023-0006.
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Abstract Chapter 20 of Plotinus’ treatise VI, 2 [43] has received particular attention because it seems to deal with the Intellect. However, the connection of this chapter with chapter 19 is problematic insofar as the latter deals with the ways in which species are generated by the first genera. Our aim will be to show that chapter 20 can only be understood in the light of the notion of genus. More precisely, Plotinus’ aim in this chapter is to demonstrate the priority of the genus over its species by means of the theory of double activity. In order to demonstrate this point, the notion of Intellect is introduced by Plotinus as a model (παράδειγμα) to conceive this priority. We will study successively these two chapters to justify this point, insisting on the link between them as well as on the reinterpretation of some key Aristotelian concepts. This study also shows that the use of the comparison with science allows Plotinus to justify the primacy of the intelligible totalities that are the Soul and the Intellect as well as the generation of their respective parts, the particular souls and the particular intellects.
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Crystal, Ian. "Plotinus on the Structure of Self-Intellection." Phronesis 43, no. 3 (1998): 264–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852898321119731.
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AbstractIn this paper, I argue that Plotinus offers us a new and interesting account of self-intellection. It is an account which is informed to some extent by a dilemma that Sextus Empiricus raised about the intellect being to apprehend itself. The significance of Sextus' dilemma is that it sets out the framework within which such a cognitive activity is to be dealt with, namely the intellect must apprehend itself qua part or qua whole, both of which according to him are impossible. Plotinus, I think, successfully gets around this dilemma and is able to explain how the intellect can think itself qua whole. In the process of doing so, he offers an account of self-intellection in which the thinking subject or thinker becomes active in terms of generating its intellectual content, namely itself; a move which is a break from the traditional Platonic/Aristotelian account of the intellect. The paper itself is set up as follows. I start by mentioning the dilemma which Sextus raises about self-intellection. Then I attempt, through an analysis of the noetic intellect's structure, to show how Plotinus is able to offer an account of self-intellection in terms of whole apprehending whole. I conclude with Plotinus' analysis of the light analogy as a means of explaining how this intellectual process works.
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De Koninck, Thomas. "Reflexions sur l'intelligence." Études maritainiennes / Maritain Studies 4 (1988): 55–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/maritain198847.
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Jacques Maritain's concern for the intellect and everything it implies is evident everywhere in his work from the very outset It would be presumptuous and in any case impossible to sketch in one short talk even an outline of such a fundamental theme of his thought or indeed of philosophy. Still, it has become probably more vital today than ever before to awake to what intellect means. This brief paper attempts merely to indicate a few questions worth pursuing anew in the spirit both of Maritain and the chief sources of his thought on the matter. The questions include the following. Why invariably link together human dignity and intellect, as our tradition, no less theological than philosophical, undoubtedly seems to? Objections to this are, prima facie, rather obvious: an excessive cult of rationality; an implicit neglect of other, far more important, values; apparent scorn for the ignorant or the uninstructed; most plainly, forgetting love and the human heart. We face again the question: whence the dignity of intellect? What light can we expect the neurosciences and similar disciplies to shed on the nature of the mind? Are reason and intellect quite the same thing? What is intellectualknow ledge; its relation to existence and the existent; its relation to beauty and to the transcendentals; and its role in creativity? In a word, how is one to interpret Augustine's Intellectum vero valdeama? Or to face the greatest interpretive challenge of all, the famous saying of StJohn of the Cross: "One thought alone of man is worth more than the entire world; hence God alone is worthy of it"?
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Roberge, Michel. "La génération des Idées dans la Paraphrase de Sem (NH VII, 1)." Articles spéciaux 70, no. 1 (2015): 143–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1028170ar.
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Le mythe cosmogonique de la Paraphrase de Sem utilise le schéma médio-platonicien de deux Intellects : l’Intellect paternel et l’Intellect démiurge. Il situe cependant l’Intellect paternel à l’origine dans le chaos précosmique, recouvert d’un feu agité et soumis au principe mauvais, l’Obscur. De plus, la succession des Intellects procède selon le mode biologique de l’engendrement. Selon ce modèle la production des Idées ou Formes s’accomplit en deux étapes : 1) lorsque le Pneuma, principe intermédiaire entre l’Obscur et la Lumière, agissant à la façon d’un principe actif stoïcien, chute dans le chaos, l’Intellect qui était inerte reçoit l’impulsion qui le rend actif et produit, avec l’aide du feu, les Idées qui illuminent alors le chaos (2,19-3,29). 2) Lorsque le Sauveur, venu à la rescousse de la lumière du Pneuma, provoque la formation de la Matrice cosmique, l’Obscur s’unit à elle et éjacule son Intellect comme une semence. Il engendre alors le second Intellect en même temps qu’il transfère dans la Matrice les Idées que la Nature utilisera comme des « raisons séminales » pour fabriquer le monde matériel (3,30-6,30a). Traduire et interpréter ces pages exige de tenir compte du contexte philosophique et du vocabulaire technique de l’embryologie de l’époque.
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Zembrzuski, Michał. ""Homo non est intellectus". Aquinas about relation between soul and intellect." Studia Philosophiae Christianae 53, no. 4 (2019): 75. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/2017.53.4.04.
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Guyomarc’h, Gweltaz. "Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Active Intellect as Final Cause." Elenchos 44, no. 1 (2023): 93–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/elen-2023-0004.
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Abstract In his own De anima, Alexander of Aphrodisias famously identifies the “active” (poietikon) intellect with the prime mover in Metaphysics Λ. However, Alexander’s claim raises an issue: why would this divine intellect come in the middle of a study of soul in general and of human intellection in particular? As Paul Moraux asks in his pioneering work on Alexander’s conception of the intellect, is the active intellect a “useless addition”? In this paper, I try to answer this question by challenging a solution according to which the active intellect would intervene directly with the material intellect to trigger its ordinary working. I argue that the active intellect acts as a final cause, both for human intellect and for its ordinary objects of thought. The active intellect is twice “cause of the intellection”, i.e. cause of the actualization of human thought: once (i) when it offers thought occasions for thinking through objects, and again (ii) when it actualizes mediately the human intellect itself in its development. This reading agrees with Alexander’s usual position about the prime mover’s causality. It accounts for the multiplicity of expressions with which Alexander describes the causality of the active intellect in his De anima. It also explains why the development of human intellect has been described without direct reference to active intellect, since substances do not aim directly at the First cause, but their aiming at it is mediated by their desire for their own good.
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Quintana, Francisco. "Beyond "General Intellect"." Athenea Digital. Revista de pensamiento e investigación social 1, no. 7 (2005): 148. http://dx.doi.org/10.5565/rev/athenead/v1n7.187.
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Rappe, Sara. "Plotinus on Intellect." Ancient Philosophy 30, no. 2 (2010): 462–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil201030247.
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Traynor, Desmond, Des Traynor, Dermot Healy, and Blánaid McKinney. "Intellect and Feeling." Books Ireland, no. 236 (2000): 356. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20632216.
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Ovan, Sabrina. "Q’s General Intellect." Cultural Studies Review 11, no. 2 (2013): 69–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/csr.v11i2.3659.
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I would claim that the main feature of the general intellect, in all its forms, is its indeterminacy. Neither defining individuality nor a specific group, the general intellect represents a sort of passage between the singular and the multitude. Until now, the discussion of the concept of the general intellect has been the prerogative of economists, sociologists, philosophers and historians. I intend to demonstrate how this notion has also influenced the literary field, and, in particular, how the general intellect is an active element in the narration of Q, the novel written in 1999 by the writers’ collective ‘Luther Blissett Project’.
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Novakovskaia, Iuliia Vadimovna. "Intellect or Money." Moscow University Pedagogical Education Bulletin, no. 3 (September 30, 2016): 3–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.51314/2073-2635-2016-3-3-14.
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Possessing intellect and, hence, the capability of critically analyzing information, each person alone durante vita and the whole humankind throughout its existence extend and improve the knowledge system. Any individual should not be a small empty-headed screw in the global financial system. An individual should be well-rounded, which is impossible in the absence of good education combined with the historical memory and cultural heritage of the nation. Destroying the educational system means destroying the state and finally completely demolishing the civilization.
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Kunkel, Patrick. "Intellect vs. Creativity." Music Educators Journal 79, no. 7 (1993): 6. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3398605.
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