Journal articles on the topic 'Intergovernmental fiscal relations – South Africa'

Housing policy in South Africa requires that government departments at different spheres coordinate their activities to facilitate the provision of housing. This coordination is imperative because without such, effective housing provision remains compromised. The question that this paper raises is: whither intergovernmental relations (IGR) for housing policy implementation in South Africa? From this question it is clear that the nature of this discussion is conceptual as it seeks to engage on the institutional IGR model of public housing delivery. This question is raised in this paper because a system that ties activities of different spheres of government is necessary to realise housing policy implementation outcomes. However, in responding to this question several issues receive attention: Firstly, a broader view on a social contract as well as establishing public institutions to facilitate public service delivery.Secondly, intergovernmental relations and housing which consider the nature of IGR system in place, while arguing that this system is not viable for housing delivery. Thirdly, while the municipal accreditation system has been introduced, it remains complex and costly in addressing housing delivery challenges. In the final analysis, this paper argues for a constitutional amendment which would allow housing to become a functional competency of municipalities similar to other human settlements components such as roads constructions, electricity, sanitation and clean drinking water.

This paper assesses the economic effects of a hypothetical fuel levy imposed by South African provinces. The welfare effects of increasing the fuel levy by 10 per cent are negative but very small. Similarly, the marginal excess burdens for efficiency and equity (poverty) are quite low, suggesting much smaller impacts of the intervention on both economic activity and equity. Furthermore, a fiscal policy reform that raises fuel levy by 10 per cent is progressive as it has stronger negative effects on higher income households than the lower income households. A potential source of instability for the macroeconomy and total government revenue is the negative effect on economic activity induced by the fuel levy increase. The remedies suggested are that policymakers should make tax room elsewhere in the intergovernmental fiscal system to accommodate the fuel levy increase.

Abstract The notion of urban autonomy is increasingly significant in a global era where city governments are playing an ever-growing role in development, as well as in domestic and international politics. While extending significantly beyond legal configurations of local government powers and functions, urban autonomy is importantly shaped, enabled and protected by constitutional and legal provisions. This is so especially where urban governance happens in a resource-strapped and often politically volatile environment. This article considers the extent to which formal constitutional structures, and their justiciability, enable and channel urban autonomy in the developing world, with a focus on the constitutionally ensconced powers and functional authority of cities in South Africa. Through an overview of relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and of court decisions upholding urban autonomy in intergovernmental disputes, the article illustrates that South African cities have been served well by a constitutional framework emphasising cooperative governance and developmental local government, as well as by the justiciable entrenchment of local government’s executive, legislative and administrative authority.

In July 1796, Johannes Albertyn, a well-respected burgher of Stellenbosch, requested permission from Ryno van der Riet, landdrost of Stellenbosch, the chief administrative and legal officer of the district, to indenture four Khoikhoi children. He claimed that their mother, Catryn Paerl, had died recently and that before her demise, she had requested him in the presence of witnesses to raise her children and deny their biological father Jan Paerl any future role in their lives. Faced with the prospect of losing custody of his four children and having exhausted all possible avenues in seeking legal redress, including a visit to landdrost Van der Riet, the seemingly incomparable Jan Paerl hit the road and walked several kilometres from Stellenbosch to Cape Town. His destination: the Castle, in particular the office of the fiscal, otherwise known as the public prosecutor. In Cape Town, he urged the fiscal to intervene in the dispute and deny Albertyn the right to indenture his children. As their father, Paerl insisted that he, and not Albertyn, be granted sole custody of his offspring. By Paerl's demanding legal intervention at the highest level, the following encounter between Paerl, Albertyn and the Cape authorities exemplifies not only a classic struggle between master and servant, but highlights simultaneously the significance of ‘equality’ before the law in Cape society, at a time when burghers increasingly feared the possibility of gelykstelling at the end of the eighteenth century.

The ability to regulate the flow of goods, capital and people across borders is one of the defining characteristics of nation-state political power. But there is not always agreement between the central government and local officials as to the desirability of immigration, where local governments may desire greater, or fewer, numbers of immigrants, depending on the local economy and labor needs. In South Korea, a unitary form of government offers an opportunity to examine the policy distance between the national government’s stance on immigration based on the politics of the ruling party, and the attitudes of local officials who work for metropolitan-level governments (those with a population of one million or more). I look at the impact of local economic market needs on local attitudes towards national immigration policy through the lens of intergovernmental relations and Lipsky’s concept of bureaucratic discretion. Comparing two cases drawn from local governments in South Korea with dissimilar economic bases but similar levels of local autonomy, I find that economic needs at the local level are addressed by local approaches to immigration policy. Contrary to expectations, the cases illustrate the relative importance of fiscal autonomy and a new understanding for political autonomy. These cases illustrate the need for caution when applying political and institutional theory within new contexts and offer new variables for future investigations of local autonomy.

South African rand depreciated in 2013–2014 under the influence of a number of factors. Internationally, its weakness was associated with the capital outflow from all emerging markets as a result of QE’s tapering in the US. Domestically, rand plummeted because of the deterioration of the macroeconomic stance of South Africa itself: economic growth stalled and current account deficit widened again. Consumer spending was restrained with the high household indebtedness, investment climate worsened with the wave of bloody strikes, and net export was still prone to J-curve effect despite the degree of the devaluation happened. But, in its turn, those problems are a mere reflection of the deep institutional misbalances inherent to the very model of the national economy. Saving rate is too low in South Africa. This leads not only to an insufficient investment, but also to trade deficits and overdependence on speculative capital inflows. Extremely high unemployment means that the country’s economic potential is substantially underutilized. Joblessness is generated, first and foremost, by the dualistic structure of the national entrepreneurship. Basic wages are being formed by way of a bargaining between big public and semi state companies, on the one hand, and trade unions associated with the ruling party, on the other. Such a system is biased towards protection of vested interests of those who earn money in capital-intensive industries. At the same time, these rates of wages are prohibitively high for a small business; so far private companies tend to avoid job creation. A new impulse to economic development is likely to emerge only through the government’s efforts to mitigate disproportions and to pursue an active industrial policy. National Development Plan adopted in 2012 is a practical step in that direction. But the growth of public investment is constrained by a necessity of fiscal austerity; as a result, the budget deficit remained too large in recent years. South African Reserve Bank will have to choose between a stimulation of economic growth with low interest rates, on the one hand, and a support of rand by tightening of monetary policy, on the other. This dilemma will greatly influence prices of securities and yields at South African financial markets.

Disaster mitigation is one of the phases within the disaster management cycle which alleviates the adverse impact of disasters by instituting structural and non-structural measures where infrastructure and people are at risk. Disaster mitigation remains an overlooked phenomenon by governments in developing countries, despite its negative repurcusion which is aggravated by economic downturns, infrastructural destruction and political unrest. The literature review reveals a need for long-term disaster mitigation strategies to be carried out well before disaster events. Among the most crucial demands are the need to embed mitigation in government departments’ planning programmes, the need for community participation and intergovernmental relations with the aim to create disaster resistant communities. The purpose of the article is to contribute to the development of a robust disaster management framework and the centre within eThekwini Municipality with the aim to create properly balanced mitigation strategies. Furthermore, to add value to the body of knowledge in South Africa as there are a limited number of researchers who have contributed to the study of disaster mitigation. The research was undertaken at the Foreman and Kennedy Road informal settlements located in Clare Estate, under Ward 25, in Durban. Questionnaires were self-administered to a population size of 220 respondents, from which a sample size of 140 respondents completed the questionnaires, thereby generating a response rate of 63.6%. Interviews were also conducted with municipality officials involved in disaster management. Data was analysed in the form of frequency distribution and cross-tabulation tables. The article indicates a significant difference between sturdy and non-compliance building materials used to build the informal settlements. The article indicates that eThekwini Municipality does not have mitigation strategy as well as short or long-term planning. The building density, the use of combustible building materials for wall and roofs, and structural instability, all have a considerable influence on the spread of fire to the informal settlements.

Until recently, only economically developed West-oriented states launched integration initiatives encompassing the entire Asia-Pacific region. However, over the last few years Beijing proposed several such initiatives embracing territories from America to Africa. The paper discusses the changes in Chinese views towards the leadership in modern world. Recent events in Syria, Ukraine, South China Sea and East China Sea made it clear that the world becomes more polycentric, with Russia and China resistant to external interference in the territories of their vital interests. The latest trends in East Asian and Asia-Pacific regionalism are singled out. China and USA have been the main rivals in initiating and supporting competing integration models. China has demonstrated unprecedented activity and launched several integration projects of trans-regional (Asia-Pacific and Eurasia) and on regional levels (East Asia). However, despite its growing geopolitical and economic aspirations, Beijing is not frontally challenging Washington-led system of intergovernmental agreements and financial institutions in Asia. Instead, Beijing is forming an alternative pro-Chinese model of integration without US participation (or with their secondary role) thus trying to gradually transform the Asia-Pacific to post-American hegemony model. President Xi Jinping put forward a concept of “Asia-Pacific Dream”. It incorporates formation of the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “New Maritime Silk Road” that will link the economies of Asia, Europe and Africa. By proposing these large scale infrastructure projects and two new regional financial institutions (Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and New Development Bank), the Chinese leadership renewed its global and regional politics, attempting to create a Eurasian “economic corridor” which could serve not only its regional and global interests, but for the common good of whole Asia and the world. Obviously, “New Silk Roads” strategy faces geopolitical and other challenges; yet, even it partial realization would make China a leader of the continental part of Eurasia. In terms of global and regional governance these trends can be strengthened through coordinated policy of Moscow and Beijing towards including these projects into the agenda of non-Western intergovernmental institutions, such as BRICS, SCO, Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), and others. Moreover, strategic cooperation with Russia is one of the principal factors to secure the success of China’s integration plans in the Asia-Pacific and especially in Eurasia. For its part, Moscow should deepen interaction and effectively utilize the resources of “rising” China to support Russia’s interests in Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific. It is necessary for Moscow to coordinate efforts with Central Asian states and China to elaborate co-development plans for infrastructural initiatives put forward by the SCO, EEU and the “Silk Road Economic Belt”. At the same time, Moscow should increasingly encourage Chinese investment into the Russian Far East. Acknowledgements. This article has been prepared in the framework of contract with the RF Ministry of Education and Science “Formation of the New International Order in the Asia-Pacific and National Interests of Russia”, project № 1430.

This paper examines the operations of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in so far as they are able to influence the public and labour relations policy and law of their host nation with a special attention on African nations. It is to be expected that MNEs would already be comfortable with the mechanisms in place for the resolution of labour-related or commercial disputes in their country of origin. The question then that arises is: If confronted with an employment relations situation in their host nation, would the MNE attempt to circumvent or adapt the process to suit what they are already familiar with? This could pose a challenge for the practice of international labour law. Literature (Briscoe, Schuler & Tarique, 2012; Eweje, 2009; Iyanda & Bello, 1979; Onimode, 1978) already alludes to the fact that MNEs tend to take the ‘line of least resistance’ if confronted with ‘higher’ labour standards. A comparative exploratory analysis was undertaken. The paper identified MNEs in selected African countries – Nigeria, South Africa, and Zambia – that have been reported to have had a challenge in dealing with labour-related or commercial standards of their host nation. The selected MNEs had been reported in the news media for having had a ‘run in’ with their host nation on, at least, a labour - or commercial law-related matter. The principal legislation governing labour relations in these countries are, in some cases, briefly highlighted to underscore the extent of their breach or disregard by the examined MNEs. Furthermore, a qualitative, thematic analysis of selected reported cases involving these MNEs were undertaken to highlight evidences (or instances) of attempts, if any, by the MNEs to circumvent the commercial, fiscal or labour standards of the host nation. Finally, it is hoped that the result of the above analyses would inform the possibility of proposing a framework for MNEs compliance with the labour standards of their host nation.

The author investigates the impact of COVID‑19 and macro-policy adjustment on China’s economic development. The aim is to describe the situation and trend of China’s economic development before and after COVID‑19. The research method is the comparative data analysis. The study shows that in response to COVID‑19, the Chinese government, on the one hand, has accelerated its opening-up, taken the opportunity of fighting against the pandemic to provide medical assistance to and cooperate with other countries, and actively promoted the building of a community with a shared future for mankind and the process of globalization. On the basis of the Belt and Road Initiative and multilateral, regional, and subregional cooperation mechanisms such as the United Nations, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), G20 (Group of 20), and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), China and the Eurasian Economic Union began to cooperate more frequently and the trade relations between Japan, South Korea, and European developed countries became closer. Meanwhile, committed to building a global interconnection partnership, China actively participates in global economic governance and provides various public products. The Chinese government has proposed “Six Guarantees” on the basis of “Six Stability”. In order to achieve the purpose of stabilizing foreign trade and expanding imports, China has imposed various measures to accelerate the liberalization and facilitation of international trade and investment, such as implementing the new version of the “Foreign Investment Law”, establishing free trade zones, and promoting its experience and organizing international import expositions. Additionally, the Chinese government also implemented targeted fiscal and monetary policies, increased support for enterprises, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, and promoted the construction of “new infrastructure” and innovation of business model, which have formed the driving forces for the transformation of the economic development model in China from traditional business to cloud business, from traditional marketing to live streaming marketing, from traditional sales to online sales. The author concluded thatChina’s adjustment of macro policies in response to COVID‑19 was effective and played an important role in the resumption of production and life, stabilizing foreign trade activities, releasing domestic demand and promoting stable and sustained growth of the economy

This article analyses relations between South Africa's national and provincial governments on foreign affairs over the past 20 years. It departs from the premise that the idea of relative autonomy ofsubnational governments, which is embedded in South Africa's 1996 constitution, has remained largely underdeveloped owing to factors such as inherent ambiguities in the constitutional design, a strong centralising ethos on the part of the ruling party and generally weak provincial capacities. Consequently, relations between the national and provincial governments on foreign affairs have been low-key, predominantly focused on technical matters and generally of a top-down nature. Provincial governments have been virtually absent from the foreign policy-making process despite constitutional provisions to that effect. What is more, the article notes that intergovernmental processes intended to coordinate provincial international relations and align them with national development priorities and South Africa's foreign policy have for the most part been ineffective and inefficient.

This paper provides a brief introduction to the recent history of, as well as the legal and policy framework for, local government in South Africa. It discusses the transformation of local government from a racially configured, illegitimate arm of the apartheid government into a system designed to produce developmentally oriented municipalities. The progress made by South African municipalities towards realising the vision of developmental local government is remarkable and unprecedented. Over the last 13 years, municipalities have embarked on the extension of infrastructure and development, whilst absorbing fundamental changes to their internal governance and management arrangements, financial management systems and intergovernmental responsibilities. The new local government system offers great potential for the realisation of a better life for all citizens, facilitated by a new generation of municipalities. However, the challenges remain huge and some of these can be attributed to institutional fault lines. These include challenges that come with large, inclusive municipalities, new executive systems and the political appointment of senior officials. The paper also identifies the downside of overzealous institutionalisation of community participation. With regard to intergovernmental relations, the paper highlights the need for a clearer definition of local government mandates and a greater recognition of the role of big cities. The current insistence on comprehensive intergovernmental alignment of policies and budgets is questioned, and suggestions are made to substitute this with an approach of selective alignment around key national priorities.

The importance of co-operative governance is strengthened by the authority vested in the judiciary—to ensure the judicial review of any conduct, rule or law that runs contrary to the prescripts of the envisaged collaborative relations. Of particular significance is the establishment of the Constitutional Court, where retired Chief Justice Ngcobo distinguished himself as an independent thinker, within the limitations of judicial authority, in advancing the principles of co-operative governance. His rich intellect demonstrates an alternative way of arriving at the constitutionalised South African jurisprudence that has spanned twenty-two years of democracy in regulating public authority. This article reviews and provides an account of Justice Ngcobo’s selected case law in the judicial enforcement of the principles of co-operative governance. The objective is to give impetus to the advancement of an unwavering commitment and a well thought-out, futuristic and progressive outlook on the evolution of South African jurisprudence. These were motivated by a zeal to establish his deep-rooted philosophy that informed his thoughts in judicial reasoning. The motivation raises a question that is intended to help determine whether his contribution has shifted the culture of dictatorship of the pre-democratic dispensation to the affirmation of the principles of constitutional supremacy in a way that befits the general populace affected by the different spheres of government.

Ajzenstat, Janet, Paul Romney, Ian Gentles and William D. Gairdner, eds. Canada's Founding Debates. By Alan Cairns 847Lazar, Harvey, ed. Canada: The State of the Federation 1999/2000: Toward a New Mission Statement for Canadian Fiscal Federalism. By Hugh Mellon 848Mouchon, Jean. La politique sous l'influence des médias; Monière, Denis. Démocratie médiatique et représentation politique: analyse comparative de quatre journaux télévisés : Radio-Canada, France 2, RTBF (Belgique) et TSR (Suisse); et Gingras, Anne-Marie. Médias et démocratie. Le grand malentendu. Par Maud Vuillardot 850Livingstone, D. W., D. Hart and L. E. Davie. Public Attitudes towards Education in Ontario 1998: The Twelfth OISE/UT Survey; and O'Sullivan, Edmund. Transformative Learning: Educational Vision for the 21st Century. By Benjamin Levin 853Perrier, Yvan et Raymond Robert. Savoir Plus : outils et méthodes de travail intellectuel. Par Veronique Bell 855Salazar, Debra J. and Donald K. Alper, eds. Sustaining the Forests of the Pacific Coast: Forging Truces in the War in the Woods. By Jeremy Rayner 856DeLuca, Kevin Michael. Image Politics: The New Rhetoric of Environmental Activism. By Michael Howlett 857Beem, Christopher. The Necessity of Politics: Reclaiming American Public Life. By Loralea Michaelis 858Kennedy, Moorhead, R. Gordon Hoxie and Brenda Repland, eds. The Moral Authority of Government: Essays to Commemorate the Centennial of the National Institute of Social Sciences. By Joseph M. Knippenberg 860Atkinson, Hugh and Stuart Wilks-Heeg. Local Government from Thatcher to Blair: The Politics of Creative Autonomy. By G. W. Jones 862Geoghegan, Patrick M. The Irish Act of Union: A Study in High Politics, 1798-1801. By Gary Owens 863Sabetti, Filippo. The Search for Good Government: Understanding the Paradox of Italian Democracy. By Grant Amyot 864Stein, Eric. Thoughts from a Bridge: A Retrospective of Writings on New Europe and American Federalism. By Manuel Mertin 866Janos, Andrew C. East Central Europe in the Modern World: The Politics of the Borderlands from Pre- to Post-Communism. By Paul G. Lewis 869Higley, John and Gyorgy Lengyel, eds. Elites after State Socialism: Theories and Analysis. By Marta Dyczok 870Lomnitz, Larissa Adler and Ana Melnick. Chile's Political Culture and Parties: An Anthropological Explanation. By Ken Roberts 872Itzigsohn, José. Developing Poverty: The State, Labor Market Deregulation, and the Informal Economy in Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic. By Andrew Schrank 873Davenport, Rodney and Christopher Saunders. South Africa: A Modern History. By Hermann Giliomee 875Matthes, Melissa M. The Rape of Lucretia and the Founding of Republics. By Lori J. Marso 877Gorham, Eric B. The Theater of Politics: Hannah Arendt, Political Science, and Higher Education. By Herman van Gunsteren 878Dodd, Nigel. Social Theory and Modernity. By J. C. Myers 879Sciabarra, Chris Matthew. Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism. By Paul Safier 881Sztompka, Piotr. Trust: A Sociological Theory. By Fiona M. Kay 882 Laugier, Sandra. Recommencer la philosphie. La philosophie américaine aujourd'hui. Par Dalie Giroux 884Bishop, John Douglas, ed. Ethics and Capitalism. By Raino Malnes 886Orend, Brian. War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective. By Howard Williams 888Buchanan, Allen, Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels and Daniel Wikler. From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. By Travis D. Smith 889Young, Iris Marion. Inclusion and Democracy. By Jeff Spinner-Halev 891Shapiro, Ian and Stephen Macedo, eds. Designing Democratic Institutions. By John S. Dryzek 893O'Brien, Robert, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte and Marc Williams. Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements. By Stephen McBride 894Giddens, Anthony. Runaway World: How Globalization Is Reshaping Our Lives. By Trevor Salmon 896Haglund, David G., ed. Pondering NATO's Nuclear Options: Gambits for a Post-Westphalian World. By T.V. Paul 897Bertsch, Gary K. and William C. Potter, eds. Dangerous Weapons, Desperate States: Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine. By Benjamin E. Goldsmith 898Shlaim, Avi. The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. By Salim Mansur 900Aldecoa, Francisco and Michael Keating, eds. Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments. By Hans J. Michelmann 901Davis, James W. Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence. By David Rousseau 903Lavoy, Peter R., Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz, eds. Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons. By Greg Dinsmore 905

Introduction In any list of dictators and antagonists of the West the name of Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi will always rank highly as one of the most memorable, colourful and mercurial. The roles he played to his fellow Libyans, to regional groupings, to revolutionaries and to the West were complex and nuanced. These various roles developed over time but were all grounded in his self-belief as a messianic revolutionary figure. More importantly, these roles and behaviours that stemmed from them were instrumental in preserving Qaddafi’s rule and thwarting challenges to it. These facets of Qaddafi’s public self accord with the model of “persona” described by Marshall. Whilst the nature of political persona and celebrity in the Western world has been explored by several scholars (for example Street; Wilson), little work has been conducted on the use of persona by non-democratic leaders. This paper examines the aspects of persona exhibited by Colonel Qaddafi and applied during his tenure. In constructing his role as a revolutionary leader, Qaddafi was engaging in a form of public performance aimed at delivering himself to a wider audience. Whether at home or abroad, this persona served the purpose of helping the Libyan leader consolidate his power, stymie political opposition and export his revolutionary ideals. The trajectory of his persona begins in the early days of his coming to power as a charismatic leader during a “time of distress” (Weber) and culminates in his bloody end next to a roadside drainage culvert. In between these points Qaddafi’s persona underwent refinement and reinvention. Coupled with the legacy he left on the Libyan political system, the journey of Muammar Qaddafi’s personas demonstrate how political personality can be the salvation or damnation of an entire state.Qaddafi: The Brotherly RevolutionaryCaptain Muammar Qaddafi came to power in Libya in 1969 at the age of just 27. He was the leader of a group of military officers who overthrew King Idris in a popular and relatively bloodless coup founded on an ideology of post-colonial Arab nationalism and a doing away with the endemic corruption and nepotism that were the hallmarks of the monarchy. With this revolutionary cause in mind and in an early indication that he recognised the power of political image, Qaddafi showed restraint in adopting the trappings of office. His modest promotion to the rank of Colonel was an obvious example of this, and despite the fact that in practical terms he was the supreme commander of Libya’s armed forces, he resisted the temptation to formally aggrandize himself with military titles for the ensuing 42 years of his rule.High military rank was in a way irrelevant to a man moving to change his persona from army officer to messianic national leader. Switching away from a reliance on military hierarchy as a basis for his authority allowed Qaddafi to re-cast himself as a leader with a broader mission. He began to utilise titles such as “Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council” (RCC) and “Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution.” The persona on display here was one of detached impartiality and almost reluctant leadership. There was the suggestion that Qaddafi was not really acting as a head of state, but merely an ordinary Libyan who, through popular acclaim, was being begged to lead his people. The attraction of this persona remained until the bitter end for Qaddafi, with his professed inability to step aside from a leadership role he insisted he did not formally occupy. This accords with the contention of Weber, who describes how an individual favoured with charisma can step forward at a time of crisis to complete a “mission.” Once in a position of authority, perpetuating that role of leadership and acclamation can become the mission itself:The holder, of charisma seizes the task that is adequate for him and demands obedience and a following by virtue of his mission. His success determines whether he finds them. His charismatic claim breaks down if his mission is not recognized by those to whom he feels he has been sent. If they recognize him, he is their master—so long as he knows how to maintain recognition through ‘proving’ himself. But he does not derive his ‘right’ from their will, in the manner of an election. Rather, the reverse holds: it is the duty of those to whom he addresses his mission to recognize him as their charismatically qualified leader. (Weber 266-7)As his rule extended across the decades, Qaddafi fostered his revolutionary credentials via a typical cult of personality approach. His image appeared on everything from postage stamps to watches, bags, posters and billboards. Quotations from the Brother Leader were set to music and broadcast as pop songs. “Spontaneous” rallies of support would occur when crowds of loyalists would congregate to hear the Brotherly Leader speak. Although Qaddafi publicly claimed he did not like this level of public adoration he accepted it because the people wanted to adore him. It was widely known however that many of these crowds were paid to attend these rallies (Blundy and Lycett 16).Qaddafi: The Philosopher In developing his persona as a guide and a man who was sharing his natural gifts with the people, Qaddafi developed a post-colonial philosophy he called “Third Universal Theory.” This was published in volumes collectively known as The Green Book. This was mandatory reading for every Libyan and contained a distillation of Qaddafi’s thoughts and opinions on everything from sports to politics to religion to the differences between men and women. Whilst it may be tempting for outsiders to dismiss these writings as the scribbling of a dictator, the legacy of Qaddafi’s persona as political philosopher is worthy of some examination. For in offering his revelations to the Libyan people, Qaddafi extended his mandate beyond leader of a revolution and into the territory of “messianic reformer of a nation.”The Green Book was a three-part series. The first instalment was written in 1975 and focuses on the “problem of democracy” where Qaddafi proposes direct democracy as the best option for a progressive nation. The second instalment, published in 1977, focuses on economics and expounds socialism as the solution to all fiscal woes. (Direct popular action here was evidenced in the RCC making rental of real estate illegal, meaning that all tenants in the country suddenly found themselves granted ownership of the property they were occupying!) The final chapter, published in 1981, proposes the Third Universal Theory where Qaddafi outlines his unique solution for implementing direct democracy and socialism. Qaddafi coined a new term for his Islamically-inspired socialist utopia: Jamahiriya. This was defined as being a “state of the masses” and formed the blueprint for Libyan society which Qaddafi subsequently imposed.This model of direct democracy was part of the charismatic conceit Qaddafi cultivated: that the Libyan people were their own leaders and his role was merely as a benevolent agent acceding to their wishes. However the implementation of the Jamahiriya was anything but benevolent and its legacy has crippled post-Qaddafi Libya. Under this system, Libyans did have some control over their affairs at a very local level. Beyond this, an increasingly complex series of committees and regional groupings, over which the RCC had the right of veto, diluted the participation of ordinary citizens and their ability to coalesce around any individual leader. The banning of standard avenues of political organisation, such as parties and unions, coupled with a ruthless police state that detained and executed anyone offering even a hint of political dissent served to snuff out any opposition before it had a chance to gather pace. The result was that there were no Libyans with enough leadership experience or public profile to take over when Qaddafi was ousted in 2011.Qaddafi: The Liberator In a further plank of his revolutionary persona Qaddafi turned to the world beyond Libya to offer his brotherly guidance. This saw him champion any cause that claimed to be a liberation or resistance movement struggling against the shackles of colonialism. He tended to favour groups that had ideologies aligned with his own, namely Arab unity and the elimination of Israel, but ultimately was not consistent in this regard. Aside from Palestinian nationalists, financial support was offered to groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines), Umkhonto we Sizwe (South Africa), ETA (Spain), the Polisario Front (Western Sahara), and even separatist indigenous Australians. This policy of backing revolutionary groups was certainly a projection of his persona as a charismatic enabler of the revolutionary mission. However, the reception of this mission in the wider world formed the basis for the image that Qaddafi most commonly occupied in Western eyes.In 1979 the ongoing Libyan support for groups pursuing violent action against Israel and the West saw the country designated a State-Sponsor of Terror by the US Department of State. Diplomatic relations between the two nations were severed and did not resume until 2004. At this point Qaddafi seemed to adopt a persona of “opponent of the West,” ostensibly on behalf of the world’s downtrodden colonial peoples. The support for revolutionary groups was changing to a more active use of them to strike at Western interests. At the same time Qaddafi stepped up his rhetoric against America and Britain, positioning himself as a champion of the Arab world, as the one leader who had the courage of his convictions and the only one who was squarely on the side of the ordinary citizenry (in contrast to other, more compliant Arab rulers). Here again there is evidence of the charismatic revolutionary persona, reluctantly taking up the burden of leadership on behalf of his brothers.Whatever his ideals, the result was that Qaddafi and his state became the focus of increasing Western ire. A series of incidents between the US and Libya in international waters added to the friction, as did Libyan orchestrated terror attacks in Berlin, Rome and Vienna. At the height of this tension in 1986, American aircraft bombed targets in Libya, narrowly missing Qaddafi himself. This role as public enemy of America led to Qaddafi being characterised by President Ronald Reagan (no stranger to the use of persona himself) as the “mad dog of the Middle East” and a “squalid criminal.” The enmity of the West made life difficult for ordinary Libyans dealing with crippling sanctions, but for Qaddafi, it helped bolster his persona as a committed revolutionary.Qaddafi: Leader of the Arab and African Worlds Related to his early revolutionary ideologies were Qaddafi’s aspirations as a pan-national leader. Inspired by Egypt’s Gamel Abdul Nasser from a young age, the ideals of pan-Arab unity were always a cornerstone of Qaddafi’s beliefs. It is not therefore surprising that he developed ambitions of being the person to bring about and “guide” that unity. Once again the Weberian description of the charismatic leader is relevant, particularly the notion that such leadership does not respect conventional boundaries of functional jurisdictions or local bailiwicks; in this case, state boundaries.During the 1970s Qaddafi was involved in numerous attempts to broker Arab unions between Libya and states such as Egypt, Syria and Tunisia. All of these failed to materialise once the exact details of the mergers began to be discussed, in particular who would assume the mantle of leadership in these super-states. In line with his persona as the rightly-guided revolutionary, Qaddafi consistently blamed the failure of these unions on the other parties, souring his relationship with his fellow Arab leaders. His hardline stance on Israel also put him at odds with those peers more determined to find a compromise. Following the assassination of Egypt’s Anwar Sadat in 1981 Qaddafi praised the act as justified because of Sadat’s signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel.Having given up on the hope of achieving pan-Arab Unity, Qaddafi sought to position himself as a leader of the African bloc. In 2009 he became Chairperson of the African Union and took to having himself introduced as “The King of Kings of Africa.” The level of dysfunction of the African Union was no less than that of the Arab League and Qaddafi’s grandiose plans for becoming the President of the United States of Africa failed to materialise.In both his pan-Arab and pan-Africa ambitions, we see a persona of Qaddafi that aims at leadership beyond his own state. Whilst there may be delusions of grandeur apparent in the practicalities of these goals, this image was nevertheless something that Qaddafi used to leverage the next phase of his political transformation.Qaddafi: The Post-9/11 Statesman However much he might be seen as erratic, Qaddafi’s innate intelligence could result in a political astuteness lacking in many of his Arab peers. Following the events of 11 September 2001, Qaddafi was the first international leader to condemn the attacks on America and pledge support in the War on Terror and the extermination of al-Qaeda. Despite his history as a supporter of terrorism overseas, Qaddafi had a long history of repressing it at home, just as with any other form of political opposition. The pan-Islamism of al-Qaeda was anathema to his key ideologies of direct democracy (guided by himself). This meant the United States and Libya were now finally on the same team. As part of this post-9/11 sniffing of the wind, Qaddafi abandoned his fledgling Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program and finally agreed to pay reparations to the families of the victims of the Pan Am 107 flight downed over Lockerbie in 1987.This shift in Qaddafi’s policy did not altogether dispel his persona of brotherly leadership amongst African nations. As a bloc leader and an example of the possibility of ‘coming in from the cold’, Qaddafi and Libya were reintegrated into the world community. This included giving a speech at the United Nations in 2009. This event did little to add to his reputation as a statesman in the West. Given a 15-minute slot, the Libyan leader delivered a rambling address over 90 minutes long, which included him tearing up a copy of the UN Charter and turning his back to the audience whilst continuing to speak.Qaddafi: The Clown From the Western point of view, performances like this painted Qaddafi’s behaviour as increasingly bizarre. Particularly after Libya’s rapprochement with the West, the label of threatening terrorist supporter faded and was replaced with something along the lines of a harmless clown prince. Tales of the Libyan leader’s coterie of virgin female bodyguards were the subject of ridicule, as was his ardour for US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Perhaps this behaviour was indicative of a leader increasingly divorced from reality. Surrounded by sycophants dependent on his regard for their tenure or physical survival, as well as Western leaders eager to contrast his amiability with that of Saddam Hussein, nobody was prepared to draw attention to the emperor’s new clothes.Indeed, elaborate and outlandish clothing played an increasing role in Qaddafi’s persona as the decades went on. His simple revolutionary fatigues of the early years were superseded by a vast array of military uniforms heavily decorated with medals and emblems; traditional African, Arab or Bedouin robes depending on the occasion; and in later years a penchant for outfits that included images of the African continent or pictures of dead martyrs. (In 2009 Vanity Fair did a tongue-in-cheek article on the fashion of Colonel Qaddafi entitled Dictator Chic: Colonel Qaddafi—A Life in Fashion. This spawned a number of similar features including one in TIME Magazine entitled Gaddafi Fashion: The Emperor Had Some Crazy Clothes.)The Bedouin theme was an aspect of persona that Qaddafi cultivated as an ascetic “man of the people” throughout his leadership. Despite having many palaces available he habitually slept in an elaborate tent, according once again with Weber’s description of the charismatic leader as one who eschews methodical material gain. This predisposition served him well in the 1986 United States bombing, when his residence in a military barracks was demolished, but Qaddafi escaped unscathed as he was in his tent at the time. He regularly entertained foreign dignitaries in tents when they visited Libya and he took one when travelling abroad, including pitching it in the gardens of a Parisian hotel during a state visit in 2007. (A request to camp in New York’s Central Park for his UN visit in 2009 was denied; “Inside the Tents of Muammar Gaddafi”).The role of such a clown was unlikely to have been an aim for Qaddafi, but was instead the product of his own increasing isolation. It will likely be his most enduring character in the Western memory of his rule. It should be noted though that clowns and fools do not maintain an iron grip on power for over 40 years.The Legacy of Qaddafi’s Many Personas Colonel Muammar Qaddafi was a clever and complex leader who exhibited many variations of persona during his four decades of rule. These personas were generally facets of the same core self-belief of a charismatic leader, but could be conflicting, and often confusing, to observers. His eccentricities often hid a layer of deeper cunning and ambition, but ultimately led to his marginalisation and an impression by world leaders that he was untrustworthy.His erratic performance at the UN in 2009 perhaps typifies the end stages of Qaddafi’s leadership: a man increasingly disconnected from his people and the realities of what was going on around him. His insistence that the 2011 Libyan revolution was variously a colonial or terrorist inspired piece of theatre belied the deep resentment of his rule. His role as opponent of the Western and Arab worlds alike meant that he was unsupported in his attempts to deal with the uprising. Indeed, the West’s rapid willingness to use their airpower was instrumental in speeding on the rebel forces.What cannot be disputed is the chaotic legacy this charismatic figure left for his country. Since the uprising climaxed in his on-camera lynching in October 2011, Libya has been plunged in to turmoil and shows no signs of this abating. One of the central reasons for this chaos is that Qaddafi’s supremacy, his political philosophies, and his use of messianic persona left Libya completely unprepared for rule by any other party.This ensuing chaos has been a cruel, if ironic, proof of Qaddafi’s own conceit: Libya could not survive without him.References Al-Gathafi, Muammar. The Green Book: The Solution to the Problem of Democracy; The Solution to the Economic Problem; The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory. 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