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1

Vasilionytė, Ieva. "RATIONALITY: NORMAL MENTAL FUNCTIONING OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COHERENCE?" Problemos 82 (January 1, 2012): 99–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2012.0.729.

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A version of the rationalist internalist argument, employing a pro tanto reading of the term “normative reason”, is often criticized due to its conception of rationality. It is said that the condition of rationality is insufficient to secure the necessary relation between the moral judgement and the respective motivation to act. I claim that such a criticism is based on the false supposition that rationality is to be identified with normal mental functioning. It is shown that for the rationalist internalists rationality does and should rather amount to inner psychological coherence, and that t
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2

Jacobson, Stephen. "Internalism in epistemology and the internalist regress." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70, no. 4 (1992): 415–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048409212345291.

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3

BARTLETT, GARY. "WHITHER INTERNALISM? HOW INTERNALISTS SHOULD RESPOND TO THE EXTENDED MIND HYPOTHESIS." Metaphilosophy 39, no. 2 (2008): 163–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2008.00535.x.

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4

Carr, Jennifer Rose. "Don’t stop believing." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45, no. 5-6 (2015): 744–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1123454.

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It’s been argued that there are no diachronic norms of epistemic rationality. These arguments come partly in response to certain kinds of counterexamples to Conditionalization, but are mainly motivated by a form of internalism that appears to be in tension with any sort of diachronic coherence requirements. I argue that there are, in fact, fundamentally diachronic norms of rationality. And this is to reject at least a strong version of internalism. But I suggest a replacement for Conditionalization that salvages internalist intuitions, and carves a middle ground between (probabilist versions o
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5

Doyle, Casey. "Internalism and Pessimism." Journal of Moral Philosophy 16, no. 2 (2019): 189–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20180002.

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Motivational Internalism is the thesis that, necessarily, moral beliefs are accompanied by motivational states. While another's testimony might transmit knowledge and justification, it cannot warrant motivational states such as moral emotions. Thus, Internalism provides a compelling explanation of “Pessimism,” the view that there is something illicit about forming moral beliefs by testimony. This paper presents a nonconstitutive reading of the Internalist thesis and then argues that it supports Pessimism in the form of a defeasible presumption against moral deference. It also argues against vi
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6

Meeker, Kevin. "Is Hume's Epistemology Internalist or Externalist?" Dialogue 40, no. 1 (2001): 125–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300049088.

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RésuméLes philosophes distinguent souvent entre les théories internalistes et externalistes de la connaissance. Après avoir expliqué cette distinction, je défends l'idée que la théorie de la connaissance de Hume doit préférablement être vue comme étant de type internaliste. En outre, je soutiens que la version humienne de l'internalisme consolide une interprétation sceptique de Hume plutôt qu'une interprétation naturaliste. Mon objectif n'est pas seulement d'adresser un nouveau défi aux interprétations naturalistes de Hume, mais aussi d'inviter à une étude plus approfondie de plusieurs questio
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7

Kumar, Victor. "Psychopathy and internalism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46, no. 3 (2016): 318–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2016.1165571.

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AbstractDo psychopaths make moral judgments but lack motivation? Or are psychopaths’ judgments are not genuinely moral? Both sides of this debate seem to assume either externalist or internalist criteria for the presence of moral judgment. However, if moral judgment is a natural kind, we can arrive at a theory-neutral criterion for moral judgment. A leading naturalistic criterion suggests that psychopaths have an impaired capacity for moral judgment; the capacity is neither fully present nor fully absent. Psychopaths are therefore not counterexamples to internalism. Nonetheless, internalism is
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8

Driver, Julia. "Dream Immorality." Philosophy 82, no. 1 (2007): 5–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819107319013.

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This paper focuses on an underappreciated issue that dreams raise for moral evaluation: is immorality possible in dreams? The evaluatiotial internalist is committed to answering ‘yes.’ This is because the internalist account of moral evaluation holds that the moral quality of a person's actions, what a person does, her agency in any given case is completely determined by factors that are internal to that agency, such as the person's motives and/or intentions. Actual production of either good or bad effects is completely irrelevant to the moral evaluation of that agency. Since agency can be exp
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9

Bryson, Anthony, and David Alexander. "The View from the Armchair." Essays in Philosophy 13, no. 1 (2012): 162–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eip201213110.

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In the last two decades, the greatest threat to armchair philosophy has been the natural kinds approach. On this view, philosophic theorizing should not be obsessed with the ideas of justice, goodness, and truth but should look outward to the world of objects to find these things. And if these things happen to be natural kinds, like kinds of rock or fish for instance, then clearly we should reject the armchair for the lab. The philosopher should leave the office and join the scientist out in the field. Philosophy should become a species of science. We attempt to defend traditional/armchair phi
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10

BESSON, CORINE. "EXTERNALISM, INTERNALISM, AND LOGICAL TRUTH." Review of Symbolic Logic 2, no. 1 (2009): 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020309090091.

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The aim of this paper is to show what sorts of logics are required by externalist and internalist accounts of the meanings of natural kind nouns. These logics give us a new perspective from which to evaluate the respective positions in the externalist--internalist debate about the meanings of such nouns. The two main claims of the paper are the following: first, that adequate logics for internalism and externalism about natural kind nouns are second-order logics; second, that an internalist second-order logic is a free logic—a second order logic free of existential commitments for natural kind
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11

Boult, Cameron, and Sebastian Köhler. "Epistemic Judgement and Motivation." Philosophical Quarterly 70, no. 281 (2020): 738–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa007.

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Abstract Is there an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism? The answer to this question has implications for our understanding of the nature of epistemic normativity. For example, some philosophers have argued from claims that epistemic judgement is not necessarily motivating to the view that epistemic judgement is not normative. This paper examines the options for spelling out an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism. It is argued that the most promising approach connects epistemic judgements to doxastic dispositions, which are related to motivation in a fairly t
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12

López, Francisco Javier, and Xavier Gimeno. "Revisión hermenéutica de la tradición internalista en filosofía del deporte." Thémata Revista de Filosofía, no. 54 (2016): 125–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.12795/themata.2016.i54.07.

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13

Madison, BJC. "Epistemic Internalism." Philosophy Compass 5, no. 10 (2010): 840–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00333.x.

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14

Montmarquet, James A. "EPISTEMOLOGICAL INTERNALISM." Southern Journal of Philosophy 23, no. 2 (1985): 229–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1985.tb00391.x.

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15

Setiya, Kieran. "Against Internalism." Nous 38, no. 2 (2004): 266–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00470.x.

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16

Goldman, Alvin I. "Internalism Exposed." Journal of Philosophy 96, no. 6 (1999): 271–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2564679.

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17

Miller, Christian Basil. "Motivational internalism." Philosophical Studies 139, no. 2 (2007): 233–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9115-y.

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18

Egeland, Jonathan. "EPISTEMIC INTERNALISM AND TESTIMONIAL JUSTIFICATION." Episteme 17, no. 4 (2018): 458–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.48.

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ABSTRACTAccording to epistemic internalists, facts about justification supervene upon one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. Epistemic externalists, on the other hand, deny this. More specifically, externalists think that the supervenience base of justification isn't exhausted by one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. In the last decade, the internalism–externalism debate has made its mark on the epistemology of testimony. The proponent of internalism about the epistemology of testimony claims that a hearer's testimonial justification for believing that
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19

WEDGWOOD, PALPH. "Internalism Explained." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65, no. 2 (2002): 349–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00206.x.

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20

Sušnik, Matej. "Strong Motivational Internalism." International Philosophical Quarterly 55, no. 2 (2015): 165–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq201542031.

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21

Darwall, Stephen L. "Internalism and Agency." Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 155. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2214243.

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22

Alexander, David. "Weak Inferential Internalism." Journal of Philosophical Research 37 (2012): 357–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr20123717.

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23

Nordby, Halvor. "Skepticism and Internalism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39, no. 1 (2009): 35–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0039.

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The skeptical Dream argument appeals to the possibility of dreaming. The skeptic holds that states of being awake are subjectively indistinguishable from possible dream states and that this means that we do not know that we are awake. This, the skeptic then claims, means that we have to accept that we do not have external world knowledge.It is natural to assume that there must be a connection between the Dream argument and epistemic internalism, the view that a belief is justified for a given person if and only if the person has cognitive access to all the factors that are needed for the belie
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24

Railton, Peter. "INTERNALISM FOR EXTERNALISTS." Philosophical Issues 19, no. 1 (2009): 166–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2009.00165.x.

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25

Hurtig, Kent Ingvar. "Internalism and Accidie." Philosophical Studies 129, no. 3 (2006): 517–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-2904-7.

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26

Meyer, Susan Sauvé. "Aspiration and Internalism*." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102, no. 2 (2021): 475–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12762.

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27

Gauker, Christopher. "Mind and Chance." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 3 (1987): 533–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1987.10716452.

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Much discussed but still unresolved is whether a subject's internal physical structure is a sufficient condition for his beliefs and desires. The question has sometimes been expressed as a question about microstructurally identical Doppelgänger. Imagine two subjects who are identical right down to the ions traversing the synapses. Their senses are stimulated in all the same ways, their bodies execute the same motions, and identical physical events mediate between the sensory inputs and the behavioral outputs. Must they have the very same beliefs and desires? Let us call the thesis that they mu
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28

Smith, Michael. "INTERNALISM'S WHEEL." Ratio 8, no. 3 (1995): 277–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.1995.tb00088.x.

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29

King, Patricia. "Internalismo, externalismo y autoconocimiento." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 32, no. 96 (2000): 99–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2000.895.

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30

Bonjour, Laurence. "The Indispensability of Internalism." Philosophical Topics 29, no. 1 (2001): 47–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics2001291/216.

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31

Fumerton, Richard. "The Internalism/Externalism Controversy." Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 443. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2214084.

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32

Wasserman, Wayne, and Charles Sayward. "Nagel, Internalism, and Relativism." Journal of Philosophical Research 16 (1991): 309–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr_1991_2.

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33

Sosa, Ernest. "Between Internalism and Externalism." Philosophical Issues 1 (1991): 179. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1522928.

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34

D'Oro, Giuseppina. "Collingwood, Psychologism and Internalism." European Journal of Philosophy 12, no. 2 (2004): 163–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0966-8373.2004.00205.x.

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35

Kornblith, Hilary. "Can Internalism Be Saved?" Metaphilosophy 34, no. 5 (2003): 621–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2003.00297.x.

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36

Conee, Earl. "Externalism, Internalism, and Skepticism." Philosophical Issues 14, no. 1 (2004): 78–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00021.x.

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37

Brady, Michael S. "How to Understand Internalism." Philosophical Quarterly 50, no. 198 (2000): 91–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00172.

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38

Brewer, Bill. "Internalism and Perceptual Knowledge." European Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 3 (1996): 259–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.1996.tb00078.x.

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39

Robertson, John. "INTERNALISM ABOUT MORAL REASONS." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67, no. 2 (1986): 124–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.1986.tb00269.x.

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40

Moon, A. "Gibbons on Epistemic Internalism." Mind 119, no. 473 (2010): 143–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzp151.

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41

Steup, Matthias. "Internalist Reliabilism." Philosophical Issues 14, no. 1 (2004): 403–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00036.x.

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42

Dancy, Jonathan. "Externalism for Internalists." Philosophical Issues 2 (1992): 93. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1522857.

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43

Brueckner, Anthony. "Deontologism and Internalism in Epistemology." Noûs 30, no. 4 (1996): 527. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2216117.

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44

Alston, William P. "Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology." Philosophical Topics 14, no. 1 (1986): 179–221. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics198614118.

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45

Lockie, Robert. "What's Wrong with Moral Internalism." Ratio 11, no. 1 (1998): 14–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9329.00049.

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46

Kelp, Christoph. "Internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat." Philosophical Issues 30, no. 1 (2020): 192–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phis.12180.

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47

Feldman, Richard. "Chisholm's Internalism and Its Consequences." Metaphilosophy 34, no. 5 (2003): 603–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2003.00296.x.

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48

Gert, Joshua. "Skepticism about Practical Reasons Internalism." Southern Journal of Philosophy 39, no. 1 (2001): 59–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2001.tb01806.x.

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49

Oliveira, Luis R. G. "Ampliative Transmission and Deontological Internalism." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99, no. 2 (2015): 174–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/papq.12145.

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50

Brueckner, Anthony. "Justification, Internalism, and Cream Cheese." Philosophical Papers 38, no. 1 (2009): 13–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568640902933403.

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