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Books on the topic 'Internalismo e Externalismo'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 2 February 2022

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1

Butler, Keith L. Internal affairs: Making room for psychosemantic internalism. Kluwer Academic, 1998.

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2

Giannopulu, Irini. Neuroscience, Robotics and Virtual Reality: Internalised vs Externalised Mind/Brain. Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95558-2.

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3

Die interne Dimension der Bedeutung: Externalismus, Internalismus und semantische Kompetenz. P. Lang, 2007.

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4

Kuczynski, John-Michael. Conceptual atomism and the computational theory of mind: A defense of content-internalism and semantic externalism. John Benjamins Pub. Co., 2007.

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5

Indian Institute of Advanced Study., ed. Thinking about the world: An essay in De Re thought and the externalist-internalist debate. Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 2008.

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6

Contemporary theories of knowledge. Hutchinson, 1987.

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7

Pollock, John L. Contemporary theories of knowledge. Rowman & Littlefield, 1986.

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8

Pollock, John L. Contemporary theories of knowledge. Rowman & Littlefield, 1986.

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9

1969-, Cruz Joseph, ed. Contemporary theories of knowledge. 2nd ed. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999.

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10

The subject's point of view. Oxford University Press, 2008.

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11

Chandra, Saurabh, ed. SOCRATES (Vol 3, No 2 (2015): Issue- June). 3rd ed. SOCRATES : SCHOLARLY RESEARCH JOURNAL, 2015.

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12

Nagel, Jennifer. 5. Internalism and externalism. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780199661268.003.0005.

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Internalism represents the first-person point of view where knowledge is grounded by your own experience and by your own capacity to reason: if you can't see for yourself why you should believe something, you don't actually know it. Externalists say knowledge is a relationship between a person and a fact, and this relationship can be in place even when the person doesn't meet the internalist's demands for first-person access to supporting grounds. ‘Internalism and externalism’ also explains Robert Nozick's externalist tracking theory of knowledge and its difficulty, the ‘Generality Problem’. M

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13

Bonjour, Laurence. Internalism and Externalism. Oxford University Press, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195301700.003.0008.

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14

Kornblith, Hilary. Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Blackwell Publishing Limited, 2001.

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15

Farkas, Katalin. Semantic Internalism and Externalism. Edited by Ernest Lepore and Barry C. Smith. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.003.0015.

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The function of certain expressions in the language is to refer to things, and expressions refer to things in virtue of their meaning. This is so obvious that it almost defies explanation or supporting argument. What we learn when we learn the meaning of the expression is precisely that it is used to talk about a certain thing. And if two expressions like the ‘Morning Star’ and the ‘Mont Blanc’ refer to different things, this must be in virtue of the difference in their meanings. Of course, there are names like ‘Pegasus’ which do not refer to anything, but this is also a consequence of their m

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16

Paakkunainen, Hille. Internalism and Externalism about Reasons. Edited by Daniel Star. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.7.

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Internalism about normative reasons for action, in its broadest characterization, holds that each agent A’s reasons to act are constrained by some motivational fact, M, about A. Different versions of internalism differ on what M is. This chapter examines Bernard Williams’s (1981) influential version of, and argument for, internalism, in a broadly sympathetic vein. I isolate the key assumptions driving Williams’s argument, tracing their influence on Williams’s views and on the literature he sparked; and arguing that each assumption, when properly understood, is more plausible than some recent c

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17

Zahavi, Dan. Internalism, externalism, and transcendental idealism. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199684830.003.0005.

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Whereas a certain popular (Fregean) interpretation of Husserl’s theory of intentionality makes Husserl into an internalist and methodological solipsist, the aim of Chapter 4 is to show that Husserl’s commitment to transcendental idealism prevents his theory from being either. I first discuss competing interpretations of Husserl’s concept of the noema, and argue that the Fregean interpretation misreads the transcendental character of Husserl’s phenomenology. I next present an interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental idealism that highlights its difference from metaphysical idealism and shows

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18

Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology. Oxford University Press, 2007.

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19

Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press, USA, 2007.

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20

Tomáš, Marvan, ed. What determines content?: The internalism/externalism dispute. Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006.

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21

Internalism and Externalism: The Architecture of Reason. Routledge, 2007.

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22

Bueno, Otavio. Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Edited by Paul Humphreys. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199368815.013.13.

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In this chapter, two significant connections between epistemology and philosophy of science are discussed: approaches to knowledge in traditional epistemology and in philosophy of science, and the roles played by instruments in the production of scientific knowledge. The author considers, in particular, how these roles can be illuminated by certain forms of epistemological theorizing, such as internalism and externalism. These considerations indicate the significance that internalist and externalist considerations play in the proper formulation of suitable epistemic conditions for scientific i

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23

Smithies, Declan. Access Internalism and the Extended Mind. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198769811.003.0002.

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The main goal of this chapter is to argue that accessibilism in epistemology is incompatible with vehicle externalism in the philosophy of mind (also known as “the extended mind thesis”). As we shall see, however, there are strong arguments for both of these positions. On the one hand, there is a compelling argument for vehicle externalism: the parity argument from Clark and Chalmers (1998). On the other hand, there is a compelling argument for accessibilism: the Moorean argument from Smithies (2012). If accessibilism is incompatible with vehicle externalism, then both arguments cannot be soun

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24

BonJour, Laurence, and Ernest Sosa. Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues. Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, John, 2008.

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25

BonJour, Laurence, and Ernest Sosa. Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues. Blackwell Publishing Limited, 2003.

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26

Kornblith, Hilary. Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism (Blackwell Readings in Philosophy). Blackwell Publishing Limited, 2001.

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27

BonJour, Laurence, and Ernest Sosa. Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues. Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, John, 2020.

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28

Drayson, Zoe. Extended Minds and Prime Mental Conditions. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198769811.003.0009.

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The purpose of this chapter is to explore hitherto unconsidered parallels between two forms of externalism. In epistemology, Williamson argues for the indispensability of externalist propositional attitudes to make his case for knowledge as a mental state; in philosophy of mind, Clark and Chalmers argue for the indispensability of externally realized mental states to make their case for extended cognition. In this chapter, it is proposed that both arguments are attempts to reject the methodological principle of psychological internalism (PI), and that both arguments rely on the same appeal to

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29

BonJour, Laurence, and Ernest Sosa. Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues (Great Debates in Philosophy). Blackwell Publishing Limited, 2003.

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30

Giannopulu, Irini. Neuroscience, Robotics and Virtual Reality: Internalised vs Externalised Mind/Brain. Springer, 2019.

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31

McNaughton, David, and Piers Rawling. Motivating Reasons and Normative Reasons. Edited by Daniel Star. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.8.

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Reasons for action are traditionally divided into “motivating reasons,” which explain why someone did something, and “normative reasons,” which concern why she should (or should not) have done it. We explore various positions concerning both types of reason, and the relations between them. We discuss Davidson’s causal account of action, reasons internalism and externalism, constructivism, motivational internalism and externalism, and practical normative realism (PNR)—the view that there are truths concerning what you have reason to do (this is opposed by error theorists and noncognitivists, wh

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32

Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind: A defense of content-internalism and semantic externalism (Advances in Consciousness Research). John Benjamins Publishing Co, 2007.

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33

Cross, Richard. Testimony, Error, and Reasonable Belief in Medieval Religious Epistemology. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198798705.003.0003.

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Aquinas generally adopts a fallibilist epistemology, according to which it is often impossible to have good internalist justification for a belief. In line with this, he adopts a fully externalist account of the reasonableness of divine faith. Faith is justified if and only if it is caused in the believer by God. Scotus is more optimistic about the prospects for internalist justification generally. Hence, he believes that it is possible to have justified belief even on the basis of merely human testimony. The views that the two thinkers adopt on the theological question are thus wholly parasit

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34

Nagel, Jennifer. 3. Rationalism and empiricism. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780199661268.003.0003.

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‘Rationalism and empiricism’ considers the different ways of thinking about nature that emerged in the Early Modern period, illustrated by René Descartes' rationalism and John Locke's empiricism. How did they come to produce such different theories of knowledge? In the Meditations, Descartes takes a first-person approach: his guiding question is ‘What can I know for certain?’. Locke adopts a third-person approach, drawing on his observations of others alongside himself. The question Locke aims to answer is ‘What do human beings know?’. In modern terminology, the choice between taking a first-p

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35

Goldberg, Sanford C. To the Best of Our Knowledge. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198793670.001.0001.

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We expect certain things of each other as epistemic subjects, and it is the normativity of these expectations that underwrites the normativity of epistemic assessment itself. In developing this claim Sanford C. Goldberg aims to honor the insights of both internalist and externalist approaches to epistemic justification. With the internalist he embraces the idea that knowledgeable belief requires belief that is formed and maintained in an epistemically responsible fashion; with the externalist he embraces the idea that knowledgeable belief requires belief that is formed and sustained through a

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36

Goldberg, Sanford C. Epistemically Proper Belief. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198793670.003.0002.

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This chapter argues that the sort of normativity that is at the heart of epistemology is the sort of normativity involved in assessments of whether a subject’s belief satisfies the distinctly epistemic standards on knowledge. It introduces the term ‘epistemically proper’ to designate the status a belief has when it satisfies these standards. The author argues against the view that nothing short of knowledge itself can provide the standards, and proceeds to argue for the view that the theory of epistemic justification is in the business of articulating the relevant standards. Appealing to his c

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37

Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. Action. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199682706.003.0006.

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This chapter defends a connection between knowledge and practical reasoning, according to which one’s reasons for action constitute all and only that which one knows. A variety of intuitive objections to such principles are considered and rejected—a central theme is that objectors to knowledge norms often make tacit but substantive ethical assumptions about which reasons, if held, would justify which actions. Absent broader ethical theorizing, the proposed counterexamples are inconclusive. The chapter sketches possible approaches to such theories, and indicates reason for optimism about knowle

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38

Adolf, Rami, and Wansing H, eds. Referenz und Realität. Mentis, 2007.

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39

Adolf, Rami, and Wansing H, eds. Referenz und Realität. Mentis, 2007.

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40

Mendelovici, Angela. Conclusion: Intentionality and Other Related Phenomena. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0010.

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This concluding chapter reviews the view of intentionality argued for in this book, which is an aspect-theoretic version of strong identity PIT. On this view, roughly, every intentional state is identical to some non-relational phenomenal state. Chapter 1 rejected various ways of fixing reference on intentionality via its role in folk psychological or scientific theories, helping us navigate the world, or securing conditions of truth and reference, arguing that it might turn out that something other than intentionality plays these roles. This chapter returns to these ways of fixing reference o

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41

Deigh, John. Williams on Practical Reason. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190878597.003.0008.

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Bernard Williams’s controversial view about reasons for action is the topic of this essay. The essay explains Williams’s internalist account of reasons for action as an improvement on Donald Davidson’s account. It then corrects Williams’s criticism of externalist accounts of reasons for action by conceding that such accounts are viable as long as they do not imply that the reasons a person has for doing an action can explain his or her doing it. The concession follows from acknowledging the very different program of studying reasons in ethics exemplified in the work of Kurt Baier. Once the cor

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42

Farkas, Katalin. The Subject's Point of View. Oxford University Press, 2010.

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43

Evans, C. Stephen. The Naïve Teleological Argument. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190842215.003.0007.

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This chapter considers an argument from design, meant for those without a technical scientific background, and based on Thomas Reid’s concept of natural signs. For Reid, sensations function as natural signs in perception when some object in the world causes sensations, on the basis of which one is disposed to form beliefs and concepts about those objects. This establishes direct, non-inferential knowledge of what we perceive. If God exists, it is plausible that He would make himself known by means of natural signs. One kind of natural sign would be the perceived design in nature. According to

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44

Bergmann, Michael. Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.001.0001.

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Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition rejects argument-based attempts to resist radical skepticism and advocates, instead, for noninferential intuition-based commonsense resistance inspired by the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. The book begins by setting aside closure-based arguments for radical skepticism and focusing on the more fundamental underdetermination arguments, which highlight the problematic gap between our evidence and our beliefs that are based on that evidence despite their truth being underdetermined by it. The rejected argument-based response to skep

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45

Skipper, Mattias, and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, eds. Higher-Order Evidence. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198829775.001.0001.

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We often have reason to doubt our own ability to form rational beliefs, or to doubt that some particular belief of ours is rational. Perhaps we learn that a trusted friend disagrees with us about what our shared evidence supports. Or perhaps we learn that our beliefs have been afflicted by motivated reasoning or other cognitive biases. These are examples of higher-order evidence. While it may seem plausible that higher-order evidence should somehow impact our beliefs, it is less clear how and why. Normally, when evidence impacts our beliefs, it does so by virtue of speaking for or against the

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