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Journal articles on the topic 'Interpretation of statutes'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 11 February 2022

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1

Blaker, Jamie. "A Statute's Meaning Need not be its Law." Federal Law Review 46, no. 3 (September 2018): 455–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0067205x1804600305.

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There is a theory of statutory interpretation that is simple, elegant and well-subscribed. The theory is known as the meaning thesis, and it holds that the law of a statute consists in the ordinary linguistic meaning that is communicated by the statute's language. In a recent article Dale Smith has sought to discredit the meaning thesis. Here I will seek to discredit the thesis further, this time by drawing on the accomplishments of linguistics and the philosophy of language. In order for the meaning thesis to succeed, it must be demonstrated that the thesis is consistent with the established common law rules of interpretation. However, some of these rules appear to require that judges defy the plain linguistic meanings of statutes in limited circumstances. The meaning theorist's challenge, then, is to find some way to show that the established rules of interpretation do not truly cause judges to defy the language of statutes, despite appearances to the contrary. In this article, I will explain why the meaning theorist only has bad options in this regard. Of the available options, meaning theorists have settled for an argument that is premised on a flawed theory of how language communicates meaning. The theory of communication in question was proposed by H P Grice in the 1950s, but discredited by his contemporaries.

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2

Jha, Srijita, and Akshay Zaveri. "Working of Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961: Resolving the Conflict between the Literal Rule of Interpretation and Harmonious Construction." Christ University Law Journal 6, no. 2 (June 1, 2017): 45–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.12728/culj.11.3.

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This article ventures into the various interpretations given by the court for the execution of Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. It has forever been a conflict as to how the particular section has to be interpreted, in order to decide whether the items of regular assessment can be added back in the proceeding under section 153A, after the finalization of assessment. This article tries to decode the mixed opinions of the court with regard to whether it is the literal rule of interpretation or the rule of harmonious construction that would apply to interpret Section 153A. This issue has been dealt with by the authors by analysing the various tools of interpretation of statutes like Literal Rule of Interpretation, reading down of statute as a whole, Rule of Harmonious Construction of statute etc. and their application in various cases based on judicial dicta of the court of law. The authors, based on thorough analysis of Section 153A, based on the language of the provision and the interpretations attached to it by the Judiciary, have tried to resolve the conflict between the Literal rule of interpretation and harmonious construction.

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3

Kelsen, Hans. "On the theory of interpretation." Legal Studies 10, no. 2 (July 1990): 127–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-121x.1990.tb00595.x.

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The legal system is not a system of co-ordinate norms, found at one and the same level. Rather, it is a hierarchical structure of superordinate and subordinate legal norms, whose reciprocal relations are illuminated by the structural analysis undertaken by the Pure Theory of Law. The enquiry into the hierarchical structure of the legal system has significant consequences for the problem of interpretation. Interpretation is an intellectual activity accompanying the law-creating process as it moves from a higher level of the hierarchical structure to the lower level governed by this higher level. In the standard case, that of interpreting statutes, the question to be answered is how, in applying the general norm (the statute) to a concrete material fact, one is to arrive at a corresponding individual norm (a judicial decision or an administrative act).

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4

Zimmermann, Reinhard. "Statuta Sunt Stricte Interpretanda? Statutes and the Common Law: A Continental Prespective." Cambridge Law Journal 56, no. 2 (July 1997): 315–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008197300081344.

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“All statutes contrary to the common law … are to be interpreted strictly and have to be accepted in the most exact manner as they stand, and speak”. “Statutes which repeal the [common] law, have to be interpreted most strictly, and cannot be extended to cases which are not expressed in them.” “Statutes … generally consist more in ‘thus I want and thus I command’ than in a regulation according to reason”; “they fade like the moon's shadows, and like the moon they wax and wane at the legislators' whim”. It may be thought that these four sentences refer to the approach traditionally adopted in England to the interpretation of statutes. But they do not. They encapsulate the attitude adopted by the learned lawyers of the older ius commune, particularly in 13th and 14th century Italy, and in 16th century Germany. An English colleague has suggested that “civilian lawyers regard our case law with admiration and our statute book with despair”.

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5

Stephenson, Scott. "Against Interpretation as an Alternative to Invalidation." Federal Law Review 48, no. 1 (November 27, 2019): 46–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0067205x19890446.

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This article evaluates the rise of interpretation as an alternative means of judicially enforcing legislative compliance with rights. Instead of the traditional method where courts are empowered to invalidate statutes that are found to be incompatible with rights, the alternative empowers courts to interpret statutes in a manner that renders them compatible with rights. It argues that interpretation emerged as an alternative to invalidation among both constitutional reformers and judges in Australia (and elsewhere) in the 1990s and 2000s because interpretation was seen as a way of addressing democratic concerns about rights-based judicial review and as a less confrontational method of resolving rights issues. The article puts forward an argument for invalidation over interpretation on the basis that interpretation’s comparative appeal is not particularly strong—there are alternative ways of addressing the democratic concerns, and the connection between invalidation and confrontation is weak—and that invalidation is a more transparent, and therefore accountable, exercise of public power than interpretation.

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6

D'Amato, Anthony. "Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?" Virginia Law Review 75, no. 3 (April 1989): 561. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1073252.

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7

McCullick, Bryan A., Thomas Baker, Phillip D. Tomporowski, Thomas J. Templin, Karen Lux, and Tiffany Isaac. "An Analysis of State Physical Education Policies." Journal of Teaching in Physical Education 31, no. 2 (April 2012): 200–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1123/jtpe.31.2.200.

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The purpose of this study was to analyze state school-based physical education (SBPE) policies’ text and the resulting legal implications. A textualist approach to the legal method of Statutory Interpretation framed the data analysis. Findings revealed the difficulty of determining with clarity a majority of PE statutes and it is probable that based on current wording, courts could not play a role in interpreting these statutes, thus leaving interpretation to educational authorities. Significant variability of how authorities interpret statutes increases the challenge of consistent interpretation or adherence to the NASPE Guidelines for Quality Physical Education and whether meaningful policy study can be conducted to determine if SBPE makes an impact.

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8

MacKay, A. Wayne, and Gordon Krinke. "Education as a Basic Human Right: A Response to Special Education and the Charter." Canadian journal of law and society 2 (1987): 73–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0829320100001162.

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“Special Education and theCharter: The Right to Equal Benefit of the Law” is an excellent article on the provincial statutory regimes and their relationship to s. 15 of theCharter. It surveys the legislatures' attempts at delivering education to students and highlights the shortcomings in these attempts, focussing on the inability or unwillingness of the legislatures to provide an appropriate education to mentally disabled individuals. The article then takes a prospective approach, illustrating how a generous interpretation of s. 15 of theChartermight be used to correct deficiencies in educational statutes. Both the survey of statute law and the commentary on its relationship to the equality provisions of theCharterprovide a valuable addition to scholarly writing on the provision of appropriate education to the mentally disabled.However, there is some danger in assuming that the right to education derives solely from statute. Statutes are creations of legislatures. If the right to education exists only in these statutes, education may be viewed not as the right of every child, but as a privilege bestowed by the legislature, to be determined by administrators, and to be overseen only as a last resort by the courts.

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9

Harrison, Nicholas J. "Construction or deconstruction in the interpretation of statutes?" Law Teacher 23, no. 2 (January 1989): 162–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03069400.1989.9992734.

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10

Greenberg, D. "The Language of Statutes: Laws and Their Interpretation." Statute Law Review 33, no. 1 (December 26, 2011): 93–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmr026.

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11

Silverstein, Gordon. "Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Institutional Power." Review of Politics 56, no. 3 (1994): 475–501. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500018921.

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Rational choice scholars argue that there is no such thing as legislative intent, and that courts should abandon futile efforts to find and enforce that intent. Faced with ambiguous statutes, these scholars suggest judges either actively interpret statutes to achieve the best public policy possible; or they advise the judges to accept a default assumption that congressional ambiguity will be read as implicit delegation of interpretive discretion to the executive branch. Both options pose problems for the American system of separated institutions. Though legislative intent may be impossible to discern, an effort to identify legislative purpose may be critical to assure the maintenance of a balance of institutional power. How that purpose is identified is a problem not only for the Court, but for the legislative institutions responsible for statutory drafting and approval.

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12

Lee, N. "A purposive approach to the interpretation of tax statutes?" Statute Law Review 20, no. 2 (February 1, 1999): 124–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/slr/20.2.124.

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13

Coxon, B. "Open to Interpretation: The Implication of Words into Statutes." Statute Law Review 30, no. 1 (February 26, 2009): 1–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmp001.

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14

Samuels, Alec. "Thinking about Statutes: Interpretation, Interaction, Improvement. Hamlyn Lecturers, 2017." Statute Law Review 41, no. 2 (July 13, 2019): 289–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmz013.

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15

Goldfarb, Neal. "“Always speaking”? Interpreting the present tense in statutes." Canadian Journal of Linguistics/Revue canadienne de linguistique 58, no. 1 (March 2013): 63–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008413100002528.

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AbstractThis article takes a critical look through the lens of linguistics at the “always-speaking” principle in law — an influential principle that is recited in materials on legislative drafting as the justification for using the present tense, adopted in many common-law jurisdictions as a principle of interpretation, and accepted as a foundation for the linguistic analysis of the use of tense in statutes. The article concludes that the principle is an inadequate basis for interpreting or analysing statutes, for at least two reasons: the interpretive results that the principle is intended to support are explainable in terms of widely accepted principles in the analysis of tense, without any need to posit special principles that apply only to statutes; and the interpretations that would be required if the always-speaking principle were taken seriously would in many cases probably be regarded as unnatural by native speakers of English.

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16

Farrar, William D. "Survey of Selected 2019 Texas Oil and Gas Cases and Statutes." Texas A&M Journal of Property Law 6, no. 3 (December 2020): 343–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.37419/jpl.v6.i3.16.

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Texas courts and the legislature were quite active in 2019 concerning oil and gas issues. Texas courts decided many cases involving everything from deed interpretation to lease repudiation to farmout interpretation. The Texas Supreme Court has granted several petitions for review from the courts of appeal. The legislature enacted or amended statutes concerning so called “royalty leases,” the Mineral Interest Pooling Act, and others. The following are summaries of some selected cases and statutes that will be of interest to those involved with Texas oil and gas law.

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17

Fishman, Paulina. "Statutory Misinterpretation: Rash Holding in Brash Holdings." Federal Law Review 45, no. 2 (June 2017): 199–221. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0067205x1704500203.

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The modern approach to statutory construction guides the judiciary, the legal profession, litigants, and academics in interpreting the myriad legislative provisions in Australian law. Yet what if critical sections have been construed in ways that are irreconcilable with the basic rules of modern statutory interpretation? One of the most important commercial statutes in the country is the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). This article exposes one instance of misinterpretation in respect of that statute, contained in a decision of a unanimous Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria, and makes proposals for resolving such quandaries.

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18

Bakken, Gordon Morris, and William D. Popkin. "Statutes in Court: The History and Theory of Statutory Interpretation." Journal of American History 87, no. 3 (December 2000): 1114. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2675417.

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19

Alton, Stephen R., and William D. Popkin. "Statutes in Court: The History and Theory of Statutory Interpretation." American Journal of Legal History 44, no. 4 (October 2000): 462. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3113808.

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20

Humphèry-Jenner, Mark L. "Should Common Law Doctrines Dynamically Guide The Interpretation of Statutes?" Legisprudence 3, no. 2 (November 2009): 171–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17521467.2009.11424690.

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21

Anderman, S. "The interpretation of protective employment statutes and contracts of employment." Industrial Law Journal 29, no. 3 (September 1, 2000): 223–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ilj/29.3.223.

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22

Gluck Mezey, Susan. "Statutes in Court: The History and Theory of Statutory Interpretation." Justice System Journal 21, no. 2 (May 2000): 233–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23277556.2000.10871284.

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23

McDonell, Pat. "The Doctrine of Clarifications." Michigan Law Review, no. 119.4 (2021): 797. http://dx.doi.org/10.36644/mlr.119.4.doctrine.

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Clarifications are a longstanding but little-studied concept in statutory interpretation. Most courts have found that clarifying amendments to preexisting statutes bypass retroactivity limitations. Therein lies their power. Because clarifications simply restate the law, they do not implicate the presumption against retroactivity that Landgraf v. USI Film Products embedded in civil-statute interpretation. The problem that courts have yet to address is how exactly clarifying legislation can be distinguished from legislation that substantively changes the law. What exactly is a clarification? The courts’ answers implicate many of the entrenched debates in statutory interpretation. This Note offers three primary contributions. First, it summarizes the existing doctrine of clarifications as it has been established in the federal circuits and highlights the important implications of their approaches. Second, it argues that clarifications are an important tool for courts and lawmaking bodies. Third, it provides a more intelligible taxonomy for courts to use, including specific factors that ought to guide their determination of whether an amendment clarifies the law.

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24

Zeppos, Nicholas S. "Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation." Virginia Law Review 76, no. 7 (October 1990): 1295. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1073238.

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25

Hudon, Edward G. "Quelques mots sur la recevabilité des éléments de preuve extrinsèques devant les tribunaux : le Canada et les États-Unis." Articles 22, no. 2 (April 12, 2005): 371–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/042441ar.

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This article is a comparison of the use of extrinsic materials by the courts of Canada and of the United States in the interpretation of statutes. The author points out that in the United States the courts have reached the point where just about everything is admissible — particularly legislative debates, committee hearings and reports — but that in Canada the use of extrinsic materials is limited to the determination of the constitutionality of a law or statute. Although the courts of Canada are becoming more and more liberal in the use of extrinsic materials, the use of legislative debates is still not generally permitted even though they were used by one Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Anti-Inflation Act Reference. The author wonders how long it will be before the Supreme Court of Canada will abandon the little that is left of the English tradition and permit the use of extrinsic materials not only in the determination of the constitutionality of a statute, but also in its interpretation.

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Hutchison, Cameron J. "Which Kraft of Statutory Interpretation? A Supreme Court of Canada Trilogy on Intellectual Property Law." Alberta Law Review 46, no. 1 (November 1, 2008): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.29173/alr237.

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The techniques used by courts to interpret statutes can be characterized as inconsistent, and at times, excessive. Current methodologies of statutory interpretation often reflect deeply normative views about the appropriate institutional role of the legislative and judicial branches of law-making, but this characterization of the debate is misleading. Rather, the problem lies with properly discerning legislative meaning and intent in full awareness of the limitations and possibilities of statutes as communicative devices. The author suggests a new methodology of statutory interpretation, whereby courts analogize the facts before them with certain paradigm cases. This methodology serves to constrain judicial discretion and enables courts to fill gaps in legislation in connection with novel cases.

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27

Posada-Quintero, Hugo F., Paula N. Molano-Vergara, Ronald M. Parra-Hernández, and Jorge I. Posada-Quintero. "Analysis of Risk Factors and Symptoms of Burnout Syndrome in Colombian School Teachers under Statutes 2277 and 1278 Using Machine Learning Interpretation." Social Sciences 9, no. 3 (March 20, 2020): 30. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/socsci9030030.

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In 2002, the Colombian ministry of education released statute 1278, for teaching professionalization, superseding statute 2277 of 1977. Although statute 1278 was intended to increase the quality of the education service and teachers’ remuneration, there is evidence that the abundant evaluations and hindered promotion system introduced by statute 1278 resulted in an impairment of the quality of life of the teachers, and a higher incidence of burnout syndrome. We used two techniques for machine learning interpretability, SHapley Additive exPlanation summary plots and predictor importance, to interpret support vector machine and decision tree machine learning models, respectively, to better understand the differences on risk factors and symptoms of burnout syndrome in school teachers under statutes 2277 and 1278. We have surveyed 54 school teachers between August and October 2018, 17 under statute 2277, and 37 under statute 1278. Among the risk factors and symptoms of burnout syndrome considered in this study, we found that the satisfaction with earnt income was the most relevant risk factor, followed by the overtime work and the perceived severity of the sanctions on lower performance. The most relevant symptoms of burnout were fatigue at the end of the day, and frequent headaches. This methodology can be potentially used in other contexts and social groups, allowing institutional authorities and policy makers to allocate resources to specific issues affecting a particular group of workers.

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Saunders, Benjamin B. "Democracy, Liberty and the Prerogative: The Displacement of Inherent Executive Power by Statute." Federal Law Review 41, no. 2 (June 2013): 363–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.22145/flr.41.2.6.

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This article analyses arguments that the prerogative should be readily displaced by statute, where a statute deals with a subject matter similar to a prerogative. It does so by examining the leading cases on displacement of the prerogative in the United Kingdom and the Australian states, and displacement of the Australian Commonwealth's inherent executive power. The cases do not adopt a single rule but the question of whether a statute will be taken to displace a prerogative is highly dependent on the facts and the provisions of the particular statute. This article defends the current approach to displacement, for three reasons. First, the courts do not allow governments to subvert or ignore statutes by using the prerogative. Secondly, the courts have almost always decided in favour of liberty and against the conferral of coercive powers on government. Thirdly, a single rule could not do justice to all the variables involved in displacement cases. Ordinary principles of statutory interpretation are sufficient to deal with questions of displacement.

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29

Mulvey, Ryan, and James Valvo. "Opening the State House Doors." Journal of Civic Information 1, no. 2 (December 18, 2019): 17–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.32473/joci.v1i2.119009.

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Freedom of Information (“FOI”) laws apply principally to the executive branch of government and the administrative state. Yet many state FOI statutes also provide access to legislative records, whether they have been created or obtained by individual legislators, committees, or legislative-branch agencies. A comprehensive survey of state FOI laws reveals trends in how such legislative records are treated. A minority of states, for example, categorically excludes legislative records from the scope of disclosure. The remaining states provide at least some basic level of access, either in explicit terms or implied though judicial or executive-branch interpretation. In the latter case, the interpretation of an FOI statute often involves consideration of broader context and the interplay of various provisions, including exemptions applicable only to legislative records. Regardless, the data suggest a clear trend of interpreting state FOI laws to resolve any ambiguity in favor of public access.

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30

Munger, Mark A., William J. Stilling, and Stephanie F. Gardner. "Pharmacy Practice Acts: A Five-Year Follow-up." Annals of Pharmacotherapy 27, no. 5 (May 1993): 560–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/106002809302700504.

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OBJECTIVE: To rereview the status of state pharmacy practice acts since 1987. Additionally, this report discusses adoption of the 1992 National Association of Boards of Pharmacy Model State Pharmacy Practice Act as the standard state pharmacy practice statute. DATA SOURCES: State codes for 50 states and the District of Columbia, with attention focused on the pharmacy practice acts; Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands were excluded. CASE LAW SELECTION: Case law utilizing state pharmacy statutes was selected to demonstrate pharmacists' liability. DATA EXTRACTION: The focus on each statute was the statutory definition of the “practice of pharmacy.” DATA SYNTHESIS: Twelve pharmacy laws (24 percent) contain no definition of the practice of pharmacy. Compounding (92 percent), dispensing (100 percent), interpretation and evaluation of prescriptions (72 percent), consultation (85 percent), drug utilization review (69 percent), drug product selection (54 percent), drug administration (21 percent), pharmacokinetic consultation and patient assessment (13 percent) were noted in the laws for the remaining 38 states and the District of Columbia. Significant pharmacy activities codified since 1987 include consultation, drug administration, pharmacokinetic consultation, and patient assessment. Statutes defining pharmacy practice impact the profession by affecting liability and by mirroring society's view of the role of the profession. CONCLUSIONS: States have enacted new statutes principally in the areas of progressive pharmacy practice functions since 1987. Enactment of the definition of professional practice contained in the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy Model State Pharmacy Practice Act would serve the pharmacy profession by: (1) creating a uniform professional purpose; (2) creating legal responsibility that reflects contemporary practice; (3) allowing pharmacists to enlarge the scope of their practice as the profession's societal role evolves; and (4) conserving revenues normally consumed by lobbying for constant legislative revisions.

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31

Patterson, Dennis M. "Realist Semantics and Legal Theory." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 2, no. 2 (July 1989): 175–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900002848.

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In “Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review”, David O. Brink advocates a central role in legal interpretation for considerations of human purpose. He states:It is important to remember that the primary objects of legal interpretation – statutes, constitutional provisions, and precedents – like most objects of interpretation, are human artifacts, the products of purposeful activity. In interpreting the products of purposeful activity, we must appeal to the purposes which prompted and guided the activity whose product we are trying to understand.

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32

Le Roux, Wessel, and Christa Rautenbach. "Legal Interpretation after Endumeni: Clarification, Contestation, Application." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 22 (November 6, 2019): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2019/v22i0a7510.

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This special edition consists of a selection of contributions delivered during a conference "Towards an integrated approach to the interpretation of legal documents: contracts, wills and statutes", hosted by the University of the Western Cape, on 23 March 2018. The aim of the conference was to take stock of the state of legal interpretation in South Africa five years after the watershed judgment was delivered in Joint Natal Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality. The papers in the special edition provide a clarification, contestation and application of the Edumeni approach to the interpretation of legal documents.

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Manganas, Antoine. "La rétroactivité d'une loi à caractère criminel." Chronique de jurisprudence 21, no. 1 (April 12, 2005): 189–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/042370ar.

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The present study deals with two particular aspects of the problem of retrospective operation of criminal statutes. The principle of the retrospective operation of a procedural statute, as will be seen first, bears some exceptions. S. 36 of the Interpretation Act in particular prescribes that the retrospective operation of procedural enactments takes place only to the extent that the new rules of procedure may be adapted to proceedings taken before the new rules came into effect (R. v. Mustapha Ali). Yet, as will be seen subsequently, it is often very difficult to distinguish between an enactment of substantive nature and one of procedural nature in order to give a retrospective operation to the latter only. This difficulty arose particularity after the modifications of the Criminal Code concerning the offence of driving a motor vehicle with more than a specified proportion of alcohol in the blood (R. v. Johnston). After a brief discussion of those two cases, the author suggests that it is the duty of the legislator to indicate in clear terms what the retrospective operation of a new statute will be, in order to avoid many problems of interpretation.

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34

Murphy, Julian R. "Oceans Apart?: The Rule of Lenity in Australia and the United States." British Journal of American Legal Studies 9, no. 2 (August 4, 2020): 233–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/bjals-2020-0011.

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AbstractOccasionally traced back to Byzantine times, the rule that penal statutes are to be interpreted strictly in favor of the subject, also known as the rule of lenity, now finds expression in common law countries across the world. This Article compares the origins and evolution of the rule in Australia and the United States. The comparison is timely because of the current uncertainty in both jurisdictions about the rule's rationale and scope and because of an emerging global trend towards the “constitutionalization” of common law rules of interpretation. In the course of the analysis, various facets of the rule are discussed, including its common law origins; jurisprudential development; purported constitutional foundations; and modifications by state and federal statutes. Tracing the rule's development in each country reveals significant commonalities, but also important differences, in the respective approaches to the interpretation of criminal statutes. Most importantly, despite similarities in the two countries’ constitutional structures, the rule has assumed constitutional significance in the United States but not in Australia. Identification of this marked difference provides an opportunity to reflect on the separation of powers, and the federal structure, of each country.

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35

Emudainohwo, E. "The importance of an industrial court in the interpretation of labour statutes." Commonwealth Law Bulletin 46, no. 2 (April 2, 2020): 300–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03050718.2020.1781675.

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36

Tolley, Michael C. "Judicial Review of Agency Interpretation of Statutes: Deference Doctrines in Comparative Perspective." Policy Studies Journal 31, no. 3 (August 2003): 421–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1541-0072.00032.

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37

Jian-guo, Gong. "Interpretation of the Constitution and Statutes of the People's Republic of China." Criminal Justice Review 14, no. 2 (September 1989): 166–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/073401688901400206.

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38

Mackay, Lord. "Finishers, Refiners, and Polishers: The Judicial Role in the Interpretation of Statutes." Statute Law Review 10, no. 3 (1989): 151–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/slr/10.3.151.

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Stoian, Alexandru. "Particularities of the Exercise of the Public Service by the Military." International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION 27, no. 1 (June 1, 2021): 131–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/kbo-2021-0021.

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Abstract The achievement of the public interest by the state implies the enduing with public prerogatives of certain persons, who, in the exercise of the public function and by fulfilling the conditions provided by law, acquire the quality of civil servants. The regulation of the public office in Romania offers both a general perspective, through the Statute of the Civil Servants, which since the adoption of the Administrative Code in 2019 is an integral part of it, and a particular perspective, embodied by the special statutes of certain professional categories that exercise the public office in a specific regime, derogating from the general rules. Law no. 80/1995 regulates the Statute of Military Personnel and, through the conditions of exercising the stipulated duties and rights, confers a special indisputable status to military personnel. However, the provisions of the same law do not establish the quality of civil servants of the military, this quality being established by juridical interpretation.

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40

Beaupré, R. Michael. "Introduction." L’interprétation des lois et des conventions plurilingues 25, no. 4 (April 12, 2005): 935–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/042631ar.

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A comparative study of the interpretative methodology applicable in multilingual jurisdictions such as Canada, Belgium and Switzerland and before the Court of Justice of the European Communities reveals some remarkable similarities as well as some important differences. The four papers that follow were presented during a seminar on the theme « Interpretation of Multilingual Statutes and Treaties » that was held in Strasbourg on July 10, 1984 under the auspices of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal Studies. The Canadian author of one of the papers also served as rapporteur for the seminar. His report serves as an introduction to the four papers.

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Alfitri. "Whose Authority? Contesting and Negotiating the Idea of a Legitimate Interpretation of Islamic Law in Indonesia." Asian Journal of Comparative Law 10, no. 2 (December 2015): 191–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/asjcl.2016.1.

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AbstractThis article examines the history of the evolution of Islamic legal authority in Indonesia and provides an account of how it is contested and negotiated in contemporary Indonesia, using the history of family law reform as an example. There is a plurality of sources of authority for Islamic law as they operate within the domain of family law. The case studies reveal tensions between continuity and change in the development of Islamic legal principles and the strategies that different actors employ to advance their preferred version of Islamic legal norms: while the state has adopted a synthetic approach in order to accommodate these multiple legal authorities and increase the efficacy of its own statutes, the ulama persistently insist on the authority of fiqh as the immutable point of reference in resolving legal problems faced by Muslims. These conflicts ensure that the statutes will continue facing challenges as a legitimate interpretation of Islamic law in Indonesia.

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Munger, Mark A., Jeffrey A. Green, Paul A. Greve, and Lynn S. Lovejoy. "Professional Liability for Pharmacists: A Focus on Pharmacy Practice Acts." Drug Intelligence & Clinical Pharmacy 22, no. 11 (November 1988): 886–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/106002808802201111.

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The increased complexity of pharmacotherapeutics and the expanded role of pharmacists in the drug-use process may bring about an increased liability exposure for failure to conform to a professional standard of care. Therefore, a survey of 51 state pharmacy practice acts was conducted: (1) to establish a nationwide statutory definition of pharmacy practice, and (2) to outline possible use of the statutes in civil and administrative law. Twenty percent of state statutes contain no definition of pharmacy practice. Of the remaining 41 states, dispensing (97.5 percent), compounding (92.5 percent), interpretation and evaluation of prescriptions (68.2 percent), and consultation (73 percent) are legally defined. Pharmacokinetic consultation, drug administration, pharmacist prescribing, and pharmaceutical research are defined in one, seven, four, and one state(s), respectively. Pharmacists may face legal responsibilities from both the courts and state boards of medical and pharmacy practice. Aggressively updating the statutes and regulations to reflect contemporary pharmacy practice may provide a mechanism for a defense in court litigation and regulatory action.

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Johnson, Steve R. "AUER/SEMINOLE ROCK DEFERENCE IN THE TAX COURT." Pittsburgh Tax Review 11, no. 1 (March 26, 2014): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/taxreview.2013.19.

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Deference doctrines involve the extent to which courts, in their interpretation of statutes and regulations, should be influenced by how the agencies charged with administering these authorities construe them. Deference doctrine has received enormous attention in case law and commentary during the past three decades, both in tax and in administrative law.

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Bisson, Alain-François. "L'interaction des techniques de rédaction et des techniques d'interprétation des lois." La rédaction des lois 21, no. 3-4 (April 12, 2005): 511–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/042402ar.

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That there is an interaction effect between legislative drafting techniques and judicial methods for the interpretation of statutes is beyond question. But what really lies behind that interaction is a sort of tug of war between two opponents, legislator and judge, each obsessed with the other and each driven by the other to dig in his heels and resist at all costs, regardless of the caricature they may make of their respective roles. The presumed hostility of judges to the labours of the legislator leads to petty drafting techniques which, in turn, leave judges with a feeling of the legislator's hostility towards them, thus resulting in interpretation techniques which, if not altogether negative, clearly indicate the judges' distrust of the legislator. This vicious circle must be broken and a return made to broader conceptions of legal interpretation. The judges, no doubt, have their part to play in the task of reconciliation. But no real progress can be made if the legislator does not first set the proper example in taking the honourable and calculated risk of expressing himself in simple and open language. The recent change in drafting techniques, at least in certain classes of statutes, is an encouraging sign in that regard.

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ZEIFERT, Mateusz. "GRAMMATICAL ISSUES IN JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION – DOES LEGAL PRACTICE NEEDS LINGUISTIC THEORY? BASED ON POLISH COURTS’ DECISIONS." Comparative Legilinguistics 34 (January 4, 2019): 33–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/cl.2018.34.2.

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Most interpretational problems in law pertain to the meaning of words. However, in this paper I address problems caused in Polish courts by grammar (namely: syntax and inflexion) of legal provisions. One can distinguish five main sources of grammatical issues in judicial interpretation of law: syntax of a sentence (i.e. order of words), conjunctive words (i.e. i, lub), punctuation marks (i.e. comma, semicolon, dash), nominal grammatical categories (i.e. number, gender), verbal grammatical categories (i. e. aspect, tense, mood). Traditional Polish canons of interpretation offer no clues on how to deal with such issues, stating only that statutes should be construed in accordance with the rules of grammar. In fact, cases in which such interpretational issues occur, are decided in a highly incoherent manner. The courts tend to feel a tension between grammatical form of a provision and its purpose, function, or other extra-linguistic values. I think the main reason of such controversy is a very limited vision of grammar shared by the courts, stemmed from primary school rather than contemporary linguistic theories.

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peruginelli, ginevra. "access to legal literature: the italian dogi database." Legal Information Management 5, no. 3 (September 2005): 175–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1472669605000782.

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legal information has specific features due to its nature, its different utilisation purposes and the intrinsic need for integration of its components, represented by legislation, cases and doctrine. access to legal literature in particular is a primary requirement; it responds to the demand for understanding and interpretation of statutes and cases, an objective that law scholars and professionals greatly contribute to.

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Shapiro, Martin. "The European Court of Justice: Of Institutions and Democracy." Israel Law Review 32, no. 1 (1998): 3–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700015582.

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The problem of democracy and judicial review is a problem engendered by successful constitutional courts. For where courts are not successful in establishing veto powers over legislation, no problem or only a very limited problem occurs. Of course any court interpreting statutes in the process of applying them does some law making. How much this law making interferes with democracy depends on how easy it is for the legislature to legislate. Where legislatures can amend statutes easily, they can easily correct “errors” of judicial statutory interpretation. Judicial review of the lawfulness of administrative action essentially involves the same power of statutory interpretation with the same potential for legislative correction.Most of the nations of the world that do not have successful constitutional courts are not democracies. Indeed, no state without considerable claims to democracy has successful judicial review. These facts are clues to the obvious. Constitutional government is limited government. In the real world we do not encounter nondemocratic limited governments although we encounter many shades of more or less democratic, more or less constitutional governments. So there is some affinity between democracy and constitutionalism.

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Grundfest, Joseph A., and A. C. Pritchard. "Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation." Stanford Law Review 54, no. 4 (April 2002): 627. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1229575.

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van Zyl Smit, Jan. "The New Purposive Interpretation of Statutes: HRA Section 3 after Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza." Modern Law Review 70, no. 2 (March 2007): 294–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2007.00638.x.

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Spielman, Bethany. "Invoking the Law in Ethics Consultation." Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2, no. 4 (1993): 457–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180100004497.

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A request that an ethics committee or consultant analyze the ethical issues in a case, delineate ethical options, or make a recommendation need not automatically but often does elicit legal information. In a recent book in which ethics consultants described cases on which they had worked, almost all cited a legal case or statute that had shaped the consultation process. During a period of just a few months, case consultation done under the auspices of one university hospital ethics committee involved interpretation of statutes on living wills, durable powers of attorney, competency, confidentiality, guardianship, AIDS testing, and disability (personal observation). At another hospital, 30% of ethics consultations were thought to involve legal issues. Attorneys at a third hospital estimated that virtually every case involves legal issues. The notion that ethics consultation is an “amalgam” of medicine, ethics, interpersonal skills, and law is gaining currency. Ethics consultation has become a channel through which law enters the clinical setting.

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