Journal articles: 'Interpreting law'

1

Gaye, Oulimata. "Who's Interpreting the Law?" Agenda, no. 40 (1999): 97. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4066025.

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Frier, Bruce W. "Interpreting Codes." Michigan Law Review 89, no. 8 (August 1991): 2201. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1289367.

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Fisher, William W. "Interpreting Holmes." Harvard Law Review 110, no. 5 (March 1997): 1010. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1342109.

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Eskridge, William N. "Interpreting Legislative Inaction." Michigan Law Review 87, no. 1 (October 1988): 67. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1289147.

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Bailey, Diggory. "INTERPRETING PARLIAMENTARY INACTION." Cambridge Law Journal 79, no. 2 (May 15, 2020): 245–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008197320000276.

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AbstractThis article considers the interpretive significance of legislative inaction. Section I considers the nature of arguments based on legislative inaction. Section II explores the practical, conceptual and constitutional problems with trying to rely on legislative inaction as an interpretive aid. Section III concludes that attempts to draw inferences from legislative inaction alone are deeply flawed, but that inferences might legitimately be drawn from inaction if it forms part of the context against which the legislation is enacted. Even then, however, there are practical difficulties in determining what inferences to draw.

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O’donnell, Ian. "Interpreting Penal Change." Criminal Justice 4, no. 2 (May 2004): 199–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1466802504044915.

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Bhatia, Vijay K. "Interpreting law in socio-pragmatic space." Semiotica 2017, no. 216 (May 24, 2017): 109–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/sem-2015-0079.

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AbstractUnlike any other form of professional communication, legal discourse, especially in a legislative context, is unique in the sense that it is full of contradictions. Firstly, it is highly depersonalized, as its illocutionary force is independent of any specific writer or reader, and yet it is meant to address a diverse range of audiences. Secondly, it is meant for ordinary citizens, but is written in a style that is meant only for legal specialists. Thirdly, although its primary function is to assign rights and impose obligations to act or prohibit action, it is written in a highly nominal style (language of thinking) rather than verbal style (language of doing). And finally, legislative provisions are meant to be “clear,” “precise,” “unambiguous,” on the one hand, and “all-inclusive,” on the other, which can be seen as a contratdiction in terms. Most of these seeming contradictions make it difficult for the various stakeholders, which include specialists as well as non-specialists, to manage “socio-pragmatic space” in the construction and, more importantly, interpretation of such provisions, particularly when they are interpreted in broadly socio-political contexts. Drawing on some of the contradictory interpretations of certain sections of the Basic Law, widely regarded as the mini-constitution of Hong Kong, this paper will identify and discuss key theoretical issues emerging from a diversity of meanings attributed to somewhat innocuous legislative constructions, which precipitated the “Occupy Central” movement, largely popularized as the symbolic “Umbrella Movement.” The paper thus attempts to highlight two rather different aspects of interpretation of legal meaning, one in the court of law for the negotiation of justice, and the other in wider socio-political and public domains where law is interpreted broadly with wider social implications.

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Legros, Cécile. "Interpreting International Shipping Law with EU Soft Law Instruments." European Journal of Commercial Contract Law 7, no. 1 (June 29, 2015): 32–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.7590/187714615x14328875962546.

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9

Savage, Joanne. "Interpreting “Percent Black”." Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice 4, no. 1-2 (July 19, 2006): 29–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/j222v04n01_02.

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Ackerman, Bruce. "Interpreting the Women's Movement." California Law Review 94, no. 5 (October 1, 2006): 1421. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20439069.

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11

T. St J. N. B. "Enacting and Interpreting Legislation." Statute Law Review 15, no. 3 (1994): 214–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/slr/15.3.214.

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Singh QC, R. "Interpreting Bills of Rights." Statute Law Review 29, no. 2 (August 29, 2008): 82–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmn010.

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Osti, Cristoforo. "Interpreting Convergence: Where Antitrust Meets Consumer Law." European Competition Journal 5, no. 2 (August 2009): 377–408. http://dx.doi.org/10.5235/ecj.v5n2.377.

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Sherwyn, David, Zev J. Eigen, and Adam A. Klausner. "Interpreting the ADA and Civil Rights Law." Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 41, no. 1 (February 2000): 85–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/001088040004100126.

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15

Beckstrom, Heidi. "Interpreting the law: Help on the internet." Journal of Emergency Nursing 24, no. 1 (February 1998): 7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0099-1767(98)90157-x.

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16

Hudson, John. "Milsom's Legal Structure: Interpreting Twelfth-Century Law." Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis / Revue d'Histoire du Droit / The Legal History Review 59, no. 1-2 (1991): 47–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157181991x00189.

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17

Rubin, Edward, D. Neil MacCormick, and Robert S. Summers. "Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study." American Journal of Comparative Law 41, no. 1 (1993): 128. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/840510.

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18

Lundmark, Thomas, D. Neil MacCormick, and Robert S. Summers. "Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study." American Journal of Comparative Law 46, no. 1 (1998): 211. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/841084.

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19

Barnard, Catherine, and Bob Hepple. "Indirect Discrimination: Interpreting Seymour-Smith." Cambridge Law Journal 58, no. 2 (July 1999): 399–412. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008197399002068.

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THE preliminary ruling by the European Court of Justice in the Seymour-Smith and Perez case about the scope and meaning of indirect discrimination has done little to clarify this perplexing concept. The ruling does not tell the thousands of short-service employees whose claims were stayed pending the litigation whether the qualifying period of two years’ continuous service for the right not to be unfairly dismissed is contrary to Community law. Nor does it provide clear standards by which disparate impact is to be tested, nor the relevant time for assessing the legality of an allegedly discriminatory measure, nor the conditions for establishing objective justification. More generally, these proceedings under Article 177 (now Article 234) of the EC Treaty reveal a failure by the Court to perform its function of facilitating the national court in interpreting and applying Community equality law in a way which would be consistent and uniform throughout the Union.

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20

SILTALA, RAIMO. "Interpreting Statutes. A Comparative Study." Ratio Juris 6, no. 3 (December 1993): 350–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.1993.tb00157.x.

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21

Leib, Ethan J. "Interpreting Statutes Passed Through Referendums." Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 7, no. 1 (March 2008): 49–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1089/elj.2008.7104.

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22

Mendes, C. H. "Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study." International Journal of Constitutional Law 6, no. 2 (March 21, 2008): 349–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icon/mon005.

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23

Hart, Barbara Lane. "Book Review: Interpreting Crime Statistics." International Criminal Justice Review 7, no. 1 (May 1997): 141–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/105756779700700109.

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24

Larre, Tamara. "Misguided Inferences? The Use of Expressio Unius to Interpret Tax Law." Alberta Law Review 51, no. 3 (May 11, 2014): 497. http://dx.doi.org/10.29173/alr47.

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This article explores how the interpretive canon of expressio unius has been used by the courts when interpreting the Income Tax Act, and discusses the canon’s place within the landscape of statutory interpretation of income tax law. The article reviews the existing literature to describe the canon, the assumptions on which the canon relies, and the reasons in favour of and against the canon’s use. The ultimate conclusion is there is some value in the interpretive tool, but it should be used only to prompt interpreters to ask questions instead of prompting them to draw conclusions. While canons of interpretation are generally considered textualist in nature, expressio unius type reasoning is often used as a way of taking into account the context of a particular provision. Another problem apparent in the case law is that the canon, also called implied exclusion, is often confused with the canon of implied exception. The article also examines court decisions that apply or reject the use of expressio unius when interpreting the Income Tax Act. Finally, the article proposes factors that should be considered when determining whether expressio unius should be used in a particular tax case.

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25

Kim, Young Jin. "Realizing Justice and Law from Interpreting Literary Works." Korean Journal of Law and Society 54 (April 30, 2017): 179–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.33446/kjls.54.6.

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26

Gaja, Giorgio. "Interpreting Articles Adopted by the International Law Commission." British Yearbook of International Law 85, no. 1 (2014): 10–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bybil/brv001.

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27

Magill, Gerard. "Interpreting Moral Doctrine: Newman on Conscience and Law." Horizons 20, no. 1 (1993): 7–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0360966900026736.

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AbstractThe religious epistemology of John Henry Newman offers an avenue, unexplored by scholars, for interpreting moral doctrine today. Although he did not write any work on moral theology, a systematic account of the interaction between conscience and moral law in his writings can illumine foundational concerns about personal morality and episcopal authority in the Roman Catholic Church. In reaction to the rationalism of the Enlightenment Newman had remarkable confidence in the capabilities and trustworthiness of the personal, historical reasoning of individuals and ecclesial communities alike—a type of reasoning that he recognized as the driving force for the genesis and the application of moral law. Not surprisingly, his concern for historical moral consciousness, with its emphasis upon subjectivity, generated a significant shift from abstractness to concreteness in theological method, a shift that would later influence the thought of Bernard Lonergan. To illustrate the contemporary relevance of Newman's commitment to personal reasoning in theology, his explanation of the legitimate authority of conscience and doctrine provides the basis for an instructive critique of the document On the Interpretation of Dogmas (1989) from the International Theological Commission.

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28

Birch, Diane, and Michael Hirst. "INTERPRETING THE NEW CONCEPT OF HEARSAY." Cambridge Law Journal 69, no. 1 (March 2010): 72–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008197310000188.

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29

Fleming, David. "Alice and the judiciary–interpreting contracts." Cambridge Law Journal 57, no. 3 (November 1998): 429–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008197398283012.

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WHEN the discussion between Humpty Dumpty and Alice takes on the role of leading case and its interpretation becomes a matter of dispute between a Lord Justice of Appeal and a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, then it might be thought that the academic lunatics have taken over the legal asylum.

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30

Fairhurst, J. "SIMAP-Interpreting the Working Time Directive." Industrial Law Journal 30, no. 2 (June 1, 2001): 236–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ilj/30.2.236.

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31

Rosanvallon, P. "Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution." International Journal of Constitutional Law 5, no. 3 (June 13, 2007): 564–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icon/mom015.

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32

Gao, Richard. "Interpreting the electrophysiological power spectrum." Journal of Neurophysiology 115, no. 2 (February 1, 2016): 628–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1152/jn.00722.2015.

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Recent experimental findings suggest that there may be rich physiological information embedded within the power spectrum of neurophysiological recordings, which, in addition to power in specific oscillatory frequencies, can be extracted with the appropriate model. This article reviews previous empirical and modeling results, as well as the canonical power law model that is often used to describe the power spectrum. In addition, a modified power law model with parameters estimating synaptic and spiking contributions is proposed.

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33

Moser-Mercer, B., L. Kherbiche, and B. Class. "Interpreting Conflict: Training Challenges in Humanitarian Field Interpreting." Journal of Human Rights Practice 6, no. 1 (January 6, 2014): 140–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jhuman/hut025.

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34

Kain, Patrick. "Interpreting Kant's Theory of Divine Commands." Kantian Review 9 (March 2005): 128–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s136941540000203x.

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Kant rejected ‘theological morality’, insisting that no one, including God, can be the ‘author’ of the moral law because the moral law is a categorically necessary, non-positive law. Kant was also no religious enthusiast and clearly intended to rule out certain kinds of dependence of ethics on theology. Such considerations make it tempting to suggest that Kant was fully committed to what has been called the ‘autonomy of ethics’ from theology. Yet an observant reader of Kant's corpus is constantly confronted with passages in which Kant discusses philosophical theology, connections between moral philosophy and theology, and even argues that we should ‘recognize all our duties as divine commands’ (KpV, 5: 129).

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35

Berry, David S. "Interpreting rights and culture: ExtendingLaw's empire." Res Publica 4, no. 1 (March 1998): 3–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02334930.

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36

Matusiak-Frącczak, Magdalena. "Interpreting Law Through International Judicial Dialogue by Polish Courts." Bratislava Law Review 4, no. 2 (December 31, 2020): 49–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.46282/blr.2020.4.2.181.

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International judicial dialogue is a new method of law interpretation that gains popularity in analyses of legal scholars and still raises a lot of doubts both on its existence as well as its definition. This paper will deal with the application of this technique by Polish courts. In the first place, it will be explained what international judicial dialogue actually means. Afterwards, the paper will in detail discuss problems connected to the use of this method on the basis of decisions of Polish courts, first, by presenting examples of a proper, decorative and failed dialogue, and then by emphasizing complications caused by this method in the Polish jurisprudence. It will be also explored whether there exists a real dialogue, meaning that not only Polish courts receptively refer to judgments of international and foreign courts, but there is also some level of reciprocity in those references. At the end of the paper, the advantages and disadvantages of this method will be deliberated. In this part, I will suggest some solutions permitting mitigation of some adverse effects s of this technique.

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37

Phelan, Mary. "Medical Interpreting and the Law in the European Union." European Journal of Health Law 19, no. 4 (2012): 333–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157180912x650681.

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Abstract In 2011, the Danish government announced that from June that year it would no longer cover the costs of medical interpreters for patients who had been living in Denmark for more than seven years. The Dutch Ministry of Health followed with an even more draconian approach; from 1 January 2012, the cost of translation and interpreting would no longer be covered by the state. These two announcements led to widespread concern about whether or not there is a legal foundation for interpreter provision in healthcare. This article considers United Nations treaties, conventions from the Council of Europe and European Union law. European Union member states have been slow to sign up to international agreements to protect the rights of migrant workers. The European Union itself has only recently moved into the area of discrimination and it is unclear if the Race Directive covers language. As a result, access to interpreters in healthcare, where it exists, is dependent on national anti-discrimination legislation or on positive action taken at national or local level rather than on European or international law.

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38

Amsden, Brian. "Rhetorical interventions in the law: Interpreting “I ♥ Boobies!”." First Amendment Studies 50, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2016.1152907.

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39

Turton, Gemma, and Sally Kyd. "Causing controversy: interpreting the requirements of causation in criminal law and tort law." Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 70, no. 4 (January 13, 2020): 425–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v70i4.242.

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The occurrence of a fatal road traffic collision may raise a number of legal issues and result in litigation both in the civil and criminal courts. The role of the different branches of law is distinct, with the aims of the litigation being quite different, but both require causation to be proved. Such cases are examined in this article as a vehicle for discussing how the principles of causation play out in each branch of law. It will be seen that the particular aims of the law dictate how doctrines of causation are applied, with particular problems caused by the legislature’s creation of strict liability offences. To resolve these problems, we propose that the criminal law borrow from negligence in adopting a test akin to the ‘harm within the risk’ test, adapting it to the role of the criminal law by formulating a ‘harm within the wrong’ requirement for causation.

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40

Pirker, Benedikt, and Jennifer Smolka. "Making Interpretation More Explicit: International Law and Pragmatics." Nordic Journal of International Law 86, no. 2 (June 19, 2017): 228–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718107-08602004.

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Building on earlier research, the present article integrates linguistics and pragmatics into the study of interpretation of treaties in international law. This approach aims to make the reasoning of interpreting agents and their appeals to interpretive canons more explicit and transparent. This is consequently demonstrated with a number of practical examples in which the process of legal interpretation and its accommodation of the mentioned norms of interpretation can be adequately described and modelled. At the same time, it is shown that legal language possesses certain particularities, but nevertheless ultimately follows the basic pragmatic rules of communication. Nonetheless, linguistics and pragmatics can only provide an ultimately descriptive account of interpretation, so that evaluative judgements on the normative questions of how to respect the norms of international law still need to be made and – from a normative perspective – the rules of international law are not replaced or abrogated.

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41

Leiter, Brian. "Legal Indeterminacy." Legal Theory 1, no. 4 (December 1995): 481–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352325200000227.

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To say that the law is indeterminate is to say that the class of legal reasons (hereafter “the Class”) is indeterminate. The Class, in turn, consists of four components:1. Legitimate sources of law (e.g., statutes, constitutions, court decisions, social policy, morality);2. Legitimate interpretive operations that can be performed on the sources in order to generate rules of law (e.g., proper methods of interpreting statutes or prior cases or of reasoning about moral concepts as these figure in the sources);3. Legitimate interpretive operations that can be performed on the facts of record in order to generate facts of legal significance (e.g., proper ways of grouping and categorizing fact situations for purposes of legal analysis); and4. Legitimate rational operations that can be performed on facts and rules of law to finally yield particular decisions (e.g., deductive reasoning).

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42

Coster van Voorhout, Jill E. B. "Human trafficking for labour exploitation: Interpreting the crime." Utrecht Law Review 3, no. 2 (December 20, 2007): 44. http://dx.doi.org/10.18352/ulr.47.

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43

Cammarn, Scott A. "Interpreting ERISA: Corporate Officer Liability for Delinquent Contributions." Duke Law Journal 1986, no. 4 (September 1986): 710. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1372490.

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44

Scott, Rosamund. "INTERPRETING THE DISABILITY GROUND OF THE ABORTION ACT." Cambridge Law Journal 64, no. 2 (July 7, 2005): 388–412. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008197305006902.

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“NOT only would it be a bold and brave judge … who would seek to interfere with the discretion of doctors acting under the Abortion Act 1967, but I think he would really be a foolish judge who would try to do any such thing, unless, possibly, where there is clear bad faith and an obvious attempt to perpetrate a criminal offence.” So said Sir George Baker P. in Paton v. B.P.A.S. and his view has been repeated at apposite judicial moments in subsequent cases. Recently, however, a legal attempt was indeed made to question the discretion of doctors in Jepson v. The Chief Constable of West Mercia Police Constabulary. Reverend Joanna Jepson asked the West Mercia Police to investigate doctors who had authorised an abortion for bilateral cleft lip and palate at 28 weeks under the disability ground of the Abortion Act 1967 (as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990). Abortion is legal under that section if two doctors have formed an opinion in good faith that “there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped”.

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45

Bevan, Chris. "Interpreting Statutory Purpose - Lessons fromYemshawvHounslow London Borough Council." Modern Law Review 76, no. 4 (July 2013): 742–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12033.

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46

Miers, David. "Taxing Perks and Interpreting Statutes: Pepper v Hart." Modern Law Review 56, no. 5 (September 1993): 695–710. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1993.tb01898.x.

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47

Prassl, J. "Interpreting Employment Protective Legislation: Gisda Cyf v Barratt." Industrial Law Journal 40, no. 1 (February 3, 2011): 103–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/indlaw/dwq033.

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48

Xing, Hongfei, and Jinhai Xu. "Interpreting the legislation connotation of water resource regulations." Frontiers of Law in China 3, no. 4 (October 21, 2008): 600–610. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11463-008-0029-1.

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49

Graglia, Lino A. ""Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner on Bork." Stanford Law Review 44, no. 5 (May 1992): 1019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1228934.

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50

Schumm, Walter R. "Interpreting Past Religious Discrimination Today." Psychological Reports 93, no. 2 (October 2003): 513–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.2003.93.2.513.

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Much of modern western law now presupposes opposition to discrimination based on race, religion, sex, national origin, and other factors. However, ancient religious Scriptures may have sanctioned certain types of discrimination. Whether those who are inclined to accept literal interpretations of their Scriptures will condone certain forms of discrimination could be evaluated to contrast the effects of modernization versus religious indoctrination on various kinds of prejudice.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Interpreting law'

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