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Ferreira, André Luís Doneux. "Discurso propedêutico de Kant diante da recepção da Crítica da Razão Pura." Universidade de São Paulo, 2013. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-22102013-100358/.
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O objetivo central proposto nesta dissertação é investigar como a recepção da primeira edição da Crítica da razão pura ressoa no corpus dos textos dedicados à preparar o leitor para a compreensão da obra, ou seja, como Kant reconstitui seu discurso propedêutico em relação à Crítica da razão pura a partir dos referenciais oferecidos pelos juízos do público sobre a obra publicada em 1781. O corpus, portanto, está delimitado aos três textos cuja tarefa propedêutica ou seja, a referida preparação prévia do leitor é claramente influenciada pela recepção da Crítica da razão pura. São eles: Prolegômenos a toda metafísica futura que queira apresentar-se como ciência; a Introdução à Crítica da razão pura em sua segunda edição; o Prefácio à segunda edição desta mesma obra. Esta problemática aparentemente técnica é tomada como mote para a realização de uma leitura da posição de Kant frente a acontecimentos marcantes no contexto filosófico e político dos anos seguintes à publicação da primeira edição da Crítica da razão pura marcadamente, a Pantheismusstreit e a mudança no trono prussiano em 1786, a qual, frequentemente, é tomada como causa da suposta recaída no dogmatismo, que seria observada na segunda edição da Crítica da razão pura. Não obstante, a interpretação de algumas das questões centrais para a fortuna crítica da filosofia kantiana, em particular, o estatuto do idealismo transcendental, a autonomia que deve caracterizar o uso público da razão e a elucidação do projeto de uma Crítica da razão pura também fazem parte do escopo da problemática proposta nesta dissertação. Sobretudo, importa valorizar o discurso propedêutico de Kant e as mudanças nele introduzidas, sem as quais as tentativas de compreensão de sua obra seriam inócuas, senão impossíveis de realizar-se objetivamente.The main objective of this dissertation is to investigate how the reception of the first edition of the Critique of pure reason echoes in the text corpus devoted to prepare the reader to understand this book. In other words, how does Kant reconstitute his introductory speech in relation to the references and judgments given by the readers of the first edition, which was published in 1781? Thus, the text corpus comprises three texts where the propaedeutic task - the prior preparation of the reader - is clearly influenced by the reception of the Critique of Pure Reason. These texts are: the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, which presents itself as science, the second edition of the Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason and the Preface of the latter. Moreover, these changes could be analyzed in Kant\'s position about remarkable events in the philosophical and political context of the years following the publication of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. They were mainly the Pantheismusstreit and the change in the Prussian throne in 1786, which is often taken as the cause of the alleged \"return into dogmatism\" that was noticed in the second edition of the Critique of pure reason. On the same note, the interpretation of some of the nodal questions in the critical fortune of the Kantian philosophy, especially the status of transcendental idealism, the autonomy that must characterize the public use of reason and the elucidation of the project of a Critique of Pure Reason also compose important points for this dissertations investigation. All in all, it is crucial to valorize the introductory speech of Kant and the changes made by the author as an overall attempt to understand his work. Without it, our comprehension of such important texts would be innocuous or even impossible to occur objectively.
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Senchaudhuri, Esha. "A critique of pure public reason." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2011. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/314/.
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Contemporary political liberalism defends the view that any legitimate law ought to be justified to those reasonable citizens subject to it. A standard way in which to accomplish this task is to construct a set of public reasons, comprised of constitutional essentials and public democratic values, which are then used to justify all political mandates. The dissertation begins with a criticism of this process of justification for outcomes of legitimate procedures of public decision-making. It argues that given how reasons contribute to judgment formation, it is highly optimistic to assume that reasonable consent on procedures of collective decision-making correspond to the justifiability of procedural outcomes. Instead, I argue for an ideal of legitimate decision-making which enables each citizen to assume a threshold level of personal responsibility for all political decisions made by the political collective. Integrating responsibility into a theory of liberal legitimacy requires a reformulation of the rules of public justification. I argue that citizens concerned with making responsible political decisions must be allowed to justify their political positions through both reasonable judgments as well as sympathetic judgments such as compassion for those who live with disability and mercy towards the criminally motivated. The notion of sympathy, as formulated by David Hume and expanded by Adam Smith, provides an account of how individuals’ ethical evaluations are affected by their ability to be in fellow-feeling with other people. A substantial portion of my doctoral thesis considers the situations in which a private judgment couched in sympathetic terms can meet political liberalism’s demands of publicity and reciprocity.
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Pickering, Mark. "A phenomenalist interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason." Thesis, Boston University, 2013. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/12833.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University
PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you.I argue that Kant's transcendental idealism is best understood as a form of phenomenalism. I understand 'phenomenalism' to be the thesis that "objects are nothing but actual or possible perceptions." In Kant's terms, an empirical object is what a set of all of the actual and possible judgments of experience that refer to its particular empirical object have in common. Judgments of experience are the application of concepts to sensation passively received, making empirical objects mind-dependent but intersubjective. I argue for this view by showing first that Kant holds knowledge of things in themselves is impossible. All putative references to them in the text presuppose assumptions that we are not justified in making. Our reason necessarily requires us to make these assumptions and hence ascribe existence to things in themselves, but these assumptions are unwarranted. Therefore, there can be no real basis in Kant's texts for saying that things in themselves constitute a world of their own that affects the world of appearances (the Two-World View), that they are sets of unknowable properties of empirical objects (the ontological One-World View), or that they are aspects of empirical objects regarded apart from sensible intuition (the epistemological One-World View). Rather, only agnosticism about things in themselves is appropriate. Kant defines an 'actual' or 'real' thing as a thing either being given in experience or as being entailed by a given experience in conjunction with empirical laws. According to Kant, 'possible experience' has both formal (transcendental) and material (empirical) constraints. Any experience must accord with the formal conditions in order to count as experience in the first place, but any experience according with the material conditions, even if it never occurs, must be regarded as equally real as those that do. If my argument succeeds, then the Critique does not appeal to unknowable things to make sense of the world. Rather, it restricts our knowledge to the very class of objects that are within the bounds of possible experience, and it renders them completely transparent and accessible to the human mind.
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Wood, Jonathan David. "Kant's theory of objectivity in the #Critique of pure reason'." Thesis, Birkbeck (University of London), 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.309475.
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Sears, Robert. "Kant's Leibniz-critique in the amphiboly chapter of the "Critique of Pure Reason"." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0016/NQ46543.pdf.
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Frammartino, Anna. "The combination of sensibility and understanding in Kant's Critique of pure reason." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp02/NQ27645.pdf.
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HINZ, KRISTINA. "CRITIQUE OF VIOLENCE, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON: WALTER BENJAMIN S AND IMMANUEL KANT S CRITICAL ENTERPRISE IN COMPARISON." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2016. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=37088@1.
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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIROCOORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR
PROGRAMA DE SUPORTE À PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO DE INSTS. DE ENSINO
PROGRAMA DE EXCELENCIA ACADEMICA
Em 1921, Walter Benjamin publicou, com apenas 28 anos, seu controverso ensaio Da crítica da violência, representando um acerto com o modelo republicano de governança e desenvolvimento à luz da Primeira Guerra Mundial. Identificando uma relação intrínseca e necessária entre autoridade legal e violência física, Da crítica da violência tem se tornado um texto altamente influente para a discussão de violência na política, inspirando teóricos tão diferentes como Carl Schmitt, Herbert Marcuse, Jurgen Habermas, Jacques Derrida e Giorgio Agamben. Esta dissertação de mestrado propõe uma leitura do ensaio benjaminiano que o entende primeiramente como resposta à filosofia crítica e política de Immanuel Kant. Discutindo os conceitos de crítica, política vis-à-vis violência e história nas obras dos dois autores, essa dissertação visa esclarecer as divergências e também paralelas nos pensamentos dos dois autores, argumentando que ambos autores defendem uma visão que considera a violência como o único meio para alcançar a liberdade.
In 1921, Walter Benjamin published, at the age of only 28, his controversial essay Critique of violence, representing an account on the republican model of governance and development in the light of the First World War. Identifying an intrinsic and necessary relationship between legal authority and physical violence, Critique of violence has become a highly influential text for the discussion on the role of violence in politics, inspiring theorists as different as Carl Schmitt, Herbert Marcuse, Jurgen Habermas, Jacques Derrida and Giorgio Agamben. This master thesis proposes a reading of Benjamin s essay which it comprehends primarily as an answer to the critical and political philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Discussing the concepts of critique, politics vis-à-vis violence, and history in the works of both authors, this master thesis has the goal to clarify the divergences but also the parallels within the thought of both authors, arguing that both authors defend a position which considers violence as the only means for achieving freedom.
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Antonini, David Robert. "THE CONCEPTION OF THE PRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION IN THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON: KANT AND HEIDEGGER." OpenSIUC, 2013. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/theses/1254.
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The primary objective of this thesis is to provide an account of productive imagination in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason using Heidegger's interpretation in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Kant's account of productive imagination largely remains in the context of his own project to establish the conditions for the possibility of experience which can ground a theory of knowledge. Thus, Kant's project can largely be read as a work of epistemology leaving an account of experience that is limited to knowledge of empirical objects. Therefore, in turning to Heidegger, I seek to provide an account of experience in the Critique that is not merely epistemic. Rather, in focusing on productive imagination in the Critique, as Heidegger has, one can obtain an account of experience that is revelatory of human finitude. Therefore, the thesis proceeds as follows. First, I offer an introduction providing proper context for the project. In Chapter 1, I offer a reading of both the A and B deductions from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in order to establish the role and limits of productive imagination. Chapters 2 and 3 follow Heidegger through a large section of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics in order to highlight the role of productive imagination and to move beyond the limits present in Kant's account. Lastly, I offer a conclusion.
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Frangeskou, Adonis. "Levinas, Kant and the Problematic of Temporality : A Diachronic Interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason." Thesis, Staffordshire University, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.522255.
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Fulmer, Everett C. "Science and Faith in Kant's First Critique." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/110.
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This thesis engages in an interpretative debate over Kant’s general aims in the first Critique. I argue that a defense of the rational legitimacy of religious faith is at the very center of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Moreover, I argue that Kant’s defense of faith is inextricably bound up with his views on the legitimacy of science. On my account, Kant’s Critique not only demonstrates that science is fully consistent with religious faith, but also that science, when properly understood, actually favors religious belief over non-belief.
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Renton, Paul. "Synthesis and harmony : a study of Kant's theory of sensible experience in the Critique of pure reason." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2013. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk:80/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=203531.
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In this thesis I argue that Kant's model of cognition is best considered as a modified version of Locke's representationalism. My argument presents a balanced approach to reading Kant, which acknowledges that in practice the systematic nature in which we represent the world is the result of a combination of internal and external factors. The possibility of cognition rests, not only on the nature of the cognitive faculties and our capacity to represent in general, but also upon the nature of the metaphysical world and its relation to sensibility. As I present Kant, the possibility of representing a world is dependent upon our general capacity to combine, the suitability of the given content of the manifold in sensibility to combination of this kind, and the nature of the metaphysical world that determines the content of the manifold. Initially I draw the parallel between Locke and Kant on the suggestion of Kant himself in the Prolegomena. Much of what Locke says is easily found in Kant, except for claim that ideas are reducible to their causes or that ideas are isomorphic to the things that produce the ideas in us. I think we can find isomorphism in Kant and I present a reading of his main doctrines that is, not only consistent with an isomorphic relation between representation and the metaphysical world, but the most appropriate reading given the general task he sets for the Critique.
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Ingram, Caleb. "A Creature Divided Against Itself Cannot Stand: Therapeia in the Philosophies of Plato and Immanuel Kant." OpenSIUC, 2018. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/theses/2397.
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Using the scholarship of Robert Cushman to navigate Plato’s dialogues, Chapter 1 of this thesis establishes their multifaceted model of philosophy as therapeia. Said model includes Plato’s practical diagnosis of the human condition, his many notions formulated as a cure, and this first chapter ends by briefly responding to some of Martha Nussbaum’ recent criticisms of "Platonism," within The Therapy of Desire, and expounding upon the dialogue Phaedrus as Plato's therapeutic treatment of eros. Chapter 2 looks to the works of Dieter Henrich and T.K Seung in order to explore their proposed links between the philosophies of Plato and Kant, carving out a space for a new connection of therapeia. Chapter 3 discusses The Critique of Pure Reason in light of Plato’s own therapeutic philosophy, analyzing Kant’s unique diagnosis of a further, intellectual aspect of the human condition, his basic means of treating it, and the ideal form of human activity toward which he intends to direct our abortive intellectual desires.
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Willatt, Edward. "Understanding Kant's architectonic method in the critique of pure reason and its role in the work of Gilles Deleuze." Thesis, University of Greenwich, 2009. http://gala.gre.ac.uk/5652/.
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How we read Kant's Critique of Pure Reason has a huge influence on how convincing we find the parts of which it is composed. This thesis will argue that by taking its arguments and concepts in isolation we neglect the unifying architectonic method that Kant employed. Understanding this text as a response to a single problem, that of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgement, will allow us to evaluate it more fully. We will explore Kant's attempts to relate the a priori and the synthetic in the Introduction, Metaphysical Deduction and Analytic of Principles of the Critique of Pure Reason. Having developed this reading at length we will be able to reassess Kant's relation to the work of Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze's critique of Kant and his tendency to make selective use of his work has so far characterised their relations. However, by reading Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in terms of its unifying method we will open up a new means of relating these two thinkers. Whilst Deleuze rejects many key Kantian concerns and concepts he embraces his methodological concern with the ability of problems to unify our thought. The problem-setting and forms of argument that emerge within Kant's architectonic method will be related to Deleuze's account of experience. This thesis will contribute to both Kant and Deleuze studies on the basis of the reading of the Critique of Pure Reason it will present. By showing how Kant's text is to be read as a whole we will be able to challenge the conclusion that the arguments he makes ultimately rely upon a notion of 'subjective origin'. The problem of accounting for 'the actual' through its relation to 'the virtual' in Deleuze's thought will be re-assessed on the basis of his newly established relation with Kant. Understanding Kant's method in the Critique of Pure Reason will be shown to strengthen both his own account of experience and that offered by Deleuze.
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FONSECA, FABIO FRANCOIS MENDONCA DA. "THE INFINITE JUDGMENTS: THEIR FUNCTION AND THEIR NATURE - SOME ASPECTS OF THE PREDICATIVE NEGATION IN THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2007. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=11400@1.
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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIROO trabalho se destina a elucidar os motivos pelos quais Kant postula, na Crítica da Razão Pura, a tese de que os juízos infinitos da forma S é não-P não se reduzem aos afirmativos da forma S é P e nem aos negativos da forma S não é P. A distinção não parece se sustentar na abordagem extensional que é própria da Lógica Geral, uma vez que a equivalência entre juízos infinitos e negativos se revela incontornável. O método adotado segue as advertências dadas pelo próprio Kant e consiste em localizar algum passo da argumentação desenvolvida na Dialética Transcendental onde esta forma judicativa desempenhe um papel exclusivo e imprescindível. Duas hipóteses são examinadas. A primeira é que os juízos infinitos têm papel essencial na formulação e na solução da Primeira Antinomia da Razão Pura. A segunda é que têm função na formulação do Princípio da Determinação Completa, o qual é suscitado a pretexto de se elucidar o Ideal Transcendental da Razão Pura. Esta segunda hipótese se mostrará de fato a solução do nosso problema, mas terá repercussões sérias na interpretação de toda Crítica da Razão Pura, sobretudo ao pressupor um aspecto intensional da predicação que, no geral, tem sido desconsiderado e, por vezes, até mesmo recusado pelo comentário da filosofia de Kant.
The task of this work is explaining why Kant claims in Critique of Pure Reason that infinite judgments of the form S is not-P are not reducible to the affirmative ones of the form S is P nor to the negative ones of the form S is not P The distinction does not seem justifiable in the extensional approach that is proper of General Logic, since the equivalence between infinite and negative judgments ends up to be inevitable. We adopt a method that is suggested by Kant s advices, which consists in looking for some moment in the discussion of Transcendental Dialectic where this form of judgment plays an exclusive and indispensable role. Two hypotheses are examined. The first one is that infinite judgments have an essential role in the formulation and in the solution of the First Antinomy of Pure Reason. The second one is that they have function in the formulation of the Principle of Complete Determination, which is mentioned in order to explain the Transcendental Ideal of Pure Reason. Actually, this second hypothesis will show up as the solution for our problem, but also will have strong repercussions at the interpretation of the whole Critique of Pure Reason, especially for presupposing an intensional aspect of predication that generally has been ignored and sometimes denied by Kantian philosophy s commentators.
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Coriolano, Ericsson Venâncio. "A representação do incondicionado na crítica da razão pura." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFC, 2016. http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/22608.
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CORIOLANO, Ericsson Venâncio. A representação do incondicionado na crítica da razão pura . 2016. 177f. – Tese (Doutorado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2016.Submitted by Gustavo Daher (gdaherufc@hotmail.com) on 2017-04-19T11:47:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2016_tese_evcoriolano.pdf: 1115617 bytes, checksum: 3f39ccadbb31fc5903fdeaf264bef73e (MD5)
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The main theme of this PhD thesis is the representation of the unconditioned in the Critique of Pure Reason. It is argued an essential function of the unconditioned for the preparation of logical and transcendental activities of speculative reason. There is in this work, in a new light, the defense of exposition of some theses about the following sub-themes: 1) the origin of transcendent concepts necessary mode in consciousness; 2) the definition of transcendental appearance; 3) the development and solution of the antinomy of pure reason; 4) the definition of transcendental freedom; 5) the exposition of the function of speculative reason in the establishment of scientific knowledge. Themes (1) and (2) are covered in the first chapter through the exposition of the function of representation of the unconditioned in the development of subjective derivation of transcendental ideas carried out by Kant, of A293/B349 to A338/B396, in the Critique of Pure Reason. Themes (3) and (4) are treated in the second chapter, specifically in the presentation of the results of the research about The Antinomy of Pure Reason, in the second chapter of the second book of the Transcendental Dialectic, of A405/B432 to A568/B596. The theme (5) is found in the third chapter and it is presented by the defense of the thesis that the speculative reason has a vital role to scientific knowledge, it is obtained from the study about Appendix of the Transcendental Dialectic, of A642 / B670 to A705 / B733. It is defended here, ultimately, that all these issues are based on a fundamental thesis that permeates all Transcendental Dialectic, namely that the unconditioned can be determined as a transcendental element with a regulative empirical use of all experience to establish a systematic unity of all objective knowledge.
O tema central desta Tese é a representação do incondicionado dentro da Crítica da Razão Pura. Defende-se uma função imprescindível do incondicionado para elaboração das atividades lógica e transcendental da razão especulativa. Encontra-se aqui, sob uma nova ótica, a apresentação da defesa de algumas teses acerca dos seguintes temas secundários: 1) a origem de conceitos transcendentes de modo necessário no pensamento; 2) a definição de aparência transcendental; 3) a elaboração e solução da antinomia da razão pura; 4) a definição de liberdade transcendental; 5) a exposição da função da razão especulativa no estabelecimento do conhecimento científico. Os temas (1) e (2) são abordados no primeiro capítulo através da exposição da função da representação do incondicionado no desenvolvimento da derivação subjetiva das ideias transcendentais realizada por Kant na Crítica da Razão Pura de A293/B349 a A338/B396. Os temas (3) e (4) são tratados no segundo capítulo, mais precisamente na apresentação dos resultados da investigação do A Antinomia da Razão Pura, segundo capítulo do segundo livro da Dialética Transcendental, de A405/B432 a A568/B596. O tema (5) é encontrado no terceiro capítulo e será apresentado através da defesa da tese, obtida a partir do estudo do Apêndice da Dialética Transcendental, de A642/B670 a A705/B733, que a razão especulativa tem uma função imprescindível para o conhecimento científico. Defender-se-á, em última análise, que todos esses temas são fundamentados em uma tese de fundo que perpassa toda Dialética Transcendental, a saber, que o incondicionado pode ser determinado como elemento transcendental com um uso empírico regulativo de toda experiência para o estabelecimento de uma unidade sistemática de todo conhecimento objetivo.
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Bowman, Caroline. "The Demand for the Unconditioned in the Antinomies: A Defense of Kant." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2016. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1320.
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I interpret and defend Kant's criticism of traditional metaphysics and his indirect proof of transcendental idealism in the first Critique's Antinomy of Pure Reason. Throughout my thesis, I focus on the role of the principle "P2" in the Antinomy ("If the conditioned is given, then the whole sum of conditions, and hence the absolutely unconditioned, is given"). I first defend Kant's use of the principle to motivate the proofs of the Thesis and Antithesis arguments in the second antinomy, which concerns composition, and the third antinomy, which concerns causality. I then explain how the role of P2 in the proofs exposes Kant's indirect proof of transcendental idealism to a significant challenge, to which I develop a response. Finally, I pose the question of whether Kant ultimately argues that the unconditioned exists, or whether he argues that it is merely possible that the unconditioned exists. I explore both options and outline avenues for further consideration of this question, which I argue is crucial to understanding Kant's critical project.
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Osborne, Gregg. "¿Dónde está la deducción objetiva de Kant?" Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2012. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/112823.
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Where Is Kant’s Objective Deduction?”. The preface to the first edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is marked by a distinction between objective and subjective sides of the transcendental deduction. The objective side alone is said to be essential to Kant’s main purpose and is also said to retain its full strength even if the subjective side is not found to be convincing. The thesis of this paper is twofold. First, that the most prominent accounts of this distinction in the literature are all subject to insuperable objections. Second, that the meat of the objective side is not to be found in the chapter explicitly devoted to the transcendental deduction but rather in the second chapter of the Analytic of Principles. What this implies is that a portion of the text frequently held to be the very heart of the Critique is said in the preface to the first edition to be inessential. We must therefore ask whether it is and be prepared to justify any divergence from the position espoused by Kant himself in 1781.El prefacio de la primera edición de la Crítica de la razón pura de Kant está signado por la distinción entre los aspectos objetivo y subjetivo de la deducción trascendental. El aspecto objetivo es considerado esencial para el propósito principal de Kant, y se suele considerar que mantiene toda su fuerza incluso si el aspecto subjetivo no resulta convincente. La tesis de este artículo es doble. Primero, las interpretaciones más prominentes de esta distinción, en la literatura filosófica sobre Kant, no se sostienen. Segundo, lo central del aspecto objetivo no debe ser encontrado en el capítulo explícitamente dedicado a la deducción trascendental, sino más bien en el segundo capítulo de la Analítica de los principios. Esto implica que una parte del texto, frecuentemente considerada como el corazón mismo de la Crítica, es descrito en el prefacio a la primera edición como no esencial. Debemos, por tanto, preguntar si lo es, y estar dispuestos a justificar alguna divergencia respecto de la posición expuesta por Kant mismo en 1781.
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Heide, David C. "Kant's Idealism: On the Character and Limits of Spatial Representation." The Ohio State University, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1283966702.
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LeBlanc, Richard. "Kant and the Meaning of Freedom in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit." Thèse, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/20248.
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Relying mainly on R. B. Pippin’s and D. Moggach’s interpretative works on Kant and Hegel, the thesis tackles the problem of the reception of Kant by Hegel. It does so by looking into the impact of Kant’s first critique on the Preface, the Introduction and the first part of the section Self-consciousness of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Three Kantian conditions for there to be freedom are identified and shown to be reinterpreted by Hegel in a continuist perspective. These three conditions are spontaneity, reflectivity and negativity which propels and retains the free Kantian subject in the Hegelian becoming of reality.
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Coriolano, Ericsson VenÃncio. "A representaÃÃo do incondicionado na crÃtica da razÃo pura." Universidade Federal do CearÃ, 2016. http://www.teses.ufc.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=19295.
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nÃo hÃO tema central desta Tese à a representaÃÃo do incondicionado dentro da CrÃtica da RazÃo Pura. Defende-se uma funÃÃo imprescindÃvel do incondicionado para elaboraÃÃo das atividades lÃgica e transcendental da razÃo especulativa. Encontra-se aqui, sob uma nova Ãtica, a apresentaÃÃo da defesa de algumas teses acerca dos seguintes temas secundÃrios: 1) a origem de conceitos transcendentes de modo necessÃrio no pensamento; 2) a definiÃÃo de aparÃncia transcendental; 3) a elaboraÃÃo e soluÃÃo da antinomia da razÃo pura; 4) a definiÃÃo de liberdade transcendental; 5) a exposiÃÃo da funÃÃo da razÃo especulativa no estabelecimento do conhecimento cientÃfico. Os temas (1) e (2) sÃo abordados no primeiro capÃtulo atravÃs da exposiÃÃo da funÃÃo da representaÃÃo do incondicionado no desenvolvimento da derivaÃÃo subjetiva das ideias transcendentais realizada por Kant na CrÃtica da RazÃo Pura de A293/B349 a A338/B396. Os temas (3) e (4) sÃo tratados no segundo capÃtulo, mais precisamente na apresentaÃÃo dos resultados da investigaÃÃo do A Antinomia da RazÃo Pura, segundo capÃtulo do segundo livro da DialÃtica Transcendental, de A405/B432 a A568/B596. O tema (5) à encontrado no terceiro capÃtulo e serà apresentado atravÃs da defesa da tese, obtida a partir do estudo do ApÃndice da DialÃtica Transcendental, de A642/B670 a A705/B733, que a razÃo especulativa tem uma funÃÃo imprescindÃvel para o conhecimento cientÃfico. Defender-se-Ã, em Ãltima anÃlise, que todos esses temas sÃo fundamentados em uma tese de fundo que perpassa toda DialÃtica Transcendental, a saber, que o incondicionado pode ser determinado como elemento transcendental com um uso empÃrico regulativo de toda experiÃncia para o estabelecimento de uma unidade sistemÃtica de todo conhecimento objetivo.
The main theme of this PhD thesis is the representation of the unconditioned in the Critique of Pure Reason. It is argued an essential function of the unconditioned for the preparation of logical and transcendental activities of speculative reason. There is in this work, in a new light, the defense of exposition of some theses about the following sub-themes: 1) the origin of transcendent concepts necessary mode in consciousness; 2) the definition of transcendental appearance; 3) the development and solution of the antinomy of pure reason; 4) the definition of transcendental freedom; 5) the exposition of the function of speculative reason in the establishment of scientific knowledge. Themes (1) and (2) are covered in the first chapter through the exposition of the function of representation of the unconditioned in the development of subjective derivation of transcendental ideas carried out by Kant, of A293/B349 to A338/B396, in the Critique of Pure Reason. Themes (3) and (4) are treated in the second chapter, specifically in the presentation of the results of the research about The Antinomy of Pure Reason, in the second chapter of the second book of the Transcendental Dialectic, of A405/B432 to A568/B596. The theme (5) is found in the third chapter and it is presented by the defense of the thesis that the speculative reason has a vital role to scientific knowledge, it is obtained from the study about Appendix of the Transcendental Dialectic, of A642 / B670 to A705 / B733. It is defended here, ultimately, that all these issues are based on a fundamental thesis that permeates all Transcendental Dialectic, namely that the unconditioned can be determined as a transcendental element with a regulative empirical use of all experience to establish a systematic unity of all objective knowledge.
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Silva, Jaderson Oliveira da. "HEIDEGGER E KANT: O PROJETO ONTOLÓGICO DE SER E TEMPO E A INTERPRETAÇÃO FENOMENOLÓGICA DA CRÍTICA DA RAZÃO PURA." Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, 2013. http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9144.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível SuperiorThe goal of this work is to provide a reconstruction of Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of Critique of Pure Reason carried out in the late twenties in light of the task of a destruction of the history of ontology on the guideline of the problem of temporality. The reconstruction is focused on Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1930) regarded in connection with textcourses from the period around Being and Time, in particular The Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1927-28) and The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology (1927). After an examination of the central methodological lines derived from the task of phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology the work presents the interpretation of Kant's thesis about being and the background in which it is formulated the thesis according to which Kant's Critique must be understood as a project to lay the foundations for metaphysics. By means of these considerations the work is able to reconstruct the phenomenological interpretation of Critique of Pure Reason as a laying of the foundation for metaphysics which inquires into the problem about the fore ontological understanding that enables entities to become manifest to finite human reason. In light of central orientations provided by the general ontological project of Being and Time the center of attention is the temporal nature of pure objectivity horizon which is developed by means of interpretations of transcendental schematism and transcendental deduction. Thus the work is intended to illuminate Heidegger's claim according to which Kant is the first and only one who traversed a stretch of the path toward the dimension of temporality .
O objetivo do trabalho é reconstruir a interpretação fenomenológica da Crítica da Razão Pura realizada por Heidegger ao final dos anos vinte à luz da tarefa de destruição da história da ontologia seguindo o fio condutor da problemática da temporalidade. A reconstrução é focada no livro Kant e o problema da Metafísica (1929), considerado em conexão com os cursos do período ao redor de Ser e Tempo, especialmente, Interpretação Fenomenológica da Crítica da Razão Pura de Kant (1927-28) e Problemas Fundamentais da Fenomenologia (1927). Após o exame das orientações metodológicas centrais derivadas da tarefa de desenvolver uma destruição fenomenológica da história da ontologia, o trabalho apresenta a interpretação da tese kantiana sobre o ser e reconstrói o pano de fundo em que é formulada a tese segundo a qual a Crítica de Kant deve ser compreendida enquanto um projeto de fundamentação da metafísica. Estas considerações permitem reconstruir a interpretação fenomenológica da Crítica da Razão Pura enquanto fundamentação da metafísica, a qual investiga o problema pela possibilidade de uma compreensão ontológica prévia que permite a manifestação do ente à razão humana finita. À luz das orientações do projeto ontológico de Ser e Tempo, a reconstrução centra o foco na problemática da natureza temporal do horizonte da objectualidade pura, desenvolvida por Heidegger mediante interpretações da doutrina do esquematismo e da dedução transcendental. Deste modo, o trabalho procura esclarecer a afirmação segundo a qual Kant foi o primeiro e único que se moveu durante um trecho do caminho da investigação na dimensão da temporalidade .
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Cudney, Thomas Wayne. "Kant's Use of Transcendental Arguments." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2010. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/62.
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Kant is famous for his use of transcendental arguments in the transcendental deduction. This thesis examines how such a transcendental argument is used within Kant’s methodological framework. Following the work of Henrich and Walker, the paper asks whether transcendental arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason are compatible with Kant’s methodology in general. We find that these arguments and Kant’s methodology are compatible, and that transcendental arguments are indeed very weak arguments by Walker’s standards. However, the entire transcendental deduction should be understood as a deduction writing that uses transcendental arguments particularly effectively according to Kant’s own methodological standards.
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Franzén, Nils. "Bild och begrepp : Heideggers läsning av Kant ur ett fenomenologiskt perspektiv." Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-9075.
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This thesis explores some key aspects of early Heidegger’s interpretations of Kant from a phenomenological perspective. In general terms, it analyzes Heidegger’s claim that Kant’s faculties share a common root in the transcendental imagination, as a critical development of motives found in Husserl’s phenomenology. More precisely, the thesis argues that the motive for deriving Kant’s first faculty, intuition, from the synthesis of imagination can be understood as an attempt to account for the receptivity of a finite subject, without yielding to a causal description of sensibility. Phenomenology shares this problem with Kant’s critical philosophy. Concerning the claim that the second faculty, understanding, originates from the transcendental imagination, Heidegger connects it to his ambition of liberating Kant from a Cartesian heritage, where understanding is conceived as an independent faculty, disconnected from time and sensibility. The thesis explores this motive in relation to Husserl’s claim that the independent use of understanding in the forming of judgments and concepts –is derived from its function in the service of intuition. The belonging together of intuition and understanding is a core aspect of phenomenology, present from its breakthrough in Husserl’s Logical Investigations to his last writings in The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. A general ambition of the thesis is, through a reading of Heidegger’s interpretations of Kant, to shed some light on this fact, and hopefully thereby – at least to some extent – to deepen our understanding of the phenomenological project as such. Although the thesis’ primary concern is not polemical, on some occasions it criticizes other interpreters of Heidegger’s relation to Kant for neglecting or wholly rejecting the phenomenological point of departure of Heidegger’s interpretations.
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van, Zwol Erik. "Responsibility, spontaneity and liberty." Thesis, University of Canterbury. Humanities, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/5763.
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Isaiah Berlin maintains that there are two distinct forms of freedom or liberty: negative and positive. Berlin’s principal claim is that negative liberty does not require that the self be somehow separate from the empirical world (causally aloof, or an originator of causal chains). My principal claim is that to be an agent is to be committed to a separation of self in this sense, thus that the self for its very being requires to possess a species of positive liberty. This conception proceeds in part from Immanuel Kant’s claim that there is a separation between spontaneity and receptivity. Commitment to this assertion allows there to be an understood distinction between the self as a spontaneous self-active agent that makes choices, and the self as a mere reactionary brute that does what it does by biological imperatives. In this thesis, I defend the view that negative liberty is subsumed under positive liberty: you cannot have the former without the latter. I am therefore taking a rationalist stance towards Berlin’s thinking. My methodology is to bring into consideration two perspectives upon the underlying normative principles within the space of reason. The first is of Kant’s understanding of the principle of responsibility and the activity of spontaneity; the second is John McDowell’s understanding of that principle and activity. The key claim of this thesis is that Berlin misunderstands what it is to be a chooser. To be a chooser is to be raised under the idea that one is an efficient cause; human children are brought up being held responsible for their reasons for acting. This principle allows mere animal being to be raised into the space of reason, where we live out a second nature in terms of reason. Using their conclusions I further investigate Berlin’s understanding of conceptual frameworks, taking particular interest in historic ‘universal’ conceptions that shape human lives. He too finds that that we are choosers is necessary for what it is to be human. I take his conclusion, and suggest that if he had had a clear understanding of the space of reason, the historic claim that we have choice would find a more solid footing in the principle of that space, in that we are responsible for our actions. I conclude that the upshot of understanding the ‘I’ as an originating efficient cause is that we treat ourselves as free from a universal determinism that Berlin himself disparages; and that the cost to Berlin is that all choice is necessarily the activity of a higher choosing self. It is part of a Liberal society’s valuing, by their societal commitment to, the ideology of raising our children to understand themselves as choosers, that we have choice at all. This is irrespective of whether that which fetters choice is internal or external to the agent, or of whether having self-conscious itself requires such a cultural emergence of second nature.
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Chabbouh, Junior Marco Antonio. "Os argumentos pela aprioridade e subjetividade de espaço e tempo na estética transcendental: uma discussão das leituras de Kemp Smith, Paton e Kitcher." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2012. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/11617.
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Previous issue date: 2012-10-29Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico
One of the best-known teachings of the Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant is that of the ideality of space and time. The present work aims at discussing the relations between the proofs of the apriority of space and time and the proofs of their subjective character. To achieve this aim, the present text takes the form of a comparative and commented exposition of the readings by Norman Kemp Smith, Herbert James Paton and Patricia Kitcher. This exposition is made in three main chapters. The first one is intended to make an approach to the main problem, the second one is a detailed discussion of the mentioned readings and the third one is constituted by the position taking from the offered debate. It intends then, to demonstrate that Paton s interpretation is the most successful among the three, because it is able to solve pressing problems enunciated by Kemp Smith without trespassing, as Kitcher did, the boundaries of the critical text. Hence, it is also shown that the ideality of space and time intended by Kant is not made through a doctrine of innate ideas similar to the rationalist ones, but is only a doctrine that states the existence of an innate capacity responsible for the production of pure spacial and temporal contents once experience begins
Um dos mais célebres ensinamentos da Crítica da Razão Pura de Immanuel Kant é o da idealidade do espaço e do tempo. O presente trabalho tem como objetivo discutir as relações existentes entre as provas a favor da aprioridade do espaço e do tempo e as provas a favor de seu caráter subjetivo. Para levar a cabo a tarefa citada, o presente texto toma a forma de uma exposição comparativa e comentada das interpretações de Norman Kemp Smith, Herbert James Paton e Patricia Kitcher. Essa exposição faz-se em três capítulos. O primeiro é uma aproximação ao problema central, o segundo constitui-se de uma discussão em detalhe das interpretações analisadas e o terceiro consiste na tomada de posição a partir da discussão oferecida. Pretende-se mostrar que a leitura feita por Paton é a mais bem sucedida dentre as três por conseguir dar conta de importantes questões postuladas por Kemp Smith sem extrapolar, como fez Kitcher, os limites textuais. Sendo assim, evidencia-se que a idealidade do espaço e do tempo pretendida por Kant não se constitui a partir de uma doutrina que afirma a existência de ideias inatas nos moldes racionalistas dogmáticos, mas que afirma unicamente a presença de uma capacidade inata responsável por produzir conteúdos espaciais e temporais puros mediante a experiência
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Conterato, Luis Sergio Vieira. "O conceito de coisa em si na Crítica da Razão Pura e as origens da polêmica que o envolve." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2017. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/20456.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES
This dissertation aims to study the concept of thing in itself in the Critique of Pure Reason and the origins of the controversy that surrounds it. In the light of this scope, this work was elaborated and articulated in three chapters whose purpose was to point out the origins of the controversy that involves the concept of thing itself, the main objectors and their respective objections to the thing itself. Given these questions to the thing itself, we’ve approached Allison's proposal to defend a non-polemical use of the concept of thing itself, from the understanding that the distinction phenomena and thing itself are two ways of considering the same thing. Next, it deals with the construction of the concept of thing itself within the Critique of Pure Reason, addressing the implications of texts of the Preface, Transcendental Aesthetics, Analytic Concepts and Analytic of the Principles for the consolidation of the meaning of the thing considered in itself it. In this sense, the differences between the thing itself, phenomenon, transcendental object and noumenon, and especially in what sense some of these concepts can be used as equivalents in the light of the Critique of Pure Reason, stand out. Finally, the importance of the concept of thing itself in Transcendental Idealism was analyzed, since the criticisms were incisive, but Kant remained with the concept of thing itself in his Theory of Knowledge. Thus, the task of the concept of thing itself in Transcendental Idealism was observed, which led to the conclusion that the thing considered in itself, in spite of the controversies surrounding it, is essential for the success of Kant's critical program, named as Transcendental Idealism whose thesis is the access to the objects of the senses, since these depend on the pure forms of sensibility and the impossibility of the cognoscent subject to scan things considered in themselves, since their existence does not depend on the human faculty of knowledge
Essa dissertação tem como objetivo estudar o conceito de coisa em si na Crítica da Razão Pura e as origens da polêmica que o envolve. À luz desse escopo, o trabalho foi elaborado e articulado em três capítulos, cujo propósito foi de apontar as origens da polêmica que envolve o conceito de coisa em si, os principais objetores e seus respectivos questionamentos à coisa em si. Dado estes questionamentos à coisa em si, abordou-se a proposta de Allison em defender um uso não polêmico do conceito de coisa em si, a partir da compreensão que a distinção fenômeno e coisa em si são dois modos de considerar a mesma coisa. Em seguida, trata-se da construção do conceito de coisa em si no interior da Crítica da Razão Pura, abordando as implicações de textos do “Prefácio”; “Estética Transcendental”; “Analítica dos Conceitos” e “Analítica dos Princípios” para a consolidação do significado da coisa considerada em si mesma. Nesse sentido, destacam-se as diferenças entre coisa em si, fenômeno, objeto transcendental e númeno e, especialmente, em que sentido alguns desses conceitos podem ser utilizados como equivalentes à luz da Crítica da Razão Pura. Por fim, analisou-se a importância do conceito de coisa em si no Idealismo Transcendental, visto que as críticas foram incisivas, mas Kant permaneceu com esse conceito em sua Teoria do Conhecimento. Sendo assim, observou-se a tarefa do conceito de coisa em si no Idealismo Transcendental o que conduziu à conclusão de que a coisa considerada em si mesma, a despeito das polêmicas que a envolve, é imprescindível para o êxito do programa crítico de Kant, nomeado como Idealismo Transcendental cuja tese é o acesso aos objetos dos sentidos, pois estes dependem das formas puras da sensibilidade e a impossibilidade do sujeito cognoscente esquadrinhar as coisas consideradas em si mesmas, porque o modo de existir dessas não dependem da faculdade humana de conhecimento
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Teles, Alexandre. "O sistema de filosofia transcendental de Schopenhauer : uma interpretação e defesa." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/26470.
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Neste trabalho é apresentada e defendida a tese segundo a qual o projeto filosófico de Arthur Schopenhauer deve ser entendido como o estabelecimento de um sistema de filosofia transcendental, constituído de uma teoria da experiência coordenada a uma teoria geral das faculdades cognitivas e a um “primeiro princípio”, que apresentamos e discutimos. Assim compreendida, a filosofia de Schopenhauer guarda uma relação peculiar de continuidade com a filosofia transcendental de Kant: herda e reformula o projeto de Karl Leonhard Reinhold, articulado em resposta aos céticos Salomon Maimon e Gottlob Ernst Schulze, edificando um sistema de filosofia transcendental que contempla as ambições fundacionistas presentes no projeto de Reinhold, as críticas que esse projeto recebera e críticas endereçadas à própria teoria da experiência de Kant no contexto de recepção da Crítica da Razão Pura.In this work is presented and defended the thesis according to which Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophical project should be understood as aiming at putting forward a system of transcendental philosophy. That system comprises a theory of experience coordinated to a general theory of cognitive faculties and to a “first principle” which we present and discuss. So understood, Schopenhauer’s philosophy exhibits a peculiar relationship of continuity with Kant’s transcendental philosophy: it inherits and reformulates Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s project as it was conceived in response to the skeptics Salomon Maimon and Gottlob Ernst Schulze, building a system of transcendental philosophy which encompasses the foundationalist ambitions of Reinhold’s project and the criticisms which that project had received, as much as some criticisms which was addressed at Kant’s theory of experience itself in the context of reception of the Critique of Pure Reason.
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Shaw, Brandon W. "Function and epigenesis in Kant's Critique of pure reason." 2003. http://purl.galileo.usg.edu/uga%5Fetd/shaw%5Fbrandon%5Fw%5F200308%5Fma.
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Chang, Shi-Wen, and 張喜雯. "On the Distinction between Appearances and Things in Themselves in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/10306729955599837981.
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碩士佛光人文社會學院
哲學系碩士班
94
On the Distinction between Appearances and Things in Themselves in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason Abstract The terms ‘appearances’ and ‘things in themselves’ are almost present in each chapter of Critique of Pure Reason. In different context, Kant himself expresses the meaning of these two terms in ambiguous ways. Moreover, the transcendental distinction between appearances and things in themselves in Kantian is not only important for Kant’s theoretical philosophy, but also for his practical philosophy because it leaves room for the discussion of the existence of God, rational soul, and free will. Therefore, it is important to explore what is the meaning of distinction between phenomenon and things in themselves. Kant’s ambiguous expression of these two terms causes scholars’ different interpretations. The most apparent opposing camps are “two-world theory” and “two-aspects theory”. Each quote lots of paragraphs from Kant’s original text (most of them are in Critique of Pure Reason) to justify their interpretations. This thesis intends to compare these two interpretations with Kant’s original text, trying to make clear which interpretation is more satisfactory, in order to explore the meaning of the distinction between appearances and things in themselves. Comparing two interpretations with Kant’s originals (esp. Critique of Pure Reason), this paper concludes that the “two-world” theory violates Kant’s conclusion when discussing the meaning of noumenon in his Critique of Pure Reason. Moreover, the texts, with which those scholars quote to support their interpretations seem to be chosen arbitrarily for not concerning Kant’s contexts as well as his conclusion about the relation between nomenon and phenomenon. For above reasons, this paper concludes that the “two-world” theory is inadequate to illuminate the relation of these two terms. On the contrary, “two-aspects” theory, emphasizing on the “transcendental” distinction between noumenon and phenomenon, considers that the concept ‘noumenon’ is not a concept with real content but only a “limiting concept,” which serve as a passive functional word to prevent reason from violateing its possible extent. The argument concerning the passive function of ‘noumenon’ corresponds to Kant’s main idea of ‘noumenon’ in his Critique of Pure Reason. Furthermore, when quoting and interpreting Kant’s other texts, scholars of “two-aspects” theory seem more reasonable than scholars holding the “two-world” theory. The conclusion of this thesis shows that “two-aspects” theory (esp. Allison’s interpretation) is more adequate for illuminating the distinction between appearances and things in themselves. Keywords: distinction between appearances and things in themselves, transcendental idealism, “two-world” theory, “two-aspects” theory
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Chung, Chen-Yu, and 鍾振宇. "A Study on the Concept of Thing in Itself in Kant''s "Critique of Pure Reason"." Thesis, 1995. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/38449527074215897811.
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Heftler, Christopher Scott. "Kant’s analytic-geometric revolution : ostensive judgment as algebraic time–state relation in the Critique of pure reason." Thesis, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2011-12-4950.
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In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant defends the mathematically deterministic world of physics by arguing that its essential features arise necessarily from innate forms of intuition and rules of understanding through combinatory acts of imagination. Knowing is active: it constructs the unity of nature by combining appearances in certain mandatory ways. What is mandated is that sensible awareness provide objects that conform to the structure of ostensive judgment: “This (S) is P.”
Sensibility alone provides no such objects, so the imagination compensates by combining passing point-data into “pure” referents for the subject-position, predicate-position, and copula. The result is a cognitive encounter with a generic physical object whose characteristics—magnitude, substance, property, quality, and causality—are abstracted as the Kantian categories. Each characteristic is a product of “sensible synthesis” that has been “determined” by a “function of unity” in judgment.
Understanding the possibility of such determination by judgment is the chief difficulty for any rehabilitative reconstruction of Kant’s theory. I will show that Kant conceives of figurative synthesis as an act of line-drawing, and of the functions of unity as rules for attending to this act. The subject-position refers to substance, identified as the objective time-continuum; the predicate-position, to quality, identified as the continuum of property values (constituting the second-order type named by the predicate concept). The upshot is that both positions refer to continuous magnitudes, related so that one (time-value) is the condition of the other (property-value).
Kant’s theory of physically constructive grammar is thus equivalent to the analytic-geometric formalism at work in the practice of mathematical physics, which schematizes time and state as lines related by an algebraic formula. Kant theorizes the subject–predicate relation in ostensive judgment as an algebraic time–state function. When aimed towards sensibility, “S is P” functions as the algebraic relation “t → ƒ(t).”text
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De, Backer Jake. "Herr Kant, der Alleszermalmer-Kant the "All-Crushing" Destroyer of Metaphysics: Metaphilosophy of the Critique of Pure Reason." 2015. http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_hontheses/12.
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The Critique of Pure Reason inaugurated Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Commentators commonly distinguish between Kant’s Positive Project (PP), that is, his epistemology as laid out in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic, from his Negative Project (NP), expressed in terms of the destructive implications his epistemology has on speculative metaphysics and rational theology. Against this tradition I will argue that the whole of the Critique is largely a negative-destructive enterprise. I will focus on what is commonly taken as the centerpiece of the PP, that is, the Transcendental Deduction, and demonstrate that even here the NP is given normative priority. Though, to be sure, certain passages tend to encourage an interpretation of the PP as primary, I contend that this view is myopic and fails to pay sufficient attention to Kant’s global concerns in the Critique. I will demonstrate that a clear exposition of Kant’s metaphilosophical aims, commitments, and convictions is in fact corrosive to any such reading. The objective of this thesis, then, is two-fold: 1) to provide an account of Kant’s metaphilosophy in the Critique, and 2) to argue for what I will here and elsewhere refer to as the Primacy of the Negative Thesis, that is, that Kant prioritized boundary-setting over principle-generating.
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"THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LAW OF CAUSALITY IN KANTS CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON." Master's thesis, METU, 2005. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12606807/index.pdf.
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Haar, Deborah L. "L’évolution de l’argument contre l’idéalisme dans la Critique de la raison pure." Thèse, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/8483.
Full textAbstract:
Chacune des éditions de la Critique de la raison pure contient une preuve de la réalité du monde externe : la première se trouve dans le « quatrième paralogisme » et la deuxième dans la « Réfutation de l’idéalisme ». Ce travail examine l’évolution du premier argument vers le deuxième, en rendant compte de deux critiques importantes de la première édition qui ont influencé le second travail de Kant. La deuxième partie de ce travail se concentre sur des problèmes propres à la Réfutation, où sont traités des sujets particulièrement problématiques, tel que la structure de la conscience empirique déterminée, le rôle du permanent dans l’établissement de l’objectivité, ainsi qu’un argument secondaire présenté dans les notes de bas de page du texte principal et de la préface.Each edition of the Critique of Pure Reason contains a proof for the reality of the external world: the first is located in the “Fourth Paralogism”, the second, in the “Refutation of Idealism.” This work examines the evolution from the first argument to the second, taking into account two significant criticisms of the first edition which influenced Kant’s second attempt. The latter half of this work treats topics particular to the Refutation only, focusing again on the issues which were stumbling blocks, namely the structure of determined empirical consciousness, the role of the permanent in establishing objectivity, as well as a secondary argument found in the footnotes of the main text and preface.