Academic literature on the topic 'Intuitive Logic'

It is no secret that 'managerial' solutions are not, on average, nearly as reliable as 'technical' solutions. The focus of this work is to clarify the reasons why this is so, and to seek ways to increase the reliability of managerial solutions. The causes of this situation are both subjective (human factor failure), which can be influenced, and objective (complexity of the problem, the specifics of human behaviour, etc.) that can be only minimally influenced. Significant subjective causes at work were identified as: a. cognitive distortions at the mental level of thinking of the problem solvers; b. deficiencies in making inference and drawing conclusions; c. incorrect argumentation. There are two ways to reduce these causes: 1. cultivation of managerial thinking of the problem solvers; 2. the use of reserves in the implementation of approaches and tools of theoretical disciplines that already operate successfully elsewhere and are beneficial for managerial solutions. The first way deals with procedures for managerial solutions formulated in the language of the relevant discipline (the language of management), expressed by natural language and the chain of formulas (calculations) and visual (graphic) tools in the form of managerial decision trees, diagrams and charts with the rules of 'managerial logic'. This is generally defined as a set of approaches, tools, methods and skills needed for credible justification when solving managerial problems. Specifically it deals with: - the 'case-based reasoning' approach, which aims at finding the best point of view on a given problem and analysing all considered aspects within its context step-by-step in detail; - translating the tools and methods of modern logic (especially its intuitionistic version) from the language of logic into the language of management taking into account the factual content of expressive means of the language of management including the ability of their effective application; - respecting the principles of rational and ethical argumentation within managerial solutions. The second way circumvents managerial solution procedures by recasting the managerial task to the task of a scientific discipline (logic, game theory, etc.) and derives the correct result therein. In this context we talk about the use of knowledge of theoretical disciplines in management. Both of these ways are demonstrated in the work in a number of illustrative examples and the annexed case studies addressing the specific tasks of managerial practice.

This paper describes the tension between intuition about number theory and attempts to formalize it. I will first examine the root of the dilemma, Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem, which demonstrates that in any reasonable formalization of number theory, there will be independent statements. After proving the theorem, I consider some of its consequences on intuition, focusing on Freiling's "Dart Experiment" which is based on our usual notion of the real numbers as a line. This experiment gives an apparent refutation of the Axiom of Choice and the Continuum Hypothesis; however, it also leads to an equally apparent paradox. I conclude that such paradoxes are inevitable as the formalization of mathematics takes us further from our initial intuitions.

Dans le champ du raisonnement, les théories du double processus sont largement reconnues comme expliquant différents phénomènes, tels que les biais décisionnels et le raisonnement moral ou coopératif. Ces théories conçoivent le mode de pensée de l'homme comme une interaction entre un système rapide, automatique et intuitif (Système 1) et un système plus lent et contrôlé (Système 2). Le point de vue dominant sur les double processus et le modèle default-interventionist qui suppose l'existence d'une interaction sérielle entre ces systèmes. Ainsi, quand quelqu'un est affronté à un problème de raisonnement, la réponse de Système 1 se forme initialement. Puis, le Système 2 peut être impliqué dans le processus. Les théories du double processus dominantes postulent que les biais de raisonnement sont le résultat d'une réponse intuitive erronée du Système 1. Selon ces théories le Système 1 est capable de générer des réponses basées sur les indices « heuristiques », tels que les stéréotypes - mais il ne peut pas rendre compte des principes logico-mathématiques. Malgré la grande reconnaissante qu'elle a reçu, cette théorie contient une présomption jamais testée, notamment la présomption « corrective ». Celle-ci postule que dans les situations où les indices heuristiques sont en conflit avec les principes logico-mathématiques, le Système 2 devient obligatoirement impliqué afin de corriger la réponse erronée de Système 1 et ainsi arrive à une réponse utilisant les principes logiques. Il semble donc crucial de tester cette présomption, qui est la question centrale de cette thèse. Dans l’Étude 1, j'ai utilisé des versions modifiées du paradigme de deux réponses afin de tester la présomption corrective utilisant deux problèmes classiques du raisonnement (problèmes de taux de base et de raisonnement syllogistique). Dans ce paradigme, les participants résolvent la même tâche deux fois. D'abord, ils doivent donner une réponse très rapidement. Après, ils font face à la même tâche sans contrainte temporelle. Afin de vérifier que la première réponse est intuitive, on a employé quatre méthodes : des instructions, une charge concomitante, un temps limite de réponse, ainsi que la charge concomitante et le temps limite simultanément. La théorie du double processus prédit que les réponses logiquement correctes n'apparaissent que dans l'étape finale. A contrario, j'ai trouvé que la plupart des participants ayant donné la bonne réponse à l'étape finale l'avaient déjà donnée lors de la phase initiale. Cet effet était présent dans toutes les procédures expérimentales et dans les 2 problèmes de raisonnement. Dans l’Étude 2, j'ai testé la même présomption avec un problème de raisonnement plus difficile, le problème de la « batte-et-balle ». J'ai conduit 7 expériences avec le paradigme de deux réponses et j'ai trouvé que les personnes ayant donné la réponse correcte à la fin l'ont déjà générée lors de la réponse initiale - donc, il semblerait que les participants l'ont fait intuitivement. Ces résultats m'ont amené à réviser le cadre default-interventionist et à proposer une théorie du double processus hybride qui suppose que le Système 1 génère deux différentes réponses intuitives dont une basée sur les principes logico-mathématiques. Ces réponses possèdent une force équivoque au début - celle qui gagnera plus en force sera donnée comme la réponse initiale. J'ai testé les prédictions dérivées de ce modèle via l’Étude 3. Grâce l’Étude 4, j'ai mis au point le modèle hybride en testant les changements de force des réponses intuitives au cours du temps. Au cours de l’Étude 5, j'ai commencé à tester la possibilité de généraliser ce modèle hybride et j'ai étudié si les patterns de réponse étaient similaires lorsque les participants répondent à des dilemmes moraux. Dans l’Étude 6, j'ai utilisé l'EEG afin de retrouver les corrélats neuronaux du traitement logique précoce au cours du raisonnement<br>Dual-process theories of reasoning have become widely recognized as an explanation for various phenomena, such as thinking biases, moral or cooperative reasoning. Dual-process theory conceives human thinking as the interaction of a fast, more automatic, intuitive system (System 1) and a slower, controlled, more deliberative one (System 2). Arguably, the most dominant view on dual processes is the default-interventionist model. This posits a serial interaction between the two systems. When someone is faced with a reasoning problem, initially a System 1 intuitive response is formed. Then, afterwards, System 2 might get engaged in the process. Prominent dual-process theorists argue that reasoning bias occurs as a result of erroneous System 1 intuition. System 1 is thought to be able to generate responses based on "heuristic" cues, such as stereotypes - and cannot account for logico-mathematical principles. Despite its huge recognition, this theory comes with an untested assumption: the corrective (time-course) assumption. This posits that in cases when heuristic cues are in conflict with logico-mathematical principles, System 2 needs to engage in order to correct initially formed System 1 intuitions, and form a judgement based on logical principles. Testing this assumption is inevitably important and the central question of this thesis. In Study 1, I used four modified versions of the two-response paradigm to test the corrective assumption with two different classical reasoning problems (base rate problems, syllogistic reasoning). In this paradigm, people are presented with the same problem twice. First, they are asked to give an initial, very quick response. After, they are presented with the same problem again and asked to give a final response without any constraints. To make sure that the initial response is really intuitive, we applied four different procedures: instructions, concurrent load, response deadline and load plus deadline. Dual process theory predicts that logically correct responses appear only at the final response stage. Surprisingly, I found that the majority of people who gave the logically correct response in the final response stage already gave it form the beginning. This effect was found to be consistent among all experimental procedures and both reasoning problems. In Study 2, I tried to test the same assumption, with a different -harder- reasoning problem, the bat-and-ball problem. Interestingly, I ran 7 experiments with the two-response paradigm and consistently found that correct reasoners are often able to generate the correct response from the beginning, so-to-say, intuitively. These results forced me to revise the default-interventionist framework and propose the hybrid dual process model. This model now argues that System 1 generates two kinds of intuitive responses one of which is based on mathematico-logical principles. These responses are generated with unequal strength - the one which gains the more strength will be given as the initial response. In Study 3, I directly tested predictions derived from this model. In Study 4, I further developed the hybrid model by testing the changes in the strength of intuitive responses over time. In Study 5, I started to test the hybrid model's domain generality, and test if I find similar patterns of responses when people are faced with moral dilemmas. In Study 6, I used EEG to search for the neural correlates of early logical processing in reasoning. Overall, this thesis found evidence that forces us to revise the traditional dual process view on human reasoning

Dans les Règles pour la direction de l’esprit, Descartes fonde sa première théorie de la science sur deux « actes de l’intellect » : intuitus et deductio. Au moment de définir le concept d’intuition, Descartes précise qu’il en fait un « usage nouveau », qui ne doit pas être confonduavec la signification courante qu’on lui a donnée dans les Écoles. L’exposition de ses premières découvertes scientifiques impliquerait donc une noétique différente de celle que lui ont enseignée ses maîtres jésuites. Reprenant un mot ancien, Descartes lui donne une signification neuve et un rôle inédit dans l’édifice de la connaissance humaine. Mais on n’a pas toujours compris le sens historique et philosophique de cette démarcation : de qui et de quoi Descartes entend-il se démarquer ? Et qu’y avait-il au juste de nouveau dans l’usage qu’il proposait ? Notre enquête propose de retracer l’histoire de cette idée d’intuition intellectuelle au cours de l’âge classique, chez les premiers lecteurs des Regulae, Malebranche, Locke, dans les entrées des dictionnaires et des encyclopédies du XVIIIe siècle,dans les nouveaux manuels de logique inspirés de Locke. Nous retraçons cette histoire jusqu’à ce que Kant, en 1770, semble y mettre le point final, en affirmant qu’il n’y a pas en l’homme de connaissance intuitive intellectuelle. Pourtant, et c’est tout le paradoxe, lorsque Kant formule ce constat d’échec, le mot même d’intuition s’est enfin, et pour la première fois,imposé dans le vocabulaire philosophique européen<br>In the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Descartes grounds his first theory of knowledge upon two "acts of the understanding" : intuitus and deductio. When he explains what he means by intuition, he warns the reader that he intends to make a "new use" of this word, which shall not be confused with the way the "schoolmen" understood it in the past. Descartes' first scientific discoveries seem to imply a new noetic, different from the one his Jesuit masters taught him while he was a student at La Fleche. But what, exactly, was new about the way Descartes used this ancient word ? The present inquiry is an attempt to give this question an answer, and also to trace this concept of intuition through the whole early modern period; in the works of the first readers of the Regulae (Baillet, Port-Royal, Malebranche), in the theory of knowledge of John Locke, in the dictionaries, lexicons and encyclopedias of the 18th century, in the new textbooks of Logic, inspired by Locken in some theological discussions over the nature of beatific vision.Our inquiry ends in 1770 when Kant declares that there's no such thing as "intellectual intuition" in man's mind, and that the only kind of intuition man's capable of is a sensitive one. Kant seems to put an endpoint to this chapter of European philosophy. But, on the other hand, when Kant writes this sentence, the word" intuition" has fully entered the European philosophical vocabulary, for the first time with its new meaning

Cette thèse cherche d’abord à confronter les prétentions respectives des méthodes phénoménologique et analytico-linguistique classiques à fournir chacune une explication de la connaissance a priori des nécessités d’essence qui soit aussi dépourvue que possible de présupposés et de pétitions de principe. Le problème précis autour duquel se noue cette confrontation est celui de la possibilité des vérités a priori matérielles. Dans un premier temps, nous proposons une lecture et une résolution méréologiques de ce problème en termes husserliens de touts composés des parties dépendantes, qui permet mieux de rendre compte des tels ensembles que la méréologie atomiste qui caractérise la plupart des ontologies formelles « analytiques » ; et nous proposons ce faisant une compréhension de la méthode d’intuition eidétique comme analyse méréologique. Dans un second temps, nous appliquons cette analyse à la méthode phénoménologique elle-même, comprenant la réduction transcendantale comme une variation méréologique sur l’a priori matériel de la corrélation qui caractérise la structure même de la relation entre l’ego et le monde, ce qui nous oblige de voir cette structure à son tour comme un tout concret intuitionnable dont les parties subjective et objective ne sont que des moments absolument dépendants, sans aucun privilège accordé au pôle sujet de cette structure. Ainsi, ce n’est qu’à la stricte condition que la phénoménologie se « désubjectivise » qu’elle puisse à la fois réfuter un certain nombre de dogmes analytiques et empiristes et fonder sa propre méthode dans une absence comparative de présupposés<br>This dissertation takes as its point of departure a polemical comparison of the respective claims of the phenomenological and classical analytic-linguistic methods to provide an account of a priori knowledge of essential or necessary truth that is as free as possible of presuppositions and circular reasoning. The precise problem around which this confrontation crystalizes is the one concerning the possibility of material a priori truths. First, we propose a mereological interpretation of and solution to this problem in the Husserlian terms of wholes composed of dependent parts, which allows for a better account of such wholes than does the atomistic mereology that characterizes most “analytic” formal ontologies, and we propose an understanding of the method of eidetic intuition as mereological analysis. Secondly, we apply this analysis to the phenomenological method itself, understanding the transcendental reduction as a mereological variation on the material a priori of correlation that characterizes the very structure of the relation between the ego and the world; this obliges us to see this structure in turn as an intuitable concrete whole whose subjective and objective parts are merely absolutely dependent moments, without privileging the subject-pole of this structure. In this way, it is only on the strict condition that phenomenology “desubjectivize” itself that it might at once refute a certain number of analytic and empiricist dogmas and ground its own method without recourse to unnecessary and untenable presuppositions

Ce travail avait pour objectif d’étudier les déterminants psychologiques potentiels du surpoids et de l’obésité et de contribuer à l’évaluation d’une prise en charge triaxiale de cette maladie chronique, complexe et socialement handicapante. La revue de littérature nous a permis d’appréhender les hypothèses étiologiques de l’obésité et ses conséquences médicales, sociales et psychologiques, ainsi que les différents modèles psychologiques proposés. Notre travail s’est ensuite dirigé vers trois études qui avaient toutes pour objectif d’évaluer l’effet de la prise en charge du Groupe de Réflexion de l’Obésité et du surpoids (GROS) sur le poids, l’alimentation intuitive, l’alimentation émotionnelle, la restriction cognitive et la satisfaction corporelle. Les recherches n’ont pas permis de mettre en évidence l’efficacité de la prise en charge du GROS, comparativement à une autre prise en charge. Néanmoins, et avec toutes les limites énoncées, elle aurait un effet positif sur le poids et sur l’alimentation intuitive. Enfin, notre travail s’est conclu avec l’étude MOS dont le but était de repérer les déterminants psychologiques potentiels du surpoids et de l’obésité en comparant les sujets normo-pondéraux et les sujets en surpoids ou obèses sur plusieurs variables : l’activité physique hebdomadaire, le stress perçu, la restriction cognitive, les stratégies de gestion émotionnelle, la personnalité et la présence d’évènements de vie stressants ou traumatiques. Toutes les analyses ont mis en évidence que la restriction cognitive était un prédicteur de l’IMC de même que l’âge et le stress perçu. En revanche, le fait que la symptomatologie traumatique prédise de façon négative l’IMC nous a fortement surpris. D’autres recherches sont nécessaires pour confirmer ces résultats aux perspectives thérapeutiques et préventives<br>The purpose of this work was to study the potential psychological determinants of overweight and obesity and to contribute to the evaluation of triaxial management of this chronic, complex and socially disabling disease. The literature review allowed us to understand the etiological hypotheses of obesity and its medical, social and psychological consequences, as well as the various psychological models proposed. Then, our work focused on three studies that were aimed to evaluate the effect of the management of the Groupe de Réflexion sur l’Obésité et le Surpoids (GROS), the Frenchy think tank on obesity and overweight, on weight, intuitive diet, weight loss and weight loss. emotional eating, cognitive restriction and body satisfaction. The research did not highlight the effectiveness of the management of the GROS, compared to another treatment. Nevertheless, and with all the limitations, it would have a positive effect on weight and intuitive eating. Finally, our work was concluded with the MOS study, the purpose of which was to identify the potential psychological determinants of overweight and obesity by comparing normo-weight subjects and overweight or obese subjects on several variables: weekly physical activity, perceived stress, cognitive restraint, emotional management strategies, personality and the presence of stressful or traumatic life events. All analyzes showed that cognitive restraint was a predictor of BMI as well as age and perceived stress. On the other hand, the fact that traumatic symptomatology predicts BMI negatively surprised us. Further research is needed to confirm these results with therapeutic and preventive perspectives

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:26:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marco Aurelio de Mello Castrianni.pdf: 25069561 bytes, checksum: daef5acc3dc2c452c84bee0877334ac4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-11-08<br>Logic is a Philosophy instrument, as well as for the other sciences. Among its methods are deduction and induction, which are discursive, and the intuition. By deduction, we reason from the general to the particular. By induction, we start from the particular to reach the general. Intuition is the direct way to acquire knowledge. The logic methods have their basis in Rationalism and Empiricism. For the former, the knowledge stems from exclusively in the reason; its method is deductive. For the latter, the knowledge is acquired by experience, either external or internal; its method is inductive. Intuition is the no discursive method. Using it, we can reach the values, the object of Axiology. The values implicate the genesis of the rules and juridical principles. The phenomenon of the values happens in the society and interact with the culture. The human being is the source value, and the Justice is the fundamental value. Equity is a kind of Justice, which surpasses in a certain way. The Juridical Logic is the application of the Logic as Law instrument. The operator uses either deduction or induction, i.e., are methods used for interpretation and application. The intuition is also applied by the Law operators, although its study has not been so developed. It can be seen by the analyses, as juridical, the principles and the rules, the doctrine and other works, the sentences, the jurisprudence, the habits, the analogy and criminal investigation. None of the methods is used in an isolated way, for interpretation and Law application, because they are not enough, although the three ones, objects of this study, are adequate. The methods which are most studied are deductive and inductive, but the intuition has also an important role in the interpretation and application of the Law, although the operator does not realize how often he makes use of it in his everyday work. The methods are, therefore, complementary and interdependent<br>A Lógica é instrumento da Filosofia e de todas as ciências. Entre seus métodos estão a dedução e a indução, que são discursivos, e a intuição. Pela dedução, raciocina-se do geral para o particular. Pela indução, parte-se do particular para se chegar ao geral. A intuição é forma direta de aquisição de conhecimento. Os métodos lógicos têm seu fundamento no Racionalismo e no Empirismo. Para o primeiro, o conhecimento se origina exclusivamente na razão; seu método é o dedutivo. Para o segundo, o conhecimento se adquire pela experiência, seja externa ou interna; seu método é o indutivo. A intuição se trata de método não discursivo. Por ela, se chega aos valores, objeto da Axiologia. Os valores implicam a gênese de normas e princípios jurídicos. O fenômeno dos valores se dá na sociedade e se interrelaciona com a cultura. O ser humano é o valor fonte, e a Justiça, o valor fundamental. A Eqüidade é uma espécie de Justiça e, de certa forma, a supera. A Lógica Jurídica é a aplicação da Lógica como instrumento do Direito. O seu operador utiliza tanto a dedução como a indução, ou seja, são métodos utilizados para sua interpretação e aplicação. A intuição também é aplicada pelos operadores do Direito, embora seu estudo ainda não esteja tão desenvolvido. Isso se constata pela análise, no âmbito jurídico, dos princípios, das normas, da doutrina e outros trabalhos, das sentenças, da jurisprudência, do costume, da analogia e da investigação criminal. Nenhum dos métodos é utilizado de forma isolada, para interpretação e aplicação do Direito, pois, por si só, não é suficiente, embora sejam todos os três, objeto deste estudo, adequados. Todos podem e devem ser utilizados. Os métodos mais estudados são o dedutivo e o indutivo, mas a intuição também tem um importante papel na interpretação e na aplicação do Direito, embora o operador possa até não se dar conta de quanto a utiliza em seu trabalho cotidiano. Os métodos são, pois, complementares e interdependentes