Academic literature on the topic 'Iran – Foreign relations'
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Journal articles on the topic "Iran – Foreign relations"
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Bardan, Falah Mubarak. "The Iranian Impact on Iraqi-Jordanian Relations after 2003." Dirasat: Human and Social Sciences 50, no. 6 (December 30, 2023): 276–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.35516/hum.v50i6.7082.
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Objectives: The study aims to examine the possibilities and challenges associated with repairing ties between Jordan and Iraq. Additionally, it explores how Iraq's foreign policy priorities towards other nations are influenced, in part, by Iran.
Methods: The historical evolution of relations between Iraq and Jordan is tracked using the historical technique described in the first section of the article. The second section employs an analytical and descriptive technique to investigate the impact of the Iranian variable on the Iraq-Jordan relationship.
Results: Iranian influence on Iraqi political decision-making has significantly shaped Iraq's political, economic, and security orientations concerning other Arab nations. Iran assesses Iraq's international relations through the zero-sum game theory, viewing alliances between Iraq and its Arab neighbours or nations close to the United States as detrimental to its interests.
Conclusion: Since 2003, Iran has actively interfered in Iraq, directly impacting its foreign policy. The constraints on Iraqi political decision-makers limit their ability to advance Iraq's national interests. Consequently, the post-2003 relationship between Iraq and Jordan serves as a model illustrating the impact of the Iranian component in Iraq, leading to minimal changes in Iraq's foreign policy concerning the Arab regional environment.
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SOFI, DASKO HASAN, and AZAD OTHMAN SALIH. "The Iranian Foreign Policy towards Kurdistan Region–Iraq 2003-2018." Twejer 3, no. 3 (December 2020): 913–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.31918/twejer.2033.25.
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After the US invasion of Iraq and the fall of Ba’ath-regime in 2003, the Kurdistan Region-Iraq became one of the main issues in Iranian foreign policy in the region. Although there have been several changes in Iranian foreign policy respecting its relationship with the Kurdistan Regional Government at various times, there has been no change in its strategy towards the region regarding its political independence and the right to self-determination of its people. The significant historical, cultural, and neighbourly relations that exist between Iran and the Kurdistan Region could become the basis for relations between the two parties for the sake of common interests and benefits and to establish peace and stability in the region. The main objective of this research is as follows: to clarify Iranian foreign policy towards the Kurdistan Region-Iraq and to explain the future horizon of the relations between the two parties in light of the current reality and based on the vital interests of the two parties in general. Keywords: Iran, Kurdistan Region, Foreign Policy, Ba’ath Regime, Shi’ism.
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Katz, Mark N. "Losing Balance: Russian Foreign Policy toward Iraq and Iran." Current History 102, no. 666 (October 1, 2003): 341–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/curh.2003.102.666.341.
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Moscow's balancing act between Washington and Baghdad [has] failed, and its balancing act between Washington and Tehran is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. … [A] reluctance to establish clear priorities among competing interests threatens to undermine both its relations with the United States and its influence in a region of continuing strategic importance to Russia.
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KELBİZADEH, Elnur. "Pragmatism of the Ideological State: Main Aspects of Armenian Policy of İran [İdeolojik Devletin Pragmatizmi: İran’ın Ermenistan Politikasının Ana Hatları]." Journal of Caucasian Studies 7, no. 13 (May 31, 2022): 45–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.21488/jocas.1087682.
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The South Caucasus region has become one of the important directions of Iran's foreign policy since 1991. Iran is closely interested in the processes taking place in the region. Because Iran is connected with the countries of the region by historical ties, neighborly relations and many common security interests. In the first years after the countries of the region regained their independence, analysts predicted that Iran would be able to establish closer ties with Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus. Such predictions were based on the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a Muslim state and prefers an ideological approach to foreign policy. However, it soon became clear that Iran's foreign policy is undergoing a transformation. There are elements of the transition from idealism to pragmatism in the country's foreign policy. Contrary to expectations, Iran's relations with Christian Armenia began to develop better than Muslim Azerbaijan. The article examines the place of pragmatism in the foreign policy of Iran in the context relations with Armenia. At the same time, an analysis was made of the effectiveness of the idealist approach in the foreign policy of Armenia, as a secular state. The article proposes that, although the conceptual foundations of Iran's foreign policy are defined by the principles of idealism, they are pragmatic in their relations with Armenia.
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Jathol, Iqra, Muhammad Qazafi, and Tahir Husain. "Iran’s Changing Foreign Policy Trends." Asian Social Science 13, no. 6 (May 30, 2017): 95. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ass.v13n6p95.
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The changes in international politics caused change in foreign policies of the states. The governments of many countries began to develop foreign policies to alliances and relations. According to with the "Look to the Iranian government, the East" can serve Iran's national interests and can break dependence on the West and balanced foreign policy problems: political isolation logical isolation. These are caused by Iran's foreign policy; Iran has rejected the prevailing norms of the international system and the regional dynamics. The immediate consequences are: political showdown with the West particularly the U.S. and in the region tensions have increased with the neighbors. At the same time Iran heavily relies on its oil and gas revenue to achieve an economic growth. At this time when Iran is facing increasing international isolation, "Look to the East" policy can serve as fine recipe for its stagnated oil business and the Asian nations. Iranian state is looking proactively towards the Asian Countries especially India. Iran’s foreign policy raises many unanswered questions. The objectives of study to provide an account and assessment of Iran’s relations with the outside world within these new systemic conditions and account of Iran’s relations with the rest of the world will be preceded by a brief historical account of these relations. The study tries to highlight about Iran’s foreign policy? How does Iran define its interests and choose to pursue them? Is this a matter to be explained or to be understood? Is its foreign policy based on words or deeds, behavior or action?
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Kalbizada, Elnur Hashim. "PRAGMATISM IN IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY AND RELATIONS WITH ARMENIA." History, Archeology and Ethnography of the Caucasus 18, no. 3 (October 10, 2022): 679–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.32653/ch183679-693.
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The South Caucasus region has been one of the key directions of Iran’s foreign policy since 1991. Iran is closely interested in the processes that take place in the region, as it has historical ties, neighborly relations and common security interests. In the first years after the countries of the region regained their independence, analysts predicted that Iran would be able to establish closer ties with Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus. Such predictions were based on the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a Muslim state and prefers an ideological approach to foreign policy. However, it soon became clear that Iran’s foreign policy is undergoing a transformation. There are elements of the transition from idealism to pragmatism in the country’s foreign policy. Contrary to expectations, Iran’s relations with Christian Armenia began to develop better than with Muslim Azerbaijan. The article examines the place of pragmatism in the foreign policy of Iran in the context of relations with Armenia. At the same time, it analyzes the effectiveness of the idealist approach in the foreign policy of Armenia, as a secular state. The article suggests that, although the conceptual foundations of Iran’s foreign policy are defined by the principles of idealism, they are pragmatic in their relations with Armenia. If we look at the Iran’s policy on the Caucasus since the 1990s, we can conclude that this policy was largely realistic and pragmatic, rather than ideological. In fact, the years when the Caucasus states, including Armenia, regained their independence coincided with Iran’s withdrawal from an ideological approach to foreign policy. At that time, Iran’s new regional foreign policy was based solely on national interests due to the ongoing geopolitical processes, and the expansion of the revolution was no longer a priority.
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Zavada, Ya, and O. Tsebenko. "IRAN-IRAQ RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF REGIONAL SECURITY." National Technical University of Ukraine Journal. Political science. Sociology. Law, no. 1(53) (July 8, 2022): 60–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.20535/2308-5053.2022.1(53).261111.
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The article analyzes Iran-Iraq relations in the context of regional security. It has been studied that the eight-year Iran-Iraq war became the most bloody and destructive armed conflict of the second half of the XX century. It is worth noting that the beginning of the war caused rivalry: ethnic and religious, political and economic, ideological and personal. Also, the struggle for leadership in the region played a special role. It is established that the USA intervention in Iraq in 2003 changed the geopolitical conditions not only in this country, but in the region as a whole. Although the IRI did not support the USA military operation and condemned it, the invasion of Iraq was in Iran’s interests. After all, the overthrow of Hussein’s regime eliminated one of the main threats to Iran’s national security and, as a result, contributed to the development of bilateral relations. Iran has close relations with the Shiite government in Iraq. Tehran’s foreign policy strategy in the neighboring state is to unite Iraqi Shiite parties to strengthen Shiite rule in Baghdad. It was found that the Iraqi authorities have not formed a unified position on the development of Iran’s nuclear program, because society is divided into supporters of Iran and its opponents. Typically, Shiites who actively support Tehran want to cooperate with it and, accordingly, support the development of Iran’s nuclear program, the signing of the JCPOA, and thus criticize the change in USА policy toward Tehran and the withdrawal from the nuclear deal. At the present stage, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Iraq are actively developing bilateral cooperation and cooperating in many areas, primarily security, economic and political.
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Bibi, Fozia, and Lubna Abid Ali. "Historical, Empirical and Domestic Pieces of evidence of Iran's Foreign Policy." Global Foreign Policies Review V, no. I (March 30, 2022): 57–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gfpr.2022(v-i).06.
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This article discusses the empirical and domestic factors in the formulation of the foreign policy of Iran. It is essential to understand the history, state-craft and power complex of Iran. In Iran, Faqih is the supreme leader and he has full command of the armed forces and general policies of the state. The foreign policy complex of Iran consists of individuals, agencies and different departments that directly influence the foreign policy of Iran. The foreign policy complex and Statecraft of Iran's political system play a significant role and influence the foreign policy behaviour of Iran. Since the Islamic revolution, Iran is facing threats from regional and global powers. Post Saddam, Iran is mainly focusing on Saudi Arabia, Israeli and America to contain their influence. Since last many decades, Iran is facing serious criticism and sanctions because of its nuclear program. Despite USA sanctions, Iran is moving from the regional to the global arena and also improving its relations with Russia, and China.
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Omidi, Ali. "Russian-Iranian Ties: Strategic Alliance, Strategic Coalition, or Strategic Alignment (Partnership)." Russian Politics 7, no. 3 (September 7, 2022): 341–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604023.
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Abstract One of the most critical foreign policy issues of middle – power states is how to mold attitudes towards major powers. Since 1979, Iran has changed the nature of its relations with major powers. Although the Iranian Revolution adopted the ‘Neither East, Nor West’ motto as a macro guide to its foreign policy, since the late 1980s Iran and the Soviet Union – now Russia, have advanced their bilateral relations. Despite Iran and Russia sharing convergent views on many international issues, they have not promoted their ties to a strategic alliance. The present paper addresses the question of what conceptual model represents Iran-Russia relations and what challenges the two countries face in expanding their strategic partnership in the 2020s. This research addresses these problems at three levels: inter-state, regional, and global, and was conducted through a descriptive-analytical method. It is hypothesized that current Iran-Russia relations could be referred to as a ‘strategic alignment’.
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Taufiq, Firmanda, and Ayu Maulida Alkholid. "IRAN-US RELATIONS AFTER THE DEATH OF QASSEM SOLEIMANI." Jurnal CMES 14, no. 2 (December 8, 2021): 117. http://dx.doi.org/10.20961/cmes.14.2.50830.
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<p>Iran-United States relations have up and down. Some sharp diplomatic statements made by the US president, Donald Trump, as well as the president of Iran, Ayatullah Khomeini. In fact, the sanctions that must be accepted by the US against Iran are embargo sanctions. This article aims to analyze how the future relations between Iran and the United States. Cooperation between the two countries has a history that dates back to the Cold War. Relations between these two countries based on a variety of interests, including economic, political, military, ideological, and security considerations . The theory used in this research is balance of power theory. The US has major interest in the Middle East and Iran is a rival of the US in achieving that interest. Nevertheless, many US foreign policies are caused tension between the two countries. Conversely, Iran has considerable economic importance, but the role of the Iran government elite also has a significant influence in the determination of their foreign policy. The findings in this study, despite challenges and complicated processes, the US and Iran are eternal rivals in the fusion of power and political influence in the Middle East, and relations between both will continue to fluctuate . </p>
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Iran – Foreign relations"
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Morsy, Ahmed. "Bandwagon for profit : Egyptian foreign policy toward Iran." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/13077.
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What explains the lack of normalized relations between Egypt and Iran? Despite mutual potential benefits Egypt and Iran could have gained from normalized bilateral relations over the past several decades, a range of factors prevented them from doing so, including personality politics, domestic political and economic considerations, as well as regional and external alliances and competing visions of regional order. Accordingly, the trajectory of modern Egyptian policy toward Iran has been non-linear. Realist and constructivist schools of International Relations theory, on their own, cannot adequately explain how Egypt's foreign policy toward Iran varied from times of hostility, friendship, stagnation, and openness under Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, and Muhammad Morsi. As such, neoclassical realism - with its emphasis on the interaction between geopolitical structural conditions and the roles of leadership and domestic politics in shaping a state's foreign policy - offers the best framework for analyzing Egypt's foreign policy behavior toward Iran.
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Blumel, Christina M. "A comparative analysis of U.S. foreign policy in Iran and the Philippines." PDXScholar, 1991. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds/4295.
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This paper is a comparative analysis of U.S. foreign policy towards Iran and the Philippines. The question which prompted this research topic was simple: why was the outcome for the United States so different in terms of subsequent relations with each state after the downfall of the Shah and Ferdinand Marcos? Both leaders were important U.S. allies in strategic states that had benefited from foreign aid. Opposition groups in each state resented this support of their repressive leaders. Unlike Iran, good relations with the Philippines continued during the Aquino presidency, without the resentment and mistrust which prevented good relations after the Shah's departure.
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Gibson, Bryan. "Covert relationship: American foreign policy, intelligence, and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980--1988." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/27848.
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Following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iraq invaded Iran resulting in a costly war from 1980 to 1988, which threatened American interests in the Persian Gulf. From the outset, the stated official American policy was strict neutrality, but this was not the case. The war had provided the United States with an opportunity to improve relations with Iraq, particularly alter Iran reversed the Iraqi invasion in the summer of 1982. Because the Reagan administration could not let Iraq collapse, the United States tilted heavily towards Iraq in defiance of its stated policy. Interestingly, the tilt towards Iraq did not stop the Reagan administration from secretly dealing with Iran in 1985. Consequently, the disclosure of these dealings resulted in the buildup of American naval forces in the region to protect the shipment of oil, and eventually the use of force to end the conflict in 1988.
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Austin, J. William B. "Imperialism, postimperialism and Iran." Thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/50073.
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The usual explanations of the events leading to the Iranian Revolution have been either an analysis of Iranian culture or an analysis of the exploitation of Iran by imperialist powers. This thesis seeks to expand on imperialist theory by using post-imperialist theory to explore the reciprocal affects of transnational class formation which came about with the growth of transnational corporations. This approach is well suited to the Iranian case because of the strong ties that Iran under the Shah had with the international community.Master of Arts
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Pagé, Charles 1978. "Involvement based on identitive affinities : the case of Iran." Thesis, McGill University, 2001. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=33918.
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Since the end of the Cold War, considerable attention has been paid to "ethnic" or "identitive" conflicts. Some scholars argue that these conflicts tend to draw in 'kin' states who support the belligerent(s) with whom they share identitive affinities. This thesis examines such involvement, based on identitive affinities, in ethnopolitical conflicts. In particular, it analyses the pattern of involvement of one country: Iran. Specifically, it looks at Iran's policy towards five conflicts: Afghanistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Iraq, South Lebanon and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.This thesis argues that kinship is only a permissive cause of involvement while the presence and scope of involvement are determined by other factors, in the following order: security threats, non-security interests (influence, economic interests), and ideology. Proximity is of great importance as security threats usually emanate from neighbours and not from far-away enemies.
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Ross, Christopher Nicholas. "Lord Curzon, the 'Persian question', and geopolitics, 1888-1921." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.609030.
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Khatib-Shahidi, Rashid Armin. "German foreign policy towards Iran : the case of the National Bank of Persia." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1999. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:55dd46e5-2eef-46f6-be8b-ca7bb177a518.
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The objective of this thesis is to show that after World War I, the National Bank of Persia emerged as an ideal accessory to Germany's desire to establish a foothold in Iran. It argues that the main motive behind Germany's involvement in the National Bank was to utilise the bank as a vehicle for extending German national interest into Iran. However, although Germany's main interest was to thereby gain economic influence in Iran, the National Bank provided Germany with a tool that furthered its desire for political participation and the establishing of authority within the spheres of interest of Britain and Russia. The objective of this thesis is not to establish a comprehensive and complete overview of German foreign policy toward Iran and its interactions with the National Bank of Persia. It aims rather at highlighting a number of events that are significant for an examination of Germany's policy toward Iran and its evolution up until the outset of World War II. In pursuit of this task, emphasis is given to the opinion expressed at the time, as reflected in German sources, rather than the historical reality behind those sources. German foreign policy towards Iran in the first half of the twentieth century can be divided into three distinct phases. The first phase, which was initiated before Word War I, collapsed as a consequence of the war and the Versailles Treaty, achieving little success. The second, more significant, phase began around 1924, and was marked by the creation of the National Bank of Persia in 1927, the appointment of the German national Lindenblatt as its director, the appointment of his compatriot Schniewind as financial advisor to the Persian government, the contracts granted to German companies and consortiums for the construction of the Trans Iranian Railway, the reestablishment of trade relations between Germany and Iran, and the wide-ranging flight concessions granted by the Iranian government to the German company Junkers. The third phase of Germany's involvement with Iran came about with the achievements that resulted from the trade agreements of 1935. From a German perspective after 1933 diplomacy started to replace the role of the National Bank, as the prime agent of Germany's relations with Iran. This phase lasted until the British-Russian invasion of Iran in 1941, and saw Germany lose almost its entire influence over the National Bank, while its influence over trade with Iran had progressively increased. Germany's foreign political success during the inter-war period resulted in an expansion of its commercial relations, which elevated Germany from a country with almost no trade relations with Iran to its largest trading partner.
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Tisdale, Tyron Earl Jr. "The United States and Iran, 1951-1953: The Cold War interaction of national security policy, alliance politics and popular nationalism." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/184685.
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The years 1951 to 1953 are among the most important and controversial in Iranian history. The period is significant not only for the domestic dynamics of popular nationalism under Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, but also for the role that United States policy played in an interaction with the conflict between a lingering British economic presence and the Iranian move to nationalize its oil industry. An examination of United States national security policy of that time reveals that policy toward Iran was consistent with the overall post-war policy of the United States, dominated as it was by the central theme of preventing the spread of communism. The task for the men who were charged with the application of U.S. policy in Iran during those years was to accommodate two factors which complicated the search for an order which would ensure post-war national security for the United States: Iranian nationalism as epitomized by Mossadegh; and the economic and diplomatic interests of Great Britain. The United States sought to resolve the conflict so that instability in Iran would not invite communist influence or takeover. United States policymakers were influenced by several factors which combined to eventually decide the outcome. The centrality of the perceived world communist expansion threat, McCarthyism in the United States, the role of several key figures with experience in U.S.-Soviet diplomacy, and the change from a Democratic to a Republican administration at the time Mossadegh was experiencing a deterioration of his own domestic political situation; all worked toward the still-controversial outcome of U.S. policy: the overthrow of Mossadegh. The primacy of containment of communism in United States policy did not preclude variations in its application, nor did this emphasis ignore the forces of Iranian nationalism and self-determination. Nonetheless, given the men involved in the policy decisions, the information available to them and the context of the post-World War II international order, the outcome was predictable and entirely consistent at the time with creating an international order conducive to the national security interests of the United States.
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Rees, Samuel Huw. "The collapsing pillar : Jimmy Carter and US foreign policy towards Iran, 1977-1981." Thesis, Swansea University, 2013. https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa43014.
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The continuing diplomatic impasse between the United States and Iran dates back to the turbulent events of the late 1970s. Blame for the 'loss' of Iran, which had been one of the 'twin pillars' of US strategy in the Persian Gulf, has inevitably fallen on the White House incumbent at the time, President Jimmy Carter. This thesis offers a reassessment of Carter's decision making and his responses to the fall of the Shah, the Islamic Revolution and the US embassy hostage taking. It demonstrates that the breakdown of US-Iranian relations was not simply a one-president phenomenon and, more significantly, Carter's handling of Iran was not as dire as it is often portrayed. The research is based on a thorough examination of the available archive material, including newly released documents, as well as recent interviews with the major protagonists. When Carter took office in 1977 he inherited a badly creaking Iranian pillar that was soon to collapse altogether. The flawed policies of his predecessors placed strict limitations on his administration and unwittingly created a ticking time bomb in the form of the Shah. Despite these restrictions, Carter battled to reconcile the strategic necessities of Cold War containment with his moral principles in areas such as human rights and arms sales. In an administration seemingly dominated by the disagreements amongst his top two advisors, Carter remained the key decision maker at all times. He recognised the practical limits of American power and assumed sensible positions in response to an ever changing and uncontrollable crisis. Aside from its contemporary significance, Iran is therefore critical to Carter's disputed legacy and how he rates as a foreign policy president.
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Paules, Marian Helen Boroujerdi Mehrzad. "United States relations with Iran: American identity, foreign policy, and the politics of representation." Related Electronic Resource: Current Research at SU : database of SU dissertations, recent titles available full text, 2003. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/syr/main.
Full textBooks on the topic "Iran – Foreign relations"
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Phillips, Jarett M. Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. Hauppauge, N.Y: Nova Science Publishers, 2010.
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Hussain, Ashraf. Iran-GCC relations. Aligarh: Centre of West Asian Studies, Aligarh Muslim University, 1997.
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Council, American-Iranian, ed. Revisiting US-Iran relations. Princeton: American-Iranian Council, 1999.
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Nasri, Farzeen. Stopping the war between Iran and Iraq. Santa Barbara, CA: Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 1985.
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Ali, Lubna Abid. Post-revoluntionary Iran: Foreign policy. Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 2008.
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Ali, Mohammadi, and Ehteshami Anoushiravan, eds. Iran and Eurasia. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2000.
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Mousavian, Seyyed Hossein. Iran-Europe relations: Challenges and opportunities. London: Routledge, 2008.
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Silverstein, Ben. Iran-United States foreign relations: A bibliography. Monticello, Ill., USA: Vance Bibliographies, 1988.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Iran – Foreign relations"
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Clawson, Patrick, and Michael Rubin. "Foreign Relations Under Khatami." In Eternal Iran, 139–58. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781403977106_9.
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Abbas, Khurram. "Conservative Administration in Iran and Future of Pakistan–Iran Relations." In Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 142–58. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003250920-11.
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Surkov, Nikolay. "Russian Foreign Policy in the Gulf: A Quest for Regional Partnerships and Opportunities." In Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran, 79–108. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4_4.
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Malik, Hafeez. "Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan and its Impact on Pakistan’s Foreign Policy." In Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, 127–62. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08553-8_7.
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Khan, Amina, and Mohammad Waqas Sajjad. "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, Saudi Arabia, and Iran." In Contributions to International Relations, 293–306. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32432-1_18.
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Ahmadian, Hassan, and Payam Mohseni. "Iran’s Syria Strategy: The Evolution of Deterrence." In NL ARMS, 231–60. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_13.
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AbstractIran has been a critical player in the Syrian war since 2011, crafting a complex foreign policy and military strategy to preserve its Syrian ally. What have been the drivers of Iranian decision-making in this conflict? And how has Iranian strategy evolved over the course of the war? This chapter argues that the logic of deterrence has been fundamental not just for shaping the contours of Iran–Syria relations since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, but also for determining the overall trajectory of Iranian strategy in the Syrian war. The authors outline Iran’s decision-making calculus and divide the country’s strategy on Syria after the Arab Spring into four primary phases: (1) a ‘Basij’ strategy to establish local militias in Syria; (2) a regionalization strategy to incorporate transnational fighters and militias in the war effort; (3) an internationalization strategy to incorporate Russia and balance the United States; and (4) a post-ISIS deterrence strategy to balance against the United States, Turkey and Israel. Iran’s Syria strategy progressively escalated in response to the possible defeat of its ally and the deterioration of its forward deterrence capacities against the United States and Israel. Today, the potential for direct inter-state conflict is rising as proxy warfare declines and Iran attempts to maintain the credibility of its forward deterrence.
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Lambert, Laurent A., and Moosa Elayah. "Conclusions." In The Post-American Middle East, 247–66. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29912-4_10.
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AbstractDuring the two decades of the US War on Terror, the indicators of peace, stability, and security have markedly deteriorated in nearly two-thirds of the countries of the broad Middle East region, wherein American foreign policy has become particularly resented, as expressed in various survey polls. The United States had never fought for so long a war (and legally, the War on Terror is still continuing), and the political structures of the Middle East never had been so fundamentally challenged—and in a few countries, destroyed—since World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire a century ago. The War on Terror, as such or under different names, has been characterized by grand policy claims, the actual destabilization of dozens of countries, the widespread use of torture, the endemic corruption of tribal and government elites, the polarization of inter-state relations across the Middle East, counter-productive policies of drone bombings with frequent collateral civilian victims, and large-scale migrations across and from a region that will need decades to reconstruct itself and heal from the trauma. Building upon the previous nine chapters, this final section presents our conclusions as to why the WoT failed so badly in the region and why the role of the United States has sharply declined in importance there, having identified four main reasons. Finally, we explain that the long-announced regional withdrawal of the United States has disappointed traditional partners. Tellingly, Egypt, Israel, and the Gulf monarchies have decided in 2022 to not abide by the US sanctions against Russia in order not to antagonize an international power that has become particularly influential in Syria, Iran, and the broad region, at a time when Washington seems to be losing always more ground to what it has officially called in its strategic doctrine “near-peer competitors”, i.e., Russia and China.
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Anderson, Liam, and Dirwar Zawity. "The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) as Foreign Policy (Non-state) Actor in Iraq." In Non-State Actors in International Relations, 101–26. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51885-0_6.
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Işıksal, Hüseyin. "Political Chaos in Iraq, ISIS, and Turkish Foreign Policy: The High Cost of the Westphalian Delusion." In Turkey’s Relations with the Middle East, 83–103. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59897-0_6.
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"FOREIGN RELATIONS." In Modern Iran (RLE Iran A), 173–92. Routledge, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203833209-14.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Iran – Foreign relations"
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Dančo, Ján. "Iran's Position As an Oil Power." In EDAMBA 2021 : 24th International Scientific Conference for Doctoral Students and Post-Doctoral Scholars. University of Economics in Bratislava, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.53465/edamba.2021.9788022549301.73-81.
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Oil extraction and export is the most crucial sector of the Islamic Republic of Iran's economy. Iran is one of the countries with the largest oil reserves, and revenues from its sale are the most important source of funding. However, this sector is sensitive to external factors and reacts sharply to developments in foreign markets. The change in the value orientation of Iran's foreign policy after the evolution in 1979 has resulted in a period of instability that has had a significant impact on Iran's oil industry. In this paper, we will try to describe the most significant factors that affect the oil industry in Iran. This paper considers mainly external determinants such as sanctions and its effectiveness, oil price volatility and political and economic relations between Iran and international community. At the end of this paper author examines the perspectives in the Iranian economy in the following decades. The work also deals with the main economic issues that the administration of the newly elected president Ebrahim Raisi will face.
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Toprak, Nuri Gökhan. "From Embargo to Blockade: An Evaluation of the United States Sanctions against Iran in the Context of the Use of Economic Impact Tools in Foreign Poli." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c11.02219.
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The concept of influence can be defined as a tool of international actors, a form of power, the ability to overcome obstacles in order to achieve different purposes or the desired result in the process of power relations established between actors in international politics. According to the approach that aims to reach the concept of influence as the desired result, in the process of setting up influence states try to influence each other through different methods and tools in which can be used through states’ own capacities. In addition to political and military tools, economic impact tools related to the field of foreign trade and finance are frequently used today. Economic impact tools, such as external aid, which may be positive or rewarding, may also be negative or punitive in a range from the boycott to the blockade. The study aims to provide a qualitative assessment of the United States' (US) economic sanctions against Iran in the context of the use of economic impact tools in international politics. In order to achieve this aim, 12 executive orders issued by the US on the grounds that Iran poses a threat to its national security, foreign policy and economy will be examined. In the conclusion of the study, the assumption that the US sanctions against Iran almost for 40 years has become a multilateral structure such as commercial and financial blockade from a structure related to bilateral relations such as boycott and embargo will be tested.
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Riyazi, İlgar, Dilek Özdemir, Aslı Cansın Doker, and Ömer Selçuk Emsen. "Dutch Disease and Iranian Economy: Has Orientation to Compulsory Autarky Suppressed the Disease?" In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c08.01848.
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The discovery of natural resources and its impact on the increase in export revenues is highly likely to affect production, consumption and foreign trade relations of non-natural resources sectors. The inertia condition created by the resource exploration is defined as the curse of natural resources. Additionally, the curse of the resources reveals negative repercussions such as the Dutch Disease, rent-seeking, overconfidence and neglect education. Within this aspect, the Dutch disease can be defined as a mechanism emerging through the discovery of natural resources and its exports, which causes negativity in other export products. As the disease will be expected to come out, war and embargo practices can also be considered to be self-sufficiency in diversity in the local/national economy. In this framework, it is discussed in this study, whether Iran falls to the Dutch Disability, or it is organized by external forces the period between 1980 and 2014. According to findings obtained from the time series analyzes, the natural resource richness was determined in Iran if the presence of the Dutch disease is not strong. In recent years, however, it can be said that the weakness of the disease has led to the war and embargo that Iran experienced especially in self-sufficiency.
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Sune, Engin. "Greater Eurasia and New Trajectories in Türkiye's Globalization." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c15.02750.
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In recent years, Türkiye’s relationship with its Western allies has crumbled, which was well-reflected in their antagonistic policies towards Syria, Iraq, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the expansion of NATO. On the Western side, this is associated with the domestic political and ideological transformation in Türkiye, such as the Presidential system, neo-Ottoman ideologies, or the political atmosphere following the failed coup attempt of 2016. The rapprochement of the country with Russia, especially the collaboration in the security matters such as the Syrian war and the purchase of the S-400 missile defense system, are contextualized within this discourse. This study elaborates on the shift in Türkiye’s foreign policy by revealing the current globalization process occurring in Greater Eurasia, which drags countries of the region into its orbit through the capacity of energy resources, expansion of economic relations, and provision of an immature security framework. Via the capacity of Russian energy resources and security policies, and China’s expanding capital under the scope of the One Belt and One Road strategy, a variegated form of globalization is taking place in Eurasia. This study contextualizes the recent shift in the political economy of Türkiye within the scope of an ever-expanding Eurasia. It targets to reveal the main characteristics of the globalization in Greater Eurasia. Lastly, it situates the shift in Türkiye within the larger context of this variegated form of globalization.
Reports on the topic "Iran – Foreign relations"
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Barton, Frederick D. Testimony: Statement of Frederick D. Barton, Senior Fellow and Director, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate on Accelerating Economic Progress in Iraq"". Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, July 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada438876.
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Lewis, Dustin, ed. Database of States’ Statements (August 2011–October 2016) concerning Use of Force in relation to Syria. Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict, May 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.54813/ekmb4241.
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Many see armed conflict in Syria as a flashpoint for international law. The situation raises numerous unsettling questions, not least concerning normative foundations of the contemporary collective-security and human-security systems, including the following: Amid recurring reports of attacks directed against civilian populations and hospitals with seeming impunity, what loss of legitimacy might law suffer? May—and should—states forcibly intervene to prevent (more) chemical-weapons attacks? If the government of Syria is considered unwilling or unable to obviate terrorist threats from spilling over its borders into other countries, may another state forcibly intervene to protect itself (and others), even without Syria’s consent and without an express authorization of the U.N. Security Council? What began in Daraa in 2011 as protests escalated into armed conflict. Today, armed conflict in Syria implicates a multitude of people, organizations, states, and entities. Some are obvious, such as the civilian population, the government, and organized armed groups (including designated terrorist organizations, for example the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS). Other implicated actors might be less obvious. They include dozens of third states that have intervened or otherwise acted in relation to armed conflict in Syria; numerous intergovernmental bodies; diverse domestic, foreign, and international courts; and seemingly innumerable NGOs. Over time, different states have adopted wide-ranging and diverse approaches to undertaking measures (or not) concerning armed conflict in Syria, whether in relation to the government, one or more armed opposition groups, or the civilian population. Especially since mid-2014, a growing number of states have undertaken military operations directed against ISIS in Syria. For at least a year-and-a-half, Russia has bolstered military strategies of the Syrian government. At least one state (the United States) has directed an operation against a Syrian military base. And, more broadly, many states provide (other) forms of support or assistance to the government of Syria, to armed opposition groups, or to the civilian population. Against that backdrop, the Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict (HLS PILAC) set out to collect states’ statements made from August 2011 through November 2016 concerning use of force in relation to Syria. A primary aim of the database is to provide a comparatively broad set of reliable resources regarding states’ perspectives, with a focus on legal parameters. A premise underlying the database is that through careful documentation of diverse approaches, we can better understand those perspectives. The intended audience of the database is legal practitioners. The database is composed of statements made on behalf of states and/or by state officials. For the most part, the database focuses on statements regarding legal parameters concerning use of force in relation to Syria. HLS PILAC does not pass judgment on whether each statement is necessarily legally salient for purposes of international law. Nor does HLS PILAC seek to determine whether a particular statement may be understood as an expression of opinio juris or an act of state practice (though it might be).
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Yatsymirska, Mariya. Мова війни і «контрнаступальна» лексика у стислих медійних текстах. Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, March 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.30970/vjo.2023.52-53.11742.
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The article examines the language of the russian-ukrainian war of the 21st century based on the materials of compressed media texts; the role of political narratives and psychological-emotional markers in the creation of new lexemes is clarified; the verbal expression of forecasts of ukrainian and foreign analysts regarding the course of hostilities on the territory of Ukraine is shown. Compressed media texts reflect the main meanings of the language of the russian-ukrainian war in relation to the surrounding world. First of all, the media vocabulary was supplemented with neologisms – aggressive and sad: “rashism”, “denazification”, “katsapstan”, “orks”, “rusnia”, “kremlins”, “parebrik”, “in the swamps”, “nuclear dictator”, “putinism”, “two hundred” and others. Numerals acquired new expressive and evaluative meanings: “200s” (dead), “300s” (wounded), “400s” (russian military personnel who filed reports for termination of the contract), “500s” (hopelessly drunk russian soldiers, alcoholics who are unable to perform combat tasks). The language of war intensified the slogans of the struggle for state independence and people’s freedom. The scope of the greeting “Glory to Ukraine! – Glory to Heroes!”. New official holidays have appeared in the history of Ukraine since 2014: “Heroes of the Heavenly Hundred” Day (February 20), “Ukrainian Volunteer Day” (March 14), “Defenders and Defenders of Ukraine Day” (October 14), “Volunteer Day” (5 December). As you know, the professional holiday of the military is the Day of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” (December 6). A special style is characteristic of media texts on military topics: “Iron Force of Ukraine” (Iron Force of Ukraine), “digitize the Army” (for effective simulation of military operations); “grain corridor” (export of Ukrainian grain to African and European countries); “don’t let Ukraine lose” (the position of the Allies at the first stage of the war), “Ukraine must win!” (the position of the Allies in the second stage of the war); “in the Russian-Ukrainian war, the thinking of the 19th century collided with the thinking of the 21st century”, “a politician is a person who understands time” (Grigori Yavlinskyy, Russian oppositionist); “aggressive neutrality” (about Turkey’s position); “in Russia”, “there, in the swamps” (in Russia), “weak, inadequate evil” (about Russia), “behind the fence”; “a great reset of the world order”; “technology of military creativity”; “they are not Russian and not Ukrainian, they are Soviet”, “people without mentality”, “in Ukraine and without Ukraine” (Vitaly Portnikov about a separate category of Russian-speaking citizens in Ukraine); “information bed of Ukraine” (about combat operations on the front line; “when a descendant asks me what I did in those terrifying moments, I will know what to answer. At the very least, I did not stand aside” (opinion of a Ukrainian fighter). Compressed in media texts is implemented in the headline, note, infographic, chronicle, digest, help, caption for photos, blitz poll, interview, short articles, caricature, visual text, commercial, etc. Researchers add “nominative-representative text (business card text, titles of sections, pages, names of presenters, etc.) to concise media texts for a functional and pragmatic purpose.” accent text (quote, key idea); text-navigator (content, news feed, indication of movement or time); chronotope”. A specific linguistic phenomenon known as “language compression” is widespread in media texts. Language compression is the art of minimization; attention is focused on the main, the most essential, everything secondary is filtered out. Compression uses words succinctly and sparingly to convey the meaning as much as possible. For example, the headline “Racism. What is the essence of the new ideology of the Russian occupiers?”. The note briefly explains the meaning of this concept and explains the difference from “nazism” and “fascism”. Key words: compressed media text, language compression, language of war, emotional markers, expressive neologisms, political journalism.