Academic literature on the topic 'Irish separatist movement'

Dissenters in the long nineteenth century believed that they were on the right side of history. This chapter argues that the involvement of evangelical Nonconformists in politics was primarily driven by a coherent worldview derived from a Congregationalist understanding of salvation and the gathered nature of the church. That favoured a preference for voluntarism and a commitment to religious equality for all. Although Whig governments responded to the rising electoral clout of Dissenters after 1832 by meeting Dissenting grievances, both they and the Conservatives retained an Erastian approach

This chapter provides a summary of the main arguments and empirical evidence of the book. It re-emphasizes the argument that inclusion drove the process of moderation in a gradual and path dependent process. It also argues that moderation was strategic and involved extensive movement away from revolutionary violence towards working through the existing system and accepting reformism. However, it did not entail core value change or the abandonment of core goals. It provides an assessment of how republicans are pursuing their goal of a united Ireland in a post-peace process era, arguing that republicans have been largely ineffective in their efforts and are instead now relying on exogenous factors to advance their cause. It concludes by considering the implications of Irish republicanism for other cases of separatist conflict and for comparative peace processes. It argues that the pathway to moderation offered here highlights that moderation can occur when internal change within a movement is met with tolerance from the ruling state to allow that movement to politicise without abandoning core goals.

Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, Irish unionists increasingly associated Irish-America with violence and extremism. This chapter examines the relationship of Irish unionists and the United States in this era, as unionists denounced American funding of Irish nationalism, condemned Irish Parliamentary Party connections to violence and crime, and feared the threat of separatism. Unionists also emphasized the international appeal of their own movement as they attempted to draw support from the United States in their campaigns against Home Rule. This chapter concludes that the unionists’ approach to the United States was paradoxical and multifaceted, as they attempted to condemn Irish-American influence and extremism while at the same time seeking American aid for their own movement.

The framework for much of modern terrorist action is ethnic or nationalist, with each nationalism being culturally unique. The emblematic terrorist act—the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914—was a nationalist act. Nationalist movements have shown greater resilience than smaller left-wing revolutionary groups. Nationalism is a very strong force, so even a nation whose struggle seems likely to fail, such as the Chechens, may never give up. ‘Nationalism and terror’ looks at how nationalists have used terror to fight their cause, illustrating this with the case studies of the Irish republican IRA, the Basque separatists ETA, and Zionists in Palestine. Can terror liberate nations?

‘Military neutrality’ and ‘political neutrality’ are not the same. The Irish authorities did not allow the state’s non-aligned status to prevent them joining the crusade in the West against communism. They had a Cold War agenda. In the 1950s, leading officials such as Colonel Dan Bryan in G2, the Irish army intelligence directorate, believed that Ireland should assist the NATO powers in their global struggle. So, too, did Peter Berry, the Department of Justice secretary in Dublin. They supplied detailed information on the tiny communist organisation to the ‘hypersensitive’ Americans, for example, and provided intelligence on ‘peace’ activists to the British. Details on suspect activists ended up in the files of the Church’s ‘vigilance’ committee – a clear breach of the separation of Church and State. As functionaries in what Berry termed the ‘communist international’, Michael O’Riordan in Dublin and Desmond Greaves in London were seen to be taking directions from the British communist party, the CPGB. The communists had their own Cold War agenda to follow, with ‘world peace’ Moscow’s priority. But this issue did not capture the imagination of the working class, as a frustrated Roy Johnston discovered. Nevertheless, orders were orders for Ireland’s ‘fifth column’. Some communist-led organisations, however, were believed to have recruitment potential. Could the CPGB-directed Connolly Association, and its equivalent in New York – both ‘dangerous’ in Bryan’s view – convert Irish exiles by highlighting issues related to Northern Ireland? Was there any possibility that communists could succeed in infiltrating the Irish republican movement?...