Log in

Relevant bibliographies by topics / Irrational thinking / Books

To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Irrational thinking.

Books on the topic 'Irrational thinking'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 February 2022

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 31 books for your research on the topic 'Irrational thinking.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse books on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

1

Wilson, Robert Anton. The new inquisition: Irrational rationalism and the citadel of science. Phoenix, Ariz., U.S.A: Falcon Press, 1986.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Wilson, Robert Anton. The new inquisition: Irrational rationalism and the citadel of science. Phoenix, Ariz., U.S.A: Falcon Press, 1986.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Denialism: How irrational thinking hinders scientific progress, harms the planet, and threatens our lives. New York: Penguin Press, 2010.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Specter, Michael. Denialism: How irrational thinking hinders scientific progress, harms the planet, and threatens our lives. New York: Penguin Press, 2009.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Specter, Michael. Denialism: How irrational thinking hinders scientific progress, harms the planet, and threatens our lives. New York: Penguin Press, 2009.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Specter, Michael. Denialism: How irrational thinking hinders scientific progress, harms the planet, and threatens our lives. New York: Penguin Press, 2010.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Specter, Michael. Denialism: How irrational thinking hinders scientific progress, harms the planet, and threatens our lives. New York: Penguin Press, 2009.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

The 7 laws of magical thinking: How irrational beliefs keep us happy, healthy, and sane. New York: Hudson Street Press, 2012.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Carlos, Marroquín, ed. Das Irrationale denken: Reflexionen zum Verstehen der Gegenwart. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2003.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Predictably Irrational. New York: HarperCollins, 2009.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Hutson, Matthew. The 7 Laws of Magical Thinking: How Irrational Beliefs Keep Us Happy, Healthy, and Sane. Plume, 2013.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

Specter, Michael. Denialism - How Irrational Thinking Harms the Planet and Threatens Our Lives. Recorded Books, 2010.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Thebarge, Ronald W. The situational evaluations inventory: Development of a situationally sensitive test of irrational thinking. 1989.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Denialism: How Irrational Thinking Hinders Scientific Progress, Harms the Planet, and Threatens Our lives. USA: The Penguin Press, 2009.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Idiot Proof: Deluded Celebrities, Irrational Power Brokers, Media Morons, and the Erosion of Common Sense. PublicAffairs, 2004.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions. Harper, 2009.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions. Harper, 2010.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions. HarperCollins, 2008.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

19

Wedgwood, Ralph. The Aim of Rationality. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198802693.003.0010.

Full text

Abstract:

It is proposed that rationality has an external goal—thinking as correctly as possible. (For example, perhaps believing as correctly as possible is being maximally confident of the truth, and choosing as correctly as possible is choosing something feasible and optimally choiceworthy.) If your thinking is irrational, that is bad news about your thinking’s degree of correctness; the more irrational your thinking is, the worse the news is about your thinking’s degree of correctness. This idea is interpreted in probabilistic terms. There is a probability function, fixed by the mental states and events present in your mind, such that the degree to which your thinking is ‘good news’ about correctness is determined by how your thinking compares to alternative ways of thinking in terms of its expected degree of correctness according to that probability function. This proposal can explain the normativity of the requirements of rational coherence.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

20

Grimes, David Robert. Irrational Ape: Why Flawed Logic Puts Us All at Risk and How Critical Thinking Can Save the World. Simon & Schuster, Limited, 2019.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

Grimes, David Robert. Irrational Ape: Why Flawed Logic Puts Us All at Risk and How Critical Thinking Can Save the World. Simon & Schuster, Limited, 2020.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

Irrational Ape: Why Flawed Logic Puts Us All at Risk and How Critical Thinking Can Save the World. Simon & Schuster, Limited, 2019.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

Ariely, Dan. The Predictably Irrational CD: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions. HarperAudio, 2008.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

24

Predictably Irrational, Revised and Expanded Edition: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions. Harper Perennial, 2010.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

25

Wedgwood, Ralph. The Value of Rationality. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198802693.001.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

Rationality is a central concept for epistemology, ethics, and the study of practical reason. But what sort of concept is it? It is argued here that—contrary to objections that have recently been raised—rationality is a normative concept. In general, normative concepts cannot be explained in terms of the concepts expressed by ‘reasons’ or ‘ought’. Instead, normative concepts are best understood in terms of values. Thus, for a mental state or a process of reasoning to be rational is for it to be in a certain way good. Specifically, rationality is a virtue, while irrationality is a vice. What rationality requires of you at a time is whatever is necessary for your thinking at that time to be as rational as possible; this makes ‘rationally required’ equivalent to a kind of ‘ought’. Moreover, rationality is an “internalist” normative concept: what it is rational for you to think at a time depends purely on what is in your mind at that time. Nonetheless, rationality has an external goal—namely, getting things right in your thinking, or thinking correctly. The connection between rationality and correctness is probabilistic: if your thinking is irrational, that is bad news about your thinking’s degree of correctness; and the more irrational your thinking is, the worse the news is about your thinking’s degree of correctness. This account of the concept of rationality indicates how we should set about giving a substantive theory of what it is for beliefs and choices to be rational.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

26

John, Rich. Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Depression: Retrain Your Brain from Wrong Behaviors, Irrational Beliefs and Negative Ways of Thinking. Open Yourself to Life, Happiness and the Freedom of Change. Independently Published, 2019.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

27

Smith, Peter Scharff. Prisoners’ Families, Public Opinion, and the State. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198810087.003.0008.

Full text

Abstract:

This chapter moves the focus from the offender-state binary to a broader discussion about the relationship between penal policies, prisons, and society. It does so using a partly Durkheimian approach. The sociologist Émile Durkheim saw the function of the institutions of penality less as a form of instrumental rationality and more as a kind of routinized expression of emotion. According to such an approach, thinking of punishment as a calculated instrument for the rational control of conduct would be to miss its essential character, to mistake superficial form for true content since the essence of punishment is irrational, unthinking emotion fixed by a sense of the sacred and its violation. Furthermore, this chapter suggests that interpreting and implementing the rights of prisoners’ children and families provides a perspective on criminal justice systems, which can potentially change the current state-offender dynamic.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

28

Siegel, Harvey. Rationality and Judgment. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190682675.003.0011.

Full text

Abstract:

Philosophical/epistemic theories of rationality differ over the role of judgment in rational argumentation. According to the “classical model” of rationality, rational justification is a matter of conformity with explicit rules or principles. Critics of the classical model, such as Harold Brown and Trudy Govier, argue that the model is subject to insuperable difficulties. They propose, instead, that rationality be understood, ultimately, in terms of judgment rather than rules. In this paper I respond to Brown’s and Govier’s criticisms of the classical model, and to the “judgment model” they propose in its place. I argue that that model is unable both to distinguish between rational and irrational judgment and to avoid recourse to rules, and is therefore inadequate as an account of rationality, critical thinking, or argument appraisal. More positively, I argue that an adequate account of rationality must include a place for both rules and judgment.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

29

Brudholm, Thomas. Hatred Beyond Bigotry. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190465544.003.0004.

Full text

Abstract:

This chapter ponders the value of a focused conceptual examination of hatred for the combating of hate. A common argument found in much scholarship on hate crime and hate speech is that the term “hate” is misleading, and that bias or prejudice does a better job. However, this assertion is generally based on scanty consideration as to the concept of hatred itself. In order to qualify the conversation about hatred today, the chapter returns to Plato’s conceptualization of misology in the Phaedo and Aristotle’s account of hatred in the Rhetoric. This exploration among other things shows that there is a long tradition for thinking about certain forms of hatred as prejudice, but also that hatred can be approached as a reasonable and reason responsive feeling, rather than simply irrational and bad. The chapter mobilizes these philosophical readings for the purpose of reconsidering the question whether “hate” is indeed a misnomer.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

30

Barry, John. Green Political Economy. Edited by Teena Gabrielson, Cheryl Hall, John M. Meyer, and David Schlosberg. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199685271.013.30.

Full text

Abstract:

This chapter outlines the main features of green political economy and how it differs from dominant orthodox neo-classical economics. Neo-classical economics is critiqued on the grounds of its false presentation of itself as “objective” and “value neutral.” Its ecologically irrational commitment to the imperative of orthodox economic growth as a permanent feature of the economy compromises its ability to offer realistic or normatively compelling guides to how we might make the transition to a sustainable economy. Green political economy is presented as an alternative form of economic thinking but one which explicitly expresses its normative/ideological value bases. It also challenges the commitment to undifferentiated economic growth as a permanent objective of the human economy. In its place, it promotes “economic security” and a post-growth economy. The latter includes the transition to a low-carbon energy economy, and is one which maximizes quality of life and actively seeks to lower socio-economic inequality.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

31

Pugh, Jonathan. Autonomy, Rationality, and Contemporary Bioethics. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858584.001.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

Personal autonomy is often lauded as a key value in contemporary Western bioethics, and the claim that there is an important relationship between autonomy and rationality is often treated as an uncontroversial claim in this sphere. Yet, there is also considerable disagreement about how we should cash out the relationship between rationality and autonomy. In particular, it is unclear whether a rationalist view of autonomy can be compatible with legal judgments that enshrine a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment, regardless of whether ‘… the reasons for making the choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent’. This book brings recent philosophical work on the nature of rationality to bear on the question of how we should understand autonomy in contemporary bioethics. In doing so, the author develops a new framework for thinking about the concept, one that is grounded in an understanding of the different roles that rational beliefs and rational desires have to play in personal autonomy. Furthermore, the account outlined here allows for a deeper understanding of different forms of controlling influence, and the relationship between our freedom to act, and our capacity to decide autonomously. The author contrasts his rationalist account with other prominent accounts of autonomy in bioethics, and outlines the revisionary implications it has for various practical questions in bioethics in which autonomy is a salient concern, including questions about the nature of informed consent and decision-making capacity.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!