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1
Parray, Tauseef Ahmad. "Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy." American Journal of Islam and Society 27, no. 3 (July 1, 2010): 95–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v27i3.1307.
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Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy analyzes the theoretical relationshipbetween religion and democracy, specifically Islam’s relationshipwith liberal democracy. It discusses the relationship between Islam,Muslim-majority societies (viz., Iran, Turkey, and Indonesia), and liberaldemocracy in a way that advances theory and practice regarding their relationsand this relationship is the immediate focus of this study, and the conclusionshave a much broader applicability in illuminating the theoreticalrelationship between religion, secularism, and democracy in general, and incontributing to the development of a liberal-democratic theory for Muslimsocieties in particular.
The author’s primary methodological approach is historical and comparative.Drawing on insights and lessons from western political theory andhistory, he examines the relationship between liberal-democratic developmentand religion both theoretically and in the context of the Muslim world.The three countries mentioned above are presented as case studies as ameans to reinforce the theoretical claims. The book consists of four chaptersfollowed by a conclusion, endnotes, a bibliography, and an index ...
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Dastmalchian, Amir. "Political Islam, Iran, and the Enlightenment: Philosophies of Hope and Despair." American Journal of Islam and Society 28, no. 3 (July 1, 2011): 148–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v28i3.1246.
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Political Islam, Iran, and the Enlightenment is Mirsepassi’s latest treatisethat focuses on the Iranian intellectual and political climate. Mirsepassiis concerned to show the German and French intellectual influences of Islamistintellectuals as they search for an appropriate response to modernity.With Iran taken as a case study, Mirsepassi’s discussion is intended to underminethose analyses of Muslim political aspirations which deem theseaspirations to be inherently anti-Western. Comprising an introduction andseven chapters, Mirsepassi’s work speaks to those researchers in a range ofsociopolitical disciplines concerned with coming to grips with intellectualdevelopments in the Muslim world. The book might also interest thoseinterested in understanding the impact of continental philosophy on theMuslim world. Although the emphasis is on Iran, an attempt is made inthe final chapter, especially, to broaden the discussion by dealing with theIndian experience of modernity.According to Mirsepassi, the Muslim understanding of modernity andsecularism was influenced by the specific visions of modern society heldby Kemal Ataturk and the “Shah of Iran” (presumably the ambitious RezaShah). These two figures were in turn influenced by the antireligious fervorof French secularism. The attempt of Muslim intellectuals, therefore, toestablish a correct vision of society was informed by the radical Counter-Enlightenment figures of German and French philosophy. Furthermore,Muslim intellectuals overlooked Western visions of modern society whichwere not antireligious. Political Islam, Iran, and the Enlightenment, therefore,constructs a narrative that leads to examining the experience of British-style secularism in India. Mirsepassi’s fear is that a lack of appreciationof the European heritage of Islamists ‒ who Mirsepassi sees as intellectuallyand politically totalitarian and as representing all Muslims ‒ will leadto the sidelining of two groups from within the Muslim world. These twogroups are the quietist ulama and the reformist intellectuals, the latter ofwhich offer Mirsepassi the hope of an Islamic response to modernity thatis consistent with democratic principles ...
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Zaidi, Ali Hassan. "Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam." American Journal of Islam and Society 21, no. 1 (January 1, 2004): 102–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v21i1.1815.
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While the public role of intellectuals in North America, and perhaps in theWest more generally, is declining, one may hazard to say that their roleremains significant in the Muslim world, judging by the number of intellectualswho have been censored in Muslim societies. Iran, in particular,has a strong tradition of public intellectuals, the latest of whom isAbdolkarim Soroush, a vocal critic of the post-revolutionary clericalregime. An official in the early years of post-revolutionary Iran, he hassubsequently been harassed and censored for arguing that secularism is the best way to guard against the abuse of power. Since Soroush hasquickly gained a following both inside and outside Iran, the editors are tobe commended for editing and translating his wide-ranging ideas andmaking them accessible to the English reading public.The editors’ introduction contextualizes Soroush’s work by locatinghim within a current of Iranian enlightened-religious intellectuals, and,more generally, in a current of Muslim reformist thought that includes thelikes of Muhammad Iqbal and Ali Shariati. Chapter 1, an interview withSoroush, reveals the major influences on the development of his thought,while the remaining 11 chapters are a collection of his essays, lectures,and speeches. Most of this material consists of lectures that he deliveredin the early 1990s. Chapters 2, 4, and 6-9 represent the core of his ideason the limits of religious knowledge, secularism, and the mutual dependenceof freedom and critical reason. The remaining chapters nicelyround out the book with topics ranging from a defense of critical reason,science, and freedom to the differences between the educational model ofthe traditional religious seminary versus the modern university.Chapter 2 presents Soroush’s theory of the contraction and expansionof religious knowledge. Here, he makes the controversial (at least in thepost-revolutionary Iranian context) argument that while religion andsacred scriptures may be flawless and constant, the interpreters of religionare not. Hence, Soroush argues that traditional Islamic knowledge needsto be treated like any other branch of knowledge, “as incomplete, impure,insufficient, and culture-bound” (p. 32) ...
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Dar, Showkat Ahmad. "Naser Ghobadzadeh, Religious Secularity: A Theological Challenge to the Islamic State." ICR Journal 7, no. 1 (January 15, 2016): 144–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.52282/icr.v7i1.294.
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This book is an important - though controversial - addition to the discourse surrounding Islamic political thought. It traces its lineage to the debate advocating a separation of religion and politics. By putting this politico-religious discourse into a new oxymoronic term, ‘religious secularity’, the author attempts to construct another theological challenge to the concept of an Islamic state. Hailing from Iran, Dr. Naser Ghobadzadeh (currently a Research Fellow at the Institute for Social Justice, the Australian Catholic University), examines Islamic politico-religious discourse in the context of his homeland. Briefly reviewing the political struggles Muslims have faced during the second half of the twentieth century while trying to fulfil their aspirations of establishing an Islamic state, he attempts to describe the parallel Iranian quest for a democratic secular state. Being aware of the varied definitions and understandings of the term ‘secularism’, he intentionally uses the term ‘secularity’ to clarify the distinction between the emerging discourse in Iran and the conventional understanding of secularism as a global paradigm. This discourse, according to the author, was first developed following a series of articles written by Abdulkarim Soroush in 1989, in which the latter emphasized a separation of religion from religious knowledge (p.25). The author ignores, however, the Sunni scholar, Shaykh Ali Abdul Raziq, who, in his book entitled al-Islam wa usul al-Hukm (1925), held the same view. This might be because of the author’s focus on Shi'ite political thought.
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Abdolmohammadi, Pejman. "Remarks on the Origins of Secularism and Nationalism in Iran." Eurasian Studies 13, no. 1-2 (October 17, 2015): 153–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24685623-12340008.
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Mirzā Fatḥʿalī Āḫūndzāde (1812-1878) is one of the most important thinkers and intellectuals of the 19th century in Iran. He started to develop a critical perception of political Islam, giving rise to a new current of thought based on Persian nationalism, secularism and constitutionalism. This article, after a brief introduction of the political and historical context of the 19th century, will analyse the political thought of Āḫūndzāde, highlighting some fundamental elements of his ideas and reflections such as enlightenment, nationalism, constitutionalism, the relationship between religion and politics, and the importance of individual liberties and civil rights. Āḫūndzāde was able to combine the Western enlightenment with the Persian pre-Islamic history and identity, creating, for the first time in the Iranian modern history, a new current of thought based on secularism and nationalism. This article will also show how Āḫūndzāde’s thought influenced the political evolution of Persia from the mid of nineteenth century until today, highlighting some important historical events of Persia such as the Constitutional Revolution, Riḍā Šāh’s reign, Muṣaddiq’s government and the political movements of today’s Iranian civil society.
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Madaninejad, Banafsheh. "Religious Secularity." American Journal of Islam and Society 33, no. 3 (July 1, 2016): 99–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v33i3.920.
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Naser Ghobadzadeh’s Religious Secularity presumes that Muslim thinkers nolonger consider an Islamic state as the desired political system. This aversionto a theocratic state is perhaps felt most by those Iranian reformist thinkerswho have had to operate in such a state since the 1979 Islamic revolution. Theauthor claims that in its place, the Muslim world has devised a new theoreticalcategory called “religious secularity,” which allows for a religiously secularstate to, at least theoretically, present itself as an alternative to an Islamic one.He defines this religiously secular attitude as one that refuses to eliminate religionfrom the political sphere, but simultaneously carves out a space for secularpolitics by narrowly promoting only the institutional separation of religionand state.He claims that this concept has two goals: to (1) restore the clergy’s genuinespiritual aims and reputation and (2) show that Islam is compatible withthe secular democratic state. In Iran, rather than launching overt attacks againstthe theocratic state, this discourse of religious secularity has created a more“gentle, implicit and sectarian manner in challenging the Islamic state.” Unlikein pre-revolutionary times when there were both religious and non-religiousideologies vying for an audience, Ghobadzadeh suggests that in Iran today,“the alternative discourses are religious and concentrate on liberating religiousdiscourse from state intervention.”The author pays homage to Abdullahi An-Na’im and claims to be usingIslam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari‘a (2008) as aconceptual framework. As far as subfields within political science go,Ghobadzadeh’s Religious Secularity is also similar in form to NaderHashemi’s Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy (2009) and, as such,can be considered a work of theoretical comparative political science ...
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Soltani, Ebrahim K. "Conventional Secularism and the Humanization of Islam: Theory and practice of religious politics in Iran." Journal of the Middle East and Africa 9, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 195–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2018.1499910.
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Monshipouri, Mahmood. "Political Science." American Journal of Islam and Society 14, no. 4 (January 1, 1997): 99–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v14i4.2222.
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Adopting an issue-oriented approach toward understanding Islamic andWestern political thought, Professor Abdul Rashid Moten places these two tradition'swithin historical and contemporary contexts. Moten's book thereby providesa comparative analysis of key issues, including Islamic research methodology,Islamic law, Islamic political and social order, strategies and tactics ofvarious Islamic movements, and the link between Islam and politics.In chapter 1, Moten examines the secular domination of Muslim thought andculture, arguing that secularism was imported into the Muslim world throughthe efforts of a Westernized elite. He adds that no such secular state had everexisted in the Muslim world. This owes much to the fact that there was (is) nocommon ground between Islam and secularism (p. 7). With secularism camenationalism, liberal political institutions, and the pursuit of a capitalist economicsystem. Nationalism, Moten notes, wedged its way into the Muslim world,dividing it into new nation-states and client states (p. 12). Since independence,secularism has failed to meet the socioeconomic and political needs of Muslimsocieties. The rising tide of Islamic revivalism against secular regimes inAlgeria and Turkey demonstrates disenchantment with the shattered secularistdreams in the Muslim world (p. 16).Chapter 2 attempts to scrutinize the inherent link between Islam and politics.The pillars of Islam, Moten writes, go beyond moral and spiritual upliftment;they entail both practical and symbolic significance in all aspects of life. InIslam, ethics sets the tone for politics, and the rules of political behavior originatefrom ethical norms. Political life cannot be separated from the broaderframework of the religious and spiritual life (p. 21 ). Islamic rulers have hardly,if ever, emphasized the separation of religion and politics. Since the nineteenthcentury, Islamic modernists and revivalists have debated the nature of this separation.The reemergence of Islam in Muslim politics and societies in the lastquarter of the twentieth century has pointed to a distinct Islamic order and thereawakening of Muslim identity. Moten cites, among others, Iran and Pakistanas examples of such a renaissance (p. 30). However, he fails to examine the divisiveeffects of lslamization programs in Pakistan (under Zia al-Haqq) and othercountries such as Sudan.The comparison between Western and Islamic methods of political inquiry isthe subject of close scrutiny in chapter 3. Moten maintains that the Islamic conceptionof polity is based on profound religious-cultural grounds and that religionand polity form an organic unity (p. 37). Likewise, ethics and politics are ...
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Ahmad, Refat Sayed. "Religion and the state in Turkey and Iran: a comparative overview†." Contemporary Arab Affairs 7, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 36–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2014.880281.
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The question of the relationship between religion and the state in the Islamic world is as old as Islam itself. The experiences of Turkey and Iran during the past 30 years qualify among the most instructive applications of the relationship. In these two cases, the interaction between the systems of governance, on the one hand, and the Islamic cultural and legislative heritage, on the other, represents a common factor, whereas they differ in terms of the doctrinal reference on which each of these experiences is based. They also differ in perspective, application mechanisms and their relations with the West. The present research can be encapsulated, in broad outline, under five main headlines which raise questions more than provide answers: (1) the historical background of the relationship between religion and the state in the Turkish and Iranian models; (2) the effect of the ascent of revolutionary Islam in Iran, after the revolution of 1979, on the problematic of state–religion relations; (3) from ‘well-being’ to ‘justice and development’: limitations and prospects of a historical compromise between religion, secularism and the state; (4) points of controversy and commonalities in the Turkish and Iranian experiences from the 1980s to the end of 2012; and (5) looking into the relationship of each of these two models with the Arab Spring revolutions: are they determinants of these revolutions or investing in their development?
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Wani, Gowhar Quadir. "Islam and Democracy after the Arab Spring." American Journal of Islam and Society 36, no. 1 (January 17, 2019): 91–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v36i1.860.
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The debate on Islam and democracy is one of the most heated in academia,engaging both Muslims and non-Muslims, normative and analytic approaches.It also takes place on two levels: political-theoretical determinationsof the compatibility or incompatibility between Islam and democracy,and empirical discussions over how much Muslims (or Muslim societies)have modernized or resisted modernization. These debates have yieldeda vast literature, to which the present book under review is a significantaddition. It presents an overview of the historical developments regardingIslam and democracy and anticipates future trends in seven major countries:Turkey (Chapter 2), Iran (Chapter 3), Pakistan (Chapter 4), Indonesia(Chapter 5), Senegal (Chapter 6), Tunisia (Chapter 7), and Egypt (Chapter8). The book also includes an introductory chapter (Chapter 1) and a conclusion(Chapter 9).The introduction provides a literature review and brief overview of thedevelopments that served as immediate causes of Arab Spring in variouscountries. Various analysts have cited factors including a ‘youth bulge’ (amajority of the population in the Muslim world is comprised of citizensunder 30), poverty, unemployment, repressive monarchial regimes, andthe mass provocative events of self-immolation (as of Bouazizi in Tunisia)or killing (as of Khalid Said in Egypt) or torture (as of graffiti artists inSyria). Other analysts are of the opinion that the Muslim countries wereat last catching up to the rest of the democratic world. This book considersthese factors, presenting a critical assessment of Huntington’s equation ofmodernization with secularization and his equation of rejecting secularism ...
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Gonabad, Reza Abedi, Ebrahim Fayaz, and Ahmad Naderi. "Review of Discourse Components of Islamic Republic of Iran in the Middle East." Journal of Politics and Law 10, no. 5 (November 29, 2017): 105. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v10n5p105.
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With the victory of the Islamic Revolution, some shift in paradigm or the shift of discourse is observed in Iran. Islamic Republic System of Iran that was replaced instead of Pahlavi Regime took different discourse, behavior and function practically in addition to domestic policy at the level of foreign policy at the level of the Middle East or West of Asia and North of Africa and this approach was definitely different from the past. The discourse had a central indication of jurisprudential political Islam as the social and political protest against national Iranian radical otherness, western quasi-modernism, secularism and militarism of Pahlavism Discourse, which was created by the friction and dialectic between dominant discourses of similarity to west and discourses different from the west. In this study, 4 components and indices of anti-arrogance Islamism, monist Shiism (establishment of the Islamic Ummah), independence and anti-order orientation based on supporting Axis of Resistance against Axis of Compromise are explained as discourse components of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Middle East. The data analysis method in this study is mainly based on qualitative methods. Moreover, this study has used data description and analysis using documentary references and methods and through referring to the library and internet.
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Gahan, Jairan. "The Sovereign and the Sensible." Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 41, no. 2 (August 1, 2021): 222–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/1089201x-9127102.
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Abstract This article investigates the history of the formation of the red-light district of Tehran in 1922, to tackle larger questions about the genealogy of the constitutional Islamic state in Iran in the twentieth century. Through an engagement with the Islamic local campaign against prostitution and the state's subsequent sovereign decision to form the district, this article demonstrates how Islamic public sensibilities moved to the forefront of analytics of governance, under postconstitutional state formations (1911–). This revisionist narrative remaps the force of religion in Tehran, a city that is so often glossed as a case of state-oriented top-down secularization and subsequent Islamization in the twentieth century. The aim is not to question the process of secularization or to render it incomplete, but to demonstrate how secularism in Iran negotiated and consolidated a particular relationship between Islam and sovereign modern rule. As such, this work reads the history of the district against the grain of the grand narrative of the Islamic Revolution's (1979) moment of rupture to trace the genealogical roots of moral governance in the Islamic Republic today, within the postconstitutional state formations in the early twentieth century.
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Powell, Russell. "Evolving Views of Islamic Law in Turkey." Journal of Law and Religion 28, no. 2 (January 2013): 467–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0748081400000114.
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The tradition of Kemalist secularism (laiklik) in Turkey is often cited to distinguish Turkey as an exceptional case among predominantly Muslim countries. While it is true that the Turkish Constitution, laws, and legal opinions approach the relationship between the state and religion very differently than those of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or even Indonesia, it would be wrong to underestimate the role that religion plays in the formation of Turkish legal norms, including citizen understanding of those norms. There is a wealth of literature describing the nature of Turkish secularism and its evolution. A number of both quantitative and qualitative studies inquire about the preference forShari'aamong Turkish voters. The typical question asks whether respondents favor the establishment of aShari'astate. Over the past fifteen years, these surveys have received response rates ranging between five and twenty-five percent in favor of such a state. However, these results are extremely problematic, because they do not provide any context or meaning for “the establishment of aShari'astate,” either for those who favor it or for those who oppose it. This study begins to unpack the range of possible meanings attributed toShari'awithin Turkey, both among voters and among intellectuals, as a framework for future empirical studies and as a basis for deeper understandings of the role of Islam within Turkish law and politics.
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Fazalbhoy, Nasteen. "Islam, Politics and Social Movements." American Journal of Islam and Society 9, no. 3 (October 1, 1992): 416–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v9i3.2579.
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This book contains thirteen well-researched case studies on social movements in North Africa, India, the Middle East, and Iran. Each movement differs,as the issues and concerns vary according to area. This diversity is mademanageable by a neat categorization taking into account geography, periodization,and problematics, for example, and by the editors' clear explanation,in the first part of the book, of how the articles are arranged. In the second partare articles by Von Sivers, Clancy-Smith, Colonna, and Voll. Each authoranalyzes resistance and millenarian movements in precolonial (i.e., nineteenthandearly twentieth-century) North Africa. Part three, with articles by Frietag,Gilmartin and Swdenburg, deals with more contemporary issues, such asIslam and nationalism in India and Palestine. Part four discusses labor movements in Egypt and northern Nigeria (Beinin, Goldberg, Lubeck), while partfive looks at the Iranian revolution and the mles of Imam Khomeini and AliShari'ati in defining and inspiring it (Algar, Abrahamian, Keddie).One of the main issues that must be addressed when dealing with socialmovements in Islamic societies is whether they are really "Islamic" or whetherthey just happen to be taking place in Muslim Societies. Lapidus, in his introductoryessay, brings out the main issues when he says that the movements arestudied "in order to explore their self-conception and symbols, the econofnicand political conditions under which they developed, and their relation toagrarian and capitalist economic structum and to established state regimes andelites" (p. 3). The authors look at social, structural, and ideological featureswithout giving exclusive primacy to one or the other. Burke stresses this point.In his article, he discusses methodological issues and places the studies in thecontext of contemporary modes of analyses such as the "new cultural" and the"new social history" methods inspired by E. P. Thompson and others. Thisessay is an invaluable introduction to the case studies. Placing the movementsin the context of changes occurring in the Islamic world as well as in the contextof wider political and social events, the essay allows one to make comparisonsacmss the different areas covered in terms of popular culture, patternsof collective action, the problem of Islam and secularism, and other aspects.The articles range from the role of Islamic symbols (i.e., the mosque inIndia) in articulating new political organizations designed to deal with the ...
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Siavoshi, Sussan. "Foucault in Iran." American Journal of Islam and Society 34, no. 2 (April 1, 2017): 114–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v34i2.779.
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To report history in the making, Michel Foucault travelled to Tehran in 1978.He had a commission from Corriere della sera, the prestigious Italian newspaper,to write a series of articles about the unfolding revolutionary process.He landed in Tehran two days after “Black Friday,” during which the armywas believed to have massacred 5,000 people. Foucault was impressed by thecourage of the undeterred protestors who kept pouring into the streets in defiance of a powerful regime. These articles, sympathetic to the movement andits leading force, Shi’a Islam, received a scornful response from his secularFrench colleagues. He was accused of being anti-modern, nihilistic, ignorant,and a man beguiled by a revolutionary effervescence.After the establishment of the Islamic Republic and the consequent bloodybattles leading to the concentration of power in the hands of the militant religiousrevolutionaries, Foucault’s detractors put concerted public pressure uponhim to repent for his “mistaken” judgments. This major “French” controversyfailed, however, to attract much attention in English-speaking circles until theappearance of Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson’s Foucault and Iranian Revolution:Gender and Seduction of Islamism (University of Chicago Press:2005). Highly critical of Foucault’s “romantic” depiction of the revolutionarymovement, these two authors also found in his reports an occasion to attackhis early, post-structuralist writings, interpreting them as anti-modern. Thebook’s overt critique of Foucault rested upon the intellectual pillar of the Enlightenmentdiscourse, with its teleological and secularist approach to history.Needless to say, Afary and Anderson were also critical of Islam’s public role,not only in the revolution but also beyond ...
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Masterton, Rebecca. "Medina in Birmingham; Najaf in Brent." American Journal of Islam and Society 33, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): 121–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v33i1.887.
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Medina in Birmingham; Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam by Innes Bowenseeks to explain to a mainly non-Muslim readership the complexities and nuancesof different Muslim groups that have come to live in Britain since the1950s. The book aims to be “a guide to the ideological differences, organisationalstructures and international links of the main Islamic groups active inBritain today” needed in order partly to counter the perception that Muslimsform one homogenous mass. It follows in the tradition of ethnographic worksbegun in the colonial period, that were produced in order to inform the BritishGovernment about the thinking and culture of those under its administrationand, more importantly, about whether they were planning any uprisings orposed any threat. An example of this approach can be seen in Bowen’s assurancesthat the Twelver Shi‘a living in Britain do not unequivocally supportIran:The most striking feature of Britain’s Shia community is the lack of influencethat the Islamic Republic of Iran exerts over it, despite all of its resources.[…] The fact that Najaf school secularism has triumphed over Tehran’s Islamismwill be something of a relief to [the] British government. (p. 162)Bowen also remarks on how little Britain’s police force know about the Muslimgroups with which they have co-operated: ...
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Nugroho, Anjar, and Tulus Warsito Surwandano. "Ali Shari’ati’s revolutionary Islamic thought and its relevance to the contemporary socio-political transformation." Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies 7, no. 2 (December 1, 2017): 251. http://dx.doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v7i2.251-276.
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Ali Shari’ati emerged as an enlightened intellectual figure in the phenomenonof the authoritarian and oppressive power of the Syah Pahlavi regime. Shari’atiappeared as a pioneer of radical ideas about Islam and the revolution whichstemmed from the Shi’a teachings that had been grafted into the revolutionary tradition of the Third World and Marxism. Shari’ati succeeded in establishing a revolutionary Islamic ideology that became the basis of the mass collective consciousness against the regime of the Syah. In Shari’ati’s thought, Islam is an emancipatory ideology and liberation. The progressive and revolutionary view of Shari’ati’s Islam derives from a belief system of tauhid. While tauhid in Shari’ati’s view is the unity among God, man and the universe, the society which is full of social discrimination, injustice, and arbitrariness can be categorized as Shirk, the opponent of tauhid. In the context of the Iranian revolution, the Shari’ati’s Islamic thought and ideology became the fourth t-text-stroke-width: 0px; "> bridge or road from the ideological stalemate of the pre-revolutionary opposition movement, which is between secularist-nationalist, Marxist-Communistand Islamic Fundamentalism. Further, Shari’ati’s ideology paved the way forthe acceptance of Imam Khomeini as a revolutionary leader. This paper aimsto contextualize Ali Shari’ti’s views on socio-political change in Indonesia.Ali Shari’ati muncul menjadi sosok intelektual tercerahkan dalam fenomenakekuasaan rezim Syah Pahlevi yang otoriter dan menindas. Shari’ati lalu tampilsebagai pelopor gagasan-gagasan radikal tentang Islam dan revolusi yang bersumberdari ajaran Syi’ah yang sudah dicangkokkan dengan tradisi revolusioner DuniaKetiga dan Marxisme. Ali Shari’ati berhasil membangun ideologi Islam revolusioneryang kemudian menjadi basis kesadaran kolektif massa menentang kekuasaan rezimSyah. Dalam pemikiran Shari’ati, Islam adalah sebuah ideologi emansipasi danpembebasan. Pandangan Islam Ali Shari’ati yang progresif dan revolusionerbersumber pada satu sistem keyakinan yaitu tauhid. Jika tauhid dalam pandanganShari’ati adalah kesatuan antara Tuhan, manusia dan alam semesta, maka kondisimasyarakat yang penuh diskriminasi sosial, ketidakadilan, dan kesewenang-wenangandapat dikategorikan sebagai syirk, lawan dari tauhid. Dalam konteks revolusi Iran,tawaran pemikiran dan ideologi Islam Syari’ati menjadi jembatan atau jalan keempatdari kebuntuan ideologi gerakan oposisi pra-revolusi, yaitu antara nasionalis-sekuler,Marxis-Komunis dan Fundamentalisme Islam. Ideologi Shari’ati melapangkanjalan bagi diterimanya Imam Khomeini sebagai pemimpin revolusioner. Tulisanini hendak mengkontekstualisasikan pemikiran Ali Shari’ati dalam perubahan sosialpolitik di Indonesia.
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Hazza, Thaer Najrs, and Anmar Mahmoud Khalaf. "Religion and state in Erdogan's mind." Tikrit Journal For Political Science 3, no. 12 (February 22, 2019): 130. http://dx.doi.org/10.25130/poltic.v3i12.8.
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If there are events that confirm Samuel Huntington's argument about the clash of civilizations and Bernard Lewis's thesis on Islam, such as the establishment of the Islamic state in Iran, and the events of September 11, what all these people condone is that Islamist movements are not always an extension of fundamentalism In countries such as Turkey and Indonesia, social movements helped bring in democracy, after decades of authoritarian rule by secularist regimes backed by the army. Religious groups in these countries have participated in the transition to democracy. In Turkey, Islamist groups have fought the vessels in order to strengthen democracy, and in order to participate in the achievement of freedom of opinion and expression and the promotion of religious and human rights, and this is what he did Erdogan and his colleagues since they receive power in Turkey
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Ali, Mikhail. "Islamic Fundamentalism and the Doctrine of Jihad." American Journal of Islam and Society 21, no. 3 (July 1, 2004): 162–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v21i3.1783.
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A. J. Abraham, a professor at CUNY and the New York Institute of Technology,as well as a scholar of Near and Middle Eastern History, accuratelystates that the “Islamic Tendency” has been a significant phenomenonin contemporary times and has “attracted a great deal of negative attention”(p. 2). This compendium packages two prior works: The Warriors of God:Jihad (Holy War) and the Fundamentalists of Islam and a monograph entitledKhoumani and Islamic Fundamentalism: Contributions of IslamicSciences to Modern Civilization. The former is based largely on thesismaterial coauthored with George I. Haddad at Princeton; the latter is amonograph presented during the 1979 hostage crisis in Iran. The intent ofbringing these two works together is ambitious: to foster a “sympathetic”but objective lay understanding of jihad (p. 2) that excludes the sensationalistviews exploited by all factions for political aspirations. The author’spremise, as noted in the preface, is the need for “balanced yet opposingpoints of view” (p. 3).The first work provides a background and insight on jihad that delvesbeyond the “holy war versus internal struggle” discussion. A methodologicalbreakdown of jihad into seven chapter topics, starting with thehermeneutical “Doctrine of Jihad” and ending with the legalistic “Status ofNon-Moslems,” follows a logical pedagogy in the conventional understandingof jihad from an ideological framework to an actual interpretedlaw. Abraham also acknowledges factors leading to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism(p. 12), and thereby provides a succinct framework for furtherdiscussion. Inasmuch as these factors could have been more seamlessly tiedto current developments across the Middle East, Abraham treats the defunctclash between the Islamic world and the Soviet empire as more a symptomof “resisting secularism” than of addressing the actual appeal of Islamicfundamentalism itself to individuals and the collective Muslim psyche ...
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Fox, Ashley M., Sana Abdelkarim Alzwawi, and Dina Refki. "Islamism, Secularism and the Woman Question in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring: Evidence from the Arab Barometer." Politics and Governance 4, no. 4 (December 23, 2016): 40–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v4i4.767.
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The uprisings that led to regime change during the early period of the Arab Spring were initially inclusive and pluralistic in nature, with men and women from every political and religious orientation engaging actively in political activities on the street and in virtual spaces. While there was an opening of political space for women and the inclusion of demands of marginalized groups in the activists’ agenda, the struggle to reimagine national identities that balance Islamic roots and secular yearnings is still ongoing in many countries in the region. This paper seeks to deepen understanding of the extent to which the pluralistic sentiments and openness to accepting the rights women have persisted following the uprising. We aim to examine changes in attitudes towards women’s equality in countries that underwent regime change through popular uprisings during revolutionary upheavals of the Arab Spring and in countries where regimes have remained unchanged. Using available data from consecutive rounds of the Arab Barometer survey, we examine changes in attitudes in nine countries with two rounds of Arab Barometer during and post Arab Spring (Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon, Sudan, Jordan, Iraq, Palestine). We find that support for “Muslim feminism” (an interpretation of gender equality grounded in Islam) has increased over the period and particularly in Arab Spring countries, while support for “secular feminism” has declined. In most countries examined, relatively high degrees of support for gender equality co-exist with a preference for Islamic interpretations of personal status codes pertaining to women. We discuss the implications of these findings for academics and activists concerned with women’s rights in the Middle East North Africa (MENA).
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Jing, Yanchun, Jiangang Zhu, and Yongjing Han. "Secularity and Transformation of the Faith-Based Community: Ethnography of the Religious Charity of Baha’i in Macau." Religions 11, no. 12 (December 4, 2020): 652. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel11120652.
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Since the 1970s, religious charities in Chinese communities have gradually become public and rational, transforming from previously raising donations for the temples or disaster relief. Even in mainland China, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam all began to enter the secular society after the 1980s and gradually merged into local public life by providing public welfare. Little attention has been paid to Baha’i, which originated in Iran in the middle of the 19th century and has become one of the most rapidly expanding new religions in the world. Based upon the ethnography of a Baha’i group in Macau, we first introduce the development of Baha’i, its activities and its charity services. In considering this example, we engage with the following questions. As a new world religion, why would Baha’i carry out these charity events? How did it begin its charity activities in Macau? How do charity activities convey its religious philosophy and religious practice? How should we interpret these religious charity practices? This exploratory research on a religious group in Macau revealed that the modern religion derives publicity and rationalization from its strong driving force for secularization, that the believers are also increasingly emphasizing their social and cultural citizenship, and that the religious organization is also gradually transforming into a networked faith-based community.
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Johnston, David L. "Secularism Confronts Islam." American Journal of Islam and Society 26, no. 2 (April 1, 2009): 110–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v26i2.1394.
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This work by a leading French Islamicist is both an analysis of Islam, secularism,and society in Europe, as well as a prescription for its leaders on howto “correct” their wrongheaded policies with regard to their Muslim minoritiesbased on this analysis. This might seem unduly arrogant on OlivierRoy’s part, but his past landmark books do seem to commend the perspicacityof his views on the subject, and most of all, The Failure of Political Islam(Harvard University Press: 1994) and Globalized Islam: The Search for theNew Umma (Hurst: 2004).On one level, Roy is focused on France: how one might begin to mitigatethe polarization of the French elites in the wake of forbidding the veil in publicplaces and the violence of the 2005 riots in the poorest – mostly Muslim– suburbs of Paris. Indeed, the first chapter is devoted to the historical rootsof France’s virulent version of state-enforced secularism (laïcité). But onanother level, this is a work rich in theoretical analysis, widening its insightsto Britain and the United States and their “common law” version of laïcité, aswell as providing a new theory to the sociology of religion.The intensity of the French debate raises important questions. “The campaignof Islamophobia we are witnessing today is involved in the reshapingof the French political and intellectual landscape” (p. 2). How so? The ChristianRight and the Extreme Right’s suspicion of Islam is now shared by a sizableportion of the Left, which has reacted with fear to the French Muslimcommunity’s new and outspoken rhetoric. School girls want to wear the veilout of pride. And this new Islamic discourse has been promoted both by the“bearded Salafist preacher” and the suave intellectual embodied by TariqRamadan ...
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Esposito, John L. "Moderate Muslims." American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22, no. 3 (July 1, 2005): 11–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v22i3.465.
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The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
JLE: Our human tendency is to define what is normal or moderate in terms of someone just like “us.” The American government, as well as many western and Muslim governments and experts, define moderate by searching for reflections of themselves. Thus, Irshad Manji or “secular” Muslims are singled out as self-critical moderate Muslims by such diverse commentators as Thomas Friedman or Daniel Pipes. In an America that is politicized by the “right,” the Republican and religious right, and post-9/11 by the threat of global terrorism and the association of Islam with global terrorism, defining a moderate Muslim becomes even more problematic. Look at the situations not only in this country but also in Europe, especially France. Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts integration, or must it be assimilation? Is a moderate Muslim secular, as in laic (which is really anti-religious)? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts secularism, as in the separation of church and state, so that no religion is privileged and the rights of all (believer and nonbeliever) are protected? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts a particular notion of gender relations, not simply the equality of women and men but a position against wearing hijab? (Of course let’s not forget that we have an analogous problem with many Muslims whose definition of being a Muslim, or of being a “good” Muslim woman, is as narrowly defined.) In today’s climate, defining who is a moderate Muslim depends on the politics or religious positions of the individuals making the judgment: Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes, Gilles Kepel, Stephen Schwartz, Pat Robertson, and Tom DeLay. The extent to which things have gotten out of hand is seen in attempts to define moderate Islam or what it means to be a good European or American Muslim. France has defined the relationship of Islam to being French, sought to influence mosques, and legislated against wearing hijab in schools. In the United States, non-Muslim individuals and organizations, as well as the government, establish or fund organizations that define or promote “moderate Islam,” Islamic pluralism, and so on, as well as monitor mainstream mosques and organizations. The influence of foreign policy plays a critical role. For some, if not many, the litmus test for a moderate Muslim is tied to foreign policy issues, for example, how critical one is of American or French policy or one’s position in regard to Palestine/Israel, Algeria, Kashmir, and Iraq. Like many Muslim regimes, many experts and ideologues, as well as publications like The Weekly Standard, National Review, The Atlantic, The New York Sun and media like Fox Television, portray all Islamists as being the same. Mainstream and extremist (they deny any distinction between the two) and indeed all Muslims who do not completely accept their notion of secularism, the absolute separation of religion and the state, are regarded as a threat. Mainstream Islamists or other Islamically oriented voices are dismissed as “wolves in sheep’s clothing.” What is important here is to emphasize that it is not simply that these individuals, as individual personalities, have influence and an impact, but that their ideas have taken on a life of their own and become part of popular culture. In a post-9/11 climate, they reinforce the worst fears of the uninformed in our populace. The term moderate is in many ways deceptive. It can be used in juxtaposition to extremist and can imply that you have to be a liberal reformer or a progressive in order to pass the moderate test, thus excluding more conservative or traditionalist positions. Moderates in Islam, as in all faiths, are the majority or mainstream in Islam. We assume this in regard to such other faiths as Judaism and Christianity. The Muslim mainstream itself represents a multitude of religious and socioeconomic positions. Minimally, moderate Muslims are those who live and work “within” societies, seek change from below, reject religious extremism, and consider violence and terrorism to be illegitimate. Often, in differing ways, they interpret and reinterpret Islam to respond more effectively to the religious, social, and political realities of their societies and to international affairs. Some seek to Islamize their societies but eschew political Islam; others do not. Politically, moderate Muslims constitute a broad spectrum that includes individuals ranging from those who wish to see more Islamically oriented states to “Muslim Democrats,” comparable to Europe’s Christian Democrats. The point here is, as in other faiths, the moderate mainstream is a very diverse and disparate group of people who can, in religious and political terms, span the spectrum from conservatives to liberal reformers. They may disagree or agree on many matters. Moderate Jews and Christians can hold positions ranging from reform to ultraorthodox and fundamentalist and, at times, can bitterly disagree on theological and social policies (e.g., gay rights, abortion, the ordination of women, American foreign and domestic policies). So can moderate Muslims.
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Esposito, John L. "Moderate Muslims." American Journal of Islam and Society 22, no. 3 (July 1, 2005): 11–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v22i3.465.
Full textAbstract:
The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
JLE: Our human tendency is to define what is normal or moderate in terms of someone just like “us.” The American government, as well as many western and Muslim governments and experts, define moderate by searching for reflections of themselves. Thus, Irshad Manji or “secular” Muslims are singled out as self-critical moderate Muslims by such diverse commentators as Thomas Friedman or Daniel Pipes. In an America that is politicized by the “right,” the Republican and religious right, and post-9/11 by the threat of global terrorism and the association of Islam with global terrorism, defining a moderate Muslim becomes even more problematic. Look at the situations not only in this country but also in Europe, especially France. Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts integration, or must it be assimilation? Is a moderate Muslim secular, as in laic (which is really anti-religious)? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts secularism, as in the separation of church and state, so that no religion is privileged and the rights of all (believer and nonbeliever) are protected? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts a particular notion of gender relations, not simply the equality of women and men but a position against wearing hijab? (Of course let’s not forget that we have an analogous problem with many Muslims whose definition of being a Muslim, or of being a “good” Muslim woman, is as narrowly defined.) In today’s climate, defining who is a moderate Muslim depends on the politics or religious positions of the individuals making the judgment: Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes, Gilles Kepel, Stephen Schwartz, Pat Robertson, and Tom DeLay. The extent to which things have gotten out of hand is seen in attempts to define moderate Islam or what it means to be a good European or American Muslim. France has defined the relationship of Islam to being French, sought to influence mosques, and legislated against wearing hijab in schools. In the United States, non-Muslim individuals and organizations, as well as the government, establish or fund organizations that define or promote “moderate Islam,” Islamic pluralism, and so on, as well as monitor mainstream mosques and organizations. The influence of foreign policy plays a critical role. For some, if not many, the litmus test for a moderate Muslim is tied to foreign policy issues, for example, how critical one is of American or French policy or one’s position in regard to Palestine/Israel, Algeria, Kashmir, and Iraq. Like many Muslim regimes, many experts and ideologues, as well as publications like The Weekly Standard, National Review, The Atlantic, The New York Sun and media like Fox Television, portray all Islamists as being the same. Mainstream and extremist (they deny any distinction between the two) and indeed all Muslims who do not completely accept their notion of secularism, the absolute separation of religion and the state, are regarded as a threat. Mainstream Islamists or other Islamically oriented voices are dismissed as “wolves in sheep’s clothing.” What is important here is to emphasize that it is not simply that these individuals, as individual personalities, have influence and an impact, but that their ideas have taken on a life of their own and become part of popular culture. In a post-9/11 climate, they reinforce the worst fears of the uninformed in our populace. The term moderate is in many ways deceptive. It can be used in juxtaposition to extremist and can imply that you have to be a liberal reformer or a progressive in order to pass the moderate test, thus excluding more conservative or traditionalist positions. Moderates in Islam, as in all faiths, are the majority or mainstream in Islam. We assume this in regard to such other faiths as Judaism and Christianity. The Muslim mainstream itself represents a multitude of religious and socioeconomic positions. Minimally, moderate Muslims are those who live and work “within” societies, seek change from below, reject religious extremism, and consider violence and terrorism to be illegitimate. Often, in differing ways, they interpret and reinterpret Islam to respond more effectively to the religious, social, and political realities of their societies and to international affairs. Some seek to Islamize their societies but eschew political Islam; others do not. Politically, moderate Muslims constitute a broad spectrum that includes individuals ranging from those who wish to see more Islamically oriented states to “Muslim Democrats,” comparable to Europe’s Christian Democrats. The point here is, as in other faiths, the moderate mainstream is a very diverse and disparate group of people who can, in religious and political terms, span the spectrum from conservatives to liberal reformers. They may disagree or agree on many matters. Moderate Jews and Christians can hold positions ranging from reform to ultraorthodox and fundamentalist and, at times, can bitterly disagree on theological and social policies (e.g., gay rights, abortion, the ordination of women, American foreign and domestic policies). So can moderate Muslims.
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Andresen, Joshua. "Deconstruction, Secularism, and Islam." Philosophy Today 56, no. 4 (2012): 375–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtoday20125641.
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Meirison, Meirison. "Kurds, Islam, and Secularism." MADANIA: JURNAL KAJIAN KEISLAMAN 23, no. 1 (July 7, 2019): 47. http://dx.doi.org/10.29300/madania.v23i1.1720.
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MacKenzie, Julie. "Review: Secularism Confronts Islam." Media International Australia 127, no. 1 (May 2008): 199–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1329878x0812700134.
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Borovalı, Murat, and Cemil Boyraz. "Turkish secularism and Islam." Philosophy & Social Criticism 40, no. 4-5 (February 14, 2014): 479–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453714522476.
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In this article, recent attempts by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to address the problems of Alevi citizens in Turkey are analysed. After briefly outlining the sources of Alevi revitalization in the 1990s, the article critically discusses different aspects of the Alevi Opening process. It concludes by arguing that the Alevi question reveals many aspects of the problematic nature of secularism in Turkey.
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Keyman, E. Fuat. "Modernity, Secularism and Islam." Theory, Culture & Society 24, no. 2 (March 2007): 215–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263276407075008.
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Küçükcan, Talip. "Secularism Confronts Islam: Olivier Roy." Digest of Middle East Studies 18, no. 1 (April 2009): 144–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1949-3606.2009.tb00122.x.
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Gunter, M. M. "Democracy, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey." Journal of Church and State 55, no. 2 (March 20, 2013): 343–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jcs/cst008.
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Stan, Lavinia. "Democracy, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey." European Legacy 19, no. 4 (June 7, 2014): 529–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2014.927244.
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Roy, Olivier. "Secularism and Islam: The Theological Predicament." International Spectator 48, no. 1 (March 2013): 5–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2013.759365.
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Al, Serhun. "Democracy, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey." British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 40, no. 3 (July 2013): 352–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2013.808921.
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Anzalone, Christopher. "Secularism Confronts Islam - By Olivier Roy." Religious Studies Review 34, no. 4 (December 2008): 314–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-0922.2008.00328_4.x.
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Mazrui, Ali A. "Islam in a More Conservative Western World." American Journal of Islam and Society 13, no. 2 (July 1, 1996): 246–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v13i2.2317.
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My findings are tentative and subject to further research. This presentationrests on three paradoxes of great relevance to Muslims in the West.The first paradox is that, from the point of views of Muslims in the West,western secularism might be good news and western materialism might bebad news. In other words, western secularism is perhaps a blessing in disguisefor Muslims, whereas western materialism is a curse. The secondparadox is that recent Republican, rather than Democratic, foreign policyhas been more friendly to Muslims, wherea Democratic, rather thenRepublican, domestic policies are probably more friendly to Muslims. Thethird paradox concerns the two Islams in the United States: indigenou andimmigrant. In the United States, western secularism has protected minorityreligious groups by insisting on the separation of church and state. Thisis as major reason why American Jews have been among the greatestdefenders of the separation of church and state, for any breach could leadto the imposition of some practices of the religious majority, such as forcingJewish children to participate in Christian prayers at school.The secular state permits religious minorities to practice their religionsin relative peace. Of course, like all doctrines, secularism has its fanaticwho sometimes want to degrade, rather than protect, the sacred. But at itsbest, a secular state is a refuge of safety for minority religions. It is in thissense that western secularism is a friend of Muslims living in the West.But while secularism represents a divorce from formal religion, materialismis a dilution of spirituality. One can be without a formal religion andstill be deeply spiritual in a humanistic sense. John Stuart Mill and BertrandRussell, for example, had no formal religion, yet each had deeply spiritualvalues. Albert Schweitzer, the Nobel Laureate for Peace and an eventualagnostic, remained deeply committed to the principle of reverence for life,even to the extent of protecting the lives of insects in Africa ...
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Ghannouchi, Rached. "The state and religion in the fundamentals of Islam and contemporary interpretation." Contemporary Arab Affairs 6, no. 2 (April 1, 2013): 164–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2013.783184.
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From a historical perspective, there has always existed a distinction between the state and religion in Islam, yet no separation. Moreover, there are many types of secularism and many interpretations in Islam. The elite in Tunisia adopts the French type of secularism whereby a most complete separation between the state and religion exists. The case advanced here is that a large part of the unfolding discussions and debates in the context of the ongoing struggle is based on an ambiguous understanding of secularism and Islam. Secularism is not an atheist philosophy, but a series of arrangements and measures designed to ensure freedom of thought and belief. The way of arriving at an equation that guarantees people's rights and freedoms is by delineating religion's constants and variables. Modern democratic mechanisms are the best manifestation of shura in Islam, whereby interpretation is no longer an individual act but a collective one performed by the people's representatives.
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Iftikhar, Ifra, Irem Sultana, and Rao Shahid Mahmood Khan. "Exploring the Idea of Secularism among Media Students." Global Mass Communication Review V, no. III (September 30, 2020): 73–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gmcr.2020(v-iii).06.
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Secularism is the most misunderstood and misconstrued term. The study analyses the comprehension of the concept of secularism in the minds of youth in Pakistan. A brief survey was conducted among 200 media students in a public university, and four focus groups were conducted to explore their understanding of secularism and its relationship with Islam. The survey was comprised of straight forward three items asking for unambiguous responses. The findings revealed that secularism, by any definition, and are not an unambiguous notion for the youth in Pakistan despite the fact that contemporary Muslim religious scholars do not view secularism as a negation of Islam. Secularism to them represents a concept in competition with traditional religion. It is essentially linked to the issues of ethical particularism rather than a neutral, positive ideology that asks for the separation of state and religion.
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Daun, Holger. "Islam, Christianity and Secularism in European Education." Policy Futures in Education 6, no. 6 (January 2008): 730–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.2304/pfie.2008.6.6.730.
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Pace, Enzo. "Umut Azak, Islam and Secularism in Turkey." Archives de sciences sociales des religions, no. 152 (December 31, 2010): 9–242. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/assr.22626.
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Firmonasari, Aprilia, Wening Udasmoro, and Yohanes Tri Mastoyo. "Understanding Secularism and National Identity in French Political Discourses." Jurnal Humaniora 32, no. 2 (June 1, 2020): 135. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/jh.55450.
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The concept of secularism or laicité is expressed in political discourses in various ways by the French presidential candidates in the 2017 campaign. Both candidates, Emmanuel Macron (EM) and Marine Le Pen (MLP) used specific forms and lingual expressions to explain secularism and national identity, especially those related to ‘Islam’, ‘immigration’ and ‘terrorism’. This study uses critical discourse analysis linked to their parties’ ideologies based on identity, activities, goals, norms, and values. In the discourses presented by EM and MLP, Islam is associated with religion, Muslims, jihad, Islamic fundamentalists, the burqa, and secularism. The results of discourse analysis show that EM’s and MLP’s discourses on secularism and Islam are notably different. MLP views secularism in France as being under threat due to external threats, namely immigrants and in particular Muslim immigrants. In contrast, EM views secularism as a concept to support and protect the identity of the nation and to support and to add to the diversity of French culture and identity. The findings of this research is that French concepts of national identities, which is closely related to secularism, correlates to the ideologies of the respective presidential candidates’ parties. The relationships between the parties’ ideologies, national identities, and discourses investigated in this research can be used as a methodology for political discourses, especially French political discourses.
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Syaifuddin, Helmy. "ISLAM DAN NEGARA: Otoritas dan Kekuasaan dalam Pemikiran Islam." ULUL ALBAB Jurnal Studi Islam 6, no. 1 (December 26, 2018): 85–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.18860/ua.v6i1.6174.
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Moslem world at first only understands the concept of religious and political territory; dar al Islam and dar al harb. Since the concept of state-nation as political system entity which modernism brings has covered Islamic nation, there emerges a conceptual and historical tension on the relation between Islam and politics. The presence of state-nation which holds ethnicity as the basic criteria and foundation has taken over religious stand as the attachment of national identity. It is replaced by the emergence of sense of culture and demography as well as nationalism. The idea of state-nation has replaced the idea of Islamic order for nation. This fact leads the swift of the authority and power the leader has. Within the context of tension between Islam and politics, Muhammad Arkoun proposed the solution by redefining the concept of the authority and power. It is to accept the idea of state-nation with its secular view. He argued that political regime of Moslem world after colonialism is de facto secular and controlled by Western paradigm. Therefore, Moslem can revise the idea of secularism and the regime position committed to secularism to be Islamic-based by doing great diffusion, or what Arkoun called as intellectual modernity
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Chen, Yang. "From Radical Secularism to Islamic NationalismThe Historical Evolution of Politico-Religious Relationship in Turkey." Sociology of Islam 8, no. 1 (February 24, 2020): 110–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22131418-00801003.
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Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (jdp) has continuously won elections and consolidated its power since 2002, while Turkish society has become increasingly conservative at the same time. The official implementation of the presidential system after June 2018 has triggered the world’s concerns and reflections about the future direction of Turkish society: a secular road, an Islamic road, or a new path of balance between religion and secularism. This necessitates an historical analysis of Turkey’s politico-religious relations. The role of Islam in Turkish society can be roughly divided into the following five stages: the suppression of Islam (1923–1950), the release of Islam (1950–), the re-politicization of Islam (1970–), the co-optation of Islam (1980–), and the new development of political Islam (2002–). During the jdp period, a fragile balance between secularism and Islamism had been achieved. But after the July 15th coup in 2016, the jdp adjusted its ideology from radical secularism to Islamic nationalism. The combination of Islamism and nationalism brings more challenges to the solidarity of Turkish society.
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Rahman, Md Mizanur. "Triangular Confluence: Islam and Modernity in Bangladesh." Journal of Asian and African Studies 53, no. 6 (December 28, 2017): 866–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0021909617747639.
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This paper attempts to investigate modernity in contemporary Bangladesh, going beyond the Secularism–Islamism binary, and arguing that modernity in Bangladesh should be understood by considering the triangular confluence of the impact of the Bengal Renaissance, the rise of Islamism, and the consequences of globalization. Based on history, the paper describes the movements and mechanisms of liberalist and Islamist modernizing approaches and examines their impact on dominant modernization debates in present Bangladesh. This paper examines why secularism became so contested in Bangladesh, why the conservative branch of Islamic modernity became dominant, and the complexities that globalization has added to modernity in Bangladesh.
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Rahnema, S., and H. Moghissi. "Introduction: Secularism and Islamism: Iran and Beyond." Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 31, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 1–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/1089201x-2010-045.
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Dickinson, Eerik. "Iran and Islam." Iranian Studies 31, no. 3-4 (September 1998): 625–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00210869808701937.
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Mujibuddin, M., and Rina Zuliana. "Post-Sekulerisme Islam Populis di Indonesia." JSW: Jurnal Sosiologi Walisongo 3, no. 1 (April 15, 2019): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.21580/jsw.2019.3.1.3486.
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<p>This article explores the phenomenology of post-secularism in Indonesia. Populist Islamic movement strike for islamization public sphere as a sign of post-secularism in Indonesia. The islamization proceeded both in government dan the public sphere. These phenomena show that the community of urban Muslims can’t leave religious aspects in the public sphere. This research uses the qualitative-description method and library research models. The first result of this research shows that Islamic populism is coming from the urban Muslim middle class who have access to the modern world. Second, the populist Islamic movement who did islamization of the public sphere shows the strengthening of religion's role in the public sphere.</p><p> </p><p> </p>
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ISMAIL, A. ILYAS. "ISLAM PROGRESIF INDONESIA." ALQALAM 36, no. 01 (June 30, 2019): 67. http://dx.doi.org/10.32678/alqalam.v29i1.570.
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Theofogicaffy, Islam is one and absolutely correct. However, historicaffy, after being understood and translated into the real life, Islam is not single, but various or plural that manifests at feast in three schools of thoughts: Traditional Islam, Revivalist Islam (fundamentalism), and Liberal Islam (Progressive). The group of Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) represents the fast school of thoughts. Even though it is stiff young (ten years), JIL becomes populer because it frequentfy proposes the new thoughts that often evoke controversions in the community. The reformation of thoughts proposed by JIL covers four areas: first, reformation in politics. In this context, JIL gives a priority to the idea of secularism; Second, reformation in socio-religion. Dealing with this, JIL proposes
the concept of pluralism; Third, reformation in individual freedom. In this case, JIL gives a priority to the idea of liberalism both in thoughts and actions;fourth, reformation in women. Regarding this, JIL proposes the idea of gender equaliry. This reformation thought of JIL receives pro and con in the community. On the one hand,some of them panne and fulminate it; on the other hand, the other ones support and give appreciation. In such situation, JIL grows as a thought and Islamic progressive movement in Indonesia.
Key Words: Islamic Thought, JIL, Secularism, Pluralism, Liberalism, and Gender Equality.
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