Academic literature on the topic 'Islamist parties'
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Journal articles on the topic "Islamist parties"
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Cavatorta, Francesco, and Raquel Ojeda Garcia. "Islamism in Mauritania and the narrative of political moderation." Journal of Modern African Studies 55, no. 2 (May 8, 2017): 301–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x17000039.
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ABSTRACTThe rise of Islamism following the Arab Spring has renewed interest in the democratic credibility of Islamist parties and movements. Focusing on the case of Mauritania's Islamists this article analyses the validity of the moderation hypothesis and argues that for some Islamist parties, moderation, when historically situated, has always been a key trait. The case of Mauritanian Islamism is interesting because it takes place within an intellectual and geographical place that straddles both the Arab world and sub-Saharan Africa, therefore providing insights on how Islamism has become an influential ideological framework in both worlds, that are much less separate than superficially believed.
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Khairullin, T. R. "Trends in Political Islam: Transition towards Liberalization." Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences 92, S2 (June 2022): S100—S104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1134/s1019331622080056.
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Abstract The evolution of Islamism/political Islam as an ideological system is analyzed. This system was formed in the 1970s‒1980s and initially played the role of a progressive and alternative model, replacing the previously dominant ideas of Arab nationalism. However, the Islamists failed to fully achieve one of their main goals—the creation of an Islamic state—because of the deterrence of secular authoritarian states. The events in the Persian Gulf and the temporary drop in oil prices in the late 1990s aggravated the ideological crisis of Islamism and led to its rethinking. As a solution, a more liberal version of Islamism was proposed in the form of post-Islamism, which combined Islamic and democratic principles and was focused on duties rather than human rights. The next milestone in liberalizing Islamist ideas was the events of the Arab Spring, which led to a rethinking of post-Islamist ideas, as well as the liberalization and politization of the Salafi doctrine. Moreover, the failures of a number of Islamist parties in achieving political power, as well as the activities of radical Islamist groups, discredited Islamism among the population of the Middle East and North Africa. It is likely that the next crisis of Islamism will lead to its further liberalization or the formation of a new ideological model.
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García-Rivero, Carlos, Enrique Clari, and Joaquín Martín Cubas. "Islamist Political Parties and Parliamentary Representation in the Middle East and North Africa." Comparative Sociology 20, no. 4 (October 1, 2021): 441–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691330-bja10038.
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Abstract Over the past century, political Islam has taken the form of political parties and entered the electoral realm to gain institutional power. The Arab Spring sparked an unprecedented electoral advance of Islamists. New elections gave rise to new governments under the control of Islamist in several countries in the region which created a new political scenario unthinkable only a few years earlier. In comparison with the traditional political parties, little is known about Islamist parties as recently empowered political actors. Against this background, this article explores the origin of Islamist political parties in the MENA region, the evolution of their parliamentary representation and the causes that fuel the latter. The first section of the article describes the appearance and evolution of Islamist political parties and the context in which the latter took place. The second part analyses the economic and political factors that explain the evolution presented in part one
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Khairullin, Timur R. "Post-islamism: features, processes and prospects." Asia and Africa Today, no. 9 (2021): 34. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s032150750016589-9.
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The article is devoted to the analysis of such an ambiguous phenomenon as Post-Islamism, which emerged as an alternative to the ideas of Islamism that were subjected to the crisis in the 1990s. A distinctive feature of Post-Islamic ideas is their compatibility with the principles of democracy in a globalizing world. Unlike Islamism, Post-Islamism focuses on the rights of an individual instead of his duties. However, these progressive ideas could not become a full-fledged replacement for Islamism, since the decline in its popularity at the end of the XX century turned out to be temporary. The success of a number of Islamist parties in the parliamentary elections at the beginning of the XXI century became a confirmation of this. The events of the Arab Spring have made significant adjustments to the ideological architecture of the region. In the wake of the fall of authoritarian regimes and the growth of democratic calls for the expansion of human rights and freedoms, Islamist movements from moderate to ultra-radical have intensified. Against the background of the victory of moderate Islamists in the parliamentary elections in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, they again started talking about the onset of a phase of Post-Islamism. However, the failures of the Islamists in achieving political power and creating an Islamic state are more a tactical shift in their policy than a strategic one. Few Islamist movements have abandoned their goal of creating an Islamic State with the full application of Islamic law. Since Islamism is ambiguous, the boundaries between it and post-Islamism are still blurred and inaccurate. Despite this, post-Islamism is a more intellectual discourse about Islam and its place in the modern world and society.
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Yildirim, A. Kadir, and Caroline M. Lancaster. "Bending with the Wind: Revisiting Islamist Parties’ Electoral Dilemma." Politics and Religion 8, no. 3 (June 16, 2015): 588–613. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755048315000310.
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AbstractIslamist parties' electoral performance is a hotly debated question. Two arguments dominate the literature in terms of Islamist parties' performance in democratic elections. The conventional argument has been the “one man, one vote, one time” hypothesis. More recently, Kurzman and Naqvi challenge this argument and show that Islamists tend to lose in free elections rather than win them. We argue that existing arguments fall short. Specifically, we theorize that moderateness of Islamist platform plays a key role in increasing the popularity of these parties and leads to higher levels of electoral support. Using data collected by Kurzman and Naqvi, we test our hypothesis, controlling for political platform and political economic factors in a quantitative analysis. We find that there is empirical support for our theory. Islamist parties' support level is positively associated with moderateness; however, this positive effect of moderation is also conditioned by economic openness.
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Hanna, Michael Wahid. "Egypt's non-Islamist parties." Adelphi Series 55, no. 453-454 (February 17, 2015): 105–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2015.1131426.
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Zherlitsyna, Natalia A. "Post-Islamism: From Islamism to Muslim Democracy? Transformation of Islamist Parties in Tunisia and Morocco." Asia and Africa Today, no. 8 (2022): 50. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s032150750021339-4.
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The article analyzes the transformation of the parties of political Islam in and after coming to power as a result of the revolutionary events of the Arab Spring. It was then, in the 2010s, after decades of repression and isolation, that adherents of political Islam had the opportunity to become key players on the new political scene in the region. Political Islam as a modern ideology faces fundamental existential questions about the nature and relevance of Islamism as a political project, and the issue of Islamists’ participation in the political life of the Muslim world is becoming increasingly relevant. In Tunisia and Morocco, parties of political Islam have been given the opportunity to integrate and be recognized in the political arena. The inclusion of Islamists in legal political life in Tunisia and Morocco contributed to their ideological and political transformation, especially in relation to such complex issues as the relationship between religion and politics, issues of individual freedoms, human rights, minorities and women's issues. Scholars use the terms “post-Islamism” and “neo-Islamism” to define the changes that have taken place over the past decade. Which imply the transformation of socially conservative parties towards the adoption of the rules of a civil democratic political system and the rejection of the Islamization of society from above. The Tunisian Islamist party Ennahda and the Moroccan Justice and Development Party have gone through somewhat similar paths over the past decade, having passed through the crucible of power and taking responsibility for the processes taking place in their countries. They have also shown flexibility in finding compromises and drawing dividing lines between their religious preaching activities and politics. Both parties continue to strike a balance in combining the right doses of Islamism, democracy, pluralism, secularism and national interests.
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Tomac, Ayca. "‘Rejecting the Legacy, Restoring the Honor’: The Anti-Capitalist Muslims in Turkey." Religions 11, no. 11 (November 20, 2020): 621. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel11110621.
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Post-Islamism as coined by Asef Bayat in 1996 laid the framework to analyze rapid and fundamental changes in social and political life of the Muslim world. However, this paper argues that the scholarship around post-Islamism disregards neoliberal structuration introduced and expanded by post-Islamist parties and movements (such as the Justice and Development Party of Turkey). This structuration, coupled with the legacies of anti-left sentiments in preceding Islamist movements, stifles the Muslim youth in the region whose frustrations and aspirations are left silenced. Based on my ethnographic study between 2013 and 2017, the paper introduces the group of the Anti-Capitalist Muslims in Turkey as an internal challenge to the legacies of Islamist ideologies and the neoliberal politics of post-Islamism.
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Günay, Onur, and Erdem Yörük. "Governing ethnic unrest: Political Islam and the Kurdish conflict in Turkey." New Perspectives on Turkey 61 (October 31, 2019): 9–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/npt.2019.17.
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AbstractHow can we explain the mass appeal and electoral success of Islamist political parties? What are the underlying sources of the Islamist political advantage? Scholars have provided numerous answers to these widely debated questions, variously emphasizing the religious nature of the discourses in Islamist movements, their ideological hegemony, organizational capacity, provision of social services, reputation, and structural factors. However, one key aspect of Islamist movements has been underexplored in the current literature; namely, Islamists’ promises to resolve ethnic questions that remain unresolved in secularist nation-states. In this article, we argue that the extent to which Islamists govern ethnic unrest significantly shapes their electoral success and ability to establish broader hegemony. Based on ethnographic and sociological data, this article explores one particular recent electoral puzzle that reveals the limits of the scholarly literature on Islamist political advantage, examining the ethnic politics of the governing Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) in Turkey.
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Steuer, Clément. "Qu’est-ce qu’un parti fondé sur une base religieuse ? Interprétations concurrentes d’une catégorie juridique dans le contexte politique égyptien." Social Compass 66, no. 3 (July 12, 2019): 318–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0037768619855254.
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In Egypt, the ‘political parties with a religious basis’ are explicitly prohibited by law since 1977. However, this ban has had a negligible impact on political life, because administrative jurisprudence has since long diminished its scope, by reducing the question of the religious basis of a party to that of the confession of its members. Nevertheless, the secular opponents of the Islamists have repeatedly claimed, since the constitutionalization of this ban in January 2014, that it should be interpreted more strictly. This article first recalls how the Islamist and secular camps emerged during the political and constitutional struggles of the 2011–2013 era, before examining the competing interpretations of the notion of ‘religious party’, such as made by the administrative jurisprudence, by supporters of the ban on Islamist parties, and by the Islamists themselves.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Islamist parties"
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Butt, Tasnim. "Political party formation theories. The case of the Islamist parties of Pakistan." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/331092.
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Cette thèse se focalise sur les différentes théories qui traitent de la genèse des partis politiques. Elle consiste, dans un premier temps, à faire un inventaire de ces théories pour ensuite les appliquer aux principaux partis sunnites islamistes du Pakistan - la Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), la Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), la Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) et la Markazi Jamiat ahl-e-Hadith (MJAH). À travers cet exercice inédit, il s’agit d’évaluer la pertinence ou non de ces théories à expliquer la formation des partis confessionnels pakistanais.Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
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Yildirim, Abdulkadir. "Muslim Democratic Parties: Economic Liberalization and Islamist Moderation in the Middle East." The Ohio State University, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1280199427.
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Jonasson, Ann-Kristin. "At the Command of God? on the political linkage of Islamist parties /." Göteborg, Sweden : Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, Göteborg University [distributor], 2004. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/57584580.html.
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YILMAZ, BERNA. "DYNAMICS OF ISLAMIST PARTY MODERATION: THE CASE OF TURKEY." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2434/174076.
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The present dissertation takes issue with the ideological moderation of Islamist political parties, and tries to develop an explanatory model regarding the domestic conditions of such party ideological repositioning by drawing on the empirical evidence coming from the Islamist parties in Turkey. The research design consists of a longitudinal comparative study of six Islamist political parties that appeared on the Turkish political scene, and covers a time period of approximately three decades (1970-2001). The comparison, which is conducted using both historical comparative and statistical methods, aims at assessing the contribution of three distinct, yet interrelated factors to the ideological moderation of the Turkish Islamist movement in the late 1990s, which culminated into the birth of the Justice and Development Party. These factors are the socio-economic transformation of the Islamist constituency, the repressive policies of the Turkish state vis-à-vis Islamist political actors, and the exposure of these actors to moderating influences emanating from democratic institutions and practices. Through an in-depth examination of the ideological evolution of the Islamist parties in the above-mentioned period, a number of intervening variables that mediated between these factors and the outcome of ideological moderation are identified including the antagonistic relations between the secular state and Islamist businesses, the changing role of Islam in the official ideology of the Turkish state and the shifts in the distribution of power inside Islamist parties as they are manifested in changes in leadership and the dominant faction.
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Murniati, Sri. "Conditions for Moderation: Unpacking the Inclusion Experience of Islamist Parties in Three Different Political Systems in Indonesia." Ohio : Ohio University, 2008. http://www.ohiolink.edu/etd/view.cgi?ohiou1219832770.
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Bouzamondo, Tarek. "Islamisme et pouvoirs dans le monde arabe : les partis islamistes en Egypte et en Algérie." Aix-Marseille 3, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008AIX32087.
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Nous assistons depuis le début de ce siècle à en retour en force de l'islam politique dans sa forme non radicale et non violente. Les récents succès de certains partis islamistes dans le monde arabo-musulman sont là pour le démontrer. En Algérie, lors des dernières élections législatives, les partis islamistes modérés n'ont pas perdu de terrain malgré la domination des partis du pouvoir. Certains islamistes participent même aux gouvernements. En Egypte, la situation est tout à fait différentes et le débat politique est hermétiquement fermé aux islamistes depuis l'assassinat du président Sadate en 1981. Les Frères musulmans sont contraints par une sorte d'informalité politique à passer des alliances avec des partis de l'opposition ou bien de partir en cavalier seul lors des différentes écheances électorales. L'étude comparative de la trajectoire de ces partis et mouvements politiques en Egypte et en Algérie est importante pour mieux comprendre et cerner les rapports entre islamisme et pouvoir dans le monde arabeSince the beginning of the century, political islam has made a strong return in its non radical and non violent manner. Recent election successes of some islamist parties in the arabo-muslim world demonstrate this fact. In Algeria, at the occasion of the last legislative elections, moderate islamist parties did not decrease even if parties of the government dominate. Some islamists even participate in governments. In Egypt, the situation is totally different and the political debate is hermetically closed to islamist people ever since the murder of president Sadat in 1981. Because of their political informality, the Muslim brothers have to make alliances with opposition parties or have to face the different electoral deadlines alone. The comparative study of these parties and politic movements development in Egypt and Algeria is important to understand and precise links between Islamism and power in Arabic world
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Gencel, Sezgin Ipek. "Political engagement patterns of islamist movements : the case of the Nizam/Selamet movement." Paris, EHESS, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011EHES0046.
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Plus précisément, cette étude couvre la période 1960-1980 et examine la genèse du Mouvement Nizam/Selamet ainsi que son organisation en tant qu'un parti politique. I En outre, a travers ce travail sont mis en évidence ses objectifs et particularités : idéationnelles par rapport aux autres Islamistes passés et contemporains en Turquie, ainsi que sa souplesse considérable dans le choix de ses stratégies et alliés, à l'instar du Parti du Peuple Républicain, considéré comme le plus grand ennemi des Islamistes. En faisant usage du cas du Mouvement Nizam/Selamet, cette thèse soutient que Iles Mouvements Islamistes sont des phénomènes sociaux complexes qui émergent et i survivent à travers un processus incrémentaI faisant interagir des ensembles complexes voire même indéterminés de facteurs cognitifs, relationnels et environnementaux. La réponse à la question réside donc dans ces configurations de facteurs qui doivent être découverts en effectuant des allers retours entre des échelles macro (le champ politique), méso (l'organisation et les réseaux' sociaux) et micro (les acteurs) aux niveaux à la fois national et local du champ politique et du mouvement. Une dimension historique c’est aussi nécessaire qui permet d'étudier les facteurs interagissant au sein de chaque phase du mouvement qui lui donnent la forme et la substance de son engagement politique; et de prendre en compte de l’influence d’une phase sur l’autreFocusing on the Nizarn/Selamet Movement, this dissertation studies why and how there are variations in the political engagement patterns of "moderate" Islamist movements operating within the same institutional/political context. ; Specifically, covering a period from the 1960s through the 1970s, this study I examines why and how the Nizam/Selamet Movement emerged and established political party; produced goals and ideational elements distinct from contemporary and past Islamist movements in Turkey and showed considerable flexibility in its choice of allies, strategies and policies, including formation of a coalition government with the archenemy of the Islamists, the Republican People's Party. Drawing on the Nizam/Selamet case, this study argues that Islamist movements are complex social phenomena that emerge and survive through an incremental process entailing interacting, complex and even undetermined sets of cognitive, relational and environmental factors. The answer to the research question thus lies in unearthing these configurations through descending up and down the macro (political field), meso (network and organization) and micro (properties and trajectories of the movement elites ! and activists) echelons at both national and local levels of the political field and the movement. A historical dimension is also necessary to highlight intra-and extra-movement factors at different life phases of the movement (accumulated resources and inherited constraints), which shape the form and substance of its political engagement; and to take into consideration the influence of one stage over the other
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Ababneh, Sara. "Islamic political parties as a means of women's empowerment? : the case of Hamas and the Islamic Action Front." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.522830.
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Steuer, Clément. "L'émergence contrariée d'un groupe d'entrepreneurs politiques en Égypte : Le cas du hizb Al-Wasat." Thesis, Lyon 2, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011LYO22019/document.
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Le hizb Al-Wasat (parti du centre) a été fondé en 1996 par des Frères musulmans égyptiens dissidents. Son existence n'ayant jamais été reconnue par la Commission des partis, il appartient depuis 14 ans à la catégorie des partis taht al-tâ'sîs (en voie d'institutionnalisation). L'objectif de cette thèse est de comprendre comment les membres du Wasat s'efforcent d'avancer vers leur objectif – devenir des professionnels de la politique – avec peu de moyens et une marge d'action légale très réduite pour les organisations appartenant à cette catégorie.Ce travail s'appuie principalement sur deux corpus : une série de 29 entretiens menés au Caire au printemps 2008 avec la quasi-totalité des membres du Comité exécutif du Wasat et avec des membres d'autres mouvements d'opposition, et la « série textuelle chronologique » constituée par les quatre programmes du Wasat tels qu'ils ont été présentés lors de chaque saisine de la Commission des partis (1996, 1998, 2004 et 2009). Si ce dernier corpus se prête à une analyse lexicométrique, les travaux résultants de la transcription des entretiens – du fait de leur hétérogénéité – ont dû faire l'objet d'une catégorisation. Ce sont les données catégorisées qui ont ensuite été quantifiées et traitées statistiquement.Cette étude montre que le Wasat a évolué tant au niveau de la composition lexicale de ses énoncés programmatiques (passage d'un discours militant à un discours technocratique) que dans sa composition (aux militants fréristes des débuts sont venus s'adjoindre de nouveaux membres présentant des trajectoires militantes très différentes de celles des fondateurs). Par ailleurs, le Wasat a su se ménager une place dans un espace situé aux frontières des champs politique et intellectuel, notamment à travers les relations entretenues avec les intellectuels de la Wasatiya. Enfin, les membres de ce parti se sont insérés dans les réseaux de l'opposition égyptienne, et jouent un rôle dans son animationHizb Al-Wasat (the Center party) was founded in 1996 in Egypt by a group of former Muslim Brothers. Since it has never been formally accepted by the Party committee, it spent the 14 last years as a taht al-tâ'sîs (waiting for institutionalization) party. The objective of this thesis is to understand how the Wasat members are trying to achieve their goals – becoming professional politicians – with a little legal margin due to their taht al-tâ'sîs situation.This work is mainly relying on two corpuses: 29 interviews done in Cairo during the spring of 2008 with almost all the members of the Wasat executive committee and with several members of other opponent organizations, and the “chronological textual series” compounded of the four Wasat programs, as they have been presented to the Party committee for each of its case submissions (1996, 1998, 2004 and 2009). This last corpus has been studied through a lexicometric analysis. But the transcripts of the interviews – due to their heterogeneity – have first been translated into French, and then been categorized. Lastly, the categorized data have been studied by the means of statistics.Results of this study are showing that the semantic field of the Wasat program evolved since the beginning (from a militant to a technocratic discourse), as well as its membership (it attracted new members, with a different political background from founders). In addition, Wasat members succeed to manage for themselves a place in a space located at the boundaries of the intellectual and the political fields, particularly through their relations with some Wasatiya intellectuals. Finally, this party members became a part of the Egyptian opposition network, inside which they are playing a leading role
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Sukmajati, Mada [Verfasser], and Aurel [Akademischer Betreuer] Croissant. "HOW ISLAMIC PARTIES ORGANIZE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL IN POST-SUHARTO INDONESIA : An Empirical Study of Six Major Islamic Parties In The Tasikmalaya District, West Java Province / Mada Sukmajati ; Betreuer: Aurel Croissant." Heidelberg : Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg, 2011. http://d-nb.info/1179229843/34.
Full textBooks on the topic "Islamist parties"
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M, Rubin Barry, ed. Guide to Islamist movements. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2010.
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Ayan Musil, Pelin. The Transformation of Kurdish and Islamist Parties in Turkey. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06293-3.
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Schwedler, Jillian. Faith in moderation: Islamist parties in Jordan and Yemen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
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Jonasson, Ann-Kristin. At the command of God?: On the political linkage of Islamist parties. Göteborg: Dept. of Political Science, Göteborg University, 2004.
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When victory is not an option: Islamist movements in Arab politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012.
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Arat, Yeşim. Rethinking Islam and liberal democracy: Islamist women in Turkish politics. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005.
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Peaceful Islamist mobilization in the Muslim world: What went right. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009.
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Islamist opposition in authoritarian regimes: The Party of Justice and Development in Morocco. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011.
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The 21st Amendent Act of Pakistan: A matter of serious concern for Islamist parties in Pakistan. Islamabad: Center for Research & Security Studies, 2015.
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Barsalou, Judith Marie. Islamists at the ballot box: Findings from Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and Turkey. [Washington, D.C.]: United States Institute of Peace, 2005.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Islamist parties"
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Boubekeur, Amel. "Islamist Parties in Algeria." In Interpreting Islamic Political Parties, 167–89. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230100770_9.
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Zhang, Chuchu. "Theorizing Islamist Parties’ Mobilization at the Polls." In Islamist Party Mobilization, 23–49. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9487-4_2.
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Lounnas, Djallil. "Moderate Islamist parties in the MENA region and Europe." In Routledge Handbook of EU–Middle East Relations, 265–75. London: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429317873-28.
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Ayan Musil, Pelin. "Comparing Ethnic and Religious Parties in Turkey." In The Transformation of Kurdish and Islamist Parties in Turkey, 1–38. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06293-3_1.
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Ayan Musil, Pelin. "A Discursive Opportunity Structure to Confront the State." In The Transformation of Kurdish and Islamist Parties in Turkey, 81–101. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06293-3_3.
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Ayan Musil, Pelin. "Comparing the Origins of the AKP and the HDP." In The Transformation of Kurdish and Islamist Parties in Turkey, 39–79. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06293-3_2.
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Ayan Musil, Pelin. "Conclusion: Consequences on Regime Change." In The Transformation of Kurdish and Islamist Parties in Turkey, 163–79. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06293-3_5.
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Ayan Musil, Pelin. "State Repression, Issue-Ownership and the Populist Surge: Comparing the AKP and the HDP." In The Transformation of Kurdish and Islamist Parties in Turkey, 103–62. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06293-3_4.
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Aleef, Dastan. "Identity and Power—The Discursive Transformation of the Former Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan." In Between Peace and Conflict in the East and the West, 175–93. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77489-9_9.
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AbstractThe former Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) underwent a political transformation from an Islamist organization, partly responsible for armed mobilizations during the Civil War in Tajikistan (1992–1997), to a moderate and arguably democratic party from the early 2000s until 2015. The party defined and redefined its identity to fit both Islamic and secular democratic narratives. This research traced the evolution of the IRPT’s identity in light of critical events such as the change in leadership in 2006, and the Arab Spring. A discourse analysis of the IRPT’s main communication channel, Najot, from 2008 to 2015 has been conducted, which found three themes where strong articulations about identity were made: secularism, the Civil War, and the Islamic World. First, they challenged the core legislation regulating the triangular relationship of state, society, and religion; they justified political Islam; and they criticized what they called “secular extremism.” Second, the party produced a counter-narrative of Civil War actors and actions to that of the state. Third, they expressed solidarity with legal and controversial Islamic parties elsewhere, such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, or the Palestinian Hamas. This paper has found that the IRPT’s ideological transformation was limited due to the remaining Islamist elements in their discourse and the lack of clarity on the compatibility between Islamic and secular democratic programs.
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Pickel, Gert, and Cemal Öztürk. "The Varying Challenge of Islamophobia for the EU: On Anti-Muslim Resentments and Its Dividend for Right-Wing Populists and Eurosceptics—Central and Eastern Europe in a Comparative Perspective." In Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, 57–80. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54674-8_3.
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Abstract The so-called refugee crisis and the fear of Islamist terror have turned out to be serendipitous for right-wing populist parties. They portray themselves as defenders of the ‘Christian Occident’ and campaign against an ‘invasion of Muslims’ that was allegedly orchestrated by cosmopolitan elites of the EU. Against this backdrop, this chapter explores the linkage between anti-Muslim sentiments and Eurosceptic attitudes. The study shows that (1) there is a pan-European nexus between Islamophobia and Euroscepticism, (2) there is a nexus that is primarily driven by voters of right-wing populist parties and (3) the magnitude of Islamophobic attitudes differ, however, between societies. An anti-Muslim social climate is particularly widespread in Eastern Europe, where hardly any Muslims live. The contribution addresses the resulting implications for the legitimacy of the EU.
Conference papers on the topic "Islamist parties"
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Kuru, Ahmet T. "CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON ISLAMISM AND SECULARISM IN TURKEY: THE GÜLEN MOVEMENT AND THE AK PARTY." In Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement. Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.55207/mmwz7057.
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The debate between secularists and Islamic groups, a conspicuous feature of Turkish politics for decades, changed in the late 1990s when the political discourse of mainstream Islamic groups embraced secularism. The establishment elite advocate the existing French model of an ‘assertive secularism’, meaning that, in the public domain, the state supports only the ex- pression of a secular worldview, and formally excludes religion and religious symbols from that domain. The pro-Islamic conservatives, on the other hand, favour the American model of ‘passive secularism’, in which the state permits the expression of religion in the public do- main. In short, what Turkey has witnessed over the last decade is no longer a tussle between secularism and Islamism, but between two brands of secularism. Two actors have played crucial roles in this transformation: the Gülen movement and the Justice and Development (AK) Party. Recently the Gülen movement became an international actor and a defendant of passive secularism. Similarly, although the AK Party was originated from an Islamist Milli Görüş (National Outlook) movement, it is now a keen supporter of Turkey’s membership to the European Union and defends (passive) secularist, democratic regime. This paper analyses the transformation of these important social and political actors with regard to certain structural conditions, as well as the interactions between them.In April 2007, the international media covered Turkey for the protest meetings of more than a million people in three major cities, the military intervention to politics, and the abortive presidential election. According to several journalists and columnists, Turkey was experienc- ing another phase of the ongoing tension between the secularists and Islamists. Some major Turkish newspapers, such as Hürriyet, were asserting that the secularists finally achieved to bring together millions of opponents of the ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma (Justice and Development) (AK) Party. In addition to their dominance in military and judicial bureauc- racy, the secularists appeared to be maintaining the support of the majority of the people. The parliamentary elections that took place few months later, in July, revealed that the main- stream Turkish media’s presentation was misleading and the so-called secularists’ aspira- tions were unrealistic. The AK Party received 47 percent of the national votes, an unusual ratio for a multiparty system where there were 14 contesting parties. The main opposition, Cumhuriyet Halk (Republican People’s) Party (CHP), only received 21 percent of the votes, despite its alliance with the other leftist party. Both the national and international media’s misleading presentation of Turkish politics was not confined by the preferences of the vot- ers. Moreover, the media was primarily misleading with its use of the terms “Islamists” and “secularists.” What Turkey has witnessed for the last decade has not been a struggle between secularism and Islamism; but it has been a conflict between two types of secularism. As I elaborated else- where, the AK Party is not an Islamist party. It defends a particular understanding of secular- ism that differs from that of the CHP. Although several leaders of the AK Party historically belonged to an Islamist -Milli Görüş (National Outlook)- movement, they later experienced an ideational transformation and embraced a certain type of secularism that tolerates public visibility of religion. This transformation was not an isolated event, but part of a larger expe- rience that several other Islamic groups took part in. I argue that the AKP leaders’ interaction with the Gülen movement, in this regard, played an important role in the formation of the party’s new perspective toward secularism. In another article, I analyzed the transformation of the AK Party and Gülen movement with certain external (globalization process) and internal (the February 28 coup) conditions. In this essay, I will focus on the interaction between these two entities to explore their changing perspectives. I will first discuss the two different types of secularism that the Kemalists and conservatives defend in Turkey. Then, I will briefly summarize diverse discourses of the Milli Görüş and Gülen movements. Finally, I will examine the exchanges between the Gülen movement and the AK Party with regard to their rethinking of Islamism and secularism.
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Dubovetskaia, Ekaterina Leonidovna. "Dynamics of public opinion towards Islamists in the Arab Republic of Egypt at the beginning of the 21st century." In All-Russian Scientific Conference. Publishing house Sreda, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.31483/r-105446.
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The article describes the process of restructuring the Egyptian political field in the context of confrontation between representatives of the military elite and religious political movements in Egypt on the eve and after the events of the Arab Spring. The data of sociological surveys conducted by the Arab Barometer Center on the attitude of citizens towards Islamist parties and religious leaders in the MENA are analyzed. As a result of a comparative analysis of data for 2012–2014 with data obtained in 2018–2019, conclusions were drawn about a decrease in the level of trust of the population of the region in Islamists and a decrease in the level of religiosity in general. As a result of the historical analysis, the reasons that influenced this process are named, including the unsuccessful reforms of the Islamists and the rise of the extremist movement.
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Gurbuz, Mustafa. "PERFORMING MORAL OPPOSITION: MUSINGS ON THE STRATEGY AND IDENTITY IN THE GÜLEN MOVEMENT." In Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement. Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.55207/hzit2119.
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This paper investigates the Gülen movement’s repertoires of action in order to determine how it differs from traditional Islamic revivalist movements and from the so-called ‘New Social Movements’ in the Western world. Two propositions lead the discussion: First, unlike many Islamic revivalist movements, the Gülen movement shaped its identity against the perceived threat of a trio of enemies, as Nursi named them a century ago – ignorance, disunity, and poverty. This perception of the opposition is crucial to understanding the apolitical mind-set of the Gülen movement’s fol- lowers. Second, unlike the confrontational New Social Movements, the Gülen movement has engaged in ‘moral opposition’, in which the movement’s actors seek to empathise with the adversary by creating (what Bakhtin calls) ‘dialogic’ relationships. ‘Moral opposition’ has enabled the movement to be more alert strategically as well as more productive tactically in solving the everyday practical problems of Muslims in Turkey. A striking example of this ‘moral opposition’ was witnessed in the Merve Kavakci incident in 1999, when the move- ment tried to build bridges between the secular and Islamist camps, while criticising and educating both parties during the post-February 28 period in Turkey. In this way the Gülen movement’s performance of opposition can contribute new theoretical and practical tools for our understanding of social movements. 104 | P a g e Recent works on social movements have criticized the longstanding tradition of classify- ing social movement types as “strategy-oriented” versus “identity-oriented” (Touraine 1981; Cohen 1985; Rucht 1988) and “identity logic of action” versus “instrumentalist logic of ac- tion” (Duyvendak and Giugni 1995) by regarding identities as a key element of a move- ment’s strategic and tactical repertoire (see Bernstein 1997, 2002; Gamson 1997; Polletta 1998a; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). Bifurcation of identity ver- sus strategy suggests the idea that some movements target the state and the economy, thus, they are “instrumental” and “strategy-oriented”; whereas some other movements so-called “identity movements” challenge the dominant cultural patterns and codes and are considered “expressive” in content and “identity-oriented.” New social movement theorists argue that identity movements try to gain recognition and respect by employing expressive strategies wherein the movement itself becomes the message (Touraine 1981; Cohen 1985; Melucci 1989, 1996). Criticizing these dualisms, some scholars have shown the possibility of different social movement behaviour under different contextual factors (e.g. Bernstein 1997; Katzenstein 1998). In contrast to new social movement theory, this work on the Gülen movement indi- cates that identity movements are not always expressive in content and do not always follow an identity-oriented approach; instead, identity movements can synchronically be strategic as well as expressive. In her article on strategies and identities in Black Protest movements during the 1960s, Polletta (1994) criticizes the dominant theories of social movements, which a priori assume challengers’ unified common interests. Similarly, Jenkins (1983: 549) refers to the same problem in the literature by stating that “collective interests are assumed to be relatively unproblematic and to exist prior to mobilization.” By the same token, Taylor and Whittier (1992: 104) criticize the longstanding lack of explanation “how structural inequality gets translated into subjective discontent.” The dominant social movement theory approaches such as resource mobilization and political process regard these problems as trivial because of their assumption that identities and framing processes can be the basis for interests and further collective action but cannot change the final social movement outcome. Therefore, for the proponents of the mainstream theories, identities of actors are formed in evolutionary processes wherein social movements consciously frame their goals and produce relevant dis- courses; yet, these questions are not essential to explain why collective behaviour occurs (see McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). This reductionist view of movement culture has been criticized by a various number of scholars (e.g. Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Polletta 1997, 1999a, 1999b; Eyerman 2002). In fact, the debate over the emphases (interests vis-à-vis identities) is a reflection of the dissent between American and European sociological traditions. As Eyerman and Jamison (1991: 27) note, the American sociologists focused on “the instrumentality of movement strategy formation, that is, on how movement organizations went about trying to achieve their goals,” whereas the European scholars concerned with the identity formation processes that try to explain “how movements produced new historical identities for society.” Although the social movement theorists had recognized the deficiencies within each approach, the attempts to synthesize these two traditions in the literature failed to address the empirical problems and methodological difficulties. While criticizing the mainstream American collective behaviour approaches that treat the collective identities as given, many leading European scholars fell into a similar trap by a 105 | P a g e priori assuming that the collective identities are socio-historical products rather than cog- nitive processes (see, for instance, Touraine 1981). New Social Movement (NSM) theory, which is an offshoot of European tradition, has lately been involved in the debate over “cog- nitive praxis” (Eyerman and Jamison 1991), “signs” (Melucci 1996), “identity as strategy” (Bernstein 1997), protest as “art” (Jasper 1997), “moral performance” (Eyerman 2006), and “storytelling” (Polletta 2006). In general, these new formulations attempt to bring mental structures of social actors and symbolic nature of social action back in the study of collec- tive behaviour. The mental structures of the actors should be considered seriously because they have a potential to change the social movement behaviours, tactics, strategies, timing, alliances and outcomes. The most important failure, I think, in the dominant SM approaches lies behind the fact that they hinder the possibility of the construction of divergent collective identities under the same structures (cf. Polletta 1994: 91). This study investigates on how the Gülen movement differed from other Islamic social move- ments under the same structural factors that were realized by the organized opposition against Islamic activism after the soft coup in 1997. Two propositions shall lead my discussion here: First, unlike many Islamic revivalist movements, the Gülen movement shaped its identity against perceived threat of the triple enemies, what Nursi defined a century ago: ignorance, disunity, and poverty. This perception of the opposition is crucial to grasp non-political men- tal structures of the Gülen movement followers. Second, unlike the confrontational nature of the new social movements, the Gülen movement engaged in a “moral opposition,” in which the movement actors try to empathize with the enemy by creating “dialogic” relationships.
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Ihsan, A. "Islamic Political Parties in the Post-Truth Era." In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Social and Political Sciences, ICSPS 2019, 12th November 2019, Jakarta, Indonesia. EAI, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/eai.12-11-2019.2293532.
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Santoso, Rudi, Khairuddin, and Abdul Qodir Zaelani. "Islamic Legal Analysis on the Role and Functions of Islamic Political Parties in Indonesia." In 1st Raden Intan International Conference on Muslim Societies and Social Sciences (RIICMuSSS 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.201113.038.
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Jubba, Hasse, Zuly Qodir, Irwan Abdullah, Saifuddin Qudsy, Mega Hidayati, Mustaqim Pabbajah, Rabiatul Adawiah, Suparto Iribaram, and Misran Misran. "The Contestation of Islamic and Nationalists Parties in 2019 Election." In Proceedings of the First International Conference on Democracy and Social Transformation, ICON-DEMOST 2021, September 15, 2021, Semarang, Indonesia. EAI, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/eai.15-9-2021.2315552.
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Mayrudin, Yeby, and M. Chairil Akbar. "Identity Politics Within Indonesian Islamic Parties: Study of PKB and PKS." In Proceedings of the International Conference of Democratisation in Southeast Asia (ICDeSA 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icdesa-19.2019.58.
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Ridwan, Reztya, and Kamarudin Kamarudin. "Defense Factors of Islamic Political Parties in Election (Comparative study of Malaysian Islamic Parties (PAS) in Malaysia 2013 and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) di Indonesia 2014)." In Proceedings of the First International Conference on Administration Science (ICAS 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icas-19.2019.86.
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Harun, M., Nyoman Putra Jaya, and RB Sularto. "Criminal Accountability of Political Parties in Achieving Fair Election in Indonesia." In The First International Conference On Islamic Development Studies 2019, ICIDS 2019, 10 September 2019, Bandar Lampung, Indonesia. EAI, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/eai.10-9-2019.2289459.
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Jenko, Aladin. "Divorce problems Divorce from a man does not occur except in court model." In INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF DEFICIENCIES AND INFLATION ASPECTS IN LEGISLATION. University of Human Development, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.21928/uhdicdial.pp238-250.
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"Divorce is considered a form of family disintegration that leads to the demolition of the family and family pillars after its construction through the marriage contract and then the termination of all social ties between husband and wife and often between their relatives. Divorce rates have risen to frightening levels that threaten our Islamic societies. Among the most important causes of divorce in our society are the following: The failure of one or both spouses in the process of adapting to the other through the different nature of the spouses and their personalities, the interference of the parents, the lack of harmony and compatibility between the spouses, the bad relationship and the large number of marital problems, the cultural openness, the absence of dialogue within the family. Several parties have sought to develop possible solutions to this dangerous phenomenon in our society, including: Establishment of advisory offices to reduce divorce by social and psychological specialists, and include the issue of divorce within the educational and educational curricula in a more concerned manner that shows the extent of the seriousness of divorce and its negative effects on the individual, family and society, and the development of an integrated policy that ensures the treatment of the causes and motives leading to divorce in the community, as well as holding conferences. Scientific and enlightening seminars and awareness workshops and the need for religious institutions and their media platforms to play a guiding and awareness role of the danger and effects of divorce on family construction and society, and to educate community members about the dangers of divorce and the importance of maintaining the husband’s bond and stability. As well as reviewing some marriage legislation and regulations, such as raising the age of marriage and reconsidering the issue of underage marriage, which is witnessing a rise in divorce rates. Among the proposed solutions is the demand to withdraw the power of divorce from the man's hands and place it in the hands of the judge, to prevent certain harm to women, or as a means to prevent the frequent occurrence of divorce. The last proposition created a problem that contradicts the stereotypical image of divorce in Islamic law, for which conditions and elements have been set, especially since Islamic Sharia is the main source of personal status laws in most Islamic countries. Therefore, the importance of this research is reflected in the study of this solution and its effectiveness as a means to prevent the spread of divorce, and not deviate from the pattern specified for it according to Sharia."
Reports on the topic "Islamist parties"
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Yilmaz, Ihsan, and Kainat Shakil. Religious Populism and Vigilantism: The Case of the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), January 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.55271/pp0001.
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Religious populism and radicalism are hardly new to Pakistan. Since its birth in 1947, the country has suffered through an ongoing identity crisis. Under turbulent political conditions, religion has served as a surrogate identity for Pakistan, masking the country’s evident plurality, and over the years has come to dominate politics. Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) is the latest face of religious extremism merged with populist politics. Nevertheless, its sporadic rise from a national movement defending Pakistan’s notorious blasphemy laws to a “pious” party is little understood. This paper draws on a collection of primary and secondary sources to piece together an account of the party’s evolution that sheds light on its appeal to “the people” and its marginalization and targeting of the “other.” The analysis reveals that the TLP has evolved from a proxy backed by the establishment against the mainstream parties to a full-fledged political force in its own right. Its ability to relate to voters via its pious narrative hinges on exploiting the emotional insecurities of the largely disenfranchised masses. With violence legitimized under the guise of religion, “the people” are afforded a new sense of empowerment. Moreover, the party’s rhetoric has given rise to a vigilante-style mob culture so much so that individuals inspired by this narrative have killed in plain sight without remorse. To make matters worse, the incumbent government of Imran Khan — itself a champion of Islamist rhetoric — has made repeated concessions and efforts to appease the TLP that have only emboldened the party. Today, the TLP poses serious challenges to Pakistan’s long-standing, if fragile, pluralistic social norms and risks tipping the country into an even deadlier cycle of political radicalization.
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Yilmaz, Ihsan, Zahid Ahmed, Galib Bashirov, Nicholas Morieson, and Kainat Shakil. Islamist Populists in Power: Promises, Compromises and Attacks on Democratic Institutions. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), August 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.55271/pp0013.
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This paper comparatively examines the ruling religious populist governments in Turkey and Pakistan through a theoretical framework that focuses on populists’ promises, their compromises, and their attacks on democratic institutions. Through our three-legged framework, we examine how these religious populists behave in power and how strategic necessities, the realities of governing, and structural constraints shape their policies. Similar to the other populists in other parts of the world, before coming to power, Islamist populists make sweeping promises to the people and quick fixes to major problems of the country—most famously, quick and substantial economic development. While they may want to retain their uncompromising style and lofty goals, the realities of governing force populists to make serious compromises to their designated ‘enemies’ and on their values once they are in power. Finally, like other authoritarian politicians, Islamist populists attack formal institutions of democracy such as the judiciary, the media, and civil society; they politicize them, evacuate them, and eventually capture them from within. Keywords: Religion, populism, Islamism, authoritarianism, populists in power, democratic backsliding, Turkey, Pakistan
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Yilmaz, Ihsan. The AKP’s Authoritarian, Islamist Populism: Carving out a New Turkey. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), February 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.55271/op0005.
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The global tide of populism will leave a profound mark on Turkey. The ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) success during the past two decades, has hinged on Islamist authoritarian populism and been driven by its long-time leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. “New Turkey” is now a reality. The AKP has been successful at dismantling the Kemalist ideals – ironically, perhaps, by using similarly repressing techniques, such as cracking down on civil liberties and democratic rights.
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Yilmaz, Ihsan, Syaza Shukri, and Kainat Shakil. The Others of Islamist Civilizational Populism in AKP’s Turkey. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), February 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.55271/pp0018.
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Turkey’s history and politics allow populism and Sunni Islamist civilizationalism to thrive. The ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) use of Islamist authoritarian populism in its second decade of power has widened its “otherization” of political opponents, non-Muslims, non-Sunnis, ethnic minorities, vulnerable groups, and all those who reject the AKP’s views and democratic transgressions. To comprehend how Erdogan and his deft colleagues leverage identities of Sunni Islam and Turkish ethnicity, alongside pre-existing collective fears to develop populist authoritarianism, in this article, each category of “the others” is investigated through the lens of civilizational populism. This article specifically delves into the “otherization” process towards the Kemalists, secularists and leftists/liberals, Kurds, Alevis, and practicing Sunni Muslim Gulen Movement. The different methods of AKP’s civilizational populist “otherization” continues to polarize an already divided Turkish nation, generating incalculable harm.
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HEFNER, Robert. IHSAN ETHICS AND POLITICAL REVITALIZATION Appreciating Muqtedar Khan’s Islam and Good Governance. IIIT, October 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.47816/01.001.20.
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Ours is an age of pervasive political turbulence, and the scale of the challenge requires new thinking on politics as well as public ethics for our world. In Western countries, the specter of Islamophobia, alt-right populism, along with racialized violence has shaken public confidence in long-secure assumptions rooted in democracy, diversity, and citizenship. The tragic denouement of so many of the Arab uprisings together with the ascendance of apocalyptic extremists like Daesh and Boko Haram have caused an even greater sense of alarm in large parts of the Muslim-majority world. It is against this backdrop that M.A. Muqtedar Khan has written a book of breathtaking range and ethical beauty. The author explores the history and sociology of the Muslim world, both classic and contemporary. He does so, however, not merely to chronicle the phases of its development, but to explore just why the message of compassion, mercy, and ethical beauty so prominent in the Quran and Sunna of the Prophet came over time to be displaced by a narrow legalism that emphasized jurisprudence, punishment, and social control. In the modern era, Western Orientalists and Islamists alike have pushed the juridification and interpretive reification of Islamic ethical traditions even further. Each group has asserted that the essence of Islam lies in jurisprudence (fiqh), and both have tended to imagine this legal heritage on the model of Western positive law, according to which law is authorized, codified, and enforced by a leviathan state. “Reification of Shariah and equating of Islam and Shariah has a rather emaciating effect on Islam,” Khan rightly argues. It leads its proponents to overlook “the depth and heights of Islamic faith, mysticism, philosophy or even emotions such as divine love (Muhabba)” (13). As the sociologist of Islamic law, Sami Zubaida, has similarly observed, in all these developments one sees evidence, not of a traditionalist reassertion of Muslim values, but a “triumph of Western models” of religion and state (Zubaida 2003:135). To counteract these impoverishing trends, Khan presents a far-reaching analysis that “seeks to move away from the now failed vision of Islamic states without demanding radical secularization” (2). He does so by positioning himself squarely within the ethical and mystical legacy of the Qur’an and traditions of the Prophet. As the book’s title makes clear, the key to this effort of religious recovery is “the cosmology of Ihsan and the worldview of Al-Tasawwuf, the science of Islamic mysticism” (1-2). For Islamist activists whose models of Islam have more to do with contemporary identity politics than a deep reading of Islamic traditions, Khan’s foregrounding of Ihsan may seem unfamiliar or baffling. But one of the many achievements of this book is the skill with which it plumbs the depth of scripture, classical commentaries, and tasawwuf practices to recover and confirm the ethic that lies at their heart. “The Quran promises that God is with those who do beautiful things,” the author reminds us (Khan 2019:1). The concept of Ihsan appears 191 times in 175 verses in the Quran (110). The concept is given its richest elaboration, Khan explains, in the famous hadith of the Angel Gabriel. This tradition recounts that when Gabriel appeared before the Prophet he asked, “What is Ihsan?” Both Gabriel’s question and the Prophet’s response make clear that Ihsan is an ideal at the center of the Qur’an and Sunna of the Prophet, and that it enjoins “perfection, goodness, to better, to do beautiful things and to do righteous deeds” (3). It is this cosmological ethic that Khan argues must be restored and implemented “to develop a political philosophy … that emphasizes love over law” (2). In its expansive exploration of Islamic ethics and civilization, Khan’s Islam and Good Governance will remind some readers of the late Shahab Ahmed’s remarkable book, What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic (Ahmed 2016). Both are works of impressive range and spiritual depth. But whereas Ahmed stood in the humanities wing of Islamic studies, Khan is an intellectual polymath who moves easily across the Islamic sciences, social theory, and comparative politics. He brings the full weight of his effort to conclusion with policy recommendations for how “to combine Sufism with political theory” (6), and to do so in a way that recommends specific “Islamic principles that encourage good governance, and politics in pursuit of goodness” (8).
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Cesur, Resul, and Naci Mocan. Does Secular Education Impact Religiosity, Electoral Participation and the Propensity to Vote for Islamic Parties? Evidence from an Education Reform in a Muslim Country. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w19769.
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Ihsan, Yilmaz, and Raja Ali M. Saleem. The nexus of religious populism and digital authoritarianism in Pakistan. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), December 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.55271/pp0016.
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Pakistan has a turbulent political history. In the seven decades since its creation, the country has faced four military-led dictatorships and another two decades under indirect military rule. Given this political trend, authoritarianism is not a novel phenomenon in the country. Digital authoritarianism, however, is a relatively new domain of oppression. This paper looks at how a political party in power and the “establishment” (military elite and its civilian collaborators) have been increasing the control of digital mediums as well as weaponizing space. This dual control and usage allow for growing digital authoritarianism. Using the case study of Imran Khan’s government (2018-2022) and its collaboration with the military establishment in enforcing digital authoritarianism, this article uses four levels of an assessment of internet governance in Pakistan (whole network level, sub-network level, proxy level, and user level). In addition, the role of Khan’s political party’s Islamist populist outlook in contributing to authoritarianism is also discussed. A lot of censorship happens around ideas of protecting Islam and Pakistan’s Muslim identity. The review also finds that the establishment uses not only religion but also ultra-nationalism and fears of foreign attacks, primarily by “Hindu” India, as means to closely surveil and curb the rights of citizens which it deems not worthy of trust. Our results find that Pakistan’s digital space is highly oppressive where ideas of religion, ontological insecurity, and nationalism are weaponized to legitimize the state’s growing authoritarianism.
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Oduncu, Arif. Country Diagnostic Study – The Kyrgyz Republic. Islamic Development Bank Institute, December 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.55780/rp21001.
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The Country Diagnostic Study (CDS) for the Kyrgyz Republic uses the Hausmann-Rodrik-Velasco growth diagnostics model to identify the binding constraints being faced in its quest for higher and more sustained economic growth and make recommendations to relax these constraints. Hence, the findings of the CDS can help the Islamic Development Bank in identifying areas where it can have a greater impact and provide an evidence-basis to support the development of the Member Country Partnership Strategy (MCPS). During the last two decades, the Kyrgyz Republic has recorded low performance in economic development. The country recorded only 3.0 percent of average annual Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)-adjusted Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita growth from 2000 to 2019. The Kyrgyz Republic is facing several economic and social problems that are challenging its economic development model. This CDS report shows that the most binding constraints to inclusive and sustainable growth include i) low human capital, ii) poor infrastructure, iii) government and market failures, and iv) high cost of capital. The Kyrgyz development model’s performance is a subject of concern not only for the government and other local stakeholders but also for the technical and financial partners of the Kyrgyz Republic, including the Islamic Development Bank. The MCPS aims to contribute to the global efforts made by the Kyrgyz Republic to meet its economic and social needs through leveraging opportunities offered by the new business model of the Bank. Given the Kyrgyz Republic’s positives, the Bank can consider financing transport, energy and ICT infrastructure projects and supporting manufacturing and agricultural sectors to assist economic growth.
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Yilmaz, Ihsan, Raja M. Ali Saleem, Mahmoud Pargoo, Syaza Shukri, Idznursham Ismail, and Kainat Shakil. Religious Populism, Cyberspace and Digital Authoritarianism in Asia: India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey. European Center for Populism Studies, January 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.55271/5jchdy.
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Turkey, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia span one of the longest continuously inhabited regions of the world. Centuries of cultural infusion have ensured these societies are highly heterogeneous. As plural polities, they are ripe for the kind of freedoms that liberal democracy can guarantee. However, despite having multi-party electoral systems, these countries have recently moved toward populist authoritarianism. Populism —once considered a distinctively Latin American problem that only seldom reared its head in other parts of the world— has now found a home in almost every corner of the planet. Moreover, it has latched on to religion, which, as history reminds us, has an unparalleled power to mobilize crowds. This report explores the unique nexus between faith and populism in our era and offers an insight into how cyberspace and offline politics have become highly intertwined to create a hyper-reality in which socio-political events are taking place. The report focuses, in particular, on the role of religious populism in digital space as a catalyst for undemocratic politics in the five Asian countries we have selected as our case studies. The focus on the West Asian and South Asian cases is an opportunity to examine authoritarian religious populists in power, whereas the East Asian countries showcase powerful authoritarian religious populist forces outside parliament. This report compares internet governance in each of these countries under three categories: obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights. These are the digital toolkits that authorities use to govern digital space. Our case selection and research focus have allowed us to undertake a comparative analysis of different types of online restrictions in these countries that constrain space foropposition and democratic voices while simultaneously making room for authoritarian religious populist narratives to arise and flourish. The report finds that surveillance, censorship, disinformation campaigns, internet shutdowns, and cyber-attacks—along with targeted arrests and violence spreading from digital space—are common features of digital authoritarianism. In each case, it is also found that religious populist forces co-opt political actors in their control of cyberspace. The situational analysis from five countries indicates that religion’s role in digital authoritarianism is quite evident, adding to the layer of nationalism. Most of the leaders in power use religious justifications for curbs on the internet. Religious leaders support these laws as a means to restrict “moral ills” such as blasphemy, pornography, and the like. This evident “religious populism” seems to be a major driver of policy changes that are limiting civil liberties in the name of “the people.” In the end, the reasons for restricting digital space are not purely religious but draw on religious themes with populist language in a mixed and hybrid fashion. Some common themes found in all the case studies shed light on the role of digital space in shaping politics and society offline and vice versa. The key findings of our survey are as follows: The future of (especially) fragile democracies is highly intertwined with digital space. There is an undeniable nexus between faith and populism which offers an insight into how cyberspace and politics offline have become highly intertwined. Religion and politics have merged in these five countries to shape cyber governance. The cyber governance policies of populist rulers mirror their undemocratic, repressive, populist, and authoritarian policies offline. As a result, populist authoritarianism in the non-digital world has increasingly come to colonize cyberspace, and events online are more and more playing a role in shaping politics offline. “Morality” is a common theme used to justify the need for increasingly draconian digital laws and the active monopolization of cyberspace by government actors. Islamist and Hindutva trolls feel an unprecedented sense of cyber empowerment, hurling abuse without physically seeing the consequences or experiencing the emotional and psychological damage inflicted on their victims.
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Yilmaz, Ihsan, Raja M. Ali Saleem, Mahmoud Pargoo, Syaza Shukri, Idznursham Ismail, and Kainat Shakil. Religious Populism, Cyberspace and Digital Authoritarianism in Asia: India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), January 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.55271/rp0001.
Full textAbstract:
Turkey, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia span one of the longest continuously inhabited regions of the world. Centuries of cultural infusion have ensured these societies are highly heterogeneous. As plural polities, they are ripe for the kind of freedoms that liberal democracy can guarantee. However, despite having multi-party electoral systems, these countries have recently moved toward populist authoritarianism. Populism —once considered a distinctively Latin American problem that only seldom reared its head in other parts of the world— has now found a home in almost every corner of the planet. Moreover, it has latched on to religion, which, as history reminds us, has an unparalleled power to mobilize crowds. This report explores the unique nexus between faith and populism in our era and offers an insight into how cyberspace and offline politics have become highly intertwined to create a hyper-reality in which socio-political events are taking place. The report focuses, in particular, on the role of religious populism in digital space as a catalyst for undemocratic politics in the five Asian countries we have selected as our case studies. The focus on the West Asian and South Asian cases is an opportunity to examine authoritarian religious populists in power, whereas the East Asian countries showcase powerful authoritarian religious populist forces outside parliament. This report compares internet governance in each of these countries under three categories: obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights. These are the digital toolkits that authorities use to govern digital space. Our case selection and research focus have allowed us to undertake a comparative analysis of different types of online restrictions in these countries that constrain space foropposition and democratic voices while simultaneously making room for authoritarian religious populist narratives to arise and flourish. The report finds that surveillance, censorship, disinformation campaigns, internet shutdowns, and cyber-attacks—along with targeted arrests and violence spreading from digital space—are common features of digital authoritarianism. In each case, it is also found that religious populist forces co-opt political actors in their control of cyberspace. The situational analysis from five countries indicates that religion’s role in digital authoritarianism is quite evident, adding to the layer of nationalism. Most of the leaders in power use religious justifications for curbs on the internet. Religious leaders support these laws as a means to restrict “moral ills” such as blasphemy, pornography, and the like. This evident “religious populism” seems to be a major driver of policy changes that are limiting civil liberties in the name of “the people.” In the end, the reasons for restricting digital space are not purely religious but draw on religious themes with populist language in a mixed and hybrid fashion. Some common themes found in all the case studies shed light on the role of digital space in shaping politics and society offline and vice versa. The key findings of our survey are as follows: The future of (especially) fragile democracies is highly intertwined with digital space. There is an undeniable nexus between faith and populism which offers an insight into how cyberspace and politics offline have become highly intertwined. Religion and politics have merged in these five countries to shape cyber governance. The cyber governance policies of populist rulers mirror their undemocratic, repressive, populist, and authoritarian policies offline. As a result, populist authoritarianism in the non-digital world has increasingly come to colonize cyberspace, and events online are more and more playing a role in shaping politics offline. “Morality” is a common theme used to justify the need for increasingly draconian digital laws and the active monopolization of cyberspace by government actors. Islamist and Hindutva trolls feel an unprecedented sense of cyber empowerment, hurling abuse without physically seeing the consequences or experiencing the emotional and psychological damage inflicted on their victims.