Relevant bibliographies by topics / Israel Mossad

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Israel Mossad'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 28 July 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "Israel Mossad"

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Guttmann, Aviva. "Covert Diplomacy to Overcome a Crisis: West German and Israeli Intelligence after the Munich Olympics Attack." Journal of Cold War Studies 25, no. 4 (2023): 101–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01172.

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Abstract What happens among intelligence communities when two countries face a diplomatic crisis? This article looks at the interactions between the West German Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) and Israel's Mossad in a multilateral liaison called the Club de Berne after the Munich Olympics attack in September 1972. The article shows that these covert links were a means to overcome the crisis and served different functions for each side. For the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which had been severely criticized after giving in to terrorist pressure, the BfV tried to prove to Israel its value as a security asset. For Israel, the Club de Berne allowed Mossad to send a covert message that aimed to pressure the FRG into a no-negotiation line. For both, the agencies could build on preexisting relations based on trust in the Club de Berne, which helped with the normalization process after the crisis. Although diplomatic and domestic policies after the Munich attack are well known, the intelligence dimension has thus far not been explored. The article offers a new way of thinking about covert diplomacy in theory and practice.
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Friedman, James. "Arendt in Jerusalem, Jackson at Nuremberg: Presuppositions of the Nazi War Crimes Trials." Israel Law Review 28, no. 4 (1994): 601–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700011778.

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In 1961 the government of Israel brought criminal charges in Jerusalem against Adolf Eichmann, a former Obersturmbannfuher (Lt. Col.) in the S.S. Eichmann's name had frequently come up at the Nuremberg trials, as he had overseen the substantial task of transporting European Jews to Nazi concentration and death camps during the war. However, he was never tried at Nuremberg because he had evaded capture by allied armies and begun a new life in Argentina. In 1961 the Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, kidnapped Eichmann and brought him to Israel to stand trial. Given Eichmann's notoriety, and the rather unusual way in which Israel obtained in personam jurisdiction over him, it was not surprising that the trial received world-wide attention.In Jerusalem Eichmann was charged with violations of the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law of 1950.
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Kohavi, Itai, and Wojciech Nowiak. "THE IMPACT OF WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS ON ISRAELI NATIONAL SECURITY." Przegląd Strategiczny, no. 10 (December 15, 2017): 157–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/ps.2017.1.8.

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Since the 1967 war in the Middle East, The Israeli settlements in the West Bank have always been one of the most controversial topics in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This article deals with the question: What is the impact of the West Bank settlements on the national security of Israel? The approach used to explore these issues is face-to-face in-depth interviews, during 2016, with 27 high-ranking Israeli Generals from the Military Intelligence (Aman), the National Intelligence Agency (Mossad), the Internal Security Agency (Shabak), the National Security Council (Malal), the Planning Branch of the General Staff (Agat), and the Prime Minister’s close circle of advisors. The interviews revealed three perspectives on the importance of the settlements for the Israeli national security. The first, views the settlements as a contribution to the national security of Israel, the second, views the settlements as a heavy national security liability, and the third, views the question as an irrelevant one, explaining that no one asks if Tel Aviv is important for the national security of Israel. As securitization of political messages is arguably at least as common in Israel as in other countries, with immediate national security challenges, the detailed perspectives of the Israeli National Security Elite (INSE) helps to extract the professional security rationales from the misleading political clatter. The article can be of interest to policy makers and researchers who deal with national security in general and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular.
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Manin, Iaroslav, and Aleksandra Evgen'evna Klimashina. "State security of Israel: international and national legal aspects." Национальная безопасность / nota bene, no. 2 (February 2023): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0668.2023.2.39932.

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The object of the study is Israeli international and national legal relations to ensure the defense of the country and the security of the state, the subject is normative legal acts establishing the regime of protection of Israel from internal and external threats. The article discusses the international treaties of the State of Israel concerning weapons of mass destruction and the fight against terrorism, as well as Israeli documents on defense and security management. The authors pay attention to the genesis and evolution of the Israeli armed forces and special services, the peculiarities of their functioning. The institute of military duty and conscription for military service in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), current problems of the activities of the Mossad and AMAN intelligence services, as well as the general security service - Shin Bet (SHABAK) are considered in detail. The above practice of military administration in the State of Israel is relevant in the conditions of modern militarism. The researchers propose to use the Israeli experience of legislative regulation in the field of national defense and state security in the current Russian historical conditions. The scientific novelty of the work consists in presenting the reader with original information on the subject of the article, relevant conclusions and suggestions. The main ones are the conclusions about the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Israel, its deliberate postponement of the application of international legal acts on weapons of mass destruction in order to develop them and deter opponents. It is proposed, by analogy with Israeli legislation, to deprive Russian citizenship for crimes against the foundations of the constitutional order and security of the Russian Federation, extremism and terrorism. The article substantiates the introduction of universal military duty for Russian citizens using, by analogy, the Israeli system of deferrals from military service. It is proposed to train ordinary and non-commissioned personnel of the domestic armed forces in working professions, as in Israel, and the official granting of unlimited powers to Russian intelligence abroad.
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Lehrs, Lior. "The peacenik and the spook as the diplomatic avant-garde." Cooperation and Conflict 54, no. 4 (February 7, 2019): 544–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010836719827325.

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In conflicts between a state and a non-state actor, such as a paramilitary or terrorist organization, when no official diplomatic relations and recognition exists, there is a need for actors who can serve as a “diplomatic avant-garde.” This article identifies a diplomatic pattern in which breakthroughs occur through cooperative work between two types of actors: unofficial citizen diplomats and key figures in intelligence bodies. Each actor brings specific resources: unofficial actors have contacts with the non-state actor, while intelligence officers can offer backing from within the official system of the state. The article analyzes the topic using three case studies: Brendan Duddy and the MI6 officer Michael Oatley (UK and the Provisional IRA, 1975–1993); Willie Esterhuyse and the head of the South African National Intelligence Service, Neil Barnard (South African government and the ANC, 1987– 1990); and Gershon Baskin and the Mossad official David Meidan (Israel and Hamas, 2011). This study examines the unique relations between these two types of actors and how their collaboration promoted negotiations with non-state armed actors. It analyzes three stages: establishment of contact between these actors, persuasion of the relevant parties, and the breakthrough moment when talks shifted to an official back channel.
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Jorge, Bernardo Wahl G. de Araújo. "Israel e a Mossad "Spies against armageddon: inside Israel’s secret wars" de Dan Raviv e Yossi Melman (New York: Levant Books, 2012, 353p.)." Malala 3, no. 4 (April 4, 2015): 131. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.2446-5240.malala.2015.101779.

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Friedheim, Emmanuel. "Bar-Ilan Meir, Astrology and other Sciences among the Jews of Israel in the Hellenistic-Roman and Byzantine Periods, Jérusalem, Mossad Bialik, 2012." Tsafon, no. 68 (December 1, 2014): 162–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/tsafon.8869.

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Morag, Nadav. "The Head of the Mossad: In Pursuit of a Safe and Secure Israel. By Shabtai Shavit. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2020. ISBN 9780268108335. Hardcover. 434 Pages. $29.00." Journal of Strategic Security 14, no. 1 (April 2021): 125–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.14.1.1926.

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Rodman, David. "Mossad; Spies against Armageddon: inside Israel's secret wars." Israel Affairs 19, no. 4 (October 2013): 737–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2013.829619.

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Magen, Clila. "The Israeli Mossad and the media: Historical and theoretical perspectives." Public Relations Review 39, no. 2 (June 2013): 111–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2013.01.005.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Israel Mossad"

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Podracká, Petra. "Izraelská bezpečnosť a existenčné hrozby v 21. storočí." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2011. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-193796.

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This Master Thesis aims to present the current existential threats to Israeli security. Israel is a Jewish country in the middle of the Muslim region and her demise is wished by many involved parties. The Author describes sophisticated security systems of Israel, their efficiency and its unofficial nuclear program. From the state actors, it is Iran that has become the number one perceived threat in Israel thanks to its officials' rhetoric, its support towards terrorist organizations and its nuclear program. Israel is often involved in asymmetrical conflicts against non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah. The new extremist group Islamic State can also potentially pose a threat. Has Israel got reasons to worry about her existence? Has the Arab Spring brought about positives, negatives, or new possibilities? The Author aims to answer these questions.
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DeBrosse, Jim. ""Lost in the Master's Mansion": How the Mainstream Media Have Marginalized Alternative Theories of the JFK Assassination." Ohio University / OhioLINK, 2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1406818924.

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Kotler, Carmia. "O uso da arte como instrumento ideológico na fundação de Israel: estudo sobre \'Nos Passos da Consumpção, espetáculo em sete atos sobre os dias de Ezequias, rei de Judá, e Acaz, seu pai\', de Eliezer Lipa Ioffê." Universidade de São Paulo, 2014. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8152/tde-07112014-123522/.

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Esta tese trata da obra de Eliezer Lipa Ioffê Nos Passos da Consumpção, Espetáculo em sete atos sobre os dias de Ezequias, rei de Judá, e Acaz, seu pai, aqui traduzida para o português, e de outros textos escritos por ele, tendo como pano de fundo o renascimento da língua hebraica nos séculos XIX e XX. Trata também de elementos biográficos e do desenvolvimento do teatro na língua hebraica. A obra teatral de Ioffê impõe-se como forte crítica às ideias coletivistas, tidas como igualitárias, sintetizadas pelo kibuts, assim como a atitudes discutíveis dos políticos da época, com desdobramentos no presente. Como parte da tendência em Israel de publicações autobiográficas a respeito da vida no kibuts, este trabalho busca expor, num formato diferenciado, através da obra de Ioffê, a desconfiança acerca da aparente igualdade na vida comunitária do kibuts e ao mesmo tempo apresentar elementos sobre a opção de vida individualista oferecida pelo moshav ovdim, criado por Ioffê
This thesis analyses the use of art as an ideological tool in the founding of Israel through the study on Eliezer Lipa Ioffe´s theater play \"In the Footsteps of Consumption, spectacle in seven acts on the days of Hezekiah king of Judah and Akhaz his father and some other texts written by him. This work sets light on the revival of the Hebrew language in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and also deals with biographical elements and the development of Hebrew Language Theater. Ioffe´s theatrical work translated here to Portuguese imposes itself as a strong criticism against collectivist ideas, wich are considered egalitarian, synthesized in the kibutz life, as well as against controversial political attitudes of the time, with repercussions in the present. As part of the Israeli current trend of autobiographical publications about kibutz life, this work seeks to expose in a different format, through the work of Ioffe, the mistrust about the apparent equality in the kibutz community life, and on the same time present an \"individualistic\" life option offered by Moshav Ovdim, created by Ioffe
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Hawkins, Andrew. "Israeli Precision Strikes after the Second Intifada: On Target or Missing the Mark?" Master's thesis, 2015. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-333460.

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During the Second Intifada, Israel shocked the international community by becoming the first country in the world to publically announce an overt policy of targeted-killing. While utilized by Israel in previous conflicts, the Second Intifada was a turning point in Israeli history due to a series of dramatic changes introduced to its targeting policy which would sharply contrast those which were previously utilized. This diploma thesis analyzed thirty-eight cases of Israeli targeting operations conducted both before and during the Second Intifada to determine if the changes made to its policy during the Second Intifada resulted in more or less successful targeting operations compared to those conducted prior to this time period. The results of this study indicated that, following the introduction of the aforementioned policy changes, Israeli targeting operations during the Second Intifada were less successful than those conducted prior to this time period.
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Fenichel, Deborah Ruth. "Exhibiting ourselves as others : Jewish museums in Israel /." 2005. http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/fullcit/3199412.

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Books on the topic "Israel Mossad"

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Shavit, Shabtai. Rosh ha-Mosad: Head of Mossad. Rishon le-Tsiyon: Yediʻot aḥaronot, 2018.

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Mlechin, L. M. Mossad: Taĭnai︠a︡ voĭna. Moskva: T︠S︡entrpoligraf, 2000.

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Mosad, reshimah 14: Mossad, the list of 14. [Israel]: [Yaʼir Robel], 2016.

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Cherner, I︠U︡. Mossad: Pervye polveka. Moskva: Ripol klassik, 2003.

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Frattini, Eric. Mossad: Mânia israelului. București: Tritonic, 2009.

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Musci, Aldo. Breve storia del Mossad. Roma: Datanews, 2001.

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author, Arkin Dan, ed. Tevel u-meloʼah: Sipuro shel ish Mosad = One man's Mossad. Or Yehudah: Kineret, 2015.

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Taĭnye operat︠s︡ii "Mossad" i "Mukhabarat". Moskva: Kuchkovo pole, 2008.

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Hasan, Kaya, ed. Karanlıktaki adam: Bir mossad tarihi. İstanbul: Profil Yayıncılık, 2008.

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Opperskalski, Michael. Mossad: Israels Auftragskiller und Geheimagenten. Münster: Unrast, 1998.

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Book chapters on the topic "Israel Mossad"

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Allwardt, Ulrich. "Der Moshaw." In Israel, 56–57. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-01260-3_9.

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Keren, Michael, and David Levhari. "The Israeli Moshav as a Credit Union: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard." In Agricultural Cooperatives in Transition, 125–41. New York: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429041693-8.

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Zamir, Itzhak, and T. Allen Zysbla. "Meir Schnitzer and Others v.The Chief Military Censor and Others." In Public Law In Israel, 108–24. Oxford University PressOxford, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198258537.003.0006.

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Abstract What is the power of the ‘Military Censor’, operating in accordance with the Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945, to prohibit publication of a newspaper article which is critical of the role of the Chief of the Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations (‘Mossad’), and which contains information related to forthcoming changes in the leadership of the Mossad? This is the question that stands at the centre of the petition before us.
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Sonne, Werner. "Im Schattenreich: Der Mossad und der BND." In Israel und wir, 95–115. Verlag C.H.BECK oHG, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.17104/9783406820144-95.

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Heller, Joseph. "The United States and the crisis of the Six Day War (May 14–June 5, 1967)." In The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-67. Manchester University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9781526103826.003.0016.

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The Johnson administration was surprised by the mid-May crisis. Israel, far less surprised, expected the US to honour the promises it made in 1957. However, when the chips were down in 1967 the Sixth Fleet failed to prevent the Arab aggression However, Washington did nothing to stop the inevitable deterioration, since any movement in Israel’s favour meaning opening a new front in the cold war, while the Vietnam war was at its height, and the German problem was still a hot issue in the cold war. The visit of foreign minister Abba Eban and General Meir Amit, head of the Mossad, to the US to warn the administration about the danger of war did not move Johnson, Rusk and McNamara. Johnson’s policy was that ‘Israel will not be alone unless it decided to be alone’. No green light was given to Israeli decision-makers, who had no choice but to treat Nasser’s challenges as casus belli..
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Ginor, Isabella, and Gideon Remez. "The Soviets “Return” in October." In The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973, 293–300. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190693480.003.0026.

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As US-Soviet discussions continued to arrange another Nixon-Brezhnev summit in California, Israeli and American actors were increasingly convinced that the USSR had suffered a setback in Egypt with the “expulsion of advisers.” US statesman Henry Kissinger felt no urgency to comply with Soviet demands to reciprocate for the supposed Soviet concession by pressing Israel for an interim settlement, including withdrawal, until after the US election. In October, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was reported – among others, by Mossad informant Ashraf Marwan – to have revised war aims toward a limited advance in Sinai without the offensive weapons he had supposedly been denied by Moscow. Deceptive reports planted in the Western press claimed that this led to a rapprochement with the Soviets, and that their advisers began to return. Actually, they never left and the weapons flow continued unabated, but as these reports were quickly discredited the US and Israeli perceptions of an irrevocable Egyptian-Soviet rift were reinforced.
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Ginor, Isabella, and Gideon Remez. "“We Will be Two Ismails”." In The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973, 315–26. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190693480.003.0028.

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The failure of US President Richard Nixon to make good on his post-reelection vow to press Israel was evident when Prime Minister Golda Meir, visiting Washington in the spring of 1973, offered no concessions in return for continued arms supply. Reports from “Mossad spy” Ashraf Marwan and others of imminent Egyptian attack led Israel to call a costly alert in April; US statesman Henry Kissinger took credit for getting the Soviets to make Egyptian President Anwar Sadat delay the offensive until after a summit with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in California in June. But evidence shows that the ultimate timing of a joint offensive with Syria in October had already been determined. While Sadat’s envoy Hafez Ismail impressed Kissinger with peace proposals in Washington, War Minister Ahmed Ismail shuttled between Moscow and Damascus to coordinate war plans and weapons supplies. At the summit in August, Brezhnev took a belligerent stance. The USSR’s support for the impending attack was exemplified by delivery of Scud missiles with Soviet operators, and participation in the final councils of war.
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"Mossad: General." In The Israeli Secret Services, 13–24. Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203788134-3.

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"THE RURAL MOSHAV INDUSTRIALISATION PROCESS." In The Industrial Geography of Israel, 174–78. Routledge, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203038178-29.

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Ginor, Isabella, and Gideon Remez. "The Ultimate Test of Ashraf Marwan." In The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973, 327–36. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190693480.003.0029.

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Israeli and US intelligence had ample field reports of Soviet as well as Egyptian and Syrian war preparations well before Yom Kippur, 6 October 1973, but these were disregarded in favor of an unchanged assessment that an Arab offensive was unlikely – among other reasons, for assumed lack of Soviet support. One cause was the priority assigned to the input of “Mossad spy” Ashraf Marwan, who did not relay a warning until after the mass evacuation of Soviet advisers’ dependents from Egypt and Syria on 4 October provided an unmistakable indication. It was, however, misinterpreted as signaling Soviet dissociation from the impending offensive. Marwan’s warning came too late for effective mobilization of Israeli reserves, and also included a spurious assurance that the USSR was not involved. In a continuing internecine Israeli controversy about Marwan’s role, this supports the claim that he acted as an efficient Egyptian double agent.
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Conference papers on the topic "Israel Mossad"

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Daniel, Dr, and Dr William. "Applicable Lessons Learned from AHIP/OH-58D and LHX/RAH-66 Development Programs for the Army's FARA Open Systems Aircraft." In Vertical Flight Society 76th Annual Forum & Technology Display. The Vertical Flight Society, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4050/f-0076-2020-16264.

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The Army's Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) program is much bigger than the two ambitious high speed helicopters that Bell and Sikorsky will now get more than $1 billion to build. At least five other major moving pieces must come together on time to turn the final aircraft, whoever makes it, into a working weapon: - a new Improved Turbine Engine built by GE; - helicopter-launched mini-drones called Air Launched Effects (ALE); - a new Long-Range Precision Munition (LRPM), with the Israeli Spike-NLOS as the initial version; - an Integrated Missile Launcher (IML) to launch both the missile and the drones; - and the underlying electronic framework of standards and interfaces to plug it all together, the Modular Open Systems Architecture (MOSA). *Recently, FARA has added a 20mm Gatling Gun being developed by The Advanced Rotorcraft Armament and Protection System (ARAPS) program team at the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Center (CCDC) Armaments Center The Army is "not just focused on the air vehicle, but focused on the weapon system," said Brig. Gen. Walter Rugen, Future Vertical Lift director at Army Futures Command, in a call this morning with reporters. [1] While some have questioned the viability of fielding the FARA in ten years, e.g. by 2028, others have offered reasons on why the plan for a next-gen recon aircraft needs to be accelerated. Who knows how much money will be available to the Army for sustaining its aviation fleet as budget walls close in over the next several years? Trilliondollar deficits have a way of impinging on defense budgets. What is proposed, though, is that the Army compress its development schedule for a new armed recon rotorcraft so that our soldiers begin to be better equipped against the likes of Russia and China somewhere around 2025, rather than after 2030. A whole lot can happen in ten years. We don't need another Army development program to be overtaken by events. (2) However, since the FARA will likely be in service for a half-century or more, it makes sense to conduct rigorous analysis up front to ensure that what is fielded has the capabilities to provide the most value for the warfighter and the taxpayer. Prior to spending billions of dollars and decades producing the FARA aircraft, it is prudent to spend the time to determine what the right solutions should be. Many projects fail when the initial requirements are not well thought out and the ramifications are not clearly understood. To solve the tension between these conflicting desires, designers need to iterate the design sensitivities with operational analysis to show the pros and cons of each attribute, alone and in concert, but ultimately the Army must prioritize its requirements and potentially make hard trade-off decisions.(3) The major objective of this paper is provide a methodology for the necessary understanding of the push and pull of technology readiness and application through trade studies and operational analysis early to avoid disappointments and to minimize FARA slippages and cost increases. This will be accomplished by reviewing Lessons Learned from the AHIP/OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and the LHX/RAH-66 Comanche development programs. While the authors were directly involved in these programs as Army Aviation engineers, managers and senior executives, the major emphasis for this paper will be to address how the government-industry teams brought these programs successfully through initial development. Fortunately, for the AHIP/OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Development Program there are excellent documentation of the government-industry team participation in References 4 and 5. While the authors strongly endorse the lessons learned in these documents, they will have a few of their own. For the LHX/RAH66 Comanche Development Program there is considerably less documentation; however, the authors will provide Army and their lessons learned. It is hoped that this paper and the referenced documents will be read, and the lessons learned by both government and industry involved in the FARA development program.
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Reports on the topic "Israel Mossad"

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Kislev, Yoav, Ramon Lopez, and Ayal Kimhi. Intergenerational Transfers by Farmers under Different Institutional Environments. United States Department of Agriculture, April 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.32747/1995.7604936.bard.

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This research studies the issues of intergenerational transfers in general and farm succession in particular in two different institutional environments. One is the relatively unregulated farm sector in the United States, and the other is the heavily regulated family farms in Israeli moshavim. Most of the analysis is based on modern economic theory dealing with inheritance and other intergenerational issues. However, we start with two background studies. One is a review of the legal system affecting farm succession in the moshav, which, as we claim throughout the report, is of major importance to the question in hand. The second is an ethnographical study aimed at documenting various inheritance and succession practices in different moshavim. These two studies provide insight for most of the economic studies included here. The theoretical studies mostly deal with various aspects of two major decisions faced by farmers: who will succeed them on the farm, and when will succession take place. The first decision clearly depends on the institutional structure: for instance, Israeli farmers are limited to one successor while American farmers are not. The second decision can be taken in three stages: sharing farm work with the successor, sharing farm management, and eventually transferring the ownership. The occurrence and length of each stage depend on the first decision as well as on the institutional structure directly. The empirical studies are aimed at analyzing the practices and considerations of Israeli and American farmers regarding various intergenerational transfers-related issues. We found that American farmers' decisions are mainly driven by the desire to let the farm prosper in future generations and by a preference for equal treatment of heirs, and not at all by old-age support considerations. In contrast, we demonstrate the significant effect of old-age support on the value of the transferred farm in a sample of Israeli farms. Using Israeli census data, we find that the time of farm ownership transfer responds to economic incentives. A smaller Israeli panel data set shows that controlling for the occurrence of succession, farm size rises with operator's age and eventually falls, while intensity of production seems to decline steadily. This explains another finding, that farm transfer contributed significantly to farm growth when farming was attractive to successors. This finding supports our main conclusion, that the succession decisions are of major importance to the viability and profitability of family farms over the long run.
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