Journal articles on the topic 'IX Tactical Air Command'

The utility and utilization of the Advanced Instructional Features (AIFs) capabilities of USAF Aircrew Training Devices (ATDs) was explored by means of a survey of 534 Simulator Instructors from Air Training Command, Military Airlift Command, Strategic Air Command, and Tactical Air Command training sites. The primary purpose of the survey was to provide a database that could be used in defining the requirements for ATD procurements and in developing future ATD training programs. In general, the features that were rated highest in utility and utilization were those used for training management, variation of task difficulty/fidelity, and monitoring student performance. The level of AIF use was affected somewhat by hardware and/or software deficiencies; however, the presumed training value of an AIF was the most important determiner of its use.

This study develops the real-time maneuver library generation technique for performing aggressive maneuvers of fixed-wing aircraft. Firstly, the general maneuver libraries are defined, and then 7th-order polynomials are used to create the maneuver libraries. The attitude command attitude hold (ACAH) system, the rate command rate hold (RCRH) system, and the speed command speed hold (SCSH) system using the proportional-integral-derivative (PID) control technique are designed to minimize the complexity of the flight control system (FCS) and to reduce the weight and volume of the payload. Moreover, the FCS is used for implementing tactical maneuvers. Finally, flight simulations are implemented for the longitudinal loop and Immelmann-turn maneuvers to check the usefulness of the proposed maneuver library generation technique. This study can affect the development of flight techniques for aircraft tactical maneuvers and the modification of air force operational manuals.

In this paper we briefly highlight relevant laboratory research that provided the theoretical and empirical underpinnings for the development of a task-analytic training methodology. The actual task-analytic methodology, developed to decompose tasks performed to support tactical command and control (C2), air-weapons controller missions, is briefly discussed. The present paper provides the necessary background for the actual application of the methodology. The details of the direct application are presented in a companion paper by Eggemeier, Fisk, Robbins, and Lawless (1988).

The aim of the research was to create such a calculation model for the air defense efficiency that will enable to determine the degree of implementation of the task by anti-aircraft defense forces in combat conditions. The innovative approach to the efficiency of air defense presented in the article focuses on the methods and algorithms enabling the assessment of the feasibility of the air defense task. In its general form, it is based on the determination of the probable number of air assault assets intended for the implementation of an air task (destruction, incapacitation, disorganization of the cover object) and the possibility of air defense sets (means) to repel an air attack. The research was conducted with the use of qualitative methods – when determining the elements of protection or tactical and technical data. The results of the presented research can be implemented in the command process in air defense.

The paper presents the analysis of the present situation in the concern of the public protection against modern toxics by using the light type of shelters. The object of laboratory tests in the chemical agents’ environment is the complete light shelter (tent), called No-1 which is designed for the military purpose as the mobile command post at the brigade level. The point of concern is given to characteristics of the tent construction and its tactical-technical parameters. After the tests, there was discovered that the light type shelter provides the personnel protection against chemical or biological agents that could be find in the air as the BC agents or industrial toxics. The air inside the tent shelter is pressurized and decontaminated by the special NBC filters and the device is called UFW-900-2C. This filter set is equipped with adequate electronic controller and parts which provide an effective air cleaning and sufficient flow across the tent, and finally this composition works as the efficient, complete set. Keywords: construction, public protection, light type protection, NBC filtration

Over the past few years, American military policy in Europe has changed qualitatively. Official Washington was forced to recognize the strengthening of Russian military power and the need to reconsider the role of the European command as a rear, designed to ensure the actions of the Central and African command. Of particular concern to the Pentagon is the Russian potential in areas such as air defense, long-range artillery, anti-tank ammunition and electronic warfare. The United States believes that over the past decade there has been a marked improvement in the quality of Russian troops, their combat readiness and equipment. Under these conditions, the American armed forces are losing their once undeniable and absolute superiority in Eastern Europe. The Americans had to once again increase the number of their armed forces on the European continent (though on the basis of rotation), increase allocations for “deterring Russia” and persistently demand from their European allies to increase defense budgets. OfficialWashington does not exclude the possibility of a large-scale military conflict with Russia in Europe. The new US Nuclear Policy Review of 2018 states that the Russian Federation is ready for the first use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

The article discusses the combat work of the Red Army air force (the 1st and the 3rd air armies of the Western and Kalinin fronts, respectively) during the Rzhev-Sychev operation, focusing on the role of field aircraft repair for the replacement of losses suffered in the battle, and for maintaining the overall combat capability of the air forces in the offensive zone. The author suggests considering the battle of Rzhev as one of the largest and longest aviation battles of the Great Patriotic War. The paper offers a comparative analysis of the number of forces involved in the Rzhev-Sychevsky operation with other large-scale air operations. Drawing on hitherto unstudied sources from the collections of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation and on statistical data, the author explains the tactical application of aviation in the Central part of the Soviet-German front in the summer and autumn of 1942, as well as the patterns and main causes of losses during the military operation. The author emphasizes the critical importance of field repair for an accelerated recovery of air force strike capabilities; this gave the Soviet units significant advantages over the German Luftwaffe in the region. As the paper shows, the command of the 1st and 3rd air armies were fully aware of the importance of field repair and gave it thoughtful consideration; already during the intense fighting, measures were taken to share the gained experience with other units.

Small remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), also known as unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), are expected to provide important contributions to wildland fire operations and research, but their evaluation and use have been limited. Our objectives were to leverage US Air Force-controlled airspace to (1) deploy RPAS in support of the 2012 Prescribed Fire Combustion and Atmospheric Dynamics Research (RxCADRE) project campaign objectives, including fire progression at multiple scales and (2) assess tactical deployment of multiple RPAS with manned flights in support of incident management. We report here on planning for the missions, including the logistics of integrating RPAS into a complex operations environment, specifications of the aircraft and their measurements, execution of the missions and considerations for future missions. Deployments of RPAS ranged both in time aloft and in size, from the Aeryon Scout quadcopter to the fixed-wing G2R and ScanEagle UAS. Real-time video feeds to incident command staff supported prescribed fire operations and a concept of operations (a planning exercise) was implemented and evaluated for fires in large and small burn blocks. RPAS measurements included visible and long-wave infrared (LWIR) imagery, black carbon, air temperature, relative humidity and three-dimensional wind speed and direction.

ObjectivesMusculoskeletal injuries (MSI) are an important concern in military populations. The purpose of this study was to describe the burden of MSI and associated financial cost, in a sample of US Air Force Special Operations Command Special Tactics Operators.MethodsIn this cross-sectional study, medical records of the Operators were reviewed during the years 2014–2015. MSI that occurred during a 1-year period prior to the date of review were described. MSI attributes described included incidence, anatomic location, cause, activity when MSI occurred, type and lifetime cost of MSI estimated using the Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System.ResultsA total of 130 Operators participated in the study (age: 29.1±5.2 years). The 1-year cumulative incidence of MSI was 49.2 injured Operators/100 Operators/year. The most frequent anatomic location and sublocation for MSI were the lower extremity (40.9% of MSI) and shoulder (20.9%), respectively. Lifting was a common cause of MSI (21.8%). A large per cent of MSI (55.5%) occurred while Operators were engaged in either physical or tactical training. Common MSI types were pain/spasm/ache (44.5%). Many MSI (41.8%) were classified as potentially preventable by an injury prevention training programme. The total lifetime cost of these MSI was estimated to be approximately US$1.2 million.ConclusionMSI are an important cause of morbidity and financial cost in this sample of Air Force Special Tactics Operators. There is a need to develop a customised injury prevention programme to reduce the burden and cost of MSI in this population.

<p class="p1">Many countries including India use the Russian made SAM-3 (Pechora) surface-to-air missile (SAM) weapon systems to protect their strategic and tactical infrastructure. The mathematical computations done in this paper, conclusively prove<span class="s1">s </span>that SA-125 low-blow tracking radar of Pechora is vulnerable to jamming. A project was undertaken to overcome the jamming vulnerability of Pechora aiming to design and develop an electronic counter counter measure system. This system networked the Pechora tracking radar with a western tracking radar, Flycatcher, developed by HSA Holland. The latter radar works in a MMW band. When jamming (x band) is employed by enemy aircraft the Low blow radar failed to provide target coordinates. But the flycatcher tracking radar which is tracking in Ka band provided the tracking coordinates (after parallax correction) to the command guidance computer. This way the missile guidance is protected until missile warhead in missile blasts near the target. Extensive trials carried out with a number of aircraft sorties proved the success of this developed system against jamming.</p>

The six-week-long Battle of Shangganling (known to the Americans as Operation SHOWDOWN), demonstrated the increasing military effectiveness of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (cpva) in the Korean War. The cpva intervention in October and November 1950 had deprived the American-led United Nations Command (unc) of an almost certain victory and set the outcome of the Korean War in strategic limbo. After five Chinese-led campaigns and several u.s. Eighth Army counteroffensives, the battle lines stabilized with the cpva still exposed to American firepower from the ground and air. Prolonged negotiations to settle the conflict (begun in July 1951) gave Chinese armies the opportunity to rearm, reform, and establish a competitive tactical method. Both sides deadlocked over the issue of prisoner repatriation in the spring of 1952, leading a frustrated unc to seek to inflict enough damage on Chinese armies while seizing key terrain to make them more likely to accept demands for voluntary repatriation. SHOWDOWN’s failure convinced American leaders that the military power then available in the Korean theater could not settle the war. The Chinese experience at Shangganling produced a similar lesson and further validated the cpva’s doctrine and technique that permitted them to resist the unc’s coercive approach.

Joint fires are defined as fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in the support of a common objective. When joint fires assist air, land, maritime, and SOF to move, manoeuvre, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters are called Joint Fire Support (JFS).According to the latest standardization agreements, the range of capabilities to influence enemy forces has been extended to the sphere of influence in order to achieve the desired effect, not only a physical one but also a psychological one. That way Joint Fire Support (JFS) and Effects is the coordinated and integrated employment of all weapon platforms delivering fires (including land, air, naval indirect fires) to achieve the required effects on ground targets to support land operations in the full spectrum of conflict. It encompasses the integration of indirect fires and effects in order to influence the adversary forces, installations or functions. Joint Fire Support Element (JFSE) could either encompass influence elements as, for example, PSYOPS, CIMIC, EW, or be incorporated in a wider cell dealing with overall influence activities.The necessity of conducting JFS more often occurs at the tactical level because of the complexity of contemporary operational environment (non-linear and non-continuous battlespace, dispersion of forces, high operations tempo, and short time of reaction). For this reason, JFS should be coordinated, synchronized and integrated in the framework of three vital components: surveillance and target acquisition (STA), command and control (C2), weapon (delivering) systems. Among them, Field Artillery Forces possess a relevant part of each of the abovementioned subsystems and their capabilities. The article presents selected solutions from different countries, experimented so far, and experiences from current military, peace and stabilization operations, indicating the plans and directions for further development of Joint Fire Support and Effect.

Indonesian struggle for West Irian was an essential aspect of Indonesian politics since early fifties. Indonesian Government managed to annex West Irian in the sixties due to a substantial material, technical and diplomatic support by the Soviet Union. The USSR stopped its support in 1965, when Indonesian Army under command of General Suharto undertook a terrific massacre of Indonesian communists, backed by the USA. The first President of Indonesia Sukarno was removed from his post. Suharto turned President and proclaimed the New Order (Orde Baru), manifesting itself in the Army rule over the nation. Despite strong positions of Suharto and his associates, there were many different factions in the Army, while Suharto managed to dismiss all disloyal generals. He also instituted new military orders to praise his loyal servants — The Navy Star (Bintang Jalasena), the Army Meritorious Service Star (Bintang Kartika Eka Pakçi), and Air Force Star (Bintang Swa Bhuwana Paksa) — in 1968. A year later, the West Irian open vote confirmed its joining with Indonesia, supported by the Indonesian military surveyors and army presence. Till the end of the sixties, there were constant tensions in West Timor. Indonesian Government instituted two campaign medals for operations in this area — the Satya Dharma Medal and the Raksaka Dharma / GOM IX Medal. The paper examines these two decorations and their context.

Abstract Introduction Physiological events (PEs) are a growing problem for US military aviation with detrimental risks to safety and mission readiness. Seeking causative factors is, therefore, of high importance. There is no evidence to date associating carbon dioxide (CO2) pre-flight exposure and decompression sickness (DCS) in aviators. Materials and Methods This study is a case series of six aviators with PE after being exposed to a rapid decompression event (RDE) with symptoms consistent with type II DCS. The analysis includes retrospective review of flight and environmental data to further assess a possible link between CO2 levels and altitude physiologic events (PEs). IRB approval was obtained for this study. Results This case series presents six aviators with PE after being exposed to a rapid decompression event (RDE) with symptoms consistent with type II DCS. Another three aviators were also exposed to a RDE, but remained asymptomatic. All events involved tactical jet aircraft flying at an average of 35,600’ Mean Sea Level (MSL) when a RDE occurred, Retrospective reviews led to the discovery that the affected individuals were exposed, pre-flight, to poor indoor air quality demonstrated by elevated levels of measured CO2. Conclusion PEs are a growing safety concern for the aviation community in the military. As such, increasing measures are taken to ensure safety of flight and completion of the mission. To date, there is no correlation of CO2 exposure and altitude DCS. While elevated CO2 levels cannot be conclusively implicated as causative, this case series suggests a potential role of CO2 in altitude DCS through CO2 direct involvement with emboli gas composition, as well as pro-inflammatory cascade. Aviators exposed to elevated CO2 in poorly ventilated rooms developed PE symptoms consistent with DCS, while at the same command, aviators that were exposed to a well ventilated room did not. This report is far from an answer, but does demonstrate an interesting case series that draws some questions about CO2’s role in these aviator’s DCS experience. Other explanations are plausible, including the accurate diagnosis of DCS, health variables amongst the aviators, and differences in aircraft and On-Board Oxygen Generation Systems (OBOGS). For a better understanding, the role of environmental CO2 and pre-flight exposure as a risk of DCS should be reviewed.

Prizadevanje držav za zagotavljanje svetovnega miru je postala prednostna naloga. Trend združenega delovanja enot je vsesplošno prisoten in uveljavljen. Velik razkorak med zmožnostmi in resnično izvedbo združenega delovanja je privedel do tega, da so se začeli povezovati nacionalni sistemi poveljevanja in kontrole na ravni operativnega delovanja. Povezovanje sistemov zahteva predvsem standardizacijo postopkov in opreme, zato standardizacija ni več omejena le na nacionalno raven, temveč mora biti globalna. Sodobni vojaški sistemi poveljevanja in kontrole so usmerjeni v optimalno reševanje nalog. Zgrajeni so mrežno, omogočajo vključevanje sedanjih in prihodnjih modulov ter komunicirajo med seboj brez dodatnih vmesnikov. S pravilnima usklajevanjem in delitvijo resursov pa precej zmanjšamo tudi materialna in finančna sredstva. Ognjena podpora ima v nalogah zagotavljanja miru pomembno vlogo. Velika ognjena moč zagotavlja premoč na bojišču, saj ognjena podpora pomeni skupno in usklajeno uporabo ognjenega delovanja kopenskih, mornariških ter zračnih bojnih sistemov in delovanja ofenzivnih sistemov elektronskega bojevanja ter neubojnih sredstev na cilje na kopnem in morju. Za zagotavljanje takšnega delovanja moramo imeti razvit ustrezen računalniški sistem, ki poveže vse komponente v sistem upravljanja ognjene podpore. V potrditev pomembnosti ognjene podpore je v novejšem času prišlo do izvedbe ra- čunalniškega vmesnika, ki poveže sisteme upravljanja ognjene podpore posameznih držav v celoto in omogoča skupno delovanje. Vmesnik je izveden tako, da obdržimo nacionalne delovne procese. Tako se ni treba dodatno izobraževati in usposabljati. Slovenska vojska sledi globalizacijskim usmeritvam. Dokaz je nabava ustreznega operativnega in taktičnega sistema z možnostjo mednarodne povezave. Žal nekateri sistemi Slovenske vojske nimajo te zmožnosti. Med njimi je sistem upravljanja ognjene podpore. Čeprav je sistem sodoben, brez ustrezne povezave tako v nacionalnem kot mednarodnem okolju izgublja veliko prednosti, zato se na tem področju iščejo nove, ustreznejše rešitve povezav, ki morajo izpolnjevati današnje in prihajajoče zahteve. Prav tako lahko aplikacijo rešitve povzamemo tudi za druge avtonomne sisteme, kot je sistem za zagotavljanje obveščevalnih podatkov ali sistem vodenja logistike. Zavest, da nova standardizacija in mednarodna povezanost ne pomenita povečanja stroškov, temveč kakovostno izboljšanje delovanja in materialno zmanjšanje potrebnih sredstev, naj bo glavno vodilo. The effort of the countries to provide global peace has become a priority. The trend of combined unit operations is universally present and established. A large gap between the potential and actual execution of combined operations has led to the integration of national command and control (C2) systems at the operational level. The integration of systems primarily requires the standardization of procedures and equipment. The standardization is thus no longer limited solely to the national level, but it should be global. Modern C2 systems are directed towards optimal completion of tasks. Built as networks, they allow for the integration of the existing and future modules and for their communication without additional interfaces. With a proper coordination and allocation of resources we also substantially reduce the material and financial resources. Fire support plays an important role in providing security during peace tasks. At the same time, great fire power ensures battlefield superiority, since it includes joint and coordinated use of fire from land, navy and air engagement systems, and offensive operation of electronic warfare systems and non-lethal means against land and sea targets. Such operations require an appropriate computer system which links all the components into a fire support management system. The awareness of the importance of fire support has led to the development of a computer interface, which connects fire support management systems of individu- al countries into a whole and thus enables joint operations. The interface was made in a way to preserve national work processes. Further education and training are therefore not necessary. The Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) follows the globalization trends. To this end, it has acquired an operational and tactical system capable of international connections. Unfortunately, some SAF systems, namely the fire support management system, do not include this feature. Although the system is a modern one, it loses a great deal of benefits due to the lack of appropriate national and international links. Therefore, new and more appropriate solutions for connections, capable of fulfilling contempo- rary and future requirements, are sought-after. The application of the solution can also be applied to other autonomous systems, such as the intelligence system or the logistics management system. The main principle shall be the awareness that new standardization and international cooperation do not incur increased costs, but rather a quality improvement of the operations and a quan- titative reduction of the required resources.

Historians have overlooked the important role played by airpower in combined arms during the Palestine Campaign, 1917–1918. This article argues the Egyptian Expeditionary Force adopted Western Front command structures, successfully integrating airpower within their command and control systems. Tactical and strategic airpower provided intelligence which allowed Corps and Army Headquarters to control the tempo of operations, while ground attack operations disrupted Ottoman command and control arrangements. This integration made a clear contribution to the success of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force at the crucial battles of Third Gaza and Megiddo.

The general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. — Sun TzuWorld War II saw a proliferation of maps. From command posts to the pages of National Geographic to the pages of daily newspapers, they were everywhere (Schulten). The era also saw substantive developments in cartography, especially with respect to the topographical maps that feature in our selected films. This essay offers a preliminary examination of the battle-map as depicted in two films about the Second World War: Franklin J. Shaffner’s biopic Patton (1970) and Jack Smight’s epic Midway (1976). In these films, maps, charts, or tableaux (the three-dimensional models upon which are plotted the movements of battalions, fleets, and so on) emerge as an expression of both martial and cinematic strategy. As a rear-view representation of the relative movements of personnel and materiel in particular battle arenas, the map and its accessories (pins, tape, markers, and so forth) trace the broad military dispositions of Patton’s 2nd Corp (Africa), Seventh Army (Italy) and Third Army (Western Europe) and the relative position of American and Japanese fleets in the Pacific. In both Patton and Midway, the map also emerges as a simple mode of narrative plotting: as the various encounters in the two texts play out, the battle-map more or less contemporaneously traces the progress of forces. It also serves as a foreshadowing device, not just narratively, but cinematically: that which is plotted in advance comes to pass (even if as preliminary movements before catastrophe), but the audience is also cued for the cinematic chaos and disjuncture that almost inevitably ensues in the battle scenes proper.On one hand, then, this essay proposes that at the fundamental level of fabula (seen through either the lens of historical hindsight or through the eyes of the novice who knows nothing of World War II), the annotated map is engaged both strategically and cinematically: as a stage upon which commanders attempt to act out (either in anticipation, or retrospectively) the intricate, but grotesque, ballet of warfare — and as a reflection of the broad, sequential, sweeps of conflict. While, in War and Cinema, Paul Virilio offers the phrase ‘the logistics of perception’ (1), in this this essay we, on the other hand, consider that, for those in command, the battle-map is a representation of the perception of logistics: the big picture of war finds rough indexical representation on a map, but (as Clausewitz tells us) chance, the creative agency of individual commanders, and the fog of battle make it far less probable (than is the case in more specific mappings, such as, say, the wedding rehearsal) that what is planned will play out with any degree of close correspondence (On War 19, 21, 77-81). Such mapping is, of course, further problematised by the processes of abstraction themselves: indexicality is necessarily a reduction; a de-realisation or déterritorialisation. ‘For the military commander,’ writes Virilio, ‘every dimension is unstable and presents itself in isolation from its original context’ (War and Cinema 32). Yet rehearsal (on maps, charts, or tableaux) is a keying activity that seeks to presage particular real world patterns (Goffman 45). As suggested above, far from being a rhizomatic activity, the heavily plotted (as opposed to thematic) business of mapping is always out of joint: either a practice of imperfect anticipation or an equally imperfect (pared back and behind-the-times) rendition of activity in the field. As is argued by Tolstoj in War and Peace, the map then presents to the responder a series of tensions and ironies often lost on the masters of conflict themselves. War, as Tostoj proposes, is a stochastic phenomenon while the map is a relatively static, and naive, attempt to impose order upon it. Tolstoj, then, pillories Phull (in the novel, Pfuhl), the aptly-named Prussian general whose lock-stepped obedience to the science of war (of which the map is part) results in the abject humiliation of 1806:Pfuhl was one of those theoreticians who are so fond of their theory that they lose sight of the object of that theory - its application in practice. (Vol. 2, Part 1, Ch. 10, 53)In both Patton and Midway, then, the map unfolds not only as an epistemological tool (read, ‘battle plan’) or reflection (read, the near contemporaneous plotting of real world affray) of the war narrative, but as a device of foreshadowing and as an allegory of command and its profound limitations. So, in Deleuzian terms, while emerging as an image of both time and perception, for commanders and filmgoers alike, the map is also something of a seduction: a ‘crystal-image’ situated in the interstices between the virtual and the actual (Deleuze 95). To put it another way, in our films the map emerges as an isomorphism: a studied plotting in which inheres a counter-text (Goffman 26). As a simple device of narrative, and in the conventional terms of latitude and longitude, in both Patton and Midway, the map, chart, or tableau facilitate the plotting of the resources of war in relation to relief (including island land masses), roads, railways, settlements, rivers, and seas. On this syntagmatic plane, in Greimasian terms, the map is likewise received as a canonical sign of command: where there are maps, there are, after all, commanders (Culler 13). On the other hand, as suggested above, the battle-map (hereafter, we use the term to signify the conventional paper map, the maritime chart, or tableau) materialises as a sanitised image of the unknown and the grotesque: as apodictic object that reduces complexity and that incidentally banishes horror and affect. Thus, the map evolves, in the viewer’s perception, as an ironic sign of all that may not be commanded. This is because, as an emblem of the rational order, in Patton and Midway the map belies the ubiquity of battle’s friction: that defined by Clausewitz as ‘the only concept which...distinguishes real war from war on paper’ (73). ‘Friction’ writes Clausewitz, ‘makes that which appears easy in War difficult in reality’ (81).Our work here cannot ignore or side-step the work of others in identifying the core cycles, characteristics of the war film genre. Jeanine Basinger, for instance, offers nothing less than an annotated checklist of sixteen key characteristics for the World War II combat film. Beyond this taxonomy, though, Basinger identifies the crucial role this sub-type of film plays in the corpus of war cinema more broadly. The World War II combat film’s ‘position in the evolutionary process is established, as well as its overall relationship to history and reality. It demonstrates how a primary set of concepts solidifies into a story – and how they can be interpreted for a changing ideology’ (78). Stuart Bender builds on Basinger’s taxonomy and discussion of narrative tropes with a substantial quantitative analysis of the very building blocks of battle sequences. This is due to Bender’s contention that ‘when a critic’s focus [is] on the narrative or ideological components of a combat film [this may] lead them to make assumptions about the style which are untenable’ (8). We seek with this research to add to a rich and detailed body of knowledge by redressing a surprising omission therein: a conscious and focussed analysis of the use of battle-maps in war cinema. In Patton and in Midway — as in War and Peace — the map emerges as an emblem of an intergeneric dialogue: as a simple storytelling device and as a paradigmatic engine of understanding. To put it another way, as viewer-responders with a synoptic perspective we perceive what might be considered a ‘double exposure’: in the map we see what is obviously before us (the collision of represented forces), but an Archimedean positioning facilitates the production of far more revelatory textual isotopies along what Roman Jakobson calls the ‘axis of combination’ (Linguistics and Poetics 358). Here, otherwise unconnected signs (in our case various manifestations and configurations of the battle-map) are brought together in relation to particular settings, situations, and figures. Through this palimpsest of perspective, a crucial binary emerges: via the battle-map we see ‘command’ and the sequence of engagement — and, through Greimasian processes of axiological combination (belonging more to syuzhet than fabula), elucidated for us are the wrenching ironies of warfare (Culler 228). Thus, through the profound and bound motif of the map (Tomashevsky 69), are we empowered to pass judgement on the map bearers who, in both films, present as the larger-than-life heroes of old. Figure 1.While we have scope only to deal with the African theatre, Patton opens with a dramatic wide-shot of the American flag: a ‘map’, if you will, of a national history forged in war (Fig. 1). Against this potent sign of American hegemony, as he slowly climbs up to the stage before it, the general appears a diminutive figure -- until, via a series of matched cuts that culminate in extreme close-ups, he manifests as a giant about to play his part in a great American story (Fig. 2).Figure 2.Some nineteen minutes into a film, having surveyed the carnage of Kasserine Pass (in which, in February 1943, the Germans inflicted a humiliating defeat on the Americans) General Omar Bradley is reunited with his old friend and newly-nominated three-star general, George S. Patton Jr.. Against a backdrop of an indistinct topographical map (that nonetheless appears to show the front line) and the American flag that together denote the men’s authority, the two discuss the Kasserine catastrophe. Bradley’s response to Patton’s question ‘What happened at Kasserine?’ clearly illustrates the tension between strategy and real-world engagement. While the battle-plan was solid, the Americans were outgunned, their tanks were outclassed, and (most importantly) their troops were out-disciplined. Patton’s concludes that Rommel can only be beaten if the American soldiers are fearless and fight as a cohesive unit. Now that he is in command of the American 2nd Corp, the tide of American martial fortune is about to turn.The next time Patton appears in relation to the map is around half an hour into the two-and-three-quarter-hour feature. Here, in the American HQ, the map once more appears as a simple, canonical sign of command. Somewhat carelessly, the map of Europe seems to show post-1945 national divisions and so is ostensibly offered as a straightforward prop. In terms of martial specifics, screenplay writer Francis Ford Coppola apparently did not envisage much close scrutiny of the film’s maps. Highlighted, instead, are the tensions between strategy as a general principle and action on the ground. As British General Sir Arthur Coningham waxes lyrical about allied air supremacy, a German bomber drops its payload on the HQ, causing the map of Europe to (emblematically) collapse forward into the room. Following a few passes by the attacking aircraft, the film then cuts to a one second medium shot as a hail of bullets from a Heinkel He 111 strike a North African battle map (Fig. 3). Still prone, Patton remarks: ‘You were discussing air supremacy, Sir Arthur.’ Dramatising a scene that did take place (although Coningham was not present), Schaffner’s intention is to allow Patton to shoot holes in the British strategy (of which he is contemptuous) but a broader objective is the director’s exposé of the more general disjuncture between strategy and action. As the film progresses, and the battle-map’s allegorical significance is increasingly foregrounded, this critique becomes definitively sharper.Figure 3.Immediately following a scene in which an introspective Patton walks through a cemetery in which are interred the remains of those killed at Kasserine, to further the critique of Allied strategy the camera cuts to Berlin’s high command and a high-tech ensemble of tableaux, projected maps, and walls featuring lights, counters, and clocks. Tasked to research the newly appointed Patton, Captain Steiger walks through the bunker HQ with Hitler’s Chief of Staff, General Jodl, to meet with Rommel — who, suffering nasal diphtheria, is away from the African theatre. In a memorable exchange, Steiger reveals that Patton permanently attacks and never retreats. Rommel, who, following his easy victory at Kasserine, is on the verge of total tactical victory, in turn declares that he will ‘attack and annihilate’ Patton — before the poet-warrior does the same to him. As Clausewitz has argued, and as Schaffner is at pains to point out, it seems that, in part, the outcome of warfare has more to do with the individual consciousness of competing warriors than it does with even the most exquisite of battle-plans.Figure 4.So, even this early in the film’s runtime, as viewer-responders we start to reassess various manifestations of the battle-map. To put it as Michelle Langford does in her assessment of Schroeter’s cinema, ‘fragments of the familiar world [in our case, battle-maps] … become radically unfamiliar’ (Allegorical Images 57). Among the revelations is that from the flag (in the context of close battle, all sense of ‘the national’ dissolves), to the wall map, to the most detailed of tableau, the battle-plan is enveloped in the fog of war: thus, the extended deeply-focussed scenes of the Battle of El Guettar take us from strategic overview (Patton’s field glass perspectives over what will soon become a Valley of Death) to what Boris Eichenbaum has called ‘Stendhalian’ scale (The Young Tolstoi 105) in which, (in Patton) through more closely situated perspectives, we almost palpably experience the Germans’ disarray under heavy fire. As the camera pivots between the general and the particular (and between the omniscient and the nescient) the cinematographer highlights the tension between the strategic and the actual. Inasmuch as it works out (and, as Schaffner shows us, it never works out completely as planned) this is the outcome of modern martial strategy: chaos and unimaginable carnage on the ground that no cartographic representation might capture. As Patton observes the destruction unfold in the valley below and before him, he declares: ‘Hell of a waste of fine infantry.’ Figure 5.An important inclusion, then, is that following the protracted El Guettar battle scenes, Schaffner has the (symbolically flag-draped) casket of Patton’s aide, Captain Richard N. “Dick” Jenson, wheeled away on a horse-drawn cart — with the lonely figure of the mourning general marching behind, his ironic interior monologue audible to the audience: ‘I can't see the reason such fine young men get killed. There are so many battles yet to fight.’ Finally, in terms of this brief and partial assessment of the battle-map in Patton, less than an hour in, we may observe that the map is emerging as something far more than a casual prop; as something more than a plotting of battlelines; as something more than an emblem of command. Along a new and unexpected axis of semantic combination, it is now manifesting as a sign of that which cannot be represented nor commanded.Midway presents the lead-up to the eponymous naval battle of 1942. Smight’s work is of interest primarily because the battle itself plays a relatively small role in the film; what is most important is the prolonged strategising that comprises most of the film’s run time. In Midway, battle-tables and fleet markers become key players in the cinematic action, second almost to the commanders themselves. Two key sequences are discussed here: the moment in which Yamamoto outlines his strategy for the attack on Midway (by way of a decoy attack on the Aleutian Islands), and the scene some moments later where Admiral Nimitz and his assembled fleet commanders (Spruance, Blake, and company) survey their own plan to defend the atoll. In Midway, as is represented by the notion of a fleet-in-being, the oceanic battlefield is presented as a speculative plane on which commanders can test ideas. Here, a fleet in a certain position projects a radius of influence that will deter an enemy fleet from attacking: i.e. ‘a fleet which is able and willing to attack an enemy proposing a descent upon territory which that force has it in charge to protect’ (Colomb viii). The fleet-in-being, it is worth noting, is one that never leaves port and, while it is certainly true that the latter half of Midway is concerned with the execution of strategy, the first half is a prolonged cinematic game of chess, with neither player wanting to move lest the other has thought three moves ahead. Virilio opines that the fleet-in-being is ‘a new idea of violence that no longer comes from direct confrontation and bloodshed, but rather from the unequal properties of bodies, evaluation of the number of movements allowed them in a chosen element, permanent verification of their dynamic efficiency’ (Speed and Politics 62). Here, as in Patton, we begin to read the map as a sign of the subjective as well as the objective. This ‘game of chess’ (or, if you prefer, ‘Battleships’) is presented cinematically through the interaction of command teams with their battle-tables and fleet markers. To be sure, this is to show strategy being developed — but it is also to prepare viewers for the defamiliarised representation of the battle itself.The first sequence opens with a close-up of Admiral Yamamoto declaring: ‘This is how I expect the battle to develop.’ The plan to decoy the Americans with an attack on the Aleutians is shown via close-ups of the conveniently-labelled ‘Northern Force’ (Fig. 6). It is then explained that, twenty-four hours later, a second force will break off and strike south, on the Midway atoll. There is a cut from closeups of the pointer on the map to the wider shot of the Japanese commanders around their battle table (Fig. 7). Interestingly, apart from the opening of the film in the Japanese garden, and the later parts of the film in the operations room, the Japanese commanders are only ever shown in this battle-table area. This canonically positions the Japanese as pure strategists, little concerned with the enmeshing of war with political or social considerations. The sequence ends with Commander Yasimasa showing a photograph of Vice Admiral Halsey, who the Japanese mistakenly believe will be leading the carrier fleet. Despite some bickering among the commanders earlier in the film, this sequence shows the absolute confidence of the Japanese strategists in their plan. The shots are suitably languorous — averaging three to four seconds between cuts — and the body language of the commanders shows a calm determination. The battle-map here is presented as an index of perfect command and inevitable victory: each part of the plan is presented with narration suggesting the Japanese expect to encounter little resistance. While Yasimasa and his clique are confident, the other commanders suggest a reconnaissance flight over Pearl Harbor to ascertain the position of the American fleet; the fear of fleet-in-being is shown here firsthand and on the map, where the reconnaissance planes are placed alongside the ship markers. The battle-map is never shown in full: only sections of the naval landscape are presented. We suggest that this is done in order to prepare the audience for the later stages of the film: as in Patton (from time to time) the battle-map here is filmed abstractly, to prime the audience for the abstract montage of the battle itself in the film’s second half.Figure 6.Figure 7.Having established in the intervening running time that Halsey is out of action, his replacement, Rear Admiral Spruance, is introduced to the rest of the command team. As with all the important American command and strategy meetings in the film, this is done in the operations room. A transparent coordinates board is shown in the foreground as Nimitz, Spruance and Rear Admiral Fletcher move through to the battle table. Behind the men, as they lean over the table, is an enormous map of the world (Fig. 8). In this sequence, Nimitz freely admits that while he knows each Japanese battle group’s origin and heading, he is unsure of their target. He asks Spruance for his advice:‘Ray, assuming what you see here isn’t just an elaborate ruse — Washington thinks it is, but assuming they’re wrong — what kind of move do you suggest?’This querying is followed by Spruance glancing to a particular point on the map (Fig. 9), then a cut to a shot of models representing the aircraft carriers Hornet, Enterprise & Yorktown (Fig. 10). This is one of the few model/map shots unaccompanied by dialogue or exposition. In effect, this shot shows Spruance’s thought process before he responds: strategic thought presented via cinematography. Spruance then suggests situating the American carrier group just northeast of Midway, in case the Japanese target is actually the West Coast of the United States. It is, in effect, a hedging of bets. Spruance’s positioning of the carrier group also projects that group’s sphere of influence around Midway atoll and north to essentially cut off Japanese access to the US. The fleet-in-being is presented graphically — on the map — in order to, once again, cue the audience to match the later (edited) images of the battle to these strategic musings.In summary, in Midway, the map is an element of production design that works alongside cinematography, editing, and performance to present the notion of strategic thought to the audience. In addition, and crucially, it functions as an abstraction of strategy that prepares the audience for the cinematic disorientation that will occur through montage as the actual battle rages later in the film. Figure 8.Figure 9.Figure 10.This essay has argued that the battle-map is a simulacrum of the weakest kind: what Baudrillard would call ‘simulacra of simulation, founded on information, the model’ (121). Just as cinema itself offers a distorted view of history (the war film, in particular, tends to hagiography), the battle-map is an over-simplification that fails to capture the physical and psychological realities of conflict. We have also argued that in both Patton and Midway, the map is not a ‘free’ motif (Tomashevsky 69). Rather, it is bound: a central thematic device. In the two films, the battle-map emerges as a crucial isomorphic element. On the one hand, it features as a prop to signify command and to relay otherwise complex strategic plottings. At this syntagmatic level, it functions alongside cinematography, editing, and performance to give audiences a glimpse into how military strategy is formed and tested: a traditional ‘reading’ of the map. But on the flip side of what emerges as a classic structuralist binary, is the map as a device of foreshadowing (especially in Midway) and as a depiction of command’s profound limitations. Here, at a paradigmatic level, along a new axis of combination, a new reading of the map in war cinema is proposed: the battle-map is as much a sign of the subjective as it is the objective.ReferencesBasinger, Jeanine. The World War II Combat Film: Anatomy of a Genre. Middletown, CT: Columbia UP, 1986.Baudrillard, Jean. Simulacra and Simulation. Ann Arbour: U of Michigan Press, 1994.Bender, Stuart. Film Style and the World War II Combat Genre. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013.Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Vol. 1. London: Kegan Paul, 1908.Colomb, Philip Howard. Naval Warfare: Its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically Treated. 3rd ed. London: W.H. Allen & Co, 1899.Culler, Jonathan. Structuralist Poetics. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975.Deleuze, Gilles. 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