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Journal articles on the topic 'J44'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 25 April 2022

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1

Nguyen, Thành, and Rakesh Vohra. "Near-Feasible Stable Matchings with Couples." American Economic Review 108, no. 11 (November 1, 2018): 3154–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141188.

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The National Resident Matching program seeks a stable matching of medical students to teaching hospitals. With couples, stable matchings need not exist. Nevertheless, for any student preferences, we show that each instance of a matching problem has a “nearby” instance with a stable matching. The nearby instance is obtained by perturbing the capacities of the hospitals. In this perturbation, aggregate capacity is never reduced and can increase by at most four. The capacity of each hospital never changes by more than two. (JEL C78, D47, I11, J41, J44)

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2

Kojima, Fuhito, Ning Sun, and Ning Neil Yu. "Job Matching under Constraints." American Economic Review 110, no. 9 (September 1, 2020): 2935–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190780.

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Studying job matching in a Kelso-Crawford framework, we consider arbitrary constraints imposed on sets of doctors that a hospital can hire. We characterize all constraints that preserve the substitutes condition (for all revenue functions that satisfy the substitutes condition), a critical condition on hospitals’ revenue functions for well-behaved competitive equilibria. A constraint preserves the substitutes condition if and only if it is a “generalized interval constraint,” which specifies the minimum and maximum numbers of hired doctors, forces some hires, and forbids others. Additionally, “generalized polyhedral constraints” are precisely those that preserve the substitutes condition for all “group separable” revenue functions. (JEL C78, D47, I11, J23, J41, J44)

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3

Ketel, Nadine, Edwin Leuven, Hessel Oosterbeek, and Bas van der Klaauw. "The Returns to Medical School: Evidence from Admission Lotteries." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 8, no. 2 (April 1, 2016): 225–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.20140506.

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We exploit admission lotteries to estimate the returns to medical school in the Netherlands. Using data from up to 22 years after the lottery, we find that in every single year after graduation doctors earn at least 20 percent more than people who end up in their next-best occupation. Twenty-two years after the lottery the earnings difference is almost 50 percent. Only a small fraction of this difference can be attributed to differences in working hours and human capital investments. The returns do not vary with gender or ability, and shift the entire earnings distribution. (JEL D44, I11, I26, J24, J31, J44)

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4

Haeringer, Guillaume, and Vincent Iehlé. "Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 11, no. 3 (August 1, 2019): 155–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170115.

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In a two-sided matching context we show how we can predict stable matchings by considering only one side’s preferences and the mutually acceptable pairs of agents. Our methodology consists of identifying impossible matches, i.e., pairs of agents that can never be matched together in a stable matching of any problem consistent with the partial data. We analyze data from the French academic job market for mathematicians and show that the match of about 45 percent of positions (and about 60 percent of candidates) does not depend on the preferences of the hired candidates, unobserved and submitted at the final stage of the market. (JEL C78, I23, J41, J44)

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5

Deming, David J., Noam Yuchtman, Amira Abulafi, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence F. Katz. "The Value of Postsecondary Credentials in the Labor Market: An Experimental Study." American Economic Review 106, no. 3 (March 1, 2016): 778–806. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141757.

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We study employers' perceptions of the value of postsecondary degrees using a field experiment. We randomly assign the sector and selectivity of institutions to fictitious resumes and apply to real vacancy postings for business and health jobs on a large online job board. We find that a business bachelor's degree from a for-profit online institution is 22 percent less likely to receive a callback than one from a nonselective public institution. In applications to health jobs, we find that for-profit credentials receive fewer callbacks unless the job requires an external quality indicator such as an occupational license. (JEL I23, I26, J24, J44, J63, M51)

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6

Akbulut-Yuksel, Mevlude, and Mutlu Yuksel. "The Long-Term Direct and External Effects of Jewish Expulsions in Nazi Germany." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 7, no. 3 (August 1, 2015): 58–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20130223.

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This paper examines the long-term direct and spillover effects of large-scale human capital loss caused by the persecution of Jewish professionals in Nazi Germany. Using region-by-cohort variation in the percentage of the Jewish population as a quasi-experiment, we find that German children who were at school-age during the persecutions have fewer years of schooling on average in adulthood. Moreover, these children are less likely to finish high school and go to college. These results are robust after controlling for regional unemployment and income per capita, wartime destruction, Nazi and Communist Party support, compulsory schooling reform, migration, urbanization, and mortality. (JEL I21, I28, J24, J44, N34, N44, Z12)

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7

Beker, Bahar Adem, and Mitthan Lal Kansal. "Fuzzy logic-based integrated performance evaluation of a water distribution network." Journal of Water Supply: Research and Technology-Aqua 71, no. 3 (February 26, 2022): 490–506. http://dx.doi.org/10.2166/aqua.2022.004.

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Abstract A water distribution network (WDN) is an essential component of an urban water supply scheme to deliver safe and adequate water to consumers under various operational conditions. This study focuses on the performance evaluation of an urban WDN using fuzzy logic-based aggregation of reliability, resilience, and vulnerability indices. To assess the individual performance indicators, this study advocates the pressure-dependent analysis (PDA) for hydraulic simulation. Furthermore, it advocates a fuzzy rule-based aggregated performance index (API) that will deliver the outcome in linguistic form and help the decision-maker to prioritize the maintenance of the WDN. The proposed method is illustrated with the help of a real-time WDN for part of Dire Dawa city in Ethiopia. It has been found that the API values for this network are 0.721 and 0.624, respectively, under normal and abnormal conditions, which are just satisfactory. It has been noticed that nodes J4, J44, J47, and J49 are critical from the overall low API. Efforts should be made to improve the hydraulic and residual chlorine conditions at these nodes to increase the API. It is felt that such a methodology will help the decision-makers to improve the performance of an existing urban WDN.

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8

INOUE, Hisashi, Yasuyuki MORITA, Mitsugu TODO, Yasuyuki MATSUSHITA, Kazuo ARAKAWA, and Kiyoshi KOYANO. "J44 Development of Laser-Induced Ultrasound System using Optical Interferometry." Proceedings of Conference of Kyushu Branch 2008.61 (2008): 341–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1299/jsmekyushu.2008.61.341.

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9

OGAWA, Koji, Akira NAKASHIMA, Tetsuya OKUMURA, Hirofumi SENTOKU, and Hideshiro MORITAKA. "J44 Tribocharacteristics of surface modified material by SiC fine particle peening." Proceedings of Conference of Kyushu Branch 2011.64 (2011): 369–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1299/jsmekyushu.2011.64.369.

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10

Matsumoto, Brett. "Detecting Potential Overbilling in Medicare Reimbursement via Hours Worked: Comment." American Economic Review 110, no. 12 (December 1, 2020): 3991–4003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180812.

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Fang and Gong (2017) develop a procedure to detect potential over-billing of Medicare by physicians. In their empirical analysis, they use aggregated claims data that can overstate the number of services performed due to features of Medicare billing. In this comment, I show how auditors can use detailed claims-level data to better target improper overbilling. (JEL H51, I13, I18, J22, J44)

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11

Roth, Alvin E. "Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design." American Economic Review 108, no. 7 (July 1, 2018): 1609–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.108.7.1609.

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Marketplaces are often small parts of large markets, and both markets and marketplaces come in many varieties. Market design seeks to understand what marketplaces must accomplish to enable different kinds of markets. Marketplaces can have varying degrees of success, and there can be marketplace failures. I'll discuss labor markets like the market for new economists, and also markets for new lawyers and doctors that have suffered from the unraveling of appointment dates to well before employment begins. Markets work best if they enjoy social support, but some markets are repugnant in the sense that some people think they should be banned, even though others want to participate in them. Laws banning such markets often contribute to the design of illegal black markets, and this raises new issues for market designers. I'll briefly discuss markets and black markets for narcotics, marijuana, sex, and surrogacy, and the design of markets for kidney transplants, in the face of widespread laws against (and broader repugnance for) compensating organ donors. I conclude with open questions and engineering challenges. (JEL A11, D40, D47, E26, J40, J44)

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12

Dranove, David, and Christopher Ody. "Employed for Higher Pay? How Medicare Payment Rules Affect Hospital Employment of Physicians." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 11, no. 4 (November 1, 2019): 249–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20170020.

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Hospitals employ an increasing number of physicians and bill for a growing share of outpatient procedures. We exploit a plausibly exogenous increase in Medicare prices for hospital-employed physicians relative to Medicare prices for other physicians to show that payer reimbursement rules explain part of this trend. The shock we study explains 20 percent of the increase in physician employment and 75 percent of the increase in hospital-billed outpatient procedures between 2009 and 2013.(JEL G22, I22, I13, J23, J31, J44)

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Antecol, Heather, Kelly Bedard, and Jenna Stearns. "Equal but Inequitable: Who Benefits from Gender-Neutral Tenure Clock Stopping Policies?" American Economic Review 108, no. 9 (September 1, 2018): 2420–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160613.

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Many skilled professional occupations are characterized by an early period of intensive skill accumulation and career establishment. Examples include law firm associates, surgical residents, and untenured faculty at research-intensive universities. High female exit rates are sometimes blamed on the inability of new mothers to survive the sustained negative productivity shock associated with childbearing and early childrearing in these environments. Gender-neutral family policies have been adopted in some professions in an attempt to “level the playing field.” The gender-neutral tenure clock stopping policies adopted by the majority of research-intensive universities in the United States in recent decades are an excellent example. But to date, there is no empirical evidence showing that these policies help women. Using a unique dataset on the universe of assistant professor hires at top-50 economics departments from 1980–2005, we show that the adoption of gender-neutral tenure clock stopping policies substantially reduced female tenure rates while substantially increasing male tenure rates. However, these policies do not reduce the probability that either men or women eventually earn tenure in the profession. (JEL I23, J16, J24, J32, J44)

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14

Basu, Sudipta. "How Can Accounting Researchers Become More Innovative?" Accounting Horizons 26, no. 4 (December 1, 2012): 851–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/acch-10311.

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SYNOPSIS: This essay is based on a presentation at the American Accounting Association Strategy Retreat in May 2011 on the assertion “Accounting research as of 2011 is stagnant and lacking in significant innovation that introduces fresh ideas and insights into our scholarly discipline.” It poses the question “How can accounting researchers become more innovative?” and discusses why accounting researchers may have become less innovative. It also outlines some changes in incentive structures and editorial processes needed to achieve greater innovation in accounting research. JEL Classifications: A11; A12; B23; C12; I23; J44; M4; O31.

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15

Fang, Hanming, and Qing Gong. "Detecting Potential Overbilling in Medicare Reimbursement via Hours Worked: Reply." American Economic Review 110, no. 12 (December 1, 2020): 4004–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20191970.

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Matsumoto (2020) pointed out data and coding errors in Fang and Gong (2017). We show that these errors have limited impacts: all qualitative findings remain after correcting them. Matsumoto also discussed potential service overcounting in the aggregated utilization data we used to illustrate our method, and then quantified the extent of overcounting with a sample of Medicare claims. We acknowledge the issue but discuss the noise and the bias in his quantification. Overall, our proposed method remains useful, as regulators who are interested in applying the method are unlikely to be subject to the data limitations. (JEL H51, I13, I18, J22, J44)

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16

Guryan, Jonathan, Kory Kroft, and Matthew J. Notowidigdo. "Peer Effects in the Workplace: Evidence from Random Groupings in Professional Golf Tournaments." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1, no. 4 (September 1, 2009): 34–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.1.4.34.

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This paper uses random assignment in professional golf tournaments to test for peer effects in the workplace. We find no evidence that playing partners' ability affects performance, contrary to recent evidence on peer effects in the workplace from laboratory experiments, grocery scanners, and soft fruit pickers. In our preferred specification, we can rule out peer effects larger than 0.043 strokes for a one stroke increase in playing partners' ability. Our results complement existing studies on workplace peer effects and are useful in explaining how social effects vary across labor markets, across individuals, and with the form of incentives faced. (JEL D83, J44, L83)

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17

Ganguli, Ina. "Saving Soviet Science: The Impact of Grants When Government R&D Funding Disappears." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 9, no. 2 (April 1, 2017): 165–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.20160180.

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I estimate the impact of a historic grant program, funded by George Soros, that provided grants to over 28,000 Soviet scientists shortly after the end of the USSR. Exploiting a discontinuity in the grant eligibility formula, I show that the grants more than doubled publications on the margin, significantly induced scientists to remain in the science sector, and had long-lasting impacts. While existing evidence shows negligible impacts of scientific grants, I show that funding for science can have high marginal returns when funding levels are low relative to the stock of human capital. (JEL H54, H81, I23, J44, O32, O38, P35)

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18

Carrillo, Bladimir, and Jose Feres. "Provider Supply, Utilization, and Infant Health: Evidence from a Physician Distribution Policy." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 11, no. 3 (August 1, 2019): 156–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20170619.

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We analyze a policy that substantially expanded the supply of primary care physicians in Brazil. The program increased doctor visits across all age groups and led to greater utilization of doctors for prenatal care. However, these physicians replaced nurse visits for prenatal care without increasing the overall number of visits women receive. We find no evidence of gains in widely used metrics of infant health, including birth weight, gestation, and infant mortality. Together, these findings provide suggestive evidence that physicians and nurses may be good substitutes in the production function of infant health. (JEL I11, I12, I18, J13, J16, J44, O15)

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19

Moretti, Enrico, and Daniel J. Wilson. "The Effect of State Taxes on the Geographical Location of Top Earners: Evidence from Star Scientists." American Economic Review 107, no. 7 (July 1, 2017): 1858–903. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20150508.

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We quantify how sensitive is migration by star scientists to changes in personal and business tax differentials across states. We uncover large, stable, and precisely estimated effects of personal and corporate taxes on star scientists' migration patterns. The long-run elasticity of mobility relative to taxes is 1.8 for personal income taxes, 1.9 for state corporate income tax, and −1.7 for the investment tax credit. While there are many other factors that drive when innovative individuals and innovative companies decide to locate, there are enough firms and workers on the margin that state taxes matter. (JEL H24, H25, H71, H73, J44, J61, R32)

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20

Iino, Nami, Satoshi Nishimura, Takuichi Nishimura, Ken Fukuda, and Hideaki Takeda. "Practice and Analysis of Knowledge Construction using a Domain Ontology and Procedural Knowledge." Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence 35, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): A—J44_1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1527/tjsai.a-j44.

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21

Fujisawa, Kazunori, Michael Koch, and Akira Murakami. "Bayesian inference of preferential seepage path by gradient-based Markov Chain Monte Carlo." Japanese Geotechnical Society Special Publication 8, no. 3 (March 14, 2020): 59–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.3208/jgssp.v08.j44.

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22

Roth, Alvin E., and Elliott Peranson. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design." American Economic Review 89, no. 4 (September 1, 1999): 748–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.4.748.

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We report on the design of the new clearinghouse adopted by the National Resident Matching Program, which annually fills approximately 20,000 jobs for new physicians. Because the market has complementarities between applicants and between positions, the theory of simple matching markets does not apply directly. However, computational experiments show the theory provides good approximations. Furthermore, the set of stable matchings, and the opportunities for strategic manipulation, are surprisingly small. A new kind of “core convergence” result explains this; that each applicant interviews only a small fraction of available positions is important. We also describe engineering aspects of the design process. (JEL C78, B41, J44)

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23

Bertrand, Marianne, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence F. Katz. "Dynamics of the Gender Gap for Young Professionals in the Financial and Corporate Sectors." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2, no. 3 (July 1, 2010): 228–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.2.3.228.

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The careers of MBAs from a top US business school are studied to understand how career dynamics differ by gender. Although male and female MBAs have nearly identical earnings at the outset of their careers, their earnings soon diverge, with the male earnings advantage reaching almost 60 log points a decade after MBA completion. Three proximate factors account for the large and rising gender gap in earnings: differences in training prior to MBA graduation, differences in career interruptions, and differences in weekly hours. The greater career discontinuity and shorter work hours for female MBAs are largely associated with motherhood. (JEL J16, J22, J31, J44)

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24

Zinovyeva, Natalia, and Manuel Bagues. "The Role of Connections in Academic Promotions." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 7, no. 2 (April 1, 2015): 264–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.20120337.

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This paper analyzes how evaluators' private information and subjective biases affect evaluations in academia. We use evidence from centralized selection exams in Spain, where evaluators are randomly assigned to promotion committees. Candidates are significantly more likely to be promoted when they are evaluated by an acquainted evaluator, but the source of the premium depends on the nature of this relationship. Our findings suggest that, when candidates are evaluated by their PhD advisor, a colleague or a coauthor, evaluation biases dominate the potential impact of informational gains. Weaker links, on the other hand, may improve the efficiency of the selection process. (JEL D82, I23, J44, M51)

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25

Johnson, Erin M., and M. Marit Rehavi. "Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 8, no. 1 (February 1, 2016): 115–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20140160.

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This paper provides new evidence on the interaction between patient information and physician financial incentives. Using rich microdata on childbirth, we compare the treatment of physicians when they are patients with that of comparable nonphysicians. We also exploit the presence of HMO-owned hospitals to determine how the treatment gap varies with providers’ financial incentives. Consistent with induced demand, physicians are approximately 10 percent less likely to receive a C-section, with only a quarter of this effect attributable to differential sorting. While financial incentives affect the treatment of nonphysicians, physician-patients are largely unaffected. Physicians also have better health outcomes. (JEL D83, I11, J16, J44)

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Buchmueller, Thomas, Sarah Miller, and Marko Vujicic. "How Do Providers Respond to Changes in Public Health Insurance Coverage? Evidence from Adult Medicaid Dental Benefits." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 8, no. 4 (November 1, 2016): 70–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150004.

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This study evaluates how large changes in public health insurance coverage affect provider behavior and patient wait times by analyzing a common type of primary care: dental services. When states expand coverage of dental services to adult Medicaid beneficiaries, dentists' participation in Medicaid increases and dentists see more publicly insured patients. Dentists supply more visits but only modestly increase the amount of time spent working. They achieve this in part by making greater use of dental hygienists. Wait times increase modestly, with the largest increases in wait times observed in states with restrictive scope of practice laws governing dental hygienists. (JEL G22, I11, I13, I18, I38, J22, J44)

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Richards, Michael R., and D. Sebastian Tello-Trillo. "Public Spillovers from Private Insurance Contracting: Physician Responses to Managed Care." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 11, no. 4 (November 1, 2019): 375–403. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20170441.

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Managed care is rebounding as more emphasis is placed on cost containment. These efforts may benefit consumers but challenge providers; however, empirical evidence on how supply-side managed care influences physicians is incomplete. We leverage a quasi-experiment3 in which a commercial insurer imposed a new contract regime on behavioral health providers in response to recent policy shifts. We demonstrate spillovers in the form of negative effects on local physician supply and positive effects on Medicare and Medicaid participation in areas where the insurer has market power. Commercially insured patients are also not obviously harmed but receive less intense services in some settings. (JEL G22, I11, I13, I18, I38, J22, J44)

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Johnson, Janna E., and Morris M. Kleiner. "Is Occupational Licensing a Barrier to Interstate Migration?" American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 12, no. 3 (August 1, 2020): 347–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20170704.

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Occupational licensure may limit the interstate movement of workers because it adds to the cost of moving between states. We analyze the interstate migration of 22 licensed occupations, proxying for the difficulty of the regulations by comparing state-specific licensed occupations to those with national licensing exams. Our empirical strategy also uses individuals who move a long distance, removing the influence of occupation characteristics and self-selection of migration-averse individuals into licensed occupations. Our estimates show that occupational licensing reduces interstate migration, but the magnitude of the effect can only account for a small part of the overall decline in recent decades. (JEL J44, J61, R23)

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29

Parsons, Christopher A., Johan Sulaeman, Michael C. Yates, and Daniel S. Hamermesh. "Strike Three: Discrimination, Incentives, and Evaluation." American Economic Review 101, no. 4 (June 1, 2011): 1410–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.4.1410.

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Major League Baseball umpires express their racial/ethnic prefer ences when they evaluate pitchers. Strikes are called less often if the umpire and pitcher do not match race/ethnicity, but mainly where there is little scrutiny of umpires. Pitchers understand the incentives and throw pitches that allow umpires less subjective judgment (e.g., fastballs over home plate) when they anticipate bias. These direct and indirect effects bias performance measures of minorities downward. The results suggest how discrimination alters discriminated groups' behavior generally. They imply that biases in measured productivity must be accounted for in generating measures of wage discrimination. (JEL J15, J31, J44, J71, L83)

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30

Iizuka, Toshiaki. "Physician Agency and Adoption of Generic Pharmaceuticals." American Economic Review 102, no. 6 (October 1, 2012): 2826–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.6.2826.

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I examine physician agency in health care services in the context of the choice between brand-name and generic pharmaceuticals. I examine micro-panel data from Japan, where physicians can legally make profits by prescribing and dispensing drugs. The results indicate that physicians often fail to internalize patient costs, explaining why cheaper generics are infrequently adopted. Doctors respond to markup differentials between the two versions, indicating another agency problem. However, generics' markup advantages are short-lived, which limits their impact on increasing generic adoption. Additionally, state dependence and heterogeneous doctor preferences affected generics' adoption. Policy makers can target these factors to improve static efficiency. (JEL D82, I11, J44, L65)

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31

Frakes, Michael. "The Impact of Medical Liability Standards on Regional Variations in Physician Behavior: Evidence from the Adoption of National-Standard Rules." American Economic Review 103, no. 1 (February 1, 2013): 257–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.1.257.

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I explore the association between regional variations in physician behavior and the geographical scope of malpractice standards of care. I estimate a 30–50 percent reduction in the gap between state and national utilization rates of various treatments and diagnostic procedures following the adoption of a rule requiring physicians to follow national, as opposed to local, standards. These findings suggest that standardization in malpractice law may lead to greater standardization in practices and, more generally, that physicians may indeed adhere to specific liability standards. In connection with the estimated convergence in practices, I observe no associated changes in patient health. (JEL I11, I18, J44, K13)

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32

Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen, Camille Landais, and Emmanuel Saez. "Taxation and International Migration of Superstars: Evidence from the European Football Market." American Economic Review 103, no. 5 (August 1, 2013): 1892–924. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.5.1892.

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We analyze the effects of top tax rates on international migration of football players in 14 European countries since 1985. Both country case studies and multinomial regressions show evidence of strong mobility responses to tax rates, with an elasticity of the number of foreign (domestic) players to the net-of-tax rate around one (around 0.15). We also find evidence of sorting effects (low taxes attract highability players who displace low-ability players) and displacement effects (low taxes on foreigners displace domestic players). Those results can be rationalized in a simple model of migration and taxation with rigid labor demand. (JEL F22, H24, H31, J44, J61, L83)

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33

Clemens, Jeffrey, and Joshua D. Gottlieb. "Do Physicians' Financial Incentives Affect Medical Treatment and Patient Health?" American Economic Review 104, no. 4 (April 1, 2014): 1320–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.4.1320.

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We investigate whether physicians' financial incentives influence health care supply, technology diffusion, and resulting patient outcomes. In 1997, Medicare consolidated the geographic regions across which it adjusts physician payments, generating area-specific price shocks. Areas with higher payment shocks experience significant increases in health care supply. On average, a 2 percent increase in payment rates leads to a 3 percent increase in care provision. Elective procedures such as cataract surgery respond much more strongly than less discretionary services. Non-radiologists expand their provision of MRIs, suggesting effects on technology adoption. We estimate economically small health impacts, albeit with limited precision. (JEL I11, I18, J44, O32)

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Fairlie, Robert W., Florian Hoffmann, and Philip Oreopoulos. "A Community College Instructor Like Me: Race and Ethnicity Interactions in the Classroom." American Economic Review 104, no. 8 (August 1, 2014): 2567–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.8.2567.

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Administrative data from a large and diverse community college are used to examine if underrepresented minority students benefit from taking courses with underrepresented minority instructors. To identify racial interactions, we estimate models that include both student and classroom fixed effects and focus on students with limited choice in courses. We find that the performance gap in terms of class dropout rates and grade performance between white and underrepresented minority students falls by 20 to 50 percent when taught by an underrepresented minority instructor. We also find these interactions affect longer-term outcomes such as subsequent course selection, retention, and degree completion. (JEL I23, J15, J44)

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35

Agarwal, Nikhil. "An Empirical Model of the Medical Match." American Economic Review 105, no. 7 (July 1, 2015): 1939–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20131006.

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This paper develops a framework for estimating preferences in a many-to-one matching market using only observed matches. I use pairwise stability and a vertical preference restriction on one side to identify preferences on both sides of the market. Counterfactual simulations are used to analyze the antitrust allegation that the centralized medical residency match is responsible for salary depression. Due to residents' willingness to pay for desirable programs and capacity constraints, salaries in any competitive equilibrium would remain, on average, at least $23,000 below the marginal product of labor. Therefore, the match is not the likely cause of low salaries. (JEL C78, I11, J31, J44, K21, L44)

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36

Richter, Michael, and Ariel Rubinstein. "Back to Fundamentals: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies." American Economic Review 105, no. 8 (August 1, 2015): 2570–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20140270.

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We propose a new abstract definition of equilibrium in the spirit of competitive equilibrium: a profile of alternatives and a public ordering (expressing prestige, price, or a social norm) such that each agent prefers his assigned alternative to all lower-ranked ones. The equilibrium operates in an abstract setting built upon a concept of convexity borrowed from convex geometry. We apply the concept to a variety of convex economies and relate it to Pareto optimality. The “magic” of linear equilibrium prices is put into perspective by establishing an analogy between linear functions in the standard convexity and “primitive orderings” in the abstract convexity. (JEL I11, I18, J44, K13)

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Babcock, Linda, Maria P. Recalde, Lise Vesterlund, and Laurie Weingart. "Gender Differences in Accepting and Receiving Requests for Tasks with Low Promotability." American Economic Review 107, no. 3 (March 1, 2017): 714–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141734.

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Gender differences in task allocations may sustain vertical gender segregation in labor markets. We examine the allocation of a task that everyone prefers be completed by someone else (writing a report, serving on a committee, etc.) and find evidence that women, more than men, volunteer, are asked to volunteer, and accept requests to volunteer for such tasks. Beliefs that women, more than men, say yes to tasks with low promotability appear as an important driver of these differences. If women hold tasks that are less promotable than those held by men, then women will progress more slowly in organizations. (JEL I23, J16, J44, J71, M12, M51)

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Hausman, Naomi, and Kurt Lavetti. "Physician Practice Organization and Negotiated Prices: Evidence from State Law Changes." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 13, no. 2 (April 1, 2021): 258–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.20180078.

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We study the relationship between physician organizational structures and prices negotiated with private insurers. Using variation caused by state-level judicial law changes, we show that a 10 percent increase in the enforceability of noncompete agreements (NCAs) causes 4.3 percent higher physician prices, and declines in practice sizes and concentration. Using two databases containing every physician establishment and firm between 1996 and 2007, linked to negotiated prices, we show that larger practices have lower prices for services with high fixed costs, consistent with economies of scale. In contrast, increases in firm concentration conditional on establishment concentration leads to higher prices. (JEL D24, G22, I11, J44, K22, L13)

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Chan, David C. "Influence and Information in Team Decisions: Evidence from Medical Residency." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 13, no. 1 (February 1, 2021): 106–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20180501.

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I study team decisions among physician trainees. Exploiting a discontinuity in team roles across trainee tenure, I find evidence that teams alter decision-making, concentrating influence in the hands of senior trainees. I also demonstrate little convergence in variation of trainee effects despite intensive training. This general pattern of trainee effects on team decision-making exists in all types of decisions and settings that I examine. In analyses evaluating mechanisms behind this pattern, I find support for the idea that significant experiential learning occurs during training and that teams place more weight on judgments of senior trainees in order to aggregate information. (JEL D83, I11, J44, M53, M54)

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40

Zeltzer, Dan. "Gender Homophily in Referral Networks: Consequences for the Medicare Physician Earnings Gap." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 12, no. 2 (April 1, 2020): 169–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.20180201.

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I assess the extent to which the gender gap in physician earnings may be driven by physicians’ preference for referring to specialists of the same gender. Analyzing administrative data on 100 million Medicare patient referrals, I provide robust evidence that doctors refer more to specialists of their own gender. I show that biased referrals are predominantly driven by physicians’ decisions rather than by endogenous sorting of physicians or patients. Because most referring doctors are male, the net impact of same-gender bias by both male and female doctors generates lower demand for female relative to male specialists, pointing to a positive externality for increased female participation in medicine. (JEL H51, I11, J16, J31, J44)

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Heckman, James J., and Sidharth Moktan. "Publishing and Promotion in Economics: The Tyranny of the Top Five." Journal of Economic Literature 58, no. 2 (June 1, 2020): 419–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.20191574.

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This paper examines the relationship between placement of publications in top five (T5) journals and receipt of tenure in academic economics departments. Analyzing the job histories of tenure–track economists hired by the top 35 US economics departments, we find that T5 publications have a powerful influence on tenure decisions and rates of transition to tenure. A survey of the perceptions of young economists supports the formal statistical analysis. Pursuit of T5 publications has become the obsession of the next generation of economists. However, the T5 screen is far from reliable. A substantial share of influential publications appear in non-T5 outlets. Reliance on the T5 to screen talent incentivizes careerism over creativity.( JEL A14, I23, J44, J62)

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Ho, Kate, and Ariel Pakes. "Hospital Choices, Hospital Prices, and Financial Incentives to Physicians." American Economic Review 104, no. 12 (December 1, 2014): 3841–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.12.3841.

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We estimate an insurer-specific preference function which rationalizes hospital referrals for privately insured births in California. The function is additively separable in: a hospital price paid by the insurer, the distance traveled, and plan- and severity-specific hospital fixed effects (capturing hospital quality). We use an inequality estimator that allows for errors in price and detailed hospital-severity interactions and obtain markedly different results than those from a logit. The estimates indicate that insurers with more capitated physicians are more responsive to price. Capitated plans send patients further to utilize similar quality, lower-priced hospitals; but the cost-quality trade-off does not vary with capitation rates. (JEL G22, H51, I11, I13, I18, J44)

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43

Field, Erica. "Educational Debt Burden and Career Choice: Evidence from a Financial Aid Experiment at NYU Law School." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.1.1.1.

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This paper examines the influence of psychological responses to debt on career choices from an experiment in which alternative financial aid packages were assigned by lottery to a set of law school admits. The packages had equivalent monetary value, but one required the student to take on a loan that would be paid for by the school if he worked in public interest law, while the other covered tuition as long as the student worked in public interest law. If he did not, the student would be required to reimburse the school. Tuition assistance recipients have a 36 to 45 percent higher public interest placement rate and, when lottery results were announced before enrollment, were twice as likely to enroll. (JEL I21, I22, J44, D14)

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Arcidiacono, Peter, and Michael Lovenheim. "Affirmative Action and the Quality–Fit Trade-off." Journal of Economic Literature 54, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 3–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.54.1.3.

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This paper reviews the literature on affirmative action in undergraduate education and law schools, focusing especially on the trade-off between institutional quality and the fit between a school and a student. We discuss the conditions under which affirmative action for underrepresented minorities (URM) could help or harm their educational outcomes. We provide descriptive evidence on the extent of affirmative action in law schools, as well as a critical review of the contentious literature on how affirmative action affects URM law-school student performance. Our review then discusses affirmative action in undergraduate admissions, focusing on the effects such admissions preferences have on college quality, graduation rates, college major, and earnings. We conclude by examining the evidence on “percent plans” as a replacement for affirmative action. (JEL I23, I26, I28, J15, J31, J44, K10)

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YAMADA, Hiroshi, and Shunsuke TAKASAKI. "J44 Quantitative assessment of the temperature-dependent changes in anchorage to substrate for fibroblasts in low-nutrient environments." Proceedings of Conference of Kyushu Branch 2009.62 (2009): 319–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1299/jsmekyushu.2009.62.319.

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Fredriksson, Peter, Lena Hensvik, and Oskar Nordström Skans. "Mismatch of Talent: Evidence on Match Quality, Entry Wages, and Job Mobility." American Economic Review 108, no. 11 (November 1, 2018): 3303–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160848.

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We examine the impact of mismatch on entry wages, separations, and wage growth using unique data on worker talents. We show that workers are sorted on comparative advantage across jobs within occupations. The starting wages of inexperienced workers are unrelated to mismatch. For experienced workers, on the other hand, mismatch is negatively priced into their starting wages. Separations and wage growth are more strongly related to mismatch among inexperienced workers than among experienced workers. These findings are consistent with models of information updating, where less information is available about the quality of matches involving inexperienced workers. (JEL D83, J24, J31, J41, J63, J64)

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Allgood, Sam, William B. Walstad, and John J. Siegfried. "Research on Teaching Economics to Undergraduates." Journal of Economic Literature 53, no. 2 (June 1, 2015): 285–325. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.53.2.285.

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This survey summarizes the main research findings about teaching economics to undergraduates. After briefly reviewing the history of research on undergraduate economic education, it discusses the status of the economics major—numbers and trends, goals, coursework, outcomes, and the principles courses. Some economic theory is used to explain the likely effects of pedagogical decisions of faculty and the learning choices that students make. Major results from empirical research are reviewed from the professor perspective on such topics as teaching methods, online technology, class size, and textbooks. Studies of student learning are discussed in relation to study time, grades, attendance, math aptitude, and cheating. The last section discusses changes in the composition of faculty who teach undergraduate economics and effects from changes in instructional technology and then presents findings from the research about measuring teaching effectiveness and the value of teacher training. (JEL A22, I23, J44)

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Aoki, Ryota, Satoshi Morimoto, and Yukihide Sagawa. "Development of 1.2 GHz and 2.3 GHz Band Receiving Antenna for a Relay Broadcast System." Journal of the Institute of Image Information and Television Engineers 71, no. 1 (2017): J44—J50. http://dx.doi.org/10.3169/itej.71.j44.

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49

Lise, Jeremy, and Fabien Postel-Vinay. "Multidimensional Skills, Sorting, and Human Capital Accumulation." American Economic Review 110, no. 8 (August 1, 2020): 2328–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20162002.

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We construct a structural model of on-the-job search in which workers differ in skills along several dimensions and sort themselves into jobs with heterogeneous skill requirements along those same dimensions. Skills are accumulated when used, and depreciate when not used. We estimate the model combining data from O*NET with the NLSY79. We use the model to shed light on the origins and costs of mismatch along heterogeneous skill dimensions. We highlight the deficiencies of relying on a unidimensional model of skill when decomposing the sources of variation in the value of lifetime output between initial conditions and career shocks. (JEL J24, J41, J64)

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50

Rothstein, Jesse. "Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters." American Economic Review 105, no. 1 (January 1, 2015): 100–130. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20121242.

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Teacher contracts that condition pay and retention on demonstrated performance can improve selection into and out of teaching. I study alternative contracts in a simulated teacher labor market that incorporates dynamic self-selection and Bayesian learning. Bonus policies create only modest incentives and thus have small effects on selection. Reductions in tenure rates can have larger effects, but must be accompanied by substantial salary increases; elimination of tenure confers little additional benefit unless firing rates are extremely high. Benefits of both bonus and tenure policies exceed costs, though optimal policies are sensitive to labor market parameters about which little is known. (JEL I21, J22, J23, J24, J31, J41, J45)

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