Academic literature on the topic 'Jacquerie, 1358'

Abstract Background Sexually transmitted infections (STIs) represent a growing epidemic, particularly among America’s youth. Traditional single or dual organism STI testing is limited in its utility compared to PCR panel-based vaginitis testing. PCR panel testing can identify up to 99% of vaginitis associated organisms, while simultaneously providing information about antibiotic resistance. Methods We analyzed 10,011 vaginosis panel cases released between April 2020 and May 2021. The PCR-based vaginosis panel consists of organisms associated with bacterial vaginosis, aerobic vaginitis, yeast infections, STIs, and Lactobacillus species. This panel simultaneously detects evidence of antibiotic resistance for nine classes of drugs. Results Of 9405 cases from vaginal swabs, 618 (6.8%) were positive for at least one STI including Chlamydia trachomatis (CT), Haemophilus ducreyi, Herpes Simplex Virus 1 or 2 (HSV2), Neisseria gonorrhoeae (NG), and/or Trichomonas vaginalis. Of 603 urine samples, 7.6% were positive for at least one STI and represented a younger population. Patients younger than age 25 (33% of the cohort) were disproportionately affected by STIs, consistent with CDC findings. About 50% of all positive STI cases were in patients under 25. Evidence of bacterial vaginosis was also present in 89% of CT and NG cases, and 75% of HSV2 cases. Strikingly, we found the presence of an antibiotic resistant marker(s) to first line treatment in 76.2% of CT and 19.3% of NG cases. Conclusion Our data illustrates the advantages of utilizing a PCR-panel approach to STI detection over a targeted approach for individual organisms. Coinfections with bacterial vaginosis were common and if left unidentified, patients may receive incomplete treatment. Additionally, our data suggests that antibiotic resistance testing is imperative for effective treatment planning and antibiotic stewardship in suspected STI cases. Disclosures Brittany L. Carpenter, PhD, NxGen MDx (Employee) Jacqueline D. Peacock, PhD, MB(ASCP)CM, NxGen MDx (Employee) Kyle Dubiak, PhD, NxGen MDx (Employee) Heather Fecteau, MS, LCGC, NxGen MDx (Employee) Robert Carlson, MD, FCAP, NxGen MDx (Employee)

As part of a screening program to evaluate the biological activity of indigenous plants, we report the composition and the bioactivity of essential oils (EOs) extracted from Té de Burro Aloysia polystachya [(Griseb.) Moldenke] and Lemon Verbena Aloysia citriodora [Palau] against two of the most widespread secondary pests of stored products, the red flour beetle Tribolium castaneum [Herbst] and the confused flour beetle Tribolium confusum [Jacqueline du Val]. Analysis by gas chromatography-mass spectrometry of the EOs led the identification of their major constituents and their relative proportions. EO of A. citriodora showed the highest repellent activity against both beetles (>70%). On the other hand, both plants showed fumigant toxicity only against T. confusum, without significant differences between them (LC50 values of 5.92 and 5.53 mg/L air for A. polystachya and A. citriodora, resp.). For contact toxicity (topical applications) the EO of A. polystachya was more effective (LD50 = 7.35 μg/insect) than the EO of A. citriodora (LD50 = 13.8 μg/insect) only against T. castaneum. On the other hand, T. confusum was not susceptible by contact to any of these EOs. These results provide important tools for the development of an Integrated Pest Management (IPM) program.

Background:Long-term studies in rheumatoid arthritis (RA) have reported low inflammation yet high disability over time. It is important to determine which factors are driving this disparity, so appropriate interventions can be used to reduce this gap.Objectives:To identify a subgroup of people with RA with low inflammation yet high disability over 10 years, and describe their characteristics.Methods:Data came from two cohorts of inflammatory arthritis with regular assessments over 10 years: the Norfolk Arthritis Register (NOAR, inclusion: ≥2 swollen joints for ≥4 weeks) from the UK and the Etude et Suivi des Polyarthrites Indifférenciées Récentes study (ESPOIR, inclusion: early RA) from France. Participants provided demographic data and completed patient reported outcomes (PROs, including the Health Assessment Questionnaire [HAQ]). The 2-component Disease Activity Score (DAS28-2C)1, a measure of inflammation, was calculated from swollen joint counts and C-reactive protein level. Inclusion criteria for this analyis: <2 years baseline symptom duration; HAQ and DAS28-2C at baseline and one other follow-up; recruited after 1/1/2000. HAQ and DAS28-2C were modelled simultaneously using a multivariate group-based trajectory model, to identify groups of participants with similar trajectories of HAQ and DAS28-2C over 10 years. Baseline demographics and PROs were compared between the trajectory groups using logistic regression. Analyses performed separately in NOAR and ESPOIR.Results:1001 NOAR and 767 ESPOIR participants were included. In both cohorts, a four group trajectory model had the best fit (Figure). Two subgroups were identified in each cohort that demonstrated the hypothesised relationship: similar DAS28-2C but differing HAQ scores (red trajectories in Figure), titled “High HAQ” and “Low HAQ” (mean difference in HAQ over follow-up [95% confidence interval (CI)]: NOAR 0.76 [0.73, 0.80]; ESPOIR 0.89 [0.82, 0.96]). At baseline, the High HAQ groups in both NOAR and ESPOIR were older, had a higher proportion of women, and had higher levels of fatigue (NOAR: odds ratio [OR] 1.16 [95% CI 1.06, 1.28]; ESPOIR: OR 1.20 [95% CI 1.05, 1.36] [Table]) and pain (NOAR only).Table 1.Baseline characteristics / logistic regression analysisNOARESPOIRVariableLow HAQ trajectory, mean (SD)High HAQ trajectory, mean (SD)OR (95% CI)Low HAQ trajectory, mean (SD)High HAQ trajectory, mean (SD)OR (95% CI)N (%)343 (59%)239 (41%)-131 (55%)108 (45%)-Age, years54.9 (14.2)62.1 (13.8)1.07 (1.05, 1.08)47.8 (13.3)51.8 (11.2)1.04 (1.01, 1.06)Women, N (%)224 (65.3%)176 (73.6%)1.82 (1.12, 2.78)100 (76.3%)95 (88.0%)2.73 (1.20, 6.23)Symptom duration, months7.8 (5.1)8 (5.4)1.10 (0.98, 1.05)3.4 (1.8)3.6 (1.8)1.16 (0.98, 1.37)Current smoker, N (%)77 (22.4%)50 (20.9%)1.19 (0.71, 2.00)61 (46.6%)52 (48.1%)1.52 (0.82, 2.83)DAS28-2C3.14 (1.46)3.21 (1.56)-4.65 (1.31)4.41 (1.35)-HAQ0.8 (0.6)1.4 (0.5)-1.1 (0.6)1.6 (0.6)-Pain (0-10)3.7 (2.4)4.6 (2.5)1.16 (1.07, 1.26)4.1 (2.8)5.1 (2.6)1.07 (0.95, 1.20)Fatigue (0-10)4.3 (2.8)5.3 (2.5)1.16 (1.06, 1.28)5.0 (2.6)6.5 (2.5)1.20 (1.05, 1.36)AIMS anxiety3.99 (1.96)4.42 (1.99)1.06 (0.88, 1.29)4.9 (2.26)5.98 (2.25)1.10 (0.94, 1.29)AIMS depression2.85 (1.87)3.38 (1.87)1.10 (0.94, 1.29)3.96 (1.99)5.08 (2.32)1.12 (0.94, 1.33)RF+, N (%)142 (41.4%)106 (44.4%)0.94 (0.60, 1.46)79 (60.3%)50 (46.3%)0.77 (0.34, 1.75)Anti-CCP+, N (%)113 (32.9%)86 (36.0%)1.35 (0.84, 2.17)76 (58.0%)45 (41.7%)0.89 (0.39, 2.05)Conclusion:There is a group of people with RA with high levels of disability, despite low inflammation. These results underline the potential need for pain and fatigue management in people with RA, even when inflammation is low.References:[1]Hensor et al (2019). Rheumatology (Oxford) 58(8)Acknowledgements:Thanks to the participants of NOAR and ESPOIR and those working in the recruiting centresESPOIR Funding:An unrestricted grant from Merck Sharp and Dohme (MSD) was allocated for the first 5 years of the cohort study. Two additional grants from INSERM supported part of the biological database. The French Society of Rheumatology, Abbvie, Pfizer, Lilly and more recently Fresenius and Biogen supported the ESPOIR cohort study.Disclosure of Interests:James Gwinnutt Grant/research support from: Research grant from Bristol Myers Squibb unrelated to this project, Sam Norton Consultant of: Pfizer and AstraZeneca, Kimme Hyrich Consultant of: Abbvie, Grant/research support from: Pfizer and BMS, Mark Lunt: None declared, Bernard Combe: None declared, Nathalie Rincheval: None declared, Adeline Ruyssen-Witrand: None declared, Bruno Fautrel: None declared, Jacqueline Chipping: None declared, Alex MacGregor: None declared, Suzanne Verstappen: None declared

Historians of the Jacquerie have been divided in seeing it either as an unplanned explosion of peasant resentment or as an organized undertaking directed by urban rebels in Paris. These opposing conclusions are based on the illusory assumption that the revolt was a homogenous movement with a unitary purpose and fate. In fact, the Jacquerie was a constellation of many events that evolved over time and involved thousands of individuals in hundreds of places, who understood it in different and changing ways. The story of the Jacquerie is about how individuals reacted to a specific set of circumstances, how events both planned and accidental altered their course, and what and how they chose to remember (or to forget) in its aftermath.

Meaux and Mello have conventionally served to mark the end of the Jacquerie, but in fact, large contingents of Jacques survived and continued operations until at least the middle of July. What began as a social revolt in May developed over the summer into a social war. This chapter covers the commoners’ defeat of the nobles’ attack on the city of Senlis, which remained a rebel stronghold, unlike other urban allies of the Jacques. The discussion then moves to Champagne, where nobles taking vengeance for the Jacquerie after Meaux may have incited rebellion in a region that had not previously been implicated in the movement, and the villages of the southern Île-de-France, where the Parisians tried to create a new front in the war to divert the Dauphin’s troops away from Paris. Back in the Beauvaisis, Charles of Navarre took charge of the nobles’ ongoing efforts to suppress and punish the rebels. In Rouen and in places far distant from the Jacquerie’s heartlands, contemporaneous confrontations between nobles and non-nobles were identified with the rebellion and may have been inspired by it.

This chapter looks at the causes and methods behind the Jacquerie’s sudden emergence after 28 May. The massacre at Saint-Leu-d’Esserent was a watershed moment that enabled the rapid transformation of latent resentments into large-scale, violent rebellion. Due both to recent military developments and economic dislocation connected with the Black Death, rural commoners in northern France were experiencing a crisis of the ‘moral economy’ severe enough to make some of them undertake previously unimagined action. But immediate mobilization required previous preparation. As sociologists have demonstrated, rebellion is not a process that happens by chance even if it is made possible by opportunity. It appears that the Jacquerie’s leaders were able to take advantage of pre-existing efforts to ready the countryside’s defences, as well as social and professional networks among commoners in the Beauvaisis. By 31 May, the rebellion was sufficiently organized to capture a traitor and transfer him to a local captain elsewhere who carried out a public execution attended by hundreds of witnesses. The story of this ‘traitor’ is indicative of the kinds of relationships that facilitated the revolt’s almost instantaneous mobilization, as well as the individual and accidental trajectories that led people to join or to eschew the Jacquerie, and how their paths might change over time.

With this chapter, the book returns to a chronological structure, following the revolt from around 5 June, when Étienne Marcel’s army probably marched out of Paris to join the Jacques, to the rebels’ double defeats at Meaux and near Mello on 9–10 June. It follows the progress of the Parisian army from Saint-Denis toward Meaux and its leaders’ divisive efforts to punish the reformers’ enemies and to press villagers into service along the way. A new telling of the famous battle at Meaux, where a few dozen noblemen defeated hundreds of commoners, comprises the second section. The latter half of the chapter covers the Jacques’ defeat near Mello and Clermont at the hands of Charles of Navarre. It explains how the battle unfolded, as well as how Charles of Navarre came to be the fatal enemy of the Jacques despite being the ally of the Jacques’ allies in Paris and other cities. Here, again, it is demonstrated that the revolt’s participants had heterogenous, and sometimes conflicting, programmes and that their relationships and objectives shifted over time in response to changing events.

Focusing on the violent actions of the Jacques, this chapter shows that the revolt was directed against the nobility as a social group, rather than against the rebels’ lords. Although some chroniclers depicted the Jacques’ violence as inhumanely cruel, accusing them of indiscriminate killing of women and children and gruesome rapes, the judicial sources suggest a much less violent picture. While over two dozen nobles perished at the Jacques’ hands, they were almost exclusively adult men. There is almost no judicial evidence of rape, though given the near certainty of under-reporting, it cannot be ruled out. Property damages, especially the destruction of nobles’ houses and fortresses, was the primary objective of the Jacques’ violence. Some of this was directed against the Dauphin’s partisans, destroying their infrastructural advantage and diverting forces away from an assault on Paris. Some of it, perhaps especially later in the revolt, was directed against supporters of Navarre. But not all Jacques were united behind—or perhaps even aware of—these objectives, and there is evidence of disagreement amongst the rebels over targets and tactics. Much of the violence also had a dimension of social criticism linked to the nobility’s military failures and its members’ conspicuous consumption, and some of it had a festive element, involving dancing and dressing up.

This chapter opens with the background to the Hundred Years War preceding the French defeat and capture of King Jean II at the Battle of Poitiers in September 1356. The first section explains how that defeat fostered hatred of the nobility, and how that opprobrium was transmitted and amplified in learned and popular culture in the years preceding the Jacquerie. The next two sections follow the formation of Étienne Marcel and Robert le Coq’s reform party at the assembly of the Estates General in Paris, and the eventual triumph of their efforts with the Estates’ promulgation of a Grande ordonnance in March 1357. The reformers’ efforts to protect this victory from conservative Valois loyalists led them to make a dangerous alliance with King Charles II of Navarre, a sovereign king unamenable to outside control who possessed many soldiers and a claim to the French throne. Conflict over how to address military insecurity in the countryside to Paris’s west deepened the fissures between the reformers and the Dauphin’s noble councillors, leading Marcel to undertake a spectacularly violent solution.

The introduction traces the divide in scholars’ views of the Jacquerie as either a spasmodic explosion or a carefully directed movement, and sets forth the book’s understanding of the revolt as heterogenous and fluid. It introduces the main chronicle and documentary sources for the Jacquerie and discusses their interpretative difficulties, paying specific attention to the problems of retrospection, composition, and the over-representation of some kinds of rebels. The methodology adopted combines the analysis of collective data and the close reading of individual texts in order to tell a story about how individuals reacted to a specific set of circumstances, how events both planned and accidental altered their course, and what and how they chose to remember (or to forget) in its aftermath.

Although the sources only offer information about a relatively small number of individual rebels, it is possible to surmise a great deal about the rebels, their families, and their communities, as well as the pre-existing relationships that both made the revolt possible and contributed to its eventual failure. The Jacquerie could not have taken place without the support of the rebels’ families, especially their wives, for someone had to look after the livestock, the crops, and the children. This means that women were vital to the revolt, even though the sources only name a few female individuals. While a significant minority of Jacques were artisans (or at least had artisanal surnames), a much greater proportion farmed or tended vines for a living. There were, however, significant differences of education and fortune between the revolt’s leaders and its rank-and-file members, which may have contributed to tensions within the movement. Provincial towns, especially Senlis, Beauvais, and Amiens, provided support to the Jacques, but urban–rural cooperation nevertheless rested on major inequalities and belied mutual suspicion. Most cities’ support was ambivalent and melted away when the tide turned against the Jacques after their defeats at Mello-Clermont and Meaux.

This chapter begins with Marcel’s decision on 22 February 1358 to murder two noble marshals of the royal army in the Dauphin’s bedchamber. It follows the story through the consolidation of a noble faction in reaction to this shocking event and the Dauphin’s recruitment to their cause at a meeting of nobles at Provins in April. After this meeting, the Dauphin garrisoned the castles of Montereau and Meaux on the Rivers Yonne and Marne, allowing him to blockade the fluvial routes that supplied Paris from the south and east. With the west occupied by Anglo-Navarrese troops and freebooters, all parties turned their attention north, where the towns were closely allied with the reformers and where the Oise River remained the only shipping route to or from Paris. On the eve of the Jacquerie, the territory that would soon see the majority of rebellious action was the only area that remained in contest. A final meeting of the Estates, now dominated by noble Valois loyalists, was held, issuing an ordonnance on 14 May that departed significantly from the reformers’ programme, especially regarding fiscal and military matters. The next day, news of peace with England reached Paris, up-ending the political calculus. No sources report what happened in the fortnight before the Jacquerie broke out on 28 May, but that (probably deliberate) silence must mask considerable activity on all sides.

Far from an undirected mob action, the Jacquerie was steered by a hierarchical organization of leaders whose orders were communicated to the ‘rank and file’ at assemblies called for that purpose. While these leaders did employ coercion, they were also subject to it from the movement’s members and the movement was riven by disagreement about the use of violence and the possession of authority. The rebel’s supreme leader Guillaume Calle had a circle of close associates, and on the local level there were village captains, some of whom had their own subordinate assistants. Many of these leaders, including Calle, were men of substantial wealth and education and were often chosen by their communities rather than being imposed upon them. Massive assemblies, like the gathering that initiated the revolt itself, were vital to the movement’s communication and gave to it a grassroots character that sometimes conflicted with leaders’ wishes. The Jacquerie involved significant travel for many rebels, whose actions were coordinated by written messages, as well as non-verbal signals such as flags and bells. They were given food by those frightened of or sympathetic to the revolt, especially townspeople, whose participation in the revolt is further discussed in the next chapter.

Memories of revolt marked people for a generation afterward. When he came into his kingdom, Charles V built a miniature fortress at Vincennes. Walled around with defences and impossible to enter at speed or in number, this was not the old hunting-lodge of his Capetian forebears but a testament to his need for security. From his study window, he could see anything coming from Paris a long way off. In the countryside, some manors and castles lay in ruins for decades, still described as ‘destroyed at the time of the commotions’ nearly 20 years later....